

Digital signatures- DSA

Signatures vs. MACs

Suppose parties A and B share the secret key K . Then $M, \text{MAC}_K(M)$ convinces A that indeed M originated with B. But in case of dispute A cannot convince a judge that $M, \text{MAC}_K(M)$ was sent by B, since A could generate it herself.



Problems with "Pure" DH Paradigm

- Easy to forge signatures of random messages even without holding D_A : Bob picks R arbitrarily, computes $S = E_A(R)$.
- Then the pair (S, R) is a valid signature of Alice on the "message" S .
- Therefore, the scheme is subject to existential forgery.



forgery

ability to create a pair consisting of a message m and a signature (or MAC) σ that is valid for m , where m has not been signed in the past by the legitimate signer

Existential forgery

- adversary creates any message/signature pair (m, σ) , where σ was not produced by the legitimate signer
- adversary need not have any control over m ; m need not have any meaning
- existential forgery is essentially the weakest adversarial goal; therefore the strongest schemes are those which are "existentially unforgeable"

Selective forgery

- adversary creates a message/signature pair (m, σ) where m has been chosen by the adversary prior to the attack
- m may be chosen to have interesting mathematical properties with respect to the signature algorithm; however, in selective forgery, m must be fixed before the start of the attack
- the ability to successfully conduct a selective forgery attack implies the ability to successfully conduct an existential forgery attack

Universal forgery

*αδωερσαρψ χρεατες α
παλιδ σιγνατυρε σ φορ
ανψ γιωεν μεσσαγε μ*

*ιτ ισ τηε στρονγεστ
αβιλιτψ ιν φοργινγ, ανδ
ιτ ιμπλιεσ τηε οτηερ
τυπεσ οφ φοργερψ*

Problems with "Pure" DH Paradigm

- Consider specifically RSA. Being multiplicative, we have (products mod N)

$$D_A(M_1 M_2) = D_A(M_1) D_A(M_2)$$

- If M_1 ="I OWE BOB \$20" and M_2 ="100" then under certain encoding of letters we could get $M_1 M_2$ ="I OWE BOB \$20100"

Standard Solution: Hash First

- Let E_A be Alice's public encryption key, and let D_A be Alice's private decryption key.
- To sign the message M , Alice first computes the strings $y = H(M)$ and $z = D_A(y)$. Sends (M, z) to Bob
- To verify this is indeed Alice's signature, Bob computes the string $y = E_A(z)$ and checks $y = H(M)$
- The function H should be collision resistant, so that cannot find another M' with $H(M) = H(M')$

General Structure: Signature Schemes

*Γενερατιον οφ
πριωατε ανδ πυβλιχ
κεψο (ρανδομιζεδ).*

*Σιγνινγ (ειτηερ
δετερμινιστιχ ορ
ρανδομιζεδ)*

*ζεριφιχατιον
(αχχεπτ/ρεφεχτ) –
υσυαλλψ
δετερμινιστιχ.*

Schemes Used in Practice

- RSA
- El-Gamal Signature Scheme (85)
- The DSS (digital signature standard, adopted by NIST in 94 is based on a modification of El-Gamal signature)

RSA

- Signature: encrypt hash of message using private key
- Only the person who knows the secret key can sign
- Everybody can verify the signature using the public key

Instead of RSA we can use any Public Key cryptographic protocol

RSA: Public-Key Crypto. Standard (PKCS)

- Signature: code hash of message ("digest") using private key
- PKCS-1: standard encrypt using secret key
- $0 || 1 || \text{at least 8 byte FF base 16} || 0 || \text{specification of used hash function} || \text{hash}(M)$
- (M message to be signed)
 - first byte 0 implies encoded message is less than n
 - second byte (=1) denotes signature (=2 encoding)
 - bytes 11111111 imply encoded message is large
 - specification of used hash function increases security

El-Gamal Signature Scheme

[KPS §6.4.4]

Generation

- Pick a prime p of length 1024 bits such that DL in Z_p^* is hard
- Let g be a generator of Z_p^*
- Pick x in $[2, p-2]$ at random
- Compute $y = g^x \bmod p$
- Public key: (p, g, y)
- Private key: x

El-Gamal Signature Scheme

Signing M [a per-message public/private key pair (r, k) is also generated]

- Hash: Let $m = H(M)$
- Pick k in $[1, p-2]$ relatively prime to $p-1$ at random
- Compute $r = g^k \bmod p$
- Compute $s = (m - rx)k^{-1} \bmod (p-1)$ (***)
 - if s is zero, restart
- Output signature (r, s)

El-Gamal Signature Scheme

Verify M, r, s, p, k

- Compute $m = H(M)$
- Accept if $(0 < r < p) \wedge (0 < s < p-1) \wedge (y^r r^s = g^m) \bmod p$, else reject
- What's going on?
- By (***) $s = (m - rx)k^{-1} \bmod p-1$, so $sk + rx = m$. Now $r = g^k$ so $r^s = g^{ks}$, and $y = g^x$ so $y^r = g^{rx}$, implying $y^r r^s = g^m$

Digital Signature Standard (DSS)

- NIST, FIPS PUB 186
- DSS uses SHA as hash function and DSA as signature
- DSA inspired by El Gamal

see [KPS §6.5]

- Let p be an L bit prime such that the discrete log problem mod p is intractable
- Let q be a 160 bit prime that divides $p - 1$: $p = j \cdot q + 1$
- Let α be a q -th root of 1 modulo p :
 $\alpha = 1^{1/q} \bmod p$, or $\alpha^q = 1 \bmod p$

?How do we compute α

The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)

computing α

- take a random number h
s.t. $1 < h < p - 1$ and compute
 $g = h^{(p-1)/q} \bmod p = h^j \bmod p$
- if $g = 1$ try a different h
 - things would be unsecure
- it holds $g^q = h^{p-1}$
- by Fermat's theorem $h^{p-1} = 1 \bmod p$
 - p is prime and h is by construction not a multiple of p
- choose $\alpha = g$

The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)

p prime, q prime, $p - 1 = 0 \bmod q$, $\alpha = 1^{(1/q)} \bmod p$

Private key: secret s , random $1 \leq s \leq q-1$.

Public key: $(p, q, \alpha, y = \alpha^s \bmod p)$

Signature on message M :

Choose a random $1 \leq k \leq q-1$, secret!!

Part I: $(\alpha^k \bmod p) \bmod q$

Part II: $(\text{SHA}(M) + s (\text{PART I})) k^{-1} \bmod q$

Signature $\langle \text{Part I}, \text{Part II} \rangle$

Note that Part I Does not depend on M (preprocessing)

Part II is fast to compute

The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)

• p prime, q prime, $p - 1 = 0 \bmod q$, $\alpha = 1^{(1/q)} \bmod p$, Private key: random $1 \leq s \leq q-1$. Public key: $(p, q, \alpha, y = \alpha^s \bmod p)$. Signature on message M :

- Choose a random $1 \leq k \leq q-1$, secret!!
 - Part I: $(\alpha^k \bmod p) \bmod q$
 - Part II: $(\text{SHA}(M) + s (\text{PART I})) k^{-1} \bmod q$

• Verification:

- $e_1 = \text{SHA}(M) (\text{PART II})^{-1} \bmod q$
- $e_2 = (\text{PART I}) (\text{PART II})^{-1} \bmod q$
- ACCEPT Signature if
 - $(\alpha^{e_1} y^{e_2} \bmod p) \bmod q = \text{PART I}$

Digital Signature-correctness

Accept if $(\alpha^{e1} y^{e2} \bmod p) \bmod q = \text{PART I}$
 $e1 = \text{SHA}(M) / (\text{PART II}) \bmod q$
 $e2 = (\text{PART I}) / (\text{PART II}) \bmod q$

Proof :

1. definition of PART I and PART II implies

$$\text{SHA}(M) = (-s (\text{PART I}) + k(\text{PART II})) \bmod q \text{ hence}$$

$$\text{SHA}(M)/(\text{PART II}) + s (\text{PART I})/(\text{PART II}) = k \bmod q$$

2. Definit. of $y = \alpha^s \bmod p$ implies $\alpha^{e1} y^{e2} \bmod p = \alpha^{e1} \alpha^{(s e2)} \bmod p =$
 $= \alpha^{(\text{SHA}(M)/(\text{PART II}) + s (\text{PART I})/(\text{PART II})) \bmod q} \bmod p = \alpha^{(k + cq)} \bmod p$
 $= \alpha^k \bmod p \text{ (since } \alpha^q = 1 \text{)}.$

3. Execution of $\bmod q$ implies

$$(\alpha^{e1} y^{e2} \bmod p) \bmod q = (\alpha^k \bmod p) \bmod q = \text{PART I}$$

DSS: security [KPS §6.5.5]

Secret key s is not revealed, and it cannot be forged without knowing it
Use of a random number for signing - not revealed (k)

- There are no duplicates of the same signature (even if same messages)
- If k is known, then you can compute $s \bmod q = s$ (s is chosen $< q$)
 - make s explicit from PART II
- Two messages signed with same k can reveal the value k and therefore $s \bmod q$
 - 2 equations (Part II and Part II'), 2 unknowns (s and k)

There exist other sophisticated attacks depending on implementation

if adversary knows k ...

$$[\text{Part II}] = (\text{SHA}(M) + s [\text{Part I}]) k^{-1} \bmod q$$

$$[\text{Part II}] k = (\text{SHA}(M) + s [\text{Part I}]) \bmod q$$

$$([\text{Part II}] k - \text{SHA}(M)) [\text{Part I}]^{-1} = s \bmod q = s \text{ (since } s < q)$$

then adv knows s

now adv. wants to sign M'

- $\text{Part I} = (\alpha^k \bmod p) \bmod q$ (independent on M')
- $\text{Part II} = ((\text{SHA}(M') + s [\text{Part I}]) k^{-1}) \bmod q$

DSS: efficiency

- Finding two primes p and q such that $p - 1 = 0 \pmod{q}$ is not easy and takes time
- p and q are public: they can be used by many persons
- DSS slower than RSA in signature verification
- DSS and RSA same speed for signing (DSS faster if you use preprocessing)
- DSS requires random numbers: not always easy to generate

DSS versus RSA

DSS: (+) faster than RSA for signing (preprocessing- suitable for smart card)

(+?) uses random numbers to sign (+)

Implementation problems:

- **To generate random numbers, you need special hardware (no smartcard);**
- **pseudo random generator requires memory (no smart card)**
- **Random number depending by messages does not allow preprocessing and slows down the process**

(+) standard RSA: (+) known since many years and studied - no attacks

(+) faster in signature verification

DSA vs RSA

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DSA: signature only

RSA: signature + key management

DH: Key management

DSA: patent free (RSA patented until 2000)

DSA: short signatures (RSA 5 times longer: 40 vs 200 bytes)

DSA faster

Timestamping a document

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TimeStamping Authority (TSA): guarantees timestamp of a document

Alice (A) wants to timestamp a document

1. A compute hash of document and sends to TSA
2. TSA adds timestamp, computes new hash (of timestamp and received hash) and SIGNS the obtained hash; sends back to A
3. A keeps TSA's signature as a proof
 - Everybody can check the signature
 - TSA does not know Alice's document