

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

2 - - - - - x

3 DIANNE KNOX, ET AL., :

4                      Petitioners                      :

5 v. : No. 10-1121

6 SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL :

```
7  UNION, LOCAL 1000. :
```

8 - - - - - x

9 Washington, D.C.

10 Tuesday, January 10, 2012

11

12                   The above-entitled matter came on for oral

13 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States

14 at 10:19 a.m.

15      APPEARANCES:

16 WILLIAM J. YOUNG, ESQ., Springfield, Virginia; for

17            Petitioners.

18 JEREMIAH COLLINS, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; for

19 Respondent.

20

21

22

23

24

25

1	C O N T E N T S	
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	PAGE
3	WILLIAM J. YOUNG, ESQ.	
4	On behalf of the Petitioners	3
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
6	JEREMIAH COLLINS, ESQ.	
7	On behalf of the Respondent	25
8	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF	
9	WILLIAM J. YOUNG, ESQ.	
10	On behalf of the Petitioners	50
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (10:19 a.m.)

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument  
4 first this morning in Case 10-1121, Knox v. The Service  
5 Employees International Union.

6 Mr. Young.

7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF WILLIAM J. YOUNG

8 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

9 MR. YOUNG: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it  
10 please the Court:

11 Before addressing SEIU's motion to dismiss  
12 for mootness, it is important to remember the underlying  
13 facts of this case. For 10 months in 2005 and 2006,  
14 more than 36,000 nonmembers, or nearly 40 percent of  
15 those employees represented by SEIU employed by the  
16 State of California, were compelled to contribute to  
17 SEIU's \$12 million Political Fight-Back Fund without  
18 being provided the opportunity to challenge the amount  
19 of the fee and to object to its exaction, required by  
20 the First Amendment.

21 Adding insult to that injury, the Ninth  
22 Circuit said that nonmembers could never say no to  
23 contributing to SEIU's political expenditures for ballot  
24 propositions, at least Proposition 76. They have no  
25 right to refuse to bankroll that element of SEIU's

1 political speech. This defies this Court's decisions,  
2 distorting the political process on a massive scale.

3 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Young, could I ask you  
4 to speak to the mootness question first?

5 MR. YOUNG: I was just addressing that.

6 JUSTICE KAGAN: As -- as I understand your  
7 brief, you're essentially saying that it's impossible to  
8 moot a claim for nominal damages. Is -- is that a  
9 correct reading of your position?

10 MR. YOUNG: I'm not sure I would go that  
11 far, Justice Kagan. I think in this case, the  
12 wishy-washiness, as it were, of the language used by  
13 SEIU when it distributed this pasted-on dollar to the  
14 class -- or dollars, more accurately -- was inadequate  
15 because it failed to represent the importance of the  
16 judgment that the nonmember class had won.

17 JUSTICE KAGAN: So, that's a different  
18 point, right, which is that the notice was inadequate?

19 MR. YOUNG: That would be correct.

20 JUSTICE KAGAN: And -- and when you say  
21 "inadequate," I read you to be saying sort of not  
22 apologetic enough. And -- in other words, not saying,  
23 look, you had a claim against us, we think you're right;  
24 it was a valid claim; here is your judgment in  
25 satisfaction of that claim. That it didn't forthrightly

1 say that. But do you think if it had forthrightly said  
2 that, we would be living in a different Article III  
3 universe?

4 MR. YOUNG: Not in this case, Justice Kagan.

5 Turning to the adequacy of the notice, of  
6 the financial disclosure, that did not comply with the  
7 district court's judgment, either. If -- if the only  
8 question were the distribution of nominal damages, then  
9 perhaps we would be living in that different Article III  
10 universe. But this case is about the judgment of the  
11 district court that the SEIU was attempting to comply  
12 with. They failed to do so in virtually all of its  
13 elements.

14 JUSTICE KAGAN: And how is that? How did  
15 they fail to comply, other than, you know, the question  
16 of whether they were forthright enough about the fact  
17 that they were satisfying a claim?

18 MR. YOUNG: The -- the district court had  
19 ordered -- described the type of notice that it  
20 anticipated. The district court specifically determined  
21 that SEIU's subsequent 2006 financial disclosure was  
22 inadequate to cure the problem that was caused by the  
23 seizure of fees starting in September 2005. And that's  
24 on 73a of the -- the Petition Appendix B.

25 The union in this case merely sent the same

1 financial disclosure in the notice that it sent, to try  
2 to moot the case, that it had sent in June of 2006.  
3 Well, the district court had already said this is  
4 inadequate. That seems to me to -- to end the inquiry.

5 Obviously, the district court did not  
6 contemplate that the notice that was sent in June 2006  
7 satisfied the obligations of its judgment; else it  
8 hardly could have ordered a -- a useless act in ordering  
9 a new type of notice go out.

10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And the reason  
11 that's important in terms of the content of the notice,  
12 the inadequacy, is what?

13 MR. YOUNG: The reason that is important,  
14 Justice -- Mr. Chief Justice, excuse me -- is that the  
15 SEIU is asserting that the case has become moot because  
16 it has now complied with the district court's judgment.

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I thought your --

18 MR. YOUNG: It has --

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I thought your  
20 argument was that the -- a different type of notice  
21 would have resulted in more members electing to opt out,  
22 to demand the refund of their assessments?

23 MR. YOUNG: And that's certainly one of the  
24 possible consequences. Obviously, I -- we would --  
25 that's speculative to some extent. But since the

1 purpose of the notice is to provide the information  
2 necessary to -- to object, one of the purposes, then we  
3 certainly anticipate that there would be more objectors  
4 were there to be an -- an adequate notice that complies  
5 with the district court's judgment.

6 JUSTICE ALITO: If the special assessment  
7 requires a different kind of notice and possibly a  
8 different kind of opt-in or opt-out regime, would the  
9 case be moot?

10 MR. YOUNG: If the notice -- I'm sorry. I  
11 didn't understand.

12 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, we're not dealing here  
13 with the kind of notice -- with the typical Hudson  
14 notice given at the beginning of the year, when the  
15 annual dues are collected. We're dealing with a special  
16 assessment. Now, if a different kind of notice is  
17 constitutionally required in that context, would this  
18 case be moot?

19 MR. YOUNG: No, it would not. Obviously, we  
20 have -- we -- we still have the nominal damages question  
21 and the adequacy of the payment --

22 JUSTICE ALITO: My question is whether  
23 the -- the different requirements, which presumably were  
24 not met here in the context of the special assessment,  
25 if there are different requirements in that context,

1 would that be enough to preserve this case as a live  
2 controversy?

3 MR. YOUNG: So long as the union failed to  
4 provide them, and at least in this case, the district  
5 court's judgment, we believe, provides a -- an adequate  
6 respect for Hudson's underlying requirements,  
7 Justice Alito.

8 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. -- Mr. Young --

9 MR. YOUNG: Yes, Justice --

10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- as I understand, the  
11 union recognizes that a consequence of mootness would be  
12 that the Ninth Circuit judgment is vacated. Now, if the  
13 union would also recognize that that means the district  
14 court judgment stays in place, so if the Ninth Circuit  
15 judgment is worked out and you're left with the district  
16 court judgment as the law of the case, then I think it  
17 is moot, isn't it?

18 MR. YOUNG: No, Justice Ginsburg, and this  
19 is why: The union would remain free to return to its  
20 old ways, the -- the very type of reason that this Court  
21 declined to find mootness in W.T. Grant. The union has  
22 made much -- much of a showing -- or much of a show,  
23 more accurately, of the fact that it has changed its  
24 internal policy. It won't do this for 180 days. But  
25 that can hardly be sufficient for this Court to find



1 mootness in this case. The union made this wonderful  
2 and meaningful policy change on 6 days' notice.

3 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But it wasn't -- this --  
4 this case is about a completed episode. It's about a  
5 special assessment that is long over.

6 MR. YOUNG: That is true, Justice Ginsburg.  
7 But it is also about the declaratory relief that was  
8 ordered by -- that was entered by the district court.  
9 It is about the -- which was virtually injunctive relief  
10 in this case.

11 It is also about the effect of that judgment  
12 for future activities and -- and how that will affect  
13 the way SEIU operates.

14 JUSTICE KAGAN: Does it have --

15 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, are you saying that  
16 this is capable of repetition, yet evading review? I'm  
17 not quite sure.

18 MR. YOUNG: It would certainly be so in this  
19 case, Justice Kennedy. The union set a very short  
20 time -- well, a relatively short time period, given the  
21 length of time a case comes up from the courts as a rule  
22 in this Court.

23 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Does the injunction have  
24 future -- future terms? Is it a permanent injunction or  
25 is it just an injunction that relates to the notice

1 that's required in this case?

2 MR. YOUNG: Just -- just to be clear, there  
3 is -- I'm talking about something that's tantamount to  
4 an injunction, Justice Kennedy. It's -- it wasn't  
5 actually phrased as an injunction. It was an  
6 affirmative -- an act -- ordering an affirmative act.

7 JUSTICE KAGAN: But isn't that important,  
8 Mr. Young, because usually where we've talked about  
9 capable of repetition or where we've talked about the  
10 same thing could happen again, it's where an injunction  
11 has been before us rather than a suit for damages as to  
12 a past act?

13 MR. YOUNG: Yes, Justice Kagan, I think that  
14 has been generally the case. I -- in my research, I  
15 could find very few cases where it wasn't clear to me  
16 that this Court was addressing injunctive relief.  
17 Hudson itself, it seems to me, did not specifically  
18 discuss the entry of injunctive relief in the lower  
19 court, and Hudson itself addressed a mootness issue.

20 I mean, if we -- if we talk about these  
21 cases in their -- in their strictest sense, the union's  
22 notices are all annual. So, by the theory that it  
23 becomes moot when those notices expire, or potentially  
24 moot when those notices expire, this Court would never  
25 address these issues because it would -- I can't imagine

1 one of these cases ever getting up to this Court in as  
2 little as a year.

3 But the -- this Court in Hudson, in -- I  
4 believe it was footnote 12, said that this Court reviews  
5 the policy, the procedure, the acts as they were  
6 defended in the district court. And the union's policy  
7 and procedure and acts here were defended in the  
8 district court. And, therefore, cases like this should  
9 not become moot, because it is capable of repetition and  
10 would be evading review simply by the mere limits of how  
11 long these policies and procedures are in effect.

12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Do you make that argument  
13 in your opposition?

14 MR. YOUNG: It's -- it seems to me,  
15 Justice Kennedy, it is implicit in our argument,  
16 although clearly our main point in that argument is that  
17 this is a -- a paradigm case of voluntary cessation of  
18 allegedly unlawful activity. Until cert was granted in  
19 this case, until the Petitioners' merits brief was  
20 filed, SEIU was vigorously defending its practice. It  
21 remains free to impose that practice.

22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: That's another --  
23 something quite different than the capable of returning  
24 to old ways, because here we do have a discrete episode  
25 that's over. And there was no question that, even

1     though that -- what was it, in 2005 -- that the period  
2     in 2005-2006, when the special assessment was in effect,  
3     that was long over, but you were -- you were continuing  
4     to litigate it. And nobody suggested that it would  
5     become moot simply because the period was over.

6                 MR. YOUNG: That's -- that's true, Justice  
7     Ginsburg. Pardon me.

8                 This argument -- this argument was not  
9     raised until we were before this Court, the union's  
10    argument that the case had somehow become moot, and  
11    until it issued a notice --

12                JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, they said that it  
13    had become moot because they gave you all the relief you  
14    requested; so, there was nothing left to the case.

15                MR. YOUNG: Well, "all the relief," Justice  
16    Ginsburg, implies that they had complied with the  
17    district court's judgment. As to the notice, we believe  
18    that they have not, and we believe that's clear because  
19    of the very fact that the district court rejected the  
20    2006 financial disclosure as adequate. And --

21                CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Maybe it's a good  
22    point for you to move to the merits.

23                MR. YOUNG: Yes, thank you,  
24    Mr. Chief Justice.

25                JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could I ask you a

1 question about the merits?

2 MR. YOUNG: Yes, certainly, Justice  
3 Sotomayor.

4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Are you attacking the  
5 normal system of basing assessments moving forward,  
6 based on past accounting and chargeability and  
7 non-chargeability? Or are you just attacking the  
8 special assessment?

9 MR. YOUNG: I -- I appreciate the question,  
10 Justice Sotomayor. No, we are not attacking the normal  
11 Hudson procedures. On --

12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. So,  
13 articulate for me what's -- borrowing a phrase from one  
14 of my colleagues yesterday, how do we write this  
15 opinion? When is a second Hudson notice required?  
16 Let's presume for the sake of argument that the union  
17 had cost overruns. Labor salaries went up; printing  
18 costs went up, not for lobbying; but generally there was  
19 a 10 percent increase in their expenses across the board  
20 because various contracts that they were involved in  
21 required it. Would you require a second notice in that  
22 circumstance?

23 MR. YOUNG: Yes, Justice Sotomayor. We  
24 would -- we believe -- pardon me -- that a new Hudson  
25 notice is required whenever there is a material

1 alteration in the obligations that are imposed upon  
2 nonmembers. The values that this --

3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Articulate that again.

4 A material change --

5 MR. YOUNG: A material increase or --  
6 increase in general terms, in the obligation imposed  
7 upon the nonmembers. In this case, I don't think  
8 anybody would dispute the 25 percent --

9 JUSTICE SCALIA: A material new assessment?

10 MR. YOUNG: A material new assessment.

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay.

12 MR. YOUNG: Yes, Justice --

13 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's -- we're talking  
14 about money here, right?

15 MR. YOUNG: Yes, we are.

16 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay.

17 MR. YOUNG: Yes. Certainly --

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Without -- but  
19 without regard to the reason for the assessment?

20 MR. YOUNG: I think as a matter of principle  
21 I would have to say yes, Mr. Chief Justice. The  
22 nonmember --

23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I'm not sure  
24 that -- this may just simply be repeating Justice  
25 Sotomayor's question, but if they say we have to raise

1 the assessment 10 percent because, as she said, you  
2 know, we estimated the printing costs for the union  
3 newsletter, whatever, was going to be this and it turns  
4 out they raised it, it's going to be that; so, we know  
5 we're going to have to get additional money, for things  
6 that are indisputably chargeable, why do you need  
7 special procedures in that case?

8 MR. YOUNG: Well, it wouldn't be so much a  
9 special procedure as a new opportunity to object and  
10 challenge the amount of the fee, Mr. Chief Justice.

11 Certainly, one of the elements -- and we  
12 recognize, of course, that the primary reason  
13 individuals object is political expenditures, but this  
14 Court said very clearly in Abood that people can object  
15 for any reason, for no reason, for a good reason, for a  
16 bad reason; nobody can inquire as to why someone  
17 objects.

18 And certainly when a material alteration --  
19 there has been a material increase in the obligation  
20 imposed upon nonmembers, they may choose to make an  
21 economic decision that heretofore they chose not to  
22 make. They may choose to minimize -- particularly the  
23 non-objectors. They may choose that they want to  
24 minimize the financial obligation that they are paying  
25 to the union at that time. And --

1 JUSTICE BREYER: It's peculiar because in  
2 the circumstance where the extra assessment is all going  
3 to go to chargeable activities, in fact that means  
4 economically speaking the following year the objector  
5 will be better off, not worse off, because there is a  
6 higher percentage of the total fee that's being paid to  
7 chargeable activities.

8 So, this special assessment that Justice  
9 Sotomayor and the Chief Justice were talking about is  
10 one that will benefit the objector, if he keeps quiet  
11 and says nothing. So, it's a little hard to imagine the  
12 frame of mind that would say I need the notice because  
13 now I might object, whereas I wouldn't have before.

14 MR. YOUNG: Well, Justice Breyer, the reason  
15 for the notice is these people may not trust the union.  
16 They -- they may choose to challenge the amount of the  
17 fee.

18 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes, I see that point. Can  
19 I ask you -- oh, are you -- you want to pursue that  
20 further, or are we --

21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Go ahead.

22 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. Let me give you  
23 this example.

24 MR. YOUNG: Sure.

25 JUSTICE BREYER: And now I -- but I think I



1 see what your answer is. Imagine it's year two. In  
2 year one, expenditures broke down so that it was  
3 70 percent chargeable, 30 percent not chargeable. Got  
4 that?

5 MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir.

6 JUSTICE BREYER: And normally, under Hudson,  
7 that means in year two the deal is the objectors pay  
8 70 percent, right?

9 MR. YOUNG: Yes.

10 JUSTICE BREYER: In the middle of year two,  
11 surprisingly, something comes up. Something comes up.  
12 A surprise to the union, and they want to have a special  
13 assessment. And you're saying they just can't without  
14 going through this procedure all over again?

15 MR. YOUNG: That would be correct,  
16 Justice Breyer. The -- I'm now talking about --

17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And take the money that  
18 they collected?

19 MR. YOUNG: I'm sorry.

20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Can they take the money  
21 that they collected under the first notice, and, instead  
22 of doing the special assessment, in the middle of it,  
23 this campaign gets announced by the governor, and can  
24 they then divert the chargeable amount that they had  
25 predicted and spend it on the non-chargeable amount? Or

1 are you -- or does that require a second Hudson notice?  
2 Without a special assessment.

3 MR. YOUNG: I understand, Justice Sotomayor.  
4 And no, under that case, I don't believe it would.

5 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. So, this is a  
6 peculiar rule that you have asked us to adopt. The rule  
7 is that where there is a special assessment and it will  
8 make all the objectors better off, they have to have a  
9 special notice that they can object. But where the rule  
10 is that we're going to take money we already collected  
11 from them and spend it for a totally political purpose,  
12 we don't give them a special notice and they don't have  
13 to object.

14 Now, that seems totally backwards, but I  
15 understand why you get there, and my suspicion is --  
16 which you can confirm, is that's the only administrable  
17 system you can think of.

18 JUSTICE SCALIA: Do you concede that it's  
19 going to make them better off? I would -- I would  
20 assume that that's your principal objection. They don't  
21 know whether this new assessment is indeed going to be  
22 divided the way the original one was or not. They might  
23 want to challenge --

24 MR. YOUNG: That's --

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- whether -- whether it's

1 all going to be used for -- for assessable activities or  
2 not. And they have no -- you're telling me they have  
3 no --

4 JUSTICE BREYER: Right. But in my  
5 hypothetical --

6 JUSTICE SCALIA: At the very least, they  
7 have to make a -- an interest-free loan to the -- to the  
8 union until such time as they can challenge it.

9 MR. YOUNG: Well, that's exactly correct,  
10 Justice Scalia. And I understand --

11 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes, but the hypothetical,  
12 if I could continue with it, is -- is perhaps  
13 unrealistic, but they have 20 bishops and 14 most honest  
14 people in the United States, and they've all absolutely  
15 guaranteed, and everybody agrees, that this goes to  
16 chargeable activity. And where I was going with my  
17 question, which you see where I was -- you're with me on  
18 this, right?

19 MR. YOUNG: Yes, I am, Justice --

20 JUSTICE BREYER: And combine the two. What  
21 I'm trying to point out and get your response is that  
22 you've been forced into this position to create a  
23 workable system. Now, why is that workable system one  
24 whit better than the workable system we already have,  
25 which is all this washes out in a fair manner the

1 following year, that there is an inevitable year's lag?  
2 It doesn't work perfectly, but it's as good as any  
3 other, and all we have to say is it's better than yours.  
4 Now, why is yours better than that?

5 MR. YOUNG: Well, I recall the bishops from  
6 the last time I was here, Justice Breyer. I think they  
7 made an appearance then.

8 JUSTICE BREYER: They're useful to me.

9 (Laughter.)

10 MR. YOUNG: They are, I'm sure.

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: I assume we wouldn't need a  
12 Hudson notice at all, if -- if bishops affirmed all of  
13 these things, right?

14 (Laughter.)

15 MR. YOUNG: You anticipate my next point,  
16 Justice Scalia. These -- these aren't bishops, and with  
17 due respect to our litigation opponents in this case,  
18 these are people that nonmembers don't trust. These are  
19 people with whom nonmembers do not wish to affiliate.  
20 And these are people that the nonmembers do not wish to  
21 support, and --

22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The problem is in -- in  
23 this system, and going back to Justice Breyer's  
24 practicality, they will get a chance to object. It just  
25 won't be at the moment of the special assessment; it

1 will be the following year. So, when the union gives  
2 its new notice, it's going to set forth its chargeable  
3 and non-chargeable amounts as audited, and it will say,  
4 as it did -- as it's done in the briefs before us, on  
5 Proposition 76, we're going to take 50 percent as  
6 chargeable. And the union members can come in and give  
7 a Lehnert objection, those who want to. Those who  
8 don't, know it's happened, and they agree to it.

9                   Isn't that correct? They do get a chance to  
10 object; the question is the timing.

11                  MR. YOUNG: Then the problem is, Justice  
12 Sotomayor, understanding the --

13                  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is there an answer to  
14 that? They will get a chance to object then?

15                  MR. YOUNG: Well, they'll get a chance to  
16 object after they've already paid the interest-free  
17 loan.

18                  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, but that's true of  
19 the first example I gave you. If something happens in  
20 the middle of the year and the union needs to divert  
21 already-assessed funds to challenge a election, they can  
22 do it. And you said that's okay.

23                  MR. YOUNG: And the nonmembers would have  
24 the chance to challenge that, but it would be within the  
25 normal system of ordinary union dues.

1                   We -- we, and I believe this Court in  
2   Hudson, presume that any reasonable -- reasonably  
3   competent union management would -- would have  
4   relatively stable expenditures over the years.

5                   JUSTICE SCALIA:  Isn't -- isn't the premise  
6   of Hudson that you give the notice before, before -- you  
7   receive the notice before you have to cough up the  
8   money?

9                   MR. YOUNG:  Yes.

10                  JUSTICE SCALIA:  And what's now proposed is,  
11   well, for -- if there's an additional assessment, you  
12   cough up the money first, and then later you straighten  
13   it out.  And I -- do you get -- do you get the interest?

14                  MR. YOUNG:  That seems to me to be the  
15   problem, Justice Scalia.  The people who got the June --  
16   June 2005 notice were left in the dark -- indeed, the  
17   union may have been in the dark -- as to this special  
18   assessment.  But once the union agreed to -- decided to  
19   impose the special assessment, the union was required by  
20   Hudson's principles to shed some light.  You know,  
21   perhaps it is less predictive, less accurate, to say we  
22   intend to spend the money this way.  But when you have  
23   an assessment which is purely intended for politics, and  
24   that's what the union said, to create a Political  
25   Fight-Back Fund, that's not, you know --

1 JUSTICE BREYER: Do you get -- does your  
2 Hudson notice tell you about what's going to happen next  
3 year? I thought your Hudson notice told you this was  
4 the breakdown for the last year, and as far as we can  
5 tell, that's what it will be next year, but -- but  
6 things could change. What does the Hudson notice tell  
7 you?

8 MR. YOUNG: The Hudson notice provides you  
9 with an opportunity to object and some assurance,  
10 because of the audit requirement --

11 JUSTICE BREYER: But am I right in my  
12 description of it?

13 MR. YOUNG: I think -- I think that would be  
14 a fair description, Justice Breyer.

15 JUSTICE BREYER: All right.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Do they -- do they  
17 carry over from one year to the next, or do you have to  
18 refile your objection to the union expenditures every  
19 year?

20 MR. YOUNG: Most unions, Mr. Chief Justice,  
21 require an annual objection. Now, of course, there  
22 would be nothing -- we find nothing wrong with an annual  
23 challenge requirement if you choose to challenge that  
24 year's figures, because obviously it's a specific event.  
25 But most unions seem to require annual objection. So,

1     you have to say again and again: I don't want to pay  
2     for your politics.

3                 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, but what  
4     happens --

5                 MR. YOUNG: But that's not raised in this  
6     case.

7                 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But going back to the --  
8     forget about special assessments. I think in one of the  
9     briefs, I know in one of the briefs, someone says  
10    elections happen every 4 years. So, in the normal cycle  
11    of union activities, in an election year they're going  
12    to divert more of whatever accessible moneys they have  
13    to their lobbying efforts, and the following year  
14    they'll go back to normal for 3 years.

15                You're not challenging that normal variation  
16    in the -- in the distribution of the moneys, correct?

17                MR. YOUNG: Correct, Justice Sotomayor. And  
18    that, too, may vary from union to union, from State to  
19    State even. As some of the Justices I'm sure know,  
20    Virginia has called for --

21                JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So, I guess my problem  
22    is I don't see how that, given your argument, is any  
23    less alone than this special assessment where the  
24    labor -- where the objecting members at the end of the  
25    year will get notice of what has happened that year,



1 will have an opportunity to place their Lehnert  
2 challenges and get them ruled upon, and will, as  
3 Justice Breyer said, have a benefit because they're  
4 going to either pay more if the Lehnert -- pay less if  
5 the Lehnert challenges are upheld or pay more if -- if  
6 they're not.

7 But I'm not quite sure how this is a  
8 different loan.

9 MR. YOUNG: Well, we disagree with the  
10 union's characterization of its supposed benefit. But I  
11 -- Justice Sotomayor, I see my time has expired, and I'd  
12 like to reserve a balance for rebuttal. I will try  
13 address your question more thoroughly when I stand up  
14 again.

15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.  
16 Mr. Collins.

17 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEREMIAH COLLINS

18 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

19 MR. COLLINS: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it  
20 please the Court:

21 Justice Ginsburg is absolutely correct  
22 that what we have suggested to the Court is that the  
23 court of appeals decision be vacated, with the  
24 consequence of reinstating the district court judgment.

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Why do -- why did

1 you give up once the case was granted here? You didn't  
2 consider that until the case came before this Court.

3 MR. COLLINS: That's correct, Your Honor,  
4 and the reason for that is when the events in this  
5 matter were new and the then union officers' actions  
6 were being challenged, the instinct was we're going to  
7 defend the case. And, as time went on, there was no  
8 rethinking of that situation. When the case was granted  
9 here over our opposition, noting that we didn't think  
10 that the questions presented were really presented, the  
11 officers of the union, who are not the ones involved in  
12 the original case, thought about the situation and came  
13 to the realization that they have no stake in the  
14 procedures that are at issue here. This is a local that  
15 had never done a mid-year increase in the past. The --  
16 what was contemplated as a temporary increase here  
17 turned into a permanent increase. The dues went up to  
18 1.5 percent of salary a year after this increase ended.

19 JUSTICE ALITO: What does this local, and  
20 what will the other locals, do in the future when  
21 special assessments are made? Will they provide notice  
22 or will they go back to the old system?

23 MR. COLLINS: This local -- and I won't  
24 belabor the term "special assessment" at the moment, but  
25 when we get to the merits, I think there's a

1     misunderstanding around that, Justice Alito. But this  
2     local has put in a procedure which frankly would satisfy  
3     the Petitioners' concerns for the future if future  
4     conduct was legitimately at issue here. But it is not,  
5     for two reasons.

6                 First, when we state that the district court  
7     judgment be reinstated, that's a judgment that was not  
8     appealed by the Petitioners. That defines the limits of  
9     what they can attain from this case, whatever this Court  
10    may decide, and that decision gives whatever protection  
11    it gives against future conduct. Now, it gives  
12    essentially none for a very good reason. This was a  
13    case, as has been noted, brought only about a one-time  
14    event. There were no allegations of an ongoing  
15    practice. There was no request for declaratory or  
16    injunctive relief to prevent --

17                JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Collins, as I understand  
18    Mr. Young's argument, there is a serious dispute about  
19    the adequacy of this notice, and it might be a dispute  
20    about whether it was clear enough, about that it was  
21    satisfying claims, or it might be a dispute about  
22    whether it allowed refunds easily enough, but that Mr.  
23    Young is contesting whether the notice complied with the  
24    district court's order.

25                Now, as long as that's true, don't we have a

1 live case before us? Somebody has to answer that  
2 question about whether your notice complied with the  
3 order, and if it's the case that a court has to answer  
4 that question, doesn't that depend on the questions  
5 presented here, the substantive questions?

6 MR. COLLINS: No, it doesn't, Justice Kagan.  
7 And the Court's explained in a number of cases,  
8 beginning I think with Walling v. Reuter and also,  
9 obviously, Munsingwear and U.S. Bancorp, a case can be  
10 in a posture where this Court, in disposing of it, needs  
11 to grant certain relief or clarification of the status  
12 of prior orders; and yet, the case is moot on the merits  
13 such that the Court cannot appropriately reach the  
14 merits.

15 That's what we have here. If there is a  
16 dispute -- and I'll explain in a moment why there really  
17 isn't. But if there is a dispute, for example, as to  
18 whether an individual failed to get their refund because  
19 the notice was inadequate, that dispute is not affected  
20 by and requires no decision of this Court.

21 If the district court judgment is  
22 reinstated, then the question of whether we have fully  
23 provided all relief called for by that judgment, which  
24 we believe we have, would be before the district court  
25 for decision, unaffected by --

1                   CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But this is not --  
2 this is not an incidental matter. I mean, the whole  
3 point of your friend's argument with the Hudson notice  
4 is they want people to understand what's happening with  
5 the -- their union money. And they say this notice  
6 didn't let people know that. And if the case is not  
7 moot and if they prevail, they will have a right to be  
8 heard on what the notice should say. And that will make  
9 a difference in how many people opt out or how many  
10 people don't.

11                   And I guess I'm following up on Justice  
12 Kagan's question. That's a very important part of this  
13 case, what the notice is going to say, and if we accept  
14 your view that it's moot, that issue goes by the  
15 wayside.

16                   MR. COLLINS: I think that's incorrect,  
17 Mr. Chief Justice, for two reasons: First of all, the  
18 district court required a certain kind of notice to be  
19 given. We are stating the district court judgment  
20 should be reinstated. If the notice we have given does  
21 not comport with what the district court judgment, which  
22 was not appealed by the Petitioners, requires, it will  
23 be provided by the district court.

24                   We are -- we are not contesting -- the  
25 Petitioners are looking a gift horse in the mouth.

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm sorry. I don't  
2 see how that -- I don't see how that works.

3 The notice is only required by the district  
4 court if the case is not moot. If the case is moot by  
5 the notice you sent out, the district court doesn't have  
6 a case on the basis of which to order a different  
7 notice.

8 MR. COLLINS: No, I don't think that's  
9 correct, Your Honor. A case can be moot in this Court  
10 -- and this is what I believe *Munsingwear, Walling v.*  
11 *Reuter*, and the other cases, U.S. Bancorp more recently,  
12 explain. And, at first, it seems paradoxical, but it is  
13 not paradoxical. A case -- there can be remaining  
14 issues potentially in the district court, such as  
15 whether the check that the plaintiff paid bounced or  
16 not, that could potentially have to be resolved by a  
17 district court. And it -- but it means, at least in  
18 terms of prudential mootness, there is not a substantive  
19 merits issue remaining for the court to be deciding.  
20 And it's really quite simple. The Petitioners, as I  
21 say, are looking a gift horse in the mouth.

22 The apex, the acme, that they can achieve in  
23 this case, is what they got from the district court, and  
24 it was reversed. We are saying give it back to them.  
25 Take back the reversal, reinstate the judgment.

1    Whatever they won, they will have.  We believe we have  
2    already given them everything they want.  If we have  
3    not, the district court will do that.

4                    But let me explain the second point, if I  
5    may, Mr. Chief Justice, which is that there is no  
6    legitimate issue here about whether the notice was  
7    adequate.  Mr. Young stated quite incorrectly that the  
8    notice we have provided is the same as the notice the  
9    district court struck down.  That's absolutely  
10   incorrect.  The district court said that the 2005 notice  
11   issued before the dues increase obviously did not give  
12   specific notice of the dues increase, although it stated  
13   that dues could be increased.

14                   The district court specifically held, at  
15   Petition Appendix 73a, that the 2006 notice, which  
16   described the so-called fund and the dues increase, and  
17   the purposes of it, was completely adequate.  And the  
18   notice the district court -- one also has to realize the  
19   district court was requiring the union to refund only  
20   the non-chargeable portion of activities attributed to  
21   this increase.

22                   A certain kind of notice would be needed for  
23   that to justify how the union was computing what it was  
24   saying with the chargeable portion to refund.  But what  
25   the union has done here is provide greater relief than

1 the district court ordered. We have refunded every  
2 penny that anyone who requests had paid during the  
3 increase.

4 So, there's no serious question that the  
5 notice that the union sent out, which explained what the  
6 increase had been spent on, sufficiently informed  
7 individuals as to whether they now want to get back  
8 every penny, as we've offered them, of what they paid  
9 under the increase.

10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But -- I want you to  
11 move to the merits. It may be a good time to do that.

12 MR. COLLINS: Fine. Turning to the  
13 merits --

14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Can I clarify a point?  
15 I thought I heard and maybe I just didn't look at the  
16 union regulations, the new ones -- is it limited to  
17 180 days? I thought I heard your adversary say that  
18 the --

19 MR. COLLINS: It -- no, it has a provision  
20 that it can't be repealed without 180-day notice. There  
21 can't be a sudden repeal of the new procedure.

22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I see.

23 MR. COLLINS: But I do want to make clear,  
24 we think nothing -- our position on mootness is not  
25 dependent on the Court determining that the new



1 procedure will be in effect forever. Our position --

2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could you tell me what  
3 the burden is on a union to give a second Hudson notice  
4 whenever there is a special assessment? Meaning do you  
5 happen to know how frequently unions impose special  
6 assessments --

7 MR. COLLINS: Well --

8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- and what the  
9 incremental cost is to the union of giving such notice?

10 MR. COLLINS: That requires a fairly  
11 extensive answer, I believe, Justice Sotomayor, partly  
12 because --

13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Try to summarize it. I  
14 wasn't looking to monopolize you.

15 MR. COLLINS: I understand, but I believe --  
16 I believe the word "special assessment" is being used  
17 here with a meaning that doesn't correspond to what this  
18 union did. I can say this much: There's never --  
19 there's been only one other case in any Federal court  
20 that I'm aware of, and only in a district court, there's  
21 been no other appellate court, dealing with any kind of  
22 assessment, a temporary dues increase, and how it  
23 affects Hudson rights.

24 So, this is a -- a non-event in the real  
25 world. There are -- there are no challenges that have

1 -- that have been made previously to any kinds of  
2 assessments or increases.

3 But unions use assessments in two -- in many  
4 different ways. And let me contrast one way with what  
5 happened here, and I think it will show why there's no  
6 serious question here about a need for a notice.

7 Some unions have a dues structure which  
8 covers only certain kinds of activities. And they  
9 contemplate a new kind of activity that they would not  
10 normally pay for out of dues or fees. They say often  
11 with -- with a vote, which was not required here. There  
12 was -- there was no vote required or taken here of  
13 bargaining unit members for what occurred in this  
14 instance.

15 But you may have a union that says: We want  
16 to make a kind of expenditure that's really  
17 unanticipated. It's not what we normally do with our  
18 dues. We're going to put it to a vote. If you approve  
19 it, we'll collect it. We'll probably put it in a  
20 segregated fund separate from our treasury.

21 That kind of an assessment can raise  
22 potential issues, I would acknowledge, under Hudson.  
23 It's worlds away from what we have here because all that  
24 happened in this case was that the union increased, from  
25 1 percent to 1.25 percent of salary, the regular

1 membership dues and the fees based on those dues that  
2 were deducted by employers and paid into the union's  
3 general treasury --

4 JUSTICE ALITO: Is it incorrect that this  
5 was for what was termed a "Political Fight-Back Fund"?

6 MR. COLLINS: It was -- some union  
7 communications described it as having that sole -- that  
8 purpose. The October 27th letter, which was the most  
9 detailed explanation, said it had two purposes,  
10 basically to fight back at the bargaining table and to  
11 fight back politically.

12 But what's essential, Justice Alito, it was  
13 never suggested nor was it ever the case that this money  
14 would be in any way segregated or treated as a separate  
15 entity, so to speak. So, we have the Schermerhorn  
16 problem here. Basically, Petitioners' position is based  
17 on the fallacy exposed in Schermerhorn of trying to take  
18 part of a unified general treasury and treat it as if it  
19 were a distinct entity, because --

20 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, let me give you this  
21 example, and maybe you'll say that this is different  
22 from your case and the rules should be different in  
23 these two cases. The annual dues for particular -- for  
24 members of this union are 1 percent of their salaries,  
25 and let's say that amounts to -- or it's a certain

1 percentage of their salaries, and let's say that amounts  
2 to \$500 annual dues. And let's say that, in the prior  
3 year, 90 percent of the money collected by the union was  
4 used for chargeable purposes, 10 percent for  
5 non-chargeable purposes. So, someone who objected, a  
6 nonmember who objected, would be able to get back \$50.

7 Now, during the course of the year, the  
8 union levies a special assessment or whatever you want  
9 to call it, and for this 90 -- the percentages are  
10 exactly reversed: 90 percent is for non-chargeable; 10  
11 percent is for chargeable. So, now a nonmember who  
12 potentially wants to object has \$450 at stake. Now, in  
13 that situation, why shouldn't there be separate notice?  
14 Aren't the economic incentives quite different?

15 MR. COLLINS: If I understand the  
16 hypothetical, there could be a problem there if the  
17 assumption is then that the union really is beginning a  
18 kind of spending that's really foreign to the way it's  
19 spent money in the past.

20 What needs to be explained here, though,  
21 Justice Alito, I don't think one would guess from  
22 anything that has been said today that we're talking  
23 about a period of time when the union's chargeable  
24 spending increased and its non-chargeable spending  
25 decreased. We're talking about a period of time when

1 objecting nonmembers did not even pay their pro rata  
2 share of the concededly chargeable expenditures, meaning  
3 they did not pay one penny for any political activities.

4 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, as I said, my  
5 hypothetical may be very different from what happened  
6 here, and maybe it's an unrealistic hypothetical; and  
7 you can answer that. But if -- if it were to occur,  
8 should there not be Hudson notice?

9 MR. COLLINS: Well, the problem -- it would  
10 be a closer question, but I think not, because, again,  
11 it would be caught up in the subsequent year.

12 JUSTICE ALITO: But what if the money is  
13 going to be used for an election campaign? What if it  
14 is going to be used to weigh in, in favor of one  
15 gubernatorial candidate against another, in favor of one  
16 slate of legislative candidates against another? And on  
17 those issues, the nonmembers may have very strong  
18 partisan and ideological objections. So, why should  
19 they not be given a notice at that time --

20 MR. COLLINS: It would depend --

21 JUSTICE ALITO: -- and given the opportunity  
22 not to give what would be at a minimum a -- an  
23 interest-free loan --

24 MR. COLLINS: Because --

25 JUSTICE ALITO: -- for the purpose of

1 influencing an election campaign?

2 MR. COLLINS: It would depend,  
3 Justice Alito. I think in your hypothetical, one might  
4 be able to say -- there might be more facts needed, but  
5 one might be able to say that what is occurring is  
6 something that could not be anticipated reasonably by  
7 the person who got the notice.

8 In this case, however -- and this is crucial  
9 to this case -- the notice in 2005 told every nonmember  
10 that, of our \$38 million budget, we spent 43.6 percent  
11 of it last year on non-chargeable activities. And if  
12 you do not object, we will spend whatever amount out of  
13 our roughly \$40 million budget in the coming year on  
14 various activities as we perceive the need, including  
15 specifically ballot initiatives, which were specifically  
16 mentioned in the notice as one of the things the union  
17 spent its money on.

18 Now --

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I thought your  
20 point, though -- this was a very special ballot  
21 initiative. That's what the literature suggests, that  
22 this was not sort of the normal run in the course --  
23 every 2 years, every election cycle, we spend something.  
24 That's why it's a special assessment.

25 MR. COLLINS: Well, I don't -- I wouldn't

1 call it a special assessment if one uses that term as  
2 it's usually used, to mean a very short-term assessment  
3 apart from general union functions for a new kind of  
4 function.

5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, it's not  
6 short-term; it's just until November 7th or whatever.

7 MR. COLLINS: But it's nothing new under the  
8 sun, Mr. Chief Justice. And we can see that -- for  
9 example, the record reflects the audit for 2005 shows us  
10 that, in addition to the money that was attributed to  
11 the dues increase and spent in opposing these ballot  
12 propositions, additional money, approximately  
13 \$2 million, was spent on those same purposes from the  
14 pre-increase dues.

15 So, ballot -- opposing ballot initiatives is  
16 nothing new for this union.

17 JUSTICE BREYER: Can you think of for a  
18 second -- to go back to Justice Sotomayor. Now, I would  
19 like you to see, I think, why she asked the question.

20 As I understand it, the way it works now is  
21 at the beginning of, say, September -- say it goes  
22 September -- September. September of year two, we look  
23 back to year one, and we see what the percentages were.  
24 And now we in the union calculate a budget for year two.  
25 And we go and get approval or opt-outs on that basis.

1                   Now, what I thought coming in here is that  
2   the problem was going to be, if you have to have a new  
3   notice in the middle of the year for special political  
4   assessments, you're going to discover that half the time  
5   you don't know if they're special political assessments.  
6   It's an impossible line to draw. It's really tough.

7                   You're making the argument that however you  
8   draw the line, we're on the right side of it, not the  
9   wrong side. Isn't that what -- basically what you're  
10   saying? It's not a special assessment. It wasn't  
11   really -- et cetera. Okay.

12                  Now -- but there's a new argument that's  
13   come along that I hadn't focused on, that we can avoid  
14   the administrative problem by saying all special  
15   assessments require a new notice, whether they're for  
16   political purposes or not. Hence the question that I  
17   was trying to get -- I was very interested in your  
18   answer. If we had that rule, which avoids the problem  
19   of saying which is which, how does that affect the  
20   union? Not necessarily yours but unions in general.  
21   How often is it that you draw up your budget for year  
22   two in September, you put it into effect, and then  
23   during the year, you discover you need more money from  
24   people for any reason, and, therefore, you change what  
25   you thought they were going to contribute? How often,



1 if you can give us an estimate -- and you're in a better  
2 position than I. Does it happen a lot, rarely, a  
3 little? What do you want to say?

4 MR. COLLINS: I -- I --

5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And a footnote: And if  
6 it happens a lot, how burdensome is it?

7 MR. COLLINS: I will get to that, Justice  
8 Sotomayor. I have tried to determine how frequent it  
9 is, and I've been unable. All I've been able to  
10 determine is there's no litigation over it. How  
11 often -- and I've been able to determine that so-called  
12 assessments take many different forms from -- and I  
13 think there are crucial distinctions -- from funding  
14 what would -- a kind of charge that would not otherwise  
15 be funded out of dues for some short period of time, to  
16 the opposite extreme, what we have here and what I don't  
17 think would be called an assessment frankly by anything  
18 I've read, a temporary dues increase which became  
19 permanent and which simply increased the total flow of  
20 dues and fees into the general treasury and which went  
21 for the usual -- the kinds of activities the union had  
22 always funded. And in that regard, there's one --

23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could you please answer  
24 my question?

25 MR. COLLINS: The burden?

1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right? The burden.

2 MR. COLLINS: The burden consists of two  
3 things, Justice Sotomayor. The -- if a union has to  
4 give a new Hudson notice in a situation like this,  
5 whereas I've been trying to explain the spending that  
6 went on is really not different from what one would have  
7 reasonably anticipated given the notice, then we have  
8 litigation and disputes about the need for new notices  
9 whenever any number of things happen, because one thing  
10 that happened here that is undisputed but hasn't been  
11 discussed is that collective bargaining costs were up  
12 six-fold in 2005 over 2004, and they were up six-fold in  
13 2006 over 2005.

14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: One reason -- I  
15 mean, we're dealing with the situation where the union  
16 is compelling nonunion members to give them money for  
17 political activities. We allow, as I understand Hudson,  
18 as I read it, because you can't figure out what that is,  
19 you wait until the end of the year. In other words,  
20 it's a compromise for administrative convenience.  
21 Normally, you wouldn't allow it at all, as -- at least  
22 under the law as I read it, you would not allow people  
23 to take money -- you would not allow the union to take  
24 money from people who don't want to spend it on  
25 political activities so the union can spend it on

1 political activities. But we allow that in the course  
2 of the year because it's impossible as you go on to sort  
3 these things out. I thought the argument on the other  
4 side was when you have a special assessment, an  
5 additional charge, there you don't have the  
6 administrative problem. You can tell it's .25 percent.  
7 So, you can't take that until you tell them, do you want  
8 to object or are you happy -- are you fine with having  
9 this spent on political purposes?

10 MR. COLLINS: The reason, Mr. Chief Justice,  
11 that it isn't that straight forward is quite simply that  
12 all of these questions about it's a special assessment,  
13 we can figure out what it is, we can treat it  
14 separately, flounder when one realizes that the  
15 so-called special assessment is simply a dues increase,  
16 because if I were to try to imagine -- let's try to  
17 imagine the notice that could have been given. If I was  
18 giving a new notice in the fall of 2005 to explain to  
19 all nonmembers how things look now compared to what  
20 they -- how they may have looked when the Hudson notice  
21 was given, I would say the following, completely  
22 consistent with all the facts of record in this case as  
23 revealed in the audits. I would say: We've determined  
24 we need more income. Part of this is because we  
25 anticipate \$3.7 million in fight-back expenses this

1 year. Another part is we expect more than \$3-1/2  
2 million of additional bargaining costs this year, and we  
3 expect a lot of other changes in our costs.

4 On the Petitioners' theory -- and this is  
5 why Schermerhorn is the complete answer to their  
6 theory -- there's a constitutional violation if the  
7 union says we're going to view this increase as paying  
8 for our additional political costs, and it's going to  
9 free up our bargaining -- our general treasury for the  
10 bargaining. That's a violation. But if you say we're  
11 going to treat this increase as covering those new  
12 bargaining costs we told you about, that's going to free  
13 up our general treasury for the political costs --

14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But on the -- I'm  
15 reading from the district court opinion. It said that  
16 this assessment would be used -- and they're quoting  
17 from union material -- "for a broad range of political  
18 expenses, including television, radio advertising,  
19 direct mail, voter registration, voter education, and  
20 get out the vote activities in our work sites and in  
21 communities across California." And it further said,  
22 quote, "The fund will not be used for regular costs of  
23 the union such as office rent, staff salaries or routine  
24 equipment replacement."

25 MR. COLLINS: But two points,

1 Mr. Chief Justice: First, as the court of appeals  
2 pointed out, there were other statements that said the  
3 money would be used for both purposes.

4 But, as Schermerhorn points out,  
5 Schermerhorn says even if you specifically say this part  
6 of our dues income is going to be earmarked for this  
7 purpose, it's artificial when you're dealing with a  
8 general union treasury, not a separate segregated fund,  
9 to give that separate legal status. And that -- because  
10 that is why -- my point to you, Mr. Chief Justice, is  
11 nothing in the world would have changed here.

12 JUSTICE ALITO: Suppose that the --

13 MR. COLLINS: If --

14 JUSTICE ALITO: Suppose that the proponents  
15 of Propositions 75 and 76 had come to the union and  
16 said, would you please give us an interest-free loan for  
17 money because we want to use this money to -- to  
18 persuade the electorate to enact these; but don't worry  
19 because we're going to pay it back right after the  
20 election, when we've achieved our electoral ends.

21 Would -- would the union provide the money  
22 because it's all going to come out in the wash?

23 MR. COLLINS: I -- I really can't answer  
24 that question. I don't know. I --

25 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I -- gee, I really

1   doubt that you -- that they would.  But what's the  
2   difference?  If you look at this from the perspective of  
3   a nonmember who doesn't want those ballot initiatives to  
4   be defeated, saying that we're going to give you your  
5   money back -- we're going to use your money to achieve a  
6   political end that you oppose, but don't worry because  
7   we're going to give it back to you next year after we've  
8   achieved our political end -- how does that solve the  
9   problem?

10                   MR. COLLINS:  That's not the situation here,  
11   Justice Alito.  The nonmembers were told in June 2005 in  
12   the Hudson notice that if you don't object, we may spend  
13   millions of dollars on political activities, including  
14   ballot initiatives.  If a person didn't want to support  
15   that, they merely need to object.  What then happened --  
16   and this is what gets lost in the messaging about the  
17   dues increase.  What actually happened in the real world  
18   in the period that followed is that, compared to the  
19   numbers in the 2004 Hudson notice, the union spent less  
20   on non-chargeable matters and more on chargeable  
21   matters.  And the only reason there's a case here in the  
22   Court is that the union, for whatever PR purposes,  
23   whatever it may have been, instead of saying we're going  
24   to treat the increase as covering our vastly increased  
25   bargaining costs, thereby freeing up money for politics,

1 we're instead going to describe this increase as being  
2 attributable to our political costs, thereby freeing up  
3 money for bargaining. But what the union is spending  
4 its -- its money on is bargaining. More money --

5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: It -- it seems to me that  
6 this answer is -- is so confusing that the Court  
7 probably should consider whether or not an opt-in  
8 requirement is -- is preferable. I -- we're talking --  
9 in the first exchange, you had with Justice Alito, he  
10 gave you a very simple question: 90 percent and 10  
11 percent. Then, it's reversed. Special assessment for  
12 90 percent political. And the point there was that  
13 you're taking someone's money contrary to that person's  
14 conscience. And that's what the First Amendment stands  
15 against. And you simply wouldn't answer that question.  
16 You would -- and then you say, well, maybe that it's --  
17 it's fungible, it's hard to --

18 MR. COLLINS: No, but --

19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: It seems to me that you're  
20 avoiding --

21 MR. COLLINS: No.

22 JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- a very, very critical  
23 question on the constitutional rights of these objecting  
24 members.

25 MR. COLLINS: I won't avoid the -- I don't

1 believe -- I was not meaning to avoid it,  
2 Justice Kennedy. What I thought I said is, if you are  
3 springing something on someone that's not anticipated in  
4 the notice that gave them their rights to object, then  
5 there's a problem.

6 My point is very simple. Anyone reading the  
7 2005 Hudson notice, if that person was asked -- if I  
8 don't -- if you -- if I don't object, might the union  
9 spend \$3.7 million next year on ballot initiatives that  
10 I may not want to oppose? The answer would be yes. The  
11 notice made it perfectly clear.

12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Let me ask you this --

13 MR. COLLINS: And the person can object.

14 JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- by way of background:

15 In collective bargaining negotiations, do the unions  
16 consider the -- as one factor the importance of ensuring  
17 that the governmental employer has fiscal stability?

18 MR. COLLINS: That's generally considered,  
19 yes, by unions.

20 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, isn't that  
21 ultimately a political judgment, so that even collective  
22 bargaining involves a core political judgment?

23 MR. COLLINS: And that's exactly what the  
24 Court said in Abood. And the reason that exclusivity  
25 and agency fees are permitted in -- in serving an



1 important government purpose is that the government has  
2 concluded that its interest lies in having an exclusive  
3 spokesperson who -- with whom it can negotiate so that  
4 it won't have an array of different employment relations  
5 or different --

6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But you -- you concede, in  
7 ordinary collective bargaining, there are critical and  
8 important political -- significant political judgments  
9 that are being made by the union in the course of  
10 collective bargaining with chargeable expenses?

11 MR. COLLINS: Absolutely. And Abood  
12 explicitly says that, and Abood then says that,  
13 nevertheless, the government -- we're talking about a  
14 regulatory scheme to promote the government's interest  
15 in orderly labor relations. The government needs to  
16 make arrangements and agreements on terms of employment.  
17 It has a vital interest in having an exclusive  
18 representational arrangement where that can be  
19 accomplished. And that, the Court held in Abood -- and  
20 it's not challenged by Petitioners -- that justifies the  
21 degree of impingement that's inherent in the fact that,  
22 as Your Honor correctly says, all bargaining,  
23 particularly in the public sector, has political  
24 elements in it.

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

1           Mr. Young, you have 4 minutes remaining.

2           REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF WILLIAM J. YOUNG

3           ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

4           MR. YOUNG: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

5           JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Young, I hope this  
6 won't use up much of your time, but I do have a pressing  
7 question to make sure that we're just not spinning our  
8 wheels here.

9           What if the union here had simply said all  
10 this additional assessment will go to bargaining  
11 activities, and then simply used its original  
12 assessment, the portion that had been anticipated to be  
13 used for bargaining, for political activities? It could  
14 do that, couldn't it?

15          MR. YOUNG: It would --

16          JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, it's not committed  
17 to -- to, you know, an 80-20, or whatever the division  
18 is, simply because that's what's given out in the first  
19 notice. It can indeed use its -- the anticipated  
20 portion for bargaining for political activities.

21          MR. YOUNG: It would be free to do so,  
22 Justice Scalia.

23          JUSTICE SCALIA: So, why are we wasting our  
24 time? I mean, all the unions are going to do is say  
25 this is a general assessment for bargaining purposes,

1 and then use their -- their general funds for the  
2 political thing.

3 MR. YOUNG: Because the nonmembers still  
4 have that right to challenge, Justice Scalia.

5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But they don't lose it;  
6 they're going to do it the following September. The  
7 attractive part of your argument from the beginning was  
8 that this is somehow a forced loan. And I understand  
9 the attractiveness of that. But it goes back to what  
10 Justice Breyer said from the beginning, which is, given,  
11 as has been recognized, that money is fungible and that  
12 you can't really often predict what's going to happen in  
13 the future, it's been developed a system that cyclically  
14 gets money to the people back.

15 MR. YOUNG: And money is fungible to a  
16 degree, Justice Sotomayor -- Sotomayor -- excuse me.  
17 And I respect that argument, but let's remember the  
18 facts as we have them here. In the facts of this case,  
19 it was a segregated fund. There's a separate portion, a  
20 separate line item in the union's notice for both --

21 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay. So, you win, and  
22 it'll never happen again. It'll never again be called a  
23 segregated fund for politics.

24 (Laughter.)

25 MR. YOUNG: I lose, Justice Scalia, and it

1 will happen all the time, I'm afraid.

2 JUSTICE BREYER: No, but the -- the problem  
3 if you win in this case, and then there is this other  
4 way of getting to the same -- the same result, is that  
5 the other way of getting to the same result, while  
6 permissible, is far less transparent. And people won't  
7 understand it, and it -- it encourages a kind of slyness  
8 that seems highly undesirable.

9 And the virtue of the present system is that  
10 it does require some forced loans, that's true, but it  
11 does wash out in the wash, and it ends up being fair to  
12 the objectors. And it's simply hard to think of a  
13 better system that doesn't provide more administrative  
14 problems than the existing one.

15 MR. YOUNG: But --

16 JUSTICE BREYER: So, that's -- go ahead.

17 MR. YOUNG: And I thank you, Justice Breyer.  
18 I'm sorry for interrupting.

19 It -- I understand that, Justice Breyer.  
20 And for ordinary union dues, that's why when Justice  
21 Sotomayor asked me at the beginning of the argument  
22 whether we're challenging the ordinary Hudson system, I  
23 answered no, because that system is perfectly adequate  
24 for ordinary union dues.

25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The problem is that I'm

1 being told by your adversary -- and since we don't know,  
2 I'm always afraid of writing a decision in a vacuum,  
3 okay?

4 MR. YOUNG: Sure.

5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That unions structure  
6 their business in a myriad number of ways, that some  
7 have a very small due each year and a larger special  
8 assessment for special projects. And I assume there's  
9 endless variety.

10 You're proposing a rule that every single  
11 time an assessment outside of annual dues is imposed,  
12 that a new Hudson notice can be given. And you're  
13 suggesting, Justice Scalia, that all they have to say is  
14 we think it's going to be for chargeable effect.

15 MR. YOUNG: Well, the -- I'm sorry.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Briefly, counsel.

17 MR. YOUNG: Yes, and I thank you,  
18 Mr. Chief Justice.

19 So, Justice Sotomayor, the answer is that  
20 I'm saying it would -- it would be brief -- and my  
21 friend Mr. Collins is saying that it doesn't happen that  
22 often. So, the burden is minimal. Unions have other  
23 options than extracting this money from unwitting  
24 nonmembers -- interest-free loans, internationals.

25 And I thank the Court for its attention.

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel,  
2 counsel.

3 The case is submitted.

4 (Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the case in the  
5 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

<b>A</b>				
<b>able</b> 36:6 38:4,5 41:9,11	<b>addressed</b> 10:19	21:21	<b>approval</b> 39:25	26:21 33:6
<b>Abod</b> 15:14	<b>addressing</b> 3:11	<b>alteration</b> 14:1	<b>approve</b> 34:18	34:2,3 40:4,5
48:24 49:11,12	4:5 10:16	15:18	<b>approximately</b>	40:15 41:12
49:19	<b>adequacy</b> 5:5	<b>Amendment</b>	39:12	<b>assume</b> 18:20
<b>above-entitled</b>	7:21 27:19	3:20 47:14	<b>argument</b> 1:13	20:11 53:8
1:12 54:5	<b>adequate</b> 7:4 8:5	<b>amount</b> 3:18	2:2,5,8 3:3,7	<b>assumption</b>
<b>absolutely</b> 19:14	12:20 31:7,17	15:10 16:16	6:20 11:12,15	36:17
25:21 31:9	52:23	17:24,25 38:12	11:16 12:8,8	<b>assurance</b> 23:9
49:11	<b>administrable</b>	<b>amounts</b> 21:3	12:10 13:16	<b>attacking</b> 13:4,7
<b>accept</b> 29:13	18:16	35:25 36:1	24:22 25:17	13:10
<b>accessible</b> 24:12	<b>administrative</b>	<b>announced</b>	27:18 29:3	<b>attain</b> 27:9
<b>accomplished</b>	40:14 42:20	17:23	40:7,12 43:3	<b>attempting</b> 5:11
49:19	43:6 52:13	<b>annual</b> 7:15	50:2 51:7,17	<b>attention</b> 53:25
<b>accounting</b> 13:6	<b>adopt</b> 18:6	10:22 23:21,22	52:21	<b>attractive</b> 51:7
<b>accurate</b> 22:21	<b>adversary</b> 32:17	23:25 35:23	<b>arrangement</b>	<b>attractiveness</b>
<b>accurately</b> 4:14	53:1	36:2 53:11	49:18	51:9
8:23	<b>advertising</b>	<b>answer</b> 17:1	<b>arrangements</b>	<b>attributable</b>
<b>achieve</b> 30:22	44:18	21:13 28:1,3	49:16	47:2
46:5	<b>affect</b> 9:12 40:19	33:11 37:7	<b>array</b> 49:4	<b>attributed</b> 31:20
<b>achieved</b> 45:20	<b>affiliate</b> 20:19	40:18 41:23	<b>Article</b> 5:2,9	39:10
46:8	<b>affirmative</b> 10:6	44:5 45:23	<b>articulate</b> 13:13	<b>audit</b> 23:10 39:9
<b>acknowledge</b>	10:6	47:6,15 48:10	14:3	<b>audited</b> 21:3
34:22	<b>affirmed</b> 20:12	53:19	<b>artificial</b> 45:7	<b>audits</b> 43:23
<b>acme</b> 30:22	<b>afraid</b> 52:1 53:2	<b>answered</b> 52:23	<b>asked</b> 18:6	<b>avoid</b> 40:13
<b>act</b> 6:8 10:6,6,12	<b>agency</b> 48:25	<b>anticipate</b> 7:3	39:19 48:7	47:25 48:1
<b>actions</b> 26:5	<b>agree</b> 21:8	20:15 43:25	52:21	<b>avoiding</b> 47:20
<b>activities</b> 9:12	<b>agreed</b> 22:18	<b>anticipated</b> 5:20	<b>asserting</b> 6:15	<b>avoids</b> 40:18
16:3,7 19:1	<b>agreements</b>	38:6 42:7 48:3	<b>assessable</b> 19:1	<b>aware</b> 33:20
24:11 31:20	49:16	50:12,19	<b>assessment</b> 7:6	<b>a.m</b> 1:14 3:2
34:8 37:3	<b>agrees</b> 19:15	<b>anybody</b> 14:8	7:16,24 9:5	54:4
38:11,14 41:21	<b>ahead</b> 16:21	<b>apart</b> 39:3	12:2 13:8 14:9	
42:17,25 43:1	52:16	<b>apex</b> 30:22	14:10,19 15:1	<b>B</b>
44:20 46:13	<b>AL</b> 1:3	<b>apologetic</b> 4:22	16:2,8 17:13	<b>B</b> 5:24
50:11,13,20	<b>Alito</b> 7:6,12,22	<b>appealed</b> 27:8	17:22 18:2,7	<b>back</b> 20:23 24:7
<b>activity</b> 11:18	8:7 26:19 27:1	29:22	18:21 20:25	24:14 26:22
19:16 34:9	35:4,12,20	<b>appeals</b> 25:23	22:11,18,19,23	30:24,25 32:7
<b>acts</b> 11:5,7	36:21 37:4,12	45:1	24:23 26:24	35:10,11 36:6
<b>Adding</b> 3:21	37:21,25 38:3	<b>appearance</b>	33:4,16,22	39:18,23 45:19
<b>addition</b> 39:10	45:12,14,25	20:7	34:21 36:8	46:5,7 51:9,14
<b>additional</b> 15:5	46:11 47:9	<b>APPEARAN...</b>	38:24 39:1,2	<b>background</b>
22:11 39:12	<b>allegations</b>	1:15	40:10 41:17	48:14
43:5 44:2,8	27:14	<b>appellate</b> 33:21	43:4,12,15	<b>backwards</b>
50:10	<b>allegedly</b> 11:18	<b>Appendix</b> 5:24	44:16 47:11	18:14
<b>address</b> 10:25	<b>allow</b> 42:17,21	31:15	50:10,12,25	<b>bad</b> 15:16
25:13	42:22,23 43:1	<b>appreciate</b> 13:9	53:8,11	<b>balance</b> 25:12
	<b>allowed</b> 27:22	<b>appropriately</b>	<b>assessments</b>	<b>ballot</b> 3:23
	<b>already-assess...</b>	28:13	6:22 13:5 24:8	38:15,20 39:11

39:15,15 46:3 46:14 48:9 <b>Bancorp</b> 28:9 30:11 <b>bankroll</b> 3:25 <b>bargaining</b> 34:13 35:10 42:11 44:2,9 44:10,12 46:25 47:3,4 48:15 48:22 49:7,10 49:22 50:10,13 50:20,25 <b>based</b> 13:6 35:1 35:16 <b>basically</b> 35:10 35:16 40:9 <b>basing</b> 13:5 <b>basis</b> 30:6 39:25 <b>beginning</b> 7:14 28:8 36:17 39:21 51:7,10 52:21 <b>behalf</b> 2:4,7,10 3:8 25:18 50:3 <b>belabor</b> 26:24 <b>believe</b> 8:5 11:4 12:17,18 13:24 18:4 22:1 28:24 30:10 31:1 33:11,15 33:16 48:1 <b>benefit</b> 16:10 25:3,10 <b>better</b> 16:5 18:8 18:19 19:24 20:3,4 41:1 52:13 <b>bishops</b> 19:13 20:5,12,16 <b>board</b> 13:19 <b>borrowing</b> 13:13 <b>bounced</b> 30:15 <b>breakdown</b> 23:4 <b>Breyer</b> 16:1,14 16:18,22,25	17:6,10,16 18:5 19:4,11 19:20 20:6,8 23:1,11,14,15 25:3 39:17 51:10 52:2,16 52:17,19 <b>Breyer's</b> 20:23 <b>brief</b> 4:7 11:19 53:20 <b>Briefly</b> 53:16 <b>briefs</b> 21:4 24:9 24:9 <b>broad</b> 44:17 <b>broke</b> 17:2 <b>brought</b> 27:13 <b>budget</b> 38:10,13 39:24 40:21 <b>burden</b> 33:3 41:25 42:1,2 53:22 <b>burdensome</b> 41:6 <b>business</b> 53:6 <hr/> <b>C</b> <b>C</b> 2:1 3:1 <b>calculate</b> 39:24 <b>California</b> 3:16 44:21 <b>call</b> 36:9 39:1 <b>called</b> 24:20 28:23 41:17 51:22 <b>campaign</b> 17:23 37:13 38:1 <b>candidate</b> 37:15 <b>candidates</b> 37:16 <b>capable</b> 9:16 10:9 11:9,23 <b>carry</b> 23:17 <b>case</b> 3:4,13 4:11 5:4,10,25 6:2 6:15 7:9,18 8:1 8:4,16 9:1,4,10 9:19,21 10:1	10:14 11:17,19 12:10,14 14:7 15:7 18:4 20:17 24:6 26:1,2,7,8,12 27:9,13 28:1,3 28:9,12 29:6 29:13 30:4,4,6 30:9,13,23 33:19 34:24 35:13,22 38:8 38:9 43:22 46:21 51:18 52:3 54:3,4 <b>cases</b> 10:15,21 11:1,8 28:7 30:11 35:23 <b>caught</b> 37:11 <b>caused</b> 5:22 <b>cert</b> 11:18 <b>certain</b> 28:11 29:18 31:22 34:8 35:25 <b>certainly</b> 6:23 7:3 9:18 13:2 14:17 15:11,18 <b>cessation</b> 11:17 <b>cetera</b> 40:11 <b>challenge</b> 3:18 15:10 16:16 18:23 19:8 21:21,24 23:23 23:23 51:4 <b>challenged</b> 26:6 49:20 <b>challenges</b> 25:2 25:5 33:25 <b>challenging</b> 24:15 52:22 <b>chance</b> 20:24 21:9,14,15,24 <b>change</b> 9:2 14:4 23:6 40:24 <b>changed</b> 8:23 45:11 <b>changes</b> 44:3 <b>characterizati...</b>	25:10 <b>charge</b> 41:14 43:5 <b>chargeability</b> 13:6 <b>chargeable</b> 15:6 16:3,7 17:3,3 17:24 19:16 21:2,6 31:24 36:4,11,23 37:2 46:20 49:10 53:14 <b>check</b> 30:15 <b>Chief</b> 3:3,9 6:10 6:14,17,19 12:21,24 14:18 14:21,23 15:10 16:9,21 23:16 23:20 25:15,19 25:25 29:1,17 30:1 31:5 32:10 38:19 39:5,8 42:14 43:10 44:14 45:1,10 49:25 50:4 53:16,18 54:1 <b>choose</b> 15:20,22 15:23 16:16 23:23 <b>chose</b> 15:21 <b>Circuit</b> 3:22 8:12,14 <b>circumstance</b> 13:22 16:2 <b>claim</b> 4:8,23,24 4:25 5:17 <b>claims</b> 27:21 <b>clarification</b> 28:11 <b>clarify</b> 32:14 <b>class</b> 4:14,16 <b>clear</b> 10:2,15 12:18 27:20 32:23 48:11 <b>clearly</b> 11:16 15:14	<b>closer</b> 37:10 <b>colleagues</b> 13:14 <b>collect</b> 34:19 <b>collected</b> 7:15 17:18,21 18:10 36:3 <b>collective</b> 42:11 48:15,21 49:7 49:10 <b>Collins</b> 1:18 2:6 25:16,17,19 26:3,23 27:17 28:6 29:16 30:8 32:12,19 32:23 33:7,10 33:15 35:6 36:15 37:9,20 37:24 38:2,25 39:7 41:4,7,25 42:2 43:10 44:25 45:13,23 46:10 47:18,21 47:25 48:13,18 48:23 49:11 53:21 <b>combine</b> 19:20 <b>come</b> 21:6 40:13 45:15,22 <b>comes</b> 9:21 17:11,11 <b>coming</b> 38:13 40:1 <b>committed</b> 50:16 <b>communicatio...</b> 35:7 <b>communities</b> 44:21 <b>compared</b> 43:19 46:18 <b>compelled</b> 3:16 <b>compelling</b> 42:16 <b>competent</b> 22:3 <b>complete</b> 44:5 <b>completed</b> 9:4 <b>completely</b>
--	--	---	--	--



31:17 43:21 <b>complied</b> 6:16 12:16 27:23 28:2 <b>complies</b> 7:4 <b>comply</b> 5:6,11 5:15 <b>comport</b> 29:21 <b>compromise</b> 42:20 <b>computing</b> 31:23 <b>concede</b> 18:18 49:6 <b>concededly</b> 37:2 <b>concerns</b> 27:3 <b>concluded</b> 49:2 <b>conduct</b> 27:4,11 <b>confirm</b> 18:16 <b>confusing</b> 47:6 <b>conscience</b> 47:14 <b>consequence</b> 8:11 25:24 <b>consequences</b> 6:24 <b>consider</b> 26:2 47:7 48:16 <b>considered</b> 48:18 <b>consistent</b> 43:22 <b>consists</b> 42:2 <b>constitutional</b> 44:6 47:23 <b>constitutionally</b> 7:17 <b>contemplate</b> 6:6 34:9 <b>contemplated</b> 26:16 <b>content</b> 6:11 <b>contesting</b> 27:23 29:24 <b>context</b> 7:17,24 7:25 <b>continue</b> 19:12 <b>continuing</b> 12:3	<b>contracts</b> 13:20 <b>contrary</b> 47:13 <b>contrast</b> 34:4 <b>contribute</b> 3:16 40:25 <b>contributing</b> 3:23 <b>controversy</b> 8:2 <b>convenience</b> 42:20 <b>core</b> 48:22 <b>correct</b> 4:9,19 17:15 19:9 21:9 24:16,17 25:21 26:3 30:9 <b>correctly</b> 49:22 <b>correspond</b> 33:17 <b>cost</b> 13:17 33:9 <b>costs</b> 13:18 15:2 42:11 44:2,3,8 44:12,13,22 46:25 47:2 <b>cough</b> 22:7,12 <b>counsel</b> 25:15 49:25 53:16 54:1,2 <b>course</b> 15:12 23:21 36:7 38:22 43:1 49:9 <b>court</b> 1:1,13 3:10 5:11,18 5:20 6:3,5 8:14 8:16,20,25 9:8 9:22 10:16,19 10:24 11:1,3,4 11:6,8 12:9,19 15:14 22:1 25:20,22,23,24 26:2 27:6,9 28:3,10,13,20 28:21,24 29:18 29:19,21,23 30:4,5,9,14,17 30:19,23 31:3	31:9,10,14,18 31:19 32:1,25 33:19,20,21 44:15 45:1 46:22 47:6 48:24 49:19 53:25 <b>courts</b> 9:21 <b>court's</b> 4:1 5:7 6:16 7:5 8:5 12:17 27:24 28:7 <b>covering</b> 44:11 46:24 <b>covers</b> 34:8 <b>create</b> 19:22 22:24 <b>critical</b> 47:22 49:7 <b>crucial</b> 38:8 41:13 <b>cure</b> 5:22 <b>cycle</b> 24:10 38:23 <b>cyclically</b> 51:13 <hr/> <b>D</b> <b>D</b> 3:1 <b>damages</b> 4:8 5:8 7:20 10:11 <b>dark</b> 22:16,17 <b>days</b> 8:24 9:2 32:17 <b>deal</b> 17:7 <b>dealing</b> 7:12,15 33:21 42:15 45:7 <b>decide</b> 27:10 <b>decided</b> 22:18 <b>deciding</b> 30:19 <b>decision</b> 15:21 25:23 27:10 28:20,25 53:2 <b>decisions</b> 4:1 <b>declaratory</b> 9:7 27:15 <b>declined</b> 8:21	<b>decreased</b> 36:25 <b>deducted</b> 35:2 <b>defeated</b> 46:4 <b>defend</b> 26:7 <b>defended</b> 11:6,7 <b>defending</b> 11:20 <b>defies</b> 4:1 <b>defines</b> 27:8 <b>degree</b> 49:21 51:16 <b>demand</b> 6:22 <b>depend</b> 28:4 37:20 38:2 <b>dependent</b> 32:25 <b>describe</b> 47:1 <b>described</b> 5:19 31:16 35:7 <b>description</b> 23:12,14 <b>detailed</b> 35:9 <b>determine</b> 41:8 41:10,11 <b>determined</b> 5:20 43:23 <b>determining</b> 32:25 <b>developed</b> 51:13 <b>DIANNE</b> 1:3 <b>difference</b> 29:9 46:2 <b>different</b> 4:17 5:2,9 6:20 7:7 7:8,16,23,25 11:23 25:8 30:6 34:4 35:21,22 36:14 37:5 41:12 42:6 49:4,5 <b>direct</b> 44:19 <b>disagree</b> 25:9 <b>disclosure</b> 5:6 5:21 6:1 12:20 <b>discover</b> 40:4,23 <b>discrete</b> 11:24 <b>discuss</b> 10:18 <b>discussed</b> 42:11	<b>dismiss</b> 3:11 <b>disposing</b> 28:10 <b>dispute</b> 14:8 27:18,19,21 28:16,17,19 <b>disputes</b> 42:8 <b>distinct</b> 35:19 <b>distinctions</b> 41:13 <b>distorting</b> 4:2 <b>distributed</b> 4:13 <b>distribution</b> 5:8 24:16 <b>district</b> 5:7,11 5:18,20 6:3,5 6:16 7:5 8:4,13 8:15 9:8 11:6,8 12:17,19 25:24 27:6,24 28:21 28:24 29:18,19 29:21,23 30:3 30:5,14,17,23 31:3,9,10,14 31:18,19 32:1 33:20 44:15 <b>divert</b> 17:24 21:20 24:12 <b>divided</b> 18:22 <b>division</b> 50:17 <b>doing</b> 17:22 <b>dollar</b> 4:13 <b>dollars</b> 4:14 46:13 <b>doubt</b> 46:1 <b>draw</b> 40:6,8,21 <b>due</b> 20:17 53:7 <b>dues</b> 7:15 21:25 26:17 31:11,12 31:13,16 33:22 34:7,10,18 35:1,1,23 36:2 39:11,14 41:15 41:18,20 43:15 45:6 46:17 52:20,24 53:11 <b>D.C</b> 1:9,18
--	--	---	---	--

<b>E</b> 2:1 3:1,1	<b>essentially</b> 4:7 27:12	<b>extensive</b> 33:11	29:17 30:12	<b>fungible</b> 47:17 51:11,15
<b>earmarked</b> 45:6	<b>estimate</b> 41:1	<b>extent</b> 6:25	45:1 47:9,14	<b>further</b> 16:20 44:21
<b>easily</b> 27:22	<b>estimated</b> 15:2	<b>extra</b> 16:2	50:18	<b>future</b> 9:12,24 9:24 26:20
<b>economic</b> 15:21 36:14	<b>et</b> 1:3 40:11	<b>extracting</b> 53:23	<b>fiscal</b> 48:17	27:3,3,11 51:13
<b>economically</b> 16:4	<b>evading</b> 9:16 11:10	<b>extreme</b> 41:16	<b>flounder</b> 43:14	
<b>education</b> 44:19	<b>event</b> 23:24 27:14	<hr/> <b>F</b> <hr/>	<b>flow</b> 41:19	<hr/> <b>G</b> <hr/>
<b>effect</b> 9:11 11:11 12:2 33:1 40:22 53:14	<b>events</b> 26:4	<b>fact</b> 5:16 8:23 12:19 16:3 49:21	<b>focused</b> 40:13	<b>G</b> 3:1
<b>efforts</b> 24:13	<b>everybody</b> 19:15	<b>factor</b> 48:16	<b>followed</b> 46:18	<b>gee</b> 45:25
<b>either</b> 5:7 25:4	<b>exaction</b> 3:19	<b>facts</b> 3:13 38:4 43:22 51:18,18	<b>following</b> 16:4 20:1 21:1 24:13 29:11 43:21 51:6	<b>general</b> 14:6 35:3,18 39:3 40:20 41:20 44:9,13 45:8 50:25 51:1
<b>electing</b> 6:21	<b>exactly</b> 19:9 36:10 48:23	<b>fail</b> 5:15	<b>footnote</b> 11:4 41:5	<b>generally</b> 10:14 13:18 48:18
<b>election</b> 21:21 24:11 37:13 38:1,23 45:20	<b>example</b> 16:23 21:19 28:17 35:21 39:9	<b>failed</b> 4:15 5:12 8:3 28:18	<b>forced</b> 19:22 51:8 52:10	<b>getting</b> 11:1 52:4,5
<b>elections</b> 24:10	<b>exchange</b> 47:9	<b>fair</b> 19:25 23:14 52:11	<b>foreign</b> 36:18	<b>gift</b> 29:25 30:21
<b>electoral</b> 45:20	<b>exclusive</b> 49:2 49:17	<b>fairly</b> 33:10	<b>forget</b> 24:8	<b>Ginsburg</b> 8:8,10 8:18 9:3,6 11:22 12:7,12 12:16 25:21
<b>electorate</b> 45:18	<b>exclusivity</b> 48:24	<b>fall</b> 43:18	<b>forms</b> 41:12	<b>give</b> 16:22 18:12 21:6 22:6 26:1 30:24 31:11 33:3 35:20 37:22 41:1 42:4,16 45:9 45:16 46:4,7
<b>element</b> 3:25	<b>excuse</b> 6:14 51:16	<b>fallacy</b> 35:17	<b>forth</b> 21:2	<b>given</b> 7:14 9:20 24:22 29:19,20 31:2 37:19,21 42:7 43:17,21 50:18 51:10 53:12
<b>elements</b> 5:13 15:11 49:24	<b>existing</b> 52:14	<b>far</b> 4:11 23:4 52:6	<b>forthright</b> 5:16	<b>gives</b> 21:1 27:10 27:11,11
<b>employed</b> 3:15	<b>expect</b> 44:1,3	<b>favor</b> 37:14,15	<b>forthrightly</b> 4:25 5:1	<b>giving</b> 33:9 43:18
<b>employees</b> 1:6 3:5,15	<b>expenditure</b> 34:16	<b>Federal</b> 33:19	<b>forward</b> 13:5 43:11	<b>go</b> 4:10 6:9 16:3 16:21 24:14 26:22 39:18,25 43:2 50:10
<b>employer</b> 48:17	<b>expenditures</b> 3:23 15:13 17:2 22:4 23:18 37:2	<b>fee</b> 3:19 15:10 16:6,17	<b>frame</b> 16:12	
<b>employers</b> 35:2	<b>expenses</b> 13:19 43:25 44:18 49:10	<b>fees</b> 5:23 34:10 35:1 41:20 48:25	<b>frankly</b> 27:2 41:17	
<b>employment</b> 49:4,16	<b>expire</b> 10:23,24	<b>fight</b> 35:10,11	<b>free</b> 8:19 11:21 44:9,12 50:21	
<b>enact</b> 45:18	<b>expired</b> 25:11	<b>fight-back</b> 3:17 22:25 35:5 43:25	<b>freeing</b> 46:25 47:2	
<b>encourages</b> 52:7	<b>explain</b> 28:16 30:12 31:4 42:5 43:18	<b>figure</b> 42:18 43:13	<b>frequent</b> 41:8	
<b>ended</b> 26:18	<b>explained</b> 28:7 32:5 36:20	<b>figures</b> 23:24	<b>frequently</b> 33:5	
<b>endless</b> 53:9	<b>explanation</b> 35:9	<b>filed</b> 11:20	<b>friend</b> 53:21	
<b>ends</b> 45:20 52:11	<b>explicitly</b> 49:12	<b>financial</b> 5:6,21 6:1 12:20 15:24	<b>friend's</b> 29:3	
<b>ensuring</b> 48:16	<b>exposed</b> 35:17	<b>find</b> 8:21,25 10:15 23:22	<b>fully</b> 28:22	
<b>entered</b> 9:8		<b>fine</b> 32:12 43:8	<b>function</b> 39:4	
<b>entity</b> 35:15,19		<b>first</b> 3:4,20 4:4 17:21 21:19 22:12 27:6	<b>functions</b> 39:3	
<b>entry</b> 10:18			<b>fund</b> 3:17 22:25 31:16 34:20 35:5 44:22 45:8 51:19,23	
<b>episode</b> 9:4 11:24			<b>funded</b> 41:15,22	
<b>equipment</b> 44:24			<b>funding</b> 41:13	
<b>ESQ</b> 1:16,18 2:3 2:6,9			<b>funds</b> 21:21 51:1	
<b>essential</b> 35:12				

52:16 <b>goes</b> 19:15 29:14 39:21 51:9 <b>going</b> 15:3,4,5 16:2 17:14 18:10,19,21 19:1,16 20:23 21:2,5 23:2 24:7,11 25:4 26:6 29:13 34:18 37:13,14 40:2,4,25 44:7 44:8,11,12 45:6,19,22 46:4,5,7,23 47:1 50:24 51:6,12 53:14 <b>good</b> 12:21 15:15 20:2 27:12 32:11 <b>government</b> 49:1,1,13,15 <b>governmental</b> 48:17 <b>government's</b> 49:14 <b>governor</b> 17:23 <b>grant</b> 8:21 28:11 <b>granted</b> 11:18 26:1,8 <b>greater</b> 31:25 <b>guaranteed</b> 19:15 <b>gubernatorial</b> 37:15 <b>guess</b> 24:21 29:11 36:21	37:5 42:10 46:15,17 <b>happening</b> 29:4 <b>happens</b> 21:19 24:4 41:6 <b>happy</b> 43:8 <b>hard</b> 16:11 47:17 52:12 <b>hear</b> 3:3 <b>heard</b> 29:8 32:15,17 <b>held</b> 31:14 49:19 <b>heretofore</b> 15:21 <b>higher</b> 16:6 <b>highly</b> 52:8 <b>honest</b> 19:13 <b>Honor</b> 26:3 30:9 49:22 <b>hope</b> 50:5 <b>horse</b> 29:25 30:21 <b>Hudson</b> 7:13 10:17,19 11:3 13:11,15,24 17:6 18:1 20:12 22:2,6 23:2,3,6,8 29:3 33:3,23 34:22 37:8 42:4,17 43:20 46:12,19 48:7 52:22 53:12 <b>Hudson's</b> 8:6 22:20 <b>hypothetical</b> 19:5,11 36:16 37:5,6 38:3	49:21 <b>implicit</b> 11:15 <b>implies</b> 12:16 <b>importance</b> 4:15 48:16 <b>important</b> 3:12 6:11,13 10:7 29:12 49:1,8 <b>impose</b> 11:21 22:19 33:5 <b>imposed</b> 14:1,6 15:20 53:11 <b>impossible</b> 4:7 40:6 43:2 <b>inadequacy</b> 6:12 <b>inadequate</b> 4:14 4:18,21 5:22 6:4 28:19 <b>incentives</b> 36:14 <b>incidental</b> 29:2 <b>including</b> 38:14 44:18 46:13 <b>income</b> 43:24 45:6 <b>incorrect</b> 29:16 31:10 35:4 <b>incorrectly</b> 31:7 <b>increase</b> 13:19 14:5,6 15:19 26:15,16,17,18 31:11,12,16,21 32:3,6,9 33:22 39:11 41:18 43:15 44:7,11 46:17,24 47:1 <b>increased</b> 31:13 34:24 36:24 41:19 46:24 <b>increases</b> 34:2 <b>incremental</b> 33:9 <b>indisputably</b> 15:6 <b>individual</b> 28:18 <b>individuals</b> 15:13 32:7 <b>inevitable</b> 20:1	<b>influencing</b> 38:1 <b>information</b> 7:1 <b>informed</b> 32:6 <b>inherent</b> 49:21 <b>initiative</b> 38:21 <b>initiatives</b> 38:15 39:15 46:3,14 48:9 <b>injunction</b> 9:23 9:24,25 10:4,5 10:10 <b>injunctive</b> 9:9 10:16,18 27:16 <b>injury</b> 3:21 <b>inquire</b> 15:16 <b>inquiry</b> 6:4 <b>instance</b> 34:14 <b>instinct</b> 26:6 <b>insult</b> 3:21 <b>intend</b> 22:22 <b>intended</b> 22:23 <b>interest</b> 22:13 49:2,14,17 <b>interested</b> 40:17 <b>interest-free</b> 19:7 21:16 37:23 45:16 53:24 <b>internal</b> 8:24 <b>International</b> 1:6 3:5 <b>internationals</b> 53:24 <b>interrupting</b> 52:18 <b>involved</b> 13:20 26:11 <b>involves</b> 48:22 <b>issue</b> 10:19 26:14 27:4 29:14 30:19 31:6 <b>issued</b> 12:11 31:11 <b>issues</b> 10:25 30:14 34:22 37:17	<b>item</b> 51:20 <b>it'll</b> 51:22,22 <hr/> <b>J</b> <b>J</b> 1:16 2:3,9 3:7 50:2 <b>January</b> 1:10 <b>JEREMIAH</b> 1:18 2:6 25:17 <b>judgment</b> 4:16 4:24 5:7,10 6:7 6:16 7:5 8:5,12 8:14,15,16 9:11 12:17 25:24 27:7,7 28:21,23 29:19 29:21 30:25 48:21,22 <b>judgments</b> 49:8 <b>June</b> 6:2,6 22:15 22:16 46:11 <b>Justice</b> 3:3,9 4:3 4:6,11,17,20 5:4,14 6:10,14 6:14,17,19 7:6 7:12,22 8:7,8,9 8:10,18 9:3,6 9:14,15,19,23 10:4,7,13 11:12,15,22 12:6,12,15,21 12:24,25 13:2 13:4,10,12,23 14:3,9,11,12 14:13,16,18,21 14:23,24 15:10 16:1,8,9,14,18 16:21,22,25 17:6,10,16,17 17:20 18:3,5 18:18,25 19:4 19:6,10,11,19 19:20 20:6,8 20:11,16,22,23 21:11,13,18 22:5,10,15 23:1,11,14,15
<hr/> <b>H</b> <b>half</b> 40:4 <b>happen</b> 10:10 23:2 24:10 33:5 41:2 42:9 51:12,22 52:1 53:21 <b>happened</b> 21:8 24:25 34:5,24	<hr/> <b>I</b> <b>ideological</b> 37:18 <b>III</b> 5:2,9 <b>imagine</b> 10:25 16:11 17:1 43:16,17 <b>impingement</b>			

23:16,20 24:3 24:7,17,21 25:3,11,15,19 25:21,25 26:19 27:1,17 28:6 29:1,11,17 30:1 31:5 32:10,14,22 33:2,8,11,13 35:4,12,20 36:21 37:4,12 37:21,25 38:3 38:19 39:5,8 39:17,18 41:5 41:7,23 42:1,3 42:14 43:10 44:14 45:1,10 45:12,14,25 46:11 47:5,9 47:19,22 48:2 48:12,14,20 49:6,25 50:4,5 50:16,22,23 51:4,5,10,16 51:21,25 52:2 52:16,17,19,20 52:25 53:5,13 53:16,18,19 54:1 <b>Justices</b> 24:19 <b>justifies</b> 49:20 <b>justify</b> 31:23	29:18 31:22 33:21 34:9,16 34:21 36:18 39:3 41:14 52:7 <b>kinds</b> 34:1,8 41:21 <b>know</b> 5:15 15:2 15:4 18:21 21:8 22:20,25 24:9,19 29:6 33:5 40:5 45:24 50:17 53:1 <b>Knox</b> 1:3 3:4	<b>litigation</b> 20:17 41:10 42:8 <b>little</b> 11:2 16:11 41:3 <b>live</b> 8:1 28:1 <b>living</b> 5:2,9 <b>loan</b> 19:7 21:17 25:8 37:23 45:16 51:8 <b>loans</b> 52:10 53:24 <b>lobbying</b> 13:18 24:13 <b>local</b> 1:7 26:14 26:19,23 27:2 <b>locals</b> 26:20 <b>long</b> 8:3 9:5 11:11 12:3 27:25 <b>look</b> 4:23 32:15 39:22 43:19 46:2 <b>looked</b> 43:20 <b>looking</b> 29:25 30:21 33:14 <b>lose</b> 51:5,25 <b>lost</b> 46:16 <b>lot</b> 41:2,6 44:3 <b>lower</b> 10:18	39:2 42:15 50:16,24 <b>meaning</b> 33:4,17 37:2 48:1 <b>meaningful</b> 9:2 <b>means</b> 8:13 16:3 17:7 30:17 <b>members</b> 6:21 21:6 24:24 34:13 35:24 42:16 47:24 <b>membership</b> 35:1 <b>mentioned</b> 38:16 <b>mere</b> 11:10 <b>merely</b> 5:25 46:15 <b>merits</b> 11:19 12:22 13:1 26:25 28:12,14 30:19 32:11,13 <b>messaging</b> 46:16 <b>met</b> 7:24 <b>middle</b> 17:10,22 21:20 40:3 <b>mid-year</b> 26:15 <b>million</b> 3:17 38:10,13 39:13 43:25 44:2 48:9 <b>millions</b> 46:13 <b>mind</b> 16:12 <b>minimal</b> 53:22 <b>minimize</b> 15:22 15:24 <b>minimum</b> 37:22 <b>minutes</b> 50:1 <b>misunderstan...</b> 27:1 <b>moment</b> 20:25 26:24 28:16 <b>money</b> 14:14 15:5 17:17,20 18:10 22:8,12 22:22 29:5 35:13 36:3,19	37:12 38:17 39:10,12 40:23 42:16,23,24 45:3,17,17,21 46:5,5,25 47:3 47:4,4,13 51:11,14,15 53:23 <b>moneys</b> 24:12 24:16 <b>monopolize</b> 33:14 <b>months</b> 3:13 <b>moot</b> 4:8 6:2,15 7:9,18 8:17 10:23,24 11:9 12:5,10,13 28:12 29:7,14 30:4,4,9 <b>mootness</b> 3:12 4:4 8:11,21 9:1 10:19 30:18 32:24 <b>morning</b> 3:4 <b>motion</b> 3:11 <b>mouth</b> 29:25 30:21 <b>move</b> 12:22 32:11 <b>moving</b> 13:5 <b>Munsingwear</b> 28:9 30:10 <b>myriad</b> 53:6
<b>K</b> <b>Kagan</b> 4:3,6,11 4:17,20 5:4,14 9:14 10:7,13 27:17 28:6 <b>Kagan's</b> 29:12 <b>keeps</b> 16:10 <b>Kennedy</b> 9:15 9:19,23 10:4 11:12,15 47:5 47:19,22 48:2 48:12,14,20 49:6 <b>kind</b> 7:7,8,13,16	<b>L</b> <b>labor</b> 13:17 24:24 49:15 <b>lag</b> 20:1 <b>language</b> 4:12 <b>larger</b> 53:7 <b>Laughter</b> 20:9 20:14 51:24 <b>law</b> 8:16 42:22 <b>left</b> 8:15 12:14 22:16 <b>legal</b> 45:9 <b>legislative</b> 37:16 <b>legitimate</b> 31:6 <b>legitimately</b> 27:4 <b>Lehnert</b> 21:7 25:1,4,5 <b>length</b> 9:21 <b>letter</b> 35:8 <b>let's</b> 13:16 35:25 36:1,2 43:16 51:17 <b>levies</b> 36:8 <b>lies</b> 49:2 <b>light</b> 22:20 <b>limited</b> 32:16 <b>limits</b> 11:10 27:8 <b>line</b> 40:6,8 51:20 <b>literature</b> 38:21 <b>litigate</b> 12:4	<b>M</b> <b>mail</b> 44:19 <b>main</b> 11:16 <b>making</b> 40:7 <b>management</b> 22:3 <b>manner</b> 19:25 <b>massive</b> 4:2 <b>material</b> 13:25 14:4,5,9,10 15:18,19 44:17 <b>matter</b> 1:12 14:20 26:5 29:2 54:5 <b>matters</b> 46:20 46:21 <b>mean</b> 10:20 29:2	<b>N</b> <b>N</b> 2:1,1 3:1 <b>nearly</b> 3:14 <b>necessarily</b> 40:20 <b>necessary</b> 7:2 <b>need</b> 15:6 16:12 20:11 34:6 38:14 40:23 42:8 43:24 46:15 <b>needed</b> 31:22 38:4	

<b>needs</b> 21:20 28:10 36:20 49:15	<b>normal</b> 13:5,10 21:25 24:10,14 24:15 38:22	36:12 38:12 43:8 46:12,15 48:4,8,13	48:10	<b>partly</b> 33:11
<b>negotiate</b> 49:3	<b>normally</b> 17:6	<b>objected</b> 36:5,6	<b>opposing</b> 39:11	<b>pasted-on</b> 4:13
<b>negotiations</b> 48:15	34:10,17 42:21	<b>objecting</b> 24:24	39:15	<b>pay</b> 17:7 24:1
<b>never</b> 3:22 10:24	<b>noted</b> 27:13	37:1 47:23	<b>opposite</b> 41:16	25:4,4,5 34:10
26:15 33:18	<b>notice</b> 4:18 5:5	<b>objection</b> 18:20	<b>opposition</b> 11:13 26:9	37:1,3 45:19
35:13 51:22,22	5:19 6:1,6,9,11	21:7 23:18,21	<b>opt</b> 6:21 29:9	<b>paying</b> 15:24
<b>nevertheless</b> 49:13	6:20 7:1,4,7,10	23:25	<b>options</b> 53:23	44:7
<b>new</b> 6:9 13:24	7:13,14,16 9:2	<b>objections</b> 37:18	<b>opt-in</b> 7:8 47:7	<b>payment</b> 7:21
14:9,10 15:9	9:25 12:11,17	<b>objector</b> 16:4,10	<b>opt-out</b> 7:8	<b>peculiar</b> 16:1
18:21 21:2	13:15,21,25	<b>objectors</b> 7:3	<b>opt-outs</b> 39:25	18:6
26:5 32:16,21	16:12,15 17:21	17:7 18:8	<b>oral</b> 1:12 2:2,5	<b>penny</b> 32:2,8
32:25 34:9	18:1,9,12	52:12	3:7 25:17	37:3
39:3,7,16 40:2	20:12 21:2	<b>objects</b> 15:17	<b>order</b> 27:24 28:3	<b>people</b> 15:14
40:12,15 42:4	22:6,7,16 23:2	<b>obligation</b> 14:6	30:6	16:15 19:14
42:8 43:18	23:3,6,8 24:25	15:19,24	<b>ordered</b> 5:19 6:8	20:18,19,20
44:11 53:12	26:21 27:19,23	<b>obligations</b> 6:7	9:8 32:1	22:15 29:4,6,9
<b>newsletter</b> 15:3	28:2,19 29:3,5	14:1	<b>ordering</b> 6:8	29:10 40:24
<b>Ninth</b> 3:21 8:12	29:8,13,18,20	<b>obviously</b> 6:5,24	10:6	42:22,24 51:14
8:14	30:3,5,7 31:6,8	7:19 23:24	<b>orderly</b> 49:15	52:6
<b>nominal</b> 4:8 5:8	31:8,10,12,15	28:9 31:11	<b>orders</b> 28:12	<b>perceive</b> 38:14
7:20	31:18,22 32:5	<b>occur</b> 37:7	<b>ordinary</b> 21:25	<b>percent</b> 3:14
<b>nonmember</b>	32:20 33:3,9	<b>occurred</b> 34:13	49:7 52:20,22	13:19 14:8
4:16 14:22	34:6 36:13	<b>occurring</b> 38:5	52:24	15:1 17:3,3,8
36:6,11 38:9	37:8,19 38:7,9	<b>October</b> 35:8	<b>original</b> 18:22	21:5 26:18
46:3	38:16 40:3,15	<b>offered</b> 32:8	26:12 50:11	34:25,25 35:24
<b>nonmembers</b>	42:4,7 43:17	<b>office</b> 44:23	<b>outside</b> 53:11	36:3,4,10,11
3:14,22 14:2,7	43:18,20 46:12	<b>officers</b> 26:5,11	<b>overruns</b> 13:17	38:10 43:6
15:20 20:18,19	46:19 48:4,7	<b>oh</b> 16:19		47:10,11,12
20:20 21:23	48:11 50:19	<b>okay</b> 14:11,16	<b>P</b>	<b>percentage</b> 16:6
37:1,17 43:19	51:20 53:12	21:22 40:11	<b>P</b> 3:1	36:1
46:11 51:3	<b>notices</b> 10:22,23	51:21 53:3	<b>PAGE</b> 2:2	<b>percentages</b>
53:24	10:24 42:8	<b>old</b> 8:20 11:24	<b>paid</b> 16:6 21:16	36:9 39:23
<b>nonunion</b> 42:16	<b>noting</b> 26:9	26:22	30:15 32:2,8	<b>perfectly</b> 20:2
<b>non-chargeab...</b>	<b>November</b> 39:6	<b>once</b> 22:18 26:1	35:2	48:11 52:23
13:7	<b>number</b> 28:7	<b>ones</b> 26:11 32:16	<b>paradigm</b> 11:17	<b>period</b> 9:20 12:1
<b>non-chargeable</b>	42:9 53:6	<b>one-time</b> 27:13	<b>paradoxical</b>	12:5 36:23,25
17:25 21:3	<b>numbers</b> 46:19	<b>ongoing</b> 27:14	30:12,13	41:15 46:18
31:20 36:5,10	<b>O</b>	<b>operates</b> 9:13	<b>pardon</b> 12:7	<b>permanent</b> 9:24
36:24 38:11	<b>O</b> 2:1 3:1	<b>opinion</b> 13:15	13:24	26:17 41:19
46:20	<b>object</b> 3:19 7:2	44:15	<b>part</b> 29:12 35:18	<b>permissible</b> 52:6
<b>non-event</b> 33:24	15:9,13,14	<b>opponents</b> 20:17	43:24 44:1	<b>permitted</b> 48:25
<b>non-objectors</b>	16:13 18:9,13	<b>opportunity</b>	45:5 51:7	<b>person</b> 38:7
15:23	20:24 21:10,14	3:18 15:9 23:9	<b>particular</b> 35:23	46:14 48:7,13
	21:16 23:9	25:1 37:21	<b>particularly</b>	<b>person's</b> 47:13
		<b>oppose</b> 46:6	15:22 49:23	<b>perspective</b> 46:2
			<b>partisan</b> 37:18	<b>persuade</b> 45:18
				<b>Petition</b> 5:24

<p>31:15  <b>Petitioners</b> 1:4  1:17 2:4,10 3:8  11:19 27:3,8  29:22,25 30:20  35:16 44:4  49:20 50:3  <b>phrase</b> 13:13  <b>phrased</b> 10:5  <b>place</b> 8:14 25:1  <b>plaintiff</b> 30:15  <b>please</b> 3:10  25:20 41:23  45:16  <b>point</b> 4:18 11:16  12:22 16:18  19:21 20:15  29:3 31:4  32:14 38:20  45:10 47:12  48:6  <b>pointed</b> 45:2  <b>points</b> 44:25  45:4  <b>policies</b> 11:11  <b>policy</b> 8:24 9:2  11:5,6  <b>political</b> 3:17,23  4:1,2 15:13  18:11 22:24  35:5 37:3 40:3  40:5,16 42:17  42:25 43:1,9  44:8,13,17  46:6,8,13 47:2  47:12 48:21,22  49:8,8,23  50:13,20 51:2  <b>politically</b> 35:11  <b>politics</b> 22:23  24:2 46:25  51:23  <b>portion</b> 31:20,24  50:12,20 51:19  <b>position</b> 4:9  19:22 32:24  33:1 35:16</p>	<p>41:2  <b>possible</b> 6:24  <b>possibly</b> 7:7  <b>posture</b> 28:10  <b>potential</b> 34:22  <b>potentially</b>  10:23 30:14,16  36:12  <b>PR</b> 46:22  <b>practicality</b>  20:24  <b>practice</b> 11:20  11:21 27:15  <b>predict</b> 51:12  <b>predicted</b> 17:25  <b>predictive</b> 22:21  <b>preferable</b> 47:8  <b>premise</b> 22:5  <b>present</b> 52:9  <b>presented</b> 26:10  26:10 28:5  <b>preserve</b> 8:1  <b>pressing</b> 50:6  <b>presumably</b>  7:23  <b>presume</b> 13:16  22:2  <b>prevail</b> 29:7  <b>prevent</b> 27:16  <b>previously</b> 34:1  <b>pre-increase</b>  39:14  <b>primary</b> 15:12  <b>principal</b> 18:20  <b>principle</b> 14:20  <b>principles</b> 22:20  <b>printing</b> 13:17  15:2  <b>prior</b> 28:12 36:2  <b>pro</b> 37:1  <b>probably</b> 34:19  47:7  <b>problem</b> 5:22  20:22 21:11  22:15 24:21  35:16 36:16  37:9 40:2,14</p>	<p>40:18 43:6  46:9 48:5 52:2  52:25  <b>problems</b> 52:14  <b>procedure</b> 11:5  11:7 15:9  17:14 27:2  32:21 33:1  <b>procedures</b>  11:11 13:11  15:7 26:14  <b>process</b> 4:2  <b>projects</b> 53:8  <b>promote</b> 49:14  <b>proponents</b>  45:14  <b>proposed</b> 22:10  <b>proposing</b> 53:10  <b>Proposition</b>  3:24 21:5  <b>propositions</b>  3:24 39:12  45:15  <b>protection</b> 27:10  <b>provide</b> 7:1 8:4  26:21 31:25  45:21 52:13  <b>provided</b> 3:18  28:23 29:23  31:8  <b>provides</b> 8:5  23:8  <b>provision</b> 32:19  <b>prudential</b>  30:18  <b>public</b> 49:23  <b>purely</b> 22:23  <b>purpose</b> 7:1  18:11 35:8  37:25 45:7  49:1  <b>purposes</b> 7:2  31:17 35:9  36:4,5 39:13  40:16 43:9  45:3 46:22  50:25</p>	<p><b>pursue</b> 16:19  <b>put</b> 27:2 34:18  34:19 40:22</p> <hr/> <p><b>Q</b></p> <p><b>question</b> 4:4 5:8  5:15 7:20,22  11:25 13:1,9  14:25 19:17  21:10 25:13  28:2,4,22  29:12 32:4  34:6 37:10  39:19 40:16  41:24 45:24  47:10,15,23  50:7  <b>questions</b> 26:10  28:4,5 43:12  <b>quiet</b> 16:10  <b>quite</b> 9:17 11:23  25:7 30:20  31:7 36:14  43:11  <b>quote</b> 44:22  <b>quoting</b> 44:16</p> <hr/> <p><b>R</b></p> <p><b>R</b> 3:1  <b>radio</b> 44:18  <b>raise</b> 14:25  34:21  <b>raised</b> 12:9 15:4  24:5  <b>range</b> 44:17  <b>rarely</b> 41:2  <b>rata</b> 37:1  <b>reach</b> 28:13  <b>read</b> 4:21 41:18  42:18,22  <b>reading</b> 4:9  44:15 48:6  <b>real</b> 33:24 46:17  <b>realization</b>  26:13  <b>realize</b> 31:18  <b>realizes</b> 43:14</p>	<p><b>really</b> 26:10  28:16 30:20  34:16 36:17,18  40:6,11 42:6  45:23,25 51:12  <b>reason</b> 6:10,13  8:20 14:19  15:12,15,15,15  15:16 16:14  26:4 27:12  40:24 42:14  43:10 46:21  48:24  <b>reasonable</b> 22:2  <b>reasonably</b> 22:2  38:6 42:7  <b>reasons</b> 27:5  29:17  <b>rebuttal</b> 2:8  25:12 50:2  <b>recall</b> 20:5  <b>receive</b> 22:7  <b>recognize</b> 8:13  15:12  <b>recognized</b>  51:11  <b>recognizes</b> 8:11  <b>record</b> 39:9  43:22  <b>refile</b> 23:18  <b>reflects</b> 39:9  <b>refund</b> 6:22  28:18 31:19,24  <b>refunded</b> 32:1  <b>refunds</b> 27:22  <b>refuse</b> 3:25  <b>regard</b> 14:19  41:22  <b>regime</b> 7:8  <b>registration</b>  44:19  <b>regular</b> 34:25  44:22  <b>regulations</b>  32:16  <b>regulatory</b>  49:14</p>
--	---	--	--	--

<b>reinstate</b> 30:25	<b>requirements</b>	54:1	18:1 31:4 33:3	12:5 14:24
<b>reinstated</b> 27:7	7:23,25 8:6	<b>roughly</b> 38:13	39:18	41:19 43:11,15
28:22 29:20	<b>requires</b> 7:7	<b>routine</b> 44:23	<b>sector</b> 49:23	47:15 50:9,11
<b>reinstating</b>	28:20 29:22	<b>rule</b> 9:21 18:6,6	<b>see</b> 16:18 17:1	50:18 52:12
25:24	33:10	18:9 40:18	19:17 24:22	<b>single</b> 53:10
<b>rejected</b> 12:19	<b>requiring</b> 31:19	53:10	25:11 30:2,2	<b>sir</b> 17:5
<b>relates</b> 9:25	<b>research</b> 10:14	<b>ruled</b> 25:2	32:22 39:8,19	<b>sites</b> 44:20
<b>relations</b> 49:4	<b>reserve</b> 25:12	<b>rules</b> 35:22	39:23	<b>situation</b> 26:8
49:15	<b>resolved</b> 30:16	<b>run</b> 38:22	<b>segregated</b>	26:12 36:13
<b>relatively</b> 9:20	<b>respect</b> 8:6		34:20 35:14	42:4,15 46:10
22:4	20:17 51:17	<b>S</b>	45:8 51:19,23	<b>six-fold</b> 42:12,12
<b>relief</b> 9:7,9	<b>Respondent</b>	<b>S</b> 2:1 3:1	<b>SEIU</b> 3:15 4:13	<b>slate</b> 37:16
10:16,18 12:13	1:19 2:7 25:18	<b>sake</b> 13:16	5:11 6:15 9:13	<b>slyness</b> 52:7
12:15 27:16	<b>response</b> 19:21	<b>salaries</b> 13:17	11:20	<b>small</b> 53:7
28:11,23 31:25	<b>result</b> 52:4,5	35:24 36:1	<b>SEIU's</b> 3:11,17	<b>sole</b> 35:7
<b>remain</b> 8:19	<b>resulted</b> 6:21	44:23	3:23,25 5:21	<b>solve</b> 46:8
<b>remaining</b> 30:13	<b>rethinking</b> 26:8	<b>salary</b> 26:18	<b>seizure</b> 5:23	<b>Somebody</b> 28:1
30:19 50:1	<b>return</b> 8:19	34:25	<b>sense</b> 10:21	<b>someone's</b> 47:13
<b>remains</b> 11:21	<b>returning</b> 11:23	<b>satisfaction</b> 4:25	<b>sent</b> 5:25 6:1,2,6	<b>sorry</b> 7:10 17:19
<b>remember</b> 3:12	<b>Reuter</b> 28:8	<b>satisfied</b> 6:7	30:5 32:5	30:1 52:18
51:17	30:11	<b>satisfy</b> 27:2	<b>separate</b> 34:20	53:15
<b>rent</b> 44:23	<b>revealed</b> 43:23	<b>satisfying</b> 5:17	35:14 36:13	<b>sort</b> 4:21 38:22
<b>repeal</b> 32:21	<b>reversal</b> 30:25	27:21	45:8,9 51:19	43:2
<b>repealed</b> 32:20	<b>reversed</b> 30:24	<b>saying</b> 4:7,21,22	51:20	<b>Sotomayor</b>
<b>repeating</b> 14:24	36:10 47:11	9:15 17:13	<b>separately</b> 43:14	12:25 13:3,4
<b>repetition</b> 9:16	<b>review</b> 9:16	30:24 31:24	<b>September</b> 5:23	13:10,12,23
10:9 11:9	11:10	40:10,14,19	39:21,22,22,22	14:3 16:9
<b>replacement</b>	<b>reviews</b> 11:4	46:4,23 53:20	40:22 51:6	17:17,20 18:3
44:24	<b>right</b> 3:25 4:18	53:21	<b>serious</b> 27:18	20:22 21:12,13
<b>represent</b> 4:15	4:23 13:12	<b>says</b> 16:11 24:9	32:4 34:6	21:18 24:3,7
<b>representatio...</b>	14:14 16:22	34:15 44:7	<b>Service</b> 1:6 3:4	24:17,21 25:11
49:18	17:8 18:5 19:4	45:5 49:12,12	<b>serving</b> 48:25	32:14,22 33:2
<b>represented</b>	19:18 20:13	49:22	<b>set</b> 9:19 21:2	33:8,11,13
3:15	23:11,15 29:7	<b>scale</b> 4:2	<b>share</b> 37:2	39:18 41:5,8
<b>request</b> 27:15	40:8 42:1	<b>Scalia</b> 14:9,11	<b>shed</b> 22:20	41:23 42:1,3
<b>requested</b> 12:14	45:19 51:4	14:13,16 18:18	<b>short</b> 9:19,20	51:5,16,16
<b>requests</b> 32:2	<b>rights</b> 33:23	18:25 19:6,10	41:15	52:21,25 53:5
<b>require</b> 13:21	47:23 48:4	20:11,16 22:5	<b>short-term</b> 39:2	53:19
18:1 23:21,25	<b>ROBERTS</b> 3:3	22:10,15 50:5	39:6	<b>Sotomayor's</b>
40:15 52:10	6:10,17,19	50:16,22,23	<b>show</b> 8:22 34:5	14:25
<b>required</b> 3:19	12:21 14:18,23	51:4,21,25	<b>showing</b> 8:22	<b>so-called</b> 31:16
7:17 10:1	16:21 23:16	53:13	<b>shows</b> 39:9	41:11 43:15
13:15,21,25	25:15,25 29:1	<b>scheme</b> 49:14	<b>side</b> 40:8,9 43:4	<b>speak</b> 4:4 35:15
22:19 29:18	30:1 32:10	<b>Schermerhorn</b>	<b>significant</b> 49:8	<b>speaking</b> 16:4
30:3 34:11,12	38:19 39:5	35:15,17 44:5	<b>simple</b> 30:20	<b>special</b> 7:6,15,24
<b>requirement</b>	42:14 44:14	45:4,5	47:10 48:6	9:5 12:2 13:8
23:10,23 47:8	49:25 53:16	<b>second</b> 13:15,21	<b>simply</b> 11:10	15:7,9 16:8

17:12,22 18:2 18:7,9,12 20:25 22:17,19 24:8,23 26:21 26:24 33:4,5 33:16 36:8 38:20,24 39:1 40:3,5,10,14 43:4,12,15 47:11 53:7,8 <b>specific</b> 23:24 31:12 <b>specifically</b> 5:20 10:17 31:14 38:15,15 45:5 <b>speculative</b> 6:25 <b>speech</b> 4:1 <b>spend</b> 17:25 18:11 22:22 38:12,23 42:24 42:25 46:12 48:9 <b>spending</b> 36:18 36:24,24 42:5 47:3 <b>spent</b> 32:6 36:19 38:10,17 39:11 39:13 43:9 46:19 <b>spinning</b> 50:7 <b>spokesperson</b> 49:3 <b>Springfield</b> 1:16 <b>springing</b> 48:3 <b>stability</b> 48:17 <b>stable</b> 22:4 <b>staff</b> 44:23 <b>stake</b> 26:13 36:12 <b>stand</b> 25:13 <b>stands</b> 47:14 <b>starting</b> 5:23 <b>state</b> 3:16 24:18 24:19 27:6 <b>stated</b> 31:7,12 <b>statements</b> 45:2 <b>States</b> 1:1,13	19:14 <b>stating</b> 29:19 <b>status</b> 28:11 45:9 <b>stays</b> 8:14 <b>straight</b> 43:11 <b>straighten</b> 22:12 <b>strictest</b> 10:21 <b>strong</b> 37:17 <b>struck</b> 31:9 <b>structure</b> 34:7 53:5 <b>submitted</b> 54:3 54:5 <b>subsequent</b> 5:21 37:11 <b>substantive</b> 28:5 30:18 <b>sudden</b> 32:21 <b>sufficient</b> 8:25 <b>sufficiently</b> 32:6 <b>suggested</b> 12:4 25:22 35:13 <b>suggesting</b> 53:13 <b>suggests</b> 38:21 <b>suit</b> 10:11 <b>summarize</b> 33:13 <b>sun</b> 39:8 <b>support</b> 20:21 46:14 <b>Suppose</b> 45:12 45:14 <b>supposed</b> 25:10 <b>Supreme</b> 1:1,13 <b>sure</b> 4:10 9:17 14:23 16:24 20:10 24:19 25:7 50:7 53:4 <b>surprise</b> 17:12 <b>surprisingly</b> 17:11 <b>suspicion</b> 18:15 <b>system</b> 13:5 18:17 19:23,23 19:24 20:23	21:25 26:22 51:13 52:9,13 52:22,23 <hr/> <b>T</b> <b>T</b> 2:1,1 <b>table</b> 35:10 <b>take</b> 17:17,20 18:10 21:5 30:25 35:17 41:12 42:23,23 43:7 <b>taken</b> 34:12 <b>talk</b> 10:20 <b>talked</b> 10:8,9 <b>talking</b> 10:3 14:13 16:9 17:16 36:22,25 47:8 49:13 <b>tantamount</b> 10:3 <b>television</b> 44:18 <b>tell</b> 23:2,5,6 33:2 43:6,7 <b>telling</b> 19:2 <b>temporary</b> 26:16 33:22 41:18 <b>term</b> 26:24 39:1 <b>termed</b> 35:5 <b>terms</b> 6:11 9:24 14:6 30:18 49:16 <b>thank</b> 12:23 25:15 49:25 50:4 52:17 53:17,25 54:1 <b>theory</b> 10:22 44:4,6 <b>thing</b> 10:10 42:9 51:2 <b>things</b> 15:5 20:13 23:6 38:16 42:3,9 43:3,19 <b>think</b> 4:11,23 5:1 8:16 10:13	14:7,20 16:25 18:17 20:6 23:13,13 24:8 26:9,25 28:8 29:16 30:8 32:24 34:5 36:21 37:10 38:3 39:17,19 41:13,17 52:12 53:14 <b>thoroughly</b> 25:13 <b>thought</b> 6:17,19 23:3 26:12 32:15,17 38:19 40:1,25 43:3 48:2 <b>time</b> 9:20,20,21 15:25 19:8 20:6 25:11 26:7 32:11 36:23,25 37:19 40:4 41:15 50:6,24 52:1 53:11 <b>timing</b> 21:10 <b>today</b> 36:22 <b>told</b> 23:3 38:9 44:12 46:11 53:1 <b>total</b> 16:6 41:19 <b>totally</b> 18:11,14 <b>tough</b> 40:6 <b>transparent</b> 52:6 <b>treasury</b> 34:20 35:3,18 41:20 44:9,13 45:8 <b>treat</b> 35:18 43:13 44:11 46:24 <b>treated</b> 35:14 <b>tried</b> 41:8 <b>true</b> 9:6 12:6 21:18 27:25 52:10 <b>trust</b> 16:15	20:18 <b>try</b> 6:1 25:12 33:13 43:16,16 <b>trying</b> 19:21 35:17 40:17 42:5 <b>Tuesday</b> 1:10 <b>turned</b> 26:17 <b>Turning</b> 5:5 32:12 <b>turns</b> 15:3 <b>two</b> 17:1,7,10 19:20 27:5 29:17 34:3 35:9,23 39:22 39:24 40:22 42:2 44:25 <b>type</b> 5:19 6:9,20 8:20 <b>typical</b> 7:13 <hr/> <b>U</b> <b>ultimately</b> 48:21 <b>unable</b> 41:9 <b>unaffected</b> 28:25 <b>unanticipated</b> 34:17 <b>underlying</b> 3:12 8:6 <b>understand</b> 4:6 7:11 8:10 18:3 18:15 19:10 27:17 29:4 33:15 36:15 39:20 42:17 51:8 52:7,19 <b>understanding</b> 21:12 <b>undesirable</b> 52:8 <b>undisputed</b> 42:10 <b>unified</b> 35:18 <b>union</b> 1:7 3:5 5:25 8:3,11,13 8:19,21 9:1,19
---	---	---	---	---



13:16 15:2,25 16:15 17:12 19:8 21:1,6,20 21:25 22:3,17 22:18,19,24 23:18 24:11,18 24:18 26:5,11 29:5 31:19,23 31:25 32:5,16 33:3,9,18 34:15,24 35:6 35:24 36:3,8 36:17 38:16 39:3,16,24 40:20 41:21 42:3,15,23,25 44:7,17,23 45:8,15,21 46:19,22 47:3 48:8 49:9 50:9 52:20,24 <b>unions</b> 23:20,25 33:5 34:3,7 40:20 48:15,19 50:24 53:5,22 <b>union's</b> 10:21 11:6 12:9 25:10 35:2 36:23 51:20 <b>unit</b> 34:13 <b>United</b> 1:1,13 19:14 <b>universe</b> 5:3,10 <b>unlawful</b> 11:18 <b>unrealistic</b> 19:13 37:6 <b>unwitting</b> 53:23 <b>upheld</b> 25:5 <b>use</b> 34:3 45:17 46:5 50:6,19 51:1 <b>useful</b> 20:8 <b>useless</b> 6:8 <b>uses</b> 39:1 <b>usual</b> 41:21 <b>usually</b> 10:8 39:2	<b>U.S</b> 28:9 30:11 <hr/> <b>V</b> <hr/> <b>v</b> 1:5 3:4 28:8 30:10 <b>vacated</b> 8:12 25:23 <b>vacuum</b> 53:2 <b>valid</b> 4:24 <b>values</b> 14:2 <b>variation</b> 24:15 <b>variety</b> 53:9 <b>various</b> 13:20 38:14 <b>vary</b> 24:18 <b>vastly</b> 46:24 <b>view</b> 29:14 44:7 <b>vigorously</b> 11:20 <b>violation</b> 44:6 44:10 <b>Virginia</b> 1:16 24:20 <b>virtually</b> 5:12 9:9 <b>virtue</b> 52:9 <b>vital</b> 49:17 <b>voluntary</b> 11:17 <b>vote</b> 34:11,12,18 44:20 <b>voter</b> 44:19,19 <hr/> <b>W</b> <hr/> <b>wait</b> 42:19 <b>Walling</b> 28:8 30:10 <b>want</b> 15:23 16:19 17:12 18:23 21:7 24:1 29:4 31:2 32:7,10,23 34:15 36:8 41:3 42:24 43:7 45:17 46:3,14 48:10 <b>wants</b> 36:12 <b>wash</b> 45:22	52:11,11 <b>washes</b> 19:25 <b>Washington</b> 1:9 1:18 <b>wasn't</b> 9:3 10:4 10:15 33:14 40:10 <b>wasting</b> 50:23 <b>way</b> 9:13 18:22 22:22 34:4 35:14 36:18 39:20 48:14 52:4,5 <b>ways</b> 8:20 11:24 34:4 53:6 <b>wayside</b> 29:15 <b>weigh</b> 37:14 <b>went</b> 13:17,18 26:7,17 41:20 42:6 <b>we'll</b> 3:3 34:19 34:19 <b>we're</b> 7:12,15 14:13 15:5 18:10 21:5 26:6 34:18 36:22,25 40:8 42:15 44:7,10 45:19 46:4,5,7 46:23 47:1,8 49:13 50:7 52:22 <b>we've</b> 10:8,9 32:8 43:23 45:20 46:7 <b>wheels</b> 50:8 <b>whit</b> 19:24 <b>WILLIAM</b> 1:16 2:3,9 3:7 50:2 <b>win</b> 51:21 52:3 <b>wish</b> 20:19,20 <b>wishy-washin...</b> 4:12 <b>won</b> 4:16 31:1 <b>wonderful</b> 9:1 <b>word</b> 33:16 <b>words</b> 4:22	42:19 <b>work</b> 20:2 44:20 <b>workable</b> 19:23 19:23,24 <b>worked</b> 8:15 <b>works</b> 30:2 39:20 <b>world</b> 33:25 45:11 46:17 <b>worlds</b> 34:23 <b>worry</b> 45:18 46:6 <b>worse</b> 16:5 <b>wouldn't</b> 15:8 16:13 20:11 38:25 42:21 47:15 <b>write</b> 13:14 <b>writing</b> 53:2 <b>wrong</b> 23:22 40:9 <b>W.T</b> 8:21 <hr/> <b>X</b> <hr/> <b>x</b> 1:2,8 <hr/> <b>Y</b> <hr/> <b>year</b> 7:14 11:2 16:4 17:1,2,7 17:10 20:1 21:1,20 23:3,4 23:5,17,19 24:11,13,25,25 26:18 36:3,7 37:11 38:11,13 39:22,23,24 40:3,21,23 42:19 43:2 44:1,2 46:7 48:9 53:7 <b>years</b> 22:4 24:10 24:14 38:23 <b>year's</b> 20:1 23:24 <b>yesterday</b> 13:14 <b>Young</b> 1:16 2:3 2:9 3:6,7,9 4:3	4:5,10,19 5:4 5:18 6:13,18 6:23 7:10,19 8:3,8,9,18 9:6 9:18 10:2,8,13 11:14 12:6,15 12:23 13:2,9 13:23 14:5,10 14:12,15,17,20 15:8 16:14,24 17:5,9,15,19 18:3,24 19:9 19:19 20:5,10 20:15 21:11,15 21:23 22:9,14 23:8,13,20 24:5,17 25:9 27:23 31:7 50:1,2,4,5,15 50:21 51:3,15 51:25 52:15,17 53:4,15,17 <b>Young's</b> 27:18 <hr/> <b>\$</b> <hr/> <b>\$12</b> 3:17 <b>\$2</b> 39:13 <b>\$3-1/2</b> 44:1 <b>\$3.7</b> 43:25 48:9 <b>\$38</b> 38:10 <b>\$40</b> 38:13 <b>\$450</b> 36:12 <b>\$50</b> 36:6 <b>\$500</b> 36:2 <hr/> <b>1</b> <hr/> <b>1</b> 34:25 35:24 <b>1.25</b> 34:25 <b>1.5</b> 26:18 <b>10</b> 1:10 3:13 13:19 15:1 36:4,10 47:10 <b>10-1121</b> 1:5 3:4 <b>10:19</b> 1:14 3:2 <b>1000</b> 1:7 <b>11:20</b> 54:4 <b>12</b> 11:4
--	---	---	--	--

<b>14</b> 19:13 <b>180</b> 8:24 32:17 <b>180-day</b> 32:20 <hr/> <b>2</b> <hr/> <b>2</b> 38:23 <b>20</b> 19:13 <b>2004</b> 42:12 46:19 <b>2005</b> 3:13 5:23 12:1 22:16 31:10 38:9 39:9 42:12,13 43:18 46:11 48:7 <b>2005-2006</b> 12:2 <b>2006</b> 3:13 5:21 6:2,6 12:20 31:15 42:13 <b>2012</b> 1:10 <b>25</b> 2:7 14:8 43:6 <b>27th</b> 35:8 <hr/> <b>3</b> <hr/> <b>3</b> 2:4 24:14 <b>30</b> 17:3 <b>36,000</b> 3:14 <hr/> <b>4</b> <hr/> <b>4</b> 24:10 50:1 <b>40</b> 3:14 <b>43.6</b> 38:10 <hr/> <b>5</b> <hr/> <b>50</b> 2:10 21:5 <hr/> <b>6</b> <hr/> <b>6</b> 9:2 <hr/> <b>7</b> <hr/> <b>7th</b> 39:6 <b>70</b> 17:3,8 <b>73a</b> 5:24 31:15 <b>75</b> 45:15 <b>76</b> 3:24 21:5 45:15 <hr/> <b>8</b> <hr/>	<b>80-20</b> 50:17 <hr/> <b>9</b> <hr/> <b>90</b> 36:3,9,10 47:10,12			
--	---	--	--	--