1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	x
3	KLEIN & CO. FUTURES, INC. :
4	Petitioner :
5	v. : No. 06-1265
6	BOARD OF TRADE OF THE :
7	CITY OF NEW YORK, ET AL. :
8	x
9	Washington, D.C.
LO	Monday, October 29, 2007
L1	
L2	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
L3	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
L4	at 10:04 a.m.
L5	APPEARANCES:
L6	DREW S. DAYS, III, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of
L7	Petitioner.
L8	MALCOLM L. STEWART, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor
L9	General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on
20	behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae,
21	supporting Petitioner.
22	ANDREW J. PINCUS, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of
23	Respondents.
24	
25	

1	CONTENTS	
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	PAGE
3	DREW S. DAYS, III, ESQ.	
4	On behalf of the Petitioner	3
5	MALCOLM L. STEWART, ESQ.	
6	On behalf of the Petitioner	20
7	ANDREW J. PINCUS, ESQ.	
8	On behalf of the Respondents	29
9	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF	
10	DREW S. DAYS, III, ESQ.	
11	On behalf of the Petitioner	57
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

Τ	PROCEEDINGS
2	(10:04 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument
4	first this morning in case 06-1265, Klein & Co. Futures
5	v. Board of Trade of the City of New York. Mr. Days?
6	MR. DAYS: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
7	please the Court:
8	A clearing futures commodity merchant, an
9	FCM, such as Petitioner, has standing to sue contract
10	markets and clearing organizations of contract markets
11	under Section 25 (b)(1) of the act for their bad faith
12	failure to enforce rules that are required by the act
13	and by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The
14	court of appeal's contrary ruling should be reversed for
15	three reasons, because it's contrary to the text of
16	25(b)(1), it ignores the essential rule of clearing
17	FCM's such as Petitioner recognized by the Commodity
18	Exchange Act, as well as long-standing industry rules
19	and practices an assessment with which the expert
20	Federal agency, the Commodity Future Trading Commission
21	concurs and it's in cross purposes with the goal that
22	Congress sought to achieve in enacting an express
23	private right of action in 25(b)(1) against contract
24	markets, namely to ensure the existence of fair and
25	orderly markets through a system of effective

- 1 subregulation. The plain language of the Commodity
- 2 Exchange Act confers statutory standing on Petitioner to
- 3 bring this private right of action against Respondents.
- 4 25(b)(1) makes no reference to buyer or seller but
- 5 instead confers standing on any person who engaged -- a
- 6 person who engaged in any transaction on or subject to
- 7 the rules of a contract market or licensed board of
- 8 trade.
- 9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Days, can I interrupt
- 10 you there, and ask, if you would --
- 11 MR. DAYS: Yes, Justice Ginsburg.
- 12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- if you would define
- 13 the transactions -- the particular transactions on which
- 14 you rely to come within that provision and what rules of
- 15 the exchange or the clearinghouse do you say was
- 16 violated?
- 17 MR. DAYS: Justice Ginsburg, we view this as
- 18 several subsidiary transactions that ultimately end in
- 19 the consummation of the contract, but with respect to
- 20 the rules that we have in mind -- first of all Rule 6
- 21 (a) talks about -- that can be found in the blue brief
- 22 at 1a -- that such contract executed or consummated by
- 23 or through a member of such contract market. This is a
- 24 clearing FCM that does this. And 6 (a), along with the
- 25 knife rule, that is the contract markets rule 121(f) and

- 1 306(i)(2), essentially indicate the following
- 2 arrangement: No contract can be dealt with or entered
- 3 into on a contract market without a guarantee from the
- 4 clearing FCM. The FCM becomes the buyer and seller with
- 5 respect to that particular contract. It assumes that
- 6 contract and then, after assuming that contract, has to
- 7 clear it immediately, indeed, within one hour. So
- 8 that's -- those are the rules under the statute and with
- 9 respect to the contract market.
- 10 With respect to the clearing
- organization, Rule 401(a), which is found at the red
- 12 brief at 6a, indicates that the clearing point, the
- 13 clearing FCM is the point that deals with the clearing
- 14 organization. And at that point, there's no
- 15 communication, no contact -- no contract between the
- 16 investor and the clearing organization. The clearing
- 17 organization becomes the buyer and seller. In other
- 18 words, the contract is between a clearing FCM on one
- 19 side of the contract and a clearing FCM on the other
- 20 side of the contract. The clearing organization becomes
- 21 the buyer and seller, but before that happens, it's
- 22 clear that the clearing organization views the clearing
- 23 FCM as the party to the contract. It is not the
- 24 investor. It is not any other party.
- The important thing also about this

- 1 process is that the clearing FCM is always financially
- 2 liable from the very beginning of this transaction, this
- 3 process, to the very end. That is, from the --
- 4 executing the contract and the consummation of the
- 5 contract. For the Court of Appeals to talk about buyer
- 6 or seller and treat a clearing FCM as a mere creditor or
- 7 agent really misses entirely the role that clearing
- 8 FCM's play in this process.
- 9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: You think you --
- 10 MR. DAYS: I think --
- 11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: You've talked about
- 12 the transaction, but I also ask you, what were the rules
- 13 that the Defendants violated, the rules of the statute?
- MR. DAYS: Well, it's -- it is clear, as
- 15 I indicated with respect to the rule of the contract
- 16 market, that the clearing FCM is required to clear that
- 17 particular order or contract. And, therefore, at that
- 18 point, the clearing requires some information about the
- 19 settlement price. Here the allegation is that there was
- 20 fraud at the point where the settlement price was set.
- 21 That then created a problem with the clearinghouse, and
- 22 at the clearing process there was also a continuing
- 23 violation because at both points the contract market and
- 24 the clearing organization should have been applying
- 25 their rules effectively and carefully, and we suggest

- 1 here that that was done in bad faith.
- 2 JUSTICE SOUTER: I think --
- MR. DAYS: The cause of action, we
- 4 understand, requires that there be a showing of bad
- 5 faith.
- JUSTICE SOUTER: Is -- I don't want to
- 7 reduce the issue down to something too simplistic, but
- 8 is there a rule that says don't lie, don't commit fraud?
- 9 MR. DAYS: Yes. In fact, the -- in order to
- 10 be a contract -- a market designated by the CFTC and by
- 11 the statute, there has to be a commitment to avoiding
- 12 price manipulation and cornering the market or various
- other things of that kind. So that's in the statute,
- 14 and it's also subject to the rules of the CFTC. That's
- 15 a basic understanding. That's a given. Indeed, with
- 16 respect to the whole question of settlement prices and
- 17 margins, the understanding of those who participate in a
- 18 commodity futures market is that they will establish
- 19 their margins with the expectation that those rules will
- 20 be applied fairly and firmly and in good faith.
- JUSTICE SOUTER: Am I -- am I right that we
- 22 really do not have to --
- MR. DAYS: Excuse me?
- 24 JUSTICE SOUTER: Am I correct that we really
- 25 do not have to determine that issue this morning?

1	MR. DAYS: What
2	JUSTICE SOUTER: All we have to determine is
3	whether it is possible for the Petitioner here to be
4	within the class of those with standing?
5	MR. DAYS: Absolutely.
6	JUSTICE SOUTER: Yes.
7	MR. DAYS: This is a standing case, sir.
8	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Days, suppose
9	that the exchange has a standard sort of
10	nondiscrimination provision with respect to employment
11	practices, and it an employee asserts that she was
12	discriminated against in the promotion review. Would
13	she be covered by this provision?
14	MR. DAYS: No, Your Honor. I think that
15	Congress had in mind a limitation of the standing
16	position that is standing a right to those who
17	participate in the process, when it talks about a person
18	who engaged in a transaction on or subject to the rules
19	of the contract market
20	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I suppose the
21	transaction would be her annual employment review that
22	she alleges violated the exchange rule saying the
23	exchange would not discriminate on the basis of sex.
24	MR. DAYS: I don't believe that that would
25	be a transaction on or subject to the rules of the

- 1 contract market. She would not or he would not be a
- 2 person whose transaction, that is the employment
- 3 contract, would be carried out on or subject to the
- 4 rules of the contract.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: But suppose, to narrow
- 6 that hypothetical, that there's a rule that you can't be
- 7 an employee of the clearinghouse or the exchange if you
- 8 have a conviction for fraud, and they don't -- they're
- 9 negligent and careless about enforcing that rule and
- 10 that fraud causes the loss. Under either your theory or
- 11 the government's theory, would there be liability, and
- 12 is there a difference between those two theories?
- MR. DAYS: Well, the statute itself talks
- 14 about the responsibilities of the contract market or the
- 15 clearing organization. And it describes transactions,
- 16 and transactions are described broadly but not in a way
- 17 that would encompass the examples that you gave, Justice
- 18 Kennedy.
- 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So -- so, the
- 20 transaction has some substantive limitation that is
- 21 derived from where?
- MR. DAYS: Well, it's derived from the
- 23 statute, if one looks at Rule 2(i) in the statute. That
- 24 describes transactions in a variety of ways. It's not
- 25 in any of the appendices, but it can be located, I

- 1 believe, on page 5 of the yellow brief, where we talk
- 2 about that and indeed the interpretation that was given
- 3 by the Second Circuit in the Ken Roberts case, which we
- 4 also cite at that page in the yellow brief.
- 5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But in my hypothetical
- 6 there is a transaction and there are actual damages --
- 7 I'm reading from -- from (b)(c). There's been a
- 8 transaction and the liabilities for damages sustained by
- 9 a person who engaged in the transaction or subject to
- 10 the rules of the buyer.
- 11 MR. DAYS: Well, Justice Kennedy, I want to
- 12 focus on transaction. There's nothing that I've been
- 13 able to find, nothing that the CFTC has indicated in
- 14 this respect that would cover the hypothetical that you
- 15 and Chief Justice Roberts had mentioned. Theoretically,
- 16 yes, but I don't think that -- in fact not
- 17 theoretically, yes, I would say the transaction does not
- 18 incorporate those ancillary rules of an operation of a
- 19 contract market.
- 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, why aren't
- 21 these ancillary rules? When I think of a futures
- 22 exchange market and the transaction, I think of the
- 23 buyers and the sellers, you know, the longs and the
- 24 shorts, and this strikes me as just kind of the
- 25 paperwork in the back office. Why is that, why should

- 1 we assume that's covered by the term "transaction"?
- 2 MR. DAYS: Well, it is a broad definition,
- 3 but it focuses on the process of the execution and
- 4 consummation of the contract, not matters that are
- 5 unrelated. I would view, as was indicated in the
- 6 American Agricultural Movement case, these people as
- 7 nonparticipants in the operation of the core function of
- 8 a contract market.
- 9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: These people -- you
- 10 mean the ones in our hypotheticals.
- 11 MR. DAYS: That's correct.
- 12 JUSTICE BREYER: Can I ask you -- I find it
- 13 difficult -- I'm finding it difficult to follow the
- 14 exact language on page 4a of the appendix, of (b)(1)(C).
- 15 To you, that's probably the key provision, right? And
- 16 that's in the blue brief. And catch me when I read it
- 17 wrong, if I do. As I -- as I see it, it says -- and
- 18 here it says "a clearing organization." That's what we
- 19 are interested in here, the clearing organization.
- MR. DAYS: Right.
- 21 JUSTICE BREYER: Now, a clearing
- 22 organization that doesn't enforce a bylaw properly or a
- 23 rule or reg properly, which is what you're saying
- 24 happened?
- MR. DAYS: Yes, sir.

- 1 JUSTICE BREYER: The clearing organization
- 2 got all mixed and it all --
- 3 MR. DAYS: Correct.
- 4 JUSTICE BREYER: Now, they're liable for
- 5 actual damages to a person who engaged in a transaction
- 6 in a contract market. That's what it says. And the
- 7 contract market is the futures exchange.
- 8 MR. DAYS: Yes.
- 9 JUSTICE BREYER: Not the clearing
- 10 organization.
- MR. DAYS: Yes.
- 12 JUSTICE BREYER: And they're liable to that
- 13 person for the actual losses that resulted from his
- 14 transaction in the futures exchange --- as such
- 15 transaction.
- MR. DAYS: Yes.
- JUSTICE BREYER: So what your claim -- they
- 18 were caused by the failure of the clearinghouse to
- 19 follow its rules.
- MR. DAYS: Yes, sir.
- 21 JUSTICE BREYER: If they just read that, we
- 22 have a case where the clearing organization didn't
- 23 follow its rules the -- my client engaged in a
- 24 transaction over the futures exchange.
- MR. DAYS: Yes.

- 1 JUSTICE BREYER: And it was caused harm
- 2 because the clearing organization didn't follow its
- 3 rules. You say that's what it says.
- 4 MR. DAYS: Yes, sir.
- JUSTICE BREYER: And that's what happened?
- 6 MR. DAYS: Correct.
- 7 JUSTICE BREYER: Did I understand that
- 8 correctly?
- 9 MR. DAYS: Yes. I don't know, Justice
- 10 Breyer, whether you're heading toward the concern that's
- 11 expressed by the Respondents, namely that 25(b)(1) does
- 12 not contain in that second part of the statute a
- 13 reference to a --
- 14 JUSTICE BREYER: Clearing organization.
- 15 MR. DAYS: -- clearing organization.
- 16 JUSTICE BREYER: I know, but then the
- 17 response I'm going to ask them is, so what?
- 18 MR. DAYS: Well, I think that is -- "so
- 19 what" is a proper response, I'm glad you said it rather
- 20 than I, that --
- 21 JUSTICE BREYER: I know you're going to --
- 22 but I --
- MR. DAYS: We have -- we have, we think,
- 24 standing with respect to a transaction that occurred on
- 25 the contract market even if the Respondents' argument is

- 1 persuasive that it didn't happen on the clearing
- 2 organization or subject to the rules of the clearing
- 3 organization.
- 4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: It would be an argument
- 5 for this case because that absence has been cured.
- 6 Wasn't that in the 2000 amendment that -- that they
- 7 changed the --
- 8 MR. DAYS: That's correct.
- 9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- the list to registered
- 10 entity and which does include clearinghouse.
- MR. DAYS: Yes. Well --
- 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So --
- MR. DAYS: Yes?
- 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The concern on the
- other side, I take it, is that it's not just limited to
- 16 transactions on the exchange, but transactions subject
- 17 to the rules of a contract market. And I understood
- 18 you, in response to the hypothetical that Justice
- 19 Kennedy posed, that you indicated that transaction has
- 20 some substantive limit to it, and if that's the case,
- 21 which seems to me an awfully large concession, then we
- 22 have to figure out what the limit is. And it seems to
- 23 me that it could just as easily be limited to the
- 24 transaction between buyers and sellers of futures
- 25 contracts as between all these subsidiary, ancillary,

- 1 collateral, whatever transactions that simply implement
- 2 that broader transaction.
- MR. DAYS: Well, Mr. Chief Justice, there
- 4 are limitations with respect to 25(b)(1). As I
- 5 indicated, nonparticipants in the market are not
- 6 explicitly covered by this, but also one has to
- 7 understand that there has to be a showing of bad faith
- 8 and there are no punitive damages. There are actually
- 9 damages and, therefore, this limits the extent to which
- 10 this provision can be used by someone who is not within
- 11 the category that I described.
- 12 JUSTICE BREYER: Correct me if I'm wrong,
- 13 but you're going to be more favorable to this than I
- 14 expect your opponent. I mean, there is nothing really
- 15 linguistically or otherwise wrong if you had a statute
- 16 that said people in the badminton court have to play
- 17 carefully. And if they hurt somebody on the
- 18 merry-go-round, they are liable.
- 19 And so people in the contract market have to
- 20 play carefully, and if they have hurt somebody over at
- 21 the futures exchange, they are liable.
- But it says those people in the futures
- 23 exchange are people who engage in a transaction on the
- 24 futures exchange.
- MR. DAYS: Yes, sir.

- 1 JUSTICE BREYER: And so they said well, by
- 2 odd fluke of fate, your clients didn't. It was the --
- 3 rather, their client who actually went into the futures
- 4 exchange and bought the commodity.
- 5 Your point, I take it, is -- well that's
- 6 true, but my client did something, he guaranteed that
- 7 commodity transaction in accordance with the rules of
- 8 the futures exchange, and that's what makes him a player
- 9 in the futures exchange.
- 10 MR. DAYS: Yes. As to him, yes --
- JUSTICE BREYER: He --
- 12 MR. DAYS: -- that is right.
- JUSTICE BREYER: He guaranteed through the
- 14 clearinghouse the payment of the contract made on the
- 15 futures exchange --
- MR. DAYS: That's correct.
- JUSTICE BREYER: -- which he didn't make,
- 18 but he guaranteed it.
- MR. DAYS: Well, that's not correct.
- JUSTICE BREYER: He made it.
- 21 MR. DAYS: Well, that's not correct, Justice
- 22 Breyer. The clearing --
- JUSTICE BREYER: He didn't walk on to the
- 24 floor and make it. It was his client who walked on to
- 25 the floor and said whatever. Is that right?

- 1 MR. DAYS: Well, it's hard to know who walks
- 2 on what floor. I think what is clear about this
- 3 industry is that it is the clearing FCM who is always at
- 4 the center of this, the essential participant in this
- 5 entire process.
- The FCM's may not know who the customer is.
- 7 They certainly don't know who the customer is on the
- 8 other side. The clearinghouse doesn't know who the
- 9 customer is, or the investor is. So the investor
- 10 actually plays a very small role other than putting up
- 11 his or her money at the beginning of the process.
- 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No. I mean the --
- 13 the market is about investors. It's about buyers and
- 14 sellers. Now, you're -- the clearinghouse and these
- 15 FCM's may or may not be covered by the language of the
- 16 statute, but it's an awful big stretch to say they are
- 17 central to the market.
- 18 What's central to the market are the
- 19 investors. That's why they have these. They wouldn't
- 20 have this market for -- for your clients, I mean for the
- 21 clearinghouse or anything else. The market is there for
- 22 the buyers and the sellers. That's the central
- 23 transaction.
- MR. DAYS: We don't argue that investors are
- 25 barred from bringing suits under 25(b)(1). They would

- 1 be persons who engaged in transactions on, or subject
- 2 to, the rules of the contract market.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Didn't Judge Friendly
- 4 refer to the FCM as a central player or a principal in
- 5 --
- 6 MR. DAYS: Yes. That -- that's certainly
- 7 been the case in Leist where Judge Friendly wrote the
- 8 opinion. And also --
- 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: What is the transaction --
- 10 what is the single transaction that you think brings
- 11 your client within this language?
- 12 MR. DAYS: Well, I mentioned --
- 13 JUSTICE SCALIA: What is the transaction,
- 14 the guarantee?
- 15 MR. DAYS: The one -- the contract market
- 16 requires that the clearing FCM clear a contract with one
- 17 hour -- assume the contract. So the assuming of the
- 18 contract and the clearing required by the rules of the
- 19 contract market is a violation of the CEA.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: I'm not talking about what
- 21 the rule is that was violated. It says "who engaged in
- 22 any transaction on or subject to the rules of such
- 23 contract market." What is, in brief, "the transaction"
- 24 you're relying upon?
- MR. DAYS: Well, Your Honor, as indicated,

- 1 the transaction is the process of assuming this contract
- 2 and then going toward the clearing -- clearing
- 3 organization to clear it, and it's the clearing
- 4 organization, setting the settlement price, which really
- 5 dictates what happens on the clearing organization. So
- 6 it's the setting of the settlement price which is the
- 7 key point.
- 8 JUSTICE SCALIA: The transaction does not
- 9 require two parties?
- MR. DAYS: Well, there are two parties here.
- 11 JUSTICE SCALIA: You have a one-party
- 12 transaction?
- 13 MR. DAYS: There is a -- we can view this as
- 14 one sole transaction, as one transaction with a number
- 15 of subsidiary activities along the process between
- 16 execution and consummation, or one can view various
- 17 transactions that ultimately end up with the
- 18 consummation of the contract.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Why isn't it just --
- 20 MR. DAYS: I don't think it makes any
- 21 difference one way or another.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- the guarantee, the
- 23 relationship between the clearing organization and the
- 24 clearinghouse -- the clearing organization has to give a
- 25 guarantee and has to put up margin?

- 1 MR. DAYS: That's correct.
- 2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So there is a transaction
- 3 between the clearinghouse and the clearing organization.
- 4 MR. DAYS: Oh, absolutely. Well, they are
- 5 same thing. You mean the clearing FCM and the
- 6 organization. Thank you.
- 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Days, we'll give
- 8 you a minute for rebuttal. Mr. Stewart.
- 9 ORAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART,
- 10 ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES,
- 11 AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER
- 12 MR. STEWART: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
- 13 please the Court:
- 14 For purposes of this case, the Court may
- assume that the word "transaction" in Section 25(b)(1)
- 16 is limited to the purchase and sale of futures and
- 17 options contracts.
- The Court may also assume that, in order to
- 19 engage in such a transaction, a person must be a
- 20 necessary and direct participant in the transaction.
- 21 Even under those --
- 22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Where -- where do
- 23 all of those assumptions come from? I would have
- 24 thought the limitation of "transaction" beyond the plain
- 25 language would be a significant concession in this case.

- 1 I mean --
- 2 MR. STEWART: When I say "assume," I am
- 3 saying that the Court need not decide at this point how
- 4 far, if at all, beyond the core transactions that occur
- 5 on contract markets the statute breaches. That is, with
- 6 respect to the hypothetical case of an exchange or a
- 7 clearinghouse that has an anti-discrimination rule and
- 8 is alleged to have violated that rule.
- 9 Yes, on the one hand, you could say that in
- 10 literal terms that is a transaction subject to the rules
- 11 of the exchange. On the other hand, I think there is
- 12 significant force to Respondents' contention that that
- 13 seems very far afield from what was the core of
- 14 Congress's concern. And with respect to the
- 15 anti-discrimination hypothetical, there would also be
- 16 the argument that there is a different Federal statute.
- 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So we have to figure
- 18 out what was the core of Congress's concern and limit
- 19 "transaction" in that way?
- 20 MR. STEWART: I think the Court can at least
- 21 start from the assumption that Congress referred to
- 22 transactions on, or subject to, the rules of the
- 23 contract market. And none of the things that have been
- 24 posited in the hypotheticals, the anti-discrimination,
- 25 would be transactions on a contract market.

- 1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But they would be
- 2 subject to the rules of the contract market.
- 3 MR. STEWART: They would be subject to the
- 4 rules. But our point here is that the United States and
- 5 the CFTC have not had occasion to decide how far, if at
- 6 all, beyond the core transactions on the contract market
- 7 the statute extends.
- 8 But our point is, even if we look at the
- 9 core of what Congress was driving at, the buying and
- 10 selling of futures options contracts, the clearing FCM
- 11 is a proper plaintiff because it assumes direct
- 12 contractual liability to the clearinghouse. Even before
- 13 the clearing process is completed, it was defined as the
- 14 buyer or seller of the contracts in the NYFE rules, and
- 15 its participation is essential.
- 16 Now -- now, we have a somewhat different
- 17 conception of the relevant transaction than does the
- 18 Petitioner. In our view, when Eisler executed his
- 19 trades on the floor of the exchange, he set in motion a
- 20 process that would quickly and inevitably culminate in
- 21 the clearing of the trades by the clearing organization,
- 22 and at the end of the day there would be an array of
- 23 contractual relationships.
- 24 Klein would have a contractal obligation to
- 25 the clearinghouse. The clearing FCM on the other side

- 1 of the trade would have its own obligation to the
- 2 clearinghouse. Klein would have an agreement with its
- 3 customer, First West, that would entail rights and
- 4 obligations running between them. And there would be a
- 5 similar set of rights and obligations on the other side
- 6 of the trade.
- 7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What about the argument
- 8 that if we accept your view of it, allowing the FCM to
- 9 sue, then there could be multiple liability?
- 10 MR. STEWART: I think that's incorrect. I
- 11 think the customer would also be an appropriate
- 12 plaintiff, that is, the customer would have his own
- 13 rights and obligations arising out of the -- the
- 14 contract with the clearing FCM. But the fact that they
- 15 might both be conceivable plaintiffs wouldn't mean that
- 16 they could both recover in the same case.
- 17 Remember that the statute limits recovery to
- 18 actual losses. So if the customer here, Eisler and
- 19 First West, had paid the required additional margin to
- 20 Klein, and Klein had discharged its obligation to the
- 21 clearinghouse, Klein would still be a person who had
- 22 engaged in a transaction. But Klein wouldn't be able to
- 23 recover because he would have suffered no actual losses.
- So it's the person who bears the actual loss
- 25 at the end of the day who would be the appropriate

- 1 plaintiff.
- 2 And the fact that in some cases that might
- 3 be the customer and in other cases it might be the
- 4 clearing FCM doesn't mean that there would be
- 5 duplicative recovery in a single case.
- JUSTICE ALITO: Well, when you began by
- 7 saying we could begin -- we could assume certain things,
- 8 was it included in the things that we could assume --
- 9 was it the proposition that the transaction was limited
- 10 to a purchase or sale?
- MR. STEWART: A purchase or sale, although
- 12 we would extend -- I mean we would interpret the
- 13 clearing process as part of the purchase or sale. And
- 14 the reason we would do that is that clearing occurs
- 15 inevitably by operation of law, as it were. That is,
- 16 once Eisler executes his trades, Klein has no discretion
- 17 as to whether to discharge its obligation to clear the
- 18 trades.
- 19 Klein had previously entered into a
- 20 commitment to guarantee the trades that Eisler made.
- 21 And, therefore, what -- Klein's obligations to the
- 22 clearinghouse followed directly and inevitably from the
- 23 initial trade on the floor of the exchange.
- 24 JUSTICE ALITO: Is that different from
- 25 saying under the exchange rule the FCM is actually the

- 1 party that enters into the trade.
- 2 MR. STEWART: I think it is a different
- 3 thing and there are two different bases on which the
- 4 Court could rule in our favor, that is, Rule 306(i)(2)
- of the rules of the exchange that were in effect at the
- 6 time of these trades specified that -- and that's
- 7 reproduced, I guess, at page 14a of the blue brief. And
- 8 it said -- a second sentence of Rule 306(i)(2) says
- 9 every such contract when made by a trading member shall
- 10 be made on behalf of a clearing member, who shall be the
- 11 buyer or seller of said contract on the terms set forth
- 12 therein.
- So one way to rule for Klein in this case is
- 14 to simply say even if we focus entirely on the moment at
- 15 which the trade was executed, under the rules of the
- 16 exchange, Klein was deemed to be the buyer or seller.
- 17 But we are also making the different argument and in a
- 18 sense we think the more important practical argument,
- 19 that regardless of where the contract ran during the
- 20 brief period before the clearing process was
- 21 consummated, the salient factor is that at the
- 22 conclusion of the clearing process, the clearinghouse
- 23 would look directly and only to Klein for satisfaction
- 24 of any obligations arising out of unsuccessful trades.
- In a sense the clearinghouse could be

- 1 analogized to a department store in which only the
- 2 clearing members have charge accounts. And in order for
- 3 anyone else to make a purchase, he has to make
- 4 prearrangements with a charge account holder to have
- 5 permission to charge things to his accounts. And that's
- 6 essentially what was done here. In order for Eisler to
- 7 execute trades on the floor of the exchange, he had to
- 8 have the prior commitment from Klein that Eisler would
- 9 be allowed to charge trades to client's account.
- 10 And in that situation, we think it's
- 11 entirely natural to say that Klein engaged in the
- 12 transaction, even though Eisler was making the decisions
- 13 as to exactly what trades to execute.
- JUSTICE SOUTER: Mr. Stewart --
- 15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is that why the Second
- 16 Circuit was wrong in saying it was just like a
- 17 securities broker?
- 18 MR. STEWART: Yes. I think the Second
- 19 Circuit's error was not really that it had a
- 20 misconception of how narrow or broad the private right
- 21 of action is. The Second Circuit's error was that it
- 22 misunderstood the role that a clearing FCM plays in the
- 23 process. The clearing FCM doesn't simply facilitate the
- 24 formation of contracts between other people. The
- 25 clearinghouse assumes direct contractual -- I'm sorry.

- 1 I mean the clearing FCM assumes direct contractual
- 2 liability to the clearinghouse.
- 3 And that's fundamental to the operation of
- 4 the contract markets. That is, the point of the
- 5 clearinghouse is to give investors assurance that if
- 6 their trades are successful, they will get paid. And in
- 7 order for the clearinghouse to pay the winners, it has
- 8 to have confidence that it will be able to collect from
- 9 the losers.
- 10 And the way that it has that confidence is
- 11 by identifying a small number of people, clearing FCM's,
- 12 who have demonstrated financial wherewithal and
- integrity, and saying we are going to look only to you
- 14 to satisfy these obligations. We are not going to put
- 15 ourselves in the business of going after large, large
- 16 numbers of individual investors to ensure that losing
- 17 trades will be paid.
- 18 JUSTICE SOUTER: Mr. Stewart, may I go back
- 19 to the question of multiple recoveries. And by that
- 20 term, as I understand it, the term does not mean
- 21 duplicating recoveries. And I don't understand -- and
- 22 this is what I want you to explain -- why there couldn't
- 23 be a recovery in a case analogous to this both by the
- 24 FCM and by the ultimate customer.
- Let's assume that the settlement price is,

- 1 in fact, rigged. The FCM cannot meet the resulting
- 2 margin call and folds, and hence a situation like this.
- 3 And this happens quickly enough so that the ultimate
- 4 transaction is never consummated. So that the -- the
- 5 contracting party on the FCM side of the trade doesn't
- 6 get the benefit of what would have been a favorable
- 7 contract. Couldn't you have recovery in that case both
- 8 by the customer and the FCM?
- 9 MR. STEWART: I'm not sure if I -- if I
- 10 fully understand the hypothetical.
- 11 JUSTICE SOUTER: It may be that I don't
- 12 understand how it works.
- 13 MR. STEWART: To answer a variant of it, I
- 14 think there could be cases in which both the customer
- 15 and the clearing FCM recovered something. That is, say
- 16 there is a loss of a million dollars that's attributable
- 17 to malfeasance by the exchange, and the customer comes
- 18 up with half of that money -- \$500,000. And the
- 19 clearinghouse uses that to discharge half of its own
- 20 obligation to the clearinghouse.
- Now, in that case, both the customer and the
- 22 clearing FCM might have a cause of action for \$500,000.
- 23 So there would be -- there could be multiple recoveries
- in the sense that you're describing.
- JUSTICE SOUTER: But in my hypo, the FCM is

- 1 claiming damages because his business folds. So the
- 2 damages are not limited simply to those flowing from
- 3 this transaction itself. The customer is claiming
- 4 damages for failure to consummate a contract that would
- 5 have been favorable to him.
- 6 MR. STEWART: If you assume that
- 7 consequential damage is arising out of the loss of the
- 8 business --
- 9 JUSTICE SOUTER: Right. And I am
- 10 assuming --
- 11 MR. STEWART: -- could be part of actual
- 12 losses, then there would be no barrier to each party,
- 13 the clearing FCM and the customer recovering what it
- 14 actually lost.
- 15 Our point is that there is no danger that
- 16 because the clearing FCM is -- there is no danger that
- 17 because the clearing FCM is liable for a million dollars
- 18 to the clearinghouse and the customer is liable to the
- 19 clearing FCM, each for a million dollars, that they will
- 20 both get a million dollars. It's only the person who
- 21 bears the actual loss.
- 22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
- 23 Mr. Stewart.
- Mr. Pincus.
- 25 ORAL ARGUMENT OF ANDREW J. PINCUS

1	ON BEHALF OF THE REPONDENTS
2	MR. PINCUS: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice,
3	and may it please the Court:
4	I'd like to return to the language of the
5	statute, because I think it explains why the comments
6	that Mr. Stewart started with are, in fact, compelled by
7	the language of the statute. 25 (a) talks about a
8	person who engages in any transaction on or subject to
9	the rules of a contract market. And I'm focusing on the
10	"on or subject to the rules."
11	If the Petitioners claimed in their opening
12	brief any the fact that any transaction was governed
13	by any rule, as in the Court's discrimination
14	hypotheticals, was enough, then the "on" would be
15	superfluous. There wouldn't be any need for "on",
16	because surely a transaction on a contract market has to
17	be governed by the rules of the contract market.
18	So I think that shows why "on or subject to
19	the rules of " is a term of art. It has a special
20	meaning here. And the only kinds of transactions that
21	are either on or subject
22	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, but under that
23	reading they should have used the word "and" rather than
24	"or."

MR. PINCUS: No, Your Honor.

25

1 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Or which is subject to. 2 MR. PINCUS: Well, Justice Kennedy, I think 3 what Congress was explaining there is it wasn't saying 4 any transaction subject to the rules of a contract 5 market, because that would be all of the Court's hypotheticals and discrimination and everything else, 6 7 and the word "on" wouldn't be there. And so by using "on", which by definition "on" has to be subsumed in the 8 rules because if a transaction is on a contract market, 9 10 surely is in some way governed by a rule. 11 So if Congress meant to cover every 12 transaction that is in any way governed by a rule, it wouldn't have had to include "on." 13 14 So the reason -- the fact that "on" is there 15 means, as we discussed in our brief, that this is a 16 special transaction on or subject to the rules singles 17 out a very special category of transactions. And that 18 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm sorry. I'm not following you. I think Justice Kennedy's question still 20 21 applies. Your argument assumes that the "or" is an "and." I mean, you don't need to have a transaction 22 23 "on" at all. It can be simply one subject to the rules. 24 MR. PINCUS: Yes. But the fact that

Congress put "on" in there means that it was trying to

25

- 1 capture something other --
- 2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The fact that
- 3 Congress put "on" in there and then followed it with
- 4 "or" means you don't have to worry what "on" means if
- 5 you're subject to the rules of the contract market.
- 6 MR. PINCUS: Yes, Mr. Chief Justice. But I
- 7 think the reason that "on" is there is that Congress was
- 8 signaling that it wasn't, that the second part of the
- 9 clause or "subject to the rules" didn't literally mean
- 10 or subject to any rule, because if it literally meant
- 11 that, there would have been no reason to include "on."
- 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: This is like ejusdem
- 13 generis argument. You're saying, we should interpret
- 14 "subject to the rules" in the same light that we
- 15 interpret "transaction"?
- 16 MR. PINCUS: No. This is an argument that
- on or subject to the rules that a transaction on or
- 18 subject to the rules is a special kind of transaction.
- 19 It's a term of art in the statute, and a term of art
- 20 that refers to trades.
- JUSTICE STEVENS: But even if it's a term of
- 22 art, do you contend that client was not engaged in a
- 23 transaction subject to the rules.
- 24 MR. PINCUS: Yes, we do. Your Honor, our
- 25 view is that the transaction that is referred to there

- 1 are the transactions that include, either at the trading
- 2 pit or a small category of off pit trades that are
- 3 permitted by Section C of the Commodities Exchange Act.
- 4 JUSTICE STEVENS: What is the scope of the
- 5 term "transaction" in your view? What does it cover?
- 6 MR. PINCUS: It covers the trade -- the
- 7 contract that occurs at the pit at the moment -- during
- 8 open when one --
- 9 JUSTICE STEVENS: In fact between either the
- 10 buyer or the seller and the clearinghouse, not the
- 11 clearinghouse, the FCM or whatever?
- MR. PINCUS: Well, FCMs may or may not be
- 13 involved. In this case Klein wasn't involved, because
- 14 Eisler was a floor, had floor privileges and he
- 15 actually -- he was the person who was at the pit
- 16 engaging in these transactions. So our -- our view is
- 17 that the transaction, to start with that, either occurs
- 18 at the pit when an offer is made, an open outcry, and
- 19 it's accepted at that moment that transaction and --
- JUSTICE STEVENS: And who are the parties to
- 21 the transaction?
- MR. PINCUS: The parties to that transaction
- 23 are the buyer and seller, the customers, the people that
- 24 the --
- 25 JUSTICE STEVENS: And the intermediaries are

- 1 not subject to the transaction either though they are
- 2 liable either for the purchase rights or the sale
- 3 rights?
- 4 MR. PINCUS: Yes.
- 5 JUSTICE STEVENS: They are not parties to
- 6 the transaction.
- 7 MR. PINCUS: They are not parties to the
- 8 transaction.
- 9 JUSTICE STEVENS: But you can expose them to
- 10 millions of dollars in liability.
- MR. PINCUS: At the moment, Your Honor, they
- 12 may not even be identified. At the moment that
- 13 transaction occurs --
- JUSTICE STEVENS: But they are subject to
- 15 liability if the transaction doesn't -- isn't
- 16 consummated.
- 17 MR. PINCUS: Under the rules of the clearing
- 18 organization. Yes.
- 19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But the -- the buy and the
- 20 sell contract will be worth nothing if it isn't cleared.
- 21 MR. PINCUS: Well, it could -- what the
- 22 clearing process does after the -- after that contract
- 23 is formed is to eliminate, to provide a way to strip out
- 24 the credit risk that ordinarily wouldn't be there.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: I know. But you want --

- 1 you want us to say that the clearing is no part of the
- 2 transaction, but the clearing is necessary to make a
- 3 transaction go forward. Otherwise the contract is just
- 4 a nullity.
- 5 MR. PINCUS: No, Your Honor, we don't
- 6 believe that the contract is a nullity. And in fact, if
- 7 for example a he contract was made at the pit, and for
- 8 some reason the -- the clearing member who was to clear
- 9 the transaction went bankrupt that day and didn't exist,
- 10 and therefore that transaction was not cleared, that
- 11 transaction would still be enforceable as between the
- 12 buyer and the seller.
- JUSTICE BREYER: So they had to pick it up
- 14 in an hour.
- MR. PINCUS: Well, it has to be cleared in
- 16 an hour to go through the clearing process.
- 17 JUSTICE BREYER: Fine. So therefore any
- 18 transaction wouldn't happen in your hypothetical,
- 19 because if I understand it correctly -- the buyer and
- 20 the seller, who by the way are normally represented by
- 21 clearing-houses by Klein, or by brokers like Klein, but
- in this case apparently they weren't -- they make the
- 23 transaction in the pit and then the rules of the
- 24 exchange say that the clearing-house has to pick it up,
- 25 a clearing member within one hour, and at that point

- 1 that person -- the clearing member, the broker, I guess,
- 2 this Klein type person -- becomes legally responsible
- 3 for seeing that the money is put up.
- Now, it doesn't require a big stretch -- in
- 5 fact, zero stretch, of the word transaction, to think
- 6 that word transaction covers that entire process. From
- 7 the moment -- and by the way the whole process is
- 8 governed by the rules of the futures exchange -- so
- 9 there are rules in there. So why do you -- what reason
- 10 is there for taking that word transaction, cutting out
- 11 about two-thirds of the important event, ignoring the
- 12 fact that it is covered by the rule of the future
- 13 exchange, and limiting it to the physical moment when
- 14 somebody enters the pit in an unusual case and says "I
- 15 buy for" -- and then another person says "I sell for"?
- 16 MR. PINCUS: Well, let me first point out,
- 17 Your Honor, it's not an unusual case. There frequently
- 18 may be a case even where -- either where -- even where
- 19 both sides are represented by floor brokers, where the
- 20 floor broker who is -- who is representing the party in
- 21 the trade is not the clearing member. That happens all
- the time and that's why the rules say that the clearing
- 23 member doesn't have to even be designated until one hour
- 24 after the trade. So hard to say that the clearing
- 25 member engages in that transaction on the floor when

- 1 he -- when it may not be designated.
- 2 The reason for the division is that Congress
- 3 set out a clear rule here. The transaction it referred
- 4 to, it used the language that it used elsewhere, as we
- 5 discuss in our brief, particularly in defining the
- 6 functions of floor trader and floor broker.
- 7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Pincus, if your view
- 8 were correct it would have been so easy for Congress to
- 9 say "buyers and sellers" or even "trade," but it used a
- 10 word "transaction" that you say has a special meaning in
- 11 this context, but "transaction" appears all through the
- 12 law and usually it's a term that has encompassing
- 13 meaning, like in the Federal rules "any transaction or
- 14 occurrence, " and you would say that Congress has given
- 15 it here this very constrained meaning.
- 16 MR. PINCUS: We do say that, Your Honor.
- 17 Because -- let me address first your question about why
- 18 Congress couldn't use buyer or seller. Here Congress
- 19 had to -- needed a construction that would link the --
- 20 the transaction that was being targeted with the rules
- 21 of the -- of the contract market, because that was going
- 22 to be the test here, was it's all about whether or not
- 23 contract market violated its rules, and so it needed a
- 24 construction that referred to a transaction because
- 25 those are the things that are governed by the rules of

- 1 the contract market that might be misapplied in the
- 2 work -- in the way that A, B and C talk about.
- 3 So it would have had to -- even if it had
- 4 used the phrase, you know, "purchased" or "sold," a
- 5 commodity for future delivery or an option on a contract
- 6 for future delivery -- it would still have to say on or
- 7 subject to the rules of a contract market, in order to
- 8 link back to what it was doing, which was creating a
- 9 cause of action for the violation of the contract
- 10 markets own rules with respect to a transaction that was
- 11 subject to those rules.
- 12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Why didn't it just say
- 13 sustained by a buyer or seller? "Shall be liable for
- 14 actual damages sustained by a buyer or seller." Why --
- 15 why would it need to be any more complicated than that?
- 16 MR. PINCUS: Well, because it -- it would
- 17 have to talk about --
- 18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: When everything else is
- 19 the same, instead of "a person," just "buyer and
- 20 seller."
- 21 MR. PINCUS: Well, because then in the --
- 22 several lines down it talks about actual loss and it
- 23 would have to say buyers and sellers there as well. And
- 24 --
- 25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I don't know why.

1 MR. PINCUS: Well, it would be referring 2 back to buyer or seller. But I think the key here is 3 for Congress, given the structure of the act, "any 4 transaction on or subject to the rules of the contract 5 market" is -- are these transactions. Those are the only transactions that -- that meet that test. 6 7 are the transactions, that very same phrase is used in 8 defining the functions of the floor broker and the floor trader who execute the transactions on the floor, and so 9 10 by using that phrase, Congress was tying back to something that it had a clear definition of. Let me --11 JUSTICE ALITO: Where is the clear -- there 12 13 is no clear definition. There is no definition 14 whatsoever, anywhere, of "transaction." MR. PINCUS: Well, there is no definition of 15 16 transaction, Your Honor, but in the definitions of floor 17 trader and floor broker, the phrase "on or subject to 18 the rules of a contract market" appears again in defining what they do, and so those are the people who 19 20 are at the pit, either executing for their own account 21 or for a customer's account, the trades. And so by using that very phrase in defining what they do -- which 22 23 appears by the way on, in the discussion on pages 5 and 24 6 --25 JUSTICE STEVENS: Are they persons engaged

- 1 in contracts subject to the rules -- are they persons
- 2 engaged in transactions subject to the rules?
- 3 MR. PINCUS: No, Your Honor, we don't -- we
- 4 don't think they are, because they are acting as --
- 5 JUSTICE STEVENS: Who are subject to the
- 6 rules in your view? It doesn't include the FCM, it
- 7 doesn't include the broker, it doesn't include the
- 8 trader.
- 9 MR. PINCUS: Well, certainly a floor trader
- 10 is because that's someone who is trading for his own
- 11 account. A floor broker who's merely representing a
- 12 customer is just like someone at a house closing, if you
- 13 can't make the house closing you appoint someone to
- 14 close the house. They aren't the ones who engage in the
- 15 transaction; you do.
- 16 JUSTICE SOUTER: Neither are they the person
- 17 who can end up personally liable, and -- I mean, they
- 18 don't have -- they are not subject to margin calls.
- 19 There is something very different about this set of
- 20 relationships from the broker/seller relationship in
- 21 buying and selling a house.
- 22 MR. PINCUS: Well, those people also have --
- 23 well, the -- the floor broker is not subject to a margin
- 24 call. He is subject to liability for other things that
- 25 he may do wrong, but for his role as a floor broker he

- 1 is not subject to margin responsibility.
- 2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: You recognize that the
- 3 Second Circuit was wrong when it said that this FCM is
- 4 just like a securities broker. He is just making a deal
- 5 for a commission. It seems to me that that -- that was
- 6 not proper.
- 7 MR. PINCUS: Well, Your Honor, if that was
- 8 all the Second Circuit said, I would agree with you that
- 9 would be wrong, but the Second Circuit recognized that
- 10 the -- Klein here had a risk, a credit risk because it
- 11 had backed up the credit of its customer, Eisler, and
- 12 that's why in the lessons learned report that the CFTC
- 13 --
- 14 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But it's not just Klein.
- 15 It's every FCM. That is the job of an FCM.
- 16 MR. PINCUS: That is the job of the clearing
- 17 member of what an FCM does.
- 18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So that's not -- not
- 19 comparable to just a broker who executes my order for
- 20 shares and gets a commission for it.
- 21 MR. PINCUS: No, Your Honor, but as the
- 22 Second Circuit went on to note, the fact that there is a
- 23 credit risk here, that Klein is taking a risk based on
- 24 the credit of his customer Eisler -- as the CFTC noted,
- 25 there is nothing in the rules that require clearing

- 1 members to only accept minimum margin, and it's the job
- 2 of a clearing member to -- to look into both the
- 3 credit-worthiness of its customers and the risks of the
- 4 various transactions that are open and demanding more
- 5 margin.
- 6 JUSTICE STEVENS: I was under the impression
- 7 from the briefs, and maybe I'm wrong, that you did not
- 8 defend the reasoning of the Second Circuit. Am I right
- 9 or wrong?
- 10 MR. PINCUS: Well, we don't -- to the extent
- 11 Petitioners claim that the Second Circuit based its
- 12 reasoning on -- on the imputation into 25(b) of the
- 13 limitations in 25(a), we don't agree with that.
- 14 JUSTICE STEVENS: Which was the principal
- 15 basis for its decision.
- 16 MR. PINCUS: But there was a second basis to
- 17 its decision, which talked about the fact that Klein
- 18 didn't engage in trading, and we agree with that basis
- 19 because that's what we're arguing here.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, on that subject and
- 21 you -- your client obviously has an institutional
- 22 interest in the case, assuming you don't prevail, is the
- 23 government's theory much broader and more undesirable in
- 24 your view than that offered in Klein brief? I didn't
- 25 have an opportunity to ask Mr. Days if he accepted the

- 1 government's position.
- 2 MR. PINCUS: Well, it -- it certainly would
- 3 be better if the phrase "transaction on or subject to
- 4 the rules of the contract market" meant "trade" and we
- 5 were only discussing how expansive, how elastic the
- 6 definition of "trade" was.
- 7 We would still take the position that it's
- 8 not elastic enough obviously to include clearing
- 9 members, but we think that, given the language that
- 10 Congress used and the fact that that language is used to
- 11 refer to that "on or subject to" formulation is
- 12 repeatedly used to refer to trades, we think it's very
- 13 clear that trades have to be what it is. Otherwise,
- 14 when the statute talks about the fact that a floor
- 15 broker engages in activities on or subject to the rules
- 16 of a contract market, it could be talking about
- 17 discrimination and all kinds of other activities. But
- 18 even with respect to the narrower formulation urged by
- 19 the Solicitor General, we think that it is not right for
- 20 several reasons: First of all the language of the
- 21 statute, as I said, but there's a clarity problem. If
- 22 once you move beyond that contract that is executed and
- 23 becomes complete on the pit, how far do you go? There's
- 24 clearing before the contract is executed on the pit --
- 25 at the pit. There may be antecedent activities -- for

- 1 example, someone who doesn't have floor privileges has
- 2 to go through an FCM. There may be an introducing
- 3 broker that introduces that customer to the FCM or all
- 4 of those activities which are specified in the statute
- 5 just like the subsequent clearing activity is specified
- 6 in the statute. Are they also shoe-horned into the
- 7 definition of trade?
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Pincus --
- 9 MR. PINCUS: And that's where --
- 10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Justice Kennedy was
- 11 asking you about the government's position. One of the
- 12 positions -- one aspect of the government's position is
- 13 that -- that you would not dispute that a person who
- 14 engaged in a transaction subject to the rules of a
- 15 clearinghouse would be a proper plaintiff under the
- 16 current law. Well, certainly the FCM is a person
- 17 subject to the rules of a clearinghouse.
- 18 MR. PINCUS: Yes, although obviously the
- 19 parties haven't briefed the current law. We would take
- 20 the position that the current law doesn't change the
- 21 equation and --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: That's what I thought
- 23 your position was. So that's not an accurate.
- MR. PINCUS: No.
- 25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- characterization.

- 1 MR. PINCUS: No. Our position is, again,
- 2 the "on or subject to" language, we believe, quite
- 3 clearly refers to trades and that Congress's technical
- 4 correct substitution of registered entities doesn't
- 5 change that.
- 6 JUSTICE SOUTER: But you're saying that
- 7 because a trade is on or subject to, the only thing that
- 8 can be on or subject to is a trade. And it seems to me
- 9 that that -- that's the point at which we have
- 10 difficulty following your argument. Why -- what is your
- 11 reason, textual or otherwise, for saying that because a
- 12 trade is on or subject to, no other subtransaction can
- 13 be on subject to?
- MR. PINCUS: Because -- because trades are
- 15 the only thing that fit those two criteria. Only trades
- 16 are -- can be under the statute either on the contract
- 17 market, either because -- because they are executed at
- 18 the pit or so-called off-market trades as referred to in
- 19 Section 6(c) -- very small categories of off-market
- 20 transactions --
- JUSTICE STEVENS: But even if the --
- 22 MR. PINCUS: -- that are the equivalent of
- 23 trades but can occur off-market.
- JUSTICE STEVENS: But, Mr. Pincus, even if
- 25 you limit it to the word "trades," it does not

- 1 necessarily follow that the only parties to the trade
- 2 are the original buyer and the original seller. There
- 3 are two intermediates who participate in the execution
- 4 of the trade.
- 5 MR. PINCUS: I agree, Your Honor, and that's
- 6 the second part of our argument. Once we reach the
- 7 point where it's trade, then the question is what does
- 8 trade mean? And --
- 9 JUSTICE STEVENS: Does it include this
- 10 transaction?
- 11 MR. PINCUS: Well, we believe that it --
- 12 there are -- at the pit, again, that the transaction,
- 13 the on transaction, the transaction that occurs on, is
- 14 the open outcry transaction where, in this case, Eisler
- 15 made an offer and some other floor trader accepted it,
- 16 and that was complete there. Klein has no role in that
- 17 transaction, and clearing members do not have a role in
- 18 that transaction.
- 19 JUSTICE STEVENS: Why do you say --
- 20 MR. PINCUS: They come in later.
- 21 JUSTICE STEVENS: Why do you say that Klein
- 22 had no role in it? It was an indispensable party to the
- 23 transaction.
- 24 MR. PINCUS: It was a subsequent party. It
- 25 had subsequent role --

- 1 JUSTICE STEVENS: Before it was completed he
- 2 participated, he was -- he functioned as a guarantor.
- 3 MR. PINCUS: Well, it was not -- it need not
- 4 be clear at the moment of that the trade is executed at
- 5 the pit who the clearing member will be. Often it won't
- 6 be.
- 7 JUSTICE STEVENS: It was cleared by the time
- 8 it was over.
- 9 MR. PINCUS: No -- well, it depends what you
- 10 mean by "over," Your Honor. What happens in the
- 11 process, if I can just lay it out for one minute, is the
- 12 transaction occurs at the pit. It's recorded. The
- 13 clearing member --
- 14 JUSTICE STEVENS: There is no distinction
- 15 between A and D, but before it can be consummated B and
- 16 C have to play a role.
- MR. PINCUS: Well, that activity is over.
- 18 I'll try to use neutral words. That activity at the pit
- 19 is over. The next -- that data, who bought, who sold,
- 20 and maybe the clearing members for those two parties are
- 21 identified. Maybe they're not. They might not be
- 22 identified for an hour according to the rules. So
- 23 something happened at the pit. It's then entered into
- 24 the computers, and at some subsequent point, yes, the
- 25 clearing members will be identified and the trade will

- 1 be cleared.
- Our point is that is subsequent activity.
- 3 That is activity -- that's the clearing process. It's
- 4 important, but there is enforceable contract before the
- 5 clearing event occurs. Nothing in the rules say that
- 6 the contract is unenforceable.
- 7 JUSTICE BREYER: That's true, but is there
- 8 any reason that the word "transaction" would have --
- 9 serves a purpose by being so limited?
- 10 MR. PINCUS: It does, Your Honor.
- JUSTICE BREYER: What -- what Congress would
- 12 Congress have wanted to do that?
- MR. PINCUS: In -- because in the
- 14 environment that Congress was operating just following
- 15 this Court's decision in Curran, the focus entirely was
- 16 on protecting investors.
- 17 JUSTICE BREYER: That's not a reason. I
- 18 want to know what reason, what harm will be done if in
- 19 fact we take the word "transaction" and say the word
- 20 "transaction," while it's capable of the interpretation
- 21 you give, is also capable of an interpretation that
- 22 includes all the near contemporaneous events, including
- 23 the financing and guarantees? Like a mortgage in
- 24 selling a house.
- MR. PINCUS: Because --

- 1 JUSTICE BREYER: And that also is
- 2 linguistically possible. What harm will be done --
- 3 MR. PINCUS: The harm that will --
- 4 JUSTICE BREYER: -- if the second is chosen
- 5 and not the first?
- 6 MR. PINCUS: The harm -- two categories of
- 7 harm: First, a lack of clarity. We don't know, as I
- 8 said, how far back are we going. The statute requires,
- 9 for customers that are not trade, not exchange members,
- 10 they have to go to an introducing broker. They have to
- 11 go then to an FCM.
- 12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But the only one that has
- this relationship that's different from an ordinary
- 14 broker, the only one is the FCM.
- 15 MR. PINCUS: But that's true, Your Honor,
- 16 but if the Court were to adopt a rule that says we're
- 17 going to read "transaction" broadly, and so anyone who
- 18 has anything to do with any aspect of the trade, either
- 19 before it or afterward, is covered, all of these
- 20 antecedent people, just in terms of the statutory
- 21 language, are people who have a role.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: But they're not people
- 23 who are at risk. I mean if there -- if it's a broker
- 24 who was just executing a trade for a commission is not
- 25 at risk, but this FCM is at risk, in this transaction,

- 1 series of transactions.
- 2 MR. PINCUS: But it's hard to see in the
- 3 language where Congress would have drawn the line. I
- 4 think the problem is the lack of clarity. We certainly
- 5 won't know, if the Court says we are going to move
- 6 beyond this core transaction and encompass some of the
- 7 ancillary activities --
- JUSTICE BREYER: I got that.
- 9 MR. PINCUS: Okay.
- 10 JUSTICE BREYER: I got that when you said
- 11 there were two. What's the second?
- MR. PINCUS: Well, let me just add to the --
- 13 to the first that there are subsequent activities.
- 14 There also are arrangements set up with banks that
- 15 automatically supply margins, that facilitate
- 16 transactions. And so the question will be, aren't those
- 17 banks who play an important liquidity role, aren't they
- 18 part of a transaction?
- 19 The second reason is the reason involved --
- 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The answer would be
- 21 that those transactions are not subject to the rules of
- 22 the exchange.
- MR. PINCUS: Well, they are --
- 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: They don't care what
- 25 kind of arrangement the FCM might have with its bank.

- 1 That's up to the FCM. There's no exchange --
- 2 MR. PINCUS: But it has to have an
- 3 arrangement, and that fact is a rule of the exchange.
- 4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is there some --
- 5 MR. PINCUS: So it depends what rule.
- 6 Again, we're --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Pincus --
- 8 MR. PINCUS: -- on the rule where we're not
- 9 going to know what the answer is.
- 10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The -- the agency that's
- 11 supposed to be the supervisor of this area, the CFTC, is
- 12 taking the position that the government presented to us
- 13 today. Apparently, it doesn't have the concern that you
- 14 have just expressed about reaching people who are not
- 15 themselves subject to the regulation of the exchange,
- 16 the clearinghouse.
- 17 MR. PINCUS: Well, I think it does have that
- 18 concern, Justice Ginsburg, which is why Mr. Stewart said
- 19 that the Court should sort of take this case on certain
- 20 assumptions because, as he recognized, the theory that
- 21 even the government put forward in its brief --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought that what he
- 23 was telling us was that, even if you assume that Klein
- 24 has that, even if you've assume that.
- MR. PINCUS: Well, it's certainly their

- 1 position that Klein has standing, but in terms of the
- 2 consequences of a ruling by the Court that the statute
- 3 goes beyond the core activity, I think the government's
- 4 suggestion sort of shows that even the government is not
- 5 sure, once you embark on that exercise, where the
- 6 boundary line is. And I would point out the government
- 7 is not asking for deference in this case nor could it.
- 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I think you still
- 9 owe Justice Breyer his second reason.
- 10 MR. PINCUS: I do, Your Honor, and the
- 11 second reason is involved in the government's response
- 12 to Justice Souter's question about multiple recoveries.
- 13 If all of these various people can assert
- 14 claims, then there is certainly a risk, and a
- 15 significant risk, that all of these various people will
- 16 assert different kinds of monetary harm that they will
- 17 claim is actual loss.
- 18 In this case the principal, actual loss, as
- 19 we discussed in the second argument in our brief, is
- 20 claimed as the loss from the destruction, allegedly
- 21 caused from the destruction, of Klein's business.
- If there was a bad-enough event on an
- 23 exchange, all of the people in this -- in the row from
- the introducing broker down to the end, down to the
- 25 bank, could claim that, because there was a foul-up in

- 1 the electronic reporting system and trades were
- 2 misreported for a week and, when they were unwound, the
- 3 consequences of that where lots of bankruptcies in the
- 4 futures industry, that all of those liabilities get
- 5 pegged to the contract market. As -- as the FIA --
- 6 JUSTICE STEVENS: Aren't there lots of
- 7 situations in which a various -- serious -- harms a
- 8 whole bunch of people, and they all recover?
- 9 MR. PINCUS: There are, Justice Stevens, but
- 10 this is a particular kind of industry. As the -- as the
- 11 Futures Industry Association notes in its brief, every
- 12 day more than \$5 trillion worth of contracts are traded
- on futures exchanges. There is a huge amount of
- 14 concentrated risk in contract markets.
- 15 If the contract markets are going to be made
- 16 liable to a vast array of people, there is a very
- 17 serious risk that financial jeopardy --
- 18 JUSTICE STEVENS: You would agree if the
- 19 client had been trading on its own account with a
- 20 scalper, it would have been able to recover for the --
- 21 for its loss to itself; right?
- MR. PINCUS: Yes, if it had been trading for
- 23 its own account.
- 24 JUSTICE STEVENS: If it's trading for itself
- 25 and some for other customers, it only can recover half

- 1 of those. Does that make sense?
- 2 MR. PINCUS: Yes, it does, because Klein is
- 3 a market insider. It has ways to protect itself other
- 4 than suing the contract market.
- 5 It can certainly sue its customer. It has
- 6 ways of protecting itself, as the CFTC report said, in
- 7 terms of demanding more margin, in terms of watching the
- 8 risk in its customer's portfolio, in terms of -- of
- 9 hedging its own risk. It's an insider, and it can do
- 10 that.
- 11 What Congress was concerned with here -- and
- 12 the reason our construction of the statute makes sense
- 13 -- is that it protects the outsiders, the PC investors
- 14 who are at the core of the concern here, without
- 15 imposing a broad array of liability on the contract
- 16 markets, who are in the middle of a huge, huge amount of
- 17 financial risk, which really puts them in the position
- 18 of shouldering risk that's intolerable.
- 19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Are there instances where
- 20 multiple parties who are injured sue under state law, or
- 21 is this generally deemed preemptive, or it just doesn't
- 22 happen, or --
- MR. PINCUS: Well, there are options. I
- 24 mean one of the things that Klein says here is that this
- 25 is its only option. It can go to the FTC.

- 1 In this case, for example, the FTC order
- 2 against Eisler assessed a civil penalty but then said
- 3 the order could be -- it said that obligation could be
- 4 fufilled by paying the injured parties. Klein -- to the
- 5 extent Klein has an injury, the FTC -- the CFTC in a
- 6 similar case could do the same thing. There are state
- 7 law claims. There are --
- 8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Pincus, will you
- 9 satisfy me on one point. I -- I understand your
- 10 argument about what "transaction" means. But even if I
- 11 accept that argument, explain to me again why "or
- 12 subject to the rules" doesn't add anything?
- MR. PINCUS: Well, it does. It adds -- in
- 14 our construction "the transactions that are on" are the
- 15 transactions that occur on the floor. The transactions
- 16 that are "subject to the rules" are the ex-pit
- 17 transactions.
- 18 Once you say "or subject to the rules"
- 19 involves more than ex-pit trades, off-exchange trades,
- 20 then you're into the world of the Court's hypotheticals
- 21 to Mr. Days of anti-discrimination rule.
- So it has to have a limited meaning; and, by
- 23 coupling it with "on," we think that Congress made clear
- 24 it was referring to trades.
- 25 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why wouldn't it have been

- 1 enough to just say "transactions on" if that was their
- 2 meaning? Why did -- did they --
- 3 MR. PINCUS: Because then you wouldn't
- 4 capture a category -- because then Congress would have
- 5 left out a category of trades. Congress meant to
- 6 capture investors who trade. There are two categories
- 7 of transactions that meet that test: Those that occur
- 8 on the exchange, on the -- physically on the pit, and
- 9 those that are within the industry called off-exchange
- 10 or off-pit transactions defined in Section 6(c) of the
- 11 act -- of the -- of the statute.
- 12 And so by -- the second phrase is meant to
- 13 capture those trades that may involve investors but
- 14 don't occur at the pit.
- 15 JUSTICE SOUTER: But I take if -- if your
- 16 ultimate, let's say, policy reason for confining it to
- 17 that is the -- is the policy against multiple recovery.
- 18 MR. PINCUS: Yes. The policy reason is the
- 19 risk of multiple recoveries in an area where there is a
- 20 huge amount of risk. The contract market is at the
- 21 center of things, of these \$5 trillion a day. And so
- 22 Congress wrote very carefully, and Congress's focus was,
- 23 in the wake of Curran -- and given what it said -- was
- 24 investors.
- 25 Because the -- the implied cause of action

- 1 that the Court recognized in Curran was all about
- 2 investors. The rationale --
- JUSTICE SOUTER: Their current argument is,
- 4 basically, that's all Congress was thinking about.
- 5 MR. PINCUS: Yes.
- 6 JUSTICE SOUTER: But, as I understand your
- 7 position, it's something more. Congress was also
- 8 thinking probably about multiple recovery, and it didn't
- 9 want that. And we will impute that intent to Congress
- 10 because multiple recovery would be a very bad thing for
- 11 the industry. That's basically your argument.
- MR. PINCUS: Yes. That is our argument.
- 13 JUSTICE SOUTER: Okay.
- MR. PINCUS: Um, let me say a word about the
- 15 rules and whether the rules are relevant here. It seems
- 16 to us that Congress used a phrase in the statute, and
- 17 that it -- that that cannot be changed by a rule that
- 18 says -- if an exchange adopted a rule that said some
- 19 transaction was on, or subject to, the rules of it, that
- 20 wouldn't be enough to put it into the statutory
- 21 language. The test is what Congress meant. Thank you.
- 22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
- 23 Mr. Pincus. Mr. Days, you have a minute.
- 24 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF DREW S. DAYS
- ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

- 1 MR. DAYS: Your Honors, Mr. Pincus has
- 2 identified what he views as some temporal gap between
- 3 the entering into a contract and the involvement of this
- 4 -- the clearing FCM. That simply is not the case.
- 5 Klein had a prior commitment to clear
- 6 Eisler's trade; so even at the time that Eisler was
- 7 trading, that had to be done with the understanding that
- 8 Klein was going to back him up.
- 9 If one looks at the gray brief at page 21,
- 10 it references to the rule of Knight -- rules of Knight
- 11 116 and 118 that make this very clear. The story is, as
- 12 we've indicated, that throughout this process the
- 13 clearing FCM is financially liable and, therefore, is on
- 14 the hook.
- 15 When Congress enacted the statute, it was
- 16 concerned with protecting the public and maintaining
- 17 credibility. We think that this cause of action, this
- 18 express cause of action for allowing FCMs to sue, is
- 19 most reliant to the objectives of Congress: The
- 20 faithful execution by an FCM that deals directly with
- 21 these entities, the clearinghouse and the commodity
- 22 contract market. Thank you very much.
- 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Mr. Days.
- 24 The case is submitted.
- 25 (Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m. the case in the

1	above-	-entitled	matter	was	submitted	1.)
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						
8						
9						
10						
11						
12						
13						
14						
15						
16						
17						
18						
19						
20						
21						
22						
23						
24						
25						

		1		1, , , , , , ,
A	agent 6:7	appendices 9:25	22:11 26:25	basically 57:4
able 10:13 23:22	agree 41:8 42:13	appendix 11:14	27:1 31:21	57:11
27:8 53:20	42:18 46:5	applied 7:20	assuming 5:6	basis 8:23 42:15
above-entitled	53:18	applies 31:21	18:17 19:1	42:16,18
1:12 59:1	agreement 23:2	applying 6:24	29:10 42:22	bears 23:24
absence 14:5	Agricultural	appoint 40:13	assumption	29:21
absolutely 8:5	11:6	appropriate	21:21	began 24:6
20:4	AL 1:7	23:11,25	assumptions	beginning 6:2
accept 23:8 42:1	ALITO 24:6,24	area 51:11 56:19	20:23 51:20	17:11
55:11	39:12	argue 17:24	assurance 27:5	behalf 1:16,20
accepted 33:19	allegation 6:19	arguing 42:19	attributable	1:22 2:4,6,8,11
42:25 46:15	alleged 21:8	argument 1:13	28:16	20:10 25:10
account 26:4,9	allegedly 52:20	2:2,9 3:3 13:25	automatically	30:1 57:25
39:20,21 40:11	alleges 8:22	14:4 20:9	50:15	believe 8:24
53:19,23	allowed 26:9	21:16 23:7	avoiding 7:11	10:1 35:6 45:2
accounts 26:2,5	allowing 23:8	25:17,18 29:25	awful 17:16	46:11
accurate 44:23	58:18	31:21 32:13,16	awfully 14:21	benefit 28:6
achieve 3:22	amendment	45:10 46:6	a.m 1:14 3:2	better 43:3
act 3:11,12,18	14:6	52:19 55:10,11	58:25	beyond 20:24
4:2 33:3 39:3	American 11:6	57:3,11,12,24	B	21:4 22:6
56:11	amicus 1:20	arising 23:13	b 3:11 10:7	43:22 50:6
acting 40:4	20:11	25:24 29:7	11:14 38:2	52:3
action 3:23 4:3	amount 53:13	arrangement	47:15	big 17:16 36:4
7:3 26:21	54:16 56:20	5:2 50:25 51:3	back 10:25	blue 4:21 11:16
28:22 38:9	analogized 26:1	arrangements	27:18 38:8	25:7
56:25 58:17,18	analogous 27:23	50:14	39:2,10 49:8	board 1:6 3:5
activities 19:15	ancillary 10:18	array 22:22	58:8	4:7
43:15,17,25	10:21 14:25	53:16 54:15	backed 41:11	bought 16:4
44:4 50:7,13	50:7	art 30:19 32:19	bad 3:11 7:1,4	47:19
activity 44:5	ANDREW 1:22	32:19,22	15:7 57:10	boundary 52:6
47:17,18 48:2	2:7 29:25	asking 44:11	badminton	breaches 21:5
48:3 52:3	annual 8:21	52:7	15:16	Breyer 11:12,21
actual 10:6 12:5	answer 28:13	aspect 44:12	bad-enough	12:1,4,9,12,17
12:13 23:18,23	50:20 51:9	49:18	52:22	12:21 13:1,5,7
23:24 29:11,21	antecedent	assert 52:13,16	bank 50:25	13:10,14,16,21
38:14,22 52:17	43:25 49:20	asserts 8:11	52:25	15:12 16:1,11
52:18	anti-discrimin	assessed 55:2	bankrupt 35:9	16:13,17,20,22
add 50:12 55:12	21:7,15,24	assessment 3:19	bankruptcies	16:23 35:13,17
additional 23:19	55:21	Assistant 1:18	53:3	48:7,11,17
address 37:17	apparently 35:22 51:13	Association	banks 50:14,17	49:1,4 50:8,10
adds 55:13		53:11	barred 17:25	52:9
adopt 49:16	Appeals 6:5	assume 11:1	barrier 29:12	brief 4:21 5:12
adopted 57:18	appeal's 3:14	18:17 20:15,18	based 41:23	10:1,4 11:16
afield 21:13	APPEARAN	21:2 24:7,8	42:11	18:23 25:7,20
afterward 49:19	1:15	27:25 29:6	bases 25:3	30:12 31:15 37:5 42:24
agency 3:20	appears 37:11	51:23,24 assumes 5:5	basic 7:15	51:21 52:19
51:10	39:18,23	assumes 3.3	Dabie 1.13	31.21 32:19
	<u> </u>		<u> </u>	<u> </u>

53:11 58:9	calls 40:18	54:5	24:17 35:8	27:2,5,7 28:19
briefed 44:19	capable 48:20	CFTC 7:10,14	37:3 39:11,12	28:20 29:18
briefs 42:7	48:21	10:13 22:5	39:13 43:13	33:10,11 44:15
bring 4:3	capture 32:1	41:12,24 51:11	47:4 55:23	44:17 51:16
bringing 17:25	56:4,6,13	54:6 55:5	58:5,11	58:21
brings 18:10	care 50:24	change 44:20	cleared 34:20	clearing-house
broad 11:2	carefully 6:25	45:5	35:10,15 47:7	35:24
26:20 54:15	15:17,20 56:22	changed 14:7	48:1	clearing-houses
broader 15:2	careless 9:9	57:17	clearing 3:8,10	35:21
42:23	carried 9:3	characterizati	3:16 4:24 5:4	clearly 45:3
broadly 9:16	case 3:4 8:7 10:3	44:25	5:10,12,13,13	client 12:23 16:3
49:17	11:6 12:22	charge 26:2,4,5	5:16,16,18,19	16:6,24 18:11
broker 26:17	14:5,20 18:7	26:9	5:20,22,22 6:1	32:22 42:21
36:1,20 37:6	20:14,25 21:6	Chief 3:3,6 8:8	6:6,7,16,18,22	53:19
39:8,17 40:7	23:16 24:5	8:20 9:19	6:24 9:15	clients 16:2
40:11,23,25	25:16 24:3 25:13 27:23	10:15,20 11:9	11:18,19,21	17:20
41:4,19 43:15	28:7,21 33:13	14:12,14 15:3	12:1,9,22 13:2	client's 26:9
44:3 49:10,14	35:22 36:14,17	17:12 20:7,12	13:14,15 14:1	close 40:14
49:23 52:24	36:18 42:22	20:22 21:17	14:2 16:22	close 40:14 closing 40:12,13
brokers 35:21	46:14 51:19	22:1 29:22	17:3 18:16,18	collateral 15:1
36:19	52:7,18 55:1,6	30:2 31:19	19:2,2,3,5,23	collect 27:8
broker/seller	58:4,24,25	32:2,6,12	19:24 20:3,5	come 4:14 20:23
40:20	cases 24:2,3	50:20,24 52:8	22:10,13,21,21	46:20
bunch 53:8	28:14	57:22 58:23	22:25 23:14	comes 28:17
business 27:15	catch 11:16	chosen 49:4	24:4,13,14	comments 30:5
29:1,8 52:21	categories 45:19	Circuit 10:3	25:10,20,22	commission
buy 34:19 36:15	49:6 56:6	26:16 41:3,8,9	26:2,22,23	3:13,20 41:5
buyer 4:4 5:4,17	category 15:11	41:22 42:8,11	27:1,11 28:15	41:20 49:24
5:21 6:5 10:10	31:17 33:2	Circuit's 26:19	28:22 29:13,16	commit 7:8
22:14 25:11,16	56:4,5	26:21	29:17,19 34:17	commitment
33:10,23 35:12	cause 7:3 28:22	cite 10:4	34:22 35:1,2,8	7:11 24:20
35:19 37:18	38:9 56:25	City 1:7 3:5	35:16,25 36:1	26:8 58:5
38:13,14,19	58:17,18	civil 55:2	36:21,22,24	Commodities
39:2 46:2	caused 12:18	claim 12:17	41:16,25 42:2	33:3
buyers 10:23	13:1 52:21	42:11 52:17,25	43:8,24 44:5	commodity 3:8
14:24 17:13,22	causes 9:10	claimed 30:11	46:17 47:5,13	3:13,17,20 4:1
37:9 38:23	CEA 18:19	52:20	47:20,25 48:3	7:18 16:4,7
buying 22:9	center 17:4	claiming 29:1,3	48:5 58:4,13	38:5 58:21
40:21	56:21	claims 52:14	clearinghouse	communication
bylaw 11:22	central 17:17,18	55:7	4:15 6:21 9:7	5:15
	17:22 18:4	clarity 43:21	12:18 14:10	comparable
	certain 24:7	49:7 50:4	16:14 17:8,14	41:19
c 2:1 3:1 10:7	51:19	class 8:4	17:21 19:24	compelled 30:6
11:14 33:3	certainly 17:7	clause 32:9	20:3 21:7	complete 43:23
38:2 47:16	18:6 40:9 43:2	clear 5:7,22 6:14	22:12,25 23:2	46:16
call 28:2 40:24	44:16 50:4	6:16 17:2	23:21 24:22	completed 22:13
called 56:9	51:25 52:14	18:16 19:3	25:22,25 26:25	47:1

	1	1	1	•
complicated	55:14	58:3,22	credit 34:24	11:2,11,20,25
38:15	consummate	contractal 22:24	41:10,11,23,24	12:3,8,11,16
computers	29:4	contracting 28:5	creditor 6:6	12:20,25 13:4
47:24	consummated	contracts 14:25	credit-worthi	13:6,9,15,18
conceivable	4:22 25:21	20:17 22:10,14	42:3	13:23 14:8,11
23:15	28:4 34:16	26:24 40:1	criteria 45:15	14:13 15:3,25
concentrated	47:15	53:12	cross 3:21	16:10,12,16,19
53:14	consummation	contractual	culminate 22:20	16:21 17:1,24
conception	4:19 6:4 11:4	22:12,23 26:25	cured 14:5	18:6,12,15,25
22:17	19:16,18	27:1	curiae 1:20	19:10,13,20
concern 13:10	contact 5:15	contrary 3:14	20:11	20:1,4,7 42:25
14:14 21:14,18	contain 13:12	3:15	Curran 48:15	55:21 57:23,24
51:13,18 54:14	contemporane	conviction 9:8	56:23 57:1	58:1,23
concerned 54:11	48:22	core 11:7 21:4	current 44:16	deal 41:4
58:16	contend 32:22	21:13,18 22:6	44:19,20 57:3	deals 5:13 58:20
concession	contention	22:9 50:6 52:3	customer 17:6,7	dealt 5:2
14:21 20:25	21:12	54:14	17:9 23:3,11	decide 21:3 22:5
conclusion	context 37:11	cornering 7:12	23:12,18 24:3	decision 42:15
25:22	continuing 6:22	correct 7:24	27:24 28:8,14	42:17 48:15
concurs 3:21	contract 3:9,10	11:11 12:3	28:17,21 29:3	decisions 26:12
confers 4:2,5	3:23 4:7,19,22	13:6 14:8	29:13,18 40:12	deemed 25:16
confidence 27:8	4:23,25 5:2,3,5	15:12 16:16,19	41:11,24 44:3	54:21
27:10	5:6,6,9,15,18	16:21 20:1	54:5	defend 42:8
confining 56:16	5:19,20,23 6:4	37:8 45:4	customers 33:23	Defendants 6:13
Congress 3:22	6:5,15,17,23	correctly 13:8	42:3 49:9	deference 52:7
8:15 21:21	7:10 8:19 9:1,3	35:19	53:25	define 4:12
22:9 31:3,11	9:4,14 10:19	coupling 55:23	customer's	defined 22:13
31:25 32:3,7	11:4,8 12:6,7	court 1:1,13 3:7	39:21 54:8	56:10
37:2,8,14,18	13:25 14:17	3:14 6:5 15:16	cutting 36:10	defining 37:5
37:18 39:3,10	15:19 16:14	20:13,14,18		39:8,19,22
43:10 48:11,12	18:2,15,16,17	21:3,20 25:4	<u>D</u>	definition 11:2
48:14 50:3	18:18,19,23	30:3 49:16	D 3:1 47:15	31:8 39:11,13
54:11 55:23	19:1,18 21:5	50:5 51:19	damage 29:7	39:13,15 43:6
56:4,5,22 57:4	21:23,25 22:2	52:2 57:1	damages 10:6,8	44:7
57:7,9,16,21	22:6 23:14	Court's 30:13	12:5 15:8,9	definitions
58:15,19	25:9,11,19	31:5 48:15	29:1,2,4 38:14	39:16
Congress's	27:4 28:7 29:4	55:20	danger 29:15,16	delivery 38:5,6
21:14,18 45:3	30:9,16,17	cover 10:14	data 47:19	demanding 42:4
56:22	31:4,9 32:5	31:11 33:5	day 22:22 23:25	54:7
consequences	33:7 34:20,22	covered 8:13	35:9 53:12	demonstrated
52:2 53:3	35:3,6,7 37:21	11:1 15:6	56:21 P 1:16 2:2 10	27:12
consequential	37:23 38:1,5,7	17:15 36:12	Days 1:16 2:3,10	department
29:7	38:9 39:4,18	49:19	3:5,6 4:9,11,17	1:19 26:1
constrained	43:4,16,22,24	covers 33:6 36:6	6:10,14 7:3,9	depends 47:9
37:15	45:16 48:4,6	created 6:21	7:23 8:1,5,7,8	51:5
construction	53:5,14,15	creating 38:8	8:14,24 9:13	derived 9:21,22
37:19,24 54:12	54:4,15 56:20	credibility 58:17	9:22 10:11	described 9:16

	l	l	l	l
15:11	division 37:2	encompassing	ET 1:7	55:11
describes 9:15	doing 38:8	37:12	event 36:11 48:5	explaining 31:3
9:24	dollars 28:16	enforce 3:12	52:22	explains 30:5
describing	29:17,19,20	11:22	events 48:22	explicitly 15:6
28:24	34:10	enforceable	exact 11:14	expose 34:9
designated 7:10	drawn 50:3	35:11 48:4	exactly 26:13	express 3:22
36:23 37:1	DREW 1:16 2:3	enforcing 9:9	example 35:7	58:18
destruction	2:10 57:24	engage 15:23	44:1 55:1	expressed 13:11
52:20,21	driving 22:9	20:19 40:14	examples 9:17	51:14
determine 7:25	duplicating	42:18	exchange 3:18	extend 24:12
8:2	27:21	engaged 4:5,6	4:2,15 8:9,22	extends 22:7
dictates 19:5	duplicative 24:5	8:18 10:9 12:5	8:23 9:7 10:22	extent 15:9
difference 9:12	D.C 1:9,16,19	12:23 18:1,21	12:7,14,24	42:10 55:5
19:21	1:22	23:22 26:11	14:16 15:21,23	ex-pit 55:16,19
different 21:16		32:22 39:25	15:24 16:4,8,9	
22:16 24:24	E	40:2 44:14	16:15 21:6,11	F
25:2,3,17	E 2:1 3:1,1	engages 30:8	22:19 24:23,25	facilitate 26:23
40:19 49:13	easily 14:23	36:25 43:15	25:5,16 26:7	50:15
52:16	easy 37:8	engaging 33:16	28:17 33:3	fact 7:9 10:16
difficult 11:13	effect 25:5	ensure 3:24	35:24 36:8,13	23:14 24:2
11:13	effective 3:25	27:16	49:9 50:22	28:1 30:6,12
difficulty 45:10	effectively 6:25	entail 23:3	51:1,3,15	31:14,24 32:2
direct 20:20	Eisler 22:18	entered 5:2	52:23 56:8	33:9 35:6 36:5
22:11 26:25	23:18 24:16,20	24:19 47:23	57:18	36:12 41:22
27:1	26:6,8,12	entering 58:3	exchanges 53:13	42:17 43:10,14
directly 24:22	33:14 41:11,24	enters 25:1	Excuse 7:23	48:19 51:3
25:23 58:20	46:14 55:2	36:14	execute 26:7,13	factor 25:21
discharge 24:17	58:6	entire 17:5 36:6	39:9	failure 3:12
28:19	Eisler's 58:6	entirely 6:7	executed 4:22	12:18 29:4
discharged	either 9:10	25:14 26:11	22:18 25:15	fair 3:24
23:20	30:21 33:1,9	48:15	43:22,24 45:17	fairly 7:20
discretion 24:16	33:17 34:1,2	entities 45:4	47:4	faith 3:11 7:1,5
discriminate	36:18 39:20	58:21	executes 24:16	7:20 15:7
8:23	45:16,17 49:18	entity 14:10	41:19	faithful 58:20
discriminated	ejusdem 32:12	environment	executing 6:4	far 21:4,13 22:5
8:12	elastic 43:5,8	48:14	39:20 49:24	43:23 49:8
discrimination	electronic 53:1	equation 44:21	execution 11:3	fate 16:2
30:13 31:6	eliminate 34:23	equivalent	19:16 46:3	favor 25:4
43:17	embark 52:5	45:22	58:20	favorable 15:13
discuss 37:5	employee 8:11	error 26:19,21	exercise 52:5	28:6 29:5
discussed 31:15	9:7	ESQ 1:16,18,22	exist 35:9	FCM 3:9 4:24
52:19	employment	2:3,5,7,10	existence 3:24	5:4,4,13,18,19
discussing 43:5	8:10,21 9:2	essential 3:16	expansive 43:5	5:23 6:1,6,16
discussion 39:23	enacted 58:15	17:4 22:15	expect 15:14	17:3 18:4,16
dispute 44:13	enacting 3:22	essentially 5:1	expectation 7:19	20:5 22:10,25
distinction	encompass 9:17	26:6	expert 3:19	23:8,14 24:4
47:14	50:6	establish 7:18	explain 27:22	24:25 26:22,23

			l	I
27:1,24 28:1,5	focuses 11:3	G	guarantee 5:3	huge 53:13
28:8,15,22,25	focusing 30:9	G 3:1	18:14 19:22,25	54:16,16 56:20
29:13,16,17,19	folds 28:2 29:1	gap 58:2	24:20	hurt 15:17,20
33:11 40:6	follow 11:13	General 1:19	guaranteed 16:6	hypo 28:25
41:3,15,15,17	12:19,23 13:2	43:19	16:13,18	hypothetical 9:6
44:2,3,16	46:1	generally 54:21	guarantees	10:5,14 14:18
49:11,14,25	followed 24:22	generis 32:13	48:23	21:6,15 28:10
50:25 51:1	32:3	Ginsburg 4:9,11	guarantor 47:2	35:18
58:4,13,20	following 5:1	4:12,17 6:9,11	guess 25:7 36:1	hypotheticals
FCMs 33:12	31:20 45:10	14:4,9 18:3		11:10 21:24
58:18	48:14	19:19,22 20:2	<u>H</u>	30:14 31:6
FCM's 3:17 6:8	force 21:12	23:7 26:15	half 28:18,19	55:20
17:6,15 27:11	formation 26:24	37:7 38:12,18	53:25	
Federal 3:20	formed 34:23	38:25 41:2,14	hand 21:9,11	1
21:16 37:13	formulation	41:18 44:8,10	happen 14:1	identified 34:12
FIA 53:5	43:11,18	44:22,25 49:12	35:18 54:22	47:21,22,25
figure 14:22	forth 25:11	49:22 51:4,7	happened 11:24	58:2
21:17	forward 35:3	51:10,18,22	13:5 47:23	identifying
financial 27:12	51:21	give 19:24 20:7	happens 5:21	27:11
53:17 54:17	foul-up 52:25	27:5 48:21	19:5 28:3	ignores 3:16
financially 6:1	found 4:21 5:11	given 7:15 10:2	36:21 47:10	ignoring 36:11
58:13	fraud 6:20 7:8	37:14 39:3	hard 17:1 36:24	III 1:16 2:3,10
financing 48:23	9:8,10	43:9 56:23	50:2	immediately 5:7
find 10:13 11:12	frequently	glad 13:19	harm 13:1 48:18	implement 15:1
finding 11:13	36:17	go 27:18 35:3,16	49:2,3,6,7	implied 56:25
Fine 35:17	Friendly 18:3,7	43:23 44:2	52:16	important 5:25
firmly 7:20	FTC 54:25 55:1	49:10,11 54:25	harms 53:7	25:18 36:11
first 3:4 4:20	55:5	goal 3:21	heading 13:10	48:4 50:17
23:3,19 36:16	fufilled 55:4	goes 52:3	hear 3:3	imposing 54:15
37:17 43:20	fully 28:10	going 13:17,21	hedging 54:9	impression 42:6
49:5,7 50:13	function 11:7	15:13 19:2	holder 26:4	imputation
fit 45:15	functioned 47:2	27:13,14,15	Honor 8:14	42:12
floor 16:24,25	functions 37:6	37:21 49:8,17	18:25 30:25	impute 57:9
17:2 22:19	39:8	50:5 51:9	32:24 34:11	include 14:10
24:23 26:7	fundamental	53:15 58:8	35:5 36:17	31:13 32:11
33:14,14 36:19	27:3	good 7:20	37:16 39:16	33:1 40:6,7,7
36:20,25 37:6	future 3:20	governed 30:12	40:3 41:7,21	43:8 46:9
37:6 39:8,8,9	36:12 38:5,6	30:17 31:10,12	46:5 47:10	included 24:8
39:16,17 40:9	futures 1:3 3:4,8	36:8 37:25	48:10 49:15	includes 48:22
40:11,23,25	3:13 7:18	government	52:10	including 48:22
43:14 44:1	10:21 12:7,14	51:12,21 52:4	Honors 58:1	incorporate
46:15 55:15	12:24 14:24	52:6	hook 58:14	10:18
flowing 29:2	15:21,22,24	government's	hour 5:7 18:17	incorrect 23:10
fluke 16:2	16:3,8,9,15	9:11 42:23	35:14,16,25	indicate 5:1
focus 10:12	20:16 22:10	43:1 44:11,12	36:23 47:22	indicated 6:15
25:14 48:15	36:8 53:4,11	52:3,11	house 40:12,13	10:13 11:5
56:22	53:13	gray 58:9	40:14,21 48:24	14:19 15:5

	Ī	1	Ī	Ī
18:25 58:12	involve 56:13	41:14,18 42:6	knife 4:25	9:20 20:24
indicates 5:12	involved 33:13	42:14,20 44:8	Knight 58:10,10	limitations 15:4
indispensable	33:13 50:19	44:10,10,22,25	know 10:23 13:9	42:13
46:22	52:11	45:6,21,24	13:16,21 17:1	limited 14:15,23
individual 27:16	involvement	46:9,19,21	17:6,7,8 34:25	20:16 24:9
industry 3:18	58:3	47:1,7,14 48:7	38:4,25 48:18	29:2 48:9
17:3 53:4,10	involves 55:19	48:11,17 49:1	49:7 50:5 51:9	55:22
53:11 56:9	issue 7:7,25	49:4,12,22		limiting 36:13
57:11		50:8,10,20,24	L	limits 15:9 23:17
inevitably 22:20	J	51:4,7,10,18	L 1:18 2:5 20:9	line 50:3 52:6
24:15,22	J 1:22 2:7 29:25	51:22 52:8,9	lack 49:7 50:4	lines 38:22
information	jeopardy 53:17	52:12 53:6,9	language 4:1	linguistically
6:18	job 41:15,16	53:18,24 54:19	11:14 17:15	15:15 49:2
initial 24:23	42:1	55:8,25 56:15	18:11 20:25	link 37:19 38:8
injured 54:20	Judge 18:3,7	57:3,6,13,22	30:4,7 37:4	liquidity 50:17
55:4	Justice 1:19 3:3	58:23	43:9,10,20	list 14:9
injury 55:5	3:6 4:9,11,12		45:2 49:21	literal 21:10
insider 54:3,9	4:17 6:9,11 7:2	K	50:3 57:21	literally 32:9,10
instances 54:19	7:6,21,24 8:2,6	Ken 10:3	large 14:21	located 9:25
institutional	8:8,20 9:5,17	Kennedy 9:5,18	27:15,15	longs 10:23
42:21	9:19 10:5,11	10:5,11 14:19	law 24:15 37:12	long-standing
integrity 27:13	10:15,20 11:9	30:22 31:1,2	44:16,19,20	3:18
intent 57:9	11:12,21 12:1	34:19,25 42:20	54:20 55:7	look 22:8 25:23
interest 42:22	12:4,9,12,17	44:10 54:19	lay 47:11	27:13 42:2
interested 11:19	12:21 13:1,5,7	Kennedy's	learned 41:12	looks 9:23 58:9
intermediaries	13:9,14,16,21	31:20	left 56:5	losers 27:9
33:25	14:4,9,12,14	key 11:15 19:7	legally 36:2	losing 27:16
intermediates	14:18 15:3,12	39:2	Leist 18:7	loss 9:10 23:24
46:3	16:1,11,13,17	kind 7:13 10:24	lessons 41:12	28:16 29:7,21
interpret 24:12	16:20,21,23	32:18 50:25	let's 27:25 56:16	38:22 52:17,18
32:13,15	17:12 18:3,9	53:10	liabilities 10:8	52:20 53:21
interpretation	18:13,20 19:8	kinds 30:20	53:4	losses 12:13
10:2 48:20,21	19:11,19,22	43:17 52:16	liability 9:11	23:18,23 29:12
interrupt 4:9	20:2,7,12,22	Klein 1:3 3:4	22:12 23:9	lost 29:14
intolerable	21:17 22:1	22:24 23:2,20	27:2 34:10,15	lots 53:3,6
54:18	23:7 24:6,24	23:20,21,22	40:24 54:15	
introduces 44:3	26:14,15 27:18	24:16,19 25:13	liable 6:2 12:4	M
introducing	28:11,25 29:9	25:16,23 26:8	12:12 15:18,21	maintaining
44:2 49:10	29:22 30:2,22	26:11 33:13	29:17,18 34:2	58:16
52:24	31:1,2,19,20	35:21,21 36:2	38:13 40:17	making 25:17
investor 5:16,24	32:2,6,12,21	41:10,14,23	53:16 58:13	26:12 41:4
17:9,9	33:4,9,20,25	42:17,24 46:16	licensed 4:7	MALCOLM
investors 17:13	34:5,9,14,19	46:21 51:23	lie 7:8	1:18 2:5 20:9
17:19,24 27:5	34:25 35:13,17	52:1 54:2,24	light 32:14	malfeasance
27:16 48:16	37:7 38:12,18	55:4,5 58:5,8	limit 14:20,22	28:17
54:13 56:6,13	38:25 39:12,25	Klein's 24:21	21:18 45:25	manipulation
56:24 57:2	40:5,16 41:2	52:21	limitation 8:15	7:12
	1	·	1	1

		 I		I
margin 19:25	meet 28:1 39:6	move 43:22 50:5	23:5,13 24:21	oral 1:12 2:2
23:19 28:2	56:7	Movement 11:6	25:24 27:14	20:9 29:25
40:18,23 41:1	member 4:23	multiple 23:9	obviously 42:21	order 6:17 7:9
42:1,5 54:7	25:9,10 35:8	27:19 28:23	43:8 44:18	20:18 26:2,6
margins 7:17,19	35:25 36:1,21	52:12 54:20	occasion 22:5	27:7 38:7
50:15	36:23,25 41:17	56:17,19 57:8	occur 21:4 45:23	41:19 55:1,3
market 4:7,23	42:2 47:5,13	57:10	55:15 56:7,14	orderly 3:25
5:3,9 6:16,23	members 26:2		occurred 13:24	ordinarily 34:24
7:10,12,18	42:1 43:9	<u>N</u>	occurrence	ordinary 49:13
8:19 9:1,14	46:17 47:20,25	N 2:1,1 3:1	37:14	organization
10:19,22 11:8	49:9	narrow 9:5	occurs 24:14	5:11,14,16,17
12:6,7 13:25	mentioned	26:20	33:7,17 34:13	5:20,22 6:24
14:17 15:5,19	10:15 18:12	narrower 43:18	46:13 47:12	9:15 11:18,19
17:13,17,18,20	merchant 3:8	natural 26:11	48:5	11:22 12:1,10
17:21 18:2,15	mere 6:6	near 48:22	October 1:10	12:22 13:2,14
18:19,23 21:23	merely 40:11	necessarily 46:1	odd 16:2	13:15 14:2,3
21:25 22:2,6	merry-go-rou	necessary 20:20	offer 33:18	19:3,4,5,23,24
30:9,16,17	15:18	35:2	46:15	20:3,6 22:21
31:5,9 32:5	middle 54:16	need 21:3 30:15	offered 42:24	34:18
37:21,23 38:1	million 28:16	31:22 38:15	office 10:25	organizations
38:7 39:5,18	29:17,19,20	47:3	off-exchange	3:10
43:4,16 45:17	millions 34:10	needed 37:19,23	55:19 56:9	original 46:2,2
53:5 54:3,4	mind 4:20 8:15	negligent 9:9	off-market	outcry 33:18
56:20 58:22	minimum 42:1	Neither 40:16	45:18,19,23	46:14
markets 3:10,10	minute 20:8	neutral 47:18 never 28:4	off-pit 56:10	outsiders 54:13
3:24,25 4:25	47:11 57:23	New 1:7 3:5	Oh 20:4	owe 52:9
21:5 27:4	misapplied 38:1	nondiscrimin	Okay 50:9 57:13	P
38:10 53:14,15	misconception	8:10	once 24:16	P 3:1
54:16	26:20	nonparticipants	43:22 46:6	page 2:2 10:1,4
matter 1:12 59:1	misreported	11:7 15:5	52:5 55:18	11:14 25:7
matters 11:4	53:2	normally 35:20	ones 11:10 40:14	58:9
mean 11:10	misses 6:7	note 41:22	one-party 19:11	pages 39:23
15:14 17:12,20	misunderstood 26:22	noted 41:24	open 33:8,18 42:4 46:14	paid 23:19 27:6
20:5 21:1	mixed 12:2	noted 41.24 notes 53:11	opening 30:11	27:17
23:15 24:4,12	moment 25:14	nullity 35:4,6	operating 48:14	paperwork
27:1,20 31:22 32:9 40:17	33:7,19 34:11	number 19:14	operation 10:18	10:25
46:8 47:10	34:12 36:7,13	27:11	11:7 24:15	part 13:12 24:13
49:23 54:24	34:12 30:7,13 47:4	numbers 27:16	27:3	29:11 32:8
meaning 30:20	Monday 1:10	NYFE 22:14	opinion 18:8	35:1 46:6
37:10,13,15	monetary 52:16		opponent 15:14	50:18
55:22 56:2	money 17:11	0	opportunity	participant 17:4
means 31:15,25	28:18 36:3	O 2:1 3:1	42:25	20:20
32:4,4 55:10	morning 3:4	objectives 58:19	option 38:5	participate 7:17
meant 31:11	7:25	obligation 22:24	54:25	8:17 46:3
32:10 43:4	mortgage 48:23	23:1,20 24:17	options 20:17	participated
56:5,12 57:21	motion 22:19	28:20 55:3	22:10 54:23	47:2
00.0,1207.21	111011011 22.17	obligations 23:4	22.10 5 1.25	
	<u> </u>	l 	<u> </u>	I

	1	1	1	1
participation	2:11 3:9,17 4:2	plaintiff 22:11	27:25	31:25 32:3
22:15	8:3 20:11	23:12 24:1	prices 7:16	36:3 51:21
particular 4:13	22:18 57:25	44:15	principal 18:4	57:20
5:5 6:17 53:10	Petitioners	plaintiffs 23:15	42:14 52:18	puts 54:17
particularly	30:11 42:11	play 6:8 15:16	prior 26:8 58:5	putting 17:10
37:5	phrase 38:4 39:7	15:20 47:16	private 3:23 4:3	
parties 19:9,10	39:10,17,22	50:17	26:20	Q
33:20,22 34:5	43:3 56:12	player 16:8 18:4	privileges 33:14	question 7:16
34:7 44:19	57:16	plays 17:10	44:1	27:19 31:20
46:1 47:20	physical 36:13	26:22	probably 11:15	37:17 46:7
54:20 55:4	physically 56:8	please 3:7 20:13	57:8	50:16 52:12
party 5:23,24	pick 35:13,24	30:3	problem 6:21	quickly 22:20
25:1 28:5	Pincus 1:22 2:7	point 5:12,13,14	43:21 50:4	28:3
29:12 36:20	29:24,25 30:2	6:18,20 16:5	process 6:1,3,8	quite 45:2
46:22,24	30:25 31:2,24	19:7 21:3 22:4	6:22 8:17 11:3	R
pay 27:7	32:6,16,24	22:8 27:4	17:5,11 19:1	
paying 55:4	33:6,12,22	29:15 35:25	19:15 22:13,20	R 3:1
payment 16:14	34:4,7,11,17	36:16 45:9	24:13 25:20,22	ran 25:19 rationale 57:2
PC 54:13	34:21 35:5,15	46:7 47:24	26:23 34:22	
pegged 53:5	36:16 37:7,16	48:2 52:6 55:9	35:16 36:6,7	reach 46:6
penalty 55:2	38:16,21 39:1	points 6:23	47:11 48:3	reaching 51:14
people 11:6,9	39:15 40:3,9	policy 56:16,17	58:12	read 11:16 12:21 49:17
15:16,19,22,23	40:22 41:7,16	56:18	promotion 8:12	
26:24 27:11	41:21 42:10,16	portfolio 54:8	proper 13:19	reading 10:7 30:23
33:23 39:19	43:2 44:8,9,18	posed 14:19	22:11 41:6	really 6:7 7:22
40:22 49:20,21	44:24 45:1,14	posited 21:24	44:15	7:24 15:14
49:22 51:14	45:22,24 46:5	position 8:16	properly 11:22	19:4 26:19
52:13,15,23	46:11,20,24	43:1,7 44:11	11:23	54:17
53:8,16	47:3,9,17	44:12,20,23	proposition 24:9	reason 24:14
period 25:20	48:10,13,25	45:1 51:12	protect 54:3	31:14 32:7,11
permission 26:5	49:3,6,15 50:2	52:1 54:17	protecting 48:16	35:8 36:9 37:2
permitted 33:3	50:9,12,23	57:7	54:6 58:16	45:11 48:8,17
person 4:5,6	51:2,5,7,8,17	positions 44:12	protects 54:13	48:18 50:19,19
8:17 9:2 10:9	51:25 52:10	possible 8:3 49:2	provide 34:23	52:9,11 54:12
12:5,13 20:19	53:9,22 54:2	practical 25:18	provision 4:14	56:16,18
23:21,24 29:20	54:23 55:8,13	practices 3:19	8:10,13 11:15	reasoning 42:8
30:8 33:15	56:3,18 57:5	8:11	15:10	42:12
36:1,2,15	57:12,14,23	prearrangeme	public 58:16	reasons 3:15
38:19 40:16	58:1	26:4	punitive 15:8	43:20
44:13,16	pit 33:2,2,7,15	preemptive	purchase 20:16	rebuttal 2:9
personally 40:17	33:18 35:7,23	54:21	24:10,11,13 26:3 34:2	20:8 57:24
	36:14 39:20	presented 51:12		recognize 41:2
persons 18:1 39:25 40:1	43:23,24,25 45:18 46:12	prevail 42:22	purchased 38:4	recognized 3:17
		previously 24:19	purpose 48:9	41:9 51:20
persuasive 14:1 Petitioner 1:4	47:5,12,18,23 56:8,14	price 6:19,20	purposes 3:21 20:14	57:1
1:17,21 2:4,6	plain 4:1 20:24	7:12 19:4,6	put 19:25 27:14	recorded 47:12
1.17,21 2.4,0	Piaiii 7.1 20.24	1.12 17. 4 ,0	put 17.23 27.14 	recover 23:16
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

23:23 53:8,20	report 41:12	risk 34:24 41:10	30:17,19 31:4	26:15,18,21
53:25	54:6	41:10,23,23	31:9,16,23	32:8 41:3,8,9
recovered 28:15	reporting 53:1	49:23,25,25	32:5,9,14,17	41:22 42:8,11
recoveries 27:19	represented	52:14,15 53:14	32:18,23 34:17	42:16 46:6
27:21 28:23	35:20 36:19	53:17 54:8,9	35:23 36:8,9	49:4 50:11,19
52:12 56:19	representing	54:17,18 56:19	36:22 37:13,20	52:9,11,19
recovering	36:20 40:11	56:20	37:23,25 38:7	56:12
29:13	reproduced	risks 42:3	38:10,11 39:4	Section 3:11
recovery 23:17	25:7	Roberts 3:3 8:8	39:18 40:1,2,6	20:15 33:3
24:5 27:23	require 19:9	8:20 9:19 10:3	41:25 43:4,15	45:19 56:10
28:7 56:17	36:4 41:25	10:15,20 11:9	44:14,17 47:22	securities 26:17
57:8,10	required 3:12	14:12,14 17:12	48:5 50:21	41:4
red 5:11	6:16 18:18	20:7,22 21:17	55:12,16,18	see 11:17 50:2
reduce 7:7	23:19	22:1 29:22	57:15,15,19	seeing 36:3
refer 18:4 43:11	requires 6:18	31:19 32:2,12	58:10	sell 34:20 36:15
43:12	7:4 18:16 49:8	50:20,24 52:8	ruling 3:14 52:2	seller 4:4 5:4,17
reference 4:4	respect 4:19 5:5	57:22 58:23	running 23:4	5:21 6:6 22:14
13:13	5:9,10 6:15	role 6:7 17:10		25:11,16 33:10
references 58:10	7:16 8:10	26:22 40:25	S	33:23 35:12,20
referred 21:21	10:14 13:24	46:16,17,22,25	S 1:16 2:1,3,10	37:18 38:13,14
32:25 37:3,24	15:4 21:6,14	47:16 49:21	3:1 57:24	38:20 39:2
45:18	38:10 43:18	50:17	sale 20:16 24:10	46:2
referring 39:1	Respondents	row 52:23	24:11,13 34:2	sellers 10:23
55:24	1:23 2:8 4:3	rule 3:16 4:20	salient 25:21	14:24 17:14,22
refers 32:20	13:11,25 21:12	4:25,25 5:11	satisfaction	37:9 38:23
45:3	response 13:17	6:15 7:8 8:22	25:23	selling 22:10
reg 11:23	13:19 14:18	9:6,9,23 11:23	satisfy 27:14	40:21 48:24
regardless 25:19	52:11	18:21 21:7,8	55:9	sense 25:18,25
registered 14:9	responsibilities	24:25 25:4,4,8	saying 8:22	28:24 54:1,12
45:4	9:14	25:13 30:13	11:23 21:3	sentence 25:8
regulation 51:15	responsibility	31:10,12 32:10	24:7,25 26:16	series 50:1
relationship	41:1	36:12 37:3	27:13 31:3	serious 53:7,17
19:23 40:20	responsible 36:2	49:16 51:3,5,8	32:13 45:6,11	serves 48:9
49:13	resulted 12:13	55:21 57:17,18	says 7:8 11:17	set 6:20 22:19
relationships	resulting 28:1	58:10	11:18 12:6	23:5 25:11
22:23 40:20	return 30:4	rules 3:12,18 4:7	13:3 15:22	37:3 40:19
relevant 22:17	reversed 3:14	4:14,20 5:8	18:21 25:8	50:14
57:15	review 8:12,21	6:12,13,25	36:14,15 49:16	setting 19:4,6
reliant 58:19	rigged 28:1	7:14,19 8:18	50:5 54:24	settlement 6:19
rely 4:14	right 3:23 4:3	8:25 9:4 10:10	57:18	6:20 7:16 19:4
relying 18:24	7:21 8:16	10:18,21 12:19	SCALIA 18:9	19:6 27:25
Remember	11:15,20 16:12	12:23 13:3	18:13,20 19:8	sex 8:23
23:17	16:25 26:20	14:2,17 16:7	19:11 55:8,25	shares 41:20
repeatedly	29:9 42:8	18:2,18,22	scalper 53:20	shoe-horned
43:12	43:19 53:21	21:10,22 22:2	scope 33:4	44:6
REPONDENTS	rights 23:3,5,13	22:4,14 25:5	second 10:3	shorts 10:24
30:1	34:2,3	25:15 30:9,10	13:12 25:8	shouldering

	•	ī		i
54:18	26:14 27:18	23:10 24:11	successful 27:6	32:19,19,21
showing 7:4	28:11,25 29:9	25:2 26:14,18	sue 3:9 23:9	33:5 37:12
15:7	40:16 45:6	27:18 28:9,13	54:5,20 58:18	terms 21:10
shows 30:18	56:15 57:3,6	29:6,11,23	suffered 23:23	25:11 49:20
52:4	57:13	30:6 51:18	suggest 6:25	52:1 54:7,7,8
side 5:19,20	Souter's 52:12	store 26:1	suggestion 52:4	test 37:22 39:6
14:15 17:8	so-called 45:18	story 58:11	suing 54:4	56:7 57:21
22:25 23:5	special 30:19	stretch 17:16	suits 17:25	text 3:15
28:5	31:16,17 32:18	36:4,5	superfluous	textual 45:11
sides 36:19	37:10	strikes 10:24	30:15	Thank 20:6
signaling 32:8	specified 25:6	strip 34:23	supervisor	29:22 30:2
significant	44:4,5	structure 39:3	51:11	57:21,22 58:22
20:25 21:12	standard 8:9	subject 4:6 7:14	supply 50:15	58:23
52:15	standing 3:9 4:2	8:18,25 9:3	supporting 1:21	theoretically
similar 23:5	4:5 8:4,7,15,16	10:9 14:2,16	20:11	10:15,17
55:6	13:24 52:1	18:1,22 21:10	suppose 8:8,20	theories 9:12
simplistic 7:7	start 21:21	21:22 22:2,3	9:5	theory 9:10,11
simply 15:1	33:17	30:8,10,18,21	supposed 51:11	42:23 51:20
25:14 26:23	started 30:6	31:1,4,16,23	Supreme 1:1,13	thing 5:25 20:5
29:2 31:23	state 54:20 55:6	32:5,9,10,14	sure 28:9 52:5	25:3 45:7,15
58:4	States 1:1,13,20	32:17,18,23	surely 30:16	55:6 57:10
single 18:10	20:10 22:4	34:1,14 38:7	31:10	things 7:13
24:5	statute 5:8 6:13	38:11 39:4,17	sustained 10:8	21:23 24:7,8
singles 31:16	7:11,13 9:13	40:1,2,5,18,23	38:13,14	26:5 37:25
sir 8:7 11:25	9:23,23 13:12	40:24 41:1	system 3:25 53:1	40:24 54:24
12:20 13:4	15:15 17:16	42:20 43:3,11		56:21
15:25	21:5,16 22:7	43:15 44:14,17	T	think 6:9,10 7:2
situation 26:10	23:17 30:5,7	45:2,7,8,12,13	T 2:1,1	8:14 10:16,21
28:2	32:19 43:14,21	50:21 51:15	take 14:15 16:5	10:22 13:18,23
situations 53:7	44:4,6 45:16	55:12,16,18	43:7 44:19	17:2 18:10
small 17:10	49:8 52:2	57:19	48:19 51:19	19:20 21:11,20
27:11 33:2	54:12 56:11	submitted 58:24	56:15	23:10,11 25:2
45:19	57:16 58:15	59:1	talk 6:5 10:1	25:18 26:10,18
sold 38:4 47:19	statutory 4:2	subregulation	38:2,17	28:14 30:5,18
sole 19:14	49:20 57:20	4:1	talked 6:11	31:2,20 32:7
Solicitor 1:18	Stevens 32:21	subsequent 44:5	42:17	36:5 39:2 40:4
43:19	33:4,9,20,25	46:24,25 47:24	talking 18:20	43:9,12,19
somebody 15:17	34:5,9,14	48:2 50:13	43:16	50:4 51:17
15:20 36:14	39:25 40:5	subsidiary 4:18	talks 4:21 8:17	52:3,8 55:23
somewhat 22:16	42:6,14 45:21	14:25 19:15	9:13 30:7	58:17
sorry 26:25	45:24 46:9,19	substantive 9:20	38:22 43:14	thinking 57:4,8
31:19	46:21 47:1,7	14:20	targeted 37:20	thought 20:24
sort 8:9 51:19	47:14 53:6,9	substitution	technical 45:3	44:22 51:22
52:4	53:18,24	45:4	telling 51:23	three 3:15
sought 3:22	Stewart 1:18 2:5	subsumed 31:8	temporal 58:2	time 25:6 36:22
SOUTER 7:2,6	20:8,9,12 21:2	subtransaction	term 11:1 27:20	47:7 58:6
7:21,24 8:2,6	21:20 22:3	45:12	27:20 30:19	today 51:13

23:1,6 24:23	32:15,17,18,23	<u> </u>	6:13 8:22	57:14
25:1,15 28:5	32:25 33:5,17	ultimate 27:24	18:21 21:8	words 5:18
33:6 36:21,24	33:19,21,22	28:3 56:16	37:23	47:18
37:9 43:4,6	34:1,6,8,13,15	ultimately 4:18	violation 6:23	work 38:2
44:7 45:7,8,12	35:2,3,9,10,11	19:17	18:19 38:9	works 28:12
46:1,4,7,8 47:4	35:18,23 36:5	Um 57:14		world 55:20
47:25 49:9,18	36:6,10,25	understand 7:4	$oldsymbol{ ext{W}}$	worry 32:4
49:24 56:6	37:3,10,11,13	13:7 15:7	wake 56:23	worth 34:20
58:6	37:20,24 38:10	27:20,21 28:10	walk 16:23	53:12
traded 53:12	39:4,14,16	28:12 35:19	walked 16:24	wouldn't 17:19
trader 37:6 39:9	40:15 43:3	55:9 57:6	walks 17:1	23:15,22 30:15
39:17 40:8,9	44:14 46:10,12	understanding	want 7:6 10:11	31:7,13 34:24
46:15	46:13,13,14,17	7:15,17 58:7	27:22 34:25	35:18 55:25
trades 22:19,21	46:18,23 47:12	understood	35:1 48:18	56:3 57:20
24:16,18,20	48:8,19,20	14:17	57:9	wrong 11:17
25:6,24 26:7,9	49:17,25 50:6	undesirable	wanted 48:12	15:12,15 26:16
26:13 27:6,17	50:18 55:10	42:23	Washington 1:9	40:25 41:3,9
32:20 33:2	57:19	unenforceable	1:16,19,22	42:7,9
39:21 43:12,13	transactions	48:6	wasn't 14:6 31:3	wrote 18:7
45:3,14,15,18	4:13,13,18	United 1:1,13,20	32:8 33:13	56:22
45:23,25 53:1	9:15,16,24	20:10 22:4	watching 54:7	
55:19,19,24	14:16,16 15:1	unrelated 11:5	way 9:16 19:21	X
56:5,13	18:1 19:17	unsuccessful	21:19 25:13	x 1:2,8
trading 3:13,20	21:4,22,25	25:24	27:10 31:10,12	
25:9 33:1	22:6 30:20	unusual 36:14	34:23 35:20	Y
40:10 42:18	31:17 33:1,16	36:17	36:7 38:2	yellow 10:1,4
53:19,22,24	39:5,6,7,9 40:2	unwound 53:2	39:23	York 1:7 3:5
58:7	42:4 45:20	urged 43:18	ways 9:24 54:3,6	$\overline{\mathbf{z}}$
transaction 4:6	50:1,16,21	use 37:18 47:18	week 53:2	
6:2,12 8:18,21	55:14,15,15,17	uses 28:19	went 16:3 35:9	zero 36:5
8:25 9:2,20	56:1,7,10	usually 37:12	41:22	<u> </u>
10:6,8,9,12,17	treat 6:6		weren't 35:22	\$5 53:12 56:21
10:22 11:1	trillion 53:12	V	West 23:3,19	\$500,000 28:18
12:5,14,15,24	56:21	v 1:5 3:5	we'll 3:3 20:7	28:22
13:24 14:19,24	true 16:6 48:7	variant 28:13	we're 42:19	20.22
15:2,23 16:7	49:15	variety 9:24	49:16 51:6,8	0
17:23 18:9,10	try 47:18	various 7:12	we've 58:12	06-1265 1:5 3:4
18:13,22,23	trying 31:25	19:16 42:4	whatsoever	
19:1,8,12,14	two 9:12 19:9,10	52:13,15 53:7	39:14	1
19:14 20:2,15	25:3 45:15	vast 53:16	wherewithal	1 3:11 11:14
20:19,20,24	46:3 47:20	view 4:17 11:5	27:12	1a 4:22
21:10,19 22:17	49:6 50:11	19:13,16 22:18	winners 27:7	10:04 1:14 3:2
23:22 24:9	56:6	23:8 32:25	word 20:15	11:06 58:25
26:12 28:4	two-thirds	33:5,16 37:7	30:23 31:7	116 58:11
29:3 30:8,12	36:11	40:6 42:24	36:5,6,10	118 58:11
30:16 31:4,9	tying 39:10	views 5:22 58:2	37:10 45:25	121(f) 4:25
31:12,16,22	type 36:2	violated 4:16	48:8,19,19	14a 25:7

				1 dgc 71
	I		1	
2				
2(i) 9:23				
20 2:6				
2000 14:6				
2007 1:10				
21 58:9				
25 3:11 30:7				
25(a) 42:13				
25(b) 42:12				
25(b)(1) 3:16,23				
4:4 13:11 15:4				
17:25 20:15				
29 1:10 2:8				
3				
3 2:4				
306(i)(2) 5:1				
25:4,8				
23.4,0				
4				
4a 11:14				
401 (a) 5:11				
5				
5 10:1 39:23				
57 2:11				
6				
6 4:20,24 39:24				
6a 5:12				
6(c) 45:19 56:10				
	1	I	Ī	1