

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

2 - - - - - x

3 MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL :

4 GROUP INC., :

5 Petitioner :

6 v. : No. 06-1457

7 PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT NO. 1 :

8 OF SNOHOMISH COUNTY, :

9 WASHINGTON, ET AL.; :

10 and :

11 AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER :

12 SERVICE CORPORATION, ET :

13 AL., :

14 Petitioners :

15 v. : No. 06-1462

16 PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT NO. 1 :

17 OF SNOHOMISH COUNTY, :

18 WASHINGTON, ET AL. :

19 - - - - - x

20 Washington, D.C.

21 Tuesday, February 19, 2008

22

23 The above-entitled matter came on for oral

24 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States

25 at 11:04 a.m.

1 APPEARANCES:

2 EDWIN S. KNEEDLER, ESQ., Deputy Solicitor General,
3 Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf
4 of Respondent FERC, in support of Petitioners.

5 WALTER DELLINGER, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf
6 of the Petitioners.

7 CHRISTOPHER J. WRIGHT, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf
8 of the Respondents.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1	C O N T E N T S	
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	PAGE
3	EDWIN S. KNEEDLER, ESQ.	
4	On behalf of Respondent FERC,	
5	in support of Petitioners	4
6	WALTER DELLINGER, ESQ.	
7	On behalf of the Petitioners	15
8	CHRISTOPHER J. WRIGHT, ESQ.	
9	On behalf of the Respondents	25
10	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF	
11	WALTER DELLINGER, ESQ.	
12	On behalf of the Petitioners	50
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (11:04 a.m.)

3 JUSTICE STEVENS: I'll repeat myself. I
4 didn't have the mike on. The Court will hear argument
5 in Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc., against Snohomish
6 Public Utility District No. 1, or Public District --
7 Snohomish County No. 1.

8 Mr. Kneedler.

9 ORAL ARGUMENT OF EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
10 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT FERC,
11 IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONERS

12 MR. KNEEDLER: Thank you, Justice Stevens,
13 and may it please the Court:

14 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in
15 this case reasonably denied Respondent's request to
16 modify the wholesale contracts that the purchasing power
17 companies had entered into in 2000 and 2001. The
18 Commission reasonably concluded that Respondents had not
19 made the requisite showing under the Federal Power Act
20 and under this Court's decisions in Mobile and Sierra
21 that modification of the contracts was necessary in the
22 public interest.

23 In reaching that conclusion, FERC first drew
24 on three factors that this Court had identified in
25 Sierra and found that they were not satisfied. Thus, it

1 found that Respondents had failed to show that the
2 contracts would impose financial strain on the
3 purchasing companies; that it would impose excessive
4 burdens on the customers; or that they were unduly
5 discriminatory. But FERC also looked --

6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But FERC thought it could
7 live with the Ninth Circuit's decision, because the
8 government recommended that we deny cert in this case;
9 isn't that so?

10 MR. KNEEDLER: That is -- that is correct,
11 and FERC thought that perhaps the decision could be
12 limited to the circumstances arising out of the
13 California energy crisis in the years 2000- 2001, and
14 that it could channel its concerns about contract
15 stability through those other factors.

16 But, nonetheless, FERC believes, as its
17 decisions make clear and as our position in this Court
18 makes clear, that the Ninth Circuit's reformulation of
19 the Mobile-Sierra doctrine or interpretation of the act
20 was incorrect. And, now that the Court has granted
21 review, we urge affirmance of FERC's decision in this
22 case.

23 JUSTICE SCALIA: Wasn't it clear to the
24 government that the Ninth Circuit, which is what, about
25 10 percent of the country, was going to continue this

1 interpretation of the act, and that was not a matter of
2 any consequence to FERC or to the government?

3 MR. GARRE: It was of consequence, but FERC
4 still believed it had some interpretive authority after
5 the decision. Maybe this was a wrong judgment at the
6 time, but FERC thought that it still had some
7 interpretive authority under the decision, and that it
8 could --

9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But, Mr. Kneedler, this
10 is a decision, the Ninth Circuit decision, that empowers
11 FERC. FERC says: Oh, we don't have that authority.
12 And the Ninth Circuit said: Yes, you do. So this is an
13 agency arguing that it can't do what the Ninth Circuit
14 says it can. And why can it not? Because of two
15 decisions of this Court. Is that right?

16 MR. KNEEDLER: Well, two decisions of this
17 Court and 50 years of intervening FERC, before that
18 Federal Power Commission, practice.

19 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, wait, wait, wait. It
20 didn't just say the agency may do it. It said the
21 agency must do it. I don't -- I don't consider "must"
22 to be an empowerment. I consider that to be a
23 direction.

24 MR. KNEEDLER: Right. That -- that is
25 correct. I mean it, I think -- I took the question to

1 be that it might give FERC broader flexibility, but at a
2 very substantial cost to the stability of contracts,
3 which was the underlying point that this Court stressed
4 in its decision in Sierra: That the Federal Power Act,
5 unlike -- and the Natural Gas Act, unlike the Interstate
6 Commerce Act, contemplates that rates will be set by
7 contract, or at least can be set by contract; and that
8 therefore, like in most situations, a party to a
9 contract cannot unilaterally walk away from that
10 contract or insist upon its modification because it may
11 become disadvantageous over time.

12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought -- let's go
13 back a step. I thought FERC's position was: We could
14 not decide as a matter of discretion to do this because
15 we are limited by those Supreme Court decisions.

16 MR. GARRE: Well, FERC --

17 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So it's not what FERC --
18 FERC independently interpreting the statute to reach the
19 conclusion, which it might, to reach the conclusion the
20 Ninth Circuit did. It's FERC saying: We can't do that
21 because we have our marching orders from the Supreme
22 Court.

23 MR. KNEEDLER: No. I think -- I mean there
24 are -- there are two interpretive questions here: When
25 does the public interest standard identified in this

1 Court's decisions in Mobile and Sierra apply? And then
2 there is the further question of what is necessary to
3 satisfy the public interest standard for modifying a
4 contract.

5 We think on both points the Commission's
6 decision in this case reflects an interpretive judgment
7 that the Court's decision, or the interpretation
8 reflected in the Court's decision, in Sierra applies
9 equally in the market-based rate system without any of
10 the -- either of the two prerequisites that the Ninth
11 Circuit formulated as a precondition to applying the
12 public interest standard.

13 And I would point the Court's attention, in
14 the joint appendix in the Commission's decision, to
15 joint appendix 1244 and 1245, repeated again at 1572 and
16 1573; and also the passage quoted in the Morgan Stanley
17 brief at page 17, reflects a determination of what the
18 Commission's longstanding policy has been that,
19 contracts once entered into, their integrity must be
20 protected and should not be lightly set aside.

21 And also, the Commission specifically
22 rejected at pages 1564 and 1565 of the joint appendix
23 the prerequisites that the Ninth Circuit came up with in
24 this case, that there must be an opportunity to
25 determine whether the rates were within a zone of just

1 and reasonableness at the time the contracts were
2 entered into in order for Mobile and Sierra to apply.

3 Under a market-based rate system, what FERC
4 does is determine at the outset when an applicant
5 applies for a market-based tariff whether that company
6 has market power and if so, whether it's mitigated.
7 Only in those circumstances is the company granted the
8 authority to market -- to set prices by the market.

9 JUSTICE ALITO: What happens if that
10 approval is given and then a seller enters into
11 contracts and then it's later discovered that, contrary
12 to what FERC thought when it granted the approval, the
13 seller has exercised market power or has otherwise
14 manipulated the market? Is there any remedy in that
15 situation?

16 MR. KNEEDLER: Well, what the Commission
17 determined in this case is that there was -- there was
18 no manipulation or exercise of market power identified
19 with respect to these specific contracts. And what the
20 Commission decided was that the importance of the
21 integrity of contracts in that circumstance required
22 that the contract be maintained. If the Respondents had
23 shown bad faith or something like that in the
24 connection -- or fraud in connection with the formation
25 of these particular contracts, that would have been

1 quite a different matter.

2 It's also important to note that the
3 Commission found in this case that there was no
4 dysfunction in the forward market, which is what we have
5 here. What was going on is that there was dysfunction
6 in the spot market in 2000, 2001 for a variety of
7 reasons, some of them going to market fundamentals such
8 as a shortage of generation capacity, a shortage of
9 hydropower.

10 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Just so I understand your
11 answer to Justice Alito's question, the Commission has
12 retroactive authority to alter the permission to engage
13 in these contracts only if there is fraud --

14 MR. KNEEDLER: No it can -- I'm sorry --

15 JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- or something similar?

16 MR. KNEEDLER: Once it has granted
17 market-based rate authority, FERC can revoke that. And
18 in fact, companies -- there is a triennial review of
19 that --

20 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Retroactive?

21 MR. KNEEDLER: Pardon?

22 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Retroactively?

23 MR. KNEEDLER: No. It would be revoked --

24 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But Justice Alito's
25 question, I think as I understood it, or at least a

1 question in my mind that followed upon it, was whether
2 or not -- what's the basis for any retroactive
3 revocation of that or --

4 MR. KNEEDLER: No, it wouldn't be
5 retroactive. It would be from the date of the complaint
6 that was filed.

7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Would it be a public
8 interest finding, a finding that because of the market
9 manipulation by the seller that affected this very
10 contract, the public interest demands that we not hold
11 the --

12 MR. KNEEDLER: Yes. In that situation there
13 is an important public interest in eliminating fraud.

14 JUSTICE SCALIA: I didn't say fraud. I said
15 market manipulation.

16 MR. KNEEDLER: Or market manipulation.

17 JUSTICE SOUTER: Isn't the remedy for the
18 finding of market manipulation the abrogation of the
19 contract, which is a separate process from, from the
20 revocation of market-based tariff?

21 MR. KNEEDLER: There are. And this is the
22 point I was going to make --

23 JUSTICE SOUTER: The same reason may support
24 each, but --

25 MR. KNEEDLER: Right. I was going to make

1 that point in response to Justice Kennedy's question.
2 If it turns out that subsequent evidence shows that a
3 particular company has acquired market-based power, then
4 FERC can revoke that authority on a going-forward basis
5 to continue to sell on that basis. And in fact,
6 companies are required to report any changes in their
7 circumstances that might affect their market power, and
8 there is a triennial review of that. But as long ago
9 the market --

10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Did the companies who
11 were involved in this case make those reports? I mean,
12 there was something about during this energy crisis
13 there was rampant noncompliance with the filing, with
14 the quarterly report filing.

15 MR. KNEEDLER: There was, and the Ninth
16 Circuit found that in the Lockyer decision. But that is
17 the sort of flaw and market oversight that should be
18 addressed directly by FERC. It shouldn't be -- it
19 shouldn't be addressed by collateral attacks on
20 contracts that were entered into under the regulatory
21 regime as it existed.

22 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Kneedler, I'm not
23 entirely understanding you. Why should the fact that
24 the seller later acquired market power have anything to
25 do with whether the initial contract, when he did not

1 have market power, was a fair one? The contracts are
2 already down in black and white, his later acquisition
3 of market power cannot affect --

4 MR. KNEEDLER: No, that is certainly
5 correct. I think the question, what concerned the Ninth
6 Circuit -- actually, the Ninth Circuit wasn't addressing
7 market power. It was addressing the possibility of
8 market dysfunction.

9 JUSTICE SCALIA: I understand. But later
10 acquisition of market power would result in a
11 cancellation of the permission for this particular firm
12 to enter into contracts for the future, but I don't see
13 why it would affect the past contracts.

14 MR. KNEEDLER: And we don't think it should,
15 except to the extent the public interest standard is
16 met.

17 JUSTICE SOUTER: Maybe I think I led us into
18 this, Mr. Kneedler. The situation that I was positing
19 was a situation in which the power marketer had engaged
20 in market manipulation in the context of which, at the
21 time of which, it made this contract. And my suggestion
22 to you, which I think you took, was that in a situation
23 like that there would be a basis for public interest
24 review and abrogation of this contract because of the
25 market manipulation in fact.

1 And the market manipulation would also be a
2 reason to say market power had been acquired. It had
3 not been mitigated, and hence, the market-based tariff
4 authority would also be revoked. And that was the, that
5 was the limit of my question. And I take it your answer
6 there is it could do each of those things?

7 MR. KNEEDLER: Yes. It could revoke the
8 market-based power going forward. And with respect to
9 manipulation, especially if there was manipulation
10 affecting the particular contract, that would be a basis
11 for finding that the public interest required the
12 contract to be modified.

13 If I may, I'd like to reserve the balance of
14 my time.

15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Kneedler, I do have
16 one question. It was the position that FERC took in
17 December of 2000, when it was encouraging the entrance
18 into the long-term contracts rather than using the spot
19 market, and in that order FERC said that it would
20 monitor long-term contracts vigorously for rate
21 reasonableness and that buyers could challenge rates
22 through 206 proceedings. What happened to that
23 position?

24 MR. KNEEDLER: This is such a challenge, but
25 what FERC has concluded is that the public interest

1 standard has to be satisfied in that situation. FERC
2 encouraged parties to go into the long-term market in
3 order to diminish the market volatility and it would
4 frustrate that encouragement of policy --

5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And how did FERC monitor
6 the rates vigorously to make sure they were reasonable?

7 MR. KNEEDLER: There was extensive staff
8 studies and monitoring in subsequent decisions that are,
9 that are shown and that are in the joint appendix, in
10 April -- in January and April and June when FERC came up
11 with its final program to mitigate the problems in the
12 spot market.

13 JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Dellinger.

14 ORAL ARGUMENT OF WALTER DELLINGER

15 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

16 MR. DELLINGER: Justice Stevens, good
17 morning, and may it please the Court:

18 Justice Ginsburg began by asking whether the
19 Ninth Circuit decision did not in fact empower rather
20 than restrict the authority of the Commission. The
21 answer is that the Ninth Circuit decision fundamentally
22 precludes the Commission from carrying out what the
23 Commission believes is essential to its mandate to
24 assure an abundance of electrical energy at the lowest
25 possible cost. And that is to encourage a market-based

1 approach to recognize that if you're going to have, as
2 the Commission has said, the kind of investment in the
3 building of infrastructure to produce energy, people are
4 going to have to be able to rely upon long-term
5 contracts.

6 In this case, what the Ninth Circuit's
7 decision did is to take away a very important option
8 that the Commission believes is essential in times of
9 market volatility and dysfunction. And that is the
10 option for parties to get out of the spot market and to
11 enter into a long-term contract of a secure supply.

12 If the Ninth Circuit's decision stood,
13 literally parties, buyers and sellers, would both be
14 precluded from entering into that, because you would
15 know if there were dysfunction that nothing you could
16 say in the contract could mean that you could buy power
17 for the next eight years at \$105 at a time, as was the
18 case here, when the spot market was \$300. It would take
19 away the option. And sellers would know they couldn't
20 enter into a contract they could rely upon subject only
21 to being overridden in the public interest, which FERC
22 does. And that would be very damaging to the very
23 processes which the Commission has used consistent with
24 this Court's decision of 50 years ago to encourage
25 development in this industry.

1 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, those decisions are
2 puzzling transposed to this setting, because in those
3 decisions it was the seller who had made a bad bargain;
4 the price was too low; and the seller wanted to get out,
5 right?

6 MR. DELLINGER: Yes.

7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And now we are
8 transposing that. And one of the main themes I think of
9 Justice Harlan's decision was this Act was meant to
10 protect the consumer, to make sure that the consumer
11 wasn't going to be overcharged. And that runs through
12 those two 1956 decisions, at a time when there was no
13 market-based authority, or any such, right?

14 MR. DELLINGER: Well, yes. Justice
15 Ginsburg, that is correct. That was a case where a
16 seller was seeking to get out of a contract that was
17 paying too low.

18 But the fundamental purpose -- the Court
19 recognized even in Justice Harlan's opinion that
20 maintaining the stability and expectation of contracts
21 was going to be important to consumers, to buyers as
22 well as to sellers. In this -- and FERC has adopted
23 that position.

24 In this case you have a situation where the
25 Commission decided that instability in the spot markets

1 was being partly caused by the fact that the State
2 regulatory process had discouraged people from entering
3 into longer term contracts; and FERC said in its 2000
4 San Diego order, we strongly urge utilities to move
5 their load to long-term contracts of two years or more.

6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: That's the same order
7 where they said we are going to monitor the rates for
8 reasonableness.

9 MR. DELLINGER: That is true. And when they
10 did indeed undertake a review of this, they decided that
11 with respect to these contracts there was no evidence of
12 bad faith. There was no evidence of unfairness. There
13 was no evidence of duress. There was no evidence of any
14 market manipulation that affected the contracts
15 specifically in these long-term cases.

16 The long-term contracts were part of the
17 solution or the mitigation of the problem. It was a
18 long-term contract that allowed the utilities in this
19 case to get out from under \$300 a megawatt prices and to
20 enter into a contract at \$105, in one of the cases.

21 JUSTICE STEVENS: Can I ask this question?
22 Assuming there is absolutely no bad faith or fraud or
23 anything like that, but there is just a general
24 conclusion that the market was such -- in such turmoil
25 that there could not be made reasonable or long-term

1 contracts, because the predicate for that kind of
2 negotiation just didn't exist. Would that be a basis
3 for setting aside the contract?

4 MR. DELLINGER: No; and it's very important
5 that not be a basis, because if that were the case,
6 parties would know and parties -- both -- all parties
7 were aware that there was volatility, and the Commission
8 had announced that the conditions were conducive to
9 manipulation of the spot markets. That would mean that
10 a seller would say to a buyer, we know you would like to
11 get out of this volatility and get a regular supply
12 guaranteed at a -- at a much lower price for long term.
13 We can't enter into that contract, because the fact that
14 we know there has been this problem in the market means
15 that our contract won't be upheld.

16 Now, the Ninth Circuit decision says that
17 contract terms are not binding if they were influenced
18 by a dysfunctional market; and that is the very most
19 important circumstance in which having long-term
20 contracting is most valuable.

21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is volatile the same as
22 dysfunctional?

23 MR. DELLINGER: Justice Kennedy, I don't
24 know precisely what the Ninth Circuit means by
25 dysfunctional. There is volatility. I think the

1 difference would be is there manipulation, is one
2 factor; there were a number of factors that caused the
3 volatility here --

4 JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Dellinger, does that
5 mean that it is your position that no matter how
6 dysfunctional the market was, just complete turmoil, as
7 long as the contract was made in good faith without any
8 fraud or abuse of power, it's a binding contract?

9 MR. DELLINGER: That is correct, unless --
10 and this is an important unless -- the Commission
11 reviews those contract terms and finds that the public
12 interest necessitates a revision of the contract. They
13 have that discretion. They have that authority. They
14 are prepared to and have exercised it, but in -- in this
15 case --

16 JUSTICE SCALIA: For example --

17 MR. DELLINGER: For example --

18 JUSTICE SCALIA: For example, if the prices
19 down the road turn out to be so high for the utility,
20 that the utility would go out of business?

21 MR. DELLINGER: That is an example that the
22 Court gave in Mobile and -- and Sierra. But the
23 Court -- but what the Commission would know is that the
24 circumstances would have to be rather extraordinary.
25 Because whenever you were to modify the terms of a

1 contract that the sellers have been relying upon, the
2 sellers became buyers. They also went out on the
3 market. They are buying and selling.

4 So unraveling all of these buying and
5 selling would itself be -- would be dysfunctional; but
6 what sellers would know thereafter is that they couldn't
7 rely upon the contracts. They would either have to stay
8 out of that market or they would have to charge a risk
9 premium, which would raise prices to buyers and
10 consumers.

11 So that long run harm of making it less
12 reliable to engage in contracting would have to be
13 overcome by a fairly severe showing of what the
14 short-term harms would be to one particular set of
15 buyers.

16 The Commission has made those findings.
17 They found circumstances where the contracts gave first
18 priority to commercial uses of power, and at a time of
19 shortage that meant that residential customers would be
20 cut off. The Commission ordered that done.

21 The Commission has been on the job here.
22 They have -- the process by which they grant
23 market-based rate authority is an elaborate one. They
24 get assurances that the sellers lack transmission market
25 power, generation market power, that there are no

1 barriers to entry, that if they have transmission
2 facilities there is open access. They -- any party can
3 challenge that. And any party in this case, any party
4 in this case --

5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: You said the Commission
6 is on the job, but one of the pieces of information here
7 is that the Commission staff said that the dysfunction
8 in the spot market carried over into the forward market,
9 such that prices in the forward market were inflated.

10 MR. DELLINGER: That is correct. But what
11 the Commission realized is that the parties were aware
12 of what was going on in the spot market. They were able
13 to contract on that basis. They could have asked for
14 what's called a Memphis clause, giving either party the
15 right to seek modification based on some administrative
16 determination of what a right price would be at some
17 later point. They did not. They kept in the clauses
18 that allowed only joint approaches to the Commission,
19 and indeed in one contract said that the rates are fixed
20 and shall remain in effect for the terms of this
21 agreement. That language is illustrative of how you
22 could not enter into a long-term contract and assure
23 that the terms were binding. The fact that --

24 JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't understand what
25 that statement means, anyway. The current dysfunction

1 carries over into -- into the future market? What does
2 that mean?

3 MR. DELLINGER: Right. Well --

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Does it mean that because
5 of the current dysfunction, you can't predict for sure
6 what the rates are going to be down the road? Of course
7 it means that. But doesn't a dysfunction always mean
8 that?

9 MR. DELLINGER: Yes. Dysfunction --

10 JUSTICE SCALIA: And isn't that why you
11 enter into long-term contracts?

12 MR. DELLINGER: Yes. Yes.

13 JUSTICE SCALIA: Because given the current
14 dysfunction you have no idea what the price is going to
15 be down the road.

16 MR. DELLINGER: That's exactly right.

17 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Dellinger, wasn't the
18 staff saying something more than that in that -- in that
19 report?

20 MR. DELLINGER: I don't -- I don't know what
21 you're intimating, but what the conclusion was of the
22 Commission was, for example, that there was no basis to
23 support a finding that the Respondents exercised market
24 --

25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But the Commission didn't

1 -- didn't respond to the staff report, right? Didn't
2 say anything one way or another about it.

3 MR. DELLINGER: Well, the Commission
4 expressly said with respect to the -- to the staff
5 report that there was no evidence of any manipulation.

6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Did they say it with
7 respect to the staff report? Or -- I thought they
8 thought the staff report was irrelevant?

9 MR. DELLINGER: Yes. The aspect of the
10 staff report that said that forward prices were
11 influenced by prices in the spot market and that there
12 had been dysfunction was irrelevant precisely because it
13 would have been relevant were the Commission making its
14 own bureaucratic determination of a right price. But
15 the parties made the determination of the prices that
16 they wanted to agree to, the terms they wanted to agree
17 to, and they did so with full knowledge both that they
18 knew there had been some manipulation, that there was
19 volatility and that they knew they didn't know, as
20 Justice Scalia, said the extent of it; and, therefore,
21 that's precisely why you want to be involved in a
22 contract that guarantees you today that, no matter what
23 happens to prices in the next year or next summer, one
24 of these -- one of these utilities has a guarantee of
25 power at \$105.

1 I will reserve my time for Mr. Kneedler,
2 unless there are questions.

3 No, I'm not. He is going to do a rebuttal,
4 whatever amount of time we have, Justice Stevens --

5 JUSTICE STEVENS: All right.

6 MR. DELLINGER: -- unless there are further
7 questions.

8 Thank you.

9 JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Wright.

10 ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHRISTOPHER J. WRIGHT

11 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS

12 MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Justice Stevens, and
13 may it please the Court:

14 I'd like to start off by picking up on
15 Justice Ginsburg's observation that FERC understood
16 itself to be without discretion here, and add the point
17 that this is an extremely unusual case where FERC
18 thought it lacked discretion to apply the statute. In
19 the briefs, there is now agreement that the just and
20 reasonable standard applies to all rates under the Act
21 and couldn't be more clear that the just and reasonable
22 standard applies. FERC --

23 JUSTICE ALITO: Among your arguments, and
24 the arguments of the Respondent, seems to be in some
25 tension -- seems to me in some tension to FERC's

1 market-based rate program. Do you -- do you acknowledge
2 that that is permissible interpretation of the Federal
3 Power Act or not?

4 MR. WRIGHT: I -- there is much that we
5 don't disagree with about the market-based rate program.
6 I suppose we do think that there are two things that
7 FERC has to make sure that it does as part of that
8 program.

9 First, in -- in approving the market-based
10 rate program, Judge Douglas Ginsburg said when there is
11 a competitive market, FERC may rely upon market-based
12 rates in lieu of cost-of-service regulations. That
13 makes perfect sense to us, but when there is a
14 competitive market. So we think a critical part of a
15 market-based rate program is that there must be an
16 inquiry into whether or not the market was competitive
17 when the contract was entered into. Of course, we have
18 the unusual circumstance here where Professor Kahn and
19 nine other deregulatory economists wrote a letter in May
20 2001 saying markets are out of control, this is the
21 unusual circumstance where FERC should enter a price
22 cap.

23 JUSTICE ALITO: Isn't it -- isn't it a
24 central requirement of a market-based rate program that
25 FERC cannot, except perhaps in very limited

1 circumstances, go back and undo contracts that had been
2 entered into under that program, based on a
3 retrospective determination that the rates are not just
4 and reasonable, in the same sense that FERC would have
5 applied that term if the utility had simply filed a
6 tariff?

7 MR. WRIGHT: Justice Alito, all rates must
8 be just and reasonable. We are not arguing that FERC
9 needs to go back to a cost-of-service ratemaking
10 approach; but an agency that sees just and reasonable
11 and thinks it's applying a just and reasonable standard,
12 for 70 years has thought it's either going to do a
13 cost-of-service approach, or more recently it's going to
14 rely on the market to make rates just and reasonable,
15 our modest point is that it can't ignore the market. It
16 --

17 JUSTICE SOUTER: No, but I guess this is
18 what's bothering us. Your point does not seem, at least
19 to me, to be a modest point, because if I understand
20 where you're going, you're saying that in a market with
21 the degree of volatility of this one at the time these
22 contracts were made, no contract is enforceable. It
23 will last only so long as -- as one party does not
24 complain about a disadvantage, and the minute it does,
25 it's back in front of FERC. And the argument is being

1 made that in fact a market-based rate cannot be enforced
2 through contract because the very premise -- i.e., what
3 you call and what was called a competitive -- Judge
4 Ginsburg called a competitive market -- was absent.
5 Isn't that the consequence of what you're arguing?

6 MR. WRIGHT: Yes. Let me make four points
7 here, though, that I think make absolutely clear that it
8 would not set a broad precedent to revisit the contracts
9 here.

10 And the four points are first, the
11 Government acknowledges in its brief at page 16, this
12 was the worst electricity market crisis in history.

13 Second --

14 JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, how do we know when
15 we're only in the second worst?

16 (Laughter.)

17 MR. WRIGHT: Well --

18 JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, but I mean the
19 problem is --

20 MR. WRIGHT: No, no --

21 JUSTICE SOUTER: And I don't see any -- and
22 I realize that you're giving me limiting principles to
23 what seems to me in effect a general rule that says no
24 contracts are enforceable, if they are made during
25 periods of market volatility, however sensible they may

1 be given the premise of that volatility.

2 And your first proposal for a limiting
3 principle is this is the worst of times, and I don't see
4 how that's going to help because somebody is always
5 going to claim, well, these times are -- are almost as
6 bad.

7 MR. WRIGHT: Well, Your Honor, of course the
8 Federal Power Act instructs a Federal agency to ensure
9 that rates are just and reasonable. A -- the Federal
10 Power Act --

11 JUSTICE SOUTER: Look --

12 MR. WRIGHT: The FERC, FERC needs to grapple
13 with this.

14 JUSTICE SOUTER: That's a good -- I mean
15 that's a fine general phrase, but the question is, is it
16 possible to make an enforceable contract under these
17 circumstances?

18 MR. WRIGHT: Well --

19 JUSTICE SOUTER: I haven't heard a limiting
20 principle yet. You have three others.

21 MR. WRIGHT: I have three others. There was
22 rampant noncompliance with the reporting requirements.
23 The Government concedes that, too: FERC's market-based
24 rate program, however well it might work today after
25 it's been improved, as the Government said in its

1 opposition to cert, however well it's been improved on
2 account of the 2005 amendments --

3 JUSTICE SOUTER: Did these -- did -- did the
4 Petitioners here -- do you claim that the Petitioners
5 here were guilty of failure to report?

6 MR. WRIGHT: Yes. They -- they were not --
7 they were not complying with the -- we contend that the
8 reporting requirements that were in effect in 2001 were
9 inconsistent with the statute and not --

10 JUSTICE SOUTER: That's -- that's a
11 different issue. That -- that may be that the
12 Commission was derelict in -- in having a nonstatutory
13 condition. But did these -- did these Petitioners -- do
14 you claim, is it a basis for your claim before FERC,
15 that these Petitioners failed to follow the reporting
16 requirements that were in effect?

17 MR. WRIGHT: Our -- our basic argument is
18 the rates weren't just and reasonable --

19 JUSTICE SOUTER: That's what I thought.

20 MR. WRIGHT: And the rates weren't just and
21 reasonable on the day the contracts were signed. And
22 let me make clear --

23 JUSTICE SOUTER: Okay, but here I just want
24 to make sure I understand. You're saying one -- one
25 limiting principle is the re-examination of contract

1 might be limited or at least only prompted by a -- a
2 failure to follow reporting requirements. I can
3 understand that and that offhand seems to me perfectly
4 fair. It may not cover this case, but I can understand
5 that. What are your other two reasons?

6 MR. WRIGHT: My third is, as Commissioner
7 Massey stated in his dissent, without contradiction by
8 the majority, that if the just and reasonable standard
9 were -- would be applied, these rates would be declared
10 unlawful, because they were multiples of traditional
11 prices.

12 JUSTICE SOUTER: Okay, but that seems to me
13 consistent with the problem that I have with your
14 argument. And that is, if you make a contract in a
15 period of high volatility, and it seems reasonable to
16 the two parties to come up with a rate that is certainly
17 a higher rate than anybody would come up with if they
18 were going through cost-plus-return ratemaking, the
19 contract is vulnerable. And it seems to me that
20 Commissioner Massey's argument is consistent with the
21 conclusion that all those contracts are vulnerable. So
22 I don't see that as any limiting principle. What's your
23 fourth one?

24 MR. WRIGHT: The fourth one is, as Justice
25 Ginsburg has noted, that FERC said in December 2000,

1 before all of the contracts at issue were negotiated,
2 that it would monitor and -- and would -- deems rates
3 above \$74 suspect. All the contracts in here have rates
4 above that benchmark. So it's the worst crisis in
5 history; there's rampant noncompliance; rates were
6 multiples of traditional pricings, and FERC had said it
7 was going to study these rates closely.

8 JUSTICE SOUTER: Okay, I can understand --
9 under your fourth point, I could understand the position
10 if the argument were this is above \$74, and therefore it
11 is suspect; but the claim you're making, as I understand
12 it, is a much broader claim. You're saying the entire
13 contract ought to be abrogated in the public interest,
14 not merely above 74 but below 74. Isn't that correct?

15 MR. WRIGHT: Well, I'm sorry, Your Honor.
16 We want this case to be sent back to FERC.

17 JUSTICE SOUTER: And when you get there,
18 you're saying abrogate this contract.

19 MR. WRIGHT: We are saying reduce the rates,
20 and --

21 JUSTICE SOUTER: Are you saying -- have you
22 at any point said reduce the rates to \$74?

23 MR. WRIGHT: I'm sure different -- there are
24 many different parties on my side. I'm sure we have
25 many different theories. Could I tell you what FERC 's

1 done with respect to the --

2 JUSTICE SOUTER: I will -- I will stop the
3 cross-examination, but I just wanted to get the four
4 points.

5 MR. WRIGHT: I appreciate the
6 cross-examination. It's helped me get out what I think
7 our four points --

8 JUSTICE KENNEDY: If -- if your theory
9 prevails and you go back to the Commission, does the
10 Morgan Stanley contract, where the lower rate seller
11 was, does that get reevaluated, too? You reevaluate all
12 the contracts back down the line?

13 MR. WRIGHT: Well, I -- does Morgan
14 Stanley's -- well, Morgan Stanley actually -- a number
15 of parties in Morgan Stanley's situation chose to file
16 protective actions, and Morgan Stanley didn't. So I
17 don't know whether it has waived its rights or not. But
18 I think FERC ought to grapple with that.

19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Let me say that,
20 consistent with your theory, that everybody -- that this
21 whole unwinding process backs up all the way down to the
22 original seller?

23 MR. WRIGHT: Right.

24 Well, Your Honor, the way these markets
25 work, there is every reason to think that Morgan Stanley

1 doesn't have the sort of claim that they have suggested
2 without telling us they have. And, of course, they know
3 what their portfolio is.

4 There is every reason to think they bought
5 power before the big spike came, and that they bought
6 power since then, and that they're not -- they're not
7 buying power at 104 and selling it to Snohomish at 105,
8 Your Honor.

9 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, good for them.

10 (Laughter.)

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean you're suggesting
12 they should be punished for that? I don't understand
13 what -- what follows? I mean --

14 MR. WRIGHT: We're not, Your Honor, but I
15 would remind you this is a plain-language case. The
16 statute requires rates to be just and reasonable. That
17 -- for 70 years, that's meant something to
18 administrative agencies. The reason --

19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But how would you -- how
20 would you go about determining in this case? You said
21 it's not the traditional cost of service, return on
22 investment. So how -- if you prevail, what should FERC
23 do to determine whether this rate was fair and
24 reasonable?

25 MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Your Honor.

1 We expect that, ultimately, it will do, or
2 should do, what it's done with respect to the spot
3 market. With respect to the spot market, it has
4 provided relief to parties who bought at the same time.
5 And what it has done is it has -- it has determined what
6 it calls a mitigated market clearing price.

7 It has done this with great elaborate --
8 elaboration for periods as low as 10 minutes for the
9 period in 2000 - 2001, when it is now conceded
10 manipulation raised rates on the spot market. And it
11 has taken the prices that were paid, and it has -- it
12 has reduced them to what it calls the "mitigated market
13 clearing price."

14 This is -- this is described in painful
15 detail in the -- in the Ninth Circuit's 2006 CPUC versus
16 FERC opinion.

17 JUSTICE SCALIA: Didn't your clients know
18 that the market was chaotic at the time they entered
19 into this long-term contract? I mean does this come as
20 a surprise that after the fact, now that you're paying
21 more than the market price is, you want to kick over a
22 long-term contract you entered into?

23 What has changed? Did you not know that the
24 market was chaotic? Wasn't that the very reason you
25 entered into the long-term contract.

1 MR. WRIGHT: Your Honor, we had a sort of a
2 Henry Ford choice. Any -- we had a choice of a variety
3 of rates as long as they were unjust and unreasonable.
4 We didn't have any alternative, because of the market
5 manipulation, that allowed us to get a just and
6 reasonable rate on the spot market, on long-term markets
7 --

8 JUSTICE SOUTER: You were saying that the
9 most -- the most reasonable thing for us to do was to
10 enter into a long-term contract in order to mitigate the
11 effects of the chaotic spot market. You understood
12 that.

13 MR. WRIGHT: In large part, because FERC had
14 told us they were going to monitor these contracts and
15 use the \$74 benchmark.

16 JUSTICE SCALIA: In fact, you did very well
17 under these contracts. Initially, you were even
18 reselling some of the energy that you got. You got it
19 at a price so much below what was then the market that
20 you made a profit by reselling it.

21 But now that things have changed, you don't
22 like the long-term contract.

23 MR. WRIGHT: Your Honor, it's our position
24 that we have to prove these were just and reasonable on
25 the day they were entered. And the way these markets

1 work, local utilities like Snohomish buy energy, and
2 they always sell a little bit. They're going to lose
3 153 million over the life of this contract. And it's
4 always been the life of the contract that FERC has
5 thought was the -- the real benchmark.

6 JUSTICE SOUTER: Mr. Wright, may I go back
7 to your answer to Justice Ginsburg's question? She
8 asked you: What do you want FERC to do if it does what
9 you want them to do?

10 And you said: We want them to make the same
11 kind of adjustments ex post that they made to the spot
12 prices.

13 Isn't there one big difference here to --
14 between readjusting spot prices and rewriting or
15 abrogating a contract like this?

16 In the case of adjusting the spot prices, in
17 effect. What they are saying is: Somebody isn't going
18 to make the killing that he thought he was making. It
19 was -- a spot price indicates it was a snap decision.
20 People were reacting to -- to changes in the market from
21 hour to hour. And the Commission is going to go back
22 and say, you know, you're out of luck on the killing you
23 thought you made.

24 When, on the other hand, the Commission, in
25 effect, rewrites or abrogates a contract, it is saying

1 something very different. It is saying: You may not
2 engage in long-term reliance on the agreements that you
3 make. And isn't that a huge difference?

4 MR. WRIGHT: Your Honor, we think that FERC
5 could, and it seems clear that it will, distinguish
6 between the spot market and long-term contracts on these
7 bases. Our point there is that we probably, if it does,
8 then have to overcome a hurdle and show that there
9 wasn't effective competition at the time the long-term
10 contracts were entered into.

11 FERC might rationally, once it grapples with
12 this, decide that that's the way the just and reasonable
13 standard applies.

14 JUSTICE SOUTER: Yes, but with respect,
15 doesn't that, in effect, mean -- going back to your
16 answer to Justice Ginsburg -- that what you really want
17 is to say there wasn't effective competition.

18 There wasn't effective competition because
19 the market was chaotic.

20 And, therefore, in a chaotic market,
21 including this one, a long-term contract which later
22 turns out to be disadvantageous to one side is
23 unenforceable.

24 Isn't that what you -- your real answer to
25 Justice Ginsburg is.

1 MR. WRIGHT: Well, Your Honor, again, I
2 don't think we should prevail, and it's not our position
3 that we prevail, unless we show that we didn't have just
4 and reasonable alternatives at the time we entered into
5 the contract. We don't think we can --

6 JUSTICE SOUTER: No, but I mean -- that's
7 where I don't think that, at least with me, helps your
8 argument. We all know that there is a broad umbrella
9 standard of justness and reasonableness. One index of
10 justness is the set of conditions under which the
11 parties operate. The conditions in this case were
12 conditions of chaos.

13 And what the other side is saying, I think,
14 is: We each tried to make the most reasonable deal we
15 could, the most advantageous for us that we could, under
16 these conditions of chaos.

17 They certainly produced a rate that wouldn't
18 have been produced in a calm time either by market-based
19 tariffs or by cost-plus-return ratemaking. But under
20 the circumstances that we did operate in, this is what
21 it produced. And we were dealing at arm's length.
22 Nobody was engaging in fraud, et cetera. So that's
23 just.

24 And I think when you say, as you did a
25 minute ago, there is an overarching obligation or

1 standard of justness and reasonableness, I think you're
2 saying that that reasoning that I just tried to outline
3 is not sufficient reasoning for sustaining the contract.

4 Now, if I'm wrong, tell me.

5 If I'm right, it seems to me you're really
6 saying ditch the contracts if they were entered into in
7 a period of high volatility.

8 MR. WRIGHT: Well, Your Honor, let me make
9 clear what -- what we mean by "chaos" or "high
10 volatility." We think we have to show that manipulation
11 was affecting the market. We don't -- we don't think we
12 are entitled to relief if it was the weather that was
13 affecting the market. FERC's 2003 staff --

14 JUSTICE SOUTER: Are you entitled to relief
15 if there was manipulation, but these people were not
16 engaging in the manipulation? In other words, they are,
17 in effect, innocent of the manipulation; but they, as
18 sellers, are in a chaotic market. Are you entitled to
19 relief against them under those circumstances?

20 MR. WRIGHT: We -- we don't think that a
21 statute that protects consumers and says that consumers
22 get just and reasonable rates was enacted to prevent --
23 to overcome contracts only when there is fraud in the
24 contract.

25 JUSTICE SOUTER: The trouble is that

1 justness is a relational category, and you are -- I
2 think you are saying we don't have to consider justness
3 to the parties who were doing -- we will assume for the
4 sake of the question -- the best that they could under
5 bad circumstances. You are saying justness only goes to
6 the ultimate retail ratepayer.

7 MR. WRIGHT: Again, Your Honor, we don't
8 need the statute. The statute is superfluous insofar as
9 it affects contracts, and that is its main effect, if it
10 requires fraud in the negotiation of the contract.

11 And, again, if Morgan Stanley can show that
12 it was a victim of manipulation, too, then it is
13 entitled to relief. There has certainly been some of
14 that with respect to some of these spot market deals
15 where there are occasionally intervening parties.

16 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Wright, I really don't
17 understand why you would -- why you say, you know, if --
18 if the chaos is due to the weather or maybe, you know,
19 an Arab oil embargo or whatever, that that's perfectly
20 okay. But if it's due to manipulation, it's bad. I can
21 understand if you added manipulation by one of the
22 parties, by the sellers, that I could understand.

23 But so long as it's a factor extrinsic to
24 the parties to the contract, what difference does it
25 make to the buyer whether the flukishness of the market

1 is caused by the weather or by manipulation by somebody
2 other than the seller?

3 In other words, I think it's not enough to
4 show manipulation. That's what's going on in the
5 market. And you're trying to save yourself from it. So
6 long as it's not manipulation by the seller, I don't see
7 how you have a -- I don't know -- an equitable case.

8 MR. WRIGHT: It -- on the equities, if the
9 local utilities end up bearing the brunt of making bad
10 judgments about the weather, that's one thing. It's
11 quite another thing if there is rampant non-compliance,
12 hiding the fact that there's been massive withholding of
13 energy, and driving -- and these spikes were not
14 accidental, by any means. That seems to us to be, you
15 know, a -- a sort of distinction that the -- that the
16 law draws all the time.

17 And let me say the example came --

18 JUSTICE STEVENS: I'm still puzzled by your
19 answer to Justice Scalia. If, say, it is something like
20 an atom bomb or terrorism or something totally innocent,
21 where the parties are -- but it causes the same economic
22 consequence, namely: That the rates are a lot higher
23 than they otherwise would be, why do you draw the
24 distinction that he says doesn't make sense?

25 MR. WRIGHT: Well, I guess the ultimate

1 distinction is that there isn't somebody making a whole
2 lot of money on account of market manipulation
3 somewhere.

4 JUSTICE STEVENS: No, but in each case the
5 rates would be higher than they otherwise would, and
6 you'd have to say they're high enough to be no longer
7 just and reasonable.

8 MR. WRIGHT: Well, "just and reasonable,"
9 again, has always -- has traditionally first meant a
10 sort of cost-of-service inquiry and more recently means
11 a market inquiry. But, again, a market inquiry doesn't
12 -- means a competitive market, an effective market, as
13 Professor Kahn said, not a market totally infected by
14 manipulation. And then, in any case --

15 JUSTICE STEVENS: Even if infected by an act
16 of God, it seems to me the same consequence.

17 MR. WRIGHT: I guess consumers bear the
18 brunt of acts of God, but don't -- shouldn't bear the
19 brunt of market manipulation that was unlawful and now
20 is --

21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I think you could argue
22 that it should be just the obverse.

23 JUSTICE SOUTER: Aren't you really arguing
24 -- no, but aren't you really making the argument that
25 the notion of justness does have an equitable component

1 that looks to the source of the trouble; and if the
2 source of the chaos in the market are the very people
3 who are trying to make a profit on your contract, that
4 is a reason to say that that market-based rate is not a
5 just one, because they created the conditions that gave
6 them the leverage to get you to make the deal that you
7 made?

8 But if they are not guilty of improper
9 conduct in making it, then, you know, everybody has to
10 take his lumps. Aren't you saying something like that?

11 MR. WRIGHT: We don't know because FERC
12 hasn't looked at it, what -- who Morgan Stanley paid and
13 what they paid and who made the money here.

14 JUSTICE SOUTER: No, but just as a general
15 premise, in your answer to Justice Scalia weren't you
16 assuming something like that?

17 MR. WRIGHT: We certainly think that the
18 best result would be that whoever was manipulating the
19 market ought to be the one who ends up getting their
20 return cut; and that the local utilities and any
21 innocent middlemen should be made whole, too. That's
22 fine.

23 It was brought up earlier in discussing the
24 market-based rate program sort of what sorts of remedies
25 were allowed. And let me say that -- well, I think this

1 came out, but the Enron example shows very well. Enron
2 got market-based rate authority in 1993. Enron was not
3 the only player, but was a leading player in the market
4 manipulation in 2000-2001. FERC didn't get around to
5 lifting their market-based rate authority until 2003,
6 and they did it strictly prospectively.

7 It is a core point of our argument today
8 that that shouldn't be allowed. And I think the answer
9 was: Well, market-based rate authority only results in
10 lifting the market-based rate authority; a 206 action
11 under the Federal Power Act is where consumers get
12 relief.

13 That's right, and we're here to get relief,
14 and we think that ultimately the parties that
15 manipulated the market and made too much money on
16 account of the manipulation ought to -- ought to lose
17 what they paid; and, certainly, the ratepayers shouldn't
18 bear the costs; and if there are innocent middlemen they
19 shouldn't bear the cost, either.

20 JUSTICE SOUTER: And, to the extent that you
21 make that argument, that's an answer, sort of, to the
22 question that I put to you a couple of times: Why, why
23 isn't your argument anything less broad than the fact
24 that you can't make a contract in a chaotic market?

25 And you are, at least as a subset of what

1 you are saying, telling us that if the contract -- if
2 the chaos in the market was caused by the impropriety of
3 one contracting party, that party should not profit from
4 it. And I understand that answer. That if -- to the
5 extent that that is your position, it is an answer to my
6 question.

7 MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Your Honor.

8 And let me remind the Court that one case
9 that the other side I don't think has acknowledged
10 sufficiently is this Court's 1974 Texaco decision. That
11 was a situation where FERC -- well, the Federal Power
12 Commission attempted -- attempted to do what the other
13 side is asking this Court to rule today, to essentially
14 make contracts sacrosanct and not subject to any
15 challenge.

16 FERC had told small producers that it
17 wouldn't -- that they could enter into contracts and
18 they didn't have to file the contracts, and the
19 Commission wouldn't review the contracts to see if they
20 were just and reasonable. This Court very clearly held,
21 quote, "The Commission lacks authority to place
22 exclusive reliance on market prices," unquote.

23 Under this statute, which requires just and
24 reasonable rates, there must be coexistence between
25 contracts and a regulatory backstop. And, again, in the

1 situation here that you helped me review -- the worst
2 electricity market crisis in history, rampant
3 non-compliance, rates that were multiples of traditional
4 levels, and couldn't be justified under anything FERC
5 has ever called a just and reasonable standard, and FERC
6 had said it was going to examine a benchmark -- this is
7 a case that FERC has to go back and explain why, at
8 least explain why it thinks these rates are just and
9 reasonable.

10 JUSTICE SCALIA: Just and reasonable when?

11 MR. WRIGHT: On the day they were made.

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: On the day they were
13 agreed to.

14 MR. WRIGHT: And we think they weren't,
15 because they were the product of market manipulation
16 that made all of the rates available --

17 JUSTICE SCALIA: They were just and
18 reasonable --

19 MR. WRIGHT: -- that made all rates unjust
20 and unreasonable on that date, Your Honor.

21 JUSTICE SOUTER: But I think -- and here I
22 want to be clear on this -- you're saying they were not
23 just and reasonable on the date they were made, number
24 one, if the market manipulation that caused the chaos
25 was manipulation by these Petitioners. That at least is

1 part of your argument.

2 But I think you're also saying that the
3 rates were not just and reasonable if they were the
4 result of market manipulation by others, not these
5 Petitioners. Am I correct that your argument is broad
6 enough to encompass the second alternative?

7 MR. WRIGHT: Absolutely, Your Honor.

8 JUSTICE SOUTER: Okay.

9 JUSTICE ALITO: And even that argument is
10 much narrower than what the Ninth Circuit held, isn't
11 it? The Ninth Circuit just referred to "dysfunction in
12 the market." They didn't say: And dysfunction means
13 manipulation by anybody. They seemed to have included
14 all sorts of other things: The California regulatory
15 program, the weather, and a number of other factors.

16 MR. WRIGHT: Your Honor, we certainly agree
17 that the test can't be dysfunction; that FERC has to
18 grapple with this issue and give it a concrete meaning.

19 I'm sure there would be disagreement on
20 remand as to exactly what it means, and there are lines
21 to be drawn. But FERC needs to do that. FERC hasn't
22 done that.

23 FERC honestly thought -- again, this is an
24 unusual case. FERC honestly thinks that the public
25 interest standard, or thought that the public interest

1 standard, is a completely different animal than the just
2 and reasonable standard.

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: If you are relying on the
4 narrowest ground that Justice Souter mentioned, namely,
5 manipulation by the seller, wasn't it incumbent on you
6 to demonstrate that there was manipulation by the
7 seller? Has that been -- has that been established?

8 MR. WRIGHT: We are relying on both, Your
9 Honor. We are -- our -- our main argument is that all
10 rates in the West at this period of time --

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: Because of manipulation by
12 somebody.

13 MR. WRIGHT: -- were the result of
14 manipulation.

15 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay.

16 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, didn't the ALJ find
17 there wasn't manipulation in this market, the forward
18 market?

19 MR. WRIGHT: And the ALJ found that the spot
20 market -- the ALJ found that the spot market
21 manipulation didn't affect the forward markets. No one
22 agrees to that today. FERC has disowned it. Morgan
23 Stanley has disowned it. I'm told that the ALJ has
24 disowned it.

25 JUSTICE ALITO: FERC disowned -- did FERC

1 reject the finding of the ALJ as to manipulation of this
2 --

3 MR. WRIGHT: FERC said it was irrelevant.
4 That was the part of FERC's first order, where it said
5 it is irrelevant whether the manipulation of the spot
6 markets affected manipulation in the long-term markets.
7 That would be relevant only if the just and reasonable
8 standard applies. Of course, the just and reasonable
9 standard applies.

10 One final point. One remarkable aspect of
11 this case is after FERC said that in its initial order,
12 Morgan Stanley asked them to reconsider it, and they
13 said we won't do that. Thank you.

14 JUSTICE SOUTER: Mr. Kneedler, in your
15 rebuttal, will you address the state of the record with
16 respect to evidence or findings about possible
17 manipulation by these Petitioners?

18 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

19 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT FERC,

20 IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONERS

21 MR. KNEEDLER: Yes. On page 1589 of the
22 joint appendix the Commission said we've reviewed the
23 staff reports findings in the 100-day discovery, which
24 were discovery occurring in other proceedings, and found
25 no evidence to support a finding of market manipulation

1 that specifically affected the contracts at issue.

2 It's important to recognize that there were
3 two separate markets here. There was the spot market,
4 which had struck in addition to all the weather and all
5 those things, it had structural problems requiring the
6 California investor-owned utilities to trade on the spot
7 market, which contributed to the opportunities for the
8 manipulation. The dysfunction and manipulation were
9 tied together in that market, but there was -- the ALJ
10 found that the long-term market was not dysfunctional.
11 It was functioning, it operated as it should. Both
12 parties --

13 JUSTICE STEVENS: -- know that's a premise
14 in the debate. I find it hard to accept. How could the
15 two be totally separate? It was the crisis that made it
16 necessary to engage in the long-term account.

17 MR. KNEEDLER: FERC has great discretion in
18 deciding how to apply the public interest standard.
19 It's not necessary to find that they were absolutely
20 separate. It's sufficient, though, to say that the
21 problems in the two separate markets -- the situations
22 in the two separate markets were very different. And in
23 the long-term market, FERC concluded it was important to
24 maintain the integrity of the contracts, indeed, under a
25 market-based system, as Justice Alito said, more

1 important now even than at the time of Mobile, because
2 you can't have a functioning market based-rate system
3 without confidence that contracts would be upheld.

4 In that situation, as this Court suggested
5 in Verizon, you had sophisticated buyers and
6 sophisticated sellers dealing in a situation in which
7 both knew that there was chaos in the spot market, that
8 there was -- there were structural problems there, and
9 that there were allegations of manipulation. But those
10 allegations did not carry over to the, to the long-term
11 market.

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: May I ask, I am sure you
13 understand that a finding that there was no
14 manipulations that affected these contracts is not the
15 same as a finding that there was no manipulation by
16 these sellers in the market.

17 MR. KNEEDLER: Right.

18 JUSTICE SCALIA: And there is no such
19 finding that there was no manipulation?

20 MR. KNEEDLER: That's correct. But what --

21 JUSTICE SCALIA: And there is no finding
22 that there was by these sellers.

23 MR. KNEEDLER: That's correct. And what the
24 Commission was basically saying is we are treating the
25 long-term market situation differently. Some of these

1 sellers may have been engaged in manipulation in the
2 short-term market, but FERC was trying to draw a
3 distinction between the spot market and moving forward
4 and maintaining the integrity of markets in the
5 long-term where both the buyers and the sellers were
6 both buyers and sellers typically.

7 JUSTICE SOUTER: But, in fact, it didn't get
8 that articulate. The closest it came to answering my
9 question, I take it, is at the point to which you
10 referred me in the joint appendix, no effect on these
11 contracts?

12 MR. KNEEDLER: That's correct. We don't
13 think FERC should have to engage in a market-based
14 evaluation of possible manipulation in order to hold two
15 parties, two sophisticated parties to their bargain.

16 JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, then what do you say
17 about the standard of justness? In effect, I think
18 you're saying it doesn't matter whether these particular
19 Petitioners manipulated the market creating the
20 conditions under which these contracts were made at a
21 price which turned out to be much higher than the spot
22 price would be later, it's irrelevant. That's your
23 position, isn't it?

24 MR. KNEEDLER: The manipulation in the spot
25 market, we think FERC properly concluded, did not have

1 to be taken into account --

2 JUSTICE SOUTER: I'm not talking about what
3 FERC said. I'm talking about your position. I think
4 your position is that even if these people -- even if
5 these people -- Petitioners manipulated and that created
6 the -- or contributing to creating the market under
7 which these contracts were made, that is irrelevant in
8 looking at the contracts --

9 MR. KNEEDLER: I think that's something that
10 FERC would have to decide in this case. But I don't
11 believe a claim of that sort has been made here. I
12 believe the claim has --

13 JUSTICE SOUTER: I'm not asking what claim
14 has been made. I want to know -- I want to know what
15 the government's position is. And as I understand the
16 government's position is that manipulation by these
17 Petitioners would be irrelevant to a review under the
18 public interest standard, is that right?

19 MR. KNEEDLER: I think that's the best way
20 to read FERC's decision in this case. And I think
21 that's --

22 JUSTICE SOUTER: Is that the best way to
23 read the government's position.

24 MR. KNEEDLER: Yes.

25 JUSTICE SOUTER: Here and now in this

1 courtroom.

2 MR. KNEEDLER: That FERC -- our position is
3 that FERC was not required in the public interest, which
4 looks at the market as a whole not just the two parties
5 to the contract, it looks to the consequences for the
6 market as a whole in unraveling particular contracts
7 because there might have been manipulation somewhere
8 else. We think FERC, recognizing the importance of
9 integrity of contracts, could decide that it was going
10 to look no further than the particular contracts at
11 issue in deciding whether there was market manipulation.

12 JUSTICE STEVENS: The case is undertaken.

13 (Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the case in the
14 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

A	12:19	30:2	27:25 30:17	47:7
able 16:4 22:12	addressing 13:6	AMERICAN	31:14,20 32:10	backs 33:21
above-entitled	13:7	1:11	39:8 43:24	backstop 46:25
1:23 55:14	adjusting 37:16	amount 25:4	45:7,21,23	bad 9:23 17:3
abrogate 32:18	adjustments	animal 49:1	48:1,5,9 49:9	18:12,22 29:6
abrogated 32:13	37:11	announced 19:8	50:18	41:5,20 42:9
abrogates 37:25	administrative	answer 10:11	arguments	balance 14:13
abrogating	22:15 34:18	14:5 15:21	25:23,24	bargain 17:3
37:15	adopted 17:22	37:7 38:16,24	arising 5:12	53:15
abrogation	advantageous	42:19 44:15	arm's 39:21	barriers 22:1
11:18 13:24	39:15	45:8,21 46:4,5	articulate 53:8	based 22:15
absent 28:4	affect 12:7 13:3	answering 53:8	aside 8:20 19:3	27:2
absolutely 18:22	13:13 49:21	anybody 31:17	asked 22:13	based-rate 52:2
28:7 48:7	affirmance 5:21	48:13	37:8 50:12	bases 38:7
51:19	agencies 34:18	anyway 22:25	asking 15:18	basic 30:17
abundancy	agency 6:13,20	APPEARAN...	46:13 54:13	basically 52:24
15:24	6:21 27:10	2:1	aspect 24:9	basis 11:2 12:4,5
abuse 20:8	29:8	appendix 8:14	50:10	13:23 14:10
accept 51:14	ago 12:8 16:24	8:15,22 15:9	assume 41:3	19:2,5 22:13
access 22:2	39:25	50:22 53:10	assuming 18:22	23:22 30:14
accidental 42:14	agree 24:16,16	applicant 9:4	44:16	bear 43:17,18
account 30:2	48:16	applied 27:5	assurances	45:18,19
43:2 45:16	agreed 47:13	31:9	21:24	bearing 42:9
51:16 54:1	agreement	applies 8:8 9:5	assure 15:24	began 15:18
acknowledge	22:21 25:19	25:20,22 38:13	22:22	behalf 2:3,5,7
26:1	agreements 38:2	50:8,9	atom 42:20	3:4,7,9,12 4:10
acknowledged	agrees 49:22	apply 8:1 9:2	attacks 12:19	15:15 25:11
46:9	AL 1:9,13,18	25:18 51:18	attempted 46:12	50:19
acknowledges	Alito 9:9 25:23	applying 8:11	46:12	believe 54:11,12
28:11	26:23 27:7	27:11	attention 8:13	believed 6:4
acquired 12:3	48:9 49:16,25	appreciate 33:5	authority 6:4,7	believes 5:16
12:24 14:2	51:25	approach 16:1	6:11 9:8 10:12	15:23 16:8
acquisition 13:2	Alito's 10:11,24	27:10,13	10:17 12:4	benchmark 32:4
13:10	ALJ 49:16,19,20	approaches	14:4 15:20	36:15 37:5
act 4:19 5:19 6:1	49:23 50:1	22:18	17:13 20:13	47:6
7:4,5,6 17:9	51:9	approval 9:10	21:23 45:2,5,9	best 41:4 44:18
25:20 26:3	allegations 52:9	9:12	45:10 46:21	54:19,22
29:8,10 43:15	52:10	approving 26:9	available 47:16	big 34:5 37:13
45:11	allowed 18:18	April 15:10,10	aware 19:7	binding 19:17
action 45:10	22:18 36:5	Arab 41:19	22:11	20:8 22:23
actions 33:16	44:25 45:8	argue 43:21	a.m 1:25 4:2	bit 37:2
acts 43:18	alter 10:12	arguing 6:13	B	black 13:2
add 25:16	alternative 36:4	27:8 28:5	back 7:13 27:1,9	bomb 42:20
added 41:21	48:6	43:23	27:25 32:16	bothering 27:18
addition 51:4	alternatives	argument 1:24	33:9,12 37:6	bought 34:4,5
address 50:15	39:4	3:2,10 4:4,9	37:21 38:15	35:4
addressed 12:18	amendments	15:14 25:10		brief 8:17 28:11

briefs 25:19 broad 28:8 39:8 45:23 48:5 broader 7:1 32:12 brought 44:23 brunt 42:9 43:18,19 building 16:3 burdens 5:4 bureaucratic 24:14 business 20:20 buy 16:16 37:1 buyer 19:10 41:25 buyers 14:21 16:13 17:21 21:2,9,15 52:5 53:5,6 buying 21:3,4 34:7	22:3,4 25:17 31:4 32:16 34:15,20 37:16 39:11 42:7 43:4,14 46:8 47:7 48:24 50:11 54:10,20 55:12,13 cases 18:15,20 category 41:1 caused 18:1 20:2 42:1 46:2 47:24 causes 42:21 central 26:24 cert 5:8 30:1 certainly 13:4 31:16 39:17 41:13 44:17 45:17 48:16 cetera 39:22 challenge 14:21 14:24 22:3 46:15 changed 35:23 36:21 changes 12:6 37:20 channel 5:14 chaos 39:12,16 40:9 41:18 44:2 46:2 47:24 52:7 chaotic 35:18,24 36:11 38:19,20 40:18 45:24 charge 21:8 choice 36:2,2 chose 33:15 CHRISTOPH... 2:7 3:8 25:10 Circuit 5:24 6:10,12,13 7:20 8:11,23 12:16 13:6,6 15:19,21 19:16 19:24 48:10,11	Circuit's 5:7,18 16:6,12 35:15 circumstance 9:21 19:19 26:18,21 circumstances 5:12 9:7 12:7 20:24 21:17 27:1 29:17 39:20 40:19 41:5 claim 29:5 30:4 30:14,14 32:11 32:12 34:1 54:11,12,13 clause 22:14 clauses 22:17 clear 5:17,18,23 25:21 28:7 30:22 38:5 40:9 47:22 clearing 35:6,13 clearly 46:20 clients 35:17 closely 32:7 closest 53:8 coexistence 46:24 collateral 12:19 come 31:16,17 35:19 Commerce 7:6 commercial 21:18 Commission 4:14,18 6:18 8:21 9:16,20 10:3,11 15:20 15:22,23 16:2 16:8,23 17:25 19:7 20:10,23 21:16,20,21 22:5,7,11,18 23:22,25 24:3 24:13 30:12 33:9 37:21,24 46:12,19,21	50:22 52:24 Commissioner 31:6,20 Commission's 8:5,14,18 companies 4:17 5:3 10:18 12:6 12:10 company 9:5,7 12:3 competition 38:9,17,18 competitive 26:11,14,16 28:3,4 43:12 complain 27:24 complaint 11:5 complete 20:6 completely 49:1 complying 30:7 component 43:25 conceded 35:9 concedes 29:23 concerned 13:5 concerns 5:14 concluded 4:18 14:25 51:23 53:25 conclusion 4:23 7:19,19 18:24 23:21 31:21 concrete 48:18 condition 30:13 conditions 19:8 39:10,11,12,16 44:5 53:20 conducive 19:8 conduct 44:9 confidence 52:3 connection 9:24 9:24 consequence 6:2 6:3 28:5 42:22 43:16 consequences 55:5	consider 6:21,22 41:2 consistent 16:23 31:13,20 33:20 consumer 17:10 17:10 consumers 17:21 21:10 40:21,21 43:17 45:11 contemplates 7:6 contend 30:7 context 13:20 continue 5:25 12:5 contract 5:14 7:7,7,9,10 8:4 9:22 11:10,19 12:25 13:21,24 14:10,12 16:11 16:16,20 17:16 18:18,20 19:3 19:13,15,17 20:7,8,11,12 21:1 22:13,19 22:22 24:22 26:17 27:22 28:2 29:16 30:25 31:14,19 32:13,18 33:10 35:19,22,25 36:10,22 37:3 37:4,15,25 38:21 39:5 40:3,24 41:10 41:24 44:3 45:24 46:1 55:5 contracting 19:20 21:12 46:3 contracts 4:16 4:21 5:2 7:2 8:19 9:1,11,19 9:21,25 10:13 12:20 13:1,12
--	--	--	--	--

C

13:13 14:18,20 16:5 17:20 18:3,5,11,14 18:16 19:1 21:7,17 23:11 27:1,22 28:8 28:24 30:21 31:21 32:1,3 33:12 36:14,17 38:6,10 40:6 40:23 41:9 46:14,17,18,19 46:25 51:1,24 52:3,14 53:11 53:20 54:7,8 55:6,9,10 contradiction 31:7 contrary 9:11 contributed 51:7 contributing 54:6 control 26:20 core 45:7 CORPORATI... 1:12 correct 5:10 6:25 13:5 17:15 20:9 22:10 32:14 48:5 52:20,23 53:12 cost 7:2 15:25 34:21 45:19 costs 45:18 cost-of-service 26:12 27:9,13 43:10 cost-plus-return 31:18 39:19 country 5:25 County 1:8,17 4:7 couple 45:22 course 23:6 26:17 29:7	34:2 50:8 Court 1:1,24 4:4 4:13,24 5:17 5:20 6:15,17 7:3,15,22 15:17 17:18 20:22,23 25:13 46:8,13,20 52:4 courtroom 55:1 Court's 4:20 8:1 8:7,8,13 16:24 46:10 cover 31:4 CPUC 35:15 created 44:5 54:5 creating 53:19 54:6 crisis 5:13 12:12 28:12 32:4 47:2 51:15 critical 26:14 cross-examina... 33:3,6 current 22:25 23:5,13 customers 5:4 21:19 cut 21:20 44:20 <hr/> D D 4:1 damaging 16:22 date 11:5 47:20 47:23 day 30:21 36:25 47:11,12 deal 39:14 44:6 dealing 39:21 52:6 deals 41:14 debate 51:14 December 14:17 31:25 decide 7:14 38:12 54:10	55:9 decided 9:20 17:25 18:10 deciding 51:18 55:11 decision 5:7,11 5:21 6:5,7,10 6:10 7:4 8:6,7 8:8,14 12:16 15:19,21 16:7 16:12,24 17:9 19:16 37:19 46:10 54:20 decisions 4:20 5:17 6:15,16 7:15 8:1 15:8 17:1,3,12 declared 31:9 deems 32:2 degree 27:21 Dellinger 2:5 3:6,11 15:13 15:14,16 17:6 17:14 18:9 19:4,23 20:4,9 20:17,21 22:10 23:3,9,12,16 23:17,20 24:3 24:9 25:6 demands 11:10 demonstrate 49:6 denied 4:15 deny 5:8 Department 2:3 Deputy 2:2 deregulatory 26:19 derelict 30:12 described 35:14 detail 35:15 determination 8:17 22:16 24:14,15 27:3 determine 8:25 9:4 34:23 determined 9:17	35:5 determining 34:20 development 16:25 Diego 18:4 difference 20:1 37:13 38:3 41:24 different 10:1 30:11 32:23,24 32:25 38:1 49:1 51:22 differently 52:25 diminish 15:3 direction 6:23 directly 12:18 disadvantage 27:24 disadvantageo... 7:11 38:22 disagree 26:5 disagreement 48:19 discouraged 18:2 discovered 9:11 discovery 50:23 50:24 discretion 7:14 20:13 25:16,18 51:17 discriminatory 5:5 discussing 44:23 disowned 49:22 49:23,24,25 dissent 31:7 distinction 42:15,24 43:1 53:3 distinguish 38:5 District 1:7,16 4:6,6 ditch 40:6 doctrine 5:19	doing 41:3 Douglas 26:10 draw 42:23 53:2 drawn 48:21 draws 42:16 drew 4:23 driving 42:13 due 41:18,20 duress 18:13 dysfunction 10:4,5 13:8 16:9,15 22:7 22:25 23:5,7,9 23:14 24:12 48:11,12,17 51:8 dysfunctional 19:18,22,25 20:6 21:5 51:10 D.C 1:20 2:3,5,7 <hr/> E E 3:1 4:1,1 earlier 44:23 economic 42:21 economists 26:19 EDWIN 2:2 3:3 4:9 50:18 effect 22:20 28:23 30:8,16 37:17,25 38:15 40:17 41:9 53:10,17 effective 38:9,17 38:18 43:12 effects 36:11 eight 16:17 either 8:10 21:7 22:14 27:12 39:18 45:19 elaborate 21:23 35:7 elaboration 35:8 ELECTRIC 1:11
---	---	---	---	--

electrical 15:24	36:25 38:10	expectation	15:5,10 16:21	41:25
electricity 28:12	39:4 40:6	17:20	17:22 18:3	follow 30:15
47:2	entering 16:14	explain 47:7,8	25:15,17,22	31:2
eliminating	18:2	expressly 24:4	26:7,11,21,25	followed 11:1
11:13	enters 9:10	extensive 15:7	27:4,8,25	follows 34:13
embargo 41:19	entire 32:12	extent 13:15	29:12,12 30:14	Ford 36:2
empower 15:19	entirely 12:23	24:20 45:20	31:25 32:6,16	formation 9:24
empowerment	entitled 40:12	46:5	32:25 33:18	formulated 8:11
6:22	40:14,18 41:13	extraordinary	34:22 35:16	forward 10:4
empowers 6:10	entrance 14:17	20:24	36:13 37:4,8	14:8 22:8,9
enacted 40:22	entry 22:1	extremely 25:17	38:4,11 44:11	24:10 49:17,21
encompass 48:6	equally 8:9	extrinsic 41:23	45:4 46:11,16	53:3
encourage 15:25	equitable 42:7		47:4,5,7 48:17	found 4:25 5:1
16:24	43:25	F	48:21,21,23,24	10:3 12:16
encouraged	equities 42:8	facilities 22:2	49:22,25,25	21:17 49:19,20
15:2	especially 14:9	fact 10:18 12:5	50:3,11,19	50:24 51:10
encouragement	ESQ 2:2,5,7 3:3	12:23 13:25	51:17,23 53:2	four 28:6,10
15:4	3:6,8,11	15:19 18:1	53:13,25 54:3	33:3,7
encouraging	essential 15:23	19:13 22:23	54:10 55:2,3,8	fourth 31:23,24
14:17	16:8	28:1 35:20	FERC's 5:21	32:9
ends 44:19	essentially 46:13	36:16 42:12	7:13 25:25	fraud 9:24 10:13
energy 4:14 5:13	established 49:7	45:23 53:7	29:23 40:13	11:13,14 18:22
12:12 15:24	et 1:9,12,18	factor 20:2	50:4 54:20	20:8 39:22
16:3 36:18	39:22	41:23	file 33:15 46:18	40:23 41:10
37:1 42:13	evaluation	factors 4:24	filed 11:6 27:5	front 27:25
enforceable	53:14	5:15 20:2	filing 12:13,14	frustrate 15:4
27:22 28:24	everybody	48:15	final 15:11	full 24:17
29:16	33:20 44:9	failed 5:1 30:15	50:10	functioning
enforced 28:1	evidence 12:2	failure 30:5 31:2	financial 5:2	51:11 52:2
engage 10:12	18:11,12,13,13	fair 13:1 31:4	find 49:16 51:14	fundamental
21:12 38:2	24:5 50:16,25	34:23	51:19	17:18
51:16 53:13	ex 37:11	fairly 21:13	finding 11:8,8	fundamentally
engaged 13:19	exactly 23:16	faith 9:23 18:12	11:18 14:11	15:21
53:1	48:20	18:22 20:7	23:23 50:1,25	fundamentals
engaging 39:22	examine 47:6	February 1:21	52:13,15,19,21	10:7
40:16	example 20:16	Federal 4:14,19	findings 21:16	further 8:2 25:6
Enron 45:1,1,2	20:17,18,21	6:18 7:4 26:2	50:16,23	55:10
ensure 29:8	23:22 42:17	29:8,8,9 45:11	finds 20:11	future 13:12
enter 13:12	45:1	46:11	fine 29:15 44:22	23:1
16:11,20 18:20	excessive 5:3	FERC 2:4 3:4	firm 13:11	
19:13 22:22	exclusive 46:22	4:10,23 5:5,6	first 4:23 21:17	G
23:11 26:21	exercise 9:18	5:11,16 6:2,3,6	26:9 28:10	G 4:1
36:10 46:17	exercised 9:13	6:11,11,17 7:1	29:2 43:9 50:4	GARRE 6:3
entered 4:17	20:14 23:23	7:16,17,18,20	fixed 22:19	7:16
8:19 9:2 12:20	exist 19:2	9:3,12 10:17	flaw 12:17	Gas 7:5
26:17 27:2	existed 12:21	12:4,18 14:16	flexibility 7:1	general 2:2
35:18,22,25	expect 35:1	14:19,25 15:1	flukishness	18:23 28:23

29:15 44:14 generation 10:8 21:25 getting 44:19 Ginsburg 5:6 6:9 7:12,17 12:10 14:15 15:5,18 17:1,7 17:15 18:6 22:5 23:17,25 24:6 26:10 28:4 31:25 34:19 38:16,25 Ginsburg's 25:15 37:7 give 7:1 48:18 given 9:10 23:13 29:1 giving 22:14 28:22 go 7:12 15:2 20:20 27:1,9 33:9 34:20 37:6,21 47:7 God 43:16,18 goes 41:5 going 5:25 10:5 10:7 11:22,25 14:8 16:1,4 17:11,21 18:7 22:12 23:6,14 25:3 27:12,13 27:20 29:4,5 31:18 32:7 36:14 37:2,17 37:21 38:15 42:4 47:6 55:9 going-forward 12:4 good 15:16 20:7 29:14 34:9 government 5:8 5:24 6:2 28:11 29:23,25 government's 54:15,16,23 grant 21:22	granted 5:20 9:7 9:12 10:16 grapple 29:12 33:18 48:18 grapples 38:11 great 35:7 51:17 ground 49:4 Group 1:4 4:5 guarantee 24:24 guaranteed 19:12 guarantees 24:22 guess 27:17 42:25 43:17 guilty 30:5 44:8 <hr/> H hand 37:24 happened 14:22 happens 9:9 24:23 hard 51:14 Harlan's 17:9 17:19 harm 21:11 harms 21:14 hear 4:4 heard 29:19 held 46:20 48:10 help 29:4 helped 33:6 47:1 helps 39:7 Henry 36:2 hiding 42:12 high 20:19 31:15 40:7,9 43:6 higher 31:17 42:22 43:5 53:21 history 28:12 32:5 47:2 hold 11:10 53:14 honestly 48:23 48:24 Honor 29:7 32:15 33:24	34:8,14,25 36:1,23 38:4 39:1 40:8 41:7 46:7 47:20 48:7,16 49:9 hour 37:21,21 huge 38:3 hurdle 38:8 hydropower 10:9 <hr/> I idea 23:14 identified 4:24 7:25 9:18 ignore 27:15 illustrative 22:21 importance 9:20 55:8 important 10:2 11:13 16:7 17:21 19:4,19 20:10 51:2,23 52:1 impose 5:2,3 improper 44:8 impropriety 46:2 improved 29:25 30:1 included 48:13 including 38:21 inconsistent 30:9 incorrect 5:20 incumbent 49:5 independently 7:18 index 39:9 indicates 37:19 industry 16:25 infected 43:13 43:15 inflated 22:9 influenced 19:17 24:11	information 22:6 infrastructure 16:3 initial 12:25 50:11 Initially 36:17 innocent 40:17 42:20 44:21 45:18 inquiry 26:16 43:10,11,11 insist 7:10 insofar 41:8 instability 17:25 instructs 29:8 integrity 8:19 9:21 51:24 53:4 55:9 interest 4:22 7:25 8:3,12 11:8,10,13 13:15,23 14:11 14:25 16:21 20:12 32:13 48:25,25 51:18 54:18 55:3 interpretation 5:19 6:1 8:7 26:2 interpreting 7:18 interpretive 6:4 6:7 7:24 8:6 Interstate 7:5 intervening 6:17 41:15 intimating 23:21 investment 16:2 34:22 investor-owned 51:6 involved 12:11 24:21 irrelevant 24:8 24:12 50:3,5	53:22 54:7,17 issue 30:11 32:1 48:18 51:1 55:11 i.e 28:2 <hr/> J J 2:7 3:8 25:10 January 15:10 job 21:21 22:6 joint 8:14,15,22 15:9 22:18 50:22 53:10 Judge 26:10 28:3 judgment 6:5 8:6 judgments 42:10 June 15:10 Justice 2:3 4:3 4:12 5:6,23 6:9 6:19 7:12,17 9:9 10:10,11 10:15,20,22,24 10:24 11:7,14 11:17,23 12:1 12:10,22 13:9 13:17 14:15 15:5,13,16,18 17:1,7,9,14,19 18:6,21 19:21 19:23 20:4,16 20:18 22:5,24 23:4,10,13,17 23:25 24:6,20 25:4,5,9,12,15 25:23 26:23 27:7,17 28:14 28:18,21 29:11 29:14,19 30:3 30:10,19,23 31:12,24 32:8 32:17,21 33:2 33:8,19 34:9 34:11,19 35:17 36:8,16 37:6,7
---	--	---	---	--

38:14,16,25 39:6 40:14,25 41:16 42:18,19 43:4,15,21,23 44:14,15 45:20 47:10,12,17,21 48:8,9 49:3,4 49:11,15,16,25 50:14 51:13,25 52:12,18,21 53:7,16 54:2 54:13,22,25 55:12 justified 47:4 justness 39:9,10 40:1 41:1,2,5 43:25 53:17	52:7 know 16:15,19 19:6,10,14,24 20:23 21:6 23:20 24:19 28:14 33:17 34:2 35:17,23 37:22 39:8 41:17,18 42:7 42:15 44:9,11 51:13 54:14,14 knowledge 24:17	local 37:1 42:9 44:20 Lockyer 12:16 long 12:8 19:12 20:7 21:11 27:23 36:3 41:23 42:6 longer 18:3 43:6 longstanding 8:18 long-term 14:18 14:20 15:2 16:4,11 18:5 18:15,16,18,25 19:19 22:22 23:11 35:19,22 35:25 36:6,10 36:22 38:2,6,9 38:21 50:6 51:10,16,23 52:10,25 53:5 look 29:11 55:10 looked 5:5 44:12 looking 54:8 looks 44:1 55:4 55:5 lose 37:2 45:16 lot 42:22 43:2 low 17:4,17 35:8 lower 19:12 33:10 lowest 15:24 luck 37:22 lumps 44:10	mandate 15:23 manipulated 9:14 45:15 53:19 54:5 manipulating 44:18 manipulation 9:18 11:9,15 11:16,18 13:20 13:25 14:1,9,9 18:14 19:9 20:1 24:5,18 35:10 36:5 40:10,15,16,17 41:12,20,21 42:1,4,6 43:2 43:14,19 45:4 45:16 47:15,24 47:25 48:4,13 49:5,6,11,14 49:17,21 50:1 50:5,6,17,25 51:8,8 52:9,15 52:19 53:1,14 53:24 54:16 55:7,11 manipulations 52:14 marching 7:21 market 9:6,8,8 9:13,14,18 10:4,6,7 11:8 11:15,16,18 12:7,9,17,24 13:1,3,7,8,10 13:20,25 14:1 14:2,19 15:2,3 15:12 16:9,10 16:18 18:14,24 19:14,18 20:6 21:3,8,24,25 22:8,8,9,12 23:1,23 24:11 26:11,14,16 27:14,15,20 28:4,12,25 35:3,3,6,10,12	35:18,21,24 36:4,6,11,19 37:20 38:6,19 38:20 40:11,13 40:18 41:14,25 42:5 43:2,11 43:11,12,12,13 43:19 44:2,19 45:3,15,24 46:2,22 47:2 47:15,24 48:4 48:12 49:17,18 49:20,20 50:25 51:3,7,9,10,23 52:2,7,11,16 52:25 53:2,3 53:19,25 54:6 55:4,6,11 marketer 13:19 markets 17:25 19:9 26:20 33:24 36:6,25 49:21 50:6,6 51:3,21,22 53:4 market-based 8:9 9:3,5 10:17 11:20 12:3 14:3,8 15:25 17:13 21:23 26:1,5,9,11,15 26:24 28:1 29:23 39:18 44:4,24 45:2,5 45:9,10 51:25 53:13 Massey 31:7 Massey's 31:20 massive 42:12 matter 1:23 6:1 7:14 10:1 20:5 24:22 53:18 55:14 mean 6:25 7:23 12:11 16:16 19:9 20:5 23:2 23:4,7 28:18
K Kahn 26:18 43:13 Kennedy 10:10 10:15,20,22,24 19:21,23 33:8 33:19 43:21 Kennedy's 12:1 kept 22:17 kick 35:21 killing 37:18,22 kind 16:2 19:1 37:11 Kneedler 2:2 3:3 4:8,9,12 5:10 6:9,16,24 7:23 9:16 10:14,16,21,23 11:4,12,16,21 11:25 12:15,22 13:4,14,18 14:7,15,24 15:7 25:1 50:14,18,21 51:17 52:17,20 52:23 53:12,24 54:9,19,24 55:2 knew 24:18,19	L lack 21:24 lacked 25:18 lacks 46:21 language 22:21 large 36:13 Laughter 28:16 34:10 law 42:16 leading 45:3 led 13:17 length 39:21 letter 26:19 let's 7:12 levels 47:4 leverage 44:6 lieu 26:12 life 37:3,4 lifting 45:5,10 lightly 8:20 limit 14:5 limited 5:12 7:15 26:25 31:1 limiting 28:22 29:2,19 30:25 31:22 line 33:12 lines 48:20 literally 16:13 little 37:2 live 5:7 load 18:5	M main 17:8 41:9 49:9 maintain 51:24 maintained 9:22 maintaining 17:20 53:4 majority 31:8 making 21:11 24:13 32:11 37:18 42:9 43:1,24 44:9		

29:14 34:11,13 35:19 38:15 39:6 40:9 meaning 48:18 means 19:14,24 22:25 23:7 42:14 43:10,12 48:12,20 meant 17:9 21:19 34:17 43:9 megawatt 18:19 Memphis 22:14 mentioned 49:4 merely 32:14 met 13:16 middlemen 44:21 45:18 mike 4:4 million 37:3 mind 11:1 minute 27:24 39:25 minutes 35:8 mitigate 15:11 36:10 mitigated 9:6 14:3 35:6,12 mitigation 18:17 Mobile 4:20 8:1 9:2 20:22 52:1 Mobile-Sierra 5:19 modest 27:15,19 modification 4:21 7:10 22:15 modified 14:12 modify 4:16 20:25 modifying 8:3 money 43:2 44:13 45:15 monitor 14:20 15:5 18:7 32:2 36:14 monitoring 15:8	Morgan 1:3 4:5 8:16 33:10,13 33:14,15,16,25 41:11 44:12 49:22 50:12 morning 15:17 move 18:4 moving 53:3 multiples 31:10 32:6 47:3 <hr/> N N 3:1,1 4:1 narrower 48:10 narrowest 49:4 Natural 7:5 necessary 4:21 8:2 51:16,19 necessitates 20:12 need 41:8 needs 27:9 29:12 48:21 negotiated 32:1 negotiation 19:2 41:10 nine 26:19 Ninth 5:7,18,24 6:10,12,13 7:20 8:10,23 12:15 13:5,6 15:19,21 16:6 16:12 19:16,24 35:15 48:10,11 noncompliance 12:13 29:22 32:5 nonstatutory 30:12 non-compliance 42:11 47:3 note 10:2 noted 31:25 notion 43:25 number 20:2 33:14 47:23 48:15	<hr/> O O 3:1 4:1 obligation 39:25 observation 25:15 obverse 43:22 occasionally 41:15 occurring 50:24 offhand 31:3 Oh 6:11 oil 41:19 okay 30:23 31:12 32:8 41:20 48:8 49:15 once 8:19 10:16 38:11 open 22:2 operate 39:11 39:20 operated 51:11 opinion 17:19 35:16 opportunities 51:7 opportunity 8:24 opposition 30:1 option 16:7,10 16:19 oral 1:23 3:2 4:9 15:14 25:10 order 9:2 14:19 15:3 18:4,6 36:10 50:4,11 53:14 ordered 21:20 orders 7:21 original 33:22 ought 32:13 33:18 44:19 45:16,16 outline 40:2 outset 9:4 overarching 39:25	overcharged 17:11 overcome 21:13 38:8 40:23 overridden 16:21 oversight 12:17 <hr/> P P 4:1 page 3:2 8:17 28:11 50:21 pages 8:22 paid 35:11 44:12 44:13 45:17 painful 35:14 Pardon 10:21 part 18:16 26:7 26:14 36:13 48:1 50:4 particular 9:25 12:3 13:11 14:10 21:14 53:18 55:6,10 parties 15:2 16:10,13 19:6 19:6,6 22:11 24:15 31:16 32:24 33:15 35:4 39:11 41:3,15,22,24 42:21 45:14 51:12 53:15,15 55:4 partly 18:1 party 7:8 22:2,3 22:3,14 27:23 46:3,3 passage 8:16 paying 17:17 35:20 people 16:3 18:2 37:20 40:15 44:2 54:4,5 percent 5:25 perfect 26:13 perfectly 31:3	41:19 period 31:15 35:9 40:7 49:10 periods 28:25 35:8 permissible 26:2 permission 10:12 13:11 Petitioner 1:5 Petitioners 1:14 2:4,6 3:5,7,12 4:11 15:15 30:4,4,13,15 47:25 48:5 50:17,20 53:19 54:5,17 phrase 29:15 picking 25:14 pieces 22:6 place 46:21 plain-language 34:15 player 45:3,3 please 4:13 15:17 25:13 point 7:3 8:13 11:22 12:1 22:17 25:16 27:15,18,19 32:9,22 38:7 45:7 50:10 53:9 points 8:5 28:6 28:10 33:4,7 policy 8:18 15:4 portfolio 34:3 positing 13:18 position 5:17 7:13 14:16,23 17:23 20:5 32:9 36:23 39:2 46:5 53:23 54:3,4 54:15,16,23 55:2 possibility 13:7
---	---	--	---	--

possible 15:25 29:16 50:16 53:14	37:16 46:22	11:13 13:15,23 14:11,25 16:21 20:11 32:13 48:24,25 51:18 54:18 55:3	ratepayer 41:6	reasonableness 9:1 14:21 18:8 39:9 40:1
post 37:11	pricings 32:6	punished 34:12	ratepayers 45:17	reasonably 4:15 4:18
power 1:11 4:16 4:19 6:18 7:4 9:6,13,18 12:3 12:7,24 13:1,3 13:7,10,19 14:2,8 16:16 20:8 21:18,25 21:25 24:25 26:3 29:8,10 34:5,6,7 45:11 46:11	principle 29:3 29:20 30:25 31:22	purchasing 4:16 5:3	rates 7:6 8:25 14:21 15:6 18:7 22:19 23:6 25:20 26:12 27:3,7 27:14 29:9 30:18,20 31:9 32:2,3,5,7,19 32:22 34:16 35:10 36:3 40:22 42:22 43:5 46:24 47:3,8,16,19 48:3 49:10	reasoning 40:2,3 reasons 10:7 31:5
practice 6:18	principles 28:22	purpose 17:18	rationally 38:11	rebuttal 3:10 25:3 50:15,18
precedent 28:8	priority 21:18	put 45:22	reach 7:18,19	recognize 16:1 51:2
precisely 19:24 24:12,21	probably 38:7	puzzled 42:18	reading 4:23	recognized 17:19
precluded 16:14	problem 18:17 19:14 28:19 31:13	puzzling 17:2	reacting 37:20	recognizing 55:8
precludes 15:22	problems 15:11 51:5,21 52:8	p.m 55:13	read 54:20,23	recommended 5:8
precondition 8:11	proceedings 14:22 50:24	Q	readjusting 37:14	reconsider 50:12
predicate 19:1	process 11:19 18:2 21:22 33:21	quarterly 12:14	real 37:5 38:24	record 50:15
predict 23:5	processes 16:23	question 6:25 8:2 10:11,25 11:1 12:1 13:5 14:5,16 18:21 29:15 37:7 41:4 45:22 46:6 53:9	realize 28:22	reduce 32:19,22
premise 28:2 29:1 44:15 51:13	produce 16:3	questions 7:24 25:2,7	realized 22:11	reduced 35:12
premium 21:9	produced 39:17 39:18,21	quite 10:1 42:11	really 38:16 40:5 41:16 43:23,24	reevaluate 33:11
prepared 20:14	producers 46:16	quote 46:21	reason 11:23 14:2 33:25 34:4,18 35:24 44:4	reevaluated 33:11
prerequisites 8:10,23	product 47:15	quoted 8:16	reasonable 15:6 18:25 25:20,21 27:4,8,10,11 27:14 29:9 30:18,21 31:8 31:15 34:16,24 36:6,9,24 38:12 39:4,14 40:22 43:7,8 46:20,24 47:5 47:9,10,18,23 48:3 49:2 50:7 50:8	referred 48:11 53:10
prevail 34:22 39:2,3	Professor 26:18 43:13	R		reflected 8:8
prevails 33:9	profit 36:20 44:3 46:3	R 4:1		reflects 8:6,17
prevent 40:22	program 15:11 26:1,5,8,10,15 26:24 27:2 29:24 44:24 48:15	raise 21:9		reformulation 5:18
price 17:4 19:12 22:16 23:14 24:14 26:21 35:6,13,21 36:19 37:19 53:21,22	prompted 31:1	raised 35:10		regime 12:21
prices 9:8 18:19 20:18 21:9 22:9 24:10,11 24:15,23 31:11 35:11 37:12,14	properly 53:25	rampant 12:13 29:22 32:5 42:11 47:2		regular 19:11
	proposal 29:2	rate 8:9 9:3 10:17 14:20 21:23 26:1,5 26:10,15,24 28:1 29:24 31:16,17 33:10 34:23 36:6 39:17 44:4,24 45:2,5,9,10		regulations 26:12
	prospectively 45:6	ratemaking 27:9 31:18 39:19		regulatory 4:14 12:20 18:2 46:25 48:14
	protect 17:10			reject 50:1
	protected 8:20			rejected 8:22
	protective 33:16			relational 41:1
	protects 40:21			relevant 24:13 50:7
	prove 36:24			reliable 21:12
	provided 35:4			reliance 38:2
	public 1:7,16 4:6,6,22 7:25 8:3,12 11:7,10			

46:22 relief 35:4 40:12 40:14,19 41:13 45:12,13 rely 16:4,20 21:7 26:11 27:14 relying 21:1 49:3,8 remain 22:20 remand 48:20 remarkable 50:10 remedies 44:24 remedy 9:14 11:17 remind 34:15 46:8 repeat 4:3 repeated 8:15 report 12:6,14 23:19 24:1,5,7 24:8,10 30:5 reporting 29:22 30:8,15 31:2 reports 12:11 50:23 request 4:15 required 9:21 12:6 14:11 55:3 requirement 26:24 requirements 29:22 30:8,16 31:2 requires 34:16 41:10 46:23 requiring 51:5 requisite 4:19 reselling 36:18 36:20 reserve 14:13 25:1 residential 21:19 respect 9:19	14:8 18:11 24:4,7 33:1 35:2,3 38:14 41:14 50:16 respond 24:1 Respondent 2:4 3:4 4:10 25:24 50:19 Respondents 2:8 3:9 4:18 5:1 9:22 23:23 25:11 Respondent's 4:15 response 12:1 restrict 15:20 result 13:10 44:18 48:4 49:13 results 45:9 retail 41:6 retroactive 10:12,20 11:2 11:5 Retroactively 10:22 retrospective 27:3 return 34:21 44:20 review 5:21 10:18 12:8 13:24 18:10 46:19 47:1 54:17 reviewed 50:22 reviews 20:11 revision 20:12 revisit 28:8 revocation 11:3 11:20 revoke 10:17 12:4 14:7 revoked 10:23 14:4 rewrites 37:25 rewriting 37:14	re-examination 30:25 right 6:15,24 11:25 17:5,13 22:15,16 23:3 23:16 24:1,14 25:5 33:23 40:5 45:13 52:17 54:18 rights 33:17 risk 21:8 road 20:19 23:6 23:15 rule 28:23 46:13 run 21:11 runs 17:11 <hr/> S <hr/> s 2:2 3:1,3 4:1,9 32:25 50:18 sacrosanct 46:14 sake 41:4 San 18:4 satisfied 4:25 15:1 satisfy 8:3 save 42:5 saying 7:20 23:18 26:20 27:20 30:24 32:12,18,19,21 36:8 37:17,25 38:1 39:13 40:2,6 41:2,5 44:10 46:1 47:22 48:2 52:24 53:18 says 6:11,14 19:16 28:23 40:21 42:24 Scalia 5:23 6:19 11:7,14 12:22 13:9 20:16,18 22:24 23:4,10 23:13 24:20 34:9,11 35:17	36:16 41:16 42:19 44:15 47:10,12,17 49:3,11,15 52:12,18,21 second 28:13,15 48:6 secure 16:11 see 13:12 28:21 29:3 31:22 42:6 46:19 seek 22:15 seeking 17:16 sees 27:10 sell 12:5 37:2 seller 9:10,13 11:9 12:24 17:3,4,16 19:10 33:10,22 42:2,6 49:5,7 sellers 16:13,19 17:22 21:1,2,6 21:24 40:18 41:22 52:6,16 52:22 53:1,5,6 selling 21:3,5 34:7 sense 26:13 27:4 42:24 sensible 28:25 sent 32:16 separate 11:19 51:3,15,20,21 51:22 service 1:12 34:21 set 7:6,7 8:20 9:8 21:14 28:8 39:10 setting 17:2 19:3 severe 21:13 shortage 10:8,8 21:19 short-term 21:14 53:2 show 5:1 38:8 39:3 40:10	41:11 42:4 showing 4:19 21:13 shown 9:23 15:9 shows 12:2 45:1 side 32:24 38:22 39:13 46:9,13 Sierra 4:20,25 7:4 8:1,8 9:2 20:22 signed 30:21 similar 10:15 simply 27:5 situation 9:15 11:12 13:18,19 13:22 15:1 17:24 33:15 46:11 47:1 52:4,6,25 situations 7:8 51:21 small 46:16 snap 37:19 Snohomish 1:8 1:17 4:5,7 34:7 37:1 Solicitor 2:2 solution 18:17 somebody 29:4 37:17 42:1 43:1 49:12 sophisticated 52:5,6 53:15 sorry 10:14 32:15 sort 12:17 34:1 36:1 42:15 43:10 44:24 45:21 54:11 sorts 44:24 48:14 source 44:1,2 Souter 11:17,23 13:17 27:17 28:14,18,21 29:11,14,19 30:3,10,19,23
---	--	--	---	--

31:12 32:8,17 32:21 33:2 36:8 37:6 38:14 39:6 40:14,25 43:23 44:14 45:20 47:21 48:8 49:4 50:14 53:7,16 54:2 54:13,22,25 specific 9:19 specifically 8:21 18:15 51:1 spike 34:5 spikes 42:13 spot 10:6 14:18 15:12 16:10,18 17:25 19:9 22:8,12 24:11 35:2,3,10 36:6 36:11 37:11,14 37:16,19 38:6 41:14 49:19,20 50:5 51:3,6 52:7 53:3,21 53:24 stability 5:15 7:2 17:20 staff 15:7 22:7 23:18 24:1,4,7 24:8,10 40:13 50:23 standard 7:25 8:3,12 13:15 15:1 25:20,22 27:11 31:8 38:13 39:9 40:1 47:5 48:25 49:1,2 50:8,9 51:18 53:17 54:18 Stanley 1:3 4:5 8:16 33:10,14 33:16,25 41:11 44:12 49:23 50:12 Stanley's 33:14	33:15 start 25:14 state 18:1 50:15 stated 31:7 statement 22:25 States 1:1,24 statute 7:18 25:18 30:9 34:16 40:21 41:8,8 46:23 stay 21:7 step 7:13 Stevens 4:3,12 15:13,16 18:21 20:4 25:4,5,9 25:12 42:18 43:4,15 51:13 55:12 stood 16:12 stop 33:2 strain 5:2 stressed 7:3 strictly 45:6 strongly 18:4 struck 51:4 structural 51:5 52:8 studies 15:8 study 32:7 subject 16:20 46:14 submitted 55:14 subsequent 12:2 15:8 subset 45:25 substantial 7:2 sufficient 40:3 51:20 sufficiently 46:10 suggested 34:1 52:4 suggesting 34:11 suggestion 13:21 summer 24:23	superfluous 41:8 supply 16:11 19:11 support 2:4 3:5 4:11 11:23 23:23 50:20,25 suppose 26:6 Supreme 1:1,24 7:15,21 sure 15:6 17:10 23:5 26:7 30:24 32:23,24 48:19 52:12 surprise 35:20 suspect 32:3,11 sustaining 40:3 system 8:9 9:3 51:25 52:2 <hr/> T T 3:1,1 take 14:5 16:7 16:18 44:10 53:9 taken 35:11 54:1 talking 54:2,3 tariff 9:5 11:20 14:3 27:6 tariffs 39:19 tell 32:25 40:4 telling 34:2 46:1 tension 25:25,25 term 18:3 19:12 27:5 terms 19:17 20:11,25 22:20 22:23 24:16 terrorism 42:20 test 48:17 Texaco 46:10 Thank 4:12 25:8 25:12 34:25 46:7 50:13 themes 17:8 theories 32:25 theory 33:8,20	thing 36:9 42:10 42:11 things 14:6 26:6 36:21 48:14 51:5 think 6:25 7:23 8:5 10:25 13:5 13:14,17,22 17:8 19:25 26:6,14 28:7 33:6,18,25 34:4 38:4 39:2 39:5,7,13,24 40:1,10,11,20 41:2 42:3 43:21 44:17,25 45:8,14 46:9 47:14,21 48:2 53:13,17,25 54:3,9,19,20 55:8 thinks 27:11 47:8 48:24 third 31:6 thought 5:6,11 6:6 7:12,13 9:12 24:7,8 25:18 27:12 30:19 37:5,18 37:23 48:23,25 three 4:24 29:20 29:21 tied 51:9 time 6:6 7:11 9:1 13:21 14:14 16:17 17:12 21:18 25:1,4 27:21 35:4,18 38:9 39:4,18 42:16 49:10 52:1 times 16:8 29:3 29:5 45:22 today 24:22 29:24 45:7 46:13 49:22 told 36:14 46:16	49:23 totally 42:20 43:13 51:15 trade 51:6 traditional 31:10 32:6 34:21 47:3 traditionally 43:9 transmission 21:24 22:1 transposed 17:2 transposing 17:8 treating 52:24 tried 39:14 40:2 triennial 10:18 12:8 trouble 40:25 44:1 true 18:9 trying 42:5 44:3 53:2 Tuesday 1:21 turmoil 18:24 20:6 turn 20:19 turned 53:21 turns 12:2 38:22 two 6:14,16 7:24 8:10 17:12 18:5 26:6 31:5 31:16 51:3,15 51:21,22 53:14 53:15 55:4 typically 53:6 <hr/> U ultimate 41:6 42:25 ultimately 35:1 45:14 umbrella 39:8 underlying 7:3 understand 10:10 13:9 22:24 27:19
--	--	--	--	---

30:24 31:3,4 32:8,9,11 34:12 41:17,21 41:22 46:4 52:13 54:15 understanding 12:23 understood 10:25 25:15 36:11 undertake 18:10 undertaken 55:12 undo 27:1 unduly 5:4 unenforceable 38:23 unfairness 18:12 unilaterally 7:9 United 1:1,24 unjust 36:3 47:19 unlawful 31:10 43:19 unquote 46:22 unraveling 21:4 55:6 unreasonable 36:3 47:20 unusual 25:17 26:18,21 48:24 unwinding 33:21 upheld 19:15 52:3 urge 5:21 18:4 use 36:15 uses 21:18 utilities 18:4,18 24:24 37:1 42:9 44:20 51:6 utility 1:7,16 4:6 20:19,20 27:5	v 1:6,15 valuable 19:20 variety 10:6 36:2 Verizon 52:5 versus 35:15 victim 41:12 vigorously 14:20 15:6 volatile 19:21 volatility 15:3 16:9 19:7,11 19:25 20:3 24:19 27:21 28:25 29:1 31:15 40:7,10 vulnerable 31:19,21	47:14 West 49:10 we're 28:15 34:14 45:13 we've 50:22 white 13:2 wholesale 4:16 withholding 42:12 words 40:16 42:3 work 29:24 33:25 37:1 worst 28:12,15 29:3 32:4 47:1 wouldn't 11:4 39:17 46:17,19 Wright 2:7 3:8 25:9,10,12 26:4 27:7 28:6 28:17,20 29:7 29:12,18,21 30:6,17,20 31:6,24 32:15 32:19,23 33:5 33:13,23 34:14 34:25 36:1,13 36:23 37:6 38:4 39:1 40:8 40:20 41:7,16 42:8,25 43:8 43:17 44:11,17 46:7 47:11,14 47:19 48:7,16 49:8,13,19 50:3 wrong 6:5 40:4 wrote 26:19	Z zone 8:25 \$ \$105 16:17 18:20 24:25 \$300 16:18 18:19 \$74 32:3,10,22 36:15 0 06-1457 1:6 06-1462 1:15 1 1 1:7,16 4:6,7 10 5:25 35:8 100-day 50:23 104 34:7 105 34:7 11:04 1:25 4:2 12:05 55:13 1244 8:15 1245 8:15 15 3:7 153 37:3 1564 8:22 1565 8:22 1572 8:15 1573 8:16 1589 50:21 16 28:11 17 8:17 19 1:21 1956 17:12 1974 46:10 1993 45:2 2 2000 4:17 5:13 10:6 14:17 18:3 31:25 35:9 2000-2001 45:4 2001 4:17 5:13 10:6 26:20 30:8 35:9	2003 40:13 45:5 2005 30:2 2006 35:15 2008 1:21 206 14:22 45:10 25 3:9 4 4 3:5 5 50 3:12 6:17 16:24 7 70 27:12 34:17 74 32:14,14
V	W wait 6:19,19,19 waived 33:17 walk 7:9 WALTER 2:5 3:6,11 15:14 want 24:21 30:23 32:16 35:21 37:8,9 37:10 38:16 47:22 54:14,14 wanted 17:4 24:16,16 33:3 Washington 1:9 1:18,20 2:3,5,7 wasn't 5:23 13:6 17:11 23:17 35:24 38:9,17 38:18 49:5,17 way 24:2 33:21 33:24 36:25 38:12 54:19,22 weather 40:12 41:18 42:1,10 48:15 51:4 went 21:2 weren't 30:18 30:20 44:15	X x 1:2,19 Y year 24:23 years 5:13 6:17 16:17,24 18:5 27:12 34:17		