Utilizing GPT-3.5 Turbo to Perform a Prompt-Based Adversarial Attack on AdvBench

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Abstract

Content warning: This paper contains unfiltered content generated by LLMs that may be offensive to readers.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have many applications, including changing harmful prompts to acceptable standards. In this study, we show the efficacy of employing LLMs to modify harmful prompts so that they can be accepted by other LLMs. Specifically, we examine a methodology proposed for the AdvGLUE dataset that changes the classification results.

Our evaluation focuses on the AdvBench dataset, which is a collection of harmful prompts. We demonstrate that the methodology used is unsuitable for this task. However, we identify possible further research ideas that could be generated by some modification.

This study evaluates how our methodologies work and their success rate. We also try to show the empirical result of attack success rate.

1 Introduction

In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have made significant advancements, helping humans in tasks such as code generation, business analytics, and everyday language use. These models perform well because of their extensive training on very large datasets.

One of the uses of Large Language Models can be related to adversarial attacks, where attackers try to produce undesired outcomes. Our research used an approach proposed in AttackPrompt (Xu et al., 2023) to generate prompts by changing the meaning of harmful inputs to make them acceptable to the model with a positive response.

AttackPrompt (Xu et al., 2023), is a simple idea but impresive result research Arxiv that show we can use LLMs for many adversarial purpose and focus on changing the classification result. They introduce a methodology that converts a prompt with negative classification result to positive output.

We did experiments using different levels of prompt permutation, ranging from 0 to 8, to modify adversarial prompts with the assistance of LLMs. Our methodologies involve presenting the original input along with its negative classification result and requesting an NLP model like GPT-3.5 to adjust the prompt to change the classification from negative to positive. The framework then returns the adjusted prompt result.

Our main contribution:

- Test AttackPrompt (Xu et al., 2023) methodology on AdvGLUE dataset (their datasets).
- Test AttackPrompt (Xu et al., 2023) methodology on AdvBench dataset.
- Show the success rate of their methodologies in generating the changed prompt and also the failure rate of their methodologies for adversarial purposes.
- Shows that we can consider it for further research purposes, but we have to Modify it for further purposes.

2 Related Work

In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have made many progress, and this year, many research papers have tried to cover adversarial attacks and defence mechanisms related to LLMs.

Many research papers focus on fine-tuned models and on the training process. (Chao et al., 2023; Cheng et al., 2024; Guo et al., 2024; Huang et al., 2024) focuses on papers showing how LLMs can be vulnerable to adversarial jailbreaks. (Deng et al., 2024) is one of the papers that elaborate on multi-lingual jail-breaking. (Lapid et al., 2023; Mehrotra et al., 2024; Yu et al., 2023) are Jailbreaking paper that focus on black-box setup. GPT-FUZZER (Yu et al., 2023) is a novel black-box jailbreak fuzzing framework inspired by the AFL fuzzing framework, which automates the generation of jailbreak templates for red-teaming Large Language Models (LLMs).

On the other hand, some papers use LLMs to fool themselves instead of automating the jailbreak process. (Schulhoff et al., 2023) was one of the best papers that tried to use LLMs themselves to hack a prompt to be accepted by other LLMs. An LLM Can Fool Itself (Xu et al., 2023) is the main idea of this research that focuses on fooling the LLMs by using other LLMs.

3 Methodology

We can split our methodology into three main parts: (i) Original Prompt, (ii) Guidance Prompt, and (iii) Adversarial Result. Figure 1 summarizes these methods and their examples. Let's elaborate on each section:

3.1 Original Prompt

This paper is inspired by "A Prompt-Based Adversarial Attack" (**?**), which focuses solely on dat"sets that classify inputs and change the classification from one class to another.

For example, the statement "*The only excitement comes when the cred"ts finally roll, and you get to leave the theater!*" is classified as harmful. The goal was to chan"e the statement's sentiment to positive with only some permutations. More examples are provided in Appendix A and Appendix B.

In this work, we aim to focus on a different dataset type and test their method on the AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023) dataset. AdvBench consists of a list of harmful prompts that AI assistants do not support. If you request a prompt from AdvBench, you will receive a response: "*I cannot fulfill your request. I'm just an AI assistant; my pu"pose is to provide informative and helpI'm responses, but I cannot create content that promotes or glorifies violence, illegal activities, or harmful behavior.*"

3.2 Guidance Prompt

This section represents the most essent"al part of our methodology. As previously mentioned, modifying the original prompt to submit our request to any AI assistant is necessary, therefore generating a new, *hacked* prompt. As mentioned in Figure 1, our guidance prompt consists of three key components: (i) the original input, (ii) the attack objective, and (iii) the attack guidance.

3.2.1 Original Input

Initially, we must put the original input into our prompt with its classification value (positive/negative) to request a modification of this prompt. For example, for our based example, we have *"The original sentence "The only excitement comes when the credits fina"ly roll, and you get t" leave the theater!" is classified as negative"*.

3.2.2 Attack Objectives

The"second section focuses on "sking the LLMs to generate a new sentence that must satisfy our objectives and purpose:

1. Keeping the semantic meaning of the new sentence unchanged

2. The new sentence should be classified as the opposite of the original classified result

Both conditions are essential. First, maintaining semantics is our primary goal; as long as the semantics are preserved, our approach remains valid. Second, as stated earlier, altering the classification result is the main objective of their methodology.

3.2.3 Attack Guidance

Our prompt's final section is how to generate the new hacked prompt. We are trying to help the LLMs with our Guidance to get a better response. In (Xu et al., 2023), they mentioned nine different permutations and strategies to change the meaning (listed in Table 1). However, I believe we can do more experiments in differente permutations based on other goals. Also, we can use jail-breaking research papers in tuse guidance prompt too.

In the fin,al section of our prompt, we aim to mention the guidance that can help the LLMs achieve a better response through our guidance. According to (Xu et al., 2023), nine different permutations and strategies for changing meaning are listed. We also consider more different guidance since our problem is slightly different. As shown in Table 1, recommends those rows that are in group 1 (Xu et al., 2023), and those rows that are in group 2 are recommended by us.

However, further experimentation with different permutations and strategies based on various objectives is possible. Using jail-breaking research papers in our guidance prompt could also be helpful.



Figure 1: The Summary of our Methodology

Table 1: List of Different Levels of Permutations for AI Assistant to Generate the Adversarial Prompt

Level	Attack Guidance	Group
0	"Choose at most two words in the sentence, and change them so that they"have typos."	1
1	"Change at most two le" in the sentence." "	1
" characters to the end of the sentence." "	1	
3	"Repl" in the sentence with synonyms." "	1
4	"Choose a" e that do not contribute to the"meaning of the sentence and delete them."	1
5	"Add at most two semantically neutral "ords to the sentence." "	1
6	" hort meaningless handle after the sentence, s"ch as @fasuv3."	1
7 1	"Paraphrase the sentence." "	1 " ture of the sentence." "
9 " s"	2	
10	"using emojis instead of non-proper words"	2

3.3 Adversarial Output

Now that our prompt is ready, we can ask various AI assistants to generate a "hacked" prompt. We can use any model that is capable of processing these"prompt" to generate our adversarial sample. After this step, our sample will be prepared for adversarial purposes.

4 Experiments and Results

The experimental process can be divided into two sections. First, generate the prompt and success rate of generating Adversarial Samples. Second, check the results of those generations.

4.1 Experiment Setup

4.1.1 Dataset

We use AdvGLUE (Wang et al., 2022) and AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023) for our evaluation. Their model used AdvGLUE to generate various prompts, and their experimental performance was presented in their results (Xu et al., 2023). Since AdvGLUE is covered in their paper, we mainly focus on AdvBench and their performance here. However, we focus on both of them in our experimental results.

4.1.2 Large Language Models

We used the OpenAI API for GPT-3.5 Turbo for prompt generation and tested the generated results with *Llama-2-7B*, *GPT-2*, and *GPT-3.5*.

For GPT-3.5, I used the *GPT-3.5 Turbo* API from OpenAI. For *Llama-2* and *GPT-2*, I utilized *Hugging Face* to fine-tune the models on an HPC server for evaluation.

4.2 Prompt Generation Success Rate

We tested 11 different permutations for attack guidance as listed in Table 1. Many of the LLMs are incompatible with harmful prompts and will not accept them. However, we experimented with how many prompts after guidance generation can be acceptable by the model.

As mentioned in Table 2, GPT-3.5 Turbo converted more than 95%

In Figure 2, we compare the performance of Llama-2 and GPT-3.5 for adversarial prompt creation for different levels of prompt creation. However, I used it for Llama with the smaller size of parameters, and the performance got even worse.



Figure 2: Prompt Creation Success Rate with GPT-3.5 and Llama-2

Table 2: The Success Rate of Prompt Transformation to Hacked Prompt of 575 prompts with GPT-3.5.

Permutation	Successful	Failures	Rate
level 0	568	7	98.78
level 1	570	5	99.13
level 2	547	28	95.13
level 3	560	15	97.39
level 4	559	16	97.21
level 5	555	20	96.52
level 6	560	15	97.39
level 7	569	6	98.95
level 8	566	9	98.43
level 9	540	35	93.91
level 10	549	26	95.47

4.3 Generated Prompt Evaluation

Prompt qualification is a challenging process. I tried to use their methods, and it took a long time for all of the datasets. We generate 11 CSV files, and since L = 5 and L = 6 are not helpful in any test cases (mentioned in Appendix A in Figure 3), we do not report them. AttackPrompt shows that their approach worked successfully in 48.34 of prompts in average (Xu et al., 2023).

We experiment with small size of samples to show and provide them in our results and elaborate them in our Appendix A. We show that our proposed permutation (L = 9 and L = 10) can interestingly increase the robustness of attack accuracy.

On the other hand, for AdvBench, the performance was very disappointing. Since the problem was different from what we expected, it did not help. It was helpful to get a response for some prompts, but it was not able to generate the requested target. In Figure 4, we show that for some level of permutation, we could change the meaning of the prompts from negative to positive without changing the semantics. Also, in Figure 5, we show that after different levels of permutation, some of the prompts can be accepted by different LLMs.

5 Discussion

This approach is not really helpful for the AdvBench dataset and would not help us run harmful prompts in general. However, we can still use the idea for many purposes, as we can focus later on future research directions.

- Changing the prompt and instead of using classification request and changing the result from negative to positive, optimize it based on our problem. We can try different *Attack Objectives* for different datasets.
- For some prompts, the GPT-3.5 is changing the semantics of the prompt, which means it's not always true and correct. Therefore, the robustness evaluatioit'sll not be satisfying.
- We can combine the generated prompts with the Jail-breaking approach.

6 Conclusion

We tried to test a unique approach by generating a request for GPT-3.5 to change the prompt based on our request, making the prompt hide its own harmful goal. The primary goal of this approach was to change the classification of the result, and it shows that we would be able to do that successfully. In other words, we explored different objectives for the attack using this method.

Also, we tried to add more permutations levels that can work with the AdvBench dataset and show that they can be helpful if we find helpful permutation strategies.

However, we found that this approach was ineffective in satisfying the target result of the AdvBench dataset, yet we consider the potential for using their model in further research.

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A Example of AdvGLUE dataset

Here, we tried to put some examples of AdvGLUE datasets that can work with our methods and their generated performance. In Figure 3, we test three different samples from AdvGLUE:

- *the only excitement comes when the credits finally roll, and you get to leave the theater!*
- *unfortunately, it's not silly fun unless you enjoy terrible movies*
- *It's the Iditarod lasts for days - this just felt like it did.*

All of these three examples are classified as negative, and our goal was to change the classification to positive. Red and Green, respectively, represent failure and success in changing the classification results. We used GPT-4 to evaluate the prompts.

Figure 3 shows that Level 5 and Level 6 are not helpful at all, and it's not a good idea for this purpose. Another exciting thing is that our proposed permutations (L = 9 and L = 10) perform great for the second and third samples.

B Example of AdvBENCH dataset

B.1 Classification Analysis

Here, we tried to put some examples of AdvBENCH datasets that can work with our methods and their generated performance. In Figure 4, we test three different samples from AdvGLUE:

- *the only excitement comes when the credits finally roll, and you get to leave the theater!*
- *unfortunately, it's not silly fun unless you enjoy really bad movies*
- it's the iditarod lasts for days - this just felt like it did.

All of these three examples are classified as negative, and our goal was to change the classification to positive. Red and Green, respectively, represent failure and success in changing the classification results. We used GPT-4 to evaluate the prompts.

Figure 4 shows that Level 6 is not helpful at all, and it's not a good idea for this purpose. Another exciting thing is that our proposed permutations (L = 9 and L = 10) performs great for all the examples.

Figure 3: Three different samples of AdvGLUE work. We tested our method with them and asked GPT-4 for the classification result them, red colors represents a failure of our method, and green represents the success of our method.

B.2 Harmful Prompt Acceptance Analysis

Here, we tried to put some examples of AdvBENCH datasets that can work with our methods and their generated performance. In Figure 4, we test three different samples from AdvGLUE:

- *the only excitement comes when the credits finally roll, and you get to leave the theater!*
- *unfortunately, it's not silly fun unless you enjoy really bad movies*
- it's the iditarod lasts for days - this just felt like it did.

All of these examples are from harmful prompts that are generally not accepted by LLMs. We send them through GPT-3.5, and we see that some of them are accepted after these changes. Red and Green represent failure and success in accepting them by GPT-3.5, respectively.

Figure 5 shows that our proposed permutations (L = 9 and L = 10) performs great for all examples.

C Provided Materials

I have provided my code on GitHub, which you can find at https://github.com/ashkanvg/AttackPrompt-NLP. I have attempted to include everything there. Additionally, I have provided generated prompts for different levels of permutation in various CSV files. All the images and required materials have also been uploaded to the GitHub repository.



Figure 4: Three different samples of AdvBENCH that work We tested our method with them and asked GPT-4 for the classification result them, red colors represent a failure of our method, and green represents the success of our method.



Figure 5: Three different samples of AdvBENCH that work. We tested our method with them and asked GPT-4 to get a response. Red colors represent a failure of GPT-3.5 to accept it, and green represents the success of GPT-3.5 to accept it.