

# DFRWS 2023 Challenge

— DFRWS 2023 Challenge on Industrial Control System Forensics —

## “The Troubled Elevator: Forensic Investigation of a Bank’s Elevator Malfunctioning”

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# Introduction

The DFRWS 2023 challenge is about the domain of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically focusing on programmable logic controllers (PLC). These systems are increasingly critical for monitoring and controlling industrial processes in various sectors, such as energy, water, transportation, and manufacturing. Despite their importance, advancements in security and forensics have not been adequate. This challenge seeks to offer more profound understanding of ICS network traffic and device memory analysis in practical settings.

The scenario for this challenge, “The Troubled Elevator,” involves investigating a mysterious incident in a bank’s executive-only elevator. To overcome this DFRWS challenge difficulty, we have investigated at four different levels.

1. **Visual Footage Analysis:** The CCTV footage depicts the entire session of the elevator malfunctioning. The video demonstrates the points of abnormalities observed in different timestamps.
2. **Device Level Analysis:** Two types of devices are analyzed with various tools to identify the presence of malicious programs. Here, we attempted to follow the trail of any undesirable actions that might have contributed to this unprecedented occurrence. We have examined following artifacts in this stage.
  - a. PC Memory
  - b. PLC Internal and External Memory
3. **Network Level Analysis:** The network activities are closely examined to identify the presence of suspicious participants and classify if any alteration has been made.
4. **Accumulation of individual level findings:** In this stage we correlate several findings from different aspects and expose patterns of potential interest.

## 1.1 Challenge Scenario

Kristi Wayne from Wayne Enterprise has recently bought a controversial bank in the city of Richmond. On June 29, Friday afternoon, during her visit to the bank, she used an executive-only elevator designed to provide a smooth and private commute for the high-ranking officials within the bank. Wayne enters the elevator and presses the button to get to another floor. However, the elevator suddenly starts malfunctioning, trapping Wayne inside. Wayne calls from the elevator for emergency assistance. After an extended episode of patience and misery, she is finally rescued. The elevator infrastructure is designed to log network traffic and device memory

dumps for a certain time-period. The CCTV footage of the elevator and the memory dump of Wayne's new computer in her office at the bank are also acquired.

## **1.2 Challenge Questions**

The objective of this challenge is to investigate the entire incident and provide a comprehensive report, including:

- Elevator behaviors during malfunctioning
- Timeline of elevator malfunctioning
- Specific cause of malfunctioning
- Any evidence of an inside attacker
- Any attack evidence on the network, computer, and PLC device

## **1.3 Accumulated Artifacts**

Following artifacts are collected from the scene and labeled accordingly:

1. (A1) CCTV footage of the elevator.
2. (A2) Memory dump of Kristi Waynes's computer.
3. (A3) Network diagram.
4. (A4) Network traffic log of the elevator's PLC.
5. (A5) 7 External PLC Memory dumps.
6. (A6) 7 On-Chip PLC Memory dumps.
7. (A7) PLC control logic manual.
8. (A8) Elevator manual.

## **1.4 Concept Diagram**

The overall network architecture is given in figure 1. The scenario depicts the connectivity among the computers and the associated devices.




Figure 1: Overall network schema of the scenario

# Overview of Challenge Data

## 2.1 (A1) CCTV footage of the elevator

A CCTV footage of the elevator of the size of 380.9 MB in “mp4” format is given. The duration of the video is 01:17:21 hrs. The timestamp analysis and the findings are described in section 3.1.

## 2.2 (A2) Memory dump of Kristi Wayne’s computer

A memory dump of the PC in binary format has been provided with the size of 2.1 GB. The preliminary investigation shows that, “DumpIT” by “Magnet Corporation” has been used as the memory acquisition tool. The memory dump shows that, the artifact has been collected from a PC of “Windows” operating system in figure 2 (extracted using Volatility v 2 KBG imagemap). Extensive analysis has been conducted and illustrated on section 3.2.

```
Suggested Profile(s) : Win10x64_19041
AS Layer1 : SkipDuplicatesAMD64PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace
PAE type : No PAE
DTB : 0x1ad002L
KDBG : 0xf80033205b20L
Number of Processors : 2
Image Type (Service Pack) : 0
KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xfffff800314f1000L
KPCR for CPU 1 : 0xfffff800314f1000L
KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xfffff78000000000L
Image date and time : 2023-06-22 14:32:56 UTC+0000
Image local date and time : 2023-06-22 10:32:56 -0400
```

Figure 2: Operating System of the PC Memory Dump

## 2.3 (A3) Network diagram

A network diagram has been provided describing the topology and the IP addresses of the connected devices. This diagram in figure 3 demonstrates the connections of the workstations, HMI, Log server and the PLC host (elevator).




Figure 3: The network

#### 2.4 (A4) Network traffic log of the elevator's PLC

A network traffic log of the elevator's PLC has been provided in "pcapng" format of size 30.6 MB. We have examined this file with our own developed program, Wireshark, and Network Miner. The findings are explained in section 3.3.

#### 2.5 (A5) (A6) PLC device memory dumps

Here two types of binary files are given: 1) (A5) ExtMemoryRAM, and 2) (A6) InChipRAM of size 524.3 KB and 131.1 KB respectively. Each category contains 7 memory dump files with 7 consecutive timestamps in order. We tried to extract useful information and forensic evidence available in these files and explained in section 3.4.

#### 2.6 (A7) PLC control logic manual

There is a PLC control logic handbook available that details the elevator PLC's model number. Modicon M221 (TM221C16R) by Schneider Electric with Ethernet module has been used in this experiment as defined in figure 4. Though the PLC is equipped with a Serial line, is this challenge, all communication has been conducted using Modbus TCP protocol.




Figure 4: Modicon M221 PLC

## 2.7 (A8) Elevator manual

This challenge is also facilitated with an elevator manual where the system configuration of the elevator is explained with great details. Figure 5 shows the experimental testbed of the scenario with the elevator and the PLC module.




Figure 5: Experimental setup of the elevator with Modicon PLC



# Forensic Analysis

## 3.1 (A1) CCTV footage analysis

Software used: VLC player

We have analyzed the CCTV footage and manually labeled the different stages of the elevator. We have identified 6 important marker in the video: 1) Door (Open/ Closed), 2) Passenger (Onboard/ None), 3) Lights of each floor (Red/ Green/ Off), 4) Floor Display, 5) Elevator's Direction (Up/ Down/ Both/ Off), and 6) Manual Involvement (1,2,3,4,R – Reset, B - Broken). An unknown/ non-accepted state is labeled with \*. The figure 6 represents all states of the elevator that are shown in the video.




Figure 6: State representation of the elevator.

The figure also demonstrates the timeline of elevator malfunctioning. We have noticed unrecognized markers labeled as “x” in the elevator floor displays at 19:20, 44:01, and 01:05:43. We assume the exploitation on the elevator’s PLC module has been accomplished before 19:20.

### 3.2 (A2) PC Memory dump analysis

Software used: Volatility 2, Volatility 3, Autopsy, Gidra, PE Studio, Bulk Extractor (Kali Linux), REMNIX tools, HxD, Bless, Wireshark, Network Miner.

**Analysis 1:** We have used both Volatility version 2 and 3 to find the Process lists, Process tree, Registry Hives, Network status etc. We found the host IP address is 192.168.133.137 as defined in figure 7; whereas the network diagram shows the IP address of Kristi Waynes’s computer is 192.168.10.145.

Offset	Proto	LocalAddr	LocalPort	ForeignAddr	ForeignPort	State	PID	Owner	Created
0xc6020d1ed30	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	5840	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	1148	svchost.exe	2023-06-22 14:25:00.000000
0xc6020fad270	TCPv4	192.168.133.137	49826	20.72.146.34	443	CLOSE_WAIT	828	SystemSettings	2023-06-22 14:26:59.000000
0xc60210be8e0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0	58682	*	0		1404	msedge.exe	2023-06-22 14:25:45.000000
0xc60210c4830	UDPv4	0.0.0.0	5850	*	0		1148	svchost.exe	2023-06-22 14:24:59.000000
0xc6021107820	TCPv4	192.168.133.137	49825	20.44.10.123	443	CLOSED	5460	OneDrive.exe	2023-06-22 14:26:59.000000
0xc602114a7b0	TCPv4	192.168.133.137	49671	20.7.2.167	443	ESTABLISHED	412	svchost.exe	2023-06-22 14:25:00.000000
0xc6021277a20	TCPv4	192.168.133.137	49674	13.107.21.200	443	CLOSED	4132	SearchApp.exe	2023-06-22 14:25:05.000000
0xc6021287a20	TCPv4	192.168.133.137	49678	52.96.109.226	443	CLOSED	4132	SearchApp.exe	2023-06-22 14:25:06.000000
0xc60215eca20	TCPv4	192.168.133.137	49904	13.107.21.239	443	CLOSED	1404	msedge.exe	2023-06-22 14:32:18.000000
0xc602145e900	UDPv4	0.0.0.0	5353	*	0		5044	msedge.exe	2023-06-22 14:25:29.000000
0xc6021891840	UDPv4	0.0.0.0	63424	*	0		1404	msedge.exe	2023-06-22 14:32:49.000000
0xc602197aa20	TCPv4	192.168.133.137	49741	20.7.2.167	443	ESTABLISHED	5460	OneDrive.exe	2023-06-22 14:25:32.000000
0xc6021a8c8f0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0	58651	*	0		1404	msedge.exe	2023-06-22 14:25:42.000000
0xc6021ed5010	TCPv4	192.168.133.137	49906	20.120.56.233	443	CLOSED	2540	smartscreen.exe	2023-06-22 14:32:53.000000
0xc6022591010	TCPv4	192.168.133.137	49823	13.69.109.130	443	CLOSED	6284	FileCoAuth.exe	2023-06-22 14:26:56.000000
0xc60224664a0	TCPv4	192.168.133.137	49902	13.68.233.9	443	ESTABLISHED	1972	svchost.exe	2023-06-22 14:32:06.000000
0xc6022720b50	TCPv4	192.168.133.137	49905	172.253.63.17	443	CLOSED	1404	msedge.exe	2023-06-22 14:32:37.000000
0xc60227889a0	TCPv4	192.168.133.137	49824	20.44.10.123	443	CLOSED	5460	OneDrive.exe	2023-06-22 14:26:59.000000

Figure 7: Volatility “netscan” output

Here we found 3 jobs (PID: 1148 svchost.exe; PID: 1972 svchost.exe; PID: 2540) with suspicious activities. Further analysis like “pstree/ psscan” on these jobs, do not provide any significant information.

**Findings:** According to “Virus Total” the “Foreign IP Address” 13.68.233.9 is suspicious, as defined in figure 8.




Figure 8: Suspicious Foreign IP

**Analysis 2:** We have used Autopsy to analyze the PC dumps further. Autopsy also recovered 15751 deleted files from the memory dump. Table 1 shows the extracted artifacts from the dump file.

In Memory Files			
	Artifact Type	# of files extracted	
File Views	Image	142	
	Audio	1	
	Archives	15	
	Database	23	
Documents	HTML	13	
	MS Office	2	
	Plain Texts	1250	
Executables	.exe	242	
	.dll	1347	
Application	x-dosexec	180	
	vnd-ms-excel	1	
	x-font-ttf	4	
	x-msdownload	1471	
	x-elc	1	
	xml	24	
	xhtml	2	
	octet-stream	12303	
	x-windows-registry	14	
	ms-word	1	
	x-sqlite3	23	
	x-gzip	15	
	Audio	vnd-wave	1
	Image	vnd-microsoft.icon	1
		x-portable-graymap	1
png		137	
jpeg		5	
svg		1	
	x-portable-pixmap	1	
Text	x-java-source	189	
	x-fortan	4	
	plain	1251	
	x-chdr	58	
	xml	50	
	csv	5	
	x-csrc	2	
	html	18	
	x-ini	3	

Deleted Files	
File Types	# of files recovered
c	2
csv	5
dat	1
dll	1369
doc	1
excel	1
edb	6
exe	235
f	4
fat	2
font	4
gz	15
h	58
html	12
icon	1
ini	3
java	189
jpg	5
mft	12282
mui	34
pf	2
png	137
reg	14
shortcut	6
sqlite3	23
txt	1250
unknown	1
wav	1
xml	75

Table 1: Artifact extracted by Autopsy

We have analyzed several exe, dll files using HxD Hex Editor, PE Studio and Gidra, and found the presence of several Trojans, Malwares, Spywares, Ransomwares etc. as shown in figure 9.

10






Figure 9: Presence of malicious files in PC Memory dump

**Findings:** As “Autopsy” is not able to extract the file creation time, it is not possible to trace the “dropper” software. The PC was intentionally infected by several malicious software, so that the footprint of the “dropper” software is not possible to identify.

**Analysis 3:** We have extracted 919 email address from the dump file. Based on the number of emails sent, figure 10 displays the top twenty email addresses. Here we found “kristiwayne92@gmail.com” email address has been accessed 1310 times.

n=1310	kristiwayne92@gmail.com (utf16=491)
n=55	appro@openssl.org
n=35	sh0xzj+y2kbw714qyfw0yoid3zazk@guerrillamail.com (utf16=12)
n=15	pkiadmin@trustcentre.co.za
n=14	info@globaltrust.info
n=13	pki@sk.ee
n=11	info@e-szigno.hu
n=11	yne92@gmail.com (utf16=3)
n=9	sh0xzj@guerrillamail.com
n=8	microsoft365@notificationmail.microsoft.com (utf16=3)
n=7	info@izenpe.com
n=6	googlecommunityteam-noreply@google.com
n=5	1796d24c4b2c353d6f35ef5382ef5980127@guerrillamail.com
n=5	57f7f8000f26e2c84a9cc068481b3efcb273@guerrillamail.com
n=5	kristiwayne92@gmail.com (utf16=1)
n=4	admin_ca@mtin.es
n=4	chambersignroot@chambersign.org
n=4	chambersroot@chambersign.org
n=4	noreply@google.com
n=4	onedrive@notificationmail.microsoft.com

Figure 10: Email histogram

**Findings:** It depicts, there is a strong possibility that the host computer has been exposed/ open a backdoor by clicking any suspicious email/ attachments.

**Analysis 4:** We have analyzed all xml, html for malicious javascript embeddings. We use REMNUX tools to identify macros in excel and document files. We have also identified the presence of several Trojans, Spywares, Ransomwares, BOT in “wav”, “ttf” file. Figure 11 shows the possible exploitations.



RSA key	154.6	49
---------	-------	----

Table 2: Volume of information extracted by Bulk Extractor

## Findings:

- 1) Based on the “url”, “url\_service”, “domain surf”, and “json” dump, it is evident that the browsed URLs are as illustrated in figure 12(a)(b)(c)(d).

```

46 3798152 chromewebstore.googleapis.com  ems/-\000\000\000https://chromewebstore.googleapis.com/v2/items/~/Stor
47 3875299 %s:%d  \354\012\352o\355\260=\256\213http://%s:%d/put[%s]/fc001/%
48 3875339 %s:%d  ll cmd okhttp://%s:%d/fc001/%spandanl
49 3875588 htmlcss.3322.org  pt" src="http://htmlcss.3322.org/sub/ray.js"></s
50 3939255 hoo.gl  \275\310tar\370  ="http://hoo.gl/btnl"\323\000mod\000 \014\000e

```

Figure 12(a): URL timeline

```

43 3875292 http://%s:%d/put  %\325\3310\314\354\012\352o\355\260=\256\213http://%s:%d/put[%s]/fc001/%skil
44 3875332 http://%s:%d/fc001/%spandanlin.3322.org60.248.79.226  01/%skill cmd okhttp://%s:%d/fc001/%spandanlin.3322.org60.248.79.226\210!
Adialer.AAA\000\002\000
45 3875581 http://htmlcss.3322.org/sub/ray.js  avascript" src="http://htmlcss.3322.org/sub/ray.js"></script>\134rec
46 3939248 http://hoo.gl/btnl  \0170\010\000\000\002\266\275\310tar\370  ="http://hoo.gl/btnl"\323\000mod\000 \014\000e="ext
47 3952867 https://www.bin \000\030\000 \001\0002\000\1212\005\022\200\001https://www.bin\000\000\000\000g.com/search

```

Figure 12(b): URL Service timeline



Figure 12(c): “Virus Total” response for “http://htmlcss.3322.org”




Figure 12(d): “Virus Total” response for “http://hoo.gl”

- 2) The “rfc822” extraction informs that a “cookie” file has been fetched which contained backdoor application.



[illegible]

- 3) A “pacap” file has been extracted with 254 packets. We have examined this “pacap” files and confirmed the foreign IPs 13.68.233.9 and 20.120.56.233 share the same “mac” address. Also, there are 2 TLS packets with encrypted data as shown in figure 14.

Figure 14: 2 TLS Packets with encrypted payload

We have made an effort to decode the payload using 49 retrieved RSA keys. There are two private keys and 47 public keys among them. The keys are in DER format. we are unable to convert the RSA keys to PEM or Base64 format since they are all corrupted.

Software used: Wireshark, NetworkMiner, DrawIO






Figure 15(a): Packet transfer to 192.168.10.45 (IPv4)




Figure 15(b): Packet transfer to 192.168.10.45 (IPv6)




Figure 15(c): Packet transfer to 192.168.10.45 (VM)

A possible alteration of mac address has been observed at frame 2419 as show in the figure 16.

[2023-06-29 18:32:01 UTC] Ethernet MAC has changed, possible ARP spoofing! IP 192.168.10.101, MAC 3C37862F9948 -> 000C29CF8DCA (frame 2419)

Figure 16: ARP spoofing

**Findings:** We found 3 workstations bearing IP 192.168.10.121, 192.168.10.130, and 192.168.10.164 transferred packets directly to 192.168.10.45.

### 3.4 (A5) External PLC Memory dumps analysis

Software used: Wireshark, Network Miner, HxD, Bless, “binwalk” (Kali Linux)

There are 7 external PLC memory dumps in binary. Each file has been named with the format “YYYYMMDDHMS” (ex. ExtRAM\_20230629143509.bin), which denotes the time of memory acquisition.

Engineers can review the system's states with the assistance of the external memory unit, which periodically performs backups of the system. No data is taken from external memory by the PLC. The following command mentioned in figure 17 has been used to extract the metadata of a file. This Metadata shows if there exists any encapsulated data with the offset address or not. We have used “binwalk” to extract data also known as “file curving”, defined in figure 18.

```
[root@localhost ~]# file ExtRAM_20230629143509.bin
ExtRAM_20230629143509 data zip 0xD00B-0xE8B2
```

Figure 17: Bulk Extractor (Kali Linux) command to investigate these binary files

```
[root@localhost ~]# binwalk -D = '0xD00B:0xE8B2:unzip' ExtRAM_20230629143509.bin
[root@localhost ~]# dd if = ./ext_20230629143509 | pf = ./ext_20230629143509.zip bs = 1 count = 0xD00B skip = 0
```

Figure 18: File curving

Seven XML files that show the PLC's current status were recovered from each memory dump. We measure the differences between each XML and the following XML. Table 3 shows the number of differences among the consecutive XMLs, whereas the figure 19(a)(b)(c) demonstrate the examples of the differences.

Label	XML (x)	XML (y)	Number of differences
ExpA B	(ExtA) ext_20230629143509	(ExtB) ext_20230629145014	-
ExpA C	(ExtA) ext_20230629143509	(ExtC) ext_20230629150519	5
ExpA D	(ExtA) ext_20230629143509	(ExtD) ext_20230629152024	5
ExpC D	(ExtC) ext_20230629150519	(ExtD) ext_20230629152024	-
ExpA E	(ExtA) ext_20230629143509	(ExtE) ext_20230629153528	4
ExpC E	(ExtC) ext_20230629150519	(ExtE) ext_20230629153528	4
ExpA F	(ExtA) ext_20230629143509	(ExtF) ext_20230629155033	1
ExpC F	(ExtC) ext_20230629150519	(ExtF) ext_20230629155033	4
ExpE F	(ExtE) ext_20230629153528	(ExtF) ext_20230629155033	3
ExpE G	(ExtE) ext_20230629153528	(ExtG) ext_20230629160538	3
ExpA G	(ExtA) ext_20230629143509	(ExtG) ext_20230629160538	1

ExpC_G	(ExtC) ext_20230629150519	(ExtG) ext_20230629160538	4
ExpF_G	(ExtF) ext_20230629155033	(ExtG) ext_20230629160538	-

Table 3: Difference between 2 extracted XMLs from External PLC Memory

So, the XML changes timeline is: (ExtA, ExtB)  $\rightarrow$  (ExtC, ExtD)  $\rightarrow$  ExtE  $\rightarrow$  ExtF  $\rightarrow$  ExtG. Additionally, it indicates the PLC "attack" time: (ExtA, ExtB)  $\rightarrow$  (ExtC, ExtD), that is the transition time between ExtB to ExtC, 14:50:14 to 15:05:19.

170- <Index>60</Index>	170- <Index>35</Index>
171- <Symbol>SAME_CALL</Symbol>	171- <Comment>attaxe</Comment>
172- <Comment>SameFloorCall</Comment>	
173- </PB>	172- </PB>
174- <T>	173- <T>
175- <Index>0</Index>	174- <Index>0</Index>
176- <Preset>10</Preset>	175- <Preset>5000</Preset>
177- <Base>OneSeconds</Base>	176- <Base>OneMilliSeconds</Base>
183- </T>	182- </T>
	183- <T>
	184- <Index>2</Index>
	185- <Preset>30</Preset>
	186- </T>
	187- <T>
	188- <Index>3</Index>
	189- <Preset>7</Preset>
	190- <Base>OneSecond</Base>
	191- </T>
285- <Rungs>	293- <Rungs>
	294- <RungMetadata>
	295- <MainComment />
	296- <Comments />
	297- <Name />
	298- <IsLadderSelected>false</IsLadderSelected>
	299- </RungMetadata>
	300- <RungMetadata>
	301- <MainComment />
	302- <Comments />
	303- <Name />
	304- <IsLadderSelected>false</IsLadderSelected>
	305- </RungMetadata>
1384- <Name>New Project</Name>	1404- <Name>SAFE Lab Mafia</Name>

Figure 19(a): XML Differences of ExpA\_C

169- </PB>	→	
170- <Index>60</Index>		
171- <Symbol>SAME_CALL</Symbol>		
172- <Comment>SameFloorCall</Comment>		
173- </PB>		
174- <T>		169- <T>
175- <Index>0</Index>		170- <Index>0</Index>
176- <Preset>10</Preset>		171- <Preset>5000</Preset>
177- <Base>OneSecond</Base>		172- <Base>OneMilliSeconds</Base>
353- <Rungs>		348- <Rungs>
354- <RungMetadata>	→	
355- <MainComment />		
356- <Comments />		
357- <Name />		
358- <IsLadderSelected>false</IsLadderSelected>		
359- </RungMetadata>		
1384- <Name>New Project</Name>		1373- <Name>SAFE Lab Mafia</Name>

Figure 19(b): XML Difference of ExpA\_E




Figure 19(c): XML Difference of ExpC\_E

**Findings:** The external memory analysis proves the change in On-Chip PLC memory happens between 14:50:14 to 15:05:19.

### 3.5 (A6) On-Chip PLC Memory dumps analysis

Software used: Bulk Extractor (Kali Linux), HxD, Bless, Wireshark, Network Miner

#### Theory:

After carefully reviewing the provided artifact (A4) Network Traffic Logs (pcapng), we were able to identify the workstations (IP 192.168.10.121, 192.168.10.130, 192.168.10.164) that were in charge of sending packets to the PLC (IP 198.168.10.45). Additionally, we discovered that throughout those entire sessions, the Modbus TCP protocol was utilized.

#### Modbus TCP Protocol Specification:

The typical Modbus TCP protocol header, “Function Codes”, “UMAS Codes”, “Response Codes” and “Exceptions” are given in table 4, 5, 6, and 7.

Transection Identifier	Protocol Identifier	Length Field	Unit ID	PDU			
				Function Code	Session ID	Data	
						UMAS Code	Data
2 B	2 B	2 B	1 B	1 B	1 B	1 B	Variable

Table 4: Modbus TCP Specification

Function Code		Description
Hex	Decimal	
0x01	1	Read Coil Status
0x02	2	Read Input Status (Discrete)
0x03	3	Read Multiple Holding Registers
0x04	4	Read Input Registers
0x05	5	Force Write Single Coil
0x06	6	Force Write Single Holding Register
0x07	7	Read Exception Status
0x08	8	Diagnostic
	<b>Sub-function Code</b>	
	00	"echo mode" (Return Query Data)
	01	Restart Communication Option
	02	Return Diagnostic Register
	03	Change ASCII Input Delimiter
	04	Force Listen Only Mode
	10	Clear Counters and Diagnostic Register
	11	"counter 1" (Return Bus Message Count)
	12	"counter 2" (Return Bus Communication Error Count)
	13	"counter 3" (Return Bus Exception Error Count)
	16	"counter 6" (Return Slave NAK Count)
	17	"counter 7" (Return Slave Busy Count)
	18	"counter 8" (Return Bus Character Overrun Count)
0x0B	11	Get COM Event Counter
0x0C	12	Get COM Event Log
0x0F	15	Force Write Multiple Coils
0x10	16	Preset Multiple Registers/ Write Multiple Holding Registers
0x11	17	Report Slave ID
0x14	20	Read File Record
0x15	21	Write File Record
0x16	22	Mask Write Register
0x17	23	Read/ Write Multiple Registers
0x18	24	Read FIFO Queue
0x28	43	Read Device Identification/ Encapsulated Interface Transport
0x5A	90	Request/ Reply Packet

Table 5: Function codes of Modbus TCP

UMAS Code		Description
Hex	Decimal	
0x01	1	INIT COMM: Initialize a UMAS communication
0x02	2	READ ID: Read a PLC ID
0x03	3	READ PROJECT INFO
0x04	4	READ PLC INFO: Get internal PLC info
0x06	6	READ CARD INFO: Get internal PLC SD-Card info

0x0A	10	REPEAT: Data sent back to PLC
0x10	16	TAKE PLC RESERVATION: Assign an “owner” to the PLC
0x11	17	RELEASE PLC RESERVATION
0x12	18	KEEP_ALIVE: Keep alive message
0x20	32	READ_MEMORY_BLOCK
0x21	33	WRITE_MEMORY_BLOCK
0x22	34	READ_VARIABLES
0x23	35	WRITE_VARIABLES
0x24	36	READ_COILS_REGISTERS
0x25	37	WRITE_COILS_REGISTERS
0x28	40	READ_FNC
0x29	41	WRITE_FNC
0x30	48	INITIALIZE_UPLOAD: HMI to PLC
0x31	49	UPLOAD_BLOCK: HMI to PLC
0x32	50	END_STRATEGY_UPLOAD: HMI to PLC
0x33	51	INITIALIZE_UPLOAD: PLC to HMI
0x34	52	DOWNLOAD_BLOCK: PLC to HMI
0x35	53	END_STRATEGY_UPLOAD: PLC to HMI
0x39	57	READ_ETH_MASTER_DATA
0x40	64	START_PLC
0x41	65	STOP_PLC
0x50	80	MONITOR_PLC
0x58	88	CHECK_PLC
0x6D	109	COM_ERROR: Service Discontinued
0x70	112	READ_IO_OBJECT
0x71	113	WRITE_IO_OBJECT
0x73	115	GET_STATUS_MODULE

Table 6: UMAS Codes for Modbus TCP

Response Code		Description
Hex	Decimal	
0xFD	253	ERROR
0xFE	254	OK

Table 7: Modbus Response Codes

### Analysis 1:

We have reexamined the (A4) Network Log Files artifact and decoded all the Modbus TCP transmissions. Our primary objective in this analysis is to identify the “Write” instructions (UMAS Code: 0x23 and 0x29) only for the PLC system (IP 192.168.10.45). We have isolated following frames from the given Network Log files for this investigation in table 8:

Source IP	Number of Frames	Session	Frame Range	UMAS Code (0x23: Write_Variables or 0x29: Write_FNC)
192.168.10.164	1755	1	50 – 1730	186 – 302



	130	2	1751 – 1882	–
	1777	3	46835 – 47318	47116 – 47234
	253	4	47603 – 47997	–
	489	5	85942 – 86814	86200 – 86314
	499	6	115698 – 116617	115961 – 116096
192.168.10.130	16	1	1 – 17	–
	4454	2	5465 – 11130	–
	1122	3	28896 - 30017	–
	4454	4	30085 – 34610	–
	1122	5	52660 – 53851	–
	4454	6	53918 – 58474	–
	1122	7	75057 – 76179	–
	4454	8	76335 – 80877	–
	1122	9	97432 – 98569	–
	4454	10	98798 – 103319	–
	1122	11	119874 – 120997	–
	4454	12	121291 – 125835	–
	30873	13	131815 – 208335	–
192.168.10.121	67681	–	2167 – 208330	–

Table 8: Inspection of “Write” UMAS instruction for PLC System

Figure 20 and 21 show the decoded Modbus TCP transmissions using UMAS encoding.




Figure 20: Modbus TCP communication between 192.168.10.164 and 192.168.10.45



Figure 21: Frame # 186, Modbus TCP communication between 192.168.10.164 and 192.168.10.45

We have calculated the time of intervention as defined in section 3.4. We have used following calculation to determine the time window:

Assumed time of intervention is between 14:50:14 to 15:05:19

On-Chip PLC Backup 2 and 3 is: 14:50:07 to 15:05:09

Jitter Assumption 1 sec

∴ Considered time frame: 14:50:06 to 15:05:20

∴ The selected frames for investigation from Network Log: 31314 to 58579

We found the frame number 46835 – 47267 started a suspicious session and uploaded suspicious instructions to the PLC. In this case the source IP is 192.168.10.164 and the destination is the PLC system of IP 192.168.45. Figure 22 shows the decoded Modbus TCP.







0000197C	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001D8C	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001A0C	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001D9C	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001A1C	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001DAC	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001A2C	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001DBC	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001A3C	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001DEC	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001A4C	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001DDC	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001A5C	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001DEC	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001A6C	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001DFC	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001A7C	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001E0C	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001A8B	20 ad 00 00 00 f6 01 5a	a4 29 4d 8d 01 07 8c 00	.....Z ).....	00001E1C	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001A9B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001E2C	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001AAB	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001E3C	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001AAB	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001E4C	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001AAC	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001E5C	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001AAB	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001E6C	00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001A8B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001E7B	20 b1 00 00 00 f6 01 5a	a4 29 84 91 01 07 8c 00	.....Z ).....
00001A8B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001E8B	88 13 20 00 e8 03 20 00	1e 00 24 00 07 00 23 00	.....\$.#.
00001B0B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001EAB	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001B1B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001EBB	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001B2B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001ECB	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001B3B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001EDB	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001B4B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001EEB	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001B5B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001EFB	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001B6B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001F0B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001B7B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001F1B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001B8B	20 ae 00 00 00 f6 01 5a	a4 29 00 8e 01 07 8c 00	.....Z ).....	00001F2B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001B9B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001F3B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001BA4	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001F4B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001BB4	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001F5B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001BC4	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001F6B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	.....
00001BD4	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001F7B	20 b2 00 00 00 f6 01 5a	a4 29 70 92 01 07 8c 00	.....Z ).....
00001BE4	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001F8B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001BF4	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001F9B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001C04	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001FA4	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001C14	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001FB4	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001C24	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001FC4	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
00001C34	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001FD4	00 02 00 00 4d 32 32 31	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....M221.....
00001C44	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001FE4	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	f8 00 0f 10 10 0c 10 00	.....
00001C54	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001FF4	10 0f 10 0c 10 00 10 0f	0f 0c 10 f8 00 14 0f 00	.....
00001C64	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00001004	0f 00 11 0f 10 0f 00	14 0f 00 11 0f 0f 17 1d	.....
00001C74	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00002014	ba 0f 00 11 10 10 10 10	f8 00 14 0f 00 17 1d ba	.....
00001C8B	20 af 00 00 00 f6 01 5a	a4 29 ac 8f 01 07 8c 00	.....Z ).....	00002024	35 14 0f 37 11 10 00 11	0f 00 11 10 10 c1 00 11	.....5..7.....
00001C9B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00002034	11 c9 c2 02 0f c3 c1 00	c9 c2 02 10 c3 00 10 f8	.....
00001CAB	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00002044	00 0f 10 0f 0f 0f 0f 10	00 0f 0f 10 0f 0f 0f 10	.....
00001CBB	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00002054	f8 c1 00 1d c9 c2 02 0f	c3 00 00 00 0f 0f 0f 00	.....
00001CDB	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	00002064	11 26 11 ba 26 11 ba 11	11 14 0f 00	.....&.8.....
00001CEB	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	0000207B	20 b3 00 00 00 2e 01 5a	a4 29 5c 93 01 07 24 00	.....Z )\.....\$.
00001CFB	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	0000208B	14 0f 10 0f 0f 0f 10 10	c1 00 c9 c2 02 0c 10 c3	.....
00001D0B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	0000209B	00 14 0f 00 10 06 17 11	26 11 ba 26 11 ba 0f 0c	.....&.8.....
00001D1B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	000020AB	09 be 09 ff		.....
00001D2B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	000020AB	20 b4 00 00 00 f6 01 5a	a4 29 e8 00 00 07 8c 00	.....Z ).....
00001D3B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	000020BB	8c 37 02 00 7c 0c 23 06	f2 71 00 00 23 06 f2 7a	.....7.. .#......
00001D4B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	000020CB	00 23 06 f2 7c 0c 23 06	f2 71 00 00 23 06 f2 7a	.....
00001D5B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	000020DB	78 00 00 7c 1c 23 06 f2	79 00 00 23 06 f2 72 00	.....
00001D6B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....	000020EB	00 23 06 f2 7b 00 00 fc	e2 72 01 00 23 06 f2 78	.....#. {...}.....
00001D7B	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	.....	000020FB	00 00 7c 2c 23 06 f2 79	00 00 23 06 f2 7a 00 00	..... .#.y.#......
00001D7C	20 b0 00 00 00 f6 01 5a	a4 29 98 90 01 07 8c 00	.....Z ).....	00002104	23 06 f2 73 00 00 fc e6	72 01 00 23 06 f2 78 00	.....#.5.....
00002114	00 0c 37 02 00 7c 5c 23	0a c6 7e 00 00 7e 0e 7c	.....7.. .#......	00002445	ec cc 53 ed 9f 7d 81 f3	64 5b 45 49 be c5 a2 64	.....K.s.....d(EI.....d
00002124	7e 23 06 f2 7a 00 00 f6	74 00 00 23 04 78 1d f6	.....#.#.t.....	00002455	ea 99 73 90 1f e9 b6	28 89 fc aa 58 ca 2a 16	.....K.s.....d(EI.....d
00002134	77 00 00 23 06 f6 74 00	00 23 04 7a 1d f6 77 00	.....#.#.t.....	00002465	8b d4 ed df be 2e e6 e4	0b 73 3d cb b1 7f fa 4e	.....#.#.t.....
00002144	00 23 06 f2 7c 00 00 c6	37 02 00 7c 6c 23 0a c6	.....#.#.t.....	00002475	ba a8 7c f7 b7 bb ff fc	8f db 1e f3 69 8b fa 54	.....#.#.t.....
00002154	7e 01 0e 7e 0e 7c 0e 23	04 f6 75 00 00 f6 75 00	.....#.#.t.....	00002485	b7 7d cb ff 23 f0 9a ed	dd 7c f5 ac 9f be 9b f9	.....#.#.t.....
00002164	00 23 06 f6 7e 01 00 23	04 78 0d f6 75 00 00 7e	.....#.#.t.....	00002495	f2 e6 f2 72 b5 5a 5d	ac 94 0b c7 fd 94 2b	.....#.#.t.....
00002174	5b be e6 0a 7e ae f6 7b	00 00 22 06 f6 70 00 00	.....#.#.t.....	00002505	15 e9 f2 d7 5e d7 30 67	6c 41 7f b4 c6 cf a7 b6	.....#.#.t.....
00002184	7e be 7e 4b 7f 1e 23 04	78 1d f6 70 01 00 23 06	.....#.#.t.....	00002515	c9 be 5b bf 35 49 7f eb	3b 68 94 90	.....#.#.t.....
00002194	f6 75 00 00 23 04 7a 0d	23 04 7a 1d	.....#.#.t.....	00002525	20 b9 00 00 00 f6 01 5a	a4 29 c6 00 00 07 8c 00	.....Z ).....
00002204	20 b5 00 00 00 f6 01 5a	a4 29 d4 e1 01 07 8c 00	.....Z ).....	00002535	db 16 fb 62 99 cc e3 17	eb 4b c4 32 01 c3 51 29	.....#.#.t.....
00002214	f6 70 01 00 23 06 f2 7d	00 00 c6 37 02 00 7c 2c	.....#.#.t.....	00002545	94 77 d6 3f e1 42 9d 4c	ac 56 79 7f df 72 2a 17	.....#.#.t.....
00002224	23 06 f6 7e 01 00 23 04	7c 1e 23 06 f2 7e 00 00	.....#.#.t.....	00002555	00 23 06 f2 7c 0c 23 06	fc f6 7f 0f e6 5e f6 63	.....#.#.t.....
00002234	f6 76 00 00 7e 5b fb e6	04 7f 1e 7e 5b 7c 0b 23	.....#.#.t.....	00002565	0e be f1 b6 78 71 e6 77	5d 43 ba bd 8c 7e 6f dd	.....#.#.t.....
00002244	06 f6 71 00 00 7e be 7e	7e 4b 7f 1e 7e 5b fb e6	.....#.#.t.....	00002575	d5 9c 5c 82 d9 fe 5d d7	5a 58 3e 31 56 96 6f ce	.....#.#.t.....
00002254	0a c6 7e 04 00 00 7e 7c	3e 23 04 78 0d 7e 4b 23	.....#.#.t.....	00002585	48 7b c6 38 2e 81 e7 e3	bb 64 54 97 9d 0c 08 25	.....#.#.t.....
00002264	06 f6 74 00 00 23 04 7a	0d f6 76 00 00 23 06 f6	.....#.#.t.....	00002595	01 42 49 84 58 3e 12 a1	7c 2a 42 59 80 50 16 21	.....#.#.t.....
00002274	70 00 00 23 04 78 1d f6	71 01 00 23 06 f6 70 00	.....#.#.t.....	00002605	54 be 44 a8 9c 8a 50 11	29 54 04 08 5b a3 4f 5a	.....#.#.t.....
00002284	00 23 04 7a 0d 23 04 7a	1d 7f 1a 10 0b 03 f6 7e	.....#.#.t.....	00002615	77 60 0e 22 9c 2d 44 16	82 d5 04 8e c7 4e c5 5f	.....#.#.t.....
00002294	00 00 23 06 f6 72 00 00	23 04 7c 0d fc f6 72 ac	.....#.#.t.....	00002625	15 60 ac 26 63 d4 b5 6e	55 04 af af 10 fd ab cf	.....#.#.t.....
00002304	10 f2 75 ad 10 7f 1a 11	f6 70 18 11 23 06 f2 73	.....#.#.t.....	00002635	5c 9b c6 89 4e e7 73 cb	7e 25 cd c0 f7 1d 9b 54	.....#.#.t.....
00002314	04 00 7f 1a 11 7f 1a 10	0b 02 f6 73 04 00 fc f6	.....#.#.t.....	00002645	4f 85 5a 13 40 ad 09 a1	0a 47 4d 12 cc 93 87 4e	.....#.#.t.....
00002324	72 ac 10 f2 75 ad 10 7f	1a 11 f6 70 18 11 23 06	.....#.#.t.....	00002655	5d 0b b3 2e c4 29 9f 82	f3 e4 01 d4 10 e6 c6 08	.....#.#.t.....
00002334	f2 7b 04 00 7f 1a 11 f6	71 01 00 23 06 f2 7e 00	.....#.#.t.....	00002665	71 2a a7 0c 3c 79 18 5d	09 70 5e 89 87 d1 60 a8	.....#.#.t.....
00002344	00 c6 37 02 00 7e f6 71	00 23 04 78 2d 23 04 7a	.....#.#.t.....	00002675	f7 0b 1c 45 bf 1c 84 f8	cb c9 fa fc	.....#.#.t.....







00003660	5d 70 2a 77 f3 9d 9d 75	86 33 df b3 2a da de 93	j p m u . 3 . . . . .	000039FD	6b ff 78 6e f4 75 f1 8e	77 a9 2c f4 c5 88 7e 5d	h x n u . . . . .
00003670	91 d8 5a 16 e2 55 7f 17	6a 85 e9 05 a9 93 9e ba	. . . . .	00003A00	6c df 5d 2e 0b 7d 31 0e	8e 78 c3 c3 93 52 16 fa	. . . . .
00003680	f9 ea 5d 8e 28 5a 2f f8	bb 44 7f d8 a2 af b6 e3	. . . . .	00003A1D	b2 dc 1c f1 86 84 a7 6a	59 e8 8b 71 76 c4 b3 13	. . . . .
00003690	9f 9e 9f 71 ff 1b b7 60	5d c6 7b b2 a6 51 f0 6f	. . . . .	00003A2D	9e 6a 65 a1 2f c6 e5 11	6f 51 78 aa 97 85 be 5e	. . . . .
000036A0	33 62 8b 0b 71 c2 7a 69	d9 80 d7 22 c5 67 7a 5e	. . . . .	00003A3D	a7 e1 5e b8 51 3f e7 fe	8e 49 b8 c1 a3 df 34 ba	. . . . .
000036B0	e1 00 a3 1c 09 14 0f 1d	ef dd a1 08 eb 31 b8 b3	. . . . .	00003A4D	a9 e7 dc 79 a6 bd cb c4	df 67 b2 bd 55 38 13 e4	. . . . .
000036C0	4b 08 27 e2 2c 9c e5 63	48 c2 8b b7	. . . . .	00003A5D	6b e3 78 3a f1 bc 65 82	53 81 c7 17 c7 79 70 79	. . . . .
000036D0	20 cb 00 00 00 f6 01 5a	a4 29 84 e1 00 07 ec 00	. . . . .	00003A6D	81 a7 6c 6e 1f 3f 68 e9	4b 5d 08 c5 ec cf e5 d7	. . . . .
000036E0	95 f2 2c 49 be 3e fe 28	7a 2a 7a 20 b2 03 43 27	. . . . .	00003A7D	b9 4a 51 12 cb 58 1b 12	8d b9 5f c8 a3 df 0b 0e	. . . . .
000036F9	8e 1b 3e 16 cf 61 73 12	7e 2d 24 5c 2e 8c 70 f9	. . . . .	00003A8D	a7 e1 5e b8 51 3f e7 fe	8e 49 b8 c1 a3 df 34 ba	. . . . .
00003709	2f 46 b8 54 a9 28 13 16	b9 28 5f cf 0f 71 7b db	. . . . .	00003A9D	52 7b a4 f6 7a e1 09 ab	81 ed e5 93 c0 17 4f a0	. . . . .
00003719	5f 8e 72 49 2c ea 99 c9	5c d1 57 74 b9 d3 c7 77	. . . . .	00003AAD	d0 85 9e 58 58 be bf f9	3a 46 e5 13 ba b3 82 97	. . . . .
00003729	f4 9d 87 b4 84 a1 24 dc	ef b7 d9 07 05 f7 de 9c	. . . . .	00003ABD	52 c0 cb 25 82 97 f3 82	97 85 0e 1f	. . . . .
00003739	80 6f 15 8c 0f c3 99 a4	33 79 01 4e 45 e9 2e	. . . . .	00003ACD	20 cf 00 00 00 f6 01 5a	a4 29 84 e1 00 07 ec 00	. . . . .
00003749	79 e9 91 c5 32 7c 34 3d	f2 9f 4c 8f 22 ec 1f dc	. . . . .	00003ADD	8d 66 c1 e0 a1 46 9e 21	65 b3 79 5e e8 8a 10 3a	. . . . .
00003759	4e 22 36 5b 5b 82 84 c2	13 85 5a f9 5e 9f bd 0d	. . . . .	00003AED	c8 6b 81 d0 b7 0e 01 a8	a2 78 6c e4 a5 a0 9a 26	. . . . .
00003769	80 71 0f ec 12 ac 94 98	77 5d a9 8a 7b ab 04 ea	. . . . .	00003AF9	f6 83 9f 4f 43 bf f9 ca	2d fc c7 ac 2f 25 49 7e	. . . . .
00003779	e4 5d ea aa 65 52 57 4b	ef 3b f9 5f b7 ef ea 99	. . . . .	00003B09	2d 4d f2 cb c5 9f 5b f8	ed 69 c2 5f 3c 82 e5	. . . . .
00003789	7d 27 ff eb f6 5d 43 18	6b d1 4a 56 4a 36 22 3c	. . . . .	00003B19	bf 91 26 ff c5 a2 2f 67	00 5c a5 0d 01 d4 0d 99	. . . . .
00003799	b3 95 c1 77 d3 6c de 68	da 4d ab 75 a3 eb 37 f0	. . . . .	00003B29	c9 74 ac d1 5b 71 bc b8	81 c4 70 9d 36 08 ca 46	. . . . .
000037A9	76 b8 e3 b9 c1 b3 f6 6e	0a cc 3e 9a 2a 57 69 b6	. . . . .	00003B39	20 ef 30 b8 aa a4 0d 83	32 28 28 6e 20 5c a9 69	. . . . .
000037B9	e5 dc b0 af 78 fa 21 14	16 b7 cd a4 72 9d 06 5b	. . . . .	00003B49	03 a1 68 fc a5 0c 85 2b	91 29 6a 19 c3 94 93 d9	. . . . .
000037C9	29 04 76 78 79 a6 14 04	5b b8 81 ca	. . . . .	00003B59	47 50 b3 cf c8 bd 4b 97	33 cb 5c 7f f0 60 e3 ab	. . . . .
000037D5	20 cc 00 00 00 f6 01 5a	a4 29 84 e1 00 07 ec 00	. . . . .	00003B69	85 e7 b4 e7 05 a9 88 a1	a6 70 3a 01 64 18 9c da	. . . . .
000037E5	01 3e 3e 9d 7d b5 d9 1d	32 c7 b8 1d 9e 4e c1 7d	. . . . .	00003B79	f9 f0 7a 5e 9c 22 d3 4c	c2 ef e9 fe 9a 71 a3 6a	. . . . .
000037F5	61 2f fa be 5d 4c c1 a8	98 39 63 93 60 0e 1e 03	. . . . .	00003B89	8c 11 bf 60 41 f8 8b 7c	d7 e5 d6 74 61 86 8e 83	. . . . .
00003805	1e af eb 6d 9f f3 b2 7e	84 f1 3a 50 fe 4e 58 4b	. . . . .	00003B99	1f 9a b2 83 83 82 20 fc	ed 56 f4 35 31 97 8f	. . . . .
00003815	f8 31 9c 7c 74 5d a5 84	98 47 83 6e 67 20 3c fe	. . . . .	00003BAD	b3 25 7c ef 70 f0 c3 7d	90 17 b1 38 db 34 1e	. . . . .
00003825	37 0c 0a 75 06 04 d1 ec	0a 25 77 8b 4a dc 25	. . . . .	00003BB9	15 ec 47 46 43 70 41 97	4b fe 61 a1	. . . . .
00003835	28 12 a5 c6 60 30 1c 0b	77 5a 85 b8 1d be 1d 1b	. . . . .	00003BC5	20 d0 00 00 00 f6 01 5a	a4 29 84 e1 00 07 ec 00	. . . . .
00003845	dc 55 fe 75 49 6d be c9	6a e1 70 fe d8 f5 cc ca	. . . . .	00003BD5	fc bb ca a5 2b 71 ea e9	70 a4 6b 79 88 48 fe 09	. . . . .
00003855	23 43 ae 08 c9 48 3d ed	25 da 37 11 87 c7 7d e7	. . . . .	00003C75	47 41 df 21 57 2a 89 7d	ed 1a 3b df bc 5f c4 8a	. . . . .
00003865	11 05 a5 07 08 2c a5 9b	3d 25 97 61 88 a2 ef 0b	. . . . .	00003BFF5	1e 95 51 dc c1 e6 52 3a	7c b9 78 32 0c ec 42	. . . . .
00003875	73 e7 3f d8 9f 61 f8 64	39 dd f0 15 4d df 37 34	. . . . .	00003C05	e0 cb 29 f0 a1 94 a4 9c	f6 a8 34 d6 2b e9 d8 e5	. . . . .
00003885	7d b2 70 fa 4b 23 29 9b	6c 95 b8 84 03 6f b3 54	. . . . .	00003C15	82 b1 17 c6 f7 6a 0a 3d	4f 8f 9a d7 b6 04 43 f8	. . . . .
00003895	86 05 1a 75 7d 07 c2 15	69 a9 4c 22 ae c5 44 c8	. . . . .	00003C25	58 ee 07 76 64 08 01 34	90 e2 d1 d7 6f d2 17 b5	. . . . .
000038A5	45 11 21 97 4b 84 70 f7	9c fe ab 2e f5 3a dc 68	. . . . .	00003C35	ac f4 c8 a5 d2 53 58 ff	d4 33 d1 d3 e9 3f 1d db	. . . . .
000038B5	90 89 88 f0 a0 60 41 fe	65 98 67 f1 7d a7 72 21	. . . . .	00003C45	3f 56 74 86 cf 9f 4d 4f	8d c4 7a 57 d7 84 ae c2	. . . . .
000038C5	47 89 f8 79 c1 4b 62 f0	72 29 e0 95	. . . . .	00003C55	fa eb 2a 85 2e 4d 19 e9	bf 1c db 52 6b 7b 1e	. . . . .
000038D1	20 cd 00 00 00 f6 01 5a	a4 29 84 e1 00 07 ec 00	. . . . .	00003C65	51 00 fe 3f 02 e6 79 df	a2 7f ae b3 0d 21 97 46	. . . . .
000038E1	82 c9 cb 62 f7 67 16 e8 d5	ab 05 01 17 67 16 e8 d5	. . . . .	00003C75	47 41 df 21 57 2a 89 7d	ed 1a 3b df bc 5f c4 8a	. . . . .
000038F1	52 c0 d7 0a 02 2f c0 30	6b 05 05 82 1f cf c0 61	. . . . .	00003C85	94 85 1e b9 74 7a 0a eb	1f 91 dd db 3c 3d fe 4e	. . . . .
00003901	9c e1 52 c5 06 6f 3c 18	5a a5 20 22 c4 19 07 7a	. . . . .	00003C95	5f 94 9e 37 62 74 12 13	e6 d1 a8 9e c7 16 2f	. . . . .
00003911	bd 14 22 a4 82 89 ab 8b	89 68 94 da 13 52 41 44	. . . . .	00003CA5	e0 30 76 6c 98 bb e1 a9	31 61 72 59 5e 94 4a 0a	. . . . .
00003921	34 c4 44 54 95 da 13 45	11 21 62 c4 43 7d 84 d9	. . . . .	00003CB5	4a a3 f3 77 3d 0f 4a c3	fa 83 e5 c5	. . . . .
00003931	10 39 29 38 b4 13 2b 2f	6a 91 09 c6 f3 47 a7 83	. . . . .	00003CD1	28 f2 b2 c4 e0 71 9c 95	95 51 62 60 59 bc ac a5	. . . . .
00003941	4c aa 31 0c 10 7e 9c 28	ca bc d9 84 56 a3 33 fa	. . . . .	00003CE1	e1 cc ca cc 44 9c 45 70	b3 2e 4a d9 6f e2 c1 93	. . . . .
00003951	c3 c9 51 de c3 30 c4 5b	05 80 cd 02 29 09 3f 9b	. . . . .	00003CF1	90 58 05 b8 89 2d e0 7a	7a 9c 83 df 7f df 1d 5a	. . . . .
00003961	c4 bd 35 3c 94 c1 f3 51	1e 36 bf a7 9e c5 07 8e	. . . . .	00003D01	79 71 37 84 bd 5d f5	b3 83 66 62 ef f6 78	. . . . .
00003971	4e 07 a2 c3 f0 b2 2d bd	4e 73 0b 4a 71 09 f2 e2	. . . . .	00003D11	9f ce 99 2b f8 a4 c3 22	0c 3c 8e 8f a8 25 35 3f	. . . . .
00003981	6d 4a b5 4a 49 47 50 8a	37 90 1f b7 94 e6 0e 04	. . . . .	00003D21	33 ff 86 74 26 f8 cd 20	fe 31 b8 9f f0 bb 7c a3	. . . . .
00003991	e2 08 ea 47 c2 d7 a7 f9	a5 f8 00 99 71 2b 69 2e	. . . . .	00003D31	0c 2f 25 b8 d4 79 8c	82 2a 90 d3 d5 05 22 db	. . . . .
000039A1	40 31 b8 fd c3 e6 3f 3f	fe 6a 9a f5 2f 1a bf 54	. . . . .	00003D41	fd 16 e4 ed fd dc 79 a1	f3 a1 8b 1b f5 7c 8b ad	. . . . .
000039B1	2c fe 5a 9a e1 2f 8f bf	52 31 f8 eb 69 36 bf 2c	. . . . .	00003D51	bf 10 09 9f 26 e6 6c 6a	58 f3 c8 85 7c 07 da 58	. . . . .
000039C1	fe 17 84 bf 91 6e c8 73	93 00 f5 74	. . . . .	00003D61	52 fb ed f0 4d a8 e8 77	8e 83 ed 9b 1b 36 f4 c1	. . . . .
000039D0	20 c0 00 00 00 f6 01 5a	a4 29 84 e1 00 07 ec 00	. . . . .	00003D71	ed be 33 d4 b6 4e ba f4	85 f4 e8 d4 b2 07 97 bc	. . . . .
000039E0	06 ad 8e b6 36 f8 f9 61	a7 78 29 ea d3 7d 36 d4	. . . . .	00003D81	30 c6 9b fc 7a 5c f3 70	9d 73 bb a9 57 e5 1f c6	. . . . .
000039F0	09 9b 05 27 f7 7f 05 96	48 d0 bc 3e 55 8a a7 63	. . . . .	00004110	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003991	bc 9b d2 39 2e fd 45 57	eb bb 43 50 b8 ad 4d d7	. . . . .	00004120	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003DA1	20 91 06 6a 3f 59 6c 75	ef bb 01 0a 73 74 b5 87	. . . . .	00004130	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003DB1	e2 08 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .	00004140	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003DC0	20 d2 00 00 00 00 01 5a	a4 29 84 e1 00 07 ec 00	. . . . .	00004150	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003DD0	82 fa c3 c0 4c 8d 67 19	ed fb 67 5b 8c dc 2a dc	. . . . .	00004160	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003DE0	aa 2d e9 85 db 1e ae fd	ee ec ee da aa eb fd 4d	. . . . .	00004170	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003DED	dd fe 2d 14 85 ad aa 93	6b 6d fd 99 b1 65 18 31	. . . . .	00004180	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003DF0	18 ae 0f ac 8c 59 70 f0	5e 28 88 07 e5 0e 06 1f	. . . . .	00004190	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003E00	7f 25 9b e1 9e d2 cb 48	44 99 cd 5c cb 8c cf c5	. . . . .	000041A0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003E1D	de bd a9 05 9e ef 2c c2	01 b7 2e 1c bb d4 64 78	. . . . .	000041B0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003E2D	3e dd 93 7a 8c 1f 54 5b	33 98 79 7b b9 5b 1e 56	. . . . .	000041C0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003E3D	ee d2 c9 c2 fc a1 13 84	6f e3 08 f1 69 8b fa 94	. . . . .	000041D0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003E4D	b3 e1 ed ee 9f 01 50 4b	01 02 33 00 2d 00 00 00	. . . . .	000041E0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003E5D	08 00 20 08 21 44 0f 1a	ea b4 ff ff ff ff ff ff	. . . . .	000041F0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003E6D	ff ff 05 14 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .	00004200	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003E7D	00 00 00 00 65 6e 74 72	79 01 00 10 0e e0 c2 00	. . . . .	00004210	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003E8D	00 00 00 00 00 3c 18 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .	00004220	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003E9D	06 00 00 00 00 01 00 01	00 47 00 00 00 73 18 00	. . . . .	00004230	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003EAD	00 00 00		. . . . .	00004240	20 d7 00 00 00 35 01 5a	a4 29 c4 04 00 00 2b 00	. . . . .
00003EB0	20 d3 00 00 00 9e 01 5a	a4 29 84 e1 00 07 ec 00	. . . . .	00004250	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003EC0	aa 8a 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .	00004260	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003ED0	0a 00 00 00 78 00 00 00	00 01 00 00 d4 fe 01 00	. . . . .	00004270	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003EE0	2c 01 00 00 01 02 00 00	00 02 00 00 ec 02 00 00	. . . . .	00004280	20 d8 00 00 00 f6 01 5a	a4 29 d8 fe 01 00 ec 00	. . . . .
00003EF0	02 06 00 00 ec 04 00 00	03 00 00 00 03 08 01 00	. . . . .	00004290	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003F00	00 00 01 07 40 00 00 00	0a 08 01 00 00 81 01 07	. . . . .	000042A0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003F10	a0 0f 00 00 05 07 01 00	a0 90 01 07 08 00 00 00	. . . . .	000042B0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	. . . . .
00003F20	06 03 01 00 6c 91 01 07						



We have used “Bulk Extractor (Kali Linux)” to all On-Chip PLC Memory dumps and extracted following “pcap” (Network Log Files) files. The "pcap" files don't have any packet timestamps, as given in figure 23. Consequently, we presume that the time for the initial packet transmission is the same as the OnChip PLC memory dump acquisition time.

Extracted “pacap” labels	from OnCchipRAM202306291XXXXX.bin
PLC NET1	43506
PLC NET2	45007
PLC NET3	50509
PLC NET4	52010
PLC NET5	53511
PLC NET6	55012
PLC NET7	60514

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
Number	0.000000	192.168.10.130	192.168.10.45	Modbus..	70	Query: Trans: 140; Unit: 1, Func: 90; Unity (Schneider)
2	0.000000	192.168.10.130	192.168.10.45	Modbus..	70	Query: Trans: 348; Unit: 1, Func: 90; Unity (Schneider)
3	0.000000	192.168.10.130	192.168.10.45	Modbus..	70	[TCP Previous segment not captured] Query: Trans: 157; Unit: 1, Func: 90; Unity (Schneider)
4	0.000000	192.168.10.130	192.168.10.45	TCP	70	[TCP Retransmission] 63784 → 502 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=63248 Len=16
5	0.000000	192.168.10.130	192.168.10.45	Modbus..	70	[TCP Previous segment not captured] Query: Trans: 357; Unit: 1, Func: 90; Unity (Schneider)
6	0.000000	192.168.10.130	192.168.10.45	TCP	70	[TCP Retransmission] 63784 → 502 [PSH, ACK] Seq=145 Ack=223 Win=63992 Len=16
7	0.000000	192.168.10.130	192.168.10.45	Modbus..	70	[TCP Previous segment not captured] Query: Trans: 166; Unit: 1, Func: 90; Unity (Schneider)
8	0.000000	192.168.10.130	192.168.10.45	Modbus..	70	[TCP Previous segment not captured] Query: Trans: 172; Unit: 1, Func: 90; Unity (Schneider)
9	0.000000	192.168.10.130	192.168.10.45	TCP	70	[TCP Out-Of-Order] 63785 → 502 [PSH, ACK] Seq=353 Ack=5457 Win=63992 Len=16
10	0.000000	192.168.10.130	192.168.10.45	Modbus..	70	[TCP Previous segment not captured] Query: Trans: 370; Unit: 1, Func: 90; Unity (Schneider)
11	0.000000	192.168.10.130	192.168.10.45	Modbus..	70	[TCP Previous segment not captured] Query: Trans: 180; Unit: 1, Func: 90; Unity (Schneider)
12	0.000000	192.168.10.130	192.168.10.45	TCP	70	502 → 63784 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=16 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
13	0.000000	192.168.10.130	192.168.10.45	Modbus..	70	[TCP Previous segment not captured] Query: Trans: 389; Unit: 1, Func: 90; Unity (Schneider)
14	0.000000	192.168.10.130	192.168.10.45	TCP	70	[TCP Out-Of-Order] 63784 → 502 [PSH, ACK] Seq=641 Ack=9921 Win=63744 Len=16
15	0.000000	192.168.10.130	192.168.10.45	TCP	70	[TCP Retransmission] 63784 → 502 [PSH, ACK] Seq=353 Ack=5457 Win=63744 Len=16
16	0.000000	192.168.10.130	192.168.10.45	Modbus..	70	[TCP Previous segment not captured] Query: Trans: 196; Unit: 1, Func: 90; Unity (Schneider)
17	0.000000	192.168.10.130	192.168.10.45	TCP	70	20778 → 17409 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0, bogus TCP header length (0, must be at least 20)
18	0.000000	192.168.10.130	192.168.10.45	Modbus..	70	[TCP Previous segment not captured] Query: Trans: 399; Unit: 1, Func: 90; Unity (Schneider)

Frame 1: 70 bytes on wire (560 bits), 70 bytes captured (560 bits)

Ethernet II, Src: ActionStarEn\_73:79:f3 (00:24:9b:73:79:f3), Dst: Telamecaniqu\_Ac:3e:dd (00:80:f4:4c:3e:dd)

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.10.130, Dst: 192.168.10.45

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 63785, Dst Port: 502, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 16

Modbus/TCP

Modbus

0000 00 00 f4 4c 3e dd 00 24 9b 73 79 f3 00 00 45 00

0010 00 24 9b 73 79 f3 00 00 45 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

0020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

0040 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Figure 23: Erroneous packet transmission timestamp

We have analyzed each Modbus TCP packets and decipher the codes accordingly. The decoded packet sample are given in figure 24. Moreover, we identified an ARP spoofing exploitation as shown in figure 25.




Figure 24: Decoded Modbus TCP in “pcap” file

```
[1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC] Ethernet MAC has changed, possible ARP spoofing! IP 192.168.10.45, MAC 0080F44C3EDD -> EC00F44C3EDD (frame 6)
[1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC] Modbus length is larger than the received frame (frame 12)
[1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC] Too small defined TCP Data Offset : 0, [46,46]
[1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC] Too small defined TCP Data Offset : 0, [46,46]
[1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC] Ethernet MAC has changed, possible ARP spoofing! IP 192.168.10.45, MAC 0080F44C3EDD -> 00249B7379F3 (frame 26)
[1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC] Ethernet MAC has changed, possible ARP spoofing! IP 192.168.10.130, MAC 00249B7379F3 -> 0080F44C3EDD (frame 26)
[1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC] TCP Option Kind is larger than 8 (it is:18), [54,54]
[1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC] TCP Data offset is outside frame, [46,46]
[1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC] TCP Option Kind is larger than 8 (it is:77), [54,54]
[1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC] TCP Data offset is outside frame, [46,46]
[1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC] TCP Option Kind is larger than 8 (it is:152), [54,54]
[1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC] TCP Data offset is outside frame, [46,46]
[1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC] TCP Option Kind is larger than 8 (it is:152), [54,54]
[1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC] Ethernet MAC has changed, possible ARP spoofing! IP 192.168.10.130, MAC 00249B7379F3 -> 00FEEC0079F3 (frame 148)
[1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC] Ethernet MAC has changed, possible ARP spoofing! IP 192.168.10.45, MAC 0080F44C3EDD -> 000000F2015A (frame 148)
[1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC] Too small defined TCP Data Offset : 60, [46,46]
```

Figure 25: ARP spoofing of the PLC system bearing the IP 192.168.10.45

## Findings:

- 1) Only computer that has established connectivity with the PLC system and been extracted from the "pcap" files is the "Engineering Workstation (with Logging)" with IP address 192.168.10.130.
- 2) All decoded Modbus TCP requests are in the form of “READ\_FNC” (UMAS Code 0x28) that denotes 192.168.10.130 is not in the “suspect” list.

- 3) ARP spoofing is the important discovery that indicates the presence of the malware inside the network that poisons the packets and alters original instructions of the PLC.

# Overall Findings

After a thorough analysis of the situation, we have concluded as follows:

1. **Behavior of the Elevator and malfunctioning timeline:** The anomalous behaviors of the elevator have been recognized, named, and the time zero of the abnormal behavior has been located (section 3.1).
2. **Specific cause of malfunctioning:** The workstation bearing IP 192.168.10.164 has been compromised. A “backdoor” channel has been opened and malicious instructions have been sent to the PLC through that channel. We are unable to locate the name of the malware, but it is evident that, malware like “Emotet Trojan” creates a “Virtual Environment” to drop other applications into the infected system. The system was infected by “spam email”, which leads the victim to browse “suspicious website(s)” as defined in section 3.2.
3. **Any evidence of an inside attacker:** No evidence has been located to justify this objection.
4. **(A). Any attack evidence on the network:** ARP spoofing is evident as described in section 3.3 and 3.5.  
  
**(B). Any attack evidence on the computer:** Kristi Waynes's computer's IP address is 192.168.10.164, but we were able to find the host IP, 192.168.133.137, encoded in a RAM dump by utilizing "Bulk Extractor" and "Volatility v3 netscan.". This is the classic example of the trojan that able to hide itself by creating a virtual entity and establish communication channel with its server. Detail analysis has been conducted in section 3.2.  
  
**(C). Any attack evidence on the PLC device:** We discovered indications of tampering in the PLC system's external memory backups and observed code injection into the PLC system from a workstation. Detailed analysis has been conducted on section 3.4 and 3.5.



# Biography



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