0063 easier. Failure would be less terrifying. Re-In my life, I have given a fuck about many iection less painful. Unpleasant necessities more pleasant and the unsavory shit sandwiches people and many things. I have also not given a fuck about many people and many things a little bit more savory. I mean, if we could And those fucks I have not given have made only give a few less fucks, or a few more conall the difference. sciously-directed fucks, then life would feel People often say the key to confipretty fucking easy. dence and success in life is to simply inot give a fuck. Indeed, we often refer to the stronis a fine art of non-fuck-giving. People argest, most admirable people we know in terms en't just born not giving a fuck. In fact, we're of their lack of fucks given. Like Oh, look born giving way too many fucks. Ever watch a kid cry his eyes out because his hat is the at Susie working weekends again, she doesn't wrong shade of blue? Exactly. Fuck that kid. give a fuck. Or !Did you hear that Tom called the company president an asshole and still got 114 a raise anyway? Holy shit, that dude does not and manage the fucks you give is the essence of strength and integrity. We must craft and give a fuck. Or 'Jason got up and ended his date with Cindy after 20 minutes. He said he hone our lack of fuckery over the course of years and decades. Like a fine wine, our fucks wasn't going to listen to her bullshit anymore. Man, that guy does not give a fuck. must age into a fine vintage, only uncorked and Chances are you know somebody in given on the most special fucking occasions. your life who, at one time or another, did not Most of us, most of the time, get sucked in by 121 give a fuck and went on to accomplish amazing life's mean trivialities, steamrolled by its unfeats. Perhaps there was a time in your life where you simply did not give a fuck and eximportant dramas; we live and die by the sidenotes and distractions and vicissitudes that celled to some extraordinary heights. I know suck the fucks out of us like Sasha Grey in for myself, quitting my day job in finance after only six weeks and telling my boss that I the middle of a gangbang. was going to start selling dating advice online 128 ranks pretty high up there in my own ididn't fucking around. Get your fucks together. And give a fuck; hall of fame. Same with decidhere, allow me to fucking show you. ing to sell most of my possessions and move to South America. Fucks given? None. Just went and did it. Now, while not giving a fuck may WITH BEING DIFFERENT seem simple on the surface, it's a whole new 135 bag of burritos under the hood. I don't even know what that sentence means, but I don't give a fuck. A bag of burritos sounds awesome, fucks whatsoever, they envision a kind of perfect and serene indifference to everything, a so let's just go with it. The point is, most of us struggle calm that weathers all storms. throughout our lives by giving too many fucks in situations where fucks do not deserve to be ly nothing admirable or confident about indifference. People who are indifferent are lame 142 given. We give a fuck about the rude gas staand scared. They're couch potatoes and intertion attendant who gave us too many nickels. net trolls. In fact, indifferent people often We give a fuck when a show we liked was canattempt to be indifferent because in reality celed on TV. We give a fuck when our coworkers don't bother asking us about our awesome they actually give too many fucks. They are weekend. We give a fuck when it's raining and afraid of the world and the repercussions of we were supposed to go jogging in the morning. their own choices. Therefore, they make none. Fucks given everywhere. Strewn They hide in a grey emotionless pit of their about like seeds in mother-fucking spring time. own making, self-absorbed and self-pitied, per-And for what purpose? For what reason? Conpetually distracting themselves from this unvenience? Easy comforts? A pat on the fuckfortunate thing demanding their time and ening back maybe? ergy called life. This is the problem, my friend. of a large chunk of money by a close friend Because when we give too many fucks, 156 when we choose to give a fuck about every-0119 of hers. Had I been indifferent, I would have shrugged my shoulders, sipped some mocha and thing, then we feel as though we are perpetudownloaded another season of The Wire. Sorry mom. ally entitled to feel comfortable and happy at all times, that's when life fucks us. Indeed, the ability to reserve our pissed off. I said, !No, screw that, mom. We're fucks for only the most fuckworthy of situgoing to lawyer the fuck up and go after this ations would surely make life a hell of a lot Further Issues 1764 options available to the person or changes the situation she's in, and thereby changes her at-In addition to answering the identitudes; on the one hand, and manipulation that tification and evaluation questions, a complete changes a person's attitudes directly without theory of manipulation should address severchanging the options available to her or the al further issues surrounding situation; on the other (Barnhill 2014: 53). Drawing a similar distinction, Clau-1771 dia Mills writes MANIPULATING PERSONS VERSUS MANIPULATING Discussions of manipulation ofter distinguish between cases where the manipulator influences his target directly, and cases 15 where the manipulator influences the target's behavior by arranging the target's environmen in ways that induce her to act one way rather than another. Consider Joel Rudinow's exam ple of a malingerer who manipulates a psychia trist into admitting him to the psychiatric ward (Rudinow 1978). He does this by fooling a po-22 lice officer into thinking he is about to commit suicide. The police officer brings him to the ward, reports that he is suicidal, and requests that he be admitted. Although the psychiatrist is not fooled, her hospital's rules force her to admit the malingerer at the po-Although Rudinow's case provides a lice officer's request. It seems clear that the clear contrast between what we might call psy-1792 chological manipulation and situational manipu-29 malingerer has manipulated the police officer by tricking him into adopting a faulty belief. lation, this distinction—or at least its impor But the psychiatrist, while not falling for the tance—is not always so clear. Consider tactic feigned suicide attempt and thus not adopting 9 above, where Irving threatens to withdraw his friendship if Tonya does not do as Irving any faulty beliefs, is nevertheless induced to do what she did not want to do. Although it wishes. Is this direct psy seems correct to say that the psychiatrist was tion, or situational manipulation? The criteri 1799 on offered by Barnhill and others counts it as 36 manipulated, this form of manipulation seems different from what was done to the police ofsituational manipulation, since Irving changes Tonya's choice situation so that doing Y and ficer. By feigning a suicide attempt, the maretaining Irving's friendship is no longer an lingerer has tampered with the police officer's beliefs. But he has maneuvered the psychia option. But how is this tactic any less of a trist into admitting him, not by tampering with direct interference with Tonya's decision than her psychological states, but rather by {gamif Irving had engaged in some form of decep-1806 tion? Why would it be more like what the ma-43 ing the system, as we might say. In his book, The Art of Politica lingerer does to the police officer than what Manipulation (Riker 1986) the political sci he does to the psychiatrist? This is not to deny that there is a entist William Riker calls the latter form of difference between psychological and situational manipulation theresthetic, and characterizes i as istructuring the world so you can win; (1986 manipulation. Instead, it is to ask what that difference is, and why it might matter. Presum ix). His focus is on political tactics like ger 1813 ably, the distinction is meant to differentiate 50 rymandering, poison pill amendments, and strabetween tactics that affect a target's behavtegic voting, all of which are often described as manipulation, and all of which seem more like ior by directly tampering with her psychology and those that do not. But if this is the diswhat Rudinow's malingerer does to the psychiatrist than what he does to the police officer tinction, then it seems plausible to think that Irving's use of emotional blackmail is at least In a similar way, the sociologists Donald Warwick and Herbert Kelman distinguish as direct a tampering with Tonya's psychology 1820 as, say, lago's dropping of the handkerchief 57 between 'environmental' and 'psychic' manipulation (Warwick & Kelman 1973). Their work in in a location where it will trick Othello into fluenced Faden, Beauchamp, and King's semina becoming inappropriately suspicious. Yet crite philosophical account of manipulation, whic ria like those proposed by Mills and Barnhill makes a similar distinction (Faden, Beauchamp seem to imply that these two forms of manipu-& King 1986: 355-68). Anne Barnhill distin lation are on opposite sides of that distinction guishes between manipulation that ichanges the 23 lation is immoral, but this presumption can be controls, our use of the term is devoid of any defeated in some situations. When the presumphint of moral opprobrium. In the social sciences, we can find cases of the term imaniption is defeated, manipulation is not wrong at all (i.e., not even pro tanto wrong). On this ulation; being used in a morally neutral way even when another person is the target of maview, we might say that while manipulation is nipulation. For example, several papers by the usually wrong, it is not wrong at all in the terrorist scenario. On this view, not only is evolutionary psychologist David M. Buss and 30 Irving's manipulation of Terrorist Tonya not 1393 colleagues use the term (manipulation) more or wrong on balance, but there is not even any less as a synonym for finfluence in their dismoral reason for him to choose a non-manipu cussions of how humans influence the behavior of other humans (D.M. Buss 1992; D.M. Buss lative method of getting Tonya to reveal the et al. 1987). Of course, pointing out morally bomb's location if one is available. neutral usages of imanipulation; does not re-A more complex—but, perhaps, ultimately more plausible—view would combine the ally settle the question of whether we should 1400 prefer a moralized or a non-moralized notion 37 prima facie and pro tanto approaches. Such a of manipulation. An argument for preferring a view would hold that manipulation is prima facie non-moralized notion of manipulation is providimmoral, but that when it is wrong, the wrongness is pro tanto rather than absolute. On this ed by Allen Wood, who writes that view, there are situations in which the presump tion against manipulation is defeated and manipulation is not even pro tanto wrong. Perhaps 44 bluffing in poker is like this. But where the presumption is not defeated, the wrongness of manipulation is only pro tanto, and thus able to be outweighed by sufficiently weighty coun tervailing moral considerations. In such cas es, even if it is not wrong on balance to manipulate, it would still be morally preferable 51 to avoid manipulation in favor of some other, morally legitimate, form of influence. Manipu lating a friend into refraining from sending a text to rekindle an abusive relationship might be an example where the pro tanto wrongness of manipulation is outweighed by other consid erations. In such a case, it seems plausible 58 to maintain that it would be morally prefera-No matter how we answer the question of whether manipulation in general is abble to use reason rather than manipulation to solutely immoral, prima facie immoral, pro tanget one's friend to see that sending the text would be a mistake, even if the facts of the to immoral, or not even presumptively immoral, there are clearly situations in which manipusituation would justify resorting to manipulation. A view along these lines has been defendlation is immoral. Any complete answer to the ed by Marcia Baron (2014: 116-17). Although evaluation question must explain why manipu-65 this view is far less absolute than the hardlation is immoral in those cases where it is line view, it retains the claim that manipulaimmoral. In addition, any view that holds that tion is prima facie wrong, so that there is almanipulation is only pro tanto and/or prima faways a presumption that it is immoral, though cie immoral should tell us what sorts of conthis presumption is sometimes defeated. It is siderations can defeat the presumption that it also compatible with the idea that the term is immoral and/or outweigh its pro tanto immofmanipulation; has built into it a connotation rality. Several accounts have been offered to 72 of moral dis-approbation. 1435 identify the source of the moral wrongfulness However, the claim that manipuof manipulation (when it is wrong). lation is presumptively wrong might be chal-3.2 MANIPULATION AND HARM lenged. One might argue that 'manipulation' is, or at least should be, a morally neutral term Perhaps the most straightforward without even the presumption of immorality. On way to explain the wrongfulness of manipulathis view, whether a given instance of manip-79 ulation is immoral will always depend on the tion (when it is wrong) would point to the harm facts of the situation, and the term itself indone to its targets. Manipulation is commoncludes (or should include) no presumption one ly used aggressively, as a way to harm the manipulator's target, or at least to benefit the way or the other. Clearly there are non-mormanipulator at the target's expense. The harmalized notions of manipulation. When we speak of a scientist manipulating variables in an exfulness of manipulation seems especially salient in manipulative relationships, where maperiment, or a pilot manipulating the plane's 45 wishes. One rationale for treating manipulation as a form of pressure is the observation that manipulation is neither rational persuasion nor coercion. It seems plausible, then, to suppose that there is a continuum between rational persuasion and coercion with regard to the level of pressure being exerted, with ra-52 tional persuasion exerting no pressure, coercion exerting maximum pressure, and the middle Michael Kligman and Charles Culregion, manipulation, exerting pressure that ver offer a similar account: falls short of being coercive. In this way, we might arrive at the idea that manipulation is a form of pressure that does not rise to the level of coercion. One of the earliest philosophical accounts of manipulation, by Ruth Faden, Tom Beauchamp, and Nancy King, has this structure. They begin by contrasting using rational per suasion to convince a patient to take a medically necessary drug with simply coercing him to take it. Then they observe that There are many in-between cases: For example, suppose the physician has made clear that he or she will be upset with the patient if the patient does not take the drug, and the patient is intimidated. Although the patient is not convinced that it is the best course to Kligman and Culver go on to distintake the medication, : the patient agrees to 173 take the drug because it appears that accep-1036 quish this manipulative pressure from coercion tance will foster a better relationship with the by claiming that the latter, unlike the former, doctor. Here the patient performs the action. involves sufficiently strong incentives : that under a heavy measure of control by the phyit would be unreasonable to expect any rational person not to so act; (Kligman & Culver 1992: sician's role, authority, and indeed prescription. Unlike the first case, the patient does 187). More recently, Marcia Baron and Allen not find it overwhelmingly difficult to resist Wood have also discussed forms of manipula-180 the physician's proposal, but, unlike the sec-1043 tion that seem best characterized as forms of pressure (Baron 2003; Wood 2014). ond case, it is nonetheless awkward and difficult to resist this rather (controlling) phy Although we can treat the idea that sician. (Faden, Beauchamp, & King 1986: 258, manipulation consists of a form of pressure They claim that such in between as a full-fledged theory of manipulation, most of the authors just cited hold only that some cases constitute manipulation. However, they do not claim that all forms of manipulation fall forms of manipulation consist of pressure. In 187 into the middle region of this continuum; they 1050 particular, most agree with Faden, Beauchamp, also count forms of deception, indoctrination and King, that other forms of manipulation and seduction as manipulative, and claim that are more akin to deception. Thus, it is somesome manipulative strategies what artificial to speak of the pressure modcan be as controlling as coel as a theory meant to cover all forms of ercion or as noncontrolling as manipulation. It is more accurate to regard persuasion; other manipulations the pressure model as claiming that exerting 1057 non-coercive pressure is sufficient (but perfall somewhere between these endpoints, (Faden, Beauchamp, haps not necessary) for an influence to count & King 1986: 259) as manipulative. Nevertheless, the idea that at least DISJUNCTIVE, HYBRID, AND some forms of manipulation involve pressure has 2.4 OTHER VIEWS been very influential. Joel Feinberg offers a similar account 01 of manipulation. He writes that many techniques Our discussion of the trickery and for getting someone to act in a certain way pressure accounts highlights a rather striking can be placed on a spectrum of fact: If we survey the tactics that seem intuforce running from compulsion itively to be examples of manipulation, we find proper, at one extreme, through tactics that seem best described as forms of compulsive pressure, coercion trickery as well as tactics that seem best deproper, and coercive pressure, scribed as forms of pressure. This is puzzling, 0756 2.2 MANIPULATION AS TRICKERY 89 impact on each friends' own self-valuation. As Dworkin (2000) remarks (though, admittedly, i treats it as a form of trickery, and ties it sensitive to the degree to which one values conceptually to deception. The connection be one's own life, this account of friendship ex tween manipulation and deception is a common plains the intimate relationship between friendtheme in both non-philosophical and philosoph 0763 ical discussions of manipulation. In his 1980 96 ship and happiness. If, as Aristotle claimed, all humans book Manipulatory Politics, Robert Goodin ar seek happiness, then our account explains why gues that manipulation is inherently deceptive friendship is a universal human phenomenon; wha and offers this test for whether an influence we receive from a friend and what we give to is manipulative: 1. Is the interference decep her-namely, an increased sense of self-worthtive? 2. Is the interference contrary to the contributes to one's own, as well as the oth putative will of those subject to it? (Goo 103 er's, happiness. Moreover, this account explains din, 1980: 35). In the literature on advertiswhy it is that when we judge that a perso ing, the charge that (at least some) advertis ing is manipulative often rests on the claim tive moral assessment of that person-to say it it creates false beliefs or misleadin of someone that she is a good friend contain associations (e.g., linking the vitality of th Marlboro man to a product which causes lung say that she is a good runner does not. Thi cancer). Similarly, in his discussion of pror 110 is because, as argued labove, in being a good ises, T. M. Scanlon condemns manipulation as friend to another one makes an important con a means of inducing false beliefs and expen tribution to another's happiness. Furthermore tations (Scanlon 1998: 298-322). Shlomo Cohen offers a somewhat different account of the and philosophers praise friendship. Our accoun relationship between manipulation and decep tion, according to which the distinction lies in tify friendship with any culturally determined the methods by which the target is induced to 17 aspects of friendship, or with patterns of be-0784 adopt a false belief (Cohen 2018). But even on havior that are peculiar to a specific culture this more nuanced view, there is still a strong connection between manipulation and deception process of communication of mutual valuing be Other views in this family treat manipulation as a broader category of which ferent cultures (and even within the same culdeception is a special case. Whereas decep ture). Finally, the fact that two people value tion is the deliberate attempt to trick some 24 each other and successfully communicate this 0791 one into adopting a faulty belief, these versions of the trickery account see manipulation fact one to the other does not preclude the from valuing others and successfully commun as the deliberate attempt to trick someone into cating this fact to others as well. Likewise adopting any faulty mental state-belief, dethere is no reason why people who occupy var An early example of this version of the trickery approach to manipulation can be ent-child, etc.) could not also value each oth 31 er and suc- cessfully communicate this fact 0798 found in a 1980 paper by Vance Kasten, who they cannot also be friends. manipulation occurs when there is Nevertheless, occupying certain rea difference in kind between what one intends lations may inhibit friendship, especially when to do and what one actually does, when that one party has authority over the other. Ardifference is traceable to another in such a istotle already observed that friendships be way that the victim may be said to have been 38 tween unequals—people of dis- similar social misled. (Kasten 1980: 54) positions (ruler-subject, parent-child or el Although many of Kasten's examples der-young- er)-are uncommon: {it is clear, } he of misleading involve deception, he also in writes in VIII.7, falso in the case of kings; cludes examples in which manipulation involves for with them, too, men who are much their in inducing the target to have inappropriate emo tions like guilt. More recently, Robert Noggle feriors do not expect to be friends. On Ar istotle's view, friendships typically rely on has defended a version of this more expansive 45 sufficient similarity between friends and on approach, writing that There are certain norms or ideals both friends giving and receiving the same from each other. Indeed, Aristotle emphasis that govern beliefs, desires, and emotions. Maes the endoxa that 'friendship is said to be nipulative action is the attempt to get some equality;-a view he then seeks to preserve in one's beliefs, desires, or emotions to violate these norms, to fall short of these ideals. his account. A perfect friendship, for Aristotle, is a friendship in which teach gets from (Noggle 1996: 44)

0126 asshole. Why? Because I don't give a fuck. I will ruin this guy's life if I have to. This illustrates the first subtlety about not giving a fuck. When we say, Damn, watch out. Mark Manson just don't give a fuck. we don't mean that Mark Manson doesn't care about anything; on the contrary, what we mean What we don't realize is that there 0133 is that Mark Manson doesn't care about adversity in the face of his goals, he doesn't care about pissing some people off to do what he feels is right or important or noble. What we mean is that Mark Manson is the type of quy who would write about himself in third person and use the word 'fuck' in an article 127 dif-Developing the ability to control ferent times just because he thought it was the right thing to do. He just doesn't give a fuck. This is what is so admirable—no, not me, dumbass—the overcoming adversity stuff. The staring failure in the face and shoving your middle finger back at it. The people who don't This may sound easy. But it is not. give a fuck about adversity or failure or embarrassing themselves or shitting the bed a few times. The people who just laugh and then do it anyway. Because they know it's right. They know it's more important than them and their own feelings and their own pride and their own needs. They say !Fuck it, ! not to everything in This is no way to live, man. So stop life, but rather they say 'Fuck it' to everything unimportant in life. They reserve their fucks for what truly fucking matters. Friends. Family. Purpose. Burritos. And an occasion-NOT GIVING A FUCK DOES NOT al lawsuit or two. And because of that, be-MEAN BEING INDIFFERENT: IT cause they reserve their fucks for only the MEANS BEING COMFORTABLE big things, the important things, people give a fuck about them in return. 0161 When most people envision giving no TO NOT GIVE A FUCK ABOUT ADVERSITY, YOU MUST FIRST GIVE A FUCK ABOUT SOMETHING MORE IMPORTANT THAN ADVERSITY This is misguided. There's absolute-Eric Hoffer once wrote: !A man is likely to mind his own business when it is worth minding. When it is not, he takes his mind off his own meaningless affairs by minding other people's business. The problem with people who hand out fucks like ice cream at a goddamn summer camp is that they don't have anything more fuckworthy to dedicate their fucks to. Think for a second. You're at a grocery store. And there's an elderly lady screaming at the cashier, berating him for not ac-My mother was recently screwed out cepting her 30-cent coupon. Why does this lady give a fuck? It's just 30 cents. Well, I'll tell you why. That old lady probably doesn't have anything better to But instead, I was indignant, I was If A wants to get B to do act x, there are two general strategies that A might undertake. A might change, or propose to change, the external or objective features of B's choice

do with her days than to sit at home cutting out coupons all morning. She's old and lonely. Her kids are dickheads and never visit. She hasn't had sex in over 30 years. Her pension is on its last legs and she's probably going Nevertheless, there does seem something importantly different between what the malingerer in Rudinow's example does to the police officer and what he does to the psychiatrist. But much work remains to be done to provide a well-motivated account of that difference. Such an account should not only get 1834 the intuitively right answers in cases of direct pressure (like emotional blackmail) and indirect deception (like lago's dropping the handkerchief), but it should also explain whether and why the distinction makes a moral difference. 4.2 MANIPULATION AND INTENT 1841 Some views of manipulation seem to suggest, if not require, that manipulators have

situation; or alternatively, A

might try to alter certain in-

ternal or subjective features

of B's choice situation. While

some writers might call both

least in certain circumstanc-

es, I prefer to reserve the la-

bel manipulation for a subset

of morally problematic actions

falling in the second category.

If we think that moral argu-

ment should proceed not mere

unargued intuitions, but in-

stead by identifying objective

facts about a situation that

give us good reasons for con-

demning or approving certain

things, then we would gener-

ally do much better to use a

non-moralized sense of words

like {coercion}, {manipulation},

and 'exploitation'—a sense in

which these words can be used

to manipulation, persuasion, en-

ticement, and simple requests

at the other extreme. The line

merely getting to act is drawn

somewhere in the manipulation

The attempt to influence B's

behavior takes on a manipula-

tive character when ∴ A's pri-

mary intent is no longer to

convince B, in a good faith

manner, that acting as desired

by A would be in keeping with

B's rational assessments of

outcome; [but rather] to pro-

cure or engineer the need-

ed assent by bringing pres-

presume to be the manipula-

sure to bear, in a deliberate

and calculated way, on what he

ble features of B's motivation

al system. (Kligman & Culver

1992: 186-187)

(Feinberg 1989: 189)

or persuasion part of the scale.

between forcing to act and

to refer to such objective

facts. (Wood 2014: 19-20)

ly by invoking our pro- or con

sentiments, or appealing to our

(Mills 1995: 97)

strategies manipulative, at

fairly complex intentions—such as the intention to lead the target astray—for manipulation to occur. Marcia Baron and Kate Manne offer compelling reasons to think that such requirements are too strong. Baron argues that manipulation can occur even if the manipulator only has a combination of intent and recklessness: the aim of getting the other person do what one wants, together with recklessness in the way that one goes about reaching that goal. (Baron 2014: 103) She goes on to argue that the manipulator need not be aware that she has that ntention (*Baron 2014, 101*). Manne agrees: to support this claim, she offers the example of 1862 Joan, who gives extravagant gifts to relatives who pay her less attention than (she thinks) they should (Manne 2014, 225). Manne tells Joan's story in such a way that it seems plausible to say both that Joan's gift-giving is a manipulative attempt to make her relatives feel guilty, and that Joan does not conscious ly intend to make her relatives feel quilty. If

Manne's description of her example is correct, then it seems that Joan can manipulate her relatives into feeling guilty without having any conscious intention of making them feel guilty. (Later, Manne [2014, 235] goes even farther, suggesting that 'people can even behave manipulatively despite consciously intending not to.i) Of course, those who hold that manipulation requires more conscious intention than Manne allows might simply deny that Joan's behavior is manipulative. Nevertheless. the arguments offered by Baron and Manne raise important questions about the level of conscious intentionality required for an action to be manipulative. The question of what sort of intention is required for an act to count as manipulative has practical implications for assessing the behavior of children, who sometimes behave in ways that seem aptly described as manipula-1449 nipulation may lead to subordination and even abuse. The more minor economic harm of the extraction of money from consumers might be cited as a wrong-making feature of manipulative advertising, and there has been some discussion of how manipulation might lead targets to enter into exploitative contracts. Systematic political manipulation may weaken democratic

institutions and perhaps even lead to tyranny. But not all instances of manipulation harm their victims. In fact, manipulation sometimes benefits its target. If the harm to the victim is the only wrong-making feature of manipulation, then paternalistic or beneficent manipulation could never be even pro tanto wrong. But this claim strikes most people as implausible. To see this, consider that the debate about whether paternalistic nudges are wrongfully manipulative is not settled simply by pointing out that they benefit their targets. The fact that it seems possible for an 1470 act to be wrongfully manipulative, even though it benefits (and is intended to benefit) the target, presumably explains why there are few, if any, defenses of the claim that manipulation is wrong only when and because it harms the target. Nevertheless, it seems plausible to hold that when manipulation does harm its 1477 target, this harm adds to the wrongness of the manipulative behavior. 3.3 MANIPULATION AND AUTONOMY

more commonly assumed).

tional impulses, shrewdness, pressure, etc., ino

condition on the list is sufficient, : and no

single condition : is even necessary; for an

instance of influence to be manipulative (Ack-

disjunctive, so that manipulation consists of

either trickery or pressure. Indeed, in one of

the earliest philosophical analyses of manipu-

lation, Joel Rudinow takes this approach. Rudi-

attempts to influence S's behavior by means

of deception or pressure or by playing on a

use of pressure is manipulative only if the

would-be manipulator directs it at some sup-

posed weakness in his target that will render

the target unable to resist it; this leads him

to finalize his definition in terms of decep-

tion or by playing upon a supposed weakness?

of the target, with the second disjunct meant

to cover pressure-based tactics (Rudinow 1978:

*346).* Several other philosophers have followed

Rudinow's disjunctive approach to defining ma-

nipulation (Tomlinson 1986; Sher 2011; Mandava

& Millum 2013). Indeed, as we have noted, it

is common for people who discuss manipulative

pressure to claim that manipulation comes in

the disjunctive strategy might begin with the

pressure account's continuum pressure of be-

tween rational persuasion and coercion, but go

on to add a second dimension consisting of a

continuum between rational persuasion and out-

right lying. We might then define manipulation

in terms of a two-dimensional space bounded

by rational persuasion, outright lying, and co-

ercion. A strategy like this is suggested by

Sapir Handelman, although he adds a third di-

manipulation is directly influ-

encing someone's beliefs, desires,

or emotions such that she falls

sire, or emotion in ways typical-

short of ideals for belief, de-

ly not in her self-interest or

likely not in her self-interest

2014: 73, emphasis original; for

a similar view, see Hanna 2015)

Claudia Mills offers a theory that

We might say, then, that manip-

ulation in some way purports to

be offering good reasons, when

in fact it does not. A manipu

lator tries to change another's

her bad reasons, disguised as

good, or faulty arguments, dis-

guised as sound-where the ma-

nipulator himself knows these to

be bad reasons and faulty argu-

ments (Mills 1995: 100; see Benn

1967 and Gorin 2014b for some-

A similar picture of manipulation

what similar ideas)

emerges from the work of the political theorist

Keith Dowding (2016, 2018). Dowding does not

attempt to characterize manipulation directly

Rather, he proposes ideal conditions for per

prohibit appealing to reasons that the persuad

er does not accept, and appealing to emotions

that the persuader does not share. These pro

hibitions seem to suggest a characterization of

manipulation as the attempt to influence the

as bad reasons or inappropriate emotions. This

picture of manipulation is either a version of

or a close cousin to, the picture of the manip-

ulator as trying to trick the target into make

ing choices based on faulty beliefs or inappro-

view retain the connection between manipulation

and deception, some extend it to include trick-

ing the target into adopting any faulty mental

state, including beliefs, desires, emotions, etc

This view might be further expanded by adopt-

ing Michael Cholbi's observation that the phe-

Thus, while all versions of the trickery

target by appealing to what the manipulator sees

0861 suasion in a deliberative democracy—conditions

beliefs and desires by offering

0840 can be considered as either a version of, or a

close relative to, the trickery account

in the present context. (Barnhill

A somewhat different version of

other forms as well.

delman 2009).

(Noggle 1996: 44-47).

writes that

supposed weakness of S. (Rudinow 1978: 343)

1092 cept of manipulation is not vague but rather

now begins with the following thesis:

Second, we might hold that the con-

A attempts to manipulate S iff A

He goes on to claim that that the

erman 1995: 337-38).

The paper, thus, starts by listing 0028 the lobserved facts about friend- ship in order to identify the concept into which we are investigating. Then, an account of the chief characteristic of friendship is proposed—an account that accommodates the 'observed facts' Another natural way to account for Next, two influential views of friendship are the wrongness of manipulation would be to claim considered. These views, it is argued, face dif-0035 ficulties that the account on offer circumvents. that it violates, undermines, or is otherwise antithetical to the target's personal autono-Nevertheless, the proposed account preserves my. Manipulation, by definition, influences dethe quintessential insights of these prominent accounts of friendship and thus, in accordance cision-making by means that—unlike rational persuasion—do not seem to be autonomy-prewith Aristotle's methodology, it is shown that serving. Thus, it is natural to regard it as the view of friendship presented here respects interfering with autonomous decision-making. the received opinion (endoxa) on the topic. Fi 0042 nally, the paper concludes by clarifying what The idea that manipulation is wrong because is hoped to have been established by identiit undermines autonomous choice is implicit in discussions of manipulation as a potential infying a 'distinctive characteristic' of friendvalidator of consent. But even outside of disship as the paper sets out to do. cussions of autonomous consent, the claim that THE APPARENT FACTS manipulation is immoral because it undermines autonomy is commonly made (and perhaps even

Friendship is a relation. Paradigmatically, the relata of the friendship rela-However, there are reasons for caution are persons. The relation of friendship tion about tying the moral status of manipuis a symmetric relation: A is not a friend of lation too tightly to its effects on autonomy. One can imagine cases where it is not obvious B unless B is also a friend of A. According to anthropologist Cora Du Bois (1974) it that manipulation undermines autonomy. One can is reasonable to suppose that friendship is a even imagine cases where manipulation might en-0056 universal human phenomenon that occurs in all hance the target's overall autonomy. For examsocieties. Consequently, an account of friendple, a teacher might manipulate a student into ship, she writes, imust be so phrased as to taking a class which ultimately enhances her avoid culturally determined aspects [of friendautonomy by opening new career options, improving her skills of critical self-reflection, ship]. While our account need not guarantee that friendship occurs in all societies—it is etc. We might also imagine cases where manippossible that in some societies the friendship ulation is used to support the target's autonsince, on the face of it, trickery and pressure seem rather dissimilar. What should we make of

I propose to understand friendship in terms of its contribution to our appreciathe fact that we use the same concept—maniption of our own life's value (as I explain beulation—to refer to methods of influence that low), which, in turn, impacts on our happiness. For our purposes, it matters not whether an seem to operate by such dissimilar mechanisms? Several responses are possible. First, appreciation of our own life's value is constiit is possible that the common usage of term tutive of happiness or merely a cause of happi-1078 'manipulation' refers to such a diverse set of 0133 ness. I take it as obvious that one must regard phenomena that no single analysis will capture one's own life as minimally valuable in order to every form of influence to which the term is sustain life and that a happy life requires a commonly applied. Felicia Ackerman argues that more robust sense of self-worth. These claims the term {manipulation} exhibits {combinatorial} are, indeed, compatible with a wide range of vaqueness; while it is connected to features views about happiness. like inhibition of rational deliberation, uneth-1085 icalness, deceptiveness, playing upon non-ra-

But how does friendship contribute 0140 to our sense of self-worth? We are familiar with the phenomenon that the extent to which we value something is influenced by our awareness of the value others attribute to it. The impact of others' valuation on our own is often sensitive to the extent to which we value those others the more we value or respect them, 0147 the more pronounced our awareness of the value they attribute to something will be on our own valuation of it. This happens with artifacts (e.g.,

artworks) and people alike. For example, judg ments of art critics may impact on our own valuation of an artwork (and the judgment of art 0154 critics we value and respect will likely have a more pronounced effect). Similarly, we may feel one thing when we learn about the death of a person who is a stranger to us and another when we hear this person's friends mourn her loss. This change in feeling, it is suggested, corresponds to a change in the degree 0161 to which we value that which is now lost. It is one thing to believe that a human life is valuable and another to value it. The differ ence between these two attitudes explains how it is that we can be almost indifferent to a human tragedy involving the deaths of hundreds of people in a place far and remote, while at 0168 the same time we find it almost impossible to

remain unmoved when we see a person mourning a death of a friend or a loved one. When we are confronted with the value a person's life had for another we sense the loss of something valuable. The change in our valuation of this life need not have been brought about by 0175 a change in our belief about the value of the life in question. That the extent to which we value something can be influenced by our awareness of the value others attribute to it suggests that recognizing that others value our own lives may impact on our sense of self-worth. This, in 0182 turn, enables us to link friendship and happiness. Friendship, I propose, is a relationship

mension that measures the level of control; between two people in which each participant that a given form of influence exerts (Hanvalues the other and successfully communicates this fact to the other. Because each friend values the other, each friend's awareness that the other values her will have a pronounced The norms or ideals in question will 0882 nomenon of ego depletion might induce targets vary by mental state: a belief falls short of of manipulation to form faulty intentions (tha its ideal if it is false; a pattern of attention is, intentions that do not reflect their co falls short of its ideal if excessive attention is being paid to something less relevant for choice at hand; an emotion falls short of its ideal if it is not appropriate to the situation In a similar vein, Anne Barnhill

sidered values) because their resistance to temptation has been worn down (Cholbi 2014). The trickery view can be motivated by appeal to various examples, one especially 0889 fruitful set of which is Shakespeare's Othello. It seems natural to describe Shakespeare's character lago as a manipulator. The activities in virtue of which he merits this label seem to involve various forms of trickery. For ex ample, through insinuation, innuendo and clev erly arranging circumstances (like a strategy 0896 cally placed handkerchief) he tricks Othello into suspecting-and then believing-that his new bride Desdemona has been unfaithful. He then plays on Othello's insecurities and other emotions to lead him into an irrational jealou sy and rage that both overshadow his love for Desdemona and cloud his judgment about how 0903 to react. The trickery view accounts for our sense that lago manipulates Othello by not ing that lago tricks him into adopting various faulty mental states—false beliefs, unwarrant ed suspicions, irrational emotions, and so on Proponents of the trickery view dis agree over several details, most notably how to define a faulty mental state. Some proponents of the trickery view argue that manipu lation occurs when the influencer attempts to

induce what the influencer regards as a faulty mental state into the target's deliberation (Mills 1995; Noggle 1996; this idea is built into Dowding's account). Others argue that we should define manipulation in terms of the attempt to introduce an objectively faulty menta state into the target's deliberations (Hanna 2015: 634; see also Sunstein 2016: 89). Ann Barnhill suggests that our usage of the term of whose standards determine whether the in 0924 fluencer attempts to induce the target to adopt 0609 a faulty mental state (Barnhill 2014) Although the trickery account ha considerable appeal, it faces an important challenge: It apparently fails to count as ma nipulative a whole class of tactics that seem, intuitively, to be manipulative. Tactics like charm, peer pressure, and emotional blackmail (tactics 1, 5, and 9) do not seem to involve trickery. Yet it seems quite natural to regard them as examples of manipulation.

no-libertarians had all the technology they desperately want from rockets to life exter sion to cryogenic freezing and brain uploads. It would be the cultural equivalent of a Big Bang followed by eternal expansion of the sor 2.3 MANIPULATION AS PRESSURE the universe seems to be undergoing And there are those for whom grow A third way to characterize manipuing is synonymous with growing together. I don't lation is to treat it as a kind of pressure to know how to cure these people of their per do as the influencer wishes. On this account verse and profane notion of growth, but pre tactics like emotional blackmail and peer pres sumably, if they had all the technology the sure are paradigm cases of manipulation, since wanted, they'd gratefully collapse into a Borg like collective. It would be the cultural equiv they exert pressure on the target by imposing costs for failing to do what the manipulato alent of dark matter and energy suddenly dis-

0189 to die in a diaper thinking she's in Candyland. 0252 We've found the love we need and so those em-She can't fart without extreme lower back pain. barrassing romantic rejections cease to mean She can't even watch TV for more than 15 minmuch anymore. We realize how little people pay utes without falling asleep or forgetting the attention to the superficial details about us and we focus on doing things more for our-So she snips coupons. That's all selves rather than for others. she's got. It's her and her damn coupons. All Essentially, we become more selec 0196 day, every day. It's all she can give a fuck 0259 tive about the fucks we're willing to give. This about because there is nothing else to give is something called 'maturity.' It's nice, you a fuck about. And so when that pimply-faced should try it sometime. Maturity is what hap 17-year-old cashier refuses to accept one of pens when one learns to only give a fuck about them, when he defends his cash register's puri what's truly fuckworthy. As Bunk Moreland said ty the way knights used to defend maidens' virin The Wire (which, fuck you, I still download ginities, you can damn well bet granny is going ed) to his partner Detective McNulty: 'That's 0203 to erupt and verbally hulk smash his fucking what you get for giving a fuck when it wasn't face in. Eighty years of fucks will rain down your turn to give a fuck. all at once, like a fiery hailstorm of Back in Then, as we grow older and enter my day; and !People used to show more respect? middle age, something else begins to change stories, boring the world around her to tears Our energy levels drop. Our identities solidi If you find yourself consistently 0210 giving too many fucks about trivial shit that 0273 in our lives. bothers you—your ex-girlfriend's new Facebook picture, how quickly the batteries die in the TV remote, missing out on yet another 2-for-1 sale on hand sanitizer-chances are you don't have much going on in your life to give a le-

main plotline.

in her creaking and wobbly voice.

0217 Iem. Not the hand sanitizer.

gitimate fuck about. And that's your real prob-

something. There really is no such thing as not

giving a fuck. The question is simply how we

each choose to allot our fucks. You only get a

limited number of fucks to give over your life-

don't grow on trees, Mark.; OK, he never ac-

tually said that. But fuck it, pretend like he

did. The point is that fucks have to be earned

and then invested wisely. Fucks are cultivated

like a beautiful fucking garden, where if you

fuck shit up and the fucks get fucked, ther

WE ALL HAVE A LIMITED

WHO YOU GIVE THEM TO

energy. Everything is new and exciting. And

everything seems to matter so much. Therefore

we give tons of fucks. We give a fuck about

everything and everyone-about what people

are saying about us, about whether that cute

boy/girl called us back or not, about wheth-

and begin to notice that most of these things

have little lasting impact on our lives. Those

people's opinions we cared about so much be

fore have long been removed from our lives.

stance one must already know the deinition of

the term in question. However, our ability to

conjure counterexamples to proposed definitions

com- bined with our inability to formulate ad

equate definitions, gives us reason to doubt

the priority of definitional knowledge. And

this Socratic thesis. Instead, various forms of

iprototype semantics; or Wittgensteinian ifami-

ly resemblance; accounts are now taken more or

less for granted. As Biletzki and Matar (2018)

explain, Wittgenstein spoints to 'family resem

blance' as the more suitable analogy for the

same word. There is no reason to look, as we

have done traditionally—and dogmatically—for

one, essential core in which the meaning of a

word is located and which is, therefore, com

ly not. But there are also relationships for

which it is unclear whether they are instances

of friendship-properly so called. Focusing on

prototype and resemblance, rather than necessary

and sufficient conditions, enables us to make

better sense of degrees—that some relation-

than other. The 'distinctive feature' proposed

here is meant to highlight the characteristic

evant axes of resemblance for assessing rela-

distinctive of friendship as opposed to other

relations. It might be thought that relation-

ships between (e.g.,) partners, siblings, or col-

leagues may also be such that each participant

values the other and successfully communicates

this fact to the other. If one is fortunate

one might think that the feature we identified

is not a distinctive feature of friendship, and

consequently, that our title-question has no

that although friendship differs from other

er-employee, parent-child) two people can or

cupy the relata of the friendship relation at

the same time they occupy the relata of other

social relations. If A and B are colleagues

(or siblings), for example, they may (or may not)

also be friends. According to the view on offer,  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1$ 

municate this fact one to the other, they are

friends regardless of other social relations

they occupy. The force of the objection, I sus-

pect, comes from the fact that we may tend to

introduce a colleague (or a sibling) as a col-

league; (or 'a sibling') rather than a 'friend'

an activity in which they have no genuine in-

dependent interest. But others might feel more

comfortable in a friendship which is based or

each friend's recognition of, and respect for

the other's independent interests and tastes.

So it might be a mark of some good friendships

that each friend does not invite the other to

participate in activities in which the other

has no independent interest. Such friendships

might be based on mutual acceptance of the oth-

er as she is—an acceptance which might mani-

fest itself in the complete absence of direc-

pretation of oneself can only occur if friends

engaged in reflective mutual interpretation

And although this might be common in many

friendships, some friendships could be based

primarily, and even entirely, on shared activi

ties. Lewis, again, comes to mind. {Lovers,} he

their love; Friends, hardly ever talk about their

Friendship. Lovers are normally face to face,

friendship, and indeed, they need not talk about

identify are common in friendships, it is pro

posed, because they correspond to familiar ways

for friends to communicate to each other that

each one values the other. In some friendships

one values the other by sharing secrets, while

in other friendships friends might do this by

taking an interest in whatever interests the

other—i.e., by being directed by the other—and

by interpreting the other and being sensitive

to the other's interpretation of oneself. How-

municate mutual valuing by accepting the other

as she is and by not trying to direct her, or by

maintaining a minimally structured relationship

in which each one can do as she pleases with

very limited regard to propriety and protocol.

Yet others may best communicate value by en

gaging in joint intellectual pursuits without

being concerned about each other's persona

lives at all. I suspect that some forms of com

municating value between friends may be more

prevalent in some communities than in others

But even in the same society there are multiple

ways for friends to communicate to each other

a single person may use different methods of

communicating value with different friends, and

even with the same friend at different times.

fuse specific ways of communicating mutual valu-

ing between friends with essential features of

ly not every good is such that we would pre

fer to obtain it from a friend-perhaps som

goods are such that we would like to receive

them from specific individuals who are not ou

friends. Nevertheless, we can value a friend

to help him move to a new apartment he might

want Bill to help him move rather than just

an extra set of hands. Thus, he might be dis

appointed if in response to his request Bil

offered to hire someone else to do his share

of the work. Abe and Bill's friendship could

one another, but it won't be a friendship un

less there are some benefits such that each

of them values obtaining these benefits spe-

for the other in friendships (like the one de-

0336 scribed above) is what Zimmerman (2015) calls

finstru- mental final value. He writes

own right.

0357 a final value.

on the benefits they receive from each other

so they value each other instrumentally. How

ever, in order for their relationship to be a

friendship they must each regard the other as

might value swimming because swimming is good

for her health. If swimming had not been good

for her health she would not have valued swim

ming. And yet, if she could obtain the same

health benefits she gains from swimming in some

a special pill-she would still prefer to ob

tain these benefits by swimming. We can prop

erly say of Tara that she values swimming and

that her valuing of swimming is not merely in

strumental. In contrast, Michael swims only

because swimming is good for his health. Had

the same health benefits he would have stopped

means to good health—he values good health

and he realizes that swim- ming is a means to

this end. Unlike Tara, Michael values swimming

COLLECTIVE MIND

humans can do without breaking under the stress

This sounds like a free lunch at first blush

put in new knowledge and capabilities on one

end, get to the Moon and beyond on the other

be satisfied with this apparent win-win situation

es an asymmetry into the age-old tension be

communities are self-stabilizing at some size

just like ape troops. Wander too far, and voice

mask strain draws you back in. Get too deeply

immersed in community life and exit-mask strain

nologies that allow us to lower our exit masks

further and wander farther off, than to de

velop technologies that allow us to lower our

voice masks and come closer together. Tech

nology already allows us to entirely drop out

exit masks and live in complete isolation (and

hermits have been historically choosing this

path for thousands of years). But the best

technology we have for coming really close to-

gether today is still no better than alcohol

brain-to-brain interface technology will allow

extreme communitarians to truly come together

and entirely dissolve their individuality, but

that day seems far off. This means technology

is fundamentally an expansionary force in so

synonymous with growing apart. Becoming mor

uniquely and individually defined. Any group of

such individuals, given increasing technologi

cal capability, will use it to spread out more.

This is Asimov's Spacer civilization, a good

approximation of what would happen if tech

think in terms of growth paths.

cial terms. One way to understand this is to

Perhaps a future designer drug and

There are those to whom growing is

tween exit-masks and voice-masks

end, no new masks needed

pushes you back out.

HUMANITY AS EXPANDING

Technological leverage expands what

So why is it so hard for so many to

It is because technology introduc

Under normal circumstances, human

The problem is that technology has

It is much easier to develop tech-

swimming. Michael values swimming only as

0371 there been some other (easier) way to obtain

0364 other way—say, by jogging or even by taking

The kind of value each friend has

If something A is a means to

something else B and has in

strumental value in virtue of

nonfinal if it is merely deriv-

ative from or reflective of B's

value, whereas it will be final

if it is nonderivative, that is,

if it is a value that A has in

its own right (due to the fact

that it is a means to B), ir-

respective of any value that

B may or may not have in its

Abe and Bill's friendship is based

An analogy might be helpful. Tara

this fact, such value will be

0329 be based on the fact that they are useful to

cifically from the other

0322 her. For example, if Abe asks his friend Bill

0315 get the same goods in some other way. Sure-

C&K, like Thomas, I propose, con-

that the other is valuable to them, and indeed,

absorbed in each other; Friends, side by side,

Friends need not talk about their

The features that Thomas and C&k

0714 writes, fare always talking to one another about

absorbed in some common interest.

sometime, or even often, do so

0721 each other, even if, despite Lewis' claim, they

0728 friends communicate to each other that each

0735 ever, in other friendships, friends might com-

Responsiveness to a friend's inter-

tion in C&K's sense of the term.

0693 ate an invitation from a friend to partake in

0868 social relations (e.g., student-teacher, employ-

0875 if they value each other and successfully com-

When listing the endoxa we noted

0861 enough to have such colleagues, for example,

been properly answered.21

tions which are not prototypical friendship

0854 feature' on offer does not pick out a feature

features of 'prototype' friendships and the rel-

One might think that the 'distinctive

0847 ships are more clearly instances of friendship

Now some relationships are clear

0833 means of connect- ing particular uses of the

0840 instances of friendships and others are clear-

mon to all uses of that word.

0819 a term is applied properly in a particular in-

0826 indeed, very few (if any) philosophers accept

As we get older, we gain experience

0245 er our socks match or not or what color our

birthday balloon is.

NUMBER OF FUCKS TO GIVE:

PAY ATTENTION TO WHERE AND

time, so you must spend them with care.

In life, our fucks must be spent on

As my father used to say, !Fucks

Pretending to

Pretending to

Care,

VENKATESH RAO

What is

URI D. LEIBOWITZ

Friendship?

INTRODUCTION

This paper aims to address the question in

its title by identifying a distinctive charac-

teristic of the friendship relation. The ac

count pro- posed seeks to explain why friend-

it is praised by philosophers, poets, and nov

elists, and why we all seek friends. The meth-

od employed is, broadly speaking, Aristotelian.

In book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics Ar

We must, as in all other cases

set the observed facts before

us and, after first discuss-

ing the difficulties, go on to

prove, if possible, the truth of

all the common opinions about

these affections of the mind

or, failing this, of the great

the objections and leave the

common opinions undisturbed,

sufficiently.

we shall have proved the case

er number and the most author

itative; for if we both refute

0007 ship plays a key role in human hap- piness, why

istotle writes:

fy. We know who we are and we no longer have a desire to change what now seems inevitable And in a strange way, this is liber ating. We no longer need to give a fuck about everything. Life is just what it is. We accept it, warts and all. We realize that we're never going to cure cancer or go to the moon or feel Jennifer Aniston's tits. And that's OK. Life 0280 fucking goes on. We now reserve our ever-dwin dling fucks only for the most truly fuckworthy parts of our lives: our families, our best friends, our golf swing. And to our astonishment. this is enough. This simplification actually makes us really fucking happy. Then somehow, one day, much later 0287 we wake up and we're old. And along with our gum lines and our sex drive, our ability to give a fuck has receded to the point of non-existence. In the twilight of our days, we carry out a paradoxical existence where we no lon ger have the energy to give a fuck about the big things in life, and instead we must dedi 0231 you've fucking fucked your fucks all the fuck up. 0294 cate the few fucks we have left to the simple and mundane yet increasingly difficult aspects of our lives; where to eat lunch, doctors ap

pointments for our creaky joints, 30-cent discounts at the supermarket, and driving with out drifting to sleep and killing a parking lot full of orphans. You know, practical concerns When we're young, we have tons of Then one day, on our deathbed. (hopefully) surrounded by the people we gave the majority of our fucks to throughout our life, and those few who still give a fuck about us, with a silent gasp we will gently let our last fuck go. Through the tears and the gen tly fading beeps of the heart monitor and the dimming fluorescence encapsulating us in its divine hospital halo, we drift into some unknowable and unfuckable void. Namaste, Fuckface

0063 ness (say you're at an office party where you A couple of years ago, I happened to catch the cannot be completely candid). Both are voice tail-end of a performance of Thornton Wilder's masks; masks you put on when you have to pre 1938 play Our Town on TV, and the poignant tend to agree with a sentiment you actively closing soliloquy stuck in my mind: disagree with. You relieve the strain of voic Most everybody's asleep in Grover's masks by moving to a social context where you Corners. There are a few lights on: Shorty can speak more freely, and express your real 0007 Hawkins, down at the depot, has just watched  $0070\,$   $\,$  emotions more completely. In the former case, the Albany train go by. And at the livery it would be nice to have another adult aroundmaking it a larger group — to share fears and stable somebody's setting up late and talking. Yes, it's clearing up. There are the stars do anxieties with after the child goes to bed. In ing their old, old crisscross journeys in the the latter case, it would be nice to retreat sky. Scholars haven't settled the matter yet for drinks with a couple of trusted friendsbut they seem to think there are no living bea smaller group—to have a more candid chat ings up there. Just chalk . or fire. Only this 0077 about current workplace politics. one is straining away, straining away all the Now consider two other kinds of time to make something of itself. The strain's  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right)$ masks: pretending to enjoy yourself (say at a so bad that every sixteen hours everybody lies family gathering or a graduation ceremony where down and gets a rest. people who care a lot more are deeply immersed Being the unsentimental jerk I am, in the proceedings) and pretending to be in what stuck in my mind was not the poignancy terested (such as when listening to a boring but the evocative stress and relaxation met-0084 but influential person drone on in a situaaphor. Today, thanks to the medicalization of tion where leaving would cause offense and re angst, most people would use the word stress  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) \left$ percussions). These are exit masks: masks you rather than strain to convey the thought. put on when you have to pretend to care. You

relieve the strain by moving to a social con

text where you don't have to speak or fake an

emotional intensity you don't feel. Again, in

former case by retreating to a smaller group

(perhaps going for a walk alone to unwind and

less. Of the two, exit masks are more basic

ing to agree adds no additional strain. You'll

nod along to whatever. Pretending to care is

there's an obvious a 2×2 of retreat patterns

here: retreating in response to voice-mask

strain versus exit-mask strain, retreating to a

smaller group vs. retreating to a larger group

are only two patterns. Group size is not sig-

GROUP SIZE VERSUS

wards both smaller and larger groups to relieve

both voice-mask strain and exit-voice strain is

misleading because groups are not communities

In both of the voice-mask cases, you're actually

moving towards a larger community. In both of

the exit-mask cases, you are moving towards a

ishment for relieving the stress either through

tarian power of making people wait. Since pur

ishments for transgressing waiting norms are

calibrated against big, visible actions like

to justify acting harshly against relatively

innocuous acts like texting or tweeting. The

phone acts as a loophole in the cultural con

trol structure. The weaponized-sacred becomes

overkill for the subtle act of subversion, th

norm fails to function as designed, and the

SMALL STEPS AND GIANT

onized-sacred societies, is to think of it as a

means for taking a brittle working material -

the human psyche - and getting it to work like

a perfectly inelastic material like putty, capa

ble of handling an indefinite amount of strain

without either breaking or requiring extrem

the stretching, we can behave like putty with-

out turning into putty. And the authoritarian

eye cannot easily tell the difference (leading

of course, to a technological arms race, which

well in Neil Armstrong's line, one small step

for a man, a giant leap for mankind. Apollo as

a story of exploration represents neither in-

dividual heroism (in the sense of a Campbe

lian narrative) or community heroism but bu

use of the Jeffersonian-Hamiltonian distinc

tion to analyze social systems. Stress-strain

models based on voice/exit masks shed further

light on that distinction. Both individual her

oism and community heroism are the basis for

Jeffersonian narratives. Such narratives tell

ing with grace under intense mask strain, lik

the tragic citizens of Grover's Corner. Dead

wood is a story of voice-mask heroism where a

community comes together against an external

small town to find freedom in a big city is a

gion which the linked article above discusses

is a story of Hamiltonian heroism: putting to

gether technological systems to relieve bot

kinds of mask strain without requiring signif

icant amounts of social engineering. This al

ing your mechanisms of rational deliberation

Intuitively such an influence would seem to be

with hypnosis and behavioral conditioning-are

without engaging their capacities for rational

deliberation. The effectiveness of such tag

tics is almost certainly wildly exaggerated i

the popular (and sometimes philosophical) imag

ination. However, if we imagine them working

as well as they are sometimes portrayed, the

might mean to say that manipulation bypasse

reason. Thus, we might understand manipulatio

in terms of bypassing rational deliberation, and

understand (bypassing rational deliberation) in

terms of exploiting psychological mechanisms or

techniques that can generate behavior without

bypass rational deliberation would be for it

to appeal to non-conscious motivations. Eri

Cave explores this idea in a pair of paper

(Cave 2007, 2014) on what he calls imotive ma

0469 cerns, which are conscious pro-attitudes, and

nipulation. Cave distinguishes between con

unconscious inon-concern motives. He then de

fines motive manipulation as influence that op

erates by engaging unconscious non-concern mo

tives. This theory clearly implies that appeal

to non-conscious motives, as well as influence

es that operate via (quasi-hypnotic techniques

lative (Cave 2014: 188). Although Cave himsel

does not claim that all forms of manipulation

are of this sort (Cave 2007: 130), would such

a claim be plausible? Or could we add the ap

peal to non-conscious motives to the list of

psychological mechanisms that bypass reason

es a serious problem. If we define manipula

tion in terms of bypassing rational delibera

tion, and then use the appeal to unconsciou

motives and exaggerated portrayals of hypnosis

means to bypass rational deliberation, we wil

set a very high bar for something to count a

manipulation. This bar would be too high t

count any of Irving's tactics as manipulation

since none of them completely bypasses Tor

ya's capacity for rational deliberation in the

ditioning, or the appeal to unconscious motives

what it might mean for manipulation to bypass

reason would construe manipulation as an in

fluence that is covert in a way that allows i

are an expansionary species and we might a

well get good at it. Let me wrap this up fo

hypothesis that the opposite of addiction i

not cure, but community. Setting aside gene-

ic predispositions, it seems that the risk o

debilitating addiction to anything is vastl

lowered and even managed down into a positive

if the cause of addiction is socially situa-

any latent genetic tendencies towards alcoho

ism or addictive gaming. Drinking and playing

games socially seems to make us flourish mor

instead of degenerate (though it does creat

higher-level addictions, such as civilizationa

technology we use to lower voice-mask stres

life of its own when the social cues governin

its use are removed. The cure for voice-mask

is a reason that generative, creative work, even

when done in complete isolation, does not turn

into a debilitating addiction. When technology

freedom rather than belonging in other words)

increasing isolation helps you flourish mor

argued in Eternal Hypochondria of the Expand

ing Mind, this might actually be the bigger ef

is used to lower exit mask strain (to creat

strain becomes the new disease.

0721 nation cannot be extended to exit masks. There

0728 rather than turning into an addiction. As

fect on historical time scales.

can turn into an addiction that acquires a

We can explain this as follows: any

But there is no reason this expla

0707 ed. Drinking or gaming alone risks triggering

0693 term, our social natures dominate. In the long

term, our exploratory nature dominates

0700 I've encountered in recent years has been the

now with a note on addiction

addiction to oil).

Perhaps a more promising account of

To paraphrase Stewart Brand, w

One of the most interesting idea

way that subliminal advertising, hypnosis, con

0490 and subliminal advertising to illustrate what it

Unfortunately, this approach fac

0483 and define manipulation in terms of exploiting

such mechanisms?

would appear to do.

0476 and (crude behavioral conditioning) are manipu

Another way that manipulation migh

0455 they would constitute clear examples of what it

0462 any input from rational deliberation.

Subliminal advertising tactics—along

0441 could influence your behavior without engag-

0448 fluence others without their knowledge and thus

But Apollo (and movies like Conta

force. Every story of escaping an oppressiv

0490 the story of individuals and communities act-

This curious (simulated putty) aspec

In several previous posts, I've made

0469 stress. By allowing technology to do most of

I talked about in an old post).

reaucratic heroism

0497 story of exit-mask heroism.

One way to understand how technol

0455 authoritarian eye loses visibility into the be-

0462 ogy works as a means of disarmament in weap

havior behind the mask.

LEAPS

0448 leaving or talking on a dumbphone, it is hard

0441 ceremonial silence or physical discomfort. Pun-

complaining or leaving is high.

COMMUNITY SIZE

nificant, community size is.

These are opposed drives: moving

On the surface, it might seem that

As it turns out though, though, there

The fact that you can retreat to-

But smartphones drain the authori-

get the bullshit out of your head

the most light on the cultural idea underlying 0028 the passage above. The distinction and rela-0091 the first case, you might relieve the stress by moving to a larger group that affords great tionship between stress and strain can be uner anonymity (such as a big city) and in the derstood using a stress-strain graph. In common usage, the stress and strain are used interchangeably, but in engineering, stress is the force acting on a material, while strain is the resulting distor 0035 tion in the material. In humans, stress can be 0098 in social space to speak and emote more vermeasured by the internal anxiety we feel, and sus moving in social space to speak and emote various physiological symptoms. Strain can be measured by the distortion represented by the it is only hard to pretend to agree when you social masks we need to maintain, in order to care. If you don't care to begin with, pretend function under that stress There are two basic types of masks: 0105 emotional bullshitting. Pretending to agree is masks of pretending to care are exit masks, and masks of pretending to agree are voice masks. I suspect these two kinds of masks, between them, cover almost all cases of preference

But it is actually the engineering

sense of both terms, used together, that sheds

To understand the stress-strain graphs, we have to consider how we attempt to relieve the strain of operating with a mask Usually, we look to retreat from the stress ful situation in a direction that relieves the strain. This direction can be defined in social 0056 terms. Let's look at a few examples of masks and retreat patterns. Consider first the difference be tween two masks: putting on a brave face (say when you're in adult trapped in a dangerou

MASKS AND RETREATS

falsification.

situation with a child, where you cannot admit you're scared or worried) and political correctwith a conversation on Twitter you actually care about Excuse yourself by saying you have a work appointment to Money, drugs, communication technologies, impersonal organizations. The Big Four 0385 technological means for extending your elastic limit. These technologies also work to lowe voice-mask strain. Say you're at a meeting be-

ing dominated by a cabal proposing a course of action you're opposed to. You want to speak up, but they're powerful and open dissent would be dangerous. You could: Bribe members of the cabal with money, subverting the preferences they must pretend to in public

Suggest continuing the meeting at a bar, and speak up under cover of drunkenness Backchannel on IM with co-conspirators at the meeting on your phone Invoke organizational protocols like the ability to formally propose amendments The technological leverage in both

0406 these cases arises from the fact that you do not need to openly challenge notions of sacredness, or precipitate conflict with an au thoritarian agent in possession of weapons of mass sacredness. In all these cases, technol ogy represents a means of subversion rather than direct conflict. It increases your ager 0476 of technologically enabled humanity is captured 0413 cy while masked rather than moving you to a context where you can act unmasked Written language is a particular ly powerful example: it allows us to entirely avoid the physical stress of putting on ex

pressions we don't feel This presence of an authoritarian 0420 adversary is an important factor in mask dynamics. The strain imposed by a mask maps to a gain to a counterparty who is the benefi ciary of the mask. Normally, a zero-sum condition exists: if you lower your mask, the counterparty must raise their mask to compensate, giving up some gains. This gain accrues primarily because the mask constrains how you can act. If you act more freely, the counterparty must gener ally act less freely. But if you can act with greater leverage without taking off your mask, the gain to the counterparty need not visibly decrease, limiting their ability to retaliate

0434 and be seen as justified. In other words, technology drains power from those who impose masks on others. An example should hammer home the point. A major class of situations where we need masks is waiting. Powerful people make others wait around all the time, often in states of 0378 it might also guide it. If an account of manipulation identifies its underlying character istic as being relevantly similar to some othe thing that we have independent grounds for re garding as morally wrong, then we would likely want to argue that manipulation is wrong for 0385 just our answers to one or both questions if they together imply implausible consequence For example, if we define manipulation as ever form of influence besides rational persuasio

or coercion, and then claim that the wrongnes of manipulation is absolute, we will be force to conclude that no form of influence besides rational persuasion is ever morally legitimate This is a radical conclusion that few would be willing to accept, but it is a conclusion tha results from combining a certain answer to the identification question with a certain answer to the evaluation question.

Answering the **Identification Question** 

tion have been put forward. They can be groupe 0406 roughly into three main categories: those that characterize manipulation as an influence that bypasses reason; those that treat it as a form of trickery, and those that treat it as a form of pressure. These are rough categories, and a single theory might fit into more than one of REASON

them. But they are useful groupings nonetheless. MANIPULATION AS BYPASSING Manipulation is often said to by pass; the target's rational deliberation. It i not always clear, however, whether this claim is 0420 meant as a definition of manipulation or mereone that partly explains its moral status). Bu

ly as a statement about manipulation (perhaps let us consider whether the idea that manipu lation bypasses reason can serve as a defini tion of manipulation. The thought that manipulative influ-0427 ences bypass the target's capacity for rational deliberation is appealing for at least two reasons. First, it seems reasonable to think that because manipulation differs from ratio nal persuasion, it must influence behavior by means that do not engage the target's rational capacities. Second, it seems intuitive to de

0434 scribe forms of influence that do clearly bypass the target's capacity for rational delib eration as manipulative. For example, suppos that subliminal advertising worked in the way that it is commonly—though probably inaccu rately-portrayed, so that being exposed to a subliminal message urging you to 'Drink Coke' 0630 appearing from the cultural universe, followed by a Big Crunch. Curiously, those who dream of a con

munitarian utopia created by such a Big Crunch do not see the potential for an expansionary Big Bang as the main threat (Asimov's Space society is rarely invoked as a picture of tech no-dystopia). Most communitarians believe (mistakenly in my opinion), that the Big Bang and technology driven societal expansion is not a threat because most humans would not want it So they focus their fears around the Ultimate Anticommunity: the Singularity. A Big Crunch of people terminally trapped under immense anti-belonging stress and extreme, frozen, voice-masks. Voice-masks that must extend deep into the brain, lest the Evil AI reads your very deepest thoughts via brain implants and punishes you for thinking them. Smile with your amygdala; you're on candid neuro-camera, says Skynet. Why this is a ridiculous fear is a story for another day. Suffice it to say tha

the Big Bang of culture as an eternally expand

ing exit zone is a more real threat to thos who value growing together over growing apart. Kidding aside, though I am an ex pansionary Big Bang type myself, it's not tha am opposed to the natural inclinations of the Big Crunchers. It's just that I think they have no real hope. On the scale of days, weeks and small towns, the collective nature of hu mans seems to dominate. The forces of belong ingness are extremely strong on these scales Moreover, since they are capable of being both positive and negative, they tend to cancel out But on the scale of complete (and increasing) lifespans and cheap and expanding access to the entire globe, the weaker forces of exit com pound powerfully and unidirectionally, exerting a steady, expansionary force on civilization We are amazingly good at ignoring

spective, our accounts of culture are curious ly biased. We pay a great deal of attention to our social, collective natures and our genetic need for love and belonging. We pay almost no attention to our exploratory, individualist na ture and our genetic need to get the hell away from each other using any and all means, driv en by curiosity, restlessness and the desire for freedom. The literature on our social-ape nature is extensive. The only significant idea I've found on our exploratory-ape nature is Potts' variability selection theory. Yet, ou evolutionary history shows that unlike any go rilla or chimpanzee population, our explorato ry nature has already driven us to occupy th whole planet and build layers upon layers of technology to stretch it out to near-Jupiter size in social psychological terms. In the short

The Subtle Art

(01)

MARK MANSON

it is inevitable that he will bump up against his fellow passengers. Suppose that he capitalizes on this fact to deliberately bump his rival job candidate (who is on the same subway car) out the door just as it closes, thus ensuring that he will be late for his interview. Jones's rival would be subjected to some bumping does not excuse Jones for intentionally bumping his rival out the door. Similarly, even if we inevitably introduce non-rational influences into each other's decision-making, that fact seems insufficient to prove that such inthis analogy is imperfect, but it should suffice to call into question the assumption that a deliberate nudge is not manipulative simply because some nudging is inevitable. (For a similar argument, see Douglass 2022.)

al collections of collocated people who hap pen to be in the same place at the same time And it is only psychological heal 0140 ing that matters, not physical. A big hospital in a major city has far more physical healing capability and a bigger raw group size than a small remote village, but isn't necessarily a bigger community (which leads people to some times give up better medical care for better comfort). A highly impersonal social group, like 0147 the people waiting to apply for a driver's license at a government office, might have zero community size despite being numerically large A hostile group could be viewed as having a negative size: they are out to hurt you rather than help you heal. Having to pretend to agree with something you are diametrically 0154 opposed to is the most extreme kind of voice strain you can experience. Group size cannot be smaller than zero, but community size can tify various requirements (moral or epistemic) go as low as -150.. that this relation imposes on those who par-

THE EXIT-VOICE ASYMMETRY

cietal grouping but is actually an exit zone:

somewhere you go for greater anonymity and

which you feel a personal relationship of be-

longingness. In terms of size, communities top

Communities are social contexts to

smaller community

Whatever the details of measuring community size, the qualitative distinction be tween groups and communities creates an asymmetry between exit masks and voice masks: You can stop pretending to care once you are alone, but you can only truly stop pretending to agree when you are with a group with whom 0168 you can voice your disagreement to sympathetic ears. The amount of anonymous or pseudonymous voicing of opinions online is one good indicator that being alone is not enough if you are wearing a voice mask. This asymmetry shows up in the broader exit-voice political dichotomy as well: 0175 choosing voice as a means of political expression always means you care. Choosing exit on the other hand, means you might either care and disagree (and are leaving for a different community) or that you don't care and are leav-

clear from what you do once you exit: do you 0182 become nomadic or immediately start looking for a new home where you feel you belong more? For this post, I am primarily in terested in exit as an expression of indifference rather than dissent. Exit as a means to giving up the bullshit instead of giving up the lie. Dissent exits are driven by feelings 0504 low very large groups to stretch and act collectively in ways no organic, non-technologica assemblage of humanity could. Advanced rocket engines might have gotten us to the moon, but money, alcohol, cigarettes, typewriters, phones

copiers and meeting procedures helped the hu mans involved build those engines without mur 0511 dering each other in the process. Where advanced technology is in volved (unlike say building pyramids using whips and shackles), weaponized sacredness (in this case the rhetoric of the Cold War space race versus the Soviets) arguably plays a nega tive role by creating stresses and strains in 0518 imagined communities, which prove costly later. These costs show up in the form of the ills of hyperextended Hamiltonian systems, such as a runaway military-industrial complex. What ac-

tually enables the heroic accomplishment it self is not the weaponized sacredness, but the use of technology to subvert and dilute it at 0525 both the Jeffersonian-group level and the nation-sized imagined-community level. you get the leveraged fone small step for a man<sup>3</sup>, subject to entirely human levels of stress, and requiring no superheroic gifts to endure Neil Armstrong reputedly had ice-water in his 0532 veins and a preternatural capacity for handling stress, but it was still within the nor-

self), we got a giant leap, way past the nomi 0539 nal elastic limit of humanity sans technology. the Space Race certainly drove the goal-setting at the political level in the US and USSR. Ideological propaganda was certainly instrumental in creating the necessary level scientists and engineers on either side of the space race worked under the influence of the sort of (real or dissimulated) ideologi-

tribal warfare. The reason is simple: complex technological achievements that draw on human 0553 creativity require far more lowering of exit masks than lowering of voice masks. To get to the Moon, you need to stop pretending to care what others think a lot more than you need to stop pretending to agree with what others think ganization was designed to enable specializa-0560 tion: giving everybody intellectual turf to retreat to. Somebody interested in electronics did not have to pretend to care about some body interested in book-keeping.

cal achievements enable more exit than voice has major consequences 0504 to bypass reason. Certainly, if an influence is covert and thus escapes one's notice, then i would also seem to escape any conscious rea soning process. An early version of the idea that manipulation is best characterized as co vert influence was suggested by the political 0511 es manipulation as an influence on the target which is covert in the sense that the targe

lacks knowledge or understanding of how sho is being influenced. put forward by Daniel Susser, Beate Roessle 0518 ulation is hidden influence. : Covertly influ 0525 nipulation; is that it involves changing a per

0532 psychological influences that bypass consciou 0539 with other clear cases of manipulation. Many manipulative influences, such as peer pressur nagging, emotional appeals, guilt trips, do no appear to be hidden influences. Indeed, it is difficult not to be aware of an attempted in fluence when that influence takes the form of nagging, peer pressure, or a guilt trip. Perhaps, though, it is not the in fluence itself that must be covert in order

to influence me, if I am unaware of your true

Such a view is defended by Radim Belohrad (2019), who claims that In manipulation, the influence er is keen to create an impres sion that her motives are very different from what she proj ects. .: The manipulator alway 0630 ticipants. On his view, concentrating on one's friend rather than on the friends' shared in

surely friends can take an interest in each oth er's life, and sharing secrets with one's friend need not obstruct a friendship-I think his 0637 view on friendship demonstrates that sharing secrets is not essential to friendship. De spite his unorthodox view of friendship, Lewis is clearly trying to give an account of friend ship and it is implausible to think that he is completely wrong about the nature of this re lation. Finally, to my mind, Thomas' claim that 0644 people who are public about their lives cannot have close friendships is implausible. If it were true, then authors who write revealing autobiographical novels, for example, as wel as many contemporary (celebrities) whose per sonal lives are scrutinized in the media in ex cruciating detail, would be incapable of having close friendships. It is implausible that one's ability to have close friends could depend, for

0658 that are characteristic of many friendships. Kennett (1998) [henceforth C&K] 0665 relation of direction and interpretation. As a close friend of another,3 they tell us, 5 one is characteristically and distinctively receptive to being directed and interpreted and so in

> these ways drawn by the other. (503) One i than healing potential. directed by another if lone's choices are shape On the flip side, you cannot give yourself a satisfying massage. A fun party re 0231 quires a minimum number of people (perhaps half in a small town offer more healing potential

cafeteria manager to place healthier food items nudges go beyond the medical context. Thal at eye level to nudge customers into chooser and Sunstein advocate their use by govern 0196 ing them? The question of whether and when 0259 ment, employers, and other institutions besides nudges manipulate has sparked a lively debate. the health care industry. The use of nudges Some defenders of nudges suggest by government raises additional concerns, es pecially about the paternalism behind them that because it is often impossible to frame a decision without pointing the decision-maker (Arneson 2015; White 2013). Questions about in some direction, there is nothing manipulative other forms of manipulation in the political about framing such decisions in one way rathsphere have also been raised by philosophers 0266 and political theorists. The idea that politi-0203 er than another. For example, physicians must provide outcome information either in terms of fatality rate or survival rate (and if they give both, they must give one first), and cafeteria managers must choose something to put at eye level in the displays. This being the case, why think that deliberately choosing one way

cal leaders might gain, retain, or consolidate political power by means that we would now call manipulative can be traced back at least as far back as ancient Greek figures like Cal licles and Thrasymachus. Niccolo Machiavelli not only details but recommends political tac 0273 tics that we would likely regard as manipulative. More recent philosophical work on po litical manipulation includes Robert Goodin's 1980 book on Manipulatory Politics and Clau dia Mills's important paper, !Politics and Manipulation, (1995), as well as Dowding (2016), Riker (1986), Ware (1981), Gorton (2016), Whit-0280 field (2020), and the papers collected in (Le Cheminant and Parrish 2011); for an overview of this literature, see Noggle (2021). In the field of business ethics. much philosophical attention has been focused on the question of whether advertising is manipulative. The economist John Kenneth Gal-0287 braith famously called advertising the manipulation of consumer desire; and compared being

0252 and Nys & Engelen 2017. For arguments that

and Nys & Engelen 2017).

nudges can be sometimes morally justified even

when they are manipulative, see Wilkinson 2017

Questions about the legitimacy of

0315 tising can subvert autonomy or improperly tam-

per with consumers' desires (e.g., Santilli 1983).

Such critiques are either versions of or close

relatives to critiques of advertising as manip-

ulation. On the other side, Robert Arrington

argues that, as a matter of fact, advertising

very seldom manipulates its audience or under

Michael Phillips has marshalled a large body

of empirical evidence to argue that while some

advertising is manipulative, its critics vastly

overestimate its power to influence consumers

sion so far, two main questions need to be an-

swered by any satisfactory theory of manipulation

cation question-concerns definition and iden-

tification: How can we identify which forms

of influence are manipulative and which are

not? A satisfactory answer would presumably

involve a general definition of manipulation,

which explains what the diverse forms of ma-

nipulative influence have in common. In addi-

of manipulation are manifestations of a single

more basic phenomenon, an answer to the idea

tification question should also provide crite-

ria for determining whether a given instance

of influence is manipulative. Such an analy-

sis might, of course, show that some of the

clined to count as manipulation are relevantly

different from clear cases of manipulation, so

that we might be led to revise our usage of

uation question-concerns morality: How should

A satisfactory answer to this question should

tell us whether manipulation is always immor-

al. And if manipulation is not always immor-

al, it should tell us how to determine when

a satisfactory answer to the evaluation ques-

al when it is immoral. What feature of manip-

ulation makes it immoral in those situations

evaluation questions are distinct, they are

not entirely independent. Any analysis of why

will presuppose some account of what manip-

ulation is. Thus, our answer to the identifi

the evaluation question. But an answer to the

identification question might do more than con-

strain our answer to the evaluation question:

light of a fully worked out and well supported

theory of manipulation—if we had one. Never-

theless, this list should provide a reasonably

good sense of what we mean by {manipulation}

in ordinary discourse. It should also serve to

illustrate the wide variety of tactics common-

as a form of influence that is neither coer-

cion nor rational persuasion. But this charac-

terization immediately raises the question: Is

Manipulation is often characterized

0063 our judgments about some of these tactics in

cation question will constrain our answer to

0371 manipulation is immoral (when it is immoral)

Although the identification and

0364 tion should explain why manipulation is immor-

manipulation is immoral. But more importantly,

A second question—call it the eval-

0350 phenomena that we were pre-theoretically in-

0357 we evaluate the moral status of manipulation?

the term imanipulation.

when it is immoral?

0070 ly described as manipulation.

0343 tion to illuminating how the various instances

As will be apparent from our discus-

One question—call it the identifi-

0322 mines its audience's autonomy (Arrington 1982).

MANIPULATION

0329 1.3 TWO QUESTIONS ABOUT

(Phillips 1997).

the target of advertising with being assailed by demons which in stilled in him a passion sometimes for silk shirts, sometimes for kitchenware, sometimes for chamber pots, and sometimes for

orange squash. (Galbraith 1958) Several philosophers have made simi lar criticisms of advertising. Often, these criticisms are limited to forms of advertising that do not simply convey accurate factual information. As is the case with purely informational nudges, the presentation of accurate information in advertising might not be manipulative in and of itself, though perhaps the selection of which information is presented might be manipulative. Be that as it may, most advertising attempts to influence consumer behavior by means other than or in addition to purely 0308 providing accurate information. Such non-informational advertising is the most apt target for worries about manipulation. Tom Beau champ and Roger Crisp have made influential arguments that such advertising can be manipulative (Beauchamp 1984; Crisp 1987). Similar criticisms claim that non-informational adver-

> Consider this case: Tonya plans to do Y, but Irving wants her to do X instead. Irving has tried unsuccessfully to provide Tonya with reasons for doing X rather than Y. If Irving is unwilling to resort to coercion or force, he might deploy any of the following tactics to try to influence Tonya's choice. For example, Charm Tonya into wanting to please Irving by doing X.

vation that manipulation is a contrary of ra-

tion from those that are not immoral.

tional persuasion.

0035 8.

Exaggerate the advantages of

doing X and the disadvantages every form of influence that is neither coerof doing Y, and/or understate cion nor rational persuasion a form of manipthe disadvantages of doing X 0077 ulation? If manipulation does not occupy the and the advantages of doing Y entire logical space of influences that are Make Tonya feel guilty for neither rational persuasion nor coercion, then preferring to do Y. what distinguishes it from other forms of in-Induce Tonya into an emotiona fluence that are neither coercion nor rational persuasion? state that makes doing X seen more appropriate than it really 0084 thought to include an element of moral disap-Point out that doing Y wil make Tonya seem less worthy and appealing to her friends

nya is commonly taken to be a moral criticism of Irving's behavior. Is manipulation always Make Tonya feel badly about immoral? Why is manipulation immoral (when it herself and portray Y as a is immoral)? If manipulation is not always immoral, then what determines when it is immoral? choice that will confirm or exacerbate this feeling, and/or portray X as a choice that will Preliminaries disconfirm or combat it. Do a small favor for Tonya 1.1 ORDINARY VERSUS GLOBAL before asking her to do X, so that she feels obligated to Make Tonva doubt her own Forms of influence like those listjudgment so that she will rely

ed above are commonplace in ordinary life. This on Irving's advice to do X. distinguishes them from forms of influence de-Make it clear to Tonya that scribed as {manipulation} in the free will literif she does Y rather than X, ature. There, the term imanipulation; typically Irving will withdraw his friend refers to radical programming or reprogramming ship, sulk, or become irritable of all or most of an agent's beliefs, desires, 0105 and other mental states. Such global manipuand generally unpleasant. Focus Tonya's attention on lation (as we might call it) is also typically imagined as happening via decidedly extra-or some aspect of doing Y tha Tonya fears and ramp up that dinary methods, such as supernatural interven

fear to get her to change he tion, direct neurological engineering, or radical mind about doing Y. programs of indoctrination and psychological conditioning, Global manipulation is typical Each of these tactics could rea-0112 ly thought to deprive its victim of free will. 0049 sonably be called manipulation. Many also have more specific, commonplace names, such This common intuition drives the !manipulation as 'guilt trip' (tactic 3), 'gaslighting' (tactic argument, which seeks to defend incompati bilism by claiming that living in a determinis 8), speer pressure; (tactic 5), snegging; (tactic 6), and 'emotional blackmail', (tactic 9). Per tic universe is analogous to having been the haps not everyone will agree that every tactic victim of global manipulation. (For a detailed on this list is properly described as manipu discussion of this argument, see the discus-0056 lation. And in some cases, whether the tactic 0119 sion of manipulation arguments in the entry on arguments for incompatibilism.) seems manipulative may depend on various de tails not specified in the case as described. Despite the differences betwee For example, if Y is seriously immoral, then what we might call fordinary manipulation, and perhaps it is not manipulative for Irving to the forms of manipulation in the free will litinduce Tonya to feel guilty about planning to erature, it is still worth wondering about the relationship between them. If global manipulado Y. It is also possible that we might revise 0630 introducing non-rational influences into delib-0693 rious challenges: If we take <code>!bypassing! very</code> eration, would cohere nicely with the obserliterally, then the account seems to miss many

loosen our understanding of bypassing reason Despite its appeal, this approach so that it applies to any non-rational form faces a significant challenge: Many forms of of influence, then it seems to count as manipnon-rational influence do not seem to be ma ulative many forms of influence that do not 0637 nipulative. For example, graphic portrayals of 0700 seem manipulative. And if we fix that problem the dangers of smoking or texting while driv by adopting a conception of reason according ing are not obviously manipulative even when to which appeals to the emotions are not ipse facto non-rational, then we are left with the they impart no new information to the target (Blumenthal-Barby 2012). In addition, moral original problem of determining which appeals persuasion often involves non-rational influ to the emotions are manipulative and which are ence. Appeals to the Golden Rule invite the not. Perhaps there is a way to characterize bypassing reason; that can undergird a plausi-0644 interlocutor to imagine how it would feel to ble definition of manipulation in terms of bybe on the receiving end of the action under consideration. It is difficult to believe that passing reason. But the most obvious ways t all such appeals are inherently manipulative, define {bypassing reason} face serious problems even when they appeal more to the feelings Nevertheless, even if defining ma than to facts (of which the interlocutor may nipulation in terms of bypassing reason turns already be aware). Finally, consider something out to be a dead end, it is still possible that 0714 manipulation really does bypass reason in some 0651 as innocuous as dressing up before going on a date or an interview. Presumably, the purpose sense. But it may turn out that we need a of such {impression management} is to convey a independent definition of manipulation before certain impression to the audience. Yet dress

examples of genuine manipulation. But if we

we can determine in what sense manipulation bypasses reason. Some writers, such as Cassing up on a single occasion provides little if Sunstein and Jason Hanna, seem to have such ny rational basis for conclusions about what an approach in mind when they initially charthe well-dressed person is really like day in 0658 and day out. Thus, impression management of 0721 acterize manipulation in terms of bypassing or this sort seems to be an attempt at non-ra subverting reason, but then go on to gloss iby tional influence. Yet it seems odd to count it passing or subverting; in terms of some othe account of manipulation (Sunstein 2016: 82as manipulation—especially if we treat imanip ulation; as having a connotation of being im 89; Hanna 2015). moral. Of course, we might avoid this problem However, a recent argument by Moti by defining 'manipulation' in a morally neutral Gorin raises questions for the claim that ma-0728 nipulation bypasses reason—even when that 0665 way, and then claiming that these forms of manipulation are not immoral, while others are claim is not being used to define what manip lation is (Gorin 2014a). Gorin argues that ma But this would merely move the problem with

out solving it, for now we would want to know nipulation can occur even when the target is offered only good reasons. His argument turns what distinguishes immoral forms of manipula largely on examples like this: James wishes for Jacques's death, since this would enable James Perhaps we could address this prob 0672 lem by defining reason more broadly, so that 0735 to inherit a large fortune. James knows that appeals to emotions could count as forms of Jacques believes that (1) God exists, and that (2) if God did not exist, life would be mean rational persuasion. Such a move might be in dependently motivated by the rejection of what ingless, and he would have no reason to go on some critics regard as the hyper-cognitivist living. James provides Jacques with rationa  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1$ radical separation of reason from emotion. How ever, it is not clear that allowing emotional arguments fully engage Jacques's rational fac-0679 appeals to count as rational persuasion will 0742 ulties, and consequently Jacques concludes that get us very far in defining manipulation in God does not exist. Jacques promptly commits terms of bypassing reason. For while we will suicide-just as Jack had hoped he would. As have avoided the implausible implication that Gorin notes, James's activities do not appea all appeals to emotion are ipso facto manipulato have bypassed, subverted, or otherwise been tive, we now face the question of which appeals detrimental to Jacques's capacity for reasonto emotion are manipulative and which are not. indeed, James depended on Jacques's ability 0686 And that is close to the very question that 0749 to employ his rational faculties to draw (what the idea of bypassing reason was supposed to James regarded as) the correct conclusion from his arguments. If we accept Gorin's charac

terization of James's actions as manipulative,

Thomas seems to think. Thomas might conced

that many friendships are fairly structured bu

insist that deep friendships are only minimal

ly unstructured. However, we can easily image

ine close friends who enjoy observing a stric

protocol together and, indeed, friendships i

which observing this protocol is a feature that

cements the friend- ship?. It is not uncommo

a weekly drink at the bar or a monthly mov

for friends to form certain traditions—e.g.

ie night. These kinds of traditions make re

the claim that manipulation bypasses the tarthen his example poses a significant challenge get's capacities for rational deliberation, us to the claim that manipulation always bypasse ng this claim to define manipulation faces se the target's capacity for rational deliberation 0504 gland exchange letters in which they successinant means by which mutual trust is conveyed fully communicate to each other that each one between friends. !The extent to which a perso of them values the other, we might be reluctant is willing to reveal to us private information o describe their relationship as a friendship he writes, is the most significant measure w because they do not engage in shared activi can have of that person's willingness to trust ties. And even if The President and The Queer us. One who is public about virtually every 0574 tion to reveal to a friend and consequently she would be incapable of having deep friendships The features Thomas identifies ar indeed, features that we often find in friend ships. However, I doubt that these features are es- sential to friendship. First, many friend ships are more structured and sensitive t 0581 consideration of propriety and protocol than

0511 international fundraiser—we might still not feel comfortable describing their relationship as a friendship. The President and The Queen each chooses the other as the occupant of a certain office; they do not regard the other successfully communicate mutual valuing by way 0518 of such shared activities. 4 ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS

0525 Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett (1998). I

0252 your mind. You can think of the Dunbar Gap

(150 minus the community size) as the measure

of the stress. We are under the lowest pos

sible voice-mask stress when the Dunbar Gap

when we are alone (again, in the sense of be

longing rather than merely being around people

changeably for a reason: up to a point, know

change together in very simple, often linea

on whether or not the material is brittle, i

tort endlessly without a significant further i

back when the stressor is removed. Before you

reach that point, the stress-strain relation

laxed state and shape.

show that the account proposed here respects

the main insights of these authors and that

it al- lows that both accounts are, for the

most part, true. I take this to be a virtue of

Thus, despite the plausibility of

In this section, two influential accounts of friendship are consid- ered-one by Laurence Thomas (1990) and the other by

the account on offer. As Aristotle observed lationships more structured, and yet, contrary !Now some of these views have been held by to what Thomas' account implies, they may we 0532 many men and men of old, others by a few emi make friendships deeper rather than less dee nent persons; and it is not probable that ei Second, although our paradigma ic image of friendship might be a relation i ther of these should be entirely mistaken, but which neither friend has authority over the rather that they should be right in at least other, it seems possible (as mentioned above some one respect or even in most respects. On Thomas' account, the fundamental feature for two people to be friends even if one ha of friendship is that friends confide in on authority over the other. For example, a teacher 0539 another. The idea of deep friends not confidand her student can also be friends. As dis ing in one another, Thomas writes, seems al cussed in the previous section, this might no most unthink- able.; (49) Thomas' strategy for be very common, but it doesn't seem impossible nquiring into the nature of friendship is to Third, while normally friends trust identify features that differentiate friend each other and they may often share privat ship from a parent-child relationship. Thomas information one with the other, these feature identifies three salient features. While par are not essential to friendships. Consider the 0546 ents and children do not choose to participate 0609 following utterance: He is my dearest friend in a parent-child relation, the relationship of but I don't trust him; I would never leave him friendship is one in which each friend must alone with my wife. Perhaps we would prefer not choose to participate. Friendship, according to to have to say this about our closest friend but this sentence doesn't seem to involve is, it is a relation in which thow the parties interact is not primarily a function of social 0553 roles, and so where matters of propriety and protocol are least apropos, if at all.3 Consequently, in order for a friend ship to succeed, both friends must be attuned

0588

misuse of the term (close friend) or (trust. Likewise, it is not at all obvious that sha 0616 ing secrets is essential to friendship. Indeed, C. S. Lewis takes an opposite view on the role of self-disclosure in friendships For of course we do not want t to the way in which the other views and in know our Friend's affairs at all. Friendship teracts with the world. A second salient fea unlike Eros, is uninquisitive. You become ture is that in a friendship, unlike a par man's Friend without knowing or caring whetl 0560 ent-child relation, neither party has authority 0623 er he is married or single or how he earns a living. no one cares two-pence about anyon The final feature of friendship else's family, profession, class, income, race Thomas identifies is mutual trust cemented by or previous history. Lewis believes that friendships are self-disclosure. This feature lies at the heart grounded in an interest shared by their par of Thomas' account of friendship. Thomas con tends that mutual self-disclosure is the predom

0315 downs<sup>3</sup>, they experience psychotic <sup>4</sup>breaks<sup>3</sup>. Sometimes you can bounce back quickly with some active effort, if you were not pushed too fa past your elastic limit. Other times it can take years. Sometimes you cannot bounce back completely at all. It depends on how far you've You can recognize the signs of impending breakdown. As a voice mask starts

We use stress and strain inter as the proportionality *(or elastic)* limit, they to break, you get angrier and more cruel, or break down in tears. As an exit mask starts ways. When the stress goes up, the strain goes to break, you might get increasingly callous up, when the stress goes down, the strain goes reckless, contemptuous or coldly logical. A down. When you remove the stressor altogether 0266 the material bounces back to its original re-Beyond a point known as breaking stress or the elastic limit though, depending by the Scrivener will either break down catastrophically or dis 0273 crease in stress, like putty. It will not bounce

0343 brittle breaks.

WITH TECHNOLOGY But sometimes, all anticipatory mea lower the exit-mask strain. You could: sures fail, and we are pushed past our breaking stress. At this point, we change irreversibly When humans break down, they tend personal gift to do so through brittle failure modes: they lose their composure, they have inervous break

0301 stress and strain. When you walk into a potentially tough meeting, you might bring friends along for imoral support; (planning to lower voice-mask strain). When you anticipate get ting sick of friends during a group outing, you might insist on driving separately, bringing a book, or renting separate hotel rooms (plan

of a thoughtfully selected Step out for a cigarette

of Not Giving a Fuck

> 0210 of framing the decision over another is manipulative? Some defenders of nudges suggest that in cases where it is inevitable to introduce a non-rational influence into decision-making. deliberately doing so is not manipulative. But there are reasons to be wary of this line of thought. Suppose that Jones is traveling to a 0217 job interview on a subway car so crowded that

0189 it has a 90% survival rate rather than a 10%

fatality rate. Would it be manipulative for a

surgeon to exploit this framing effect to nudge

the patient into making the decision that the

surgeon thinks best? Is it manipulative for a

0224 Clearly the fact that it was inevitable that 0231 fluences can never be manipulative. No doubt More nuanced discussions of wheth-0238 er nudges manipulate tend to focus less on the inevitability of nudging in some direc tion or another, and more on the mechanisms by which the nudging occurs, and the direction in which it pushes the person being nudged. Although there is wide agreement that some nudges can be manipulative, so far no consensus

0245 has emerged about which nudges are manipulative or how to distinguish manipulative from non-manipulative nudges. (For a sample of approaches to the question of whether and when nudges manipulate, see Blumenthal-Barby 2012: Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs 2012; Saghai 2013; Wilkinson 2013; Hanna 2015; Moles 2015; 0126 smaller community. A big city is a larger so- 0441 I think the answer is !yes.! As far as friendship is concerned it is the attitude of each friend (and the successful communication of it) rather than its appropriateness

that matters. Abe and Bill may value each oth-

er despite the fact that neither one of them

merits being valued. They may value each oth-

0133 out at Dunbar's number or thereabouts. They 0448 er because they have some false beliefs about are contexts you seek out for psychologica the other. One might expect that communica healing by drawing on shared emotional reserves tion of mutual valuing between friends will Groups on the other hand are just situation fail on occasion (or even frequently) when one values the other as a result of false beliefs about the other-for example, if one were to express those false beliefs to his friend who knows that they are false—but it might not. If friendship is based on (some) false beliefs each friend has about the other, then correct ing these false beliefs may undermine friendship. To this extent, one might expect that friendships which are based on false beliefs will not be very stable and thus are unlike 0462 ly to be sustained over a long period of time. Since on the account we are con sidering it is one's attitude of valuing one's friend that counts regardless of the appropri ateness of the attitude, then unlike some influential accounts of friendship, our account allows that vicious people can have genuine 0469 friendships. Our goal is to identify a key characteristic of friendship rather than to iden

> take in it. The claim that Abe and Bill can he friends even if their valuation one of th other is illusory is compatible with the claim 0476 that both Abe and Bill may have various reasons—moral, epistemic, or otherwise—to correct (or, perhaps, to preserve) the relevant illusion. According to the account of friendship we are considering, not only must each friend value the other, but each friend must also suc- cessfully communicate this fact to the 0483 other. That friendship is a voluntary relation is crucial for this purpose. Since friendship is voluntary, each friend chooses the other and each friend knows that the other chooses her One might choose a friend because the friend is a kind person, for example, or because the friend is useful or pleasant to her. But as 0490 long as it is clear to one that she was specifically and individually chosen then even if

> > 457-459)

she knows that she was chosen because she is useful or pleasant, it seems reasonable to ex pect that some communication of valuing will ing to be left alone. The distinction becomes have taken place. There are many ways for friends to 0497 communicate to each other that they value the other. I will say more on this in the following section. Here, however, we should note that the communication of valuing between friends is characteristically performed in, and by way of, shared activities. So, for example, even if The President of the US and The Queen of Enprojects intentions that differ from her real intentions. (2019:

Along similar lines, Gregory Whitfield (2020) claims that An act of manipulation is any intentional attempt by an agen (A) to cause another agent (B) to will/prefer/intend/act other than what A takes B's will preference or intention to be where A does so utilizing methods that obscure and render deniable A's intentions vis-àvis B (2020: 11). It is certainly true that manipula-

tors often keep their true intentions hidden lago wants Othello to think that he intends to be his friend, rather than the agent of his destruction. Exaggerating the benefits of doing what the manipulator wants, while under 0588 stating the advantages of other options (tactic 2 on our list) probably works best, if at all, if the target falsely believes that the ma-When this kind of thing happens nipulator intends to provide objective advice. However, there are other examples of manipulation where the intent does not seem to be

hidden. The intent of a teenager nagging for 0595 a new cellphone is quite transparent—to get the parent to provide the new phone. Similar y, when adolescents engage in peer pressure With tens of thousands of people to get a fellow to smoke, their intention—to taking small steps in laboratories and facto get the target to smoke—is quite transparent ries everywhere (and a few on the Moon it-Targets of guilt trips often—perhaps typically—know exactly what the guilt tripper intends 0602 to get the target to do. Perhaps anticipating The weaponized sacredness aspect of these worries, Whitfield allows manipulation t occur when the manipulator has merely achieved

iplausible deniability; about his true intentions. It is not entirely clear, though, whether this feature allows the theory to escape the prob lem of forms of manipulation like nagging and But it is highly unlikely that the 0609 peer pressure. It is certainly not obvious that such tactics only work, or only count as  $\mbox{\it ma}$ nipulation, if their users can plausibly deny their intentions. Perhaps we might characterize macal fervor and solidarity that characterize nipulation not in terms of bypassing deliberation altogether, but in terms of bypassing ra 0616 tional deliberation, that is, by introducing non-rational influences into the deliberative

process. Thus, we might follow Joseph Raz in claiming that manipulation, unlike coercion. does not interfere with a per This is why the industrial age or son's options. Instead it perverts the way that person reaches decisions, forms preference, or adopts goals. (Raz 1988: 377) The fact that complex technolog Treating manipulation as bypassir

rational deliberation, and then characterizing bypassing rational deliberation; in terms o 1. Preliminaries 1.1 Ordinary versus Global 1.2 Applications of a Theory of

Ordinary Manipulation 1.3 Two Questions about 2. Answering the Identification Question 2.1 Manipulation as Bypassing 2.2 Manipulation as Trickery A more recent version of this view was 2.3 Manipulation as Pressure 2.4 Disjunctive, Hybrid, and Other Views and Helen Nissenbaum, who write that: <code>fmanip</code>

3. Answering the Evaluation Question 3.1 Is Manipulation Always encing someone-imposing a hidden influencemeans influencing them in a way they aren' 3.2 Manipulation and Harm consciously aware of, and in a way they couldn' easily become aware of? (Susser et al., 2019: 4) 3.3 Manipulation and Autonomy 3.4 Manipulation and Treating Alan Strudler suggests that 'a sufficient ever though not exhaustive characterization of ma Persons as Things 3.5 Other Suggestions son's behavior !through a chain of events tha 4.1 Manipulating Persons versus has the desired effect only because the person Manipulating Situations This sort of view works well with 4.2 Manipulation and Intent

is unaware of that chain; (Strudler 2005: 459) influences like subliminal advertising. But 4.3 Manipulation, Vulnerability would also appear to apply to other sorts of and Oppression attention, such as priming effects and the de cision-making biases and other processes that involve unconscious, fast processing made famous by the work of Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky and colleagues (see Kahneman 2013 for an over view). However, it faces obstacles in dealing

0189 of anti-belonging or repulsion that drive you

away from groups whose sacred values are pro

fane to you. Once you're out, you start seeking

the sacred once more. Leaving the old economy

for Silicon Valley is an example of this kind

of religious conversion from one set of price

less values to another. To me, dissent exits

movements that look like exit when you zoom in

and voice when you zoom out. Leaving a compa-

ny to join another in the same industry is not

an exit at all. Dissent exits are just fractal

find less community, not different community.

difference are driven by an exploratory urge,

to find new things to value beyond the bor

ders of community life, while exits of dissen-

are driven by the urge to find the best fit

for yourself, among the valuable things commu-

nally organized human life already has to offer

RELAXANT

Or to use a positive definition, exits of in

But exits of indifference are ab

With these two ideas in mind, the

There is a basic tension in the hu

The voice-mask strain graph is up-

side down because the bigger the community, the

easier it is to lower your voice mask and speak

Individuals are more creative than committed

Hunting parties, startups and small groups of

researchers offer more exploratory potential

ized voice moves.

curves properly.

for it to bypass reason in the relevant sense Perhaps it is sufficient that the intent be hind it must be covert. On this view, the in fluence itself may not bypass conscious at tention. Yet it might still be the case that 0553 the covertness of the intent behind it renders it less likely to trigger rational scrutiny by the target. Even if I am aware of the attempt

intentions, I might fail to engage in rationa deliberation about whether I should try to re sist your influence.

0196 are not absolute exits. They are merely social 0203 solute exits. You are responding to an urge to

terest hinders friendship. Although Lewis's

conception of friendship is somewhat unusual-

example, on the thoroughness with which the me dia exposes private information about her life Although the features Thomas iden tifies are not essential features of friendship believe we all recognize them as features believe that the account of friendship offered here explains why this is so. But before we turn to this let us consider, briefly, anoth er account of friendship due to Cocking and Friendship, according to C&K, is a

by the other and one's interests and activities 0672 become oriented toward those of the friend. (504) To illustrate the notion of being directed by another, C&K present the following example A person who has no interest in ballet might gladly go to the ballet if a friend who enjoys ballet invited her. Had someone else extend ed the invitation she would not have gone. I 0679 this case one friend's interests are directed by the other. One is interpreted by the other if one sees the other's interpretation of one self, and is responsive to this interpretation in friendship, they conclude, if am distinct tively receptive both to the other's interests and to their way of seeing me.; (505)

friend to direct and be directed by another, i

is also not uncommon for each friend to accept

the other as he is. Some friends may appreci

than a nuclear family in a big city. Assemblages of humans of size great er than 150 offer richer possibilities. The complex potential field of belonging, anti-be 0238 longing and indifference forces can propel you along highly non-ritualized life routines that look like the contours of strange attractors. Depending on whether voice-mask or exit-mask strain is dominant in a given person, the community they are in can act as either a stressor or relaxant. Like Thomas, C&K identify fea-The bigger the community, the hardtures that we recognize in many friendships er you have to work to pretend to care. Com But these features, too, are not essential to munity acts as a stressor, so community size friendship. Although it is not uncommon for one

idea of community size as something that can go ship is reversible. Past that limit, it is not negative and the idea of the exit-voice asym Now the interesting thing about metry, we can understand human stress-strain humans as a species that is both social and exploratory, is that we can't normally get the 0280 strain to zero. At best we can get to some sort COMMUNITY AS STRESSOR AND of home comfort zone with a minimal amount of chronic stress, where our personal needs for healing and exploration are in some sort of zero-sum dynamic balance (I suspect the dia man condition: we explore best alone and heal gram above can be rearranged to form a clas best in togetherness. Scouts, garage tinker sic Nash equilibrium saddle diagram, but I'm 0224 ers and mathematicians often operate alone.

0287 too lazy to do that). If you have a roughly balanced need for group belonging and individual exploration, the intersection of the two strain curves de fines both your chronic stress level and ideal community size. If you have a strong bias one way or the other, your strain curves will re-0294 flect the corresponding distortions, and both size will change. BEYOND BREAKING STRESS

We actively plan for both kinds of 0308 ning to lower exit-mask strain).

0371 one feel special. You could do many things to Bring a gift of cash instead Check your phone and keep up

completely broken voice mask leads to ranting 0329 on the streets. A completely broken exit mask leads to near catatonic levels of checked-out ness, of the sort we see in Melville's Bartle You can also have patterns of break down marked by complete compliance: a signifi 0336 and resistance disappears. This is humans being broken in the sense of being tamed or do mesticated like horses. Outward appearances

building with an intact facade but fractured tic limit of human masks is also the factor that limits human accomplishment Weaponized sacredness though, is 0350 a temperamental and unreliable tool, since it relies on breaking the spirit of humans jus

enough to achieve the right level of compl ance, but not so completely as to destroy thei ability to generate productive cognitive energy Get it slightly wrong and you'll have either a revolution on your hands, or a mass of unus-0357 able humans. Brittle materials are hard to work. thoritarian force and weaponized sacredness technological leverage. And we humans have invented several major technologies to extend our elastic limits without the need for weap-EXTENDING ELASTIC LIMITS

of structural integrity are maintained at the expense of an internally broken spirit, like a load-bearing columns. Such breaks are still Our individual elastic limits for voice-mask and exit-mask strain limit what we can do collectively and individually. The elas

Say you're trapped in a boring gath ering with friends for somebody's birthday, where you have to pretend to care about making some

The term {manipulation} is commonly probation: To say that Irving manipulated To