1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	x
3	LOS ANGELES COUNTY FLOOD :
4	CONTROL DISTRICT, :
5	Petitioner : No. 11-460
6	v. :
7	NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE :
8	COUNCIL, INC., ET AL. :
9	x
LO	Washington, D.C.
11	Tuesday, December 4, 2012
12	
13	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
14	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
15	at 11:11 a.m.
16	APPEARANCES:
L7	TIMOTHY T. COATES, ESQ., Los Angeles, California; on
18	behalf of Petitioner.
19	PRATIK A. SHAH, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor
20	General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.;
21	for United States, as amicus curiae.
22	AARON COLANGELO, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of
23	Respondents.
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(11:11 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument
4	next in Case 11-460, Los Angeles Flood Control District
5	v. The Natural Resources Defense Council.
6	Mr. Coates.
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF TIMOTHY T. COATES
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
9	MR. COATES: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
10	please the Court:
11	In this case, the Ninth Circuit held that a
12	discharge from a point source under the Clean Water Act
13	occurred in the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers,
14	based upon the fact that water moved from channelized
15	portions of the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers into
16	what it termed, quote, "naturally occurring portions of
17	those rivers."
18	The court emphasized, in fact, that the
19	discharge occurred because it moved through the concrete
20	portions. And in the words of the court itself, found
21	at the cert appendix at 44, it was, "again discharged to
22	the rivers," and the "again" meaning that it was
23	prior at prior time, it was in the rivers.
24	This is completely contrary to the Court's
25	decision in Miccosukee Tribe, where the Court held that

- 1 there cannot be a discharge for purposes of the NPDES
- 2 permit program and the Clean Water Act, based upon the
- 3 mere transfer of water within a single body of water.
- 4 All the parties to this case agree that is
- 5 the correct rule. Virtually all the amici agree that is
- 6 the correct rule. And it's our view that that is
- 7 dispositive of this case. It is the only live issue
- 8 before this Court from the Ninth Circuit, and it
- 9 dictates --
- 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So why don't we just
- 11 remand and let it sort it out under the right
- 12 understanding of the legal rule? Which is basically
- 13 what the government is saying, with an added twist
- 14 because it thinks there is another legal question that I
- 15 think the Ninth Circuit has answered, but we could go
- 16 back and forth on it.
- 17 MR. COATES: Correct. At minimum, a
- 18 reversal is -- is warranted, without a doubt, but I
- 19 think given the record in this case is abundantly clear
- 20 about what the claims were before the Ninth Circuit and
- 21 what's going on with these monitoring stations.
- I mean, these monitoring stations are
- 23 clearly within the rivers themselves. There is just no
- 24 dispute about that. Even the Ninth Circuit's opinion,
- 25 like I said, the language of the opinion

- 1 suggests that --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Everybody agrees.
- 3 MR. COATES: Correct. And the reason why I
- 4 don't think there is an open remand is because there is
- 5 nothing further in the record, really, to argue about.
- At minimum, of course, we would prefer
- 7 reversal, and it would take an open remand. But I
- 8 think, given the record in this case, the only live
- 9 claim before the Ninth Circuit was this discharge theory
- 10 when they found it in the middle of rivers; and, that
- 11 being resolved against the Respondents, there is no
- 12 other live issue.
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, it seems to me
- 14 that they present a very direct syllogism. You have a
- 15 permit that sets these monitoring stations where they
- 16 are. The monitoring stations show exceedances, you have
- 17 violated your permit. What -- what's wrong with that?
- 18 MR. COATES: Well, because the nature of the
- 19 monitoring here -- for example, when you look at the
- 20 permitting question, it doesn't say the monitoring of
- 21 any permittee. If you look at the permit where it talks
- 22 about the mass emissions monitoring stations, it talks
- 23 about measuring discharges and compliance from the MS4,
- 24 not any individual permittee's MS4.
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Right. But I

- 1 understand the argument to be that that's the problem
- 2 that your permit imposes on you; in other words, that
- 3 this is where the monitoring station is supposed to be.
- 4 What is it monitoring, if not discharges from the MS4,
- 5 for which you're responsible?
- The government suggests that there could be
- 7 different rules about whether you have to show the
- 8 allocation or if that's your responsibility.
- 9 MR. COATES: But it's the -- Well, I think,
- 10 again, the -- the rules say that you look at the permit's
- 11 terms to interpret it.
- 12 And the Ninth Circuit did look at the
- 13 permit's terms. I mean, it -- it dealt with this
- 14 argument, and it noted that there are several factors in
- 15 the permit that suggest that it didn't relieve the
- 16 Respondents of the obligation of having to show an
- 17 actual discharge of water --
- 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, you don't --
- 19 you don't question that there was an actual discharge.
- 20 The storm sewer system in Los Angeles hasn't been shut
- 21 down, right?
- MR. COATES: Correct. But, again --
- 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So there are
- 24 discharges, right?
- MR. COATES: But not discharges of

- 1 pollutants, and that's what's reported.
- 2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You don't dispute
- 3 that there was at least some small amount of pollutant,
- 4 even below the -- the permit level, from your point
- 5 sources, do you?
- 6 MR. COATES: Well, we don't know that. But
- 7 the -- but the point I want to make --
- 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I'm asking you
- 9 whether -- I mean, isn't it -- doesn't common sense
- 10 suggest -- you have asked in your permit for a limit on
- 11 how much of a --
- MR. COATES: Sure.
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- particular
- 14 pollutant you can discharge.
- MR. COATES: But, again --
- 16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You wouldn't do
- 17 that, unless you expected to discharge some.
- 18 MR. COATES: You might -- You might do it
- 19 sometimes, you might do it others, you might do it in
- 20 concentrations that would cause or contribute to the
- 21 exceedances; but you still have to have a discharge that
- 22 causes or contributes to the exceedances.
- 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, why did you
- 24 put the monitoring sources where they are, if that
- 25 wasn't what was going to measure your compliance with

- 1 the permit?
- 2 MR. COATES: Because you're required, in
- 3 a -- in a system-wide permit like this, to suggest -- to
- 4 propose monitoring which is subject to the approval of
- 5 the regulatory agency. And it's a question of
- 6 monitoring of what? Not monitoring of any individual
- 7 permittee's discharge. In fact, it's not designed for
- 8 that. We even presented evidence in the district court
- 9 to that effect.
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, the government
- 11 says that that question -- you're saying, I understand,
- 12 there are other discharges -- well, you're by far the
- 13 dominant discharger, but I understand there are others,
- 14 and they may contribute as well to what the monitoring
- 15 station says.
- 16 But the government's position is that, well,
- 17 that's how you wrote the permit without any allocation;
- 18 and that whatever allocation issues you have may be
- 19 between you and the other dischargers, but that doesn't
- 20 affect the showing of liability.
- 21 MR. COATES: Well, except for the fact that
- 22 the permit terms themselves say that each permittee is
- 23 only responsible for its own discharge. If you read the
- 24 permit in the general fashion that the Respondents wish,
- 25 then -- then you're not responsible only for your own

- 1 discharge.
- 2 It's essentially you're in immediately and
- 3 responsible for all of them, until you prove otherwise.
- 4 And that's just not how the permit reads.
- 5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Where is that? I
- 6 know we've got the permit. Where does it read that way?
- 7 MR. COATES: Let's see. At the Joint
- 8 Appendix, page 93, G, 4.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: What page again?
- 10 MR. COATES: Volume I of the Joint Appendix,
- 11 page 93, and it's the fourth paragraph. And it's at the
- 12 very bottom of the fourth paragraph. "Each permittee is
- 13 responsible only for discharge for which it is the
- 14 operator."
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Suppose that the district
- 16 has 85 percent of the water by volume that's put into
- 17 this river, and then you have this high pollution index.
- 18 Does that make it an easier case for the challengers?
- 19 Or is that just irrelevant?
- 20 MR. COATES: It's just irrelevant, unless
- 21 you show that, in that bulk of water, there is a higher
- 22 concentration of pollutants.
- You could have a major discharger that
- 24 undertakes more vigorous pollution controls than other
- 25 smaller discharges. It doesn't necessarily show that

- 1 you're adding more pollutants, necessarily, or how those
- 2 pollutants contribute to exceedances measured at the
- 3 mass emissions monitoring stations.
- 4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I have one different
- 5 question. This is hypothetical. It's not in the case.
- 6 It's just for me to understand that.
- 7 Suppose you have the river, and part of it
- 8 is a concrete bank, and then there's a more natural
- 9 bedding and then another concrete bank.
- 10 And when the -- in the dry season, they fix
- 11 the concrete bank, but they use bad concrete. And a lot
- of pollutants are coming out of the concrete, but it is
- in the river. Is that a discharge under this statute?
- MR. COATES: I don't believe so. Although,
- 15 I could --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Would there be any --
- 17 MR. COATES: -- imagine circumstances where
- 18 you create an outfall unintentionally by -- by
- 19 funneling. I mean, I think you're talking about just
- 20 natural erosion of turbidity or whatever into the river.
- 21 I don't believe that would necessarily be a point
- 22 source.
- It might be a non-point source pollution,
- 24 but I don't believe that would necessarily be a point
- 25 source if it's just inadvertently -- you know,

- 1 deteriorating in the river.
- 2 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And that's -- that's a
- 3 separate provision of the statute, nonpoint source
- 4 pollutions.
- 5 MR. COATES: Well, it doesn't sound like --
- 6 you know, the -- the way it's defined under 1362 is a --
- 7 you know, like, enclosed conveyance that -- that
- 8 discharges --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, that's not in this
- 10 case.
- 11 MR. COATES: Yes, that's not in this case.
- 12 But I --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: It was just a background,
- 14 background question for you.
- MR. COATES: Yes, but I think that that --
- 16 that probably wouldn't be a discharge from a point
- 17 source.
- 18 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Coates, I am -- I am
- 19 still perplexed.
- MR. COATES: Yes.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: You say -- and it seems to
- 22 be correct, that each -- each alleged polluter is only
- 23 responsible for his own pollution. But you also say
- 24 that these monitors are so situated that it is
- 25 impossible to tell from the monitor who is responsible

- 1 for the pollution; is that right?
- 2 MR. COATES: I think that -- I think that is
- 3 right, but you look for the --
- 4 JUSTICE SCALIA: So whose fault is that?
- 5 MR. COATES: Well, the reason why -- the
- 6 reason why that that's there is to measure, essentially,
- 7 the health of these rivers so that you can fine-tune the
- 8 MS4 permit -- the systemwide permit, and so that you can
- 9 gauge general water quality standards, and if necessary,
- 10 you can fine-tune it to try and measure individual
- 11 permittees.
- 12 And we note that there is a renewed permit.
- 13 It still has the monitoring stations in it, so under the
- 14 Ninth Circuit's decision, we would still be discharging
- 15 at those monitoring stations. But it does provide for
- 16 outfall monitoring at representative outfalls for
- individual permittees to do precisely that kind of
- 18 correlation that we are talking about.
- 19 JUSTICE SCALIA: What -- what it is -- what
- 20 is it that provides for that?
- 21 MR. COATES: There is a renewed permit. The
- 22 permits are renewed every 5 years. This is -- we are on
- 23 the third permit now; this is the fourth; it's gone 10
- 24 years. The renewed permit continues the mass emission
- 25 station. So, as I mentioned, we are still discharging

- 1 in middle of the river, as far as the Ninth Circuit is
- 2 concerned.
- 3 But it does have provisions for additional
- 4 monitoring near outfalls, along the banks of the rivers,
- 5 for various permittees, so that, in the future, you
- 6 could look at that testing and go, boy, your outfall is
- 7 producing X, Y, and Z.
- 8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So this was a regulatory
- 9 void?
- 10 MR. COATES: This was a --
- 11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: A regulatory void that
- 12 these -- that there was no requirement previously that
- 13 you monitor the outfalls?
- MR. COATES: Monitoring, correct, that there
- 15 be specific outfall monitoring. It's a regulatory --
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So how do you -- how do
- 17 you envision this permit was -- by the way, just one
- 18 side question and then on to this one.
- 19 I thought the Ninth Circuit basically
- 20 endorsed your view that, under the permit, you're not --
- 21 you're only responsible for your own pollution.
- MR. COATES: That is correct.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So it has resolved this
- 24 issue?
- 25 MR. COATES: It has resolved this issue.

- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. So that's
- 2 why I ask why remand and why you're saying why remand.
- 3 MR. COATES: Yes.
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But putting that aside,
- 5 how do you think the system was supposed to work before?
- 6 MR. COATES: Well --
- 7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Did you have any
- 8 obligation, once you saw the excess pollutants, to start
- 9 the reiteration process, to try to figure out who was
- 10 the cause of this?
- 11 MR. COATES: Well, if they attribute a -- a
- 12 violation to a particular permittee -- for example, the
- 13 district court noted and the Ninth Circuit re-emphasized
- 14 it that you could at least, if you wanted to try and hook
- 15 it to a single permittee, you could at least try and
- 16 sample at an outfall for that permittee and then provide
- 17 evidence that that contributed to exceedances.
- 18 They didn't do that here, in the lower
- 19 court.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You mean the Respondents
- 21 could have done that here?
- MR. COATES: The Respondents could have done
- 23 that here. They did not argue that they did that in the
- 24 Ninth Circuit. They abandoned that -- that contention.
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So what -- what

- 1 percentage of discharges come from you, as opposed to
- 2 the other members of the MS4 --
- 3 MR. COATES: We have -- we have the most
- 4 infrastructure. I don't know the specific percentage,
- 5 but bear in mind that there are 1,400 other entities
- 6 upstairs --
- 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Give me an estimate.
- 8 MR. COATES: You know, I can't in terms of
- 9 total water volume. But we are -- we are the largest
- 10 player in that portion of the system. I'm not going to
- 11 downplay that.
- 12 What I'm saying is that there is no
- 13 necessary correlation between that and, ipso facto,
- 14 you're the one causing the exceedances at the monitoring
- 15 stations; that, again, there has to be something
- 16 traceable to our discharge that contributes to those
- 17 exceedances.
- 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What -- what goes
- 19 into these discharges, besides the rainwater runoff?
- MR. COATES: Here, it's just stormwater.
- 21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Okay.
- 22 MR. COATES: I mean, a municipal separate
- 23 storm sewer system --
- 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So your -- your
- 25 hypothesis is, in some of these minority dischargers,

- 1 that, for some reason, their rainwater would have a
- 2 different amount of pollutants than your rainwater?
- 3 MR. COATES: Well, they could -- they could
- 4 very well have storm discharge different -- Yes, there
- 5 are other discharges upstream from -- there are
- 6 industrial sites that discharge water into the L.A.
- 7 River, so -- no, absolutely. Absolutely. And again --
- 8 you know, a large jurisdiction, we may be more proactive
- 9 in terms of doing pollution control as well.
- 10 There is just no automatic correlation to
- 11 that. And I think, as the district court said -- you
- 12 know, it's not so much to ask to at least sample at one
- 13 outfall to try and show that kind of correlation, so you
- 14 can show exceedances at the margin.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry, you mean --
- 16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kennedy.
- 17

 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Circuit's error -- was the
- 18 Ninth Circuit's error here a factual one, because it was
- 19 based on the location of the stations? Or was it a legal
- 20 one because it misinterpreted our Miccosukee case?
- 21 MR. COATES: It -- it's a legal one. I
- 22 don't believe it's a factual mistake, for a couple of
- 23 reasons. One, the language that -- that I cited, that's
- 24 in the cert appendix at 44, where it talks about the
- 25 water, again, discharged to the river, suggests that

- 1 that water was in the river, and now, it's moving
- 2 through our concrete channels and it's, again,
- 3 discharged into the river. Its distinction that it
- 4 draws is that there is something different because the
- 5 MS4 is an intrastate manmade construction, as opposed to
- 6 a naturally occurring river, which talks about the
- 7 distinction being made in that regard.
- 8 And finally, the record is just abundantly
- 9 clear on where these monitoring stations are. The
- 10 opinion itself at cert appendix, page 18, footnote 4,
- 11 cites our website as the location of the monitoring --
- 12 for the location of the monitoring stations. And that
- 13 website clearly says they are within the Los Angeles and
- 14 San Gabriel Rivers. And, in fact, appellant's brief --
- 15 the Respondents' brief in the lower court, specifically
- 16 said the same thing.
- 17 And the --
- 18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You just said there were
- 19 polluters upstream. Are those industrial polluters
- 20 upstream --
- 21 MR. COATES: There are -- there are --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- or industrial
- 23 facilities, are they within your MS4?
- MR. COATES: They are not. They have
- 25 separate NPDES permits.

- 1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But what you're saying
- 2 is that there are outfalls from different people into
- 3 the same river.
- 4 MR. COATES: Correct. Correct.
- 5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. So we don't
- 6 know whether the outfall is from your MS4 or from some
- 7 other source?
- 8 MR. COATES: Correct, because they are all
- 9 upstream of -- of the monitoring station.
- 10 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. So you say they have
- 11 two remedies, that the NRDC, if they think you are
- 12 polluting, could have done -- could do two things. One,
- 13 they could go and get some expert to try to get a sample
- or to make an estimate, based on what he knows about the
- 15 industrial sites that it's actually your storm drains
- 16 that are polluting. That's one thing they could do; you
- 17 say they didn't do it.
- 18 Okay. The second thing they could do is
- 19 they go to the permitting authority, and they could say,
- 20 will you please ask the L.A. County to monitor the
- 21 actual storm drains when they come in, a sample thereof.
- 22 And you're saying they could have done that, but they
- 23 don't have to now because, now, that is a requirement.
- 24 And we are doing it.
- MR. COATES: That's correct.

Τ	JUSTICE BREYER: Okay.
2	MR. COATES: That's correct. That's
3	correct.
4	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Where where is
5	that requirement?
6	MR. COATES: Excuse me?
7	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Where is that
8	requirement that you're now doing?
9	MR. COATES: We in our reply brief, we
10	cite the fact that a a the permit has just been
11	renewed. We are waiting for the final version to go
12	online and to see it. I think what we cite to the Court
13	is the last one that was before the regional board. It
14	lines it lines out.
15	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So you are not doing
16	it now?
17	MR. COATES: We are not doing it now. I
18	mean, there's the new permit is technically
19	effective. It could be stayed if someone challenges it.
20	I think it's open until it's challenged until December
21	11th. But under the renewed permit, there is outfall
22	monitoring specific outfall monitoring. Now, the
23	mass emission station is still there, and under the
24	Ninth Circuit's opinion, we are still discharging there
25	and responsible for the exceedances.

1	So but that's the type of monitoring that
2	plaintiffs want, and that's in the new permit. If they
3	want it in the last permit, they could have disputed it;
4	they could have contested the last permit. But they
5	didn't do so. This is a fine-tuning program. I mean,
6	municipal stormwater is a complex issue. Congress
7	didn't treat it the same way it did industrial
8	stormwater.
9	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is it your position that
10	the rivers the two rivers in question are outside the
11	MS4? I thought there was a suggestion in the
12	government's brief that you could have both the river
13	and the MS4 that could cover the same area.
14	MR. COATES: We have in the lower courts,
15	the district personnel refer to the channelized portion
16	as part of our MS4 because it's all flood control to us.
17	However, we have never said it's all the same for
18	purposes of a discharge. We've been very careful about
19	that, that, for a discharge from a point source, an
20	outfall, not the monitoring stations in fact, in the
21	district court, plaintiff somewhat argued that theory,
22	the monitoring stations, when you're MS4, they're
23	exceedances; ergo, exceedances in your MS4.
24	And we pointed out, under Miccosukee, there
25	is no discharge of water. There's no discharge because

1	. it's	merel	y transf.	ferring	water	as	water	moves	past	the	\equiv
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- 2 monitoring stations. And then --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: What was the purpose of
- 4 having the monitoring station if nothing can be done?
- 5 And are -- the monitoring shows, yes, there is a lot of
- 6 pollutants in there, and we know that at least some of
- 7 them have to be ascribed to the district. But you say,
- 8 unless you -- you show the outflow, that it comes from
- 9 there, no liability.
- 10 Why shouldn't it be that, given there is
- going to be a contribution that the district is making,
- 12 that the district should have the burden of showing, no,
- there are all these other ones out there, so our
- percentage is X, not the whole thing?
- MR. COATES: Well, again, the -- the Water
- 16 Act makes you responsible for a discharge in violation
- of permit terms, so you have to have a discharge by the
- 18 permittee.
- 19 The permit terms itself are not written in
- 20 that fashion. Again, it says we are only responsible
- 21 for our own discharge. Could you write a permit that
- 22 way? Perhaps. But this permit was not written that
- 23 way.
- 24 And, in fact, the Ninth Circuit agreed with
- 25 us on that. The permit language is not tricky on that.

- 1 You could have permittee monitoring. You could. And
- 2 that's what the renewed permit does. But that is not
- 3 this permit.
- 4 The regional board -- as I said, it's part
- of a process. There have been three permits over the
- 6 last -- since 1990. And we have a fourth permit, and it
- 7 has some new provisions to fine tune it for precisely
- 8 this reason.
- 9 I note that -- the biggest dispute we seem
- 10 to have on this monitoring issue -- and -- and it's one
- 11 that I think the discussion we are having bears out, is
- 12 that it is not a straightforward issue; that when you
- look at the statute itself, the Statute 1342(p)(3)
- 14 distinguishes between industrial stormwater dischargers
- and municipal stormwater discharges.
- 16 Now, I think it is worth looking at that
- 17 provision because, if you look at (a), and that talks
- 18 about industrial dischargers, it says they have to meet
- 19 every requirement of this provision. And if you go to
- 20 1342(a), it includes everything, including the
- 21 monitoring requirements of 33 U.S.C. 1318.
- But if you look at 1342(p)(3), subdivision
- 23 (B), which talks about municipal stormwater, you do not
- 24 see that language. You do not see that "must comply"
- 25 with every other provision of this section. It doesn't

- 1 say that.
- 2 It only has, essentially, three
- 3 requirements, which is these permits can be granted on a
- 4 system-wide or jurisdiction-wide basis, you have to only
- 5 allow stormwater, and that the -- must provide to try
- and manage pollutants to the maximum extent practicable.
- 7 And that's the sum total of it.
- 8 So I don't think you can assume that these
- 9 are identical monitoring requirements. It's, at the
- 10 very least, a complex question. I think it's one that
- 11 would have behooved the Court to be able to obtain more
- 12 amicus assistance on. And part of it is the way that
- this was raised to this Court, that this was a proper
- issue for a cross-petition.
- 15 And the only justification I've seen for
- 16 this is I saw a letter come to the Court advising it of
- 17 two cases, I think, LeTulle v. Scofield -- I don't know
- 18 if it's LeTulle or LeTulle -- and Ryerson v. United
- 19 States. And neither of one of those suggest that this
- is an appropriate issue for the Court.
- 21 JUSTICE SCALIA: Is -- is your description
- 22 of the statute meant to conclude, or does it -- does it
- 23 conclude, that these outsource monitoring stations which
- 24 exist under the new permit are not really required?
- 25 MR. COATES: Well, not necessarily

- 1 statutorily required, but they are part of the -- the
- permit, yes. They're in there. They're in there.
- 3 We're not --
- 4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Oh, I understood that.
- 5 Yes.
- 6 MR. COATES: We've agreed -- we've agreed --
- 7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Can you put in the permit
- 8 stuff that the statute does not require?
- 9 MR. COATES: Well, you can -- I think you
- 10 can agree to terms in a permit, yes.
- 11 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay.
- MR. COATES: Yeah.
- 13 And with that, I would reserve the balance
- of my time for rebuttal.
- 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- 16 Mr. Shah.
- 17 ORAL ARGUMENT OF PRATIK A. SHAH,
- 18 FOR UNITED STATES, AS AMICUS CURIAE
- MR. SHAH: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
- 20 please the Court:
- 21 The answer to the question presented in this
- case is both straightforward and undisputed. Under this
- Court's decision in Miccosukee, no addition, and thus,
- 24 no discharge of pollutant occurs, when water flows from
- 25 a channelized portion of a river to a downstream portion

1	of that same river.
2	Because the monitoring stations at issue are
3	actually located within the rivers themselves, the court
4	of appeals erred in concluding that a discharge of
5	pollutants occurred when, quote, "the still-polluted
6	stormwater flowed out of the concrete channels where the
7	monitoring stations are located, through an outfall and
8	into the navigable waterways."
9	And because the court of appeals rested its
10	liability determination on that erroneous premise, the
11	judgment should be vacated and the case remanded to the
12	court of appeals.
13	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Shah, what about the
14	problem that one of the amici brought up concerning
15	dredged material? Said that if we just say Miccosukee
16	applies, then when there's a dredging operation and the
17	material is redeposited back into the same water, then
18	that would also there would be no responsibility
19	based on that.
20	MR. SHAH: Right. Your Honor, I think I
21	think the one amicus that does raise that issue raises
22	it limited to the biggest counterexample they raise

is the one that you raise about Section 404 permits for

dredged and fill material. Those permits are just very

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24

25

different in kind.

1	Section 404 applies to dredged and fill
2	material, which almost, by definition, is going to be
3	coming from the source itself. And so we think that the
4	Miccosukee line of decision just doesn't apply to that
5	permitting regime, which which is a very different
6	sort of permitting regime than we have at issue here.
7	And in any event, I think it's far beyond
8	the question presented in this case, the Miccosukee
9	rule.
10	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, tell me why
11	remand? I thought and correct me at whatever step
12	I'm wrong, okay that the district court rejected
13	Respondents' argument that the mere monitoring excesses
14	created liability. What it said is you have to follow
15	the terms of the permit and make the permittee
16	responsible only for their excess discharges, and you
L7	haven't shown us any evidence that does that.
18	The Ninth Circuit agreed that the permittee
19	is only liable for its own discharges. It held the
20	permittee liable because it believed that the discharges
21	were within their source within their outflow. So
22	what are we remanding for? The legal question of
23	whether the the monitoring stations
24	automatically create liability has been answered in the
25	negative by both courts.

1	MR. SHAH: Justice Sotomayor, I agree with
2	your reading of of both opinions below.
3	I think what we're asking for is the Court
4	to do what it normally does when it vacates an erroneous
5	part of a judgment and sends it back, that is, leave it
6	open to the court of appeals, to address any issues
7	consistent with this Court's opinion.
8	We think it's conceivable that the Ninth
9	Circuit might approach the permit construction issue
10	differently, once it's corrected of the
11	misimpressions
12	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How would it
13	MR. SHAH: that it had before it.
L4	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: what could it do
15	differently?
16	MR. SHAH: I think, in particular, the Ninth
17	Circuit construed this permit on the understanding that
18	there was a discharge of polluted water after it flowed
19	past the monitoring station and said that the district
20	could be liable, based simply on the exceedance measured
21	by the mass emission station alone.
22	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How does that change the
23	answer to the legal question that the permittee both
24	courts have said the permittee is only liable for their
25	own discharges. And unless this proves that they

- discharged -- they, themselves, discharged, which it
- 2 can't because it's in the river and not within the
- 3 source --
- 4 MR. SHAH: Well, it --
- 5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- how can that, alone,
- 6 establish liability?
- 7 MR. SHAH: Well, again, I think the Ninth
- 8 Circuit predicated its permit interpretation on the
- 9 understanding that there would be at least some way to
- 10 hold a permittee -- in this case, the district -- liable
- 11 based on the mass emission exceedance alone, and that's
- 12 because it misapprehended that there would be a
- discharge of flow of the polluted water.
- It could be, and it may not be. We don't
- 15 know until it gets back to the Ninth Circuit. It may be
- 16 that the Ninth Circuit would reject the view that you
- 17 could have a permit that sets up a permitting regime
- 18 that does not allow a plaintiff to sue any particular
- 19 permittee, unless it has evidence beyond that provided
- 20 by the monitoring regime.
- 21 JUSTICE SCALIA: So -- so -- so what follows
- 22 from that; that the district is liable because it's a
- lousy permit?
- MR. SHAH: Well, Your Honor, if --
- 25 JUSTICE SCALIA: I do not see how this

- 1 court -- how the -- how the court of appeals is going to
- 2 be able to do anything different, other than say there's
- 3 no liability here, unless, of course, it adopts another
- 4 fanciful interpretation of the statute, which is
- 5 something I worry about.
- 6 MR. SHAH: Well, Your Honor, we think that
- 7 this permit -- again, the terms of this permit are both
- 8 complex and ambiguous. We do not think that permits
- 9 should be written this way. We think permits that
- 10 provide for water quality -- for MS4s to adhere to water
- 11 quality standards based on ambient monitoring should be
- 12 coupled with either individual --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: I -- I agree with that, but
- 14 how can this permit possibly be interpreted in such a
- 15 way as to hold a district liable?
- MR. SHAH: Well, I think the most
- 17 persuasive -- and, again, we don't take a firm position
- 18 on this, but I think the most persuasive argument on the
- 19 other side would be that, when permit writers issue a
- 20 permit, they -- they assume that the permitting regime
- 21 provided in the permit would provide a basis to seek
- 22 enforcement of that permit. If that were true --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: They would assume that;
- but, if it doesn't, it doesn't.
- MR. SHAH: Well --

1	JUSTICE SCALIA: So what do you do if it
2	doesn't?
3	MR. SHAH: Well, one could imagine a regime
4	where the permittees, that is, the municipalities who
5	apply for a joint permit, would agree to a shared
6	presumption of liability. For example, there are
7	JUSTICE SCALIA: They have they have not
8	agreed.
9	MR. SHAH: Well, again, we don't
10	JUSTICE SCALIA: So you're going to impose a
11	shared thing? I see no way for the court of appeals to
12	do this in in a fashion that will not bring the case
13	right back here, and you'll be asking us to send it back
14	to the same panel.
15	MR. SHAH: Well, Your Honor, I don't think
16	it's a cert-worthy issue, how to interpret the terms of
17	this specific this is a fairly
18	JUSTICE BREYER: But, anyway, you say that
19	the court held the same thing in two other cases
20	involving two other rivers, and they didn't cross-appeal
21	from that, and so that issue isn't really in front of
22	us.
23	MR. SHAH: Well, Your Honor
24	JUSTICE BREYER: And if they did hold what
25	you said, then they'd have to reopen the other two

- 1 cases.
- MR. SHAH: Right. You Honor, I think in
- 3 terms of the cross-petition issue, that is a closed
- 4 question. I don't think the Court needs to get near it
- 5 because I think there are several other good reasons why
- 6 this Court should not decide the permit construction
- 7 issue itself.
- 8 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. But if we decide
- 9 that they needed file a cross-petition and they didn't,
- then what's the basis for our remanding, rather than
- 11 reversing?
- MR. SHAH: Well, Your Honor --
- JUSTICE BREYER: It's that issue that what
- 14 we have to decide.
- 15 MR. SHAH: Your Honor, it's established that
- 16 this Court -- even if a cross-petition were required,
- it's established that this Court has the authority to
- 18 remand for disposition of any further issues once a case
- 19 comes before this Court. So the cross-petition --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Why should we, in light
- of the clarity of the permit? That's the question
- 22 Justice Scalia is asking.
- 23 MR. SHAH: Sure. I think the Court should
- just follow its ordinary practice. We're not asking for
- anything different than its ordinary practice of

- 1 vacating the judgment and remanding for further
- 2 proceedings, consistent with its opinion.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: And if there -- if
- 4 there is --
- 5 JUSTICE SCALIA: But that is not our
- 6 ordinary practice, when -- when nothing can happen on
- 7 remand, except -- except to give judgment for the
- 8 Petitioners here.
- 9 MR. SHAH: Well, I think it would be unusual
- 10 for the Court to reverse and then instruct that judgment
- 11 be entered in favor of Petitioner. Of course, the Court
- is free to do that, and it may decide to do that. We
- just think that there is a possibility that the Ninth
- 14 Circuit would -- would take a different approach.
- JUSTICE BREYER: Sometimes, the Court says
- 16 the bottom line in that italicized thing, which I've
- 17 never fully understood when and when we don't do it, but
- it just says, "Reversed."
- 19 MR. SHAH: Right.
- JUSTICE BREYER: And then, sometimes, it
- 21 says, "It is so ordered." And exactly when you write
- the word "Reversed" -- but I usually just ask the Clerk,
- 23 all right.
- 24 (Laughter.)
- JUSTICE BREYER: But the question -- the

- 1 question is when do we do the one or the other, and I
- think, here, what they're saying is, just write the word
- 3 "Reversed," we'll deal with the rest of it. All right.
- 4 So that's --
- 5 MR. SHAH: Right. And, again, the Court is
- 6 well within its -- its discretion to do that. We
- 7 think --
- 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Doesn't that always
- 9 say that in the judgment of the Court?
- 10 MR. SHAH: Doesn't it always say what, Your
- 11 Honor?
- 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Does it say, "It is
- so ordered," in the judgment that we release?
- MR. SHAH: Yes, yes. And I think the
- 15 typical -- I think the typical phrasing would be vacate
- 16 and -- and remand for further proceedings.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Shah, am I right
- 18 about that this other theory, if it were open to the
- 19 Ninth Circuit, would apply equally to the other rivers
- 20 that Justice Breyer mentioned, and those were out of the
- 21 case because, when it got to the Ninth Circuit, we were
- 22 talking about only the Los Angeles and the San Gabriel?
- MR. SHAH: That's right, Your Honor.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: That -- that other theory
- would apply to all four.

1	MR. SHAH: I I think that is correct, and
2	the Ninth Circuit may decide that, therefore, it's not
3	going to revisit its permit interpretation. I think it
4	might be within the Ninth Circuit's discretion, since it
5	still has the case on remand, if it were to revisit its
6	permit construction.
7	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The reason it would
8	not look at Malibu and what's the other one that
9	we're already
10	MR. SHAH: The other watershed.
11	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes would be
12	because it wouldn't comply with the cross-petition rule.
13	MR. SHAH: No.
14	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We're are not going
15	to send it back to them to
16	MR. SHAH: No I'm sorry. I thought it
17	would be that the rationale that they used for those two
18	rivers, it would be in tension with it, and if they
19	agree that the rationale which led them to deny to
20	deny liability on those two rivers, that may lead them
21	to adhere to its current permit interpretation.
22	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Do do you have a
23	position on the cross-petition issue?
24	MR. SHAH: No, Your Honor, we do not.
25	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

Т	MR. SHAH: Thank you.
2	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Colangelo.
3	ORAL ARGUMENT OF AARON COLANGELO
4	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
5	MR. COLANGELO: Mr. Chief Justice, and may
6	it please the Court:
7	We do not defend the judgment on the Ninth
8	Circuit's stated rationale, but on alternative grounds
9	that are properly before this Court. The compliance
10	monitoring included in the permit determines
11	Petitioner's liability for permit violations as a matter
12	of law, as the Clean Water Act, EPA regulations, and the
13	permit's own terms all require.
14	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, where is the
15	permit's own terms? Your friend cited JA 93, which says
16	each permittee is responsible only for a discharge for
17	which it is the operator. So where does the permit
18	clearly show the opposite?
19	MR. COLANGELO: Your Honor, let me point you
20	to three provisions in the permit that, taken together,
21	compel this result. The first is page 195 of the Joint
22	Appendix, the paragraph numbered D(1). And this refers
23	to the individual permittees, and it says, "Each
24	permittee must comply with all of the terms,
25	requirements, and conditions of this order. Any

1	violation of this order constitutes a violation of the
2	Clean Water Act, its regulations, and the California
3	Water Code, and is grounds for enforcement action."
4	And that's the first of the three
5	provisions, and it is undisputed here that there are
6	permit violations. The monitoring included in the
7	permit that Petitioner and its co-permittees chose has
8	demonstrated, since 2003, undisputed permit violations.
9	The second provision is page 98
10	JUSTICE SCALIA: Wait. But but before
11	you go further, it says each permittee must comply. It
12	doesn't say that each permittee shall be responsible or
13	shall be liable. And it's the other provision that says
14	that each permittee is responsible only for a discharge
15	for which it is the operator.
16	MR. COLANGELO: Correct.
17	JUSTICE SCALIA: So you got more
18	MR. COLANGELO: Yes, You Honor.
19	JUSTICE SCALIA: more besides 195.
20	MR. COLANGELO: Well, and what 195 adds is
21	it says any violation is grounds for enforcement action.
22	Now, JA 98 talks about exactly this
23	circumstance, when violations are detected at the
24	monitoring stations. And about halfway down JA 98, it
25	says, if exceedances of water quality objectives or

1	water quality standards persist and that's only
2	measured in one place; that's at the compliance
3	monitoring in the rivers notwithstanding
4	implementation of control measures and other
5	requirements of this permit, quote, "the permittee,"
6	individually, "the permittee shall assure compliance
7	with discharge prohibitions and receiving water
8	limitations by complying with the following procedure."
9	It then sets out four steps that each
10	permittee must comply with to bring the MS4 within the
11	permit limits. Now, that is
12	JUSTICE SCALIA: Of course, the very first
13	step is A, "Upon a determination by either the permittee
14	or the regional board that discharges are causing or
15	contributing to an exceedance of an applicable water
16	quality standard, the permittee shall promptly notify,"
17	et cetera. They cannot make such a determination
18	because of the nature of the monitoring monitoring
19	here.
20	MR. COLANGELO: That's that's incorrect,
21	Your Honor. The permit compels this result because
22	there is only one place in the permit that that
23	monitoring is required, and that is the in-stream mass
24	emission stations that the permittees chose. And the
25	permit says, explicitly, the monitoring results at those

1	locations are used to assess compliance and determine
2	whether the MS4 is contributing to violations.
3	JUSTICE BREYER: But as I read it, and he
4	explained it, I thought that, look, what they're
5	thinking is this: Stormwater is really a big problem,
6	and it's really complicated how you work it out, and we
7	want the agencies to work it out. So the purpose of
8	this monitoring thing is we first determine that there
9	is an exceedance.
10	Now, once we determine that there is an
11	exceedance, which is the point of this pertinent
12	particular requirement, then we're going to go on to
13	decide who. And what we're going to do is leave you
14	with two possible choices. One is you can try to figure
15	out who, which means you've got to get an expert and
16	monitor it; or let us now have a new permit which
17	will will you know, which will which will put
18	some responsibility on the individuals, because we'll
19	monitor higher up the river.
20	Now, that's a rational way for an agency to
21	proceed and it leaves you with pretty good remedies.
22	And so why why are we running all around, trying to
23	work this thing out? Why don't you just sort of try to
24	deal with it as they described it and say, okay, we're
25	going to either prove you did it before or at least we

1	can prove it now?
2	MR. COLANGELO: There are two answers to
3	that, Your Honor. The first is this is all sorted out
4	during the permitting process. This permit was adopted
5	by the State agency and upheld by State courts upon the
6	Petitioner's challenge after 5 years of litigation. The
7	permit was based on an 80,000 page administrative record
8	and the testimony of 29 witnesses. And the point of
9	this process is that permit terms are fixed once the
LO	permit is finalized and approved by the courts.
11	Now, the reason we didn't challenge the
12	permit at the time is that we were defending the permit
13	alongside the State agency as an intervenor against
14	Petitioner's challenge. Petitioner in State court for
15	years made exactly the opposite argument that it makes
16	here. It said that it was entitled to a safe harbor
L7	provision in the permit, to excuse it from liability,
18	because it would be held responsible based on this
19	in-stream monitoring.
20	Now, there may be, as a as a technical or
21	scientific matter, better monitoring programs, to
22	determine who's putting in what and where exactly it is
23	coming from, but that cannot be reopened upon an
24	enforcement proceeding.
25	JUSTICE GINSBURG: But how do the

1	district is a big contributor, but there are other
2	contributors. So, on your theory, how do we determine
3	what is the share that the district would be liable for?
4	MR. COLANGELO: Your Honor, the permit
5	includes a blueprint that sorts that out, and it
6	parallels the traditional notion of several liability.
7	Where there are multiple contributors to a single harm,
8	each is responsible for its share
9	JUSTICE KENNEDY: But you still have to show
10	that there is a contributor. And I've been through
11	these sections, and it seems to me that a reasonable
12	interpretation of this section is that there is a
13	violation if a particular permittee violates.
14	And what I'm taking away from your argument
15	is that, once there is a violation, all the permittees
16	are liable, and that just can't be.
17	MR. COLANGELO: It can be, Your Honor, and
18	that's the that's the solution that the permit works
19	out and that the permittees negotiated for in advance.
20	JUSTICE SCALIA: What's the third section,
21	Mr. Colangelo? I'm waiting breathlessly for your third
22	section. You said there were three.
23	(Laughter.)
24	MR. COLANGELO: The third, Your Honor

JUSTICE SCALIA: I've got 195. I've got 98.

1	Where is the third one?
2	MR. COLANGELO: The third, Your Honor, is JA
3	109.
4	JUSTICE SCALIA: 109.
5	MR. COLANGELO: And this parallels a
6	provision in EPA's regulations.
7	At the very bottom of JA 109, subsection D,
8	it says, "The permittee shall carry out all inspection,
9	surveillance, and monitoring procedures necessary to
10	determine compliance and noncompliance with permit
11	conditions."
12	So the problem with Petitioner's theory is
13	that they are violating this provision of the permit,
14	which is taken virtually verbatim from EPA regulations,
15	which says that the discharger has the responsibility to
16	measure and report its own violations.
17	And stepping back to talk about the Clean
18	Water Act program, generally, and the discharge permit
19	program, generally, no one is entitled to discharge
20	without a permit; a permit fixes terms that must be
21	complied with; and at the heart of the permitting
22	program is self-monitoring and self-reporting of
23	violations

109, it strikes me as a little bit circular to say — to

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well -- Looking at

24

- say they have the responsibility to carry out inspection
- 2 and surveillance and monitoring to ensure compliance with
- 3 the permit, and their point is, well, we're not -- we're
- 4 not not in compliance with the permit because you
- 5 haven't -- there hasn't been an allocation of the
- 6 discharges to them.
- 7 MR. COLANGELO: Well -- and the problem with
- 8 that, Your Honor, is that it leads to no liability ever
- 9 for the discharger, even though it concedes --
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I think that
- 11 might be -- I think that might be right, but that gets
- 12 back to the question of whether the permit is -- is
- 13 poorly drafted.
- MR. COLANGELO: Right.
- 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And -- and I quess
- 16 the idea is they're changing the permit so to -- to cure
- 17 that problem.
- 18 MR. COLANGELO: The permit has changed. It
- 19 is not yet effective, Your Honor, but there is a new
- 20 permit that will be in effect shortly. But on the
- 21 question of whether --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, why -- why do you
- 23 need that if -- if the present permit covers it as
- clearly as you say? I mean self -- self-monitoring.
- 25 MR. COLANGELO: That is absolutely --

1	JUSTICE SCALIA: My goodness, you're going
2	to go through all of this how many how long did it
3	take you to challenge this and blah, blah, blah?
4	Why go through all that if, indeed, the present permit,
5	as you say, is perfectly adequate?
6	MR. COLANGELO: The present permit is
7	adequate. The State agency renewed the permit. That's
8	a matter of course. It changed the monitoring program.
9	The point is that whatever monitoring the State agency
10	sets and that the State courts uphold is the monitoring
11	that determines compliance.
12	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, would you still
13	I'm not clear if you gave me an answer to how the
14	district share would be determined. It is not the
15	only polluter. Are you saying each permittee is
16	responsible for the whole?
17	MR. COLANGELO: No, Your Honor. That's
18	joint and several liability. And here, JA 93, which
19	Petitioner cites, says that each permittee is
20	responsible only for its discharges. That's just
21	JUSTICE GINSBURG: So how do we find out
22	what is its part what is its share?
23	MR. COLANGELO: The permit sets that out.
24	The permit says, once a violation is detected, each
25	permittee has to go back upstream, conduct enhanced

1	monitoring to identify the particular sources of
2	pollution within its jurisdiction, control those
3	sources, but only those within its jurisdiction, and
4	continue that process until the problem is resolved.
5	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is that the 109 language
6	you cite?
7	MR. COLANGELO: No, Your Honor. That's at
8	both 98, which I cited second, and page 213.
9	JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. So the upshot would
10	be, however, as I understand it, and correct me if I'm
11	wrong, that since they're doing that now anyway under
12	the new permit and you can question my hypothetical
13	assumption there but if they are doing it under the
14	new permit, then the only result of your winning this
15	would be to transfer the running of the district from
16	the agency to the court. And I suspect the Ninth
17	Circuit knows less about it than you participating in
18	a some kind of negotiation with the agency.
19	MR. COLANGELO: No, not at all, Your Honor.
20	The the Petitioner retains the authority and, indeed,
21	the responsibility to identify the particular sources
22	within its jurisdiction that are causing the problem and
23	abating only those. So it is limited, in response to
24	Justice Ginsburg's earlier question, only to its own
25	share.

1	There is no question that there are other
2	contributors, but the permit doesn't impose a violation
3	only upon the entity who is the sole cause. There
4	are there are many polluters that discharge into
5	these rivers. The permit specifically says it is
6	unlawful to cause or contribute to a violation of water
7	quality standards. So prohibiting a contribution
8	assumes that there will be other contributors and that
9	the Petitioner will not be the sole cause.
10	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, this is all
11	fine and good. Your your friend, though, says you
12	should have cross-petitioned because the relief you seek
13	expands the judgment below, and there are all these
14	cases saying you can't do that.
15	MR. COLANGELO: Your Honor, the relief we
16	seek would not expand the judgment below because the two
17	rivers on which we lost are out of the case.
18	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I understand
19	that, but it seems reasonable, but they do cite a lot
20	of cases that say you can't do that. You can't just
21	sort of say, oh, I give up on the others because the
22	judgment, I guess, is one whole, and you would be
23	changing the judgment.
24	MR. COLANGELO: Accepting this argument,
25	Your Honor, would not change the judgment. The cases

1	that Petitioner cites are all examples except for
2	one, which I'll get to in a second where the
3	Respondent was seeking to change the judgment, either in
4	its favor or to get lesser relief, or where the result
5	would necessarily have changed the judgment.
6	Here, accepting this argument would not
7	change the judgment.
8	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Why wouldn't it
9	necessarily
10	JUSTICE GINSBURG: That's because you're giving
11	up you're giving up on the two rivers, even though your
12	theory would work the same way with respect to them?
13	MR. COLANGELO: That's correct, Your Honor.
14	And that's consistent with the cross-petition rule. A
15	respondent who is satisfied with the result below and

16 does not seek to change the judgment does not need to 17 cross-petition. A cross-petition is only necessary --18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But do you think that the 19 trial court was wrong, the district court was wrong, and 20 the Ninth Circuit, both times, when they said, well, you 21 didn't prove -- there was no -- there was no proof that 22 the district was responsible for a given part. So, on your theory, both the district court and the Ninth 23 24 Circuit were wrong on that?

MR. COLANGELO: On that legal question, Your

1	Honor, yes. But this Court can affirm on any basis
2	preserved below, and this was also preserved in our
3	brief in opposition at the jurisdictional stage, as long
4	as it would not change the judgment.
5	And here's why it would not. Let me
6	distinguish the Northwest Airlines v. County of Kent
7	case, which Petitioner cites. That case presents, in
8	fact, the opposite situation of what we have here. In
9	that case, Respondent's argument, had it been accepted,
10	would have required the district court to grant further
11	relief in continuing proceedings on a claim that no
12	longer existed because the Respondent's argument was
13	that there was no private right of action at all.
14	Our case is the opposite because, if the
15	Court accepts our position, we simply don't get any
16	further relief with respect to claims that are waived to
17	which we would have been entitled. And the two cases
18	that we've cited by letter last week both represent
19	exactly that situation.
20	JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Colangelo, did you
21	raise this argument in your brief in opposition?
22	MR. COLANGELO: Yes, Your Honor, we did.
23	JUSTICE SCALIA: Where is it in that? I was
24	looking for it.
25	MR. COLANGELO: It's in two places in the

- 1 brief in opposition, page 4 to 5, where we set out this
- 2 compliance monitoring framework, and page 18 to 19.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: But that -- That may be,
- 4 but you don't support -- and page what?
- 5 MR. COLANGELO: Page 18 to 19.
- 6 And then, again, in our supplemental brief,
- 7 Your Honor.
- 8 JUSTICE SCALIA: But you don't --
- 9 MR. COLANGELO: At the cert stage.
- 10 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- you don't say that
- 11 that's the basis for supporting the decision below. I
- 12 certainly didn't interpret it.
- MR. COLANGELO: We do -- let me just quote
- 14 what may be the most explicit thing, Your Honor, which
- is at the very bottom of page 4 in our supplemental
- 16 brief at the cert stage. "The Court of Appeals' ruling
- 17 was both correct and equitable. Every Clean Water Act
- 18 permit must include monitoring provisions ensuring that
- 19 permit conditions are satisfied."
- 20 And we lay out the compliance monitoring.
- 21 That's 4 to 5 of our supplemental brief in opposition to
- 22 cert.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't have your
- 24 supplemental brief in front of me.
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Where on 4 to 5?

1	MR. COLANGELO: At the very bottom of page
2	4, the last two lines, and the top of page 5.
3	Final now, most of our supplemental brief
4	and our brief in opposition were addressing why we did
5	not think Petitioner's question merited this Court's
б	review. This is the argument that we made in defense of
7	the judgment below, "The Court of Appeals ruling was
8	both correct and equitable. Every permit must include
9	sufficient monitoring to determine compliance."
10	JUSTICE SCALIA: Well but but that
11	that's just to say you can rely on on the extant
12	monitors.
13	MR. COLANGELO: Absolutely, Your Honor. And
14	Petitioner's saying we're not
15	JUSTICE SCALIA: So you say you know,
16	they were correct. You have to find some basis for
17	liability, and they use the monitors, and that's it. It
18	didn't it didn't say, in detail, that these people
19	had to go and and set up their own monitoring
20	under under the permit.
21	MR. COLANGELO: Your Honor, that was the
22	that was our argument in the Ninth Circuit and at the
23	cert stage, and that we do lay out exactly how the
24	permit works. The point is that the permit imposes
25	liability on the multiple dischargers

1	JUSTICE SCALIA: You you told this to the
2	Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit said no?
3	MR. COLANGELO: That's correct, Your Honor.
4	That's correct. But we can we can defend the
5	judgment on a basis, even one that the Ninth Circuit
6	rejected.
7	To go back
8	JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Colangelo, suppose we did
9	what the Solicitor General says to do and vacated
10	this. Can you think of any reason why the Ninth Circuit
11	would change its mind? I mean, is there any connection
12	between these two issues that you can point to, such
13	that our making clear to the Ninth Circuit that they
14	made a mistake on one actually would affect their
15	analysis on the other?
16	MR. COLANGELO: There is one reason, Your
17	Honor, and that is that a permit is interpreted like a
18	contract, and it is a cardinal rule of contract
19	interpretation that a contract should be read where
20	where possible to be both lawful and enforceable.
21	So the Ninth Circuit may go back down and
22	say, okay, with this corrected understanding of the
23	universe of law and facts that apply, we see that
24	Petitioner's reading of the permit would render it
25	unenforceable because none of the permittees can be held

- liable and, therefore, unlawful because the Clean Water
- 2 Act requires all permits to include within it
- 3 self-monitoring and self-reporting to demonstrate a
- 4 violation.
- 5 So the Ninth Circuit -- now, it may just --
- it may just say, we say what we said before. But it
- 7 could reconsider on that basis, and that would be a
- 8 legitimate basis for it to do so.
- 9 To go back to the earlier question about
- 10 where there is a discharge, there is no question that
- 11 Petitioner discharges these pollutants to these rivers,
- 12 so the only question for this enforcement proceeding is
- where to measure Petitioner's discharges for purposes of
- 14 liability.
- 15 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Why is there no -- where
- 16 do I look to find out that the district is making a
- discharge of polluted water, other than under the Ninth
- 18 Circuit's theory that it's in the river itself?
- 19 MR. COLANGELO: Two places, Your Honor.
- 20 First is that it's a premise for the permit itself. So
- 21 if you look at page JA 55, it says the Petitioner
- 22 discharges stormwater into these rivers. And then the
- very next paragraph shows that the Petitioner has done
- an assessment of the pollutants that are typically in
- 25 its discharges, and it lists the ones that are now in

Τ.	Violation nere.
2	So the permit, it didn't it came out of
3	this administrative process, and one of the elements
4	JUSTICE KENNEDY: So is your theory that, if
5	the district is permitted to on a scale of 1 to 10,
6	to discharge up to 2, but that if the monitoring station
7	in the river shows an 8, then it is automatically liable
8	for the increase, even though other dischargees might
9	have made this?
10	MR. COLANGELO: Yes, yes, because
11	JUSTICE KENNEDY: I don't get that from what
12	you have read. I've looked at
13	MR. COLANGELO: Your Honor, because
14	JUSTICE KENNEDY: the text you've read and
15	it looks to me like it's permittee by permittee.
16	MR. COLANGELO: It says that the MS4 is in
17	violation, that's correct. But then it says each
18	permittee must, when an exceedance is detected, take
19	these steps. So here, what they have failed to do is
20	take the necessary steps to apportion responsibility
21	among the multiple contributors. The second place, just
22	to finish on the on the proof that they discharge
23	JUSTICE SCALIA: Finish that. So what's the
24	consequence of that?
25	MR. COLANGELO: I'm sorry?

1	JUSTICE SCALIA: Therefore, each one of them
2	is liable for all of it?
3	MR. COLANGELO: No, no, Your Honor. No.
4	Each one is liable for what they put in and bears the
5	burden to demonstrate and limit what it puts in. That's
6	explicit in the permit.
7	JUSTICE SCALIA: But they haven't done so.
8	So what?
9	MR. COLANGELO: So that's a permit
10	violation, and result is that this pollution continues
11	year after year after year, when the point of the permit
12	and the point of the Clean Water Act was to eliminate
13	what everybody agrees is the biggest source of water
14	pollution in Southern California. And this
15	JUSTICE KENNEDY: So if each permittee is
16	allowed to put in a 2, but one permittee puts in an 8;
17	then both permittees are liable?
18	MR. COLANGELO: Correct, Your Honor,
19	unless because those facts are not known at the time
20	the violation is detected.
21	JUSTICE KENNEDY: No, no, we now know the
22	facts because it's the hypothetical.
23	MR. COLANGELO: Okay. So if the permittee
24	has done its own monitoring, in addition to what the

25

permit requires, and can demonstrate that it did not put

- anything in, then it is not liable. If not, then yes.
- 2 Two dischargers into the same river who agree in advance
- 3 to be measured by a single monitoring station in the
- 4 river are liable for what's measured there, and then
- 5 they sort it out.
- 6 And what -- Congress set up a regime that
- 7 would allow for system-wide and jurisdiction-wide
- 8 permits precisely because this problem was so
- 9 complicated.
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Are the
- 11 provisions -- excuse me, the provisions we've been
- 12 talking about, the three that you cited and the one that
- 13 you're -- are they boilerplate? Do they show up in every
- 14 typical stormwater permit?
- MR. COLANGELO: Well, 109 -- the fact that
- 16 the permittees must conduct all monitoring to
- demonstrate compliance, if "boilerplate" means that they
- are in all permits, then, yes, because that's a
- 19 requirement of EPA regulations.
- 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes. What about the
- one that says each permittee is responsible only for a
- discharge for which it is the operator?
- MR. COLANGELO: That's from a EPA
- regulation, too, yes. That's in the definition of
- 25 "co-permittee" at 122.2; so, yes, that's also standard

- in system-wide permits.
- 2 To go back to the earlier question about
- 3 where there is a discharge, the district court found,
- 4 and this is undisputed, at Petition Appendix 117, the
- 5 permit admits -- the permittee, Petitioner, admits that
- 6 it is discharging these pollutants, the ones measured in
- 7 violation, to these rivers. So what we have is no
- 8 question, no dispute that they discharged these
- 9 pollutants, a monitoring system included in the permit
- 10 that the State court upheld against Petitioner's
- 11 challenge, showing that those limits have been exceeded.
- 12 JUSTICE BREYER: Your basic argument is
- this permit requires you, L.A. County, to do monitoring,
- 14 to decide if you're violating it. You chose this
- 15 system, then common sense suggests you're doing it. You
- 16 struck out twice with that argument --
- MR. COLANGELO: Yes.
- 18 JUSTICE BREYER: -- in the other two rivers,
- 19 and now, you're going to go back if we permit it, and
- 20 we want to make the argument and tell the Ninth
- 21 Circuit, three times and you're out; in this case, hold
- the opposite.
- MR. COLANGELO: Well -- yes. I'm not sure I
- 24 would say we struck out, Your Honor; the --
- 25 JUSTICE BREYER: That's what you want us --

Т	I understand It.
2	(Laughter.)
3	MR. COLANGELO: But correct, the lower court
4	did not neither lower court accepted this argument
5	fully. The Ninth Circuit did agree that all permits
6	must include compliance monitoring, but it said you need
7	a little more here. And we think that was improper
8	because you can't add terms to the permit once it's been
9	settled.
10	And there was an earlier question, Justice
11	Breyer, about could we sample from an individual
12	outfall, could we show more? The problem with that is
13	that it would prove nothing. The Petitioner has said,
14	just sample from one outfall, one of our outfalls. We
15	alleged 140 violations for a dozen different pollutants
16	over a 5-year period. So sampling from a single outfall
17	as an evidentiary matter would be utterly meaningless.
18	JUSTICE BREYER: Couldn't you get some
19	expert who understands
20	MR. COLANGELO: Well, we did, Your Honor, in
21	district court as an alternative theory have an expert
22	who said all of this came from them. The district court
23	did not address that and we didn't appeal. The appeal
24	was limited just to this legal issue.
25	JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't understand why you

- didn't cross-appeal on -- on this theory that -- that
- 2 the lower court rejected.
- MR. COLANGELO: Because, Your Honor, we were
- 4 satisfied with the judgment; and that's the rule. A
- 5 respondent who is satisfied does not need to
- 6 cross-appeal, unless it is --
- 7 JUSTICE SCALIA: I didn't say you need to.
- 8 I didn't say you needed to. But I -- I would normally
- 9 have done it, just to be sure I had that arrow in my
- 10 quiver and that it would not be argued, as it will be
- 11 here, that this would be expanding the judgment below.
- 12 MR. COLANGELO: And the reason it would not
- 13 be expanding the judgment below is that we are on the
- 14 opposite side of what happened in Kent. To rule in our
- favor on this argument would just leave untouched two
- 16 claims on which we didn't prevail.
- 17 We'd get no further relief on those. It's
- 18 like two co-plaintiffs in district court who both lose
- 19 identical claims. One appeals, and the other doesn't.
- The one who appeals wins a reversal. That creates an
- 21 inconsistency, two similarly situated plaintiffs, one
- 22 has a valid claim, one no longer does. But that's the
- 23 consequence of our failing to cross-petition.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Do we have -- I just
- 25 don't remember now. Do we have a circuit split on thi

1	issue of whether a permit in a situation like this would
2	impose liability on all permittees?
3	MR. COLANGELO: No. No. There is no - I
4	don't know of any other circuit court who has
5	addressed that has addressed this question.
6	And let me speak to to the issue of
7	additional monitoring, putting the burden on plaintiffs
8	to conduct additional monitoring. The problem is it
9	creates a complicated factual dispute for district
LO	courts resolve to resolve, when that was exactly what
11	Congress wanted to eliminate.
12	When Congress adopted this permit program in
13	the Clean Water Act and then amended it to bring
14	municipal stormwater discharges under the program,
15	Congress said, we do not want district courts to be the
16	forum for sorting out all of these complicated factual
L7	issues.
18	JUSTICE BREYER: I see. What do you think
19	of the government's point? They are telling us, just
20	write what you usually write, and then you can go make
21	all your arguments, see what they do. Does that satisfy
22	you?
23	MR. COLANGELO: Your Honor, we would be most

satisfied with an affirmance on the grounds we have

presented. If the Court vacates, we would be satisfied

24

1	with that, too, and then we would go back to the
2	district
3	JUSTICE SCALIA: What if this panel found -
4	found for you on the ground that they used, they will
5	surely find for you on this other ground, which
6	(Laughter.)
7	MR. COLANGELO: Yes. We expect they would.
8	JUSTICE SCALIA: which has at least an
9	inkling of plausibility.
10	MR. COLANGELO: Thank you, Your Honor.
11	(Laughter.)
12	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
13	Mr. Coates, you have 4 minutes remaining.
14	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF TIMOTHY T. COATES
15	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
16	MR. COATES: Thank you, Your Honor.
17	To the cross-appeal issue, the cases that we
18	cite talk about the Court's prudential limitation on
19	deciding questions that are not preserved by
20	cross-petition. And I depart from my learned opponent,
21	Mr. Colangelo, on that point as to what the Court's
22	cases say. We cite the Northwest Airlines v. County of
23	Kent case, and that is a case where, in fact, the
24	respondent was not seeking to change the judgment below.
25	They did not cross-petition. They were just trying to

- 1 keep what they had.
- 2 And the Court said we are not going to reach
- 3 that issue because, if we buy the fact that there is in
- 4 fact no private right of action, the effect of that is
- 5 to essentially change the underlying judgment --
- 6 JUSTICE BREYER: Let me ask a quick
- 7 question.
- 8 MR. COATES: Sure.
- 9 JUSTICE BREYER: Does it satisfy you if we
- just write in the judgment what you -- we usually write,
- 11 and then you all can argue what it means below? What
- about that? Does that satisfy? Or do you want us to
- write something special?
- 14 (Laughter.)
- 15 MR. COATES: It -- it's acceptable
- 16 because a reversal is always better than an affirmance.
- 17 But talking about what the Court decides and what's left
- in the case, I think it is a case where the Court
- 19 reviews what the Ninth Circuit actually decided, what is
- 20 actually before it, and what is properly remaining in
- 21 the case because we don't believe the cross-appeal issue
- is here.
- 23 And that leads, I think, to reversing the
- 24 Ninth Circuit because the district is entitled to
- 25 summary judgment on these two river claims. And I think

- 1 that is all that's left in the case.
- 2 And I call the Court's attention to another
- 3 case we cited on the cross-appeal issue. It's one of
- 4 the NLRB cases, the -- the Express Publication case.
- 5 And it makes it very clear there, that the respondent
- 6 was just trying to hang on so much of what was good
- 7 about the order as he could keep and was not seeking to
- 8 change anything. And, again, the Court said no.
- 9 It basically undermines the entire basis for
- 10 the --
- 11 JUSTICE SCALIA: Did we use our usual
- 12 language, and did it go back, and the -- and the court
- of appeals considered --
- MR. COATES: I think, in one of the cases,
- 15 the Court --
- 16 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- considered the issue we
- 17 had refused to consider?
- 18 MR. COATES: In one of the cases, the Court
- simply affirmed, and so it didn't go anywhere.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay.
- MR. COATES: But --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Don't we have two -- I
- don't know that we do this all the time. When we expect
- them to keep the case and do something different, don't
- 25 we usually vacate and remand, rather than reverse?

1	MR. COATES: Well, I do know that, in the
2	context of a lot of the Court's opinions, the Court will
3	specify that judgment be granted in terms of a party.
4	I know the qualified immunity cases, you
5	find someone's entitled to qualified immunity, and it
6	comes up on a summary judgment, the reversal is to
7	the Ninth Circuit. And I've seen both languages used,
8	but it's plain, from the text of the opinion, the
9	judgment is to be entered in favor of that party.
10	And, again, I think that's appropriate here.
11	My opponent suggests and the government suggests, again,
12	that, let's go back to the Ninth Circuit and let them
13	consider this monitoring argument. They considered it.
14	In fact, they even considered the use of contract terms
15	that that they urged them to consider again.
16	It's already rejected that claim with
17	respect to these two rivers that are in front of the
18	Court. It's rejected it with respect to Malibu Creek
19	and Santa Clara River, which is not in front of the
20	Court. They even accepted it with respect to an entire
21	different party with County of Los Angeles
22	JUSTICE SCALIA: But they might change their
23	mind now. They might change their mind.
24	MR. COATES: It would be a very odd judgment
25	because you'd have two claims that are continue to be

- dismissed that are not properly before any court. Those
- 2 close -- those are closed. And you have another party
- 3 out of the case on the very ground that the Ninth
- 4 Circuit rejected in the initial opinion.
- 5 A sort of remand for some consideration of
- 6 an issue that's already spoken on just doesn't seem to
- 7 make sense and invites the very sort of kind of
- 8 jurisdictional confusion that, I think, leads the Court,
- 9 for prudential reasons, not to consider these things
- 10 unless there's a cross-petition.
- 11 I think that's why this is kind of a great
- 12 example of why prudential reasons say you should not
- 13 consider it.
- 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I understand,
- and you do cite a lot of cases for that, but I can't
- 16 figure out what sense it makes. I mean, if you're
- 17 willing to give up Santa Clara and Malibu, you're --
- 18 you're safe there, and that's the only thing you've won.
- 19 Why does it -- how does that make sense?
- MR. COATES: Well, the Court does it for two
- 21 reasons. It does it as a prudential matter because it
- 22 does look odd to affirm on -- to make a decision in this
- 23 Court on a ground that essentially repudiates the lower
- 24 court decision. It does it for prudential reasons.
- 25 And, in fact, the case they cite, LeTulle,

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1	which basically says the Court has the jurisdiction to
2	do that when someone abandons the piecemeal claim
3	is cited only once in this context after that, and
4	that's in the United States v. ITT Continental Baking
5	case, 420 U.S. 223, footnote 2.
6	And the court gives it a "but-see" for the
7	proposition that you have the jurisdiction to do it.
8	But then describes this exact situation and says, for
9	prudential reasons, we don't do it because it undermines
10	our cert jurisdiction, particularly if resolution of
11	that issue is highly fact-specific the one they are
12	trying to bring up and it would really foreclose
13	having to even decide this cert issue because you
14	wouldn't get to it.
15	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
16	The case is submitted.
17	(Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the case in the
18	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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