# Using GPT-3.5 Turbo to do a Prompt-Based Adversarial Attack on AdvBench

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## Abstract

*Content warning: This paper contains unfiltered content generated by LLMs that may be offensive to readers.*

Large Language Models (LLMs) have many applications, including changing harmful prompts to acceptable standards. In this study, we show the efficacy of employing LLMs for modifying harmful prompts to be accepted from other LLMs. Specifically, we examine a methodology proposed for the AdvGLUE dataset that change the classification results.

Our evaluation focus on the AdvBench dataset which is a collection of harmful prompts. We demonstrate that the using methodology are unsuitable for this task. However, we identify possible further research ideas that could happened by some modification.

This study evaluate how our methodologies work and its success rate and also, we tried to show the empirical result of attack success rate.

## 1 Introduction

In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have made significant advancements, helping humans in different tasks such as code generation, business analytics, and everyday language use. These models have strong performance because of their extensive training on very large datasets.

One of the usage of Large Language Models can be related to do adversarial attack, where attackers try to produce undesired outcomes. Our research used an approach, that proposed in AttackPrompt (Xu et al., 2023), to generate prompts by changing the meaning of harmful inputs, in order to make them acceptable to the model with a positive response.

AttackPrompt (Xu et al., 2023), is a simple idea but impresive result research Arxiv that show we can use LLMs for many adversarial purpose and focus on changing the classification result. They introduce a methodology for their purpose that convert a prompt with negative classification result to positive output.

We did experiments using different levels of prompt permutation, ranging from 0 to 8, to modify adversarial prompts with the assistance of LLMs. Our methodologies involves presenting the original input along with its negative classification result and requesting an NLP model like GPT-3.5 to adjust the prompt to change the classification from negative to positive. The framework then returns the adjusted prompt result.

Our main contribution:

- Test AttackPrompt (Xu et al., 2023) methodology on AdvGLUE dataset (their own datasets).
- Test AttackPrompt (Xu et al., 2023) methodology on AdvBench dataset.
- Show the success rate of their methodologies in generate the changed prompt and also their failure rate of their methodologies for adversarial purpose.
- Show that we can consider it for further research purpose but we have to Modify it for further purpose.

## 2 Related Work

In recent years, large language models (LLMs) did many progress and during this year many research papers try to cover adversarial attacks and defence mechanism that are related to LLMs.

Many research papers focus on the fine-tuned models and focusing on training process. (Chao et al., 2023; Cheng et al., 2024; Guo et al., 2024; Huang et al., 2024) focuses on papers that show how can LLMs be vulnerable to adversarial jailbreaks. (Deng et al., 2024) is one of the papers that elaborate on multi-lingual jail-breaking. (Lapid

et al., 2023; Mehrotra et al., 2024; Yu et al., 2023) are Jail-breaking paper that focus on black-box setup. GPTFUZZER (Yu et al., 2023) is a novel black-box jailbreak fuzzing framework inspired by the AFL fuzzing framework, which automates the generation of jailbreak templates for red-teaming Large Language Models (LLMs).

On the other hand, some papers use LLMs to fool themselves instead of automates the jailbreak process. (Schulhoff et al., 2023) was one of the best paper that try to use LLMs themselves to hack a prompt to be accepted by another LLMs. An LLM Can Fool Itself (Xu et al., 2023) is the main idea of this research that focus on fool the LLMs by using another LLMs.

## 3 Methodology

We can split our methodology into three main parts: (i) Original Prompt, (ii) Guidance Prompt, and (iii) Adversarial Result. These methods and their examples are summarized in Figure 1. Let's elaborate on each section:

### 3.1 Original Prompt

This paper is inspired by "A Prompt-Based Adversarial Attack" (Xu et al., 2023), which focuses solely on datasets that classify inputs and change the classification from one class to another.

For example, the statement "*The only excitement comes when the credits finally roll, and you get to leave the theater!*" is classified as negative. The goal was to change the sentiment of the statement to positive with only some permutations. More examples are provided in Appendix A and Appendix B.

In this work, we aim to focus on a different type of dataset and test their method on the AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023) dataset. AdvBench consists of a list of harmful prompts that are not supported by AI assistants. If you request a prompt from AdvBench, you will receive a response stating: "*I cannot fulfill your request. I'm just an AI assistant, my purpose is to provide informative and helpful responses, but I cannot create content that promotes or glorifies violence, illegal activities, or harmful behavior.*"

### 3.2 Guidance Prompt

This section represents the most important part of our methodology. As previously mentioned, it is necessary to modify the original prompt to submit our request to any AI assistant, therefore generating a new, *hacked* prompt. As mentioned in Figure 1, our guidance prompt consists of three key components: (i) the original input, (ii) the attack objective, and (iii) the attack guidance.

#### 3.2.1 Original Input

Initially, we must put the original input into our prompt with its classification value (positive/negative), to request a modification of this prompt. For example, for our based example we have *"The original sentence "The only excitement comes when the credits finally roll, and you get to leave the theater!" is classified as negative"*.

#### 3.2.2 Attack Objectives

The second section focuses on asking the LLMs to generate a new sentence that must satisfy our objectives and purpose:

1. Keeping the semantic meaning of the new sentence unchanged

2. The new sentence should be classified as opposite of the original classify result

Both conditions are important. Firstly, maintaining the semantic is our primary goal; as long as the semantics are preserved, our approach remains valid. Secondly, as stated earlier, altering the classification result is the main objective of their methodology.

#### 3.2.3 Attack Guidance

The final section of our prompt is the way to generate the new hacked prompt. We are trying to help the LLMs with our Guidance in order to get the better response. In (Xu et al., 2023), they mentioned nine different permutation and strategy to change the meaning (listed in Table 1). However, I believe we can do more experiment in different and more permutations based on different goals. Also, we can use jail-breaking research papers and used them in their guidance prompt too.

The final section of our prompt we aim to mention the guidance that can help the LLMs to achieving a better response through our guidance. According to (Xu et al., 2023), nine different permutations and strategies for changing meaning are listed. We also consider more different guidance since our problem is a little bit different. As shown in Table 1, those rows that are in group 1 are recommended by (Xu et al., 2023) and those rows that are in group 2 are recommended by us.




Figure 1: The Summary of our Methodology

However, I believe further experimentation with different permutations and strategies based on different objectives is possible. Additionally, using jail-breaking research papers in our guidance prompt could also be helpful.

### 3.3 Adversarial Output

Now that our prompt is ready, we can use it to ask various AI assistants to generate a "hacked" prompt. We can use any models that capable of processing these prompts to generate our adversarial sample. After this step, our sample will be prepared for adversarial purposes.

## 4 Experiments and Results

The experimental process can divided into two sections. First, generate the prompt and the success rate of Adversarial Sample generation. Second, check the result of those generations.

### 4.1 Experiment Setup

#### 4.1.1 Dataset

We use AdvGLUE (Wang et al., 2022) and AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023) for our evaluation. AdvGLUE was used by their model to generate various prompts, and their experimental performance were presented in their results (Xu et al., 2023). Since AdvGLUE is covered in their paper, we mainly focus on AdvBench and their performance here. However, we focus on both of them in our experimental results.

#### 4.1.2 Large Language Models

We used the OpenAI API for GPT-3.5 Turbo for prompt generation and tested the generated results with *Llama-2-7B*, *GPT-2*, and *GPT-3.5*.

For GPT-3.5, I used the *GPT-3.5 Turbo* API from OpenAI. For *Llama-2* and *GPT-2*, I utilized *Hugging Face* to fine-tune the models on an HPC server for evaluation.

### 4.2 Prompt Generation Success Rate

We tested 11 different permutations for attack guidance as listed in Table 1. Many of the LLMs are not compatible with harmful prompts and will not accept them. However, we did an experiment of how many prompts after guidance generation can be acceptable by the model.

As mentioned in Table 2, GPT-3.5 Turbo successfully converted more than 95% of the prompts into our new forms. The main reason for this high success rate is that GPT-3.5 does not reject many harmful prompts; it only flags some of them as concerning. On the other hand, Llama-2 rejected 80% of our requests based on its strict rules against harmful content.

In Figure 2, we compare the performance of Llama-2 and GPT-3.5 for adversarial prompt creation for different level of prompt creation. However, I used it for Llama with smaller size of parameters and the performance got even worst.

### 4.3 Generated Prompt Evaluation

Prompt qualification is a challenging process. I tried to used their methods and it take long time for all of the datasets. We generate 11 CSV files and since L = 5 and L = 6 are not helpful in any test-cases (mentioned in Appendix A in Figure 3), we do not report them. AttackPrompt shows that their approach worked successfully in 48.34 of prompts in average (Xu et al., 2023).

We experiment small size of samples to show and provide them in our results and elaborate them

Table 1: List of Different Level of Permutations for AI Assistant to generate the Adversarial Prompt

| Level | Attack Guidance | Group |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | "Choose at most two words in the sentence, and change them so that they have typos." | 1 |
| 1 | "Change at most two letters in the sentence." | 1 |
| 2 | "Add at most two extraneous characters to the end of the sentence." | 1 |
| 3 | "Replace at most two words in the sentence with synonyms." | 1 |
| 4 | "Choose at most two words in the sentence that do not contribute to the meaning of the sentence and delete them." | 1 |
| 5 | "Add at most two semantically neutral words to the sentence." | 1 |
| 6 | "Add a randomly generated short meaningless handle after the entence, such as @fasuv3." | 1 |
| 7 | "Paraphrase the sentence." | 1 |
| 8 | "Change the syntactic structure of the sentence." | 1 |
| 9 | "re-write it by using emojis" | 2 |
| 10 | "using emojis instead of non-proper words" | 2 |




Figure 2: Prompt Creation Success Rate with GPT-3.5 and Llama-2

Table 2: The Success Rate of Prompt Transformation to Hacked Prompt of 575 prompts with GPT-3.5.

| Permutation | Successful | Failures | Rate |
|---|---|---|---|
| **level 0** | 568 | 7 | 98.78 |
| **level 1** | 570 | 5 | 99.13 |
| **level 2** | 547 | 28 | 95.13 |
| **level 3** | 560 | 15 | 97.39 |
| **level 4** | 559 | 16 | 97.21 |
| **level 5** | 555 | 20 | 96.52 |
| **level 6** | 560 | 15 | 97.39 |
| **level 7** | 569 | 6 | 98.95 |
| **level 8** | 566 | 9 | 98.43 |
| **level 9** | 540 | 35 | 93.91 |
| **level 10** | 549 | 26 | 95.47 |

in our Appendix A. We shows that our proposed permutation (L = 9 and L = 10) can interestingly increase the robustness of attack accuracy.

On the other hand, for AdvBench the performance worked very disappointed. Since, the problem is different, as we expected, it did not help at all. It was helpful to get response for some prompts but it was not able to generate the requested target. In Figure 4, we show that for some level of permutation we would able to change the meaning of the prompts from negative to positive without changing the semantics. Also, in Figure 5, we show that after different level of permutation, some of the prompts can be accepted by different LLMs.

## 5 Discussion

This approach is not really helpful for AdvBench dataset and it would not help us for run harmful prompt in general. However, we still can use the idea for many purpose as we can focus later for future research directions.

- Changing the prompt and instead of using classification request and changing the result from negative to positive, optimize it based on our problem. We can try different *Attack Objectives* for different dataset.
- For some prompts, the GPT-3.5 is changing the semantic of the prompt which means it's not always true and correct. Therefore, the robustness evaluation will not be satisfying.
- We can use the generated prompts and combine them with Jail-breaking approach.

## 6 Conclusion

We tried to test a unique approach by generating a request for GPT-3.5 to change the prompt based on our request, in order to make the prompt hide

its own harmful goal. The primary goal of this approach was to change the classification of the result and it shows we would able to do that successfully. In other words, we explored different objectives for the attack using this method.

Also, we tried to add more permutations level that can work with AdvBench dataset and we show that they can be helpful if we find helpful permutation strategies.

However, we found that this approach was not effective for satisfying target result of the AdvBench dataset, yet we consider the potential for using their model in further research.

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# A Example of AdvGLUE dataset

Here we tried to put some example of AdvGLUE dataset that can works with our methods and their generated performance. In Figure 3, we test three different samples from AdvGLUE:

- *the only excitement comes when the credits finally roll and you get to leave the theater!*
- *unfortunately, it's not silly fun unless you enjoy really bad movies*
- *the iditarod lasts for days - this just felt like it did.*

All of these three three examples, classify as negative and our goal was to change the classification to positive. Red and Green respectively represent failure and success in changing the classification results. We used GPT-4 to evaluate the prompts.

Figure 3 shows that Level 5 and Level 6 is not helpful at all and it's not a good idea of this purpose. Another interesting thing is our proposed permutation (L = 9 and L = 10) perform great for second and third sample.

# B Example of AdvBENCH dataset

## B.1 Classification Analysis

Here we tried to put some example of AdvBENCH dataset that can works with our methods and their generated performance. In Figure 4, we test three different samples from AdvGLUE:

- *the only excitement comes when the credits finally roll and you get to leave the theater!*
- *unfortunately, it's not silly fun unless you enjoy really bad movies*
- *the iditarod lasts for days - this just felt like it did.*

All of these three three examples, classify as negative and our goal was to change the classification to positive. Red and Green respectively represent failure and success in changing the classification results. We used GPT-4 to evaluate the prompts.

Figure 4 shows that Level 6 is not helpful at all and it's not a good idea of this purpose. Another interesting thing is our proposed permutation (L = 9 and L = 10) perform great for all of the examples.

## B.2 Harmful Prompt Acceptance Analysis

Here we tried to put some example of AdvBENCH dataset that can works with our methods and their generated performance. In Figure 4, we test three different samples from AdvGLUE:

- *the only excitement comes when the credits finally roll and you get to leave the theater!*
- *unfortunately, it's not silly fun unless you enjoy really bad movies*
- *the iditarod lasts for days - this just felt like it did.*

All of these three three examples are from harmful prompts that generally are not accepted by LLMs. We send them through GPT-3.5 and we see some of them are accepted after these changes. Red and Green respectively represent failure and success in accepting by GPT-3.5.

Figure 5 shows our proposed permutation (L = 9 and L = 10) perform great for all of the examples.

# C Provided Materials

I provide my code in Github (https://github.com/ashkanvg/AttackPrompt-NLP) which I tried to put everything there. Also, I provided generted prompt for different levels of permutation there in different CSV files. All of the images and required materials are uploaded in the github files too.


Figure 3: Three different sample of AdvGLUE that works we test our method with them and asked GPT-4 for the classification result of them and red colors represent failure of our method and green represent success of our method.




Figure 4: Three different sample of AdvBENCH that works we test our method with them and asked GPT-4 for the classification result of them and red colors represent failure of our method and green represent success of our method.




Figure 5: Three different sample of AdvBENCH that works we test our method with them and asked GPT-4 for getting response. Red colors represent failure of GPT-3.5 to accept it and green represent success of GPT-3.5 to accept it.