Civil War, Brigade Series:

The Seven Days: Savage Station

Table of Contents

Note: See Seven Pines rulebook for the countermanifest for both games.

Introduction

Savage Station is the Seven Days module within **Seven Pines**. It is the second game in a set of three that will recreate the entirety of the Seven Days fighting. Savage Station continues the Seven Days into June 29th. It also examines the options on the south side of the Chickahominy on the 26th and 27th.

The rules here address the Battle of Savage Station, and the related maneuvering by McClellan and Lee.

Important: The Savage Station scenarios require the ownership of **Gaines Mill** (volume one of **The Battles of the Seven Days**). The **Savage Station Module** is not a stand alone game.

1.0 Terrain Notes
1.1 Swamp and Wooded Swamp Hexes

Shift one column left on the Fire Combat Table if one or more firers in a combat are in a swamp (or wooded swamp) hex. There is no additional penalty if more than one such unit fires to a given combat.

The Gamers

1.2 Richmond Fort Hexes

These numbered forts were erected by the citizens of Richmond early in the war. They effect only the hexsides they face, and any unit fired on through an unprotected hexside does not gain the benefit of the fort hex.

The Fort benefits are: -1 on the Fire Combat Table, +3 on the Morale Table. Crossing a Fort hexside costs any unit +1 movement point.

1.3 Union and Confederate Trenches

The Confederate trenches, facing east, and the Union trenches, facing west and connecting the Redoubt 1 through Redoubt 5 hexsides, represent the trenches that were dug by both sides after the battle of Seven Pines. The effects of these trenches are all the same as trenches in the Series rules: -1 on the Fire Combat Table and +3 on the Morale Table. It costs any unit +1 movement point to cross a trench hexside. Note that despite the different look of the Union trenches and the Redoubt hexes, they are all considered the same kind of trench for game purposes. The different symbols are purely to differentiate **when** they are in effect.

1.4 Use of Tracks

Because these maps must mate with the rest of **The Seven Days** on-map tracks and admin materials have been omitted so as to not interfere with either linkage or full use of the available terrain. Losses are kept track of only on the Loss Charts (no Casualty Tracks) and Artillery Ammunition must be tracked on paper (no Artillery Ammunition Tracks). Furthermore, the Terrain Key and such are on the Player's Aide Card along with the Turn and Day Records. This required one-color printing for these, but we assume the standard elevation color scheme (and most of the common terrain symbols) to be obvious to experienced and inexperienced players alike.

1.5 North

North is toward the 1.xx hexrow of each map. Map D is in the west, Map F is in the east.

2.0 Union Special Rules

2.1 Acting Army Commanders

If McClellan becomes a casualty, replace him with the highest ranking corps commander according to the following:

1. McDowell (if using pertinent options)

2. Sumner
3. Heintzelman
4. Keyes
5. Porter
6. Franklin

If replacement officer is not in play (but not a casualty himself), he enters the game via any map's south map edge two turns after McClellan's loss. The only way McClellan can become a casualty is if Union Option 5.1b was used.

2.2 Historical McClellan Restrictions.

For all of the restrictions listed below, note that they remain in effect even if McClellan becomes a casualty.

2.2a <u>Union Anti-initiative Ratings</u>. For any initiative that would require Union troops to **attack**, McClellan has an anti-initiative of -2. For orders involving movement or defense (only), McClellan has no anti-initiative. No Union corps commander has anti-initiative.

2.2b **McClellan's Paranoia.** McClellan was convinced that the Rebel army greatly outnumbered his own forces at all times. Therefore, he was extremely cautious about any aggressive move made by his own forces, always alert to an enemy counterattack.

To reflect this fear, **subtract 2** from any Corps Attack Stoppage Check (if using the defensive orders option, do not use this modifier for defensive checks.)

2.3 Attachments and Detachments

The player cannot voluntarily have a Union Corps attach units from one to another corps. Some scenarios call for such attachments, which are allowed, but these are beyond the player's control. A corps may detach up to one division to operate independently on Divisional Goals.

2.4 Union Separate Brigades

All of the brigades below can be given Divisional Goals. If wrecked, these units check morale at -6, not -4.

2.4a <u>Corps attached Cavalry.</u> The four Union corps cavalry brigades (five when counting the optional 1st Corps) have no divisional affiliation. These brigades are attached directly to their corps and trace radii directly to the corps HQ (as if they were divisions). They can be detached, but do not count against the corps detachment limit of one division. Cavalry can never be attached to a different Corps.

2.4b **The Army Cavalry.** This Cavalry brigade is attached directly to the army HQ. It can be given orders by the Army commander. It can also be attached to a corps. This brigade (and Eng, see below) can roll for initiative, as if it had a leader rating of 2. It is not considered independent, and must always have orders, or be attached to a corps, to act.

2.4c <u>The Train Guard Detachment</u> **(TGD).** The Train Guard represents the force assigned to defend the Army of the Potomac's enormous supply train during McClellan's "change of base." The TGD is independent, but subject to the following restriction: it must always remained stacked with, or adjacent to, at least one of the Union Train counters.

2.4d **The Engineer Brigade.** Handle the Engineer Brigade exactly like the Union Army Cavalry Brigade. It also greatly aids the process of destroying and rebuilding bridges. It adds 2 to any roll involving an existing bridge (either intact or destroyed), and also can build completely new bridges in certain circumstances. See 4.1.

2.4e <u>The Artillery Reserve.</u> There are seven artillery units attached to the Army, the Artillery Reserve. These units can trace command directly to any Union Corps HQ, and act on the orders of that Corps HQ. They **do not** need orders to change HQs (simply move them from one corps command radius to another's to show the change of ownership).

2.5 The Union Train and Changing Base

In scenario 6.4, Campaign Scenario #4, the decision to change base is left outside the control of the Union player, and is instead presented as a fait accompli. In 6.5 and 6.6, Campaign Scenarios #5 and #6, this decision is placed in the hands of the Union player himself, and that decision will greatly effect the victory conditions. In either case, the following rules apply.

The Union player can decide to change base in his Command Phase of any game turn. He notes the turn on his order log. He does not need to tell the Confederate player, especially if using the option allowing the placement and movement of the train units to remain secret.

Ten hours (**not turns**) after he decides to change base, the Union Player places all 10 Supply Train counters, plus the Train Guard Detachment (TGD) on a road or railroad hex in or adjacent to F26.06. (Note that in 6.4, these units are called for in the scenario set up). This will be the only time that the Supply Train units can ever stack with any other unit—exception, see the rules for the TGD, 2.4c above.

As each Supply Train unit moves, it must conform to the rules listed below. The initial stacking period is the only time that any of these rules can be violated, and then only for as long as it takes to move the units so that they are no longer stacked or have their "ZOCs" overlap, as described below. As long as a Supply Train unit does not move at all, it can remain stacked in its initial deployment. Supply Train unit restrictions:

• Each train counter has a Movement Allowance of 3.

• A train unit may only move along primary or secondary roads.

• Each train unit is assumed to completely occupy its own hex and all road hexes adjacent to it. No other unit (exception, the TGD) can move through (or stack with) any of these hexes. Note that train unit "ZOCs" cannot overlap. At least two road hexes must separate each train unit at all times. The train will not be able to move into a new hex until it and the hexes around it are cleared of other friendly units. Any unit forced to retreat onto or through a train unit is routed instead. Train units cannot displace due to retreats or rout-throughs.

• A train unit pays 1 extra MP to cross a bridge.

• A train unit pays 2 extra MP to cross a ford.

• Each train unit can safely exit

the map **only** along the south edge of map F.

• No train unit can ever act as a supply source for ammunition of any sort. The sole function of these units is to recreate the enormous logistical tail of the Union Army.

• Any time a Confederate combat unit moves adjacent to a Supply Train unit (they are unaffected by the stacking restrictions above), the supply train unit is eliminated.

Once decided, the change of base cannot be rescinded. The Union Player has no choice but to live with the consequences of his decision.

Optional: If players desire, the Union player can keep the decision to change base a secret. Instead of placing the trains on the map, he secretly records their position and turn-by-turn movements on paper. If any Confederate unit moved onto or adjacent to any train unit, all train units should immediately be placed on-map. This option preserves the air of uncertainty that Lee faced after the fighting on the 27th.

2.6 Designating a Wing Commander.

In any scenario, the Union player can create a semi-autonomous wing commander to control part of his army. This wing commander is any corps commander on the map. McClellan creates one by issuing a simple order. When it implements, the corps commander named becomes a wing commander. Any number of on-map corps can be placed under one wing commander.

A wing commander can issue orders to any corps under his authority, but can do so only through initiative when stacked with that corps' commander. The wing commander never uses command points, or issues regular orders. Generally, wing commanders can be designated in any scenario, though **only** scenarios that specifically list wing commanders **start** with a wing commander in effect.

2.7 Union Options

2.7a McClellan Attacks! Ignore the historical McClellan restrictions listed in 2.2a and 2.2b. This option gives the Confederate Player 10 VP.

The historical McClellan restrictions are pretty limiting for the Union player, and make it very difficult to mount a real attack on Magruder. This option assumes that McClellan heeded the urgings of his subordinates and called Lee's bluff in front of Richmond.

2.7b McClellan sticks around. In those scenarios where McClellan is not on map, allow him and the AOP HQ to deploy within 10 hexes of any Union unit, but no closer than 10 hexes to any Confederate unit. This option gives the Confederate player 7 VP.

Historically, McClellan was almost never on the field of an action. As a result, the Army of the Potomac often fought poorly co-ordinated, disjointed actions.

3.0 Confederate Special Rules
3.1 Confederate Command arrangements

The largest existing Confederate command organization is the division. Each division receives orders directly from the Army commander in the form of Divisional Goals. Each division rolls for all attack stoppage and defensive failure checks separately. Alternatively, the Confederate player can form wings to control multiple divisions at once.

The exception to the above is the one permanent larger command structure within the Rebel army—Jackson's Valley Army. The Valley Army functions like a permanent wing command (see below) and consists of J-V Division, E-V Division, and W-V Division. These divisions can be re-assigned per the rules in 3.2.

3.2 Creating Wing Commands

At start, only one multi-divisional organization exists in the Rebel army—Jackson's Valley Army. The Rebel player has the option of either issuing Divisional Goals to all other divisions, or of creating a new wing (a corps-equivalent structure).

During any friendly command phase, the Confederate army commander can issue a simple order directly to a division commander designating him as a wing commander. This order must specify who is to command the new wing, and which divisions now comprise the wing. It must be accepted like any other order.

Restrictions

• **Rank and Seniority:** No division commander can be assigned to a wing that would force him to serve under a general with a higher seniority number than his own. For instance, if D. H. Hill is ordered to command the right wing, he

could only command divisions whose officers had a seniority value of 5 (D. H. Hill's own seniority rating) or greater. Longstreet, with a seniority of 2, could never serve under D. H. Hill. A divisional commander can serve under a wing commander with an equivalent seniority number. Seniority numbers are printed on the leader counters, next to the leader rating.

• **Size of Wing:** No Wing can contain more that four infantry divisions at once. A division can be added to an existing Wing command as needed at a later time, subject to the above limit, but it requires a separate order (issued to the existing Wing commander from the army commander).

• **Timing:** After the creation order is issued, no orders can be sent to a Wing or its component forces until that order is accepted by the new wing commander.

• **Administration and Supply:** The Left Wing and Right Wing supply wagons are independent, and can supply any Rebel unit. The Wing HQ's are deployed once the specific wing is created. The HQ's are placed in the hex of the new wing commander, and a replacement leader is put in charge of his former division. Once the Wing commander is designated, he is a Corps commander and is no longer in command of his old division (the Repl leader is the new division commander).

3.3 Attachments and Detachments

Handle divisional attachment and detachment according to the wing rules above. Brigades can be detached at will, and may be given Divisional Goals. No division can ever have a brigade of another division attached to it.

3.4 Separate units

3.4a The ANVa Artillery. The Confederate player has three separate ANVa artillery units. Each traces command radius to any friendly division commander, and act upon any orders that division has. Actual orders are not needed to switch divisions—simply tracing radii to another division commander during the command phase realigns the artillery's command structure.

3.4b Stuart's Cavalry. The Confederate player has two cavalry Brigades, Cav and STb-Cav. Technically, this is really one large brigade under Stuart. However, as regiments were continually detached for other service, it is shown as two brigades to allow more flexibility. These two units trace command radii exactly like the above artillery. Additionally, they

can be given Divisional Goals for detached missions.

3.5 Stonewall Jackson's Mysterious Ailment.

Jackson performed unexpectedly poorly during the Richmond fighting, quite differently from his recent exhibition in the Valley. This rule is in effect for any scenario, campaign or otherwise, longer than one day's duration. During the Confederate Command Phase of the first daylight turn after any night turn, roll one die On a 5 or 6, flip Jackson to his four rated side. If he is currently on his four rated side, anything **but** a 6 will return him to his zero rated side. He remains at this rating all day, until the next roll is made. Jackson always enters the map or starts all scenarios on his zero rated side.

Some players have found this too predictable. Alternatively, roll for Jackson each time he accepts a new order, using the above conditions. If he flips, he remains at that rating until the next order is accepted. Initiative rolls will automatically flip him if a "loose cannon" result occurs.

3.6 Huger vs. Holmes

Three of Huger's units: R-Hu, Wa-Hu, and Wb-Hu, really belong to Holmes' Dept. of North Carolina. They will revert to Holmes's command instantly after Holmes arrives on the map, and must move so as to rejoin him. Thereafter, they function as sub-units of the Dept. of North Carolina

Huger's division has two wrecked lines on the loss chart: one for the three brigades of Mahone, Wright, and Armistead (M-Hu, W-Hu, and A-Hu) and one for the three units listed above. As long as they are together, treat the result as cumulative—for instance, Hu Division is not wrecked until any 4 of the component brigades are wrecked. Once the three 'loaned' brigades revert to Holmes' control, however, only use the top line for Huger's command.

Holmes' loss chart works in a different manner. Treat these three brigades (R-Hu, Wa-Hu and Wb-Hu) as separate for all purposes. Holmes would roll for stoppage for each group separately, under the normal rules for attack stoppage. If these units become part of a wing, each group would be treated as a separate division

for stoppage effects, but all would still trace to Holmes for command radius, and be one division for assignment and order purposes.

3.7 Confederate Minor Variants

3.7a Holmes crosses the James. In all scenarios except 6.2, allow Holmes and the Department of North Carolina troops (Dept. NC Division) to set up within 10 hexes of any Confederate unit—but no closer than 10 hexes to any Union unit. For each unit so deployed, give the Union player 1/2 VP (round up.) Note that in some scenarios, two of the Dept. NC Brigades and two artillery units arrive as reinforcements. In this case, award the VPs only for any units that are brought on early, or who were not called for by the reinforcement schedule.

These troops were busy guarding the line south of the James River. In that no major threat every materialized from this direction, these troops could have been massed against McClellan.

4.0 General Special rules
4.1 Building, Destroying, and Rebuilding Bridges

A significant feature of the Richmond fighting was the importance of two rivers, the Chickahominy and the White Oak Swamp. The bridges crossing these rivers became focal points of activity. Bridges can be destroyed and repaired, and in some instances new bridges built. Mark bridge building or destruction with any desired marker, or the bridges issued in our 1997 Christmas Countersheet.

4.1a Existing Bridges. Any unit can destroy an intact bridge or repair a destroyed bridge. For either procedure, the attempting unit must be adjacent to the bridge at the start of the friendly Movement Phase. If successful, place a destroyed marker on a destroyed bridge, or remove the marker from a repaired bridge.

To destroy: Roll one die. A 5 or more destroys it, 4 or less is no effect.

To repair: Roll two dice. A 12 or more repairs its, 11 or less has no effect.
*The US Engineer unit adds 3 to these rolls.

4.1b Building a new Bridge. New bridges can only be built at a ford. Only the US Engineer unit can build a bridge. The Engineer unit must begin its Movement Phase adjacent to a ford.

Roll one die. A 5 or 6 builds the bridge, 4 or less is no effect.
*Note: the US Engineer does not modify this roll.

4.2 Fatigue (optional)

The complete **Seven Days** Campaign Scenario will cover a full week of action. Even some of the shorter campaign scenarios will cover 2-4 days. Troops require a certain amount of rest to function effectively over such periods, and so provisions for fatigue are needed. The following rules intend to reproduce fatigue in a relatively simple form. However, due to the additional bookkeeping required, they are **strictly** optional. In general, not using these rules will compress the action in time.

Fatigue is kept track by division. Each division is can be in one of three fatigue states: Good, Tired, or Exhausted. Every unit within a given division **always** has the divisional status (no provisions for units which did less or more than others). For instance, if D.H. Hill's division is exhausted, all five brigades of his division are exhausted.

4.2a Recording Fatigue. Each division (or separate brigade) has a line of boxes on the Loss Chart with which to record Fatigue.

• Each **turn** that **any** unit of a given division moves, fires, or is fired upon, check off one box. Only check off one box for the division in a turn, even if all three apply to one or more units in the division.

The box is marked off even if only one unit of the division engages in activity causing fatigue. **Artillery** units **never** count for this purpose.

Apply the same rules to the marking of these boxes and to the change of fatigue states involved as you would the normal Loss Charts and their effect on Fire Levels. The instant that the division enters its new fatigue state, all restrictions of state apply.

4.2b Effects of Fatigue.

A) Good condition has no effect on a unit. The unit is normal.

B) Tired incurs the following restrictions:

- -2 to all morale checks.
- All straggler checks are always made on the 1&1/2 or more Straggler Table.

C) Exhaustion incurs the following restrictions:

- -4 to all morale checks.
- All straggler checks are made on the 1&1/2 or more straggler table, and +1 is added to all such checks.
- The unit in question may not force march.

D) All Boxes Filled in... If a unit has **all** of its fatigue boxes checked it suffers the following:

- It cannot move during the Movement Phase
- It cannot fire during an Offensive Fire Phase
- It **can** fire during a Defensive Fire Phase

4.2c Recovering from Fatigue. A division "rests" to recover from fatigue. To rest, **all** non-artillery units of the division cannot move, fire or be fired upon. A resting division cannot have (or be part of a Wing that has) attack or movement orders. It can have defensive orders, or no orders at all. At the end of a successful resting turn, erase one mark from a box on the division's fatigue record. Units **can** recover stragglers while resting.

4.2d Night and Fatigue. On night turns (not twilight), a unit either incurring or recovering from fatigue does so at twice the normal rate. For example, a unit that moves at night marks off two spaces on its fatigue record instead of one.

4.2e Swamp and Fatigue. Any unit that enters, leaves, or moves through a swamp hex (excluding units in column or mounted using road movement) accumulate fatigue at twice the normal rate. The effects of night and swamp are cumulative, so that a unit moving into a swamp hex at night would have its fatigue effect **quadrupled**.

5.0 Victory

The Seven Days was a complicated campaign. Both sides claimed victory—Lee for driving the Union army away from Richmond, and McClellan for 'saving' his army in the face of an overwhelming foe. Likely Lee had the better claim, as McClellan was fleeing a mostly imaginary enemy. Still, the change of base was a substantial accomplishment under the circumstances, and McClellan's shifting to the James caught Lee off-guard for a critical day. Ultimately, these victory conditions try to recreate the diverse nature of the historical claims, and also to recapture some of Lee's dilemma.

5.1 Victory Points For Terrain

Each player is awarded VPs for capture of geographic points on the map. These are divided into three groupings: points awarded to the Union player for capture of terrain, and two sets of awards for the Confederate player, (the one used depends on whether the Union player elects to implement the change of base, or not. Note that all six maps have terrain VPs listed. Not all maps are in play in every scenario, and each scenario will specify which maps are eligible for VP awards.

Hex	USA Award	CSA Award (regular)	CSA Award (Change of Base option)
Map A			
A12.20	2	0	0
A30.23	2	0	0
A36.30	4	0	0
A26.04	4	0	0
A53.09	4	0	0
A43.14	4	0	0
Map B			
B16.16	2	1	0
B31.30	2	1	0
B47.27	2	1	0
B47.17	4	1	0
B56.31	2	1	0
Map C			
C20.27	1	2	0
C32.17	1	2	0
C40.04	2	4	0
C50.23	0	4	0
C56.02	0	2	0
Map D			
each Richmond Hex			
	10	0	0
each Rocketts Hex			
	1	0	0
D10.23	4	0	0
D27.25	3	0	0
D42.17	3	0	0
Map E			
E5.06	1	0	0
E19.16	1	2	0
E26.20	1	2	0
E45.16	1	1	2
E53.10	1	0	5
Map F			
F2.12	1	2	0
F11.29	0	5	0
F19.35	0	5	0
F23.35	0	5	0
F31.35	0	5	0
F26.06	0	4	0
F25.27	0	5	0
F32.31	0	5	0
F50.03	1	1	5
F59.28	0	1	10

5.2 Victory Points For Casualties

This award is broken down into three general "army size" schedules. Each scenario specifies which to use: small army, medium army, or large army.

Award each side the following points if the other side's losses equal or exceed the listed amount. Such awards are NOT cumulative; a Union player, for instance, would not get 3 VP for inflicting 15 Confederate losses on the Small Army chart, and then 11 more VP when Confederate losses reached 75. Instead, give only the highest VP award.

All losses should be counted cumulatively, **including** losses at start as shown on the Scenario Starting Strength Chart, but ONLY for units that were actually in play. Do not count losses for units that were not in the scenario.

Small Army Losses	Medium Army Losses	Large Army Losses	VP Award
15	25	37	3
30	45	75	5
45	70	112	8
60	90	150	11
75	115	187	15
90	135	225	19
105	160	262	24
120	180	300	29
135	200	338	34
150	225	375	39
165	250	400	50

5.3 Victory Points Awarded For Wrecked Formations

Victory points are also awarded for wrecking larger formations. Awards are made for each division of either army that is permanently wrecked (do not count stragglers) at the end of the scenario. Each division is worth the number of points below. Only count units in play during the scenario.

CSA Unit	VP Award
Mc Division	1
Jo Division	2
Mg Division	1
H Division	4
L Division	5
AH Division	5
DH Division	4
E-V Division	3
W-J Division	2
J-V Division	3
Dept. NC Division	1 (3 with optionals)

USA Unit	VP Award
1-1(opt)	3
2-1(opt)	3
3-1(opt)	3
1-2	3
2-2	3
1-3	3
2-3	3
1-4	2
2-4	2
1-5	4
2-5	3
PaR-5	4
1-6	4
2-6	4

5.4 Victory Points and the Change of Base

In addition to the differences listed in 5.1 above, the Confederate player is awarded 5 VP for each Union Supply Train unit eliminated during the course of a game where the change of base occurs.

5.5 Determining the victor.

Each scenario (except 6.2) provides a chart for determining its victory. When play ends, add up the VP awarded each side, and then subtract the Union total from the Confederate total. Compare the result to the provided chart to determine the victor and his level of success.

6.0 Scenarios Set-Up Notes

6.0a Confederate Wings, if in existence for a scenario, are specified in the Confederate orders section. If a wing is not mentioned, it is not yet in being, but can be created **after** play begins.

6.0b No units start any scenario with fatigue (if using that option.)

6.0c Units start each scenario with the losses specified in the loss chart for that day.

6.0d In any scenario where the ANVa Supply Train does not appear, the Right Wing Supply acts as a source of artillery supply and unlimited small-arms resupply.

6.0e Jackson starts all scenarios on his "Zero" rated side.

6.0f Where a given Wing is already in play, the senior commander listed as part of the wing is in command. Generally, Longstreet command the Left Wing and Magruder commands the Right Wing.

6.1 Scenario 1: The 29th of June

On June 28th, after the retreat from Gaines Mill, McClellan saw no recourse but to retreat to the James and change his base. Most of the 28th was eaten up getting the massive supply trains moving, and not until the morning of the 29th did most of the army begin to move. Ordered to pursue, the Confederates under Magruder encountered the Union rear guard, 2nd Corps, at Savage Station along the Richmond & York River Railroad. The action that ensued was limited and indecisive, but hotly contested by the forces involved. Only the miscarriage of Lee's larger plans prevented a much larger action from developing.

General Information

First Turn: 4:00 a.m. June 29th
Last Turn: 7:00 p.m. June 29th
Scenario Length: 32 turns
Maps used: E & F (Map D can be included if desired)
First Player: Confederate
Bridges Destroyed: All Bridges over the Chickahominy are destroyed.

Union Information

Set Up:
6 Corps (less 1-6, 6b), 2xReserveb— w/i 5 F26.06
2 Corps—w/i 5 E19.16
3 Corps—w/i 5 E26.20

Artillery Ammunition: 50
Reinforcements: none

Orders:

6 Corps is to defend the vicinity of Savage Station. They must prevent any Confederate troops from using the roads running off the south edge of Map F east of the White Oak Swamp. (1-6 Division and a 6 Corps artillery battery are not in play.)

2 Corps is to retreat to the vicinity of E22.25 and defend the Railroad and Williamsburg Roads.

3 Corps is to retreat to the vicinity of F31.08 and establish a defensive line south of the railroad to protect the roads leading off the south edge of map F east of the White Oak Swamp.

Play note: McClellan is not on-map, nor may the Union player issue orders from off-map. The player is limited to Initiative and Emergency Corps Retreats to control his forces.

Historical note: These orders by no means faithfully recreate the exact nature of events for the Federals on June 29th, only the initial orders they were under. Sumner eventually withdrew to the Savage Station line, while Heintzelman's Corps departed to exit the map by around noon. A strict straight jacketing of the Union player into following these orders however, would allow the Confederate player to artificially manage such actions to his benefit. The Union player will be hamstrung enough without McClellan.

Confederate Information

Set Up:
Lee, ANVa HQ and Supply—w/i 5 E7.01.
Magruder, Right Wing HQ and Supply—E7.01
Mc Division—w/i 5 E21.01 west of the Confederate trenchline.
Jo Division—w/i 5 E11.01 west of the Confederate trenchline.
Mg Division, 2x ANVab—w/i 3 E6.01 west of the Confederate trenchline.

Artillery Ammunition: 40
Reinforcements:
At 8:00 a.m., the following forces may arrive via any or all of these hexes—E1.24, E1.27, F1.01, F1.07:

Jackson, Valley Army HQ and Supply (0 rated side), 1x ANVab, DH Division, W-V Division, J-V Division

Orders:

The **Right Wing** has been established, consisting of all units of the Mc, Jo, and Mg Divisions. It is to advance via the 9 Mile Road to attack the Union rear guard along the Richmond and York River RR near Seven Pines, and to continue the attack to Savage Station and any Union units there.

The **Valley Army**, with **DH Division** attached (but less E-V Division, not in play) is to rebuild the bridges across the Chickahominy as soon as possible and then advance to attack the Union forces around Savage Station.

Victory

Use the terrain awards for maps E and F, with the Change of Base option already implemented. The Supply Train has already exited. The Confederate player uses the Small Army loss chart, while the Union player uses the Medium Army loss chart.

Confederate Major Victory—8 or more VPs
Confederate Minor Victory—2 to 7 VPs
Draw—4 to 1 VPs
Union Minor Victory—-9 to -5 VPs
Union Major Victory—-10 or less VPs

6.2 Scenario 2: Savage Station

This scenario covers just the fighting of the 29th between Magruder and Sumner. As such, it tends to be more an exercise in the mechanics of the system, rather than a strategic contest, but is offered here for historical interest and as a training scenario. In reality, it just wasn't much of a battle.

General Information

First Turn: 3:00 p.m. June 29th
Last Turn: 7:00 p.m. June 29th
Scenario Length: 8 turns
Maps used: F
Map area in play: south of the 20.xx hexrow, west of the xx.15 hexrow, and north of the 34.xx hexrow, inclusive.
First Player: Confederate
Bridges Destroyed: All Bridges over the Chickahominy are destroyed.

Union Information

Set Up:
2 Corps HQ and Supply, 2b(4)—F29.05
1-2, 2b—w/i 1 F28.07
2-2, 2b—w/i 1 F28.04
2-6, 6b—w/i 1 F31.09

Artillery Ammunition: 15
Reinforcements: none

Orders:

2 Corps is to defend the vicinity of Savage Station.

2-6 has a Divisional Goal to support the 2 Corps, but no unit of the 2-6 may be committed to combat until either Smith (the commander of 2-6 Division) has successfully gotten initiative, or any unit of the 2-6 Division has been attacked by a Confederate unit.

Confederate Information

Set Up:
Jo Division—w/i 1 F22.02
Mc Division—w/i 1 F27.01
Mg Division, 2xANVab, Right Wing HQ and Supply—w/i 1 F25.02

Artillery Ammunition: 15
Reinforcements: None

Orders:

The **Right Wing** exists, and consists of all Confederate troops in play. The Right Wing is to attack and capture Savage Station and hex F29.05.

Victory

Historically, this was no more than a skirmish. Players will no doubt fight much more aggressively than the historical opponents.

The Confederate player wins if he inflicts more losses on his opponent than he suffers, and if he also captures both hexes at the end of the scenario. If he fulfills one of the above conditions, the result is a draw. Anything else is a Union victory.

6.3 Scenario 3: Magruder's Last Performance

Lee's massing of forces north of the Chickahominy was a gamble. McClellan still had the better part of four Corps—the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th—massed south of that stream and available for a direct stab at Richmond. John Magruder's command was left to hold the trenches opposite this Union army, and he was outnumbered almost 3-1. Only the caution of McClellan held back the Union troops outside of Richmond for the two days of fighting that it took Lee to defeat Porter's 5th Corps north of the Chickahominy.

General Information

First Turn: 3:00 p.m. June 26th
Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. June 27th
Scenario Length: 51 turns
Maps used: D & E
First Player: Union
Bridges Destroyed: The Upper Trestle Bridge (B51.07) New Bridge (B56.12) and Lower Trestle Bridge (B59.18) are all destroyed. All other Bridges are intact.

Union Information

Set Up:
2 Corps—w/i 6 E19.16
3 Corps—w/i 6 E26.20
1-4—w/i 1 E27.23
(no other 4 Corps units are in play)
6 Corps—w/i 6 E8.23
APot HQ and Supply, Eng, 5xReserveb—w/i 1 E8.32

Artillery Ammunition: 100

Mandatory Withdrawals:
There are no reinforcements—just units that must be withdrawn to support the fighting north of the Chickahominy. If the Union player fails to withdraw these units, he loses the game—because 5th Corps is destroyed.

8:00 p.m. June 26th—1xReserveb
2:00 p.m. June 27th—1-6 Division, Reserveb
3:00 p.m. June 27th—1-2 Division

The units called on to withdraw must actually be able to move off the north map edge of maps E or F when called for. Simply removing them in the course of play will not do—they must have accepted orders to leave and exit the map via normal movement. Finally, if either division is wrecked at the time it exits, it does not count for the exiting condition and a different—unwrecked—division must be substituted for it.

Orders:

2 Corps, 3 Corps, and **6 Corps** each are to defend the line of Union trenches within their set up areas.
1-4 Division has a divisional goal to support the 3 Corps.
No other units have any orders.

Confederate Information

Set Up:
Right Wing HQ and Supply, Mc Division, Mg Division, Jo Division, 2x ANVab—set up along and within two hexes of the Confederate trench line between E27.03 and E3.03 Hu Division, STb-Cav—Along and w/i 2 the Confederate trench line between E27.03 and E41.02

Artillery Ammunition: 80
Reinforcements: none

Orders:

The **Right Wing** exists, and consists of the Mc, Mg, and Jo Divisions. The Right Wing is to defend the Confederate trench line to its front at all costs.
Hu Division is to defend the Confederate trench line to its front at all costs.

Victory

Use the Terrain VP awards for maps D and E, without the Change of Base option. The Union player cannot choose to use the Change of Base option in this scenario. The Confederate player uses the Small Army Loss Chart, and shifts one level of losses in his favor when figuring final losses. The Union player uses the Medium Army Loss Chart.

Confederate Major Victory—5 or more VP
Confederate Minor Victory—0 to 4 VP

Draw -4 to -1 VP
Union Minor Victory -9 to -5 VP
Union Major Victory -15 to -10 VP
Union Massive Victory -16 or less VP

6.4 Campaign Scenario 3: McClellan in retreat.

As McClellan began his ponderous retreat, Lee remained unsure as to the direction and intention of the Union movements. Nonetheless, the Confederate commander made preparations to doggedly pursue the Federals no matter which course they chose. Historically, very little fighting ensued on these two days, except for the clash at Savage Station, but large forces were in motion.

General Information

First Turn: 4:00 a.m. June 28th
Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. June 29th
Scenario Length: 73 turns
Maps used: A, B, C, D, E, & F
After the first few turns, maps A, B, and C will likely be unneeded, as the general direction of play will tend to drive the action south. However, they are included here so as not to limit initial options. Players may want to remove those maps after all units have left them.

First Player: Confederate
Bridges Destroyed: All Bridges over the Chickahominy on maps B, E, and F are destroyed. Those Bridges on map A are intact.

Union Information

Set Up:
2 Corps—w/i 6 E19.16
3 Corps—w/i 6 E26.20
4 Corps HQ and Supply—F40.16
1-4—w/i 3 F52.28
2-4 (except 1-2-4)—w/i 3 F59.28
Cav-4, 4b—F25.25
1-2-4, 4b, 4b(2)—w/i 1 F34.29
5 Corps, 2xReserveb, Reserveb (4)—w/i 10 of E8.32
6 Corps—w/i 6 E8.23
APot HQ, 10x Supply Train, TGD—F26.06
APot Supply, Cav, Eng, 4x Reserveb—w/i 5 F26.06

Artillery Ammunition: 185
Reinforcements: none

Confederate Loss Chart—*The Seven Days Volume 2: Savage Station*

Unit ID	Brigade	Morale	Fire Levels
A-AH	Anderson	C	AA □□ AB □□□□□ A □✓□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
Ar-AH	Archer	B	AB □□ A □□□□□✓ B □□□ C □□□
B-AH	Branch	B	AAB □ AA □□□□□ AB □□□□✓□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
F-AH	Field	B	AAB □□□□ AA □□□□□ AB □□□□□ A □□□✓□□ B □□□ C □□□
G-AH	Gregg	B	AAB □□ AA □□□□□ AB □□□✓□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
P-AH	Pender	B	AAB □□ AA □□□□□ AB □□□✓□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□

AH Div AP Hill   □□□□✓□□

A-DH	Anderson	C	AA □□□□ AB □□□□✓□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
C-DH	Colquitt	C	AB □□ A □□□□✓□ B □□□ C □□□
G-DH	Garland	B	AA □□ AB □□□□ A □✓□□□ B □□□ C □□□
Ri-DH	Ripley	C	AAB □□ AA □□□□□ AB □□✓□□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
Ro-DH	Rodes	B	AB □□□□ A □□□✓□□ B □□□ C □□□

DH Div DH Hill   □□□✓□□

A-Hu	Armistead	B	AB □□□□□ A □□□✓□□ B □□□ C □□□
M-Hu	Mahone	C	AB □□□ A □□□✓□□ B □□□ C □□□
W-Hu	Wright	C	AA □□□□ AB □□□□✓□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□

Hu Div Huger   □□✓□

R-Hu	Ransom	B	AAA □□□□ AAB □□□□□ AA □□□□□ AB □✓□□□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
Wa-Hu	Walker	B	AA □□□□ AB □□□□□✓ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
Wb-Hu	Walker	C	AB □□□□ A □□□✓□□ B □□□ C □□□

Hu (NC) Huger   □□✓□

A-Jo	GT Andrsn	B	AB □□□□ A □□□□✓□ B □□□ C □□□
T-Jo	Toombs	C	AB □□□□ A □□□✓□□ B □□□ C □□□

Jo Div Jones   □□✓

A-L	Anderson	B	AA □ AB □□□□□ A □□✓□□□ B □□□ C □□□
F-L	Featherston	B	AB □□ A □□□□□✓ B □□□ C □□□
K-L	Kemper	B	AB □□□□□ A □□□✓□□ B □□□ C □□□
P-L	Pickett	A	AAB □ AA □□□□□ AB □□□□□ A □□✓□□□ B □□□ C □□□
Pr-L	Pryor	C	AB □□□ A □□□✓□□ B □□□ C □□□
W-L	Wilcox	C	AA □□□ AB □□□□□✓ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□

L Div Longstreet   □□□□✓□□

K-Mc	Kershaw	C	AB □□□□ A □□□✓□□ B □□□ C □□□
S-Mc	Semmes	B	AA □□ AB □□□□□ A □□✓□□□ B □□□ C □□□

Mc Div McLaws   □□✓

C-Mg Cobb   C AAA ☐   AAB ☐☐☐☐☐ AA ☐☐☐☐☐ AB ☐☐✔☐☐ A ☐☐☐☐☐ B ☐☐☐ C ☐☐☐
G-Mg Barksdale A AA ☐   AB ☐☐☐☐☐   A ☐☐☐☐✔ B ☐☐☐   C ☐☐☐

Mg Div Magruder   ☐☐✔

E-E-V   Elzey   B AB ☐☐☐☐   A ☐☐☐☐✔ B ☐☐☐   C ☐☐☐
Ta-E-V Taylor   B AA ☐☐☐   AB ☐☐☐☐☐ A ☐✔☐☐☐ B ☐☐☐   C ☐☐☐
Tr-E-V Trimble C AAA ☐☐   AAB ☐☐☐☐☐ AA ☐☐☐✔☐☐ AB ☐☐☐☐☐ A ☐☐☐☐ B ☐☐☐ C ☐☐☐

E-V   Ewell   ☐☐✔☐

F-J-V   Fulkerson B A ☐☐☐   B ☐☐✔☐   C ☐☐☐
J-J-V   Jones   B AB ☐☐☐☐☐ A ☐☐✔☐☐☐ B ☐☐☐   C ☐☐☐
La-J-V Lawton   B AA ☐☐☐☐   AB ☐☐☐☐☐ A ☐✔☐☐☐ B ☐☐☐   C ☐☐☐
Lb-J-V Lawton   C AB ☐☐☐☐   A ☐☐☐✔☐☐ B ☐☐☐   C ☐☐☐
W-J-V   Stonewall A A ☐☐   B ☐☐☐✔   C ☐☐☐

J-V   Winder   ☐☐☐✔☐☐

H-W-V Hood A AA ☐☐☐ AB ☐☐☐☐☐ A ☐☐☐☐✔☐ B ☐☐☐ C ☐☐☐
L-W-V Law   B AA ☐   AB ☐☐☐☐☐ A ☐☐✔☐☐☐ B ☐☐☐ C ☐☐☐

W-V   Whiting   ☐☐✔

Da-NC Daniel   C AA ☐   AB ☐☐☐☐☐   A ☐✔☐☐☐   B ☐☐☐   C ☐☐☐
Dr-NC Drayton C AAB ☐☐☐☐ AA ☐☐☐☐☐✔ AB ☐☐☐☐☐ A ☐☐☐☐☐ B ☐☐☐ C ☐☐☐
E-NC   Evans   B AA ☐☐☐☐☐ AB ☐☐☐☐☐✔ A ☐☐☐☐☐   B ☐☐☐   C ☐☐☐
M-NC   Martin   C AAB ☐   AA ☐☐☐☐☐   AB ☐☐☐✔☐☐ A ☐☐☐☐☐ B ☐☐☐ C ☐☐☐
W-NC   Wise   D AB ☐☐   A ☐☐☐✔☐☐   B ☐☐☐   C ☐☐☐

NC   Holmes   ☐✔☐
NC   w/ optionals   ☐☐☐✔☐☐

Cav   Stuart C B ☐   C ☐☐☐✔☐☐☐☐☐
STb-Cav Stuart C C ☐☐☐☐✔☐☐☐☐☐

Union Loss Chart—*The Seven Days Volume 2: Savage Station*

Unit ID	Brigade	Morale	Fire Levels
1-1-1	Kimball	B	AA □□□□□ AB □□□□□ A □✓□□□ B □□□ C □□□
2-1-1	Ferry	C	AAB □□ AA □□□□□ AB □□✓□□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
3-1-1	Tyler	C	AAB □□□ AA □□□□□✓ AB □□□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
4-1-1	Carroll	C	AAB □□□ AA □□□□□ AB □□✓□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□

1-1 Shields □□✓□□

Unit ID	Brigade	Morale	Fire Levels
1-2-1	Tower	B	AAA □ AAB □□□□□ AA □□□□✓□ AB □□□□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
2-2-1	Duryea	C	AAB □□ AA □□□□□ AB □□✓□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
3-2-1	Hartsuff	C	AAB □□□ AA □□□□□ AB □□✓□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□

2-1 Ricketts □□✓□

Unit ID	Brigade	Morale	Fire Levels
1-3-1	Auger	B	AAA □□□ AAB □□□□□ AA □□□✓□□ AB □□□□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
2-3-1	Patrick	C	AAB □□ AA □□□□□ AB □□✓□□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
3-3-1	Gibbon	A	AAB □□□ AA □□□□□ AB □□□□□ A □✓□□□ B □□□ C □□□
4-3-1	Doubleday	B	AA □ AB □□□□□ A □□✓□□ B □□□ C □□□

3-1 King □□□✓□

Unit ID	Brigade	Morale	Fire Levels
Cav-1	Bayard	D	A □□□ B □□✓□□□ C □□□□□□□□□

Unit ID	Brigade	Morale	Fire Levels
1-1-2	Caldwell	B	AA □□□ AB □□□□□ A □✓□□□ B □□□ C □□□
2-1-2	Meagher	A	AA □□□□ AB □□□□□ A □□□□✓□ B □□□ C □□□
3-1-2	French	C	AAA □□□□□ AAB □□□□□ AA □✓□□□ AB □□□□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□

1-2 Richardson □□✓□

Unit ID	Brigade	Morale	Fire Levels
1-2-2	Sully	C	AAA □□□□□ AAB □□□□□ AA □✓□□□ AB □□□□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
2-2-2	Burns	B	AAA □□□ AAB □□□□□ AA □□□□□ AB □✓□□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
3-2-2	Dana	C	AAA □ AAB □□□□□ AA □□□□✓□ AB □□□□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□

2-2 Sedgwick □□✓□

Unit ID	Brigade	Morale	Fire Levels
1-2-3	Grover	C	AAB □□□□ AA □□□□□ AB □✓□□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
2-2-3	Sickles	B	AAB □□□ AA □□□□□ AB □□□□✓□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
3-2-3	Carr	B	AAB □□□□□ AA □□□□□ AB □□□✓□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□

2-3 Hooker □□✓□

Unit ID	Brigade	Morale	Fire Levels
1-3-3	Robinson	C	AAB □□□□ AA □□□□□ AB □✓□□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
2-3-3	Birney	C	AAA □□ AAB □□□□□ AA □□□✓□□ AB □□□□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
3-3-3	Berry	C	AAA □□ AAB □□□□□ AA □□□✓□□ AB □□□□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□

3-3 Kearny □□✓□

Unit ID	Brigade	Morale	Fire Levels
Cav-3	Averell	D	C □□□□□□□□□

Unit ID	Brigade	Morale	Fire Levels
1-1-4	Howe	B	AAB □□□ AA □□□□□ AB □□□✓□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
2-1-4	Abercombie	C	AAB □□□□ AA □□□□□✓ AB □□□□□ A □□□□□ B □□□ C □□□
3-1-4	Palmer	B	AA □□□□□ AB □□□□□ A □✓□□□ B □□□ C □□□

1-4 Couch □□✓□

1-2-4	Naglee	C	AA ☐☐☐☐	AB ☐☐☐☐✔	A ☐☐☐☐☐	B ☐☐☐	C ☐☐
2-2-4	Wessells	D	AA ☐	AB ☐☐☐☐✔	A ☐☐☐☐☐	B ☐☐☐	C ☐☐
3-2-4	Wessells-2	C	AB ☐☐☐☐	A ☐☐☐✔☐☐	B ☐☐☐	C ☐☐☐	

2-4   Peck   ☐☐✔☐☐

| Cav-4 | Gregg | D | C ☐☐✔☐☐☐☐ |

1a-1-5	Martindale	B	AA ☐☐	AB ☐☐☐☐☐	A ☐☐✔☐☐☐	B ☐☐☐	C ☐☐☐
1b-1-5	Martindale	C	AB ☐☐☐☐☐	A ☐☐☐✔☐☐	B ☐☐☐	C ☐☐☐	
2-1-5	Griffen	B	AAA ☐☐	AAB ☐☐☐☐☐	AA ☐☐☐☐☐	AB ☐☐✔☐☐☐ A ☐☐☐☐☐ B ☐☐☐ C ☐☐☐
3-1-5	Butterfield	B	AAA ☐	AAB ☐☐☐☐☐	AA ☐☐☐☐☐	AB ☐☐✔☐☐☐ A ☐☐☐☐☐ B ☐☐☐ C ☐☐☐

1-5   Morell   ☐☐☐✔☐

1-2-5	Buchanan	A	AAB ☐	AA ☐☐☐☐☐	AB ☐☐☐☐☐ A ☐☐☐✔☐☐ B ☐☐☐ C ☐☐☐
2-2-5	Lovell	B	AAB ☐☐☐☐	AA ☐☐☐☐☐	AB ☐☐☐☐☐✔ A ☐☐☐☐☐ B ☐☐☐ C ☐☐☐
3-2-5	Warren	C	A ☐☐☐☐✔	B ☐☐☐	C ☐☐☐

2-5   Sykes   ☐☐☐✔

1a-PaR	Reynolds	B	AA ☐	AB ☐☐☐☐☐	A ☐☐✔☐☐☐	B ☐☐☐	C ☐☐☐
1b-PaR	Reynolds	C	AB ☐☐☐☐	A ☐☐☐✔☐☐	B ☐☐☐	C ☐☐☐	
2-PaR	Meade	B	AAA ☐☐☐☐	AAB ☐☐☐☐☐	AA ☐☐☐☐☐	AB ☐✔☐☐☐☐ A ☐☐☐☐☐ B ☐☐☐ C ☐☐☐
3-PaR	Seymour	C	AAA ☐☐	AAB ☐☐☐☐☐	AA ☐☐☐✔☐☐	AB ☐☐☐☐☐ A ☐☐☐☐☐ B ☐☐☐ C ☐☐☐

PaR-5   McCall   ☐☐☐✔☐

| Cav-5 | Farnsworth | D | C ☐☐☐✔☐☐☐☐ |

1-1-6	Taylor	C	AAA ☐☐	AAB ☐☐☐☐☐	AA ☐☐☐✔☐☐	AB ☐☐☐☐☐ A ☐☐☐☐☐ B ☐☐☐ C ☐☐☐
2-1-6	Bartlett	B	AAA ☐☐☐	AAB ☐☐☐☐☐	AA ☐☐☐☐☐	AB ☐✔☐☐☐☐ A ☐☐☐☐☐ B ☐☐☐ C ☐☐☐
3-1-6	Newton	C	AAA ☐☐☐	AAB ☐☐☐☐☐	AA ☐☐✔☐☐☐	AB ☐☐☐☐☐ A ☐☐☐☐☐ B ☐☐☐ C ☐☐☐

1-6   Slocum   ☐☐✔☐

1-2-6	Hancock	C	AAB ☐☐	AA ☐☐☐☐☐	AB ☐☐✔☐☐☐ A ☐☐☐☐☐ B ☐☐☐ C ☐☐☐
2a-2-6	Brooks	B	AB ☐☐☐☐☐	A ☐☐☐✔☐☐	B ☐☐☐	C ☐☐☐
2b-2-6	Brooks	B	AA ☐☐☐	AB ☐☐☐☐☐	A ☐✔☐☐☐	B ☐☐☐	C ☐☐☐
3a-2-6	Davidson	B	AA ☐☐☐	AB ☐☐☐☐☐	A ☐✔☐☐☐	B ☐☐☐	C ☐☐☐
3b-2-6	Davidson	B	AA ☐☐☐	AB ☐☐☐☐☐	A ☐✔☐☐☐	B ☐☐☐	C ☐☐☐

2-6   Smith   ☐☐☐✔☐☐

| Cav-6 | McReynolds | D | C ☐☐☐✔☐☐☐☐ |

Cav	Cooke	D	A ☐	B ☐☐☐☐☐✔	C ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐
Eng	Woodbury	D	AB ☐☐☐☐	A ☐☐✔☐☐☐	B ☐☐☐	C ☐☐☐
TGD	Casey	C	A ☐☐☐☐✔	B ☐☐☐	C ☐☐☐

Confederate Fatigue Charts—Savage Station

AH Div	Normal	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Tired	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Exhausted	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐
DH Div	Normal	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Tired	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Exhausted	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐
L Div	Normal	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Tired	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Exhausted	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐
Hu Div	Normal	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Tired	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Exhausted	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐
Jo Div	Normal	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Tired	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Exhausted	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐
M Div	Normal	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Tired	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Exhausted	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐
Mg Div	Normal	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Tired	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Exhausted	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐
E Div Valley Army	Normal	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Tired	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Exhausted	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐
J Div Valley Army	Normal	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Tired	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Exhausted	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐
W Div Valley Army	Normal	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Tired	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Exhausted	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐
Dept of NC Div	Normal	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Tired	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Exhausted	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐
Cav A NVa	Normal	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Tired	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Exhausted	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐
STb-Cav A NVa	Normal	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Tired	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐
	Exhausted	☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐

Union Fatigue Charts—Savage Station

Unit	State	Boxes
1 Div, 1 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
2 Div 1 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
3 Div 1 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
Cav 1 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
1 Div 2 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
2 Div 2 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
1 Div 3 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
2 Div 3 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
Cav 3 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
1 Div 4 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
2 Div 4 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
Cav 4 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
1 Div 5 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
2 Div 5 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
PaR Div 5 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
Cav 5 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
1 Div 6 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
2 Div 6 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
Cav 6 Corps	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
Cav A Pot	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
Eng A Pot	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□
TGD A Pot	Normal	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□
	Tired	□□□□□ □□□□□
	Exhausted	□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□

Orders:

2 Corps, 3 Corps, and 6 Corps each are to defend the Union trench line in their set up areas.

4 Corps is to exit the South edge of map F. All 4 Corps orders cannot be changed—the 4 Corps units called for MUST exit.

1-4 and 2-4 have Divisional Goals to exit the south edge of map F.

Cav-4 and the 4b with it each have a Divisional Goal to defend the RR bridge over the Chickahominy River.

1-2-4 and the two 4b units with it have a Divisional Goal to defend the Williamsburg Road Bridge over the Chickahominy River. These last two orders are an exception to the normal rules prohibiting Union Brigades from receiving Divisional Goals.

No other units have any orders.

Confederate Information

Set Up:

Right Wing HQ and Supply, Mc Div, Jo Div, Mg Div, 2x ANVab—On or west of the Confederate trench line between E27.03 and E3.03

Hu Div, STb-Cav—On or west of the Confederate trench line between E27.03 and E41.02

Left Wing HQ and Supply, L Div, AH Div, ANVa Supply—w/i 6 B47.18

Valley Army HQ and Supply, DH Div, E-V Div, W-V Div, J-V Div, Cav, ANVab— w/i 6 C56.02

ANVa HQ—B47.28

Artillery Ammunition: 160

Reinforcements:

3:00 p.m., June 29th, D62.14: Dept. NC Div

Orders:

The **Right Wing** exists and consists of the Mc, Mg, and Jo Divisions, is to defend the Trench line it holds.

The **Left Wing** also exists, and consists of the L and AH Divisions. It has no orders

Hu Division is to defend the trench line it holds.

Cav has a divisional goal attaching it to the Valley Army.

STb-Cav has a divisional goal attaching it to Hu division.

Dept. NC Division, when it arrives, is to move to the Darbytown road, halt and defend. The Dept. NC division consists of Holmes, W-NC, Da-NC, 2x Dept NCb. All other Dept. NC units are considered optional.

No other unit has any orders.

Victory

Use the terrain VP awards for maps D, E, and F. The Change of Base option is already implemented. Both players use the Large Army Loss chart for VP determination.

Confederate Massive Victory—15 or more VPs
Confederate Major Victory—9 to 14 VPs
Confederate Minor Victory—4 to 8 VPs
Draw—-3 to 3 VPs
Union Minor Victory—10 to -4 VPs
Union Major Victory—-11 or less VPs
Union Massive Victory no longer possible

6.5 Campaign Scenario 4: Rebel Gamble—Historical

This scenario is really the extension of the first campaign scenario, found in Gaines Mill. As such, it covers the action on both sides of the Chickahominy River for the four days of June 26th to the 29th.

General Information

First Turn: 3:00 p.m. June 26th
Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. June 29th
Scenario Length: 171 turns
Maps used: A, B, C, D, E & F
First Player: Confederate
Bridges Destroyed: The Upper Trestle Bridge (B51.07) New Bridge (B56.12) and Lower Trestle Bridge (B59.18) are all destroyed. All other Bridges are intact.

Union Information

Set Up:
2 Corps—w/i 6 E19.16
3 Corps—w/i 6 E26.20
4 Corps HQ and Supply, 2-4, 2x 4b, Cav-4—w/i 5 F50.03
1-2-4, 4b(2)—w/i 3 F34.29
1-4—w/i 1 E27.23
6 Corps—w/i 6 E8.23
APot HQ and Supply, Eng, 5x Reserveb—w/i 1 E8.32
1-5, Reserveb(4), 5b—w/i 3 A27.31
PaR-5, 2x 5b—w/i 4 A36.32
2-5, 5b(3), Reserveb—w/5 of B50.12
5 Corps HQ—B32.10
5 Corps Supply, Cav, Cav-5—w/i 5 B32.10

Artillery Ammunition: 300
Reinforcements: none

Orders:

2 Corps is to defend the line of Union trenches within its set up area.

3 Corps is to defend the line of Union trenches within its set up area.

1-4 Division has a divisional goal to support the 3 Corps.

4 Corps is to defend the Crossings of the White Oak Swamp.

1-2-4 and the 4b(2) have a Divisional Goal to defend Bottoms Bridge.

5 Corps is to defend the line of Beaver Dam Creek.

2-5 has a Divisional Goal to defend the 5th Corps left flank and prevent a crossing of either the New or Upper Trestle Bridges.

6 Corps is to defend the line of Union Trenches within its set up area.

Confederate Information

Set Up:
AH Division (less B-AH), ANVab—w/i 5 A27.04
DH Division—w/i 5 A46.12
L Division—w/i 5 A58.06
ANVab—A42.15
ANVa HQ, ANVa Supply, Left Wing Supply, ANVab—w/i 2 A53.10
Right Wing HQ and Supply, Mc Division, Mg Division, Jo Division,
ANVab—set up along and within two hexes of the Confederate trench line between E27.03 and E3.03
Hu Division, STb-Cav—Along and w/i 2 the Confederate trench line between E27.03 and E41.02

Artillery Ammunition: 250

Reinforcements:

3pm, June 26th, A1.14: B-AH
3:30pm June 26th, A1.14: W-V Division, J-V Division, E-V Division, Valley Army HQ & Supply, Cav
3:00pm June 29th, D62.14: Dept. NC Div

Orders:

AH Division. On the turn after B-AH enters or passes through A15.15, AP Hill's Division can cross at the Meadow Bridges and move to Mechanicsville.

DH Division. On the turn after AH Division crosses the Chickahominy River, DH Hill's Division can cross and move to Mechanicsville.

L Division—Longstreet's Division's orders are the same as DH Division.

B-AH has a Divisional Goal to move to Mechanicsville and then to rejoin its Division.

Valley Army—Move to Shady Grove Road, turn east and move to Hundley's Corners. Halt and await further orders.

The **Right Wing** exists, and consists of the Mc, Mg, and Jo Divisions. it is to defend its Trench line.

Hu Division has a Divisional Goal to defend its Trench line.

Cav has a Divisional Goal attaching it to the Valley Army.

STb-Cav has a Divisional Goal attaching it to Hu Division.

Dept. NC Division is to move to the Darbytown Road, halt, and defend. The Dept. NC division consists of Holmes, W-NC, Da-NC, 2x Dept NCb. All other Dept. NC units are optional.

Victory

Use the Terrain awards for all maps in this scenario. The Change of Base option is not yet implemented. Both players use the Large Army Loss Chart.

Confederate Massive Victory—20 or more VPs
Confederate Major Victory—13 to 19 VPs
Confederate Minor Victory—5 to 12 VPs
Draw—-5 to 4 VPs
Union Minor Victory—-14 to -6 VPs
Union Major Victory—-23 to -15 VPs
Union Massive Victory—-24 or less VPs

6.6 Campaign Scenario 5: Rebel Gamble—An earlier start

This scenario is an extension of Campaign Scenario Two, found in Gaines Mill as well. It is simply an earlier start for 6.5, above.

General Information

First Turn: 10:00 a.m. June 26th
Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. June 29th
Scenario Length: 181 turns
Maps used: A, B, C, D, E & F
First Player: Confederate
Bridges Destroyed: The Upper Trestle Bridge (B51.07) New Bridge (B56.12) and Lower Trestle Bridge (B59.18) are all destroyed. All other Bridges are intact.

All information is the same as Campaign Scenario #4, above, except for the Confederate reinforcements. Note that the Dept. NC Division, scheduled to arrive on

June 29th, still does so as in Campaign Scenario #4

Confederate Information
Reinforcements:
Group 1 B-AH
Group 2 W-V Division, J-V Division, E-V Division, Valley Army HQ & Supply, Cav

Variable Arrival:
Starting with the 10 a.m. June 26th turn, the Confederate player rolls for the arrival of Group 1, above. On each hour turn, the Confederate player rolls two dice, and on a 10 or more, begin the reinforcement process.

Once he has successfully rolled a 10, he can start bringing on his reinforcements. On the turn of the successful roll, B-AH arrives at A1.14. On the turn after B-AH arrives, the Valley Army—Group 2 as listed above—arrives at A1.14.

The Confederate player can delay these arrivals in an effort to deceive the Union player, even if he has rolled a 10. Once Jackson or any of his troops arrive, they can roll for initiative without restriction, even if being held off map. Obviously, the Confederate player can keep his die roll secret.

Orders:
AH Division. On the turn after B-AH enters or passes through A15.15, AP Hill's Division can cross at the Meadow Bridges and move to Mechanicsville.

DH Division. On the turn after AH Division crosses the Chickahominy River, DH Hill's Division can cross and move to Mechanicsville.

L Division—Longstreet's Division's orders are the same as DH Division.

B-AH has a Divisional Goal to move to Mechanicsville and then to rejoin its Division.

Valley Army—Move to Shady Grove Road, turn east and move to Hundley's Corners. Halt and await further orders.

Cav has a Divisional Goal attaching it to the Valley Army.

6.7 Scenario Starting Strengths

Confederate Losses

Unit	Start Str	26 Loss	27 Str	27 Loss	28 Str	28 Loss	29 Str	29 Loss	30 Str	30 Loss	1 Str	1 Loss	End Str
Whiting's Div													
H-W-V	19	(-)	19	(5)	14	(-)	14	(-)	14	(-)	14	(1)	13
L-W-V	17	(-)	17	(5)	12	(-)	12	(-)	12	(-)	12	(1)	11
Jackson's Div													
F-J-V	9	(-)	9	(-)	9	(-)	9	(-)	9	(-)	9	(-)	9
J-J-V	16	(-)	16	(-)	16	(-)	16	(-)	16	(-)	16	(-)	16
La-J-V	20	(-)	20	(3)	17	(-)	17	(-)	17	(-)	17	(1)	16
Lb-J-V	15	(-)	15	(2)	13	(-)	13	(-)	13	(-)	13	(-)	13
W-J-V	8	(-)	8	(1)	7	(-)	7	(-)	7	(-)	7	(1)	6
Ewell's Div													
E-E-V	15	(-)	15	(2)	13	(-)	13	(-)	13	(-)	13	(1)	12
Ta-E-V	19	(-)	19	(2)	17	(-)	17	(-)	17	(-)	17	(1)	16
Tr-E-V	28	(-)	28	(4)	24	(-)	24	(-)	24	(-)	24	(-)	24
D. H. Hill's Div													
A-DH	20	(-)	20	(5)	15	(-)	15	(-)	15	(-)	15	(4)	11
C-DH	13	(-)	13	(4)	9	(-)	9	(-)	9	(-)	9	(2)	7
G-DH	19	(-)	19	(5)	14	(-)	14	(-)	14	(-)	14	(3)	11
Ri-DH	23	(6)	17	(1)	16	(-)	16	(-)	16	(-)	16	(3)	13
Ro-DH	16	(-)	16	(2)	14	(-)	14	(-)	14	(-)	14	(4)	10
Jones' Div													
A-Jo	15	(-)	15	(-)	15	(2)	13	(-)	13	(-)	13	(3)	10
T-Jo	15	(-)	15	(1)	14	(1)	13	(-)	13	(-)	13	(2)	11
McLaws' Div													
K-Mc	15	(-)	15	(-)	15	(-)	15	(3)	12	(-)	12	(2)	10
S-Mc	18	(-)	18	(-)	18	(-)	18	(1)	17	(-)	17	(1)	16
Magruder's Div													
C-Mg	27	(-)	27	(-)	27	(-)	27	(-)	27	(-)	27	(4)	23
G-Mg	17	(-)	17	(-)	17	(-)	17	(-)	17	(-)	17	(5)	12
Longstreet's Div													
A-L	17	(-)	17	(3)	14	(-)	14	(-)	14	(5)	9	(-)	9
F-L	13	(-)	13	(3)	10	(-)	10	(-)	10	(4)	6	(-)	6
K-L	16	(-)	16	(-)	16	(-)	16	(-)	16	(4)	12	(-)	12
P-L	22	(-)	22	(4)	18	(-)	18	(-)	18	(3)	15	(-)	15
Pr-L	14	(-)	14	(5)	9	(-)	9	(-)	9	(4)	5	(-)	5
W-L	19	(-)	19	(6)	13	(-)	13	(-)	13	(5)	8	(-)	8
A.P. Hill's Div													
A-AH	18	(1)	17	(2)	15	(-)	15	(-)	15	(1)	14	(-)	14
Ar-AH	13	(2)	11	(3)	8	(-)	8	(-)	8	(-)	8	(-)	8
B-AH	22	(2)	20	(5)	15	(-)	15	(-)	15	(1)	14	(-)	14
F-AH	15	(1)	14	(3)	11	(-)	11	(-)	11	(2)	9	(-)	9
G-AH	23	(-)	23	(6)	17	(-)	17	(-)	17	(3)	14	(-)	14
P-AH	23	(2)	21	(4)	17	(-)	17	(-)	17	(2)	15	(-)	15
Huger's Div													
A-Hu	16	(-)	16	(-)	16	(-)	16	(-)	16	(-)	16	(4)	12
M-Hu	14	(-)	14	(-)	14	(-)	14	(-)	14	(1)	13	(3)	10
R-Hu (NC)	30	(-)	30	(-)	30	(-)	30	(-)	30	(-)	30	(5)	25
W-Hu	20	(-)	20	(-)	20	(-)	20	(-)	20	(-)	20	(4)	16
Wa-Hu (NC)	21	not engaged											
Wb-Hu (NC)	15	not engaged											
Dept. of No. Carolina													
Da-NC	17	not engaged											
Dr-NC	25	not engaged											
E-NC	21	not engaged											
M-NC	22	not engaged											
W-NC	13	not engaged											
Cav	11	Stuart's men lost 1 SP spread over the week's action											
STb-Cav	9	no loss											
total		(14)		(84)		(3)		(4)		(35)		(55)	= 19,800

Union Losses

Unit	Start Str	26 Loss	27 Str	27 Loss	28 Str	28 Loss	29 Str	29 Loss	30 Str	30 Loss	1 Str	1 Loss	End Str
2 Corps													
1-1-2	19	(-)	19	(-)	19	(-)	19	(-)	19	(3)	16	(3)	13
2-1-2	20	(-)	20	(-)	20	(-)	20	(-)	17	(3)	16	(2)	15
3-1-2	31	(-)	31	(-)	31	(-)	31	(-)	31	(1)	30	(1)	29
1-2-2	31	(-)	31	(-)	31	(-)	31	(-)	31	(2)	29	(-)	29
2-2-2	29	(-)	29	(-)	29	(-)	29	(3)	26	(1)	25	(-)	25
3-2-2	27	(-)	27	(-)	27	(-)	27	(2)	25	(3)	22	(-)	22
3 Corps													
1-2-3	25	(-)	25	(-)	25	(-)	25	(-)	25	(4)	21	(-)	21
2-2-3	24	(-)	24	(-)	24	(-)	24	(-)	24	(2)	22	(1)	21
3-2-3	26	(-)	26	(-)	26	(-)	26	(-)	26	(1)	25	(-)	25
1-3-3	25	(-)	25	(-)	25	(-)	25	(-)	25	(5)	20	(-)	20
2-3-3	28	(-)	28	(-)	28	(-)	28	(-)	28	(-)	28	(3)	25
3-3-3	28	(-)	28	(-)	28	(-)	28	(-)	28	(3)	25	(1)	24
4 Corps													
1-1-4	24	(-)	24	(-)	24	(-)	24	(-)	24	(-)	24	(2)	22
2-1-4	26	(-)	26	(-)	26	(-)	26	(-)	26	(-)	26	(2)	24
3-1-4	21	(-)	21	(-)	21	(-)	21	(-)	21	(-)	21	(3)	21
1-2-4	20		not engaged										
2-2-4	17		not engaged										
3-2-4	15		not engaged										
5 Corps													
1a-1-5	18	(-)	18	(4)	14	(-)	14	(-)	14	(-)	14	(1)	13
1b-1-5	16	(-)	16	(3)	13	(-)	13	(-)	13	(-)	13	(1)	12
2-1-5	28	(-)	28	(6)	22	(-)	22	(-)	22	(-)	22	(6)	16
3-1-5	27	(-)	27	(6)	21	(-)	21	(-)	21	(-)	21	(4)	17
1-2-5	22	(-)	22	(5)	17	(-)	17	(-)	17	(-)	17	(1)	16
2-2-5	25	(-)	25	(3)	22	(-)	22	(-)	22	(-)	22	(1)	21
3-2-5	10	(-)	10	(3)	7	(-)	7	(-)	7	(-)	7	(-)	7
1a-PaR-5	17	(2)	15	(2)	13	(-)	13	(-)	13	(2)	11	(-)	11
1b-PaR-5	15	(-)	15	(2)	13	(-)	13	(-)	13	(2)	11	(-)	11
2-PaR-5	30	(-)	30	(10)	20	(-)	20	(-)	20	(4)	16	(-)	16
3-PaR-5	28	(1)	27	(2)	25	(-)	25	(-)	25	(3)	22	(-)	22
6 Corps													
1-1-6	28	(-)	28	(11)	17	(-)	17	(-)	17	(-)	17	(-)	17
2-1-6	29	(-)	29	(5)	24	(-)	24	(-)	24	(-)	24	(-)	24
3-1-6	29	(-)	29	(5)	24	(-)	24	(-)	24	(-)	24	(-)	24
1-2-6	23	(-)	23	(1)	22	(1)	21	(-)	21	(-)	21	(-)	21
2a-2-6	16	(-)	16	(-)	16	(-)	16	(-)	16	(2)	14	(-)	14
2b-2-6	19	(-)	19	(-)	19	(-)	19	(-)	19	(3)	16	(-)	16
3a-2-6	19	(-)	19	(-)	19	(1)	18	(-)	18	(-)	18	(-)	18
3b-2-6	19		not engaged										
Cav	16	(-)	16	(2)	14	(-)	14	(-)	14	(-)	14	(-)	14
Eng	15		not engaged										
TGD	10		not engaged										
Cav-6	8		not engaged										
Cav-3	8		not engaged										
Cav-4	6		not engaged										
Cav-5	7		not engaged										
totals		(3)		(71)		(2)		(5)		(44)		(32) = 15,700	

Historical Notes

Essentially, the story of the Seven Days' Battles on the south side of the Chickahominy is one of lost opportunities. There can be no question that George McClellan missed a significant chance to seriously damage Lee's Army and perhaps take Richmond itself, when the Army of Northern Virginia moved to concentrate on Porter's isolated Federal 5th Corps near Mechanicsville. However, McClellan was not one to take large risks, and by his calculation, a frontal attack against the Confederate Works near Seven Pines while Porter was threatened with destruction north of the Chickahominy was too great a risk to run.

The initial action of the Seven Days' fighting was really initiated by McClellan, the skirmish at Oak Grove on June 25th. Had much bloodier battles not followed in the ensuing week, Oak Grove—a division-sized action which produced about 600 Union losses—would be more significantly remembered. However, it was vintage McClellan: a light probe of the Confederate defenses with no real intention of a follow-up. Lee ignored it, and went ahead with his preparations for attacking Porter.

If Oak Grove had any importance in the larger campaign, it was in establishing in McClellan's thinking that the Confederate lines south of the Chickahominy were still strongly manned. This piece of information loomed large the next day, when that afternoon Porter became engaged at Mechanicsville, and reported his lines out-flanked by evening. By midnight or so on the 26th, Porter had reported large enemy forces in multiple columns on his front and right flank around Beaver Dam Creek, which suggested that Lee had shifted troops north of the river. However, with the proof of Oak Grove still in his mind, McClellan discounted any thought that the enemy lines facing the 2nd and 3rd Corps were weaker, a thought which ultimately precluded any real effort at a Union attack over the next few days.

McClellan's justification for this reasoning was his reliance on the intelligence reports gathered by Allen Pinkerton, and used by McClellan to "prove" that Lee had close to 200,000 men, seriously outnumbering the Army of the Potomac. Following this logic, it was easy to see how Lee could concentrate major force against Porter while still outnumbering McClellan on the south side.

The truth was of course far different. Pinkerton was partly to blame, but not completely, for McClellan was deliberately manipulating those numbers when reporting back to Washington, and indeed, the various numbers McClellan reports range from lows of 80,000 to highs of 250,000 Rebels, a dizzying range indeed.

Pinkerton did a fine job of identifying the actual units with Lee's army, and in placing them in their higher brigade and divisional organization. In fact, Pinkerton's men identified every one of the 178 Confederate Regiments Lee had in his army, and in doing so drew a remarkably clear picture of the Rebel divisional structure. However, Union intelligence also identified 33 additional regiments that were not in Lee's army, a significant discrepancy. Worse, Pinkerton assumed that his assessment could not be perfect, and so estimated that there must be still more as yet unidentified enemy units.

Moreover, McClellan was not above deliberately manipulating the numbers of his own army to suit his purposes when reporting back to Washington, and had no qualms about doing the same with the Confederate numbers Pinkerton provided. The army had several different methods for counting numbers, with the two most critical methods being "aggregate present" and "effective present" totals. The "aggregate present" numbers usually included all men that had to be fed, including sick, detached, non-combatants, etc. The effective totals included only men available at that instant in their combat units, and in some cases (especially for Confederates), might only count enlisted men with muskets: the "bayonet" strength of a unit. McClellan, when discussing his numbers with Washington, invariably used the lowest numbers for his own command, and relied on Pinkerton's "aggregate" numbers for Lee's army, which not surprisingly produced discrepancies of 40-50,000 men. It is hard to imagine that McClellan was not aware of the difference. More properly, the enemy strength estimates should have been adjusted to account for the same amount of "wastage" as in the Union numbers, which would have produced a much more realistic figure for enemy effectives. As it was, once the fighting began, McClellan seemed paralyzed by this numeric shell game, and those phantom Confederates precluded him from ever seriously contemplating an attack against Lee's own vulnerability.

If anything, McClellan was convinced that he was about to be heavily attacked on both sides of the Chickahominy. On June 27th, while Porter had fallen back to Gaines Mill and was preparing to receive the attack of an estimated 80,000 Confederates, reports from the Union 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Corps—all in line facing east on the south side of the Chickahominy—indicated massive Rebel activity on their fronts. Several Generals expected eminent attacks on their lines. Professor Lowe, the balloonist, ascended that day and determined that a Rebel attack was looming. Not only was McClellan not ready to attack, he even recalled Slocum's division of the 6th Corps which had been sent north to help Porter early on the 27th because he felt he could not spare it from the lines.

Of course, all of this commotion was really Confederate General Magruder's fault, he of amateur theatrical fame. Magruder, given his similar performance at Yorktown in May, was the natural choice to command the vulnerable south side wing, facing 4 of McClellan's 5 Corps. Once again Magruder shifted troops, staged forces to threaten attacks, and generally raised as much of a ruckus as he could to divert attention from Lee's real operation across the river. It is not clear how much Magruder's antics convinced McClellan of the impending offensive, as opposed to McClellan's already well-established fear of the illusionary Rebel horde he faced; but there can be no doubt that McClellan and many of his senior commanders south of the Chickahominy expected to be assailed at any moment.

Of course, the 26th and 27th of June produced no such attacks on the Union line, as most of the men in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th Corps sat out the main fighting that raged on the opposite bank. The only reinforcement McClellan provided his beleaguered 5th Corps were the bulk of two divisions, one from the 2nd Corps and one from the 6th.

Those only managed to prevent a defeat from becoming a disaster, and by the night of the 27th, Porter's 5th Corps was retreating back across the Chickahominy. It was at this juncture that McClellan decided to proceed with his previously intended change of base. Prior to the start of the fighting, McClellan had desired to switch his supply base from the York to the James River, which would simplify his supply line and make it less vulnerable to enemy raids. In light of the fighting of the 26th, McClellan decided not to switch bases until after the situation calmed down, but by the 27th, with Porter in retreat, he decided that there was no longer any time to lose. He would switch bases, and in fact put the whole army in retreat to the James while doing so, hoping to avoid what he regarded as looming disaster.

The 28th of June was an island of relative calm in the middle of that bloody week. The Union army was busy destroying its old base at White House and assembling the huge trains that would need to be moved south to the James over the next few days. For his part, Lee was uncertain of McClellan's intentions. Ewell's command was sent east down the north bank of the Chickahominy towards Bottom's Bridge to see if the Union forces were heading that way, which would signify a Union retreat towards the York. The bulk of the Rebel Army—Longstreet's command of two divisions and Jackson's Valley Army (minus Ewell but augmented by DH Hill's division)—was kept in place around Gaines Mill awaiting developments.

The only fighting was a minor skirmish known as Golding's or Garnett's farm, where a Confederate probe revealed only that the Union lines south of the Chickahominy were still strongly occupied. Two Rebel brigades rather foolishly attacked Hancock's brigade of the Union 2nd Corps, under the leadership of Confederate General Toombs, and about 400 Rebels were lost in determining that the Federals were still there in strength.

The 29th, however, began early. At 3:00 a.m., the Union troops began leaving the area they had occupied for more than a month, the fields and woods around Fair Oaks Station. First to go were the huge trains, escorted by Porter's 5th Corps. They were headed for Malvern Hill and Harrison's Landing, both sites on the James River, where the new Union base was being established. As the morning progressed, Union infantry began leaving the works facing Richmond to form a rear-guard closer to Savage Station. Three Union Corps comprised this guard: Sumner's Second, Heintzelman's's 3rd, and Franklin's 6th. Unfortunately, McClellan had neither elected to command this force himself or appoint an overall commander, so that in essence, all three corps commanders simply did what they thought best. Unfortunately for the Federals, this created a rather disjointed mess.

The first fighting of the 29th was a small but sharp action at Allen's farm, a considerable distance west of Savage Station. Sumner, who was against the whole idea of retreat in the first place, had not taken his corps back as far as the other two commanders, and so he was essentially unsupported a mile forward of the rest of the Union army. The Confederate pursuit was not much more organized, however, and so the only action at Allen's farm was a brigade-sized affair. After about an hour's fighting, Sumner fell back to a position

more in keeping with the other two Corps. Additionally, one of Franklin's two division had been ordered away that morning by McClellan without notifying Franklin himself, so that the 6th Corps was at only half strength.

Worse yet, once the three corps were assembled, Heintzelman, observing that the position in front of Savage Station was really only about a mile and a half wide, decided that his corps really wasn't needed. Heintzelman regarded as Sumner as an alarmist anyway, and felt that there was little real threat of an enemy attack. Accordingly, the Union 3rd Corps up and marched away to the south around midday, departing without notifying anyone else of the movement. This left three divisions—Sumner's two from 2nd Corps and the remaining one of Franklin's 6th Corps—as a rear guard, about 25,000 men, half of the force McClellan intended.

For the Confederates, a similar farce was playing out. By the 29th, Lee had decided that McClellan was heading south to the James rather than east to the York, and began moving his army accordingly. Longstreet and AP Hill were ordered to recross the Chickahominy, move behind Magruder's wing facing the Union line, and march southeast along the Darbytown road, to Glendale. Holmes, commanding the North Carolina troops that had just come up from south of the James, was to support this movement by marching southeast along the river road towards the same location. The intent was to place a large force south of the White Oak Swamp, astride McClellan's line of retreat.

For his part, Jackson's command was ordered to cross the Chickahominy due south of Gaines Mill and pursue the Union army directly. Magruder, with his wing, was ordered to move due east and also pursue the Federals directly. Magruder was informed that Jackson would be coming down from the north, and to look for the Valley Army on his left.

Imagine Magruder's surprise, then, when he was informed by Jackson that the Valley Army would not be coming in on his left, since Jackson had "other important duty to perform." This was purely a staff error from Lee's Headquarters: Jackson's orders were supposed to have him pressing the retreating Federals to the south, with the contemplated movement down the north bank of the Chickahominy being only a contingency plan. This concept was unclear in the orders Jackson received, and he was under the assumption that his duty was to stay north of the Chickahominy and be prepared to pursue McClellan east, towards the York, for most of the morning.

In any case, the orders fiasco mattered little, since there was another problem for Jackson—the retreating Federals burned all the bridges, and rebuilding them was proving more difficult than expected. The Grapevine Bridge was more of a narrow footbridge, and repaired by noon, but it was impossible to use it to cross anything like Jackson's whole 30,000 man command in any reasonable time frame. Jackson entrusted the rebuilding of a larger bridge—Alexander's, after the Union engineer who built it in May—to his chief of staff, Reverend Dabney. Unfortunately, the good Reverend had been chosen to join Jackson's staff more because of his piety than his military skills, and Dabney himself admitted later that the job went badly, being pretty much a "shilly-shally affair."

All this left Magruder fairly shorthanded for any mission requiring an attack on the numerous Federals in front of him before they got away, and naturally Magruder was cautious. Worse, at 2:00 p.m., Huger, who until this point was in line alongside Magruder on his right, moved off down the Charles City Road in keeping with the general movement of the army to the southeast. Once Huger left, Magruder had only 15,000 men to face the Union concentration at Savage Station.

Hence, what started as likely conflict between two large forces of close to 50,000 men each was by 5:00 p.m. reduced to a footnote action between 25,000 Federals and 15,000 Rebels, when Magruder finally made contact with Sumner near Savage Station.

The action was not a large battle, but it did last about 4 hours, until 9:00 p.m. Magruder's men, after the initial advance, were mostly on the defensive, with Sumner's Federals counter-attacking vigorously where pressed. Neither side committed the bulk of their force: Sumner, for instance, sent into action less than 40% of his available regiments. When darkness brought a halt to the fighting, Union losses were about 1000, Confederate losses closer to 500.

For his part, Sumner felt he had won, and initial refused to leave the field, instead sending a message to McClellan to turn the army around and return! Only a direct order from McClellan got Sumner to resume the retreat, and then under protest. For the rest of his days, Sumner remained convinced that McClellan's retreat was a poor decision, and that had the army stayed and fought, they could have defeated Lee badly.

Lee was also disappointed. He had envisioned an ambitious plan that took half his army on a swing to the south to cut

off the head of the Federal column while the other half assailed the column's rear at Savage Station. Instead what Lee got was a desultory affair that proved to be of no military value, and Lee blamed Magruder for the failing. While this was almost certainly unfair—after all, Jackson hardly moved at all day—Magruder was by this point in the campaign virtually exhausted, and certainly over-stressed. Magruder had not really slept since the 26th, as he anxiously awaited the outcome of Lee's ambitious attack on the other side of the Chickahominy, and he was obviously worn out by shouldering the burden of defending Richmond with a relative handful of troops against McClellan's main body. As a result, both Magruder's messages and the general impression he left with people was of a man overwhelmed by events, and losing control of the situation. For the rest of the campaign, Magruder would have little influence, with reliance for the bulk of the fighting again being placed on Longstreet, Jackson, and the divisions under their command. Later, when the army moved north, shifting the war back away from the Confederate Capitol, Magruder did not go with it, but instead was sent to far-away Texas to assume command there. Lee had tactfully removed him from command. **

Designer's Notes

Savage Station is really the continuation of the concept first described in Gaines Mill, and as such, these notes are liable to be brief. Still, there are some new things, and changes to old things, that warrant discussion.

Firstly, it is the three maps of this game, linked with the first three, that really make the tactical situation come alive. **Gaines Mill** is a fine game, and I think a rare serious look (in game terms, anyway) at the tactical situation north of the Chickahominy, but it is clearly constrained by the overall tactical position of the bulk of the Union army south of that stream. As such, it is hard for the game to flow in any direction other than the generally historical one of a Union retirement down the Chickahominy as the Rebels maneuver on their front and north flank.

Adding the maps of Savage Station, however, changes that dynamic. I heartily recommend that anyone who has a chance to play at least one campaign game without the historical McClellan restrictions, to more fully appreciate the risk Lee felt he was taking in exposing Richmond while the bulk of the Confederate army was north of the Chickahominy. All told, the six-map playing area of these two games linked really makes the command system move to the forefront, as players find themselves trying to manage affairs over much greater distances than they are used to, and it is manifestly impossible to be everywhere at once. It is this feature that really made me want to do this game originally, and I find it just as intriguing today.

The most striking addition to the game rules is the inclusion of the slow-moving Federal train. Given that McClellan destroyed huge dumps at both White House and Fair Oaks, it is a bit of a wonder that the Union army still found enough stuff to fill up this train, but fill it they did. I tried to give the Union player a bit of a dilemma: deciding not to change base avoids having to move this massive, slow beast, but forces the Union to defend the east edge of the map much more securely, which inevitably means re-crossing the Chickahominy at some point. By changing base, however, the Union player has to stay pretty much in one place for a day, and then crawl sluggishly through the White Oak Swamp. I feel strongly that players should really use the secret train version of things, or else Lee's questions about Union intentions are answered much too easily. All in all, I hope players appreciate a little more the risks that both commanders took during this campaign.

In **Gaines Mill**, Jackson was still too predictable, so here I have added an option that re-introduces a great deal more uncertainty to the process of determining if 'good' Stonewall or 'evil' Stonewall is taking command today. Using it will mean that Jackson is likely more changeable— and perhaps more active—than he was historically, but the benefit is that he will more often disappoint at the critical moment. It is that sense of success robbed that I am striving to reach, hard to do under traditional boardgame conditions. I hope this takes us a little closer to that goal the shorter scenarios of Savage Station give me the chance to ask one of the ultimate "what if's" of the war—can McClellan take Richmond while Lee is north of the Chickahominy? Historically, of course, McClellan's idea of a major attack can be seen at King's School house, where he sent one division out of eight forward, and once that division encountered even moderate resistance, the attack was declared successful and halted for the day. With this as the governing idea of offensive action, it is unlikely that the historical McClellan could even have battered his way through Magruder's desperately thin line, let alone taken Richmond, but I have faith that the gamers involved will play things a little more aggressively. If so, the Confederate player will soon find that Magruder's men are very thin on the ground indeed, and a determined effort will drive them.

The only other action in the game is the battle of Savage Station itself. It is recreated using two scenarios: one that looks at the potential larger conflict that almost occurred, and one that focuses just on the historical encounter itself. The larger action is potentially a very exciting game, with the Federal hamstrung considerably by the now customary absence of any directing hand. I think that the smaller scenario is best for introducing newcomers to the system, or even tournament play given the limited counter mix and short time-span, but most of the major decisions have already been made, and all that's left is a purely tactical fight. Fun, certainly, but missing so much of the scope of the other scenarios.

I want to thank all the gamers that have supported and loved the CWB over the years, for they have made this project possible. Now, two-thirds of the way through it, I feel that together we have made a unique and exciting project in wargaming.

Bibliography for The Seven Days

Since the study of the Seven Days and Seven Pines are essentially the same campaign, there are very few sources that pertain to the one action but not the other. Hence, this bibliography will serve for all three games.

The books listed below are only those that proved most useful in the research of these games specifically. A number of background sources—tactical manuals such as *Casey's* and *Hardee's Tactics*; histories such as McPherson's *Battle Cry of Freedom* or Foote's *The Civil War: A Narrative*; and analysis works such as McWhiney's *Attack and Die* or Hagerman's *Military Analysis of the Civil War*—have all contributed to the ongoing evolution of the CWB series and all of its titles, but are not specifically cited here. Also, a number of sources were consulted but saw only limited or marginal use in the design of the game—most of those being biographies of many of the more minor participants and individual unit histories. What's left, and listed in full below, are those works which proved invaluable in this effort and which were consulted repeatedly.

Alexander, Edward Porter. *Military Memoirs of a Confederate*. Da Capo Press,

1993. Reprint of 1907 edition.

While containing only a few chapters on Seven Pines and Seven Days, Alexander's perspective as both a military man and a participant is outstanding. Alexander served as the Army of Northern Virginia's Ordinance Officer during the campaign, first under Johnston and continuing under Lee.

Allen, William. *Army of Northern Virginia in 1862.* Morningside, 1984. Reprint of 1892 edition.

Allen was on Jackson's staff, and a strong partisan of Jackson after the war. While clearly an apologist for Jackson's many failures here, His account of the campaign gives valuable insight into the actions of the Valley Army during the last week in June of 1862.

Buel, Clarence C.; and Johnson, Robert U. Eds. *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 2.* Yoseloff, New York, 1956.

With input from virtually all of the senior officers on both sides involved in the campaign, this book was essential in producing quality games on the subject at hand. It is also a condensed version of many of the controversies that eventually surrounded both Seven Pines and the Seven Days, as former commanders presented their often quite contradictory versions of reality in this public forum.

Cullen, Joseph P. *The Peninsula Campaign, 1862.* Stackpole Books, 1973.

A superficial treatment, more of an overview than a detailed history of the campaign. Useful as an introduction to the subject.

Dowdey, Clifford. *The Seven Days.* Broadfoot, 1988. Reprint of 1964 edition.

Dowdey reveals a strong pro-Lee, mostly Confederate point of view. While one of the few relatively modern works on a largely neglected topic, it has since been supplanted by better stuff.

Farwell, Byron. Stonewall. Norton, 1992.

About the best Jackson Biography around, in that it is relatively free of the hero-worship that tinges most such works.

Freeman, Douglas S. Lee's Lieutenants, Volume 1. Scribners, 1942.

Freeman was the definitive Lee scholar for the first half of the 20th Century. While the work he did is monumental, it does suffer from the distortions that crept into most scholarship after the late 19th century, and tends to view Lee in an almost perfect state. I have omitted his equally monumental Biography of Lee himself. Lee's Lieutenants, being a more detailed military treatment of the subject, has sufficed.

Gallagher, Gary W. "The Fall of 'Prince John' Magruder." Civil War Magazine, pp 8-15. Volume 19.

Very little good stuff exists on Magruder, who played secondary roles in both major actions before Richmond. Gallagher's portrayal of Magruder is a sympathetic one.

Greene, Will. "Jackson on the Peninsula: Failure or Scapegoat?" Civil War Magazine, pp 6-19. Volume 18.

An apologia for Jackson's repeated failures to act decisively during the Seven Days. Useful as a concise narrative of Jackson's activities, but full of excuses.

Johnston, Joseph E. *Narrative of Military Operations.* New York, 1874. *Johnston expressed considerable bitterness towards President Davis, and viewed his efforts as thwarted at almost every turn by the Confederate leader. His narrative was most interesting for what it didn't say with regards to Seven Pines, and the Longstreet vs. Smith and Huger fracases.*

Longstreet, James. *From Manassas to Appomattox.* Blue and Gray Press, Reprint of 1904 edition.

By the time Longstreet got around to writing this book, 30 years of personal attack and virtual pariah status had taken their toll. Much self-justification is included, and much that is just wrong, but a valuable memoir none-the-less. Always get a second opinion, though.

Newton, Steven H. T*he Battle of Seven Pines.* H. E. Howard, 1993.

Clearly a Longstreet-hater, Newton is a member of that clique of modern Virginians—headed by Robert Krick—who have disputed Longstreet's redemption in the eyes of historians. Like most Howard publications, the writing and editing (plenty of typos, among other things) are not first rank, but this is the only modern work dedicated solely to Seven Pines. Much of the most critical Longstreet stuff is highly speculative, and not fully grounded in fact. However, it stands up quite well as a tactical narrative.

Piston, William G. *Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant.* University of Georgia, 1987.

A strong Longstreet partisan, Piston has more to say about the post-war re-invention of events than those events themselves. It is a fascinating look at the control and manipulation of history for personal gain, and speaks none-to-highly of men like Jubal Early, William N. Pendelton, etc. It was very helpful in trying to separate fact from fiction in the very

clouded Seven Pines recriminations.

Sears, Stephen W. *George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon.* Ticknor and Fields, 1988. *Sears work is first rate, if highly critical of McClellan.*

Sears, Stephen, W. *To the Gates of Richmond.* Ticknor and Fields, 1992.

As above, excellent. This book has become the definitive study of the campaign as a whole to date. If you want to read just one book on the topic, read this one. Again, very critical of McClellan.

Smith, Gustavus, W. *The Battle of Seven Pines.* Morningside, 1974. Reprint of 1891 Edition.

Smith was relieved for cause after June 1st, replaced by Lee, and never recovered from that incident. His book is mostly an attack on Longstreet and to a lesser extent Johnston. The book is essentially an extended defense of his actions at Seven Pines. Much of this defense is a duplication of his account found in Battles and Leaders, above.

Webb, Alexander S. *The Army in the Civil War, Volume 3: The Peninsula.* Scribner's, 1885.

Webb served on McClellan's staff in the Peninsula, and this book is a fairly sympathetic view of that commander. As a history, it is useful in that it gives a strong sense of what Union Headquarters point of view was, but is not a definitive study of the various actions.

Wert, Jeffery D. *General James Longstreet.* Simon and Schuster, 1993.

Wert's Biography of Longstreet is an excellent and balanced view of the General, critical in some deserving areas, while justly complimentary in others. Together with Piston and Longstreet himself, it is helpful in untangling the various obscured threads of Seven Pines and the Seven Days actions.

Wheeler, Richard. *Sword Over Richmond.* Fairfax Press, 1986.

Wheeler's book is subtitled "An Eyewitness History of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign," and in the style of his other works, relies mostly on first-person accounts of events to tell the story. While useful, what it lacks is much by way of critical analysis of events.

War Of The Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume XI. 3 Vols. Government Printing Office, 1884.

The single most essential source for the game. These volumes contain the official correspondence and reports of the participants, and are the starting point for any research.