Defensive Measures

Adversary Actions in the face of adversity






Follow cybersecurity is one of the few domains where the edge of human performance meets

11:03 PM - 29 Mar 2016

the edge of human performance.






Cause / Effect - What is working?

Investigated

- Blocking loCs (IPs / Domains), Releases
- Signatures
- Vulnerabilities
- Patching
- Takedowns
- Incident Response / Evictions
- Civil Cases limited data
- Indictments & Arrests

loC Releases



loC Releases for CyberCrime

Significant Lack of Data (sample set of 2!)

- Network IOCs
 - Cyber Crime Short Lived
 - In Data Set avg. delta:
 - ~140 days since last seen
 - ~200 days since first appearance
 - Signatures work better
- Malware (hashes)
 - CyberCrime Known Malware
 - APT New Malware!

GOLD EVERGREEN

Roughly – The Business Club

ZeuS -> ZeuS as a Service (GoZ)


GOLD EVERGREEN



Just Cryptolocker and Game Over Zeus

GOLD EVERGREEN

April 2014 Mule Arrests



Rise in GameOver Zeus detections after mule arrests

GOLD DRAKE

Dridex, Locky, Emotet


Dridex vis a vis Chrome


Reaction to Web Inject Patches

Chrome Version +	Chrome Release Date +	Dridex Version +	Dridex Timestamp ♦	Time Delta ◆
40.0.2214.115	19.2.2015	2.093	11.3.2015	20 days
42.0.2311.90	14.4.2015	2.108	17.4.2015	3 days
43.0.2357.65	19.5.2015	3.011	26.5.2015	7 days
44.0.2403.89	21.7.2015	3.073	6.8.2015	16 days
45.0.2454.85	1.9.2015	3.102	25.9.2015	24 days
47.0.2526.73	1.12.2015	3.154	7.12.2015	6 days
48.0.2564.97	27.1.2016	3.167	29.1.2016	2 days
49.0.2623.87	8.3.2016	3.188	10.3.2016	2 days
51.0.2704.106	23.6.2016	3.225	24.6.2016	1 day
53.0.2785.116	14.9.2016	3.258	26.9.2016	12 days
54.0.2840.71	20.10.2016	3.269	17.11.2016	3 days
58.0.3029.81	19.4.2017	4.048	16.5.2017	27 days


Source: VB2017, ESET


GOLD DRAKE – DRIDEX + LOCKY + EMOTET





GOLD DRAKE – DRIDEX + LOCKY + EMOTET





GOLD DRAKE


Counterpoints / Takeaways

- Strong Technical Skill
 - Quickly overcome technical countermeasures
- Mule Arrests Correspond with
 - Short term Rise in Activity
 - Long term Decrease in Activity
- Maybe the mule arrests are working...
 - Group seems to be trying different revenue models...
- Continuous Innovation and Modifications

Are we creating "Superbugs"

Do Takedowns result in new stronger, botnets





Unclear...

Attempts to measure...

- Takedowns vs. New Features
- Takedowns vs. New Infrastructure Schemes
- Takedowns vs. New Malware Families
 - Maybe slight correlation...
 - After a takedown a new bot will be introduced ... sometime in the future




Avalanche

Bulletproof hosting supporting multiple actors

Avalanche


Activity 2014 - 2017

- Bulletproof hosting used by multiple actors, typically eastern European
- Avalanche arrests (most admins) Dec 2017



Cybercrime in general

"Organized" CyberCrime in General



Main Takeaways

What Doesn't Work Inconclusive

- Indictments w/o Arrest
- Takedowns w/o Arrest
- Wipe and Reimage

Patches

- Not everyone applies on day 1
- delivered via phish, then EK
- Civil Cases
 - Too little data
- Indicator releases
 - Too little data
 - Stale loCs
- Super Bugs?
 - seem to innovate consistently

What works

- Technical Operator Arrests
- Takedowns accompanied by Arrests