

a)

$$\begin{array}{c}
 c = m^e \bmod n \\
 c^{dp} \bmod p \equiv (m^e \bmod n)^{dp} \bmod p \quad \Bigg| \quad c^{dq} \bmod q \equiv (m^e \bmod n)^{dq} \bmod q \\
 \text{let } x_p = (m^{ed \bmod (p-1)} \bmod n) \bmod p \quad \Bigg| \quad \text{let } x_q = (m^{ed \bmod (q-1)} \bmod n) \bmod q \\
 \hline
 \text{If } (ed - 1) \bmod \phi(n) = 0, ed \bmod \phi(n) = ed \bmod (p-1) = ed \bmod (q-1) = 1 \\
 \hline
 \begin{array}{cc}
 x_p = m \bmod n \bmod p & x_q = m \bmod n \bmod q \\
 = x_p \bmod p & = x_q \bmod q \\
 \text{as } n = pq \text{ and } m < n & \\
 x_p \bmod p = m \bmod n & x_q \bmod q = m \bmod n \\
 = m & = m
 \end{array} \\
 \text{Since both } x_p \bmod p \text{ and } x_q \bmod q = m. \quad x \equiv m. \\
 \text{Therefore, } c \text{ is the correct encryption of } M
 \end{array}$$

- b) The square-and-multiply algorithm has a time complexity of  $O(l^3)$  bit operations, from  $l$  squarings and  $l$  modular multiplications  
 With the above procedure, one reduces the size of the squarings and multiplications to  $p$  and  $q < l$ , before combining. The time complexity becomes  $O(l * p^2 q^2)$  which can be shorter than  $O(l^3)$  assuming  $p * q < l$
- c) The adversary can compare between message  $m$  and incorrect decryption  $x'$  to determine which portion corresponds to  $x^q \bmod q$ . From there,

$$\begin{aligned}
 x_{\text{correct}} &= x_q \bmod q = c^{d \bmod (q-1)} \bmod q \\
 x_c^e &= c^{ed \bmod (q-1)} \bmod q
 \end{aligned}$$

Since  $ed \bmod (q-1) = 1$ ,

$$x_c^e = c \bmod q$$

He can now determine  $q$  and  $p$  from the relation  $n = pq$

- d) use large capacitors as well in the machine to smooth any power spikes, with diodes to reduce the chance of reverse discharge. In fact, one should use a redundant power supply to prevent the machine from losing power halfway during calculations as well.

Discussed with Sean, Louis, Min Htet, Min Yue