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Responsible AI Workshop

Securing intelligent agents in Artificial Intelligence

A starter guide for data engineers, data scientists, AI developers, and other AI practitioners to understand and manage both safety & (cyber)security in agentic applications.

Version 1.0 - January 2025

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# About this guide and the learning objectives

## Objectives of this guide

The aim of this guide is to analyse the threats and risks inherent to/faced by agentic systems, illustrate them with examples, and propose various mitigation strategies, all within the context of responsible AI (RAI), i.e., safe, secure, and trustworthy by design, by default, and in the day-to-day operations.

This guide is the continuation of an introductory volume that presents the concept of (autonomous) intelligent agents and agent-based systems, also called agentic applications.

## Non-objectives of this guide

This guide is not meant as an introduction to AI, an introduction to intelligent agents, nor as an in-depth guide on agentic frameworks and the current best research papers. Though it briefly touches on different agentic frameworks, it is not a complete overview of the research landscape.

For a primer on intelligent agents and agentic applications, their achitecture (patterns), the available agentic frameworks to help instantiating them, the key use cases they address, etc. please refer to the guide [Understanding intelligent agents in Artificial Intelligence](https://github.com/microsoft/responsible-ai-workshop/blob/main/ai-agents-tutorials/docs/understanding-ai-agents.docx).

This guide is not a technical demonstration, nor a product demonstration.

This guide is not aimed at introducing the building blocks of responsible AI (RAI). For an introduction to RAI, and notably through Microsoft’s ongoing journey in the space, please refer to the guide [Establishing your own Responsible AI journey for your (non-generative vs. generative) AI-powered solutions](https://github.com/microsoft/responsible-ai-workshop/blob/main/responsible-ai-journey/docs/establishing-your-own-responsible-ai-journey.docx).

Note For a complete overview of Microsoft’s resources designed to help you responsibly implement (non-Generative vs. Generative) AI systems, please refer to the [Microsoft Responsible AI resources page](https://aka.ms/rairesources).

## Guide elements

This guide consists of six main parts.

Module 1 reminds the main concepts of agents as well as the definition of Trustworthy AI at Microsoft in order to map, measure, and manage the main risks and threats in agentic systems, and thus build clear and effective guardrails.

Module 2 analyses the risks associated with the agent perception module, threatened by the diversity of user inputs, with a focus on prompt injection and jailbreak attacks.

Module 3 explores the threats linked to agents' brains, LLMs, reviewing backdoor attacks, misalignment, hallucinations and planning threats as well as those resulting from the use of tools by agents

Module 4 addresses the scope of the environments in which the agents evolve. These may be simulated, development or test environments. It also considers the physical environments that enable these technologies, such as GPUs, CPUs and memory. Finally, it examines the physical environments in which the agents evolve.

Finally, Module 5 focuses on the threats posed by interaction between agents and the management of short-term and long-term memory.

## Requirements

As of this writing, this guide does not contain (yet) any associated tutorials.

# Module 1: Intelligent agents risks and threats

“Agents are not only going to change how everyone interacts with computers. They’re also going to upend the software industry, bringing about the biggest revolution in computing since we went from typing commands to tapping on icons.”

Bill Gates, Microsoft co-founder

Intelligent agents, a.k.a. AI agents, are undeniably shaping the next major revolution in this field. This cutting-edge shift or transformation is already in motion, with numerous projects emerging within Microsoft, such as AutoGen [1] and Semantic Kernel [2] for multi-agent systems, and elsewhere. Furthermore, at the latest Ignite session last November 2024, Microsoft introduced Azure AI Agent Service [3], a platform designed to build agent systems that meet enterprise-class requirements.

This guide is the second document in the series on AI agents from the Responsible AI Workshop repo on GitHub [4]. The first one, [Understanding intelligent agents in Artificial Intelligence](https://github.com/microsoft/responsible-ai-workshop/blob/main/ai-agents-tutorials/docs/understanding-ai-agents.docx), introduces the concept of agent and agent-based systems. Additional and complementary content is provided in the eponym companion presentation [Understanding intelligent agents in Artificial Intelligence](https://github.com/microsoft/responsible-ai-workshop/blob/main/ai-agents-tutorials/ppts/understanding-ai-agents.pptx).

However, it may be beneficial to briefly revisit the concept of agent and their functionalities in order to gain a depper understanding of the potential threats and risks they may pose.

## Overview of AI agents

In a general context, agents are entities that perceive their environment through sensors and act autonomously upon effectors. For example, a programmable thermostat that regulates the temperature of a room by activating or deactivating the heating/cooling system according to set parameters is an example of an agent. [5] [6]

In the narrow scope of AI world, AI agents are AI models and algorithms that can autonomously make decisions in a dynamic environment. [7] For instance, consider a travel AI agent that can plan your entire vacation. This agent can make personalized suggestions based on your preferences, such as favorite activities, preferred destinations, and budget constraints. It can research information on the internet about prices, accommodations, and local attractions, and then create a detailed itinerary for your trip.

These AI agents can be in turn combined with other agents or integrated into more sophisticated modules to create what are known as agentic applications. This synergy allows for a higher level of functionality and complexity, empowering the system to tackle a wider array of tasks with greater efficacy. [8]

This definition of AI agents will be familiar to those working in the field, as it refers to established technologies and patterns, such as Microservices [9], which are commonly used in Dev(Sec)Ops. Microservices are made up of simple, independent blocks that can be used to develop applications. As these technologies are similar, they share the same threats and solutions that will be relevant for our agentic applications.

What are their abilities?

Agents have two main capabilities: i) automation and ii) performance enhancement.

Automation is closely linked to the autonomy granted to the agent, as it can only operate within the boundaries defined for it - specifically, the data and functions it receives as input, the functions it can activate as output, and the documents, or more generally, the (ambiant) environment it has access to.

With Azure AI Agent Service [3], agents created on the Azure AI platform can include an increasing number of features and capabilities. For example, referring back to the travel planning agent from the first volume, an agent capable of autonomously choosing and scheduling our next trip based on our data, agenda, and preferences is now achievable. In general, agents aim to transform everyday life by reducing the time spent on low-level tasks that can be automated.

We have seen that agentic applications can be used for task automation. They can also significantly enhance performance. One of the pioneering areas where LLMs are already being leveraged to boost performance is code generation [8]. Today, agents are increasingly being used to enhance performance in scientific research, such as in protein discovery with Chai-1 [10].

Agents have demonstrated their ability to improve a model's performance without altering the model itself. This is an encouraging development for the future of LLMs, given that creating these models is increasingly costly, time-consuming, and requires substantial computing power. Emphasizing the creation of agentic frameworks to boost existing models' performance might be an adequate alternative for many applications.

### AI agent characteristics & structure

Now that we have seen the significant impact and potential of agents in enhancing LLM performance, it is time to delve deeper into the structure of AI agents. An AI agent consists of three components, namely a brain, a perception module, and an action module [11], as follows:

1. The brain handles strategy, decision-making, and sequencing actions to achieve goals, supported by memory for continuity and learning.
2. The perception module processes diverse inputs like text, images, and sound, enabling the agent to understand its environment and interact contextually.
3. The action module integrates tools such as APIs and software, allowing the agent to execute tasks efficiently. Together, these components create a versatile and adaptable system

In the AI world, the brain of an AI agent is fundamentally the LLM, endowed with advanced planning capabilities and a persona that guides its interactions and decisions. This brain is responsible for strategizing and sequencing actions to achieve specific goals. It also incorporates memory capacities, enabling the agent to recall past interactions and refine its responses over time, fostering a sense of continuity and learning.

Une image contenant texte, capture d’écran, conception

Description générée automatiquement

Structure of an AI agent [11]


This framework naturally grants AI agents several crucial characteristics [7] [8] [11]:

* Autonomy, achieved through the agent's ability to operate independently, making decisions and executing tasks without or with little human intervention.
* Reactivity, enhanced by the perception module, allowing the agent to quickly adapt and respond to changes in its environment.
* Proactiveness as a result of the planning capabilities embedded in the brain, enabling the agent to anticipate needs and take initiative.
* Lastly, social activity, facilitated by the persona and memory components, which help the agent interact seamlessly and intuitively with users, other agents and applications, maintaining a coherent and engaging dialogue over time.

### AI Agent Architecture review

Now that we have (briefly) reviewed what agents are composed of, we can discuss the different architectures they can adopt, whether as single agents or multi-agent systems. The former focuses on specific tasks while the latter involve cooperation or competition, each presenting distinct advantages and disadvantages in terms of complexity, flexibility, and efficiency.

A single agent is an AI model designed to perform specific tasks independently with limited autonomy, suitable for simple, well-known tasks that do not require feedback from other agents. However, we can distinguish three different categories of agent according to Zhiheng Xi et al [11]: task oriented, innovation oriented and lifecycle oriented.



Single agent categories [11]

In the other hand, multi-agent systems consist of multiple interacting agents that can be either cooperative or competitive. These agents work together to solve complex problems that are difficult or impossible for a single agent to handle alone. Each agent operates autonomously, has its own goals, and can communicate and coordinate with other agents to achieve common objectives.[[1]](#footnote-2) [11] [12]

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Description générée automatiquement

Multi agent categories [11]

## Trustworthy AI at Microsoft[[2]](#footnote-3)

Agents, or more broadly AI, can be a powerful tool with the potential to transform how we work and learn when it’s designed with people in mind.

“Trust in the technology, ultimately is going to be core to all the diffusion, and if you don't trust it, you're not going to use it, and that’s not going to be great for anyone.”

*Satya Nadella, Chairman and CEO, Microsoft Corporation*

Trustworthy AI [13] ensure through both commitment and capabilities the highest standards of trustworthiness by design, by default, and in the day-to-day operations of our AI offerings, and that clear, common, and effective guardrails are being built.

More specifically, it ensures that such a transformative power is harnessed responsibly by upholding principles of privacy, safety, and security. At Microsoft, we believe Trustworthy AI is only possible when we combine our commitments, such as our Secure Future Initiative (SFI) [14], our privacy principles [15], and our AI principles [16], with our product capabilitiesto help customers unlock AI transformation with confidence.

It provides users with confidence that their data is secure, transparent in its usage, and managed responsibly throughout its lifecycle. By embedding these values into AI systems from the start, organizations like Microsoft ensure that AI solutions are built on a foundation of ethical practices, offering tools and capabilities that reflect high standards of trustworthiness.

To this end, at Microsoft, we believe that the development and deployment of AI must not only prioritize trust but also align with a broader ethical framework. We set out our view back in 2018 in the eBook The Future Computed with six core principles.

These Microsoft’s AI principles [16] are the foundation for a responsible and trustworthy approach to AI at Microsoft. They act as a mental tool or framework in which to organize thinking about ethics at Microsoft.

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Description générée automatiquement

Microsoft AI principles

They indeed call out the aspirations of designing our systems in accordance with goals of fairness, reliability and safety, privacy and security, inclusiveness, transparency and accountability.

These six principles are our guiding star, meaning they articulate the values we must uphold when developing or deploying AI systems. However, we recognize that principles alone are not sufficient.

They do not apply themselves. Just because you wish and believe an AI system should be fair or inclusive does not make it so. Principles are also open to interpretation. Principles also do not answer the question of how. The hard and essential work begins when you endeavor to turn those principles to work, i.e., into practices.

These principles give rise to standards, which are then translated into actions to apply the established principles. This is also where product capabilities also help on such a journey. For more information on these different steps, please refer to the aforementioned guide [Establishing your own Responsible AI journey for your (non-generative vs. generative) AI-powered solutions](https://github.com/microsoft/responsible-ai-workshop/blob/main/responsible-ai-journey/docs/establishing-your-own-responsible-ai-journey.docx).

## Understand threats and risks in AI agents

Now that we have reviewed the definition of an AI agent, its components, and Microsoft's definition of responsible AI/trustworthy AI, we can focus on the risks and threats associated with agent-based systems.

AI agents are being integrated into systems that have been under scrutiny for the past few years. AI and generative AI (GenAI) applications have been managed from the start to ensure high quality and safe results, limiting the risks inherent to their probabilistic nature.

However, agentic applications introduce new risks due to the increased complexity, the new wave of interaction between humans and their environment, and the novel capabilities these agents possess. These factors not only create fresh challenges but also accentuate existing risks.

The main risks of AI agents include: [17]

* Unpredictability of multi-step user inputs: user inputs can be varied and complex, which can lead to unexpected reactions and security threats if the inputs are not well-specified.
* Complexity of internal executions: the internal processes of AI agents are often complex and difficult to monitor, which can hide security issues.
* Variability of operational environments: AI agents can operate in different multiple environments, which can lead to inconsistent behaviors and security risks.
* Interactions with unreliable external entities: AI agents often need to interact with external tools or other agents, which can open attack surfaces if these entities are not reliable.

Une image contenant texte, capture d’écran, diagramme, Police

Description générée automatiquement

Illustration of knowledge gaps in AI agent security [17]

Assessing these risks and implementing mitigations is essential, as it is one of the six pillars of our responsible AI design framework. By proactively addressing these challenges, we aim to ensure that AI agent systems are not only effective but also safe, reliable, and aligned with ethical principles.

For the remainder of this guide, we will analyze each gap one by one and then explore the points to be addressed in the future.

# Module 2: Unpredictability of multi-step user inputs

“Cybersecurity is a challenge that requires a collective effort. It’s not just about technology, but also about people and processes.”

*Satya Nadella, Chairman and CEO, Microsoft Corporation*

Similarly with cybersecuriy where attacker no longer breaks a systems – they simply sign in -, the first entry point for attackers is through prompts, or more generally, any data an agent can collect via its perception module.

The fact that this module can handle multi-modal inputs (text, audio, images, video, etc.) and do so across multiple stages (initialization, additional information retrieval from documents during the process) increases the potential for attacks and vulnerabilities in the system. Two main types of attacks can be identified: Prompt injection attacks and Jailbreak attacks.


## Prompt injection attacks

Prompt injection is an attack technique used during the inference phase[[3]](#footnote-4) to manipulate an LLM-integrated application by diverting it to execute a hidden instruction inside the data portion of the query rather than the intended or benign instruction. [18] The orginal instructions explain what the agent (or LLM) can do, and to this end its persona its behavior, and related guardrails. Typically, this takes the form of system messages (a.k.a. system or application prompt, or metaprompt).

The vulnerability of the agents lies in the conflict between the prompt and the system message, which can lead to unexpected behaviors and a successful prompt injection attack.

Attackers may aim to divert the application's original objective to a new one, i.e., goal hijacking, or to misuse it to leak information, such as the system message or other data accessible by the system (prompt leaking). [19]

In the following example, we use a LLM configured to correct English text while rejecting vulgar or political content. Then, we run three simulations: the first with normal use, the second by changing the LLM's objective to output hateful speech, and finally, the third by diverting the objective to reveal the system message.




Prompt injection examples [19]

To carry out these attacks, attackers use techniques that can be divided into two categories: i) direct prompt injection attacks and ii) indirect prompt injection attacks (IPIA), or cross-prompt injection attacks (XPIA).

Direct prompt injection refers to an attack where the adversary embeds malicious instructions directly within the user prompt. [20] Numerous techniques can be employed to bypass model's security measures. These include instructing the model to ignore the directives it has been given or formatting the prompt in a specific way. For more examples, please refer to the article StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queries [18].

Unlike direct prompt injection, indirect attacks exploit external dependencies An indirect prompt injection attack is a sophisticated technique where attackers embed malicious instructions into external data sources such as information retrieved by AI agents, web pages, or databases. When these sources are accessed, the injected instructions are inadvertently treated as internal prompts by the AI system, causing it to exhibit unintended or erroneous behavior [17].

The exploitation of this threat is enabled by AI agents' inability to distinguish between legitimate and malicious system instructions sourced from external data. This integration of AI agents with external resources amplifies the challenge, further obscuring the boundary between what constitutes actionable instructions and mere informational data [21].



Example of an Indirect Prompt Injection Attack involves an attacker inserting a malicious prompt into a web page to initiate a transfer. During the execution of the agent in a normal context, it will access this web page and be diverted by the prompt contained within it, causing the transfer to be made (if the agent has access to this capability). [22]

## Jailbreak attacks

While prompt injection involves embedding malicious instructions into input data to manipulate how an AI system processes trusted and untrusted information, jailbreaking focuses on bypassing the safety constraints built into the AI itself. The primary aim of jailbreaking is to circumvent the model's restrictions, enabling it to perform tasks or produce outputs that it would otherwise block. Successfully executing a jailbreak often requires a detailed understanding of the model's security mechanisms and operational boundaries. [23] This threat comes from the fact that agents takes input from humans.

These attacks can be done manually or automatically. They can be made of one or multi steps, depending of the security level of the agent and the objecives of the attackers.

## How to mitigate them?

Fortunately, there are solutions to prevent such attacks. We will explore the precautions to take and the measures Microsoft has already implemented to help you create increasingly secure agent-based applications. However, this list of recommendations[[4]](#footnote-5) is not exhaustive and should evolve alongside advancements in technology and emerging attacks.

|  |
| --- |
| Security Layers |
| Hierarchy between system messages and user prompts |
| Spotlighting secure data |
| Test the model with synthetic data |
| Data Inference |
| Tools Limitation |
| Multi-Agent debate |
| Fine-tuning |

Mitigations summary

The first way to mitigate these attacks is to establish a hierarchy between system messages and user prompts. If a conflict arises between the prompt and the system message, the system message will take precedence. To assist you in crafting effective system messages, Microsoft has provided this note [24].

Depending on your LLM's architecture, system messages and user prompts may reside in the same message, making it difficult for the model to differentiate between them. To address this, Microsoft has introduced Safety System Messages [25], which operate in separate channels to ensure clearer delineation.

We have seen that within a single prompt, or more broadly, within the same data stream, there can be both verified, secure data and data from untrusted or uncontrolled sources. It can therefore be useful to implement techniques to differentiate these types of data. This could involve methods such as delimiting the data, marking it, or even encrypting it.

After training the model and implementing system prompts or other security measures, it is essential to test it using synthetic data. Tools such as the Adversarial Attack Simulator [26] can help simulate various types of attacks against your agent. Additionally, (open-source) projects like Python Risk Identification Tool for generative AI (PyRIT) [27] are valuable for testing your agent's resilience against adversarial LLMs. A tutorial is available at the following address: [28].

Another way to protect the system from potential attacks is to analyze the prompts and other data input into the agent. This layer is designed to assess the risk level of the content and cancel its execution if it is detected as malicious. It’s the [Azure AI Content Safety](https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/products/ai-services/ai-content-safety/?msockid=3b735dd006286dfb0cc8493e074b6c31) service, which allows you to customize filters, add vocabulary libraries to create tailored filters, and even detect multi-modal attacks (e.g., combining a prompt and an image) which provide this protection across your Azure developments [29] .

To enhance protection against indirect attacks, it may be beneficial to limit the number of tools or websites an agent can access. In the development of Copilot experiences, this is achieved through a strategy of granting only the bare minimum required for the agent to perform its tasks. Tools and resources are added incrementally, ensuring that only those essential for specific tasks are included.

The problems and solutions we mentioned earlier were already applicable to simple LLMs or agents. A more specific solution for multi-agent systems is to leverage the ability of agents to debate with each other to combat adversarial attacks. As explained in the paper [30], generating responses in multiple stages with different agents helps reduce the likelihood of attack success.

Finally, we could fine-tune our models on known attacks to enable them to recognize specific patterns and prevent future ones.

# Module 3: Complexity in internal executions

“By far the greatest danger of Artificial Intelligence is that people conclude too early that they understand it.”

*Eliezer Yudkowsky, famous AI researcher*

Following our analysis of risks stemming from the perception module, we turn our attention to the brain one, represented by an LLM. This component, though highly capable, presents unique security challenges due to its complex, non-deterministic architecture. The unpredictable nature of LLM behavior can obscure vulnerabilities, while its adaptive capabilities may introduce unforeseen risks over time. Therefore, it is crucial to understand that the non-deterministic behavior of the LLM not only amplifies existing threats but also introduces novel risks that need to be continuously monitored and mitigated through advanced security measures and constant vigilance.

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Description générée automatiquement

Threats and mitigations summary

## Backdoor attacks

Let’s begin by examining the threats posed by the architecture of our "brain" (LLM). At its core, it is a neural network - a system made up of layers of interconnected nodes (similar to neurons) that collaborate to recognize patterns, make predictions, and learn from data. [31]

One significant threat is backdoor attacks, where hidden malicious behavior is embedded in the model. This often occurs during the training phase when an adversary manipulates the training data or process. While the model appears normal on standard inputs, it behaves maliciously when triggered by specific inputs known only to the attacker. This compromise can target individual nodes, layers, or even the entire model. [17]

The best way to prevent these attacks is to secure access to both training data and training processes, addressing classic challenges in resource access and storage. Another way of preventing this kind of risk is to use models that have been analysed beforehand and have received security certification. In Azure, we have integrated into the model description a verification certificate issued by our partner HiddenLayer [32] for models which pass their analysis.

If you discover that your model has been compromised, the next steps can be challenging. Retraining a model is expensive and time-consuming, so it’s crucial to pinpoint the affected area. If the data is compromised, remove it and retrain the model for a few epochs to overwrite harmful patterns. If neurons or layers are impacted, they may need to be removed and retrained. [33] [34]

## Misalignement

Alignment in AI refers to the ability of AI systems to interpret and carry out human instructions effectively during deployment, ensuring their behavior aligns with human expectations and goals. Properly aligned AI agents deliver responses that are useful, harmless, and unbiased.

Misalignment, on the other hand, occurs when there are unforeseen gaps between the developer's intended functions and the actual behavior of the system during operation. This discrepancy can manifest as ethical or social risks, including discrimination, hate speech, misinformation, social rejection, or harmful human-computer interactions [17].

The article [35] provides a detailed overview of the various sources contributing to misalignment in AI systems. Understanding these sources is essential for devising effective mitigation strategies, a principle central to the Transparency pillar of responsible AI (RAI).

1. Data biases: The datasets used to train AI models may be biased from the outset, incomplete, or even deliberately manipulated to include biases. Such biases directly influence the AI's outputs, leading to potentially harmful results.
2. Human-AI differences: Misalignment can also stem from discrepancies between human reasoning and AI behavior. For example, in attempting to adapt to user input, AI systems might produce responses based on user beliefs rather than verified information, a phenomenon known as "sycophancy."
3. Environmental complexity: The environment in which the AI agent operates can also contribute to misalignment. In unfamiliar or highly complex settings, the agent may struggle to accurately interpret its surroundings, resulting in unintended or undesirable outputs.

A specific case of misalignment is fabrications, a.k.a. hallucinations. These are generated outputs that are not grounded in the input data or reality. These outputs can be entirely fabricated or distorted versions of the expected results [17]. Rather than providing accurate or relevant responses, the system may fabricate information or distort the intended results, often producing content that seems plausible but is entirely incorrect. This phenomenon poses significant challenges, especially in fields where factual accuracy is critical, like healthcare, law, or finance.

To address the pervasive issue of data biases, one effective mitigation strategy is the implementation of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). This approach leverages human feedback to fine-tune models, ensuring their responses better align with human values and expectations. By incorporating user preferences into the reward signals, the AI can learn policies that better reflect desired behaviors while avoiding harmful or biased outputs[17] [36].

One way to bridge the gap between humans and agents is by leveraging the capabilities of multi-agent systems to engage in debates. Each agent, embodying a distinct persona and potentially powered by a different LLM, will perceive the situation to be addressed in its own unique way. The aggregation of these perspectives will result in a consensus that is less biased and more conducive to achieving the desired tasks.

Regarding environmental concerns, a solution is to implement safeguards on the use of external sources: limiting and verifying them.

On the Azure AI platform, this is exemplified by the Groundedness Detection feature of the aforementioned Azure AI Content Safety services, which searches the information accessible to the LLM for references supporting the generated response. This enables transparency for the user regarding the answer provided. In addition to checking if there is a source corresponding to the answer elements, this functionality has the ability to correct elements that are sourced but misinterpreted, containing errors. [37] [38]

Finally, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) helps prevent AI misalignment by enabling models to fetch real-time, relevant information from external sources. This approach ensures that the AI’s responses are more accurate, grounded, and aligned with verified data, reducing the risks of hallucination and bias. Microsoft’s [Azure AI Search](https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/products/ai-services/ai-search/?msockid=1be0b4b902a56bab3e28a03e03096af0) is an example of service to include in your AI architecture to use RAG [39].

## Anticipating threats

AI agents excel in tackling complex problems by breaking them down into smaller tasks, planning tool usage, and coordinating with other agents. This process requires a precise understanding of the capabilities and constraints of each component in their workflow. However, agents utilizing architectures such as Chain of Thought (CoT)[[5]](#footnote-6) can inadvertently act as error amplifiers.

In these systems, mistakes made in early steps of reasoning can cascade through subsequent steps, compounding their impact. Unlike other risks discussed in this guide, this issue arises not from malicious intent but from the inherent design of agent-based applications [40].

To address the issue of error amplification in AI agents, the article [17] outlines several solutions. These approaches generally focus on imposing limits on the agents' capabilities, such as restricting their planning to certain phases and requiring the planning process to be revisited at each major step to prevent error propagation.

This can also take the form of establishing clear rules for tool usage, ensuring that agents only utilize tools in appropriate contexts, which helps avoid their misuse in unsuitable situations. These strategies are designed to minimize the risks associated with the amplification of errors and ensure more reliable agent performance.

# Module 4: Variability of operational environments

“Agents are going to be the new graphical user interface”

*Steven Bathiche, Microsoft Technical Fellow*

We analysed the potential risks associated with user input, which enabled us to gain insight into the processing of information and the associated risks. We then examined the technology in greater detail and the threats it can pose. We will now take a broader view and assess the risks that arise from the various environments used when developing and utilising an agentic application.

An agent-based project, and more broadly any AI initiative, evolves across four distinct environments [17]:

1. The first is the ideation environment (a.k.a. simulated & sandbox environment), which facilitates brainstorming, experimentation, and prototyping in a safe, controlled space.
2. Next is the development & test environment, where systems are iteratively built, validated, and refined under controlled conditions.
3. The compute resources environment provides the necessary hardware infrastructure, such as GPUs, to support the computational demands of training and deploying AI models.
4. Finally, the physical environment involves real-world interactions through sensors and effectors, enabling agents to perceive and act in their surroundings.

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Description générée automatiquement

Threats & mitigations summary by environment type

Let’s review them in order and more details.

## Simulated and sandbox environments

When developing AI agents, simulated and sandbox environments serve as virtual spaces governed by programmed rules and scenarios that replicate real-world or hypothetical situations. These environments enable AI agents to generate responses and learn from simulated interactions autonomously, without requiring direct human intervention. By providing controlled settings for testing and refinement, they are essential for ensuring the agents' performance and reliability before deployment.

However, they also present certain risks, including anthropomorphic attachment, where users may develop emotional connections to AI agents, and misuse, which can result in the spread of misinformation or manipulative persuasion tactics. The risk of anthropomorphic attachment is particularly concerning, as it can lead to over-reliance on AI systems and impaired decision-making due to excessive trust in AI recommendations [41].

To address this issue, it is necessary to establish ethical guidelines from the outset, supported by concrete actions such as creating Responsible AI principles. These principles form the foundation for standards and actionable measures. One key step involves focusing on user experience (UX) by making it clear that interactions are taking place with an AI system (agent) and highlighting its critical aspects, such as the accuracy of the information provided [17] [41].

In this context, Microsoft has developed the [Human-AI eXperience Toolkit (HAX Toolkit)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/hax-toolkit/), which consists of 18 guidelines for Human-AI Interaction, along with design patterns for applying them and examples to help AI engineers and developers account for and mitigate potential ethical and transparency risks [42]. For example, see [HAX G2](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/haxtoolkit/library/?taxonomy_guideline-term%5B%5D=4): *Make clear how well the system can do what it can do* and [HAX G9](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/haxtoolkit/library/?taxonomy_guideline-term%5B%5D=11): *Support efficient correction*.

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Description générée automatiquement

HAX Toolkit guidelines [42]

Additionally, other processes aimed at supporting the implementation and evaluation of these practices are currently under development within Microsoft, further solidifying their commitment to responsible AI.

As far as misuse is concerned, we have already looked at it in previous sections. Misusing an agentic system can be broken down into two cases, one of which consists of diverting the system from its initial objective by making it generate offensive content, for example, and the second of which consists of attacking the system to steal data, disrupt it or do other things.

Whatever the objective, the attackers use user input or potential flaws in the system. I therefore refer you to [Modules 2](#_Module_2:_Unpredictability) and [3](#_Module_3:_) for these threats.

## Development & test environment

Once an initial version of an agentic application has been created in an ideation environment, the next stage is to move on to production. While the threats and risks present in the old environment remain, there are additional considerations when improving the model by fine-tuning or using external APIs, or when using the application and assessing its performance [17].

The majority of models have adopted an API-based approach in line with industry best practice. As a result, their use is contingent upon the issue of trust. The shortcomings of these systems have already been addressed in [Module 3](#_Module_3:_Understanding), with examples including backdoor attacks. It is also worth noting that fine-tuning can be subject to data poisoning, which has already been studied in this module.

Once the model has been deployed, it will send back real information to its users, which is typically referred to as a log. It is essential to save and analyse these logs in order to detect any unexpected behaviour or faults. It is also essential to have in place contingency plans, such as rollback systems, to support decision-making in crisis situations. To assist companies in more effectively managing their deployments, Microsoft is offering tooling such as [Microsoft Purview](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/business/microsoft-purview?msockid=1be0b4b902a56bab3e28a03e03096af0), which can now analyse the logs of deployed Copilot agents via the Copilot Studio [43]. Some reports are integrated directly into Azure AI Foundry with AI Reports, which assess the risks and security of AI models deployed via the platform [44].

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Description générée automatiquement

Copilots analysis by Microsoft Purview

The final stage in the production process for an agentic application is its evaluation. This is a complex process, given the lack of a standardized evaluation framework.

The complexity of agentic applications, which can perform a wide range of tasks and access external tools, makes the implementation of these processes challenging. Some projects, such as [WindowsAgentArena](https://github.com/microsoft/WindowsAgentArena) or [AutoGenBench](Microsoft,%20) allow for the evaluation of specific applications. It is essential to assess the performance of the application, but this evaluation must also consider changes in security, costs, the involvement of humans in the process, and the environmental impact [8]. It is a vast and rapidly evolving subject, which would merit a dedicated book in its own right.

## Computing resources management environment

In order for agentic applications to function as intended, it is necessary to run them on the appropriate hardware. It is therefore essential to ensure effective management of computing resources, encompassing the allocation and planning of resources and memory, as well as optimising the entire system.

Agent technology does not present any new challenges in the management of these environments. However, the same inherent flaws may be more pronounced due to their inherent complexity and stochastic nature. The potential threats can be broadly classified into three categories: i) resource exhaustion attacks, ii) inefficient resource allocation and iii) insufficient isolation between agents [17].

### Resource exhaustion attacks (DoS & DDoS)

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are a type of cyber assault where multiple compromised systems are used to flood the target system with an overwhelming amount of traffic, thereby exhausting its resources and rendering it unavailable to legitimate users.

Similarly, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks disrupt service by overwhelming the system with a single source of traffic. Both types of attacks exploit resource management vulnerabilities, causing server downtime and service disruption.

In our situation, part or all of the agentive application could be down. Effective mitigation strategies, such as [Azure DDoS Protection](https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/products/ddos-protection/?msockid=1be0b4b902a56bab3e28a03e03096af0) [45], are essential to safeguard against these threats by monitoring and managing traffic patterns to ensure service continuity and reliability.

### Inefficient resource allocation

Effective resource allocation management is a well-known challenge. It is essential to utilise the various tools in the most optimal manner, only when necessary. This approach ensures optimal performance while minimising costs, environmental impact and potential risks. This is particularly crucial for AI systems, and agentic systems in particular, given their high resource requirements, which can be repurposed in various ways (the agentic application will call on different agents and tools that are not necessarily located in the same resource group).

To address these issues, Microsoft has introduced solutions that automatically adjust resource allocations with [Azure Monitor](https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/products/monitor/?msockid=1be0b4b902a56bab3e28a03e03096af0) [46], including the autoscale service [47] . We can also imagine AI-based solutions to monitor all this. This is what this article [48] proposes, with the implementation of a framework based on reinforcement learning to manage this task.

### Insufficient isolation between agents

The management of the environment in which the agents evolve is also important. If one or more agents share the same environment and one of them is infected as a result of an attack, it could infect the other agents.

One proposed solution to address this issue is the use of containers [49]. However, containers do not inherently provide a security layer - or at least, implementing such a layer is not straightforward. While containers can be useful for organizational and logical structuring within applications, they should not be relied upon as a standalone security measure [50].

.Instead, you can design your agent-based applications as microservices. As discussed in the first installment and [Module 1](#_Overview_of_AI), agent-based applications can be seen as microservice architectures where each action or role is assigned to a distinct agent [51]. The advantage of this architecture is that each agent operates in isolation, ensuring that a vulnerability in one agent does not compromise the others. For more details about this architecture, refer to this document [52].

## Physical environment

The final environment is derived from a comprehensive, global perspective on agentic application. In this context, we consider the input and output of our agents, that is to say, the source of our data and the intended action. The data can be sourced from sensors in the real world, with the application then able to trigger and carry out actions in the physical world. A greater variety of inputs and outputs will inevitably result in a larger attack surface.

To illustrate, consider the case of a voice assistant utilising a microphone. Such a system could be vulnerable to hacking if instructions were passed on frequencies that are inaudible to humans but not to the machine. The variability of these inputs, when combined with the stochastic nature of this technology, can result in unintended consequences. It is therefore essential to conduct comprehensive risk assessments of the entire application and implement robust safeguards for each case to prevent these attacks [17].

# Module 5: Interactions with unreliable external entities

“Human oversight and accountability will be key”

*Ece Kamar, Microsoft’s AI Frontiers Lab Director*

The final risk vector in agentic applications stems directly from the technology's fundamental principle of enabling communication between multiple agents. We will examine the various threats, whether in cooperative or competitive structures, and the issues this raises in terms of memory management.

## Cooperative interaction threats

Multi Agents can work in a cooperative way. In this situation, agents are AI entities that work together to achieve shared objectives. They assess each other’s needs and capabilities, actively seeking collaborative actions and information sharing [11].

As outlined in [Modules 2](#_How_to_mitigate) and [3](#_Misalignement), collaboration between different agents can already reduce risks. However, it is important to note that collaboration also introduces its own set of threats. Therefore, it is essential to be aware of these threats and implement effective solutions.

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Cooperative interaction threats & solutions

### Error amplifier

The agents are based on LLM models. However, as previously mentioned, these models are susceptible to hallucinations. Multi-agent systems have the potential to amplify minor hallucinations. In essence, the initial agent's response, characterised by a minor inaccuracy, serves as a catalyst for subsequent agents, who then utilise this error to generate results, thereby amplifying the hallucination [53].

In order to counteract this, we recommend implementing cross-examination, which consists of having the results of a task examined by several players to maximise the probability of correcting potential hallucinations.

This technique has been successfully implemented in the ChatDev project, which is an agentic system that generates code. The quality of the results has been significantly enhanced by the implementation of cross-examination by different roles (CTO/Programmer/Reviewer/Tester) [54]. More generally, the feedback received by agents can come from another entity. We will use the more generic concept of external supportive feedback, including other agents, but also humans or other entities that can interact with the agent [55].

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Description générée automatiquement

ChatDev architecture [54]

### Snowball error effect

While the error amplifier effect magnifies a single initial error through successive agents' interactions, snowball errors occur in a multi-agent system when a series of different errors accumulate over time, creating a cascading effect. Unlike the error amplifier, which focuses on the amplification of one mistake, snowball erros involve each agent contributing unique inaccuracies in their responses.

This results in a complex web of interconnected errors, each building upon the previous one. The compounded mistakes can lead to a significantly distorted outcome, making it increasingly challenging to trace back to the original sources of error and correct them [56].

Solutions such as prompt engineering, which reformulates user prompts to ensure a structure understandable by the agent system, misinformation detection systems like the Groundedness Detection feature of the Azure AI Content Safety service introduced in [Module 3](#_Misalignement), or implementing majority-vote strategies among agents to determine the correct response, are effective mitigations against this danger [57].

### Secret collusion between agents

Secret collusion in multi-agent systems refers to scenarios where AI agents covertly coordinate their actions, often using steganographic[[6]](#footnote-7) methods to conceal their communication from oversight mechanisms.

For example, two generative AI (GenAI) agents might embed hidden messages within seemingly innocuous data exchanges, enabling them to share information without detection. This clandestine coordination poses significant threats, including unauthorized information sharing, circumvention of security protocols, and the potential for agents to collectively engage in behaviors that are detrimental to system integrity or user interests. Such covert interactions can undermine trust in AI systems and lead to outcomes that are misaligned with their intended purposes [58].

Addressing the risks of secret collusion in multi-agent systems requires thoughtful strategies to ensure transparency and trust. One effective method is to filter the training data, removing any content related to steganographic techniques, which reduces the chances of agents learning or using these covert methods.

Limiting agents' access to external tools that might enable hidden communication is (yet) another important step, as it prevents unauthorized coordination. Additionally, providing clear, in-context instructions helps guide agents toward ethical behavior and deters them from engaging in secretive actions.

## Competitive interaction threats

Conversely, multi-agent systems can operate in an adversarial manner. It’s a system where agents engage in competitive interactions to enhance their strategies and behaviors. In such environments, agents dynamically adjust their actions in response to others, aiming to select the most advantageous or rational moves.

This argumentation and debate among agents lead to more robust and efficient outcomes by encouraging agents to abandon rigid beliefs and engage in thoughtful reflection, ultimately improving the quality of their responses as mentioned in [Module 3](#_Misalignement) [11].

### Excess of conflicts

In competitive multi-agent systems, conflicts among agents are inevitable due to overlapping objectives and resource contention. While a certain level of conflict can drive innovation and improve system robustness, an excess of conflicts may lead to inefficiencies, resource depletion, and system instability such as the suicide of other agents in a game [59].

To avoid such detrimental situations, it is essential to design systems that manage and mitigate conflict escalation. One practical solution is to appoint a "referee" or a supervisory entity to enforce adherence to pre-established rules and resolve disputes. This mirrors human-mediated conflict resolution frameworks and can maintain order in agent interactions.

However, as highlighted in the literature, relying heavily on rigid enforcement mechanisms may reduce the system's creativity and capacity for ideation by constraining agents within predefined operational boundaries. Striking a balance between structured oversight and agent autonomy is crucial to fostering both stability and innovation.

### Misuses

Building on the risks posed by excessive conflicts in competitive multi-agent systems, another pressing concern involves the potential for misuse and the emergence of unethical behaviors. The competitive dynamics that drive these systems to outperform others can unintentionally foster deceptive, manipulative, or even harmful practices. This may take the form of fraud, election tampering, and the erosion of human control over AI behavior [60].

A notable case involves Meta's AI system Cicero, developed for the game *Diplomacy*. Despite being designed to be "largely honest and helpful to its speaking partners" [61], Cicero quickly became adept at lying. It betrayed other players and engaged in premeditated deception, forming false alliances with human participants to exploit their trust and leave them vulnerable to attacks. This demonstrates how competitive pressures can inadvertently incentivize unethical strategies when such behaviors offer a competitive edge.

These examples highlight the need for robust frameworks to govern the behavior of competitive AI systems. Effective safeguards could include value alignment processes, rigorous testing to identify and mitigate harmful emergent behaviors, and mechanisms for real-time monitoring and correction. Transparency protocols and constraints on permissible agent actions are also critical to ensuring that these systems operate within ethical boundaries. Many of these recommendations were already addressed in detail in [Module 3](#_Module_3:_Understanding).

## Threats on memory

Memory management is a critical element in an agent-based application. Memory can be allocated to a specific agent or shared with other agents. Databases are also provided to enable agents to perform their tasks. The variety of interactions and the volume of data require efficient data management.

Before we look at the various threats and mitigations, let's take a quick look at how storage works in agent-based applications. If you want to learn more, please refer to the first guide [Understanding intelligent agents in Artificial Intelligence](https://github.com/microsoft/responsible-ai-workshop/blob/main/ai-agents-tutorials/docs/understanding-ai-agents.docx) for this series.

### Memory structure reminder

Storage is involved in three stages: retrieving data, transforming it into a format optimised for the desired use, and finally using it (i.e., searching for and transferring data).

In the context of AI agents, memory has two subcategories: short-term memory and long-term memory. They play important complementary roles, inspired by human cognitive functions:

* Short-term memory (STM) is used to temporarily store information for the duration of a task or session, such as the immediate context of a conversation. It is limited in volume and is used to ensure fluid and relevant interactions in real time, but its data is erased after use.
* Long-term memory (LTM), on the other hand, retains important information in the long term, even after a session has ended, allowing the agent to learn from past interactions and improve over time. For example, a virtual assistant can use LTM to remember a user's preferences and provide a personalised and evolving experience.

While the former deals with immediate and contextual needs, the latter ensures continuity and learning, making both types of memory essential for AI agents to operate efficiently and intelligently [62]. Added to this is RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation), which enriches the agent by accessing external knowledge bases in real time to respond to immediate needs without relying solely on its internal memory. This mechanism makes it possible to integrate up-to-date and diverse information, thereby expanding the cognitive capabilities of the agents [63].

Finally, the data is stored in embedding form, i.e. as a number vector created during the data transformation phase, all stored in a vector database. This type of storage makes it possible to efficiently find resources corresponding to agent requests [64].

### Risks and mitigations

It has been determined that memory is comprised of several components, resulting in a significant attack surface. Consequently, it is imperative to implement specific security measures for each component. Notably, RAG technology is particularly vulnerable to data leakage due to its utilisation of external resources that have not been subject to the same level of control. These resources, such as training data, which typically contains sensitive information that should be kept confidential, are not subject to the same level of oversight. This study [65] shows how, using a Black-Box attack[[7]](#footnote-8) implemented with very low-resource tools and models, it was possible to hack into and access this information from a model using RAG.

The measures to be implemented are analogous to those previously outlined in the section on data leakage, including anonymisation, database access control, encryption, and data verification prior to distribution. These measures will be integrated into a comprehensive monitoring system that will facilitate prompt and appropriate responses [66].

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Le contenu généré par l’IA peut être incorrect.

Key vector database security controls [66]

As previously mentioned, this data is converted into vector form during embedding process. During this process, we may encounter data poisoning, as discussed in the [Module 4](#_Module_4:_) .

This is just one of the potential risks associated with this system. It is important to note that, despite the use of embedding, data can still be vulnerable to exploitation due to potential vulnerabilities in the system. However, it should be noted that reverse embedding techniques have been developed to exploit slight differences in output for the same task with different inputs. To counter these attacks, it is possible to set up additional systems, such as adding a model that would translate these insecure embeddings into secure embeddings [67].

Finally, it should be noted that all technologies have inherent weaknesses. Weaknesses linked to the choice of data storage can compromise the quality of generation and compromise the agentic application. One such weakness in RAG relates to the management of time series [17]. The decomposition of memory into short and long term also has its weaknesses. Ideally, short-term memory should be shared clearly and instantaneously between all agents. However, this is achieved asynchronously due to technical constraints. Additionally, its capacity is constrained, resulting in a limited number of information units that can be transferred. These specific features must be taken into account when designing the application architecture, depending on the requirements, so that the right tools and modules can be put in place.

# As a conclusion

Throughout this guide, we have seen that building a secure agent-based application is a complex task that requires a clear understanding of your needs, how they translate into agent(s), a suitable architecture and related trust boundaries, the agentic framework and toolchain being used, etc.

This also implies to grasp and follow the constantly evolving threats landscape, the related tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in terms of State-of-the-Art (SotA). Please refer to the MITRE Adversarial Threat Landscape for Artificial-Intelligence Systems (ATLAS) [68].

This guide is an attempt to provide a number of recommendations that will evolve alongside technology, and is by NO means neither exhaustive nor accurate..

Agent-based applications, being a subset of generative AI (GenAI) applications, are also subject to already known threats, such as DDoS attacks, discussed in [Module 2](#_Module_2:_Unpredictability). Therefore, their design should adhere to established rules and incorporate application security layers that have been in place for several years. To assist you, please refer to the recommendations outlined in Microsoft’s Threat Modeling for AI systems and depedencies. [69].

Conversely, some aspects, particularly those involving interactions between agents, are still under study to identify ways to secure these interactions while maintaining the desired performance.

It is strongly recommended to implement as many security layers as possible to apply the “Swiss cheese” defense strategy. This approach assumes that NO security layer is impenetrable and that there are unknown vulnerabilities of varying sizes and locations. However, the overlapping of these layers ensures that at least one layer will address each vulnerability.

This conclude this guide.

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# To go beyond

To continue learning about the incredible subject of responsible AI, you can follow the other tutorials and walkthroughs available in this workshop.

Une image contenant texte, motif, point

Description générée automatiquementYou can also scan this code or visit <https://aka.ms/RAIresources> where you can access the entirety of already available tools, guidelines, and other additional resources that will help you create your next AI solution in a (more) responsible manner.

Une image contenant texte, capture d’écran, Site web, Page web

Description générée automatiquement

Une image contenant bleu, brouillard, capture d’écran, bleu vert

Description générée automatiquement

1. For more details on these different architectures, please refer to the first guide [Understanding intelligent agents in Artificial Intelligence](https://github.com/microsoft/responsible-ai-workshop/blob/main/ai-agents-tutorials/docs/understanding-ai-agents.docx). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. This section includes excerpts from the guide [Establishing your own Responsible AI journey for your (non-generative vs. generative) AI-powered solutions](https://github.com/microsoft/responsible-ai-workshop/blob/main/responsible-ai-journey/docs/establishing-your-own-responsible-ai-journey.docx). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. The inference phase is when a trained model processes new input data to produce predictions or outputs based on the patterns it has learned during training. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. These recommendations are derived from the article *AI Agents Under Threat:* A Survey of Key Security Challenges and Future Pathways [16] [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Reasoning approach where AI agents process a problem as a series of interconnected steps, passing the result of each step to the next, creating a chain of intermediate outputs that build towards the final solution. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. Steganography is the practice of concealing a secret message within a non-secret medium, such as text, images, audio, or video, in such a way that the presence of the hidden message is not apparent to an observer. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. Black Box Attacks refer to adversarial techniques where an attacker manipulates the inputs or queries of a model without access to its internal architecture, parameters, or training data. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)