1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	x
3	GLEN SCOTT MILNER, :
4	Petitioner :
5	v. : No. 09-1163
6	DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY :
7	x
8	Washington, D.C.
9	Wednesday, December 1, 2010
10	
11	The above-entitled matter came on for ora
12	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
13	at 10:01 a.m.
14	APPEARANCES:
15	DAVID S. MANN, Seattle, Washington; on behalf of
16	Petitioner.
17	ANTHONY A. YANG, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor
18	General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on
19	behalf of Respondent.
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24	
25	

1	CONTENTS	
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	PAGE
3	DAVID S. MANN, ESQ.	
4	On behalf of the Petitioner	3
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
6	ANTHONY A. YANG, ESQ.	
7	On behalf of the Respondent	23
8	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF	
9	DAVID S. MANN, ESQ.	
10	On behalf of the Petitioner	51
11		
12		
13	•	
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(10:01 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument
4	first this morning in Case 09-1163, Milner v. The
5	Department of the Navy.
6	Mr. Mann.
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF DAVID S. MANN
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
9	MR. MANN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
10	please the Court:
11	There are four points I would like to make
12	this morning. First, the plain language of Exemption 2
13	dictates an extremely narrow category of materials,
14	those related solely to internal personnel policies and
15	rules.
16	Second, even if you look beyond the plain
17	language and look to the legislative history, the
18	legislative history is focused, and the additional
19	legislative history from the House is focused, only on
20	law enforcement or investigatory materials, items that
21	were covered through the 1986 amendments to FOIA, making
22	any additional judicial High 2 unnecessary.
23	The third point: Because of FOIA's purpose,
24	if you find that the language, the plain language, is
25	not clear or if you find that the legislative history

- 1 isn't sufficient, then the focus must be on an
- 2 interpretation that supports disclosure, not secrecy.
- 3 And finally, Congress, in enacting FOIA,
- 4 conducted the balancing. In reserve for it, itself, the
- 5 authority to add to or expand FOIA through Exemption 3.
- 6 It did not leave agency discretion available for the
- 7 agencies to decide what documents they can provide or
- 8 not.
- 9 Moving into our first argument, the plain
- 10 language. At issue is a very short sentence related
- 11 solely to internal personnel rules and procedures --
- 12 rules and practices. Congress chose to use the words
- "related solely" on purpose. That's an extremely narrow
- 14 view. Now, we understand if you look at the words in
- 15 isolation, perhaps you could see that there is some
- 16 conflict between them. "Related" could be broad;
- 17 "solely" is extremely narrow. But when read together,
- 18 as they should be in this statute, "related solely" is
- 19 an extremely narrow class of documents.
- 20 JUSTICE ALITO: Could I ask you this? The
- 21 D.C. Circuit's decision in Crooker has been the leading
- 22 decision in this -- on this issue for nearly 30 years,
- 23 and there has been a great deal of reliance on it,
- 24 certainly by the lower courts in general, and perhaps
- 25 also by Congress and by the executive branch. Do you

- 1 think there's anything to be said for deference to that
- 2 decision based on the fact that it has been -- there has
- 3 been reliance on it to such a great degree for such a
- 4 period of time?
- 5 MR. MANN: No, Your Honor. When Crooker
- 6 came down, the court was faced with an extremely -- a
- 7 circumstance dealing with these FBI or ATF search and
- 8 seizure manuals, and the court adopted and created the
- 9 High 2 exemption. But, again, we believe in 1986
- 10 Congress dealt with that expressly, explicitly, and took
- 11 the exact same language and inserted into a stand-alone
- 12 exemption, Exemption 7(A), making Crooker no longer
- 13 needed or necessary. In the past, the Court --
- 14 JUSTICE ALITO: I ask -- I ask the question
- 15 because the world has changed in a lot of ways since
- 16 1981, and one is that there is now, I think, much
- 17 greater concern about the disclosure of information that
- 18 has perhaps profound security implications. That was
- 19 not as much of a concern in -- in 1981.
- If you think about, for example, suppose
- 21 there's a Federal building with a hallway that is
- 22 accessible only to somebody who has a code key. Would
- 23 that be -- is that -- does that have to be disclosed
- 24 under FOIA? Or architectural plans for a Federal
- 25 building that would disclose the size of the bomb that

- 1 would be necessary to bring the building down or bring
- 2 part of the building down; is there any FOIA exemption
- 3 that covers things like that?
- 4 MR. MANN: Well, Your Honor, there could be
- 5 a variety of FOIA exemptions -- it could fit under 7
- 6 depending on whether or not it's law enforcement-
- 7 related. For example, if it's FBI instructions on
- 8 guarding a facility or guarding individuals, perhaps
- 9 that would be law enforcement. And if it's protecting
- 10 individuals within that building, under 7(F). Or it
- 11 could be something addressed specifically through
- 12 Exemption 3.
- 13 And coming to your original -- the original
- 14 part of your question, that times have changed, we
- 15 recognize that; and Congress recognized certainly that
- 16 times could and would change when it adopted it, and
- 17 that's why we believe Congress kept for itself
- 18 Exemption 3.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Even though --
- JUSTICE BREYER: 7 and 3 --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Even though you -- you
- 22 said that there is now 7, Exemption 7, the amendment to
- 23 that, so you don't need 2 --
- MR. MANN: You --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Still, as far as I know,

- 1 every court of appeals that has weighed in has accepted
- 2 Crooker. And I was a little puzzled why you were so
- 3 intent on rejecting so-called High 2, because after all,
- 4 in this very case, Judge Fletcher, dissenting -- it's
- 5 true -- but he said he accepts Crooker, he accepts High
- 6 2, and he still thinks you win. So you don't need to
- 7 reject Crooker to prevail.
- 8 MR. MANN: We don't need to reject -- under
- 9 Judge Fletcher's viewpoint, we did not need to reject
- 10 High 2 to prevail. But, again, he was the dissent. But
- 11 more importantly, Crooker -- again, we think this
- 12 language -- this case rises and falls on the plain
- 13 language of the statute, and Crooker was an expansion of
- 14 that, and we need to accept that Crooker was an
- 15 expansion of that. And Congress accepted that it was an
- 16 expansion when they came up with 7(E).
- JUSTICE BREYER: Why does that show that? I
- 18 mean, why doesn't it show acceptance of Crooker?
- MR. MANN: Well, I think --
- 20 JUSTICE BREYER: I mean, if that -- Crooker
- 21 was -- was interpreting section 2 --
- MR. MANN: I think --
- JUSTICE BREYER: -- that was the
- 24 interpretation. Everyone had followed it, every court.
- 25 Nobody disagreed. All your four arguments Judge Edwards

- 1 went into thoroughly. Everyone but Judge Wilkey
- 2 approved it. And so Congress reads that, and they make
- 3 it specific in 7, but they say nothing about 2.
- 4 MR. MANN: I think there are three points to
- 5 look at on that. First of all, Congress originally did
- 6 look at amending section 2 -- Exemption 2, at the same
- 7 time they looked at amending Exemption 7. They chose
- 8 not to. Now, we don't -- we can't read everything into
- 9 that, but they chose not to. They made 7 specifically,
- 10 and 7 covered all of the language that we would be
- 11 looking for. So really, if you're still reading
- 12 Exemption 2 to include a High 2, then 7(E) becomes
- 13 superfluous.
- 14 And then a final point and I think a very
- 15 important point --
- 16 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, you had a different
- 17 Congress. I mean, the Congress that passed the law is
- 18 not necessarily the same Congress that -- that failed to
- 19 amend the law. Are we to consider laws to be in effect
- 20 only for so long as the Congress that passed them is
- 21 sitting, and then the failure to make any changes in
- 22 light of judicial decisions by later Congresses
- 23 effectively amends the law?
- MR. MANN: No.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: That's an extraordinary

- 1 proposition.
- 2 MR. MANN: No, that's not the proposition
- 3 I'm making. The proposition I'm making is that when the
- 4 1986 -- '84 through '86 took place, and they looked at
- 5 this and they saw the issue with Jordan and they saw the
- 6 issue with Crooker, their decision was to consolidate
- 7 that exemption, what had been called "High 2," into
- 8 7(A).
- JUSTICE BREYER: How do you know? What we
- 10 have is 7(E) in front of us; 7(E) says we want to be
- 11 sure something like Crooker's interpretation of 2
- 12 applies with law enforcement. It's simply a case -- so
- 13 they apply it with law enforcement. Absolutely now it's
- 14 quaranteed. Crooker is not quaranteed because it could
- 15 be overturned. You never know what will happen.
- 16 But what in that suggests they don't want
- 17 Crooker to apply to the Fed for example, or to the Navy,
- 18 or to -- which is here storing -- it's storing
- 19 explosives. Why would -- I mean, I can't get anything
- 20 one way or the other from the fact they passed 7.
- MR. MANN: Well, I should --
- JUSTICE BREYER: Why should I get one rather
- 23 than the other? For every argument you make, I can see
- 24 an argument the other side -- that they make.
- MR. MANN: Well, another point that I would

- 1 like to make --
- JUSTICE BREYER: What's your answer to that?
- 3 It was a question, really.
- 4 (Laughter.)
- 5 MR. MANN: Well, my answer is, is you are
- 6 correct that they did not read -- they did not
- 7 specifically state what they were doing or why. So all
- 8 we can do is look at what they did in its totality.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But there was a proposal
- 10 to amend 2 --
- MR. MANN: There had been an original --
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And there was a
- 13 conscious decision by Congress not to do 2 to conform to
- 14 Crooker more generally, but to only pass 7. So there
- 15 has to be a meaning to the decision to limit the
- 16 amendment.
- 17 MR. MANN: I -- I would believe that they --
- 18 backing up to Crooker, if you look at the arguments in
- 19 Crooker and you look at I believe every point in
- 20 Crooker, where they discuss either the legislative
- 21 history or they discuss other case law analysis leading
- 22 to High 2, it was focused on these investigative
- 23 materials: examiner's materials, manuals, manuals that
- 24 we didn't want the regulator to have an opportunity to
- 25 have. And that's all now captured in 7(E).

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1
                 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Are you interpreting --
 2
                 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Mann, do you assume
 3
    that there's always a reason for Congress's not passing
 4
            I mean, it's hard enough to figure out their
 5
    reason for passing a law --
 6
                 (Laughter.)
 7
                 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- but there could be an
 8
    infinitude of reasons why a law is not passed.
9
                MR. MANN:
                            I accept that, Your Honor.
10
                 JUSTICE SCALIA: Do you know of any case in
    which the failure of Congress to amend a law in order to
11
    overrule a court decision other than a decision of this
12
13
    Court has been held to be an implicit approval of that
14
    decision? Do we have a single case where we've said,
15
    oh, there was a line of court of appeals cases, and
16
    since Congress failed to amend the statute to take
17
    account of those court of appeals cases, Congress must
18
    have approved them. Do we have any case like that?
19
                            No, we don't, Your Honor.
                 MR. MANN:
20
                 JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't know of any.
21
                MR. MANN:
                           Your Honor, but I would like to
22
    make one additional point on this. What -- by doing
23
    what Congress did in 1986 -- and, again, they're not
24
    telling us this, but we can look at the statute -- what
25
    they've done is preserve once again that clear, distinct
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- 1 line between the exemptions. Exemption 2 on its plain
- 2 -- now Exemption 2 under its plain language is for use
- 3 related solely to internal personnel matters. That's an
- 4 isolated exemption. We don't need to go back to it to
- 5 look abroad and start looking for other exceptions. We
- 6 have Exemption 7(E) now to handle that. So there's a
- 7 clear, sharp dividing line. And as this Court said in
- 8 Rose, actually quoting Vaughn, that we needed that sharp
- 9 dividing line to let agencies know --
- 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, in Rose we
- 11 talked about a legitimate public purpose in seeking
- 12 information. I tie my question to Justice Alito's,
- 13 which is at what point does -- is it legitimate for the
- 14 public to seek information, internal information,
- 15 relating to the rules and practices of personnel? Can
- 16 the public seek information that places the community at
- 17 a severe security risk? Is it possible for us to say
- 18 that that kind of information, given our line of
- 19 reasoning in Rose, could not be legitimate public
- 20 information?
- MR. MANN: But it does not have to be using
- 22 the Exemption 2, as it's stated, for -- for the internal
- 23 personnel policies. There are other reasons and ways
- 24 that some materials that might create a security risk
- 25 can be protected.

- 1 Congress has -- there's over 150 -- I
- 2 believe the number currently is 153 statutes that
- 3 they've enacted under section 3, using section 3. That
- 4 includes as recently as last -- last year, when the
- 5 Department of Defense v. ACLU case came before you.
- 6 Congress stepped -- that was dealing with the Abu Ghraib
- 7 photos. Congress stepped in and passed an amendment to
- 8 the Securities Act to exempt those documents
- 9 specifically from release, in order to protect. And
- 10 that was using the proper authority. It didn't require
- an agency to go back and rely on an "Expand 2,"
- 12 Exemption 2.
- And that's the danger of the expansion we're
- 14 looking at, is it allows Exemption 2 to be used for an
- 15 open-ended -- any time an agency feels it may be
- 16 appropriate that it might not want to release something,
- 17 it can rely on Exemption 2. That was never the intent.
- 18 Congress tried from the beginning to preserve for itself
- 19 that discretion and that authority and to remove the
- 20 discretion.
- 21 As we point out -- as we've set out for you
- 22 in our briefs, if you look at the legislative history,
- 23 many of the agencies and Department of Justice that came
- 24 before Congress asked for that discretion, and Congress
- 25 did not give it to them. They reserved, and, instead,

- 1 we have Exemption 3.
- 2 So what we're saying is that you do not need
- 3 to -- there may be reasons that you want to take high
- 4 security information and have it isolated from the
- 5 public's review, but it's not through using an exemption
- 6 that was really designed for minor internal matters.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Of course, if that's -- if
- 8 that's the outcome of this case and if you prevail, that
- 9 would mean that more things will be classified and
- 10 withdrawn wholly from scrutiny; whereas, if other
- 11 exemptions are used, they can be shared to a greater
- 12 extent. So really what you're arguing for is for
- 13 withholding more information from more people.
- 14 MR. MANN: I don't think I am, Your Honor,
- 15 because I believe that, through the Exemption 3, they
- 16 can't limit it to. For example, in this case if there
- 17 was a need for Congress to adopt a specific protection
- 18 for these maps, it could.
- 19 The problem that we have here in this case,
- 20 again, is these maps at this base have been given out.
- 21 And, again, it's a map. It's a map showing the range,
- 22 the size of an explosion, and its effect on the
- 23 surrounding community. That map has been given out from
- this base to some people, and some of those people they
- 25 gave it to actually gave it to the newspaper. It's been

- 1 not given out to others, including my client. Other
- 2 bases nearby, our Bangor Trident Submarine Base, gave
- 3 out the map upon request.
- If this map that we're looking at is that
- 5 secure, then perhaps it should be that secure and
- 6 protected across the board. But that's not what we
- 7 have. We have -- instead, we have an individual within
- 8 an agency making a decision to withhold a certain
- 9 document from some people and not others, and when they
- 10 give it out to the others, they have no control over
- 11 what those people do with that map. And that's not a
- 12 correct use of the Exemption 2.
- JUSTICE BREYER: Well, why do you want to
- 14 know? How wide the corridors are in some Federal
- 15 buildings, and terrorists could use that to bad purpose,
- 16 but we want to give it to the firemen because they'll
- 17 use it for a good purpose. We want the policemen to
- 18 know, we want different civic groups sometimes to know,
- 19 but we want to keep a limitation. We want it
- 20 restricted, restricted to minimize the chance it will
- 21 get into the wrong hands. I mean, I don't see anything
- 22 illogical about that. What's -- what's illogical about
- 23 that?
- 24 MR. MANN: But it shouldn't be through
- 25 Exemption 2 because it's not --

- 1 JUSTICE BREYER: Why?
- 2 MR. MANN: It's not an internal --
- JUSTICE BREYER: Well, that's a different
- 4 argument.
- 5 MR. MANN: Right.
- 6 JUSTICE BREYER: I mean, your four arguments
- 7 seem to me to be the same arguments that Judge Edwards
- 8 and the D.C. Circuit considered, and they are excellent
- 9 arguments, and there are arguments on both sides, and
- 10 then they considered it and came to a conclusion. But
- 11 this is a different argument you're making here, and I
- 12 was addressing that.
- MR. MANN: It's a different argument in the
- 14 sense that what Judge Edwards was looking at and the
- 15 Crooker decision was looking at was a specific group of
- 16 documents, these manuals of policy and procedure. And,
- 17 again, we believe that that was addressed through the
- 18 7(E) in 1986.
- 19 So we're back now to: Should there still be
- 20 a High 2 category? Is that how we want to read this --
- JUSTICE BREYER: I mean, it's only addressed
- 22 for law enforcement. It's -- there are many
- 23 dangerous or -- for example, this isn't law enforcement;
- 24 this is munitions. The Navy thinks, rightly or wrongly,
- 25 I guess you can -- that they don't want these maps

- 1 circulated because they think it would make it easier to
- 2 blow up the munitions. They want the firemen to have
- 3 them, they want the civil defense workers to have them,
- 4 but they don't want people who might blow them up to
- 5 have them.
- 6 MR. MANN: Well --
- 7 JUSTICE BREYER: Now, that's -- that's their
- 8 reasoning. Now, that isn't addressed, it seems to me,
- 9 in 7, because 7 deals with law enforcement.
- MR. MANN: I would agree that this, perhaps,
- is not addressed in 7. 7 was -- was argued before the
- 12 Ninth Circuit, but not answered on whether or not these
- 13 fit under 7. But, again, it should not come back to the
- 14 use of Exemption 2. Perhaps another exemption --
- 15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: As I -- as I read the
- 16 D.C. Circuit decision, you -- you are assuming or you're
- 17 suggesting that the D.C. Circuit saw a gap that Congress
- 18 hadn't provided for, and it filled that gap. And now
- 19 the add-on that the D.C. Circuit made is no longer
- 20 necessary, so we lop it off. But the judges on that en
- 21 banc court thought that they were interpreting the
- 22 statute going through all of the steps that you
- 23 outlined. Language is rarely so plain that there's no
- 24 room for a different interpretation.
- 25 And then Judge Edwards looked to the

- 1 legislative history to see how that might inform the
- 2 decision, but -- but really, to suggest that Crooker was
- 3 just sort of a stopgap until Congress amended the
- 4 statute I think is not fair to that decision.
- 5 MR. MANN: Your Honor, the issue here is not
- 6 so much Crooker as it is what the Ninth Circuit has done
- 7 to, we believe, expand Crooker, because you're correct.
- 8 I mean, obviously, the Crooker decision was a
- 9 well-written, long, and very detailed decision, both the
- 10 en banc as well as the dissents, but -- the dissent.
- But even there, they were looking at that
- 12 same legislative history, and it's the same legislative
- 13 history that this Court looked at in Rose, and there is
- 14 a limit. They didn't say that it needed to reach all
- 15 the way out to cover anything as broad as a category of
- 16 what the Navy's proceeding with here. They looked at
- 17 manuals of procedure, the disclosure of which would
- 18 enable the regulated community to circumvent those
- 19 agency regulations. Again, you addressed that as
- 20 arguably dicta, but that's the statement you had made in
- 21 Rose, that it was by the regulated to circumvent
- 22 regulations.
- The documents we have, for example, in this
- 24 case are not. The regulated entity under the
- 25 Operating-5 manual is the Navy. It's how the Navy

- 1 stores and moves its munition around. So even under a
- 2 reading of -- of Crooker, what Crooker was looking at,
- 3 looking at the House report, taking the House report on
- 4 its face, taking the testimony before Congress that was
- 5 on its face -- again, that was still dealing with these
- 6 operating rules and guidelines for government
- 7 investigators or examiners, but not --
- 8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Mann, I thought you
- 9 disagreed with the premise of Justice Ginsburg's
- 10 question; that is, that you assert that the language
- 11 related solely to the internal personnel rules and
- 12 practices of an agency is quite clear.
- MR. MANN: I do.
- 14 JUSTICE SCALIA: I thought maybe you were
- 15 abandoning that.
- 16 MR. MANN: No, no. I mean, I -- but what I
- 17 was saying was that we do believe it was quite clear.
- 18 But if -- even if you went beyond, which obviously they
- 19 did in Crooker, and obviously you could argue from the
- 20 House report -- even if you go beyond, it's still a
- 21 limited category that does not reach so broad as what
- 22 the Ninth Circuit has opened up here, and as what the
- 23 Navy is arguing before you now, which is even broader
- 24 than what the Ninth Circuit reached.
- JUSTICE BREYER: How is it -- how is it

- 1 broader? I -- I looked for the words. I just missed
- 2 them, and you can point them out.
- 3 When I read about the circumvention, what
- 4 Crooker says is: "We hold that since the document for
- 5 which disclosure is sought meets the test of
- 6 'predominant internality,' and since its disclosure
- 7 significantly risks circumvention of federal statutes or
- 8 regulations, " it is exempt.
- 9 It didn't say anything about circumvention
- 10 because there is a regulated entity and it is that
- 11 regulated entity that will circumvent. It just spoke of
- 12 circumvention, as far as I saw. But maybe there's
- 13 another place where it talks about regulated entity. Is
- 14 there?
- 15 MR. MANN: Well, I believe it's addressed in
- 16 the decision during the context leading up to the
- 17 decision, but it is addressed by this Court in Rose --
- 18 JUSTICE BREYER: Oh, that's -- but that --
- 19 if we're looking at Crooker, I just read the words
- 20 "would there be circumvention" --
- MR. MANN: Right.
- JUSTICE BREYER: -- and it seemed to me, in
- 23 this case, the Navy has plans and they use those plans
- 24 to store munitions safely, and the risk that they worry
- 25 about is someone will get ahold of the plans and use the

- 1 positions of those munitions in order to make them
- 2 unsafe, for example, blowing them up. So that seemed
- 3 like a very serious circumvention of what the regulation
- 4 was there for.
- 5 MR. MANN: But not by the regulator --
- 6 JUSTICE BREYER: That's correct, and I
- 7 didn't find anything in Crooker that said -- and I don't
- 8 know why you'd have such a theory. I don't know what
- 9 the point of the theory would be, that you would care
- 10 whether blowing up took place by somebody who
- 11 technically was regulated by the Navy or blowing up took
- 12 place by some other person, whom they're worried about.
- MR. MANN: Because the basis -- it's -- the
- 14 basis for that is, again, this Court's language in Rose,
- 15 where it looked at -- again, we're going back to a very
- 16 few words in the House report, and the House report is
- 17 looking at these guidelines and manuals of procedure for
- 18 government investigators or examiners.
- 19 This Court took that language and looked at
- 20 it and pointed to -- well, and it's a logical extension,
- 21 that if we're looking at it from these investigators or
- 22 examiners, what we're concerned about is people being
- 23 investigated or examined. So we don't see that that
- 24 expands here.
- And, again, it's coming back to the basis of

- 1 this material shouldn't be under (i)(2). I mean, we can
- 2 discuss and debate the merits of the safety of these
- 3 maps. This is, again, a map. It's not the operating
- 4 guidelines, the Operating-5 manual. That's not what was
- 5 requested or it's not what's before you, but what's
- 6 before you is the map, the map which shows that the
- 7 largest target, no surprise, is the loading dock. The
- 8 loading dock -- we have the materials in the joint
- 9 appendix from the -- the base information, proudly
- 10 discussing that loading dock and how visible a signal
- 11 that loading dock is. There are too many --
- 12 JUSTICE ALITO: Do you have any reason to --
- 13 just out of curiosity, do you have any reason to believe
- 14 that the current version of the ESQD map is different
- from the one that was published in the newspaper
- 16 previously?
- MR. MANN: We do not know, Your Honor.
- 18 There are -- there are identified, I believe it was 14,
- 19 but I may be incorrect, separate maps in the Vaughn
- 20 index. We know, if you read -- the portions that we
- 21 have from the Operating-5 manual say they can move
- 22 munitions around as long as they stay within the
- 23 confines of the ESQD map, but it appears the map can be
- 24 amended. And, again, that's the -- that's the
- 25 prevailing question here, is we're talking about public

- 1 waters, private land around the base, and whether or not
- 2 that land stays secure. That's the great significant
- 3 public interest here, is we have a city within a mile
- 4 and a half of this base and of this very visible loading
- 5 dock that can be seen from everywhere. On the
- 6 waterfront restaurants in town, this loading dock stands
- 7 out. So whether that map changes over time would be
- 8 important to know.
- 9 If there are no further questions, I'd like
- 10 to reserve a couple minutes.
- 11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- 12 Mr. Yang.
- 13 ORAL ARGUMENT OF ANTHONY A. YANG
- 14 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
- 15 MR. YANG: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
- 16 please the Court:
- 17 Petitioner has asked this Court to disrupt
- 18 30 years of FOIA practice by rejecting an interpretation
- 19 of Exemption 2 that has prevailed and has provided a
- 20 workable standard for agencies and the courts since the
- 21 D.C. Circuit's en banc decision in Crooker.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could you tell me what
- 23 the textual basing for Crooker's "predominantly
- 24 internal and "circumvention of agency regulation"
- 25 requirements is? Where in the text are those words, and

- 1 how do you create them except through sort of judicial
- 2 crafting?
- 3 MR. YANG: Well, I think the -- as our brief
- 4 explained, there are three basic elements to Exemption
- 5 2. The first is the internal element, and we believe
- 6 that means that the records at issue must be properly
- 7 maintained within an agency and not for general release.
- 8 And --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The problem with that in
- 10 this case is that it's a mixed document. It is
- 11 predominantly for internal use, but not exclusively.
- 12 MR. YANG: Well, I think --
- 13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So how do you square
- 14 that with the words "related solely to internal"?
- 15 MR. YANG: Right. If I could just finish
- 16 the internality and then talk about how it relates
- 17 solely -- relates to that, I think that would be
- 18 probably easiest. The internal -- and when a document
- 19 is properly held within an agency as internal reflects
- 20 the FOIA balance that's at issue throughout the
- 21 exemptions. It involves the balance between the public
- 22 interest in knowing information about the government and
- 23 the need for the government to maintain certain things
- 24 in confidence. And in this context, Rose addressed two
- 25 other contexts. Rose explained that when there is no

- 1 legitimate public interest, things may be properly
- 2 internal. There's simply no reason to disclose it.
- 3 In --
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, the case summaries
- 5 there were internal solely. They were created only for
- 6 purposes of the agency's honor code review or discipline
- 7 review.
- 8 MR. YANG: Well, if it was --
- 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And yet we ordered it
- 10 disclosed. We created an exception to the --
- 11 MR. YANG: Well --
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- plain language of the
- 13 rule, it seems to me.
- 14 MR. YANG: I don't believe this Court
- 15 created an exception to the statute. I think what the
- 16 Court did was construe the statute. And although it is
- 17 not clear from the text of Rose exactly the textual
- 18 foundation for that decision, I think it is best read as
- 19 turning on the internality. And understanding what is
- 20 properly internal under Exemption 2 must be understood
- 21 in light of what FOIA is doing and what the legislative
- 22 history suggests for the exemption. And so what we --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Oh, I agree.
- MR. YANG: This case --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But I think the

- 1 distinction it made was that it's only internal rules
- 2 and practices of the agency, a personnel agency, if the
- 3 public has no legitimate interest in it.
- 4 MR. YANG: I think it said that that's the
- 5 case where there's no countervailing interest on the
- 6 other side. At least where there's no risk of
- 7 circumvention, is what the Court was saying. What we
- 8 have here is a different FOIA balance. What we have
- 9 here is something strong on the government interest
- 10 side. There are certain things that just cannot be
- 11 disclosed to the public and have the government function
- 12 well. This is one of these. This would be the
- 13 location, type, amount of munitions stored on a Naval
- 14 facility. Location --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Yang, but the
- 16 information about location I thought was disclosed,
- 17 where these explosives were stored.
- 18 MR. YANG: There are -- there is -- for
- 19 instance, the appendix includes a map of buildings. It
- 20 doesn't explain where munitions are stored, the type of
- 21 munition --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: But we know they're in
- 23 the building. We may not know the type of munition.
- MR. YANG: Maybe not in every building.
- 25 What you know is that there are buildings, there are

- 1 sites, but you don't know which ones, how much, the
- 2 types of munitions. And what we're talking about is
- 3 more than a map. What we're talking about is more
- 4 generally the ESQD information in the disclosed records,
- 5 which includes --
- 6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And I thought that that
- 7 information was given out for the Bangor facility.
- 8 MR. YANG: There appears to have been a
- 9 release -- and the record does not provide us detail as
- 10 to why -- before 9/11 by the Bangor facility of some
- 11 arcs. Now, it's important to know that arc maps have
- 12 different levels of importance. For instance, you might
- 13 have an arc map around a bomb squad on a base, because
- 14 bomb squads need to maintain a small amount of
- 15 munitions, but that arc isn't particularly sensitive.
- 16 So arc maps might be released in certain contexts, and
- 17 the Navy here actually does conduct a case-by-case
- 18 balancing to see whether or not it would be appropriate
- 19 to release this information.
- 20 Here, what we do know is that the Navy
- 21 looked at the arc maps here, which are highly sensitive
- 22 maps, as well as the associated ESQD information, and
- 23 determined that releasing this information would provide
- 24 a road map to those with bad intent to circumvent the
- 25 very safety procedures that --

- 1 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Have you compared the two
- 2 situations, in Seattle and in -- and in Bangor? What --
- 3 because --
- 4 MR. YANG: Our brief briefly addresses this.
- 5 I believe it's footnote on page -- footnote 5 on page 8.
- 6 And what we can say from the record is that the Navy
- 7 looked at the -- the material here, explained that
- 8 Bangor is a single weapons facility, involves a much
- 9 more simplistic storage and safety security problem than
- 10 the Naval Magazine Indian Island. And also, I would --
- 11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Why? If these -- if
- 12 these maps are so sensitive as you suggested, why
- weren't they classified?
- 14 MR. YANG: Well, it's difficult to classify
- 15 when you need to share in limited circumstances with
- 16 local responders. The Navy here has shared --
- 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm sorry, I don't
- 18 understand that. It's different to classify when?
- 19 MR. YANG: When you classify a document, it
- 20 restricts access to people with a Federal need to know,
- 21 people who have been adjudicated as eligible to receive
- 22 classification, receive the proper training. The Navy
- 23 in this instance needs to share limited arc information
- 24 with the local fire department and the police department
- 25 to make plans for in the event of an emergency. And

- 1 that was shared in confidence with these local force
- 2 responders and was unfortunately disclosed without our
- 3 authorization.
- 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, surely, you
- 5 classify documents that are shared outside the Federal
- 6 Government?
- 7 MR. YANG: That is true in certain
- 8 circumstances, but there are other --
- 9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Could you
- 10 classify these maps after -- I mean, assume that you
- 11 don't prevail, could you then classify these documents,
- 12 preventing their release before they're released?
- MR. YANG: Well, if the Court were to
- 14 provide us with the opportunity, I think the Navy could
- 15 consider that.
- 16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No. I mean, isn't it
- 17 the case when a government agency has to go through its
- 18 records in response to a FOIA request and comes upon
- 19 records that would otherwise be disclosable, they can at
- 20 that point say we're going to classify this so we don't
- 21 have to disclose it.
- 22 MR. YANG: The relevant executive order that
- 23 governs classification does allow classification of
- 24 materials which have been disseminated beyond the
- 25 government. But there are certain thresholds that have

- 1 to be met. I'm not an original classifying authority,
- 2 so I would not be in a position to say whether these
- 3 types of things could be classified in this instance.
- 4 It's at least theoretically possible.
- 5 But I -- what I want to underscore is that
- 6 the reason that these materials are not classified in
- 7 this instance is because it is important to share with
- 8 the local fire department. Now, the local fire
- 9 department --
- 10 JUSTICE ALITO: There's -- there's a
- 11 document on the FBI Web site called "Security Clearance
- 12 Process for State and Local Law Enforcement, " which
- 13 seems to address exactly the situation in which there's
- 14 a need to -- it says: "It is the policy of the Federal
- 15 Bureau of Investigation to share with law enforcement
- 16 personnel pertinent information regarding terrorism."
- 17 And it provides a procedure for sharing that classified
- 18 information.
- 19 MR. YANG: It is -- I don't mean to suggest
- 20 that only Federal Government employees can have
- 21 classification. You can -- you have contractors. There
- 22 are instances where you can classify material and share
- 23 it with nonfederal entities which have been given
- 24 appropriate clearances --
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It seems to me

- 1 you're asking us to do your job. You've got to go
- 2 through these documents and say -- you're telling us how
- 3 sensitive these are, and, therefore, it would harm the
- 4 national interest if they had to be disclosed.
- 5 MR. YANG: I don't --
- 6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: If that's true, you
- 7 can classify them and --
- MR. YANG: I don't think --
- 9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- instead of coming
- 10 to us and saying you should torture the language in FOIA
- 11 to allow us to determine that this is sensitive to the
- 12 national interest and therefore shouldn't be disclosed.
- MR. YANG: I don't believe that we are
- 14 asking the Court to torture the language of FOIA. We
- 15 think that we have a fair reading, by no means an
- 16 unambiguous reading of the statute, but a fair reading
- of the statute, and it's a reading that has prevailed
- 18 for almost 30 years now. And then quite beyond --
- 19 JUSTICE KAGAN: So can we talk about that
- 20 reading, Mr. Yang? Let's talk about the meaning of the
- 21 statute.
- MR. YANG: Sure.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: The key word is -- the key
- 24 term is "personnel rules and practices." If I said to
- you what's a personnel file, what would you say?

- 1 MR. YANG: Well, it depends on context. You
- 2 may be referring to Exemption 6.
- 3 JUSTICE KAGAN: It could be referring to
- 4 Exemption 6, or it could be referring to just generally,
- 5 just in a conversation? Your personnel file -- what
- 6 does it mean?
- 7 MR. YANG: Well, in the context of Exemption
- 8 6, I think it refers to files pertaining to personnel.
- 9 JUSTICE KAGAN: Can you think of another
- 10 context in which it means something other than that?
- 11 MR. YANG: I think the term -- the phrase
- 12 "personnel file" itself is normally referred -- normally
- 13 used to refer to personnel, but what--
- 14 JUSTICE KAGAN: It's a kind of H.R. file,
- 15 right?
- 16 MR. YANG: That's generally true, but --
- 17 JUSTICE KAGAN: So why should there be any
- 18 difference if you look at the term "personnel files and
- 19 practices, " that these are H.R. files and practices?
- 20 MR. YANG: Well, it's certainly one reading.
- 21 We think that personnel rules and practices of an agency
- 22 can fairly encompass instructions that you provide to
- 23 personnel. For instance, if you were to instruct
- 24 personnel that they are to appear at work at 9:00 and
- leave at 5:00, or they are to perform a certain number

- of duties, 10 cases per day, or you need to process
- 2 these cases in a certain manner -- all of those I think
- 3 would be fairly characterized as personnel rules and
- 4 practices of an agency, and --
- 5 JUSTICE SCALIA: All the rules of an agency
- 6 would -- would be sucked in, wouldn't it?
- 7 MR. YANG: Well, no, I think --
- 8 JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, all the rules the
- 9 agency promulgates are supposed to be enforced by the
- 10 personnel of the agency.
- 11 MR. YANG: I should think so.
- 12 JUSTICE SCALIA: They become personnel rules
- 13 and practices.
- 14 MR. YANG: The focus on personnel in the
- 15 statute helps to distinguish between rules and practices
- 16 which govern personnel, and rules and practices which
- 17 also are there to govern the public in its interactions
- 18 with the agency. And this goes back to the question
- 19 that we initially started on. "Relates solely" -- when
- 20 you're related solely to the internal personnel rules
- 21 and practices of the agency, it -- it extends just
- 22 beyond just the rules and practices of themselves, but
- 23 it makes sure that the focus -- solely -- is still on
- 24 personnel.
- 25 So there are things -- for instance, if the

- 1 rule is that you need to file a FOIA request in a
- 2 certain way, and the agency instructs personnel to
- 3 process it in a certain way, those rules also would
- 4 affect the public. The public would need to comply. If
- 5 there is a dual purpose, a dual function of the rule or
- 6 practice, it would not relate solely to the internal
- 7 personnel rules.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, that begs, I
- 9 think, Justice Scalia's question. One could argue that
- 10 everything that the agency develops except rules telling
- 11 the public how to come to the agency with a complaint,
- 12 et cetera -- virtually everything will govern either the
- internal personnel practices or the agency's practices
- 14 vis-à-vis the public.
- MR. YANG: But not everything that the
- 16 agency does will relate solely or exclusively to govern
- 17 the internal personnel -- the rules and practices for
- 18 personnel. When there is a dual function, that is, it
- 19 both instructs personnel how to do their duties and it's
- 20 also something that the public must take into account --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, if the -- if the
- 22 agency has a rule that says put explosive A in building
- 23 1 and put explosive B in building 2, that's hard for me
- 24 to explain that it's just a personnel rule, other than,
- 25 as Justice Scalia says, everything -- all functions have

- 1 to be undertaken by humans.
- 2 MR. YANG: Well, I -- I don't know that I
- 3 would agree with that. I think the personnel rules and
- 4 practices that are at issue here are a complex set of
- 5 rules that are based on types of munitions, the --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, what about my
- 7 hypothetical? Why -- why is that person -- primarily or
- 8 solely personnel rule?
- 9 MR. YANG: Because it is a rule that
- 10 pertains to personnel. It is a rule that governs the
- 11 personnel's discharge of their duties. And if the --
- 12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But that goes back to the
- 13 point that -- I forgot about a computer age, but,
- 14 forgetting that, humans have to do most things now.
- 15 MR. YANG: That is true. Humans generally
- 16 -- and we still do, thank goodness, do things. But the
- 17 focus of the exemption in context -- the exemption
- 18 applies to matters that relate solely to the internal
- 19 personnel rules and practices of an agency. Personnel
- 20 helps to focus the inquiry on the rules, and, again,
- 21 only relating solely, on rules that govern agency
- 22 personnel, as opposed to rules that might govern those
- 23 personnel and govern the public's interaction with the
- 24 agency. That's the key --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: I suppose the Office of

- 1 Personnel Management has a pretty broad charter, then,
- 2 on your theory of what the adjective means. OPM must be
- 3 a very powerful agency.
- 4 (Laughter.)
- 5 MR. YANG: Well, I -- it certainly is.
- 6 (Laughter.)
- 7 MR. YANG: The -- but I think what we're
- 8 saying is that personnel can have different meanings in
- 9 different contexts.
- 10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Can we go back to the --
- I mean, the origin of the Exemption 2? I thought there
- 12 was a concern in Congress that, under the APA, section 3
- 13 was shielding too much from the public, and so they
- 14 wanted to have a narrower category. Listening to you, I
- 15 really don't see how we have something that's narrower
- 16 -- narrower than the old section 3 of the APA. And if
- 17 you can give me an example, this is what the APA
- 18 shielded that would not be shielded under section 2,
- 19 maybe I would --
- 20 MR. YANG: Well, there were -- I can give
- 21 you a few examples from the legislative history, for
- 22 instance. One of the problems that Congress was
- 23 concerned with is that the old exemption, exemption in
- 24 section 3, had been construed to apply to internal
- 25 management, including things such as phone books, agency

- 1 phone books for personnel. That would no longer be
- 2 encompassed. Things like budgets that the agency
- 3 produces, that arguably would -- internal management,
- 4 that that would not be under the internal personnel
- 5 rules and practices of the agency.
- 6 And I think it's important to remember that
- 7 when Congress drafted this statute, it initially started
- 8 with internal personnel -- or, excuse me, internal
- 9 employment rules and practices and changed that to
- 10 personnel. In the report that effectuated that change,
- 11 the explanation and the only explanation was that that
- 12 change was similar -- made the exemption similar but
- 13 more tightly drawn than the APA's management exemption,
- 14 which at the time existed in another part of the
- 15 statute; it was a cross-reference.
- 16 When Congress then continued to revise the
- 17 statute, the House made very clear in the hearings, in
- 18 the House Report, and on the floor that its intent was
- 19 to cover these types of -- manuals and instructions to
- 20 agency personnel when doing so would risk the functions
- 21 that are at issue here. And when Congress in 1986
- 22 amended FOIA by adding -- or amending Exemption 7(E), it
- 23 ratified the existing rule. And it did so because -- it
- 24 ratified it and it had to -- it extended it in two
- 25 important ways.

- 1 Crooker left open the question or at least
- 2 made it vague as to whether prosecution guidelines would
- 3 be protected by Exemption 2. The reason that was
- 4 unclear is because the D.C. Circuit had previously
- 5 concluded in Jordan that Exemption 2 did not apply.
- 6 Crooker rejected all of Jordan's rationale, but then
- 7 someone enigmatically said, but we would reach the same
- 8 result. Justice Ginsburg's concurrence explained in
- 9 Crooker that this muddied the waters, and when Congress
- 10 revisited FOIA and Exemption 7(E), it specifically
- 11 provided an exemption for law enforcement investigations
- 12 and prosecutions. In doing so, it made clear that
- 13 whatever existed of Jordan was gone. It also did
- 14 something else --
- 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I would have thought
- 16 that the amendment to Exemption 7 really cut the other
- 17 way. They amended Exemption 7; they didn't amend
- 18 Exemption 2.
- MR. YANG: Well, they amended Exemption 7 --
- 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: To adopt more or
- 21 less Crooker, right?
- MR. YANG: To adopt Crooker in certain
- 23 areas.
- 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes. Exactly, not
- 25 this one.

- 1 MR. YANG: Well, no, I think what it did is
- 2 it took Crooker as understood, but what it did is with
- 3 respect to law enforcement records -- and remember it's
- 4 only records compiled for law enforcement purposes that
- 5 would disclose techniques, procedures, or guidelines for
- 6 investigations or in prosecutions. In that context,
- 7 Congress lowered the bar. It provided more protection
- 8 for those law enforcement records than Crooker did.
- 9 This is part of what Congress was doing in
- 10 Exemption 7 more generally, and this Court's decision in
- 11 Reporters Committee discusses this. Before '86,
- 12 Exemption 7 applied where disclosure would cause much of
- these harms, these enumerated harms. Congress changed
- 14 "would" through most of the sub-provisions of Exemption
- 7 to "could reasonably be expected to," and they did so
- 16 also in Exemption 7(E) where -- with respect to the
- 17 guidelines provision.
- 18 When guidelines for law enforcement
- 19 investigations or prosecutions could reasonably be
- 20 expected to circumvent the law, that's what the
- 21 exemption covers. In doing so, it's providing --
- 22 Congress decided to extend Crooker. It extended the
- 23 protections by lowering the bar in '86, and it also, as
- 24 we have discussed, did so to specifically address the
- 25 D.C. Circuit's decision in Jordan, or at least what

- 1 might have been left of that after Crooker.
- We see that as simply building on the back
- 3 of Crooker, and it did so specifically in the -- the law
- 4 enforcement context, but it did so with the premise that
- 5 Crooker had properly understood Exemption 2. And it's
- 6 important to remember that law enforcement context in
- 7 the Exemption 7(E) will only apply in a certain subset
- 8 of instances. It has to be compiled for law enforcement
- 9 purposes; it has to be -- disclose techniques,
- 10 procedures, or guidelines for law enforcement
- 11 investigations or prosecutions --
- 12 JUSTICE BREYER: What happens -- I'm just
- 13 curious -- on -- if you classify -- suppose you have a
- 14 document, "in case of emergency, these are the
- 15 evacuation procedures of a big Federal building. And
- 16 now you want to show that to the firemen, but you don't
- 17 want it to be in the newspaper. All right. And the
- 18 firemen don't have classifications, and they aren't
- 19 cleared.
- MR. YANG: Right.
- JUSTICE BREYER: But I guess if -- in order
- 22 to see it, they'd have to be cleared.
- MR. YANG: They would have -- right. Be --
- 24 JUSTICE BREYER: How long does it take,
- 25 approximately, roughly, to clear a fireman so that he

- 1 could, in fact, see the evacuation manual from the
- 2 Federal building?
- 3 MR. YANG: I don't know exactly --
- 4 JUSTICE BREYER: Can you give me a rough
- 5 idea?
- 6 MR. YANG: I'm -- this is going to --
- 7 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. Thank you.
- 8 MR. YANG: I'm going to speculate a little
- 9 bit on this --
- 10 JUSTICE BREYER: Thank you. Right.
- 11 MR. YANG: But -- and if I am wildly off,
- 12 we'll let the Court know. I think it's on the order of
- 13 6 months, but it could be longer.
- 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: For what level of
- 15 classification? I gather the investigation of the
- 16 person is quite different depending upon what level you
- 17 want, if you want to give --
- 18 MR. YANG: I think that's for the basic
- 19 secret, but I would have to -- again, I don't have a
- 20 precise answer for the Court, and we could provide a
- 21 more fulsome answer after --
- 22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The lower things
- 23 below secret --
- MR. YANG: Right.
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Are those sufficient

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1 classifications to prevent disclosure under FOIA?
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- 2 MR. YANG: Yes.
- 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What is it,
- 4 sensitive?
- 5 MR. YANG: Confidential, I believe. But
- 6 yes. Yes. Anything --
- 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And so, if you label
- 8 something confidential, you don't have to disclose it
- 9 under FOIA?
- 10 MR. YANG: Right. But classification is not
- 11 something that the executive can do, of course, just
- 12 willy-nilly. There are certain criteria that have to be
- 13 satisfied, and there are certain practical storage,
- 14 access requirements that come with classification.
- 15 JUSTICE ALITO: Do you think it's --
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel --
- JUSTICE ALITO: Do you think it's practical
- 18 to classify all of the information that might have
- 19 security implications?
- 20 MR. YANG: I think it's difficult. And
- 21 certainly --
- JUSTICE ALITO: Architectural designs --
- MR. YANG: Yes. I don't --
- JUSTICE ALITO: -- passwords.
- MR. YANG: I don't think if we go that far,

- 1 it is practical. Plus, in many contexts, there won't
- 2 have -- there won't be national -- cognizable injury to
- 3 the national security, which is the touchstone of
- 4 classification. So there are things -- you know, there
- 5 are many types of information out there -- for instance,
- 6 internal procedures regarding computer security for
- 7 agencies -- that just would not normally be thought of
- 8 as something that's classified.
- 9 Agencies also provide guidance to personnel;
- 10 for instance, in screening Medicare claims that come in.
- 11 Medicare --
- 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm sorry. You
- 13 wouldn't regard internal security procedures for
- 14 computer systems as confidential?
- 15 MR. YANG: Not classified as confidential.
- 16 In order to be classified, there has to be a
- 17 determination by the original classifying authority of
- 18 many things, but, among other things, it has to show
- 19 that disclosure of the information could reasonably be
- 20 expected to damage the national security.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Would you classify those
- 22 as internal procedural rules -- personnel rules? And
- 23 would you also classify architectural specifications as
- 24 internal personnel rules?
- MR. YANG: It depends on context. I think

- 1 the computer security instructions to personnel, how you
- 2 access and what criteria you must build your computer
- 3 systems to be secure at -- I think that would be deemed
- 4 as internal rules and practices for -- of an agency.
- 5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: What about architectural
- 6 specifications?
- 7 MR. YANG: It can. I mean, I think it's a
- 8 little misleading to talk about architectural
- 9 specifications or maps. Those are simply methods by
- 10 which you convey information. You could also write
- 11 things out longhand. It would take a lot longer, but
- 12 you could write out the same information longhand. So
- 13 long as it fits within the rubric of internal personnel
- 14 rules and practices of an agency -- that is, it is
- 15 providing guidance, it is providing rules and practice
- 16 for the agency's personnel to follow in conducting the
- 17 agency's function -- it could well be deemed to fall
- 18 within Exemption 2. Not everything would be, but
- 19 certain things can.
- 20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So, basically, anything
- 21 that the agency uses to craft its internal employee
- 22 practices and rules gets swept up as private, as
- 23 internal?
- MR. YANG: No. No, no, no.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: If -- if --

- 1 MR. YANG: It certainly would be personnel
- 2 rules and practices of an agency to be properly deemed
- 3 internal. That's where you -- the circumvention prong
- 4 comes in, of Crooker, and we believe that in order to be
- 5 properly deemed internal, the disclosure would
- 6 significantly risk circumvention of the agency's
- 7 functions.
- 8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So you are taking out
- 9 the records related to personnel and not making it a
- 10 condition of the disclosure. You're saying if any
- 11 document circumvents the agency's functioning, that's
- 12 exempted.
- 13 MR. YANG: I -- .
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You're not tying --
- 15 that's where I'm confused.
- 16 MR. YANG: I didn't mean -- if I gave that,
- if I said so, I certainly didn't mean to give that
- 18 impression. There are certain --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So, how does --
- 20 MR. YANG: There are two different --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How do the documents
- 22 that the agency reviews to determine and craft its
- 23 internal rules and practices fall under the rubric of
- 24 being related to, solely related to, personnel practices
- 25 and rules?

- 1 If they were created separately, if they
- 2 were created for multiple purposes, if they were --
- 3 MR. YANG: Well --
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- used in different
- 5 circumstances besides the relationship of employees to
- 6 others --
- 7 MR. YANG: I -- to bring us to, maybe, this
- 8 case, to give an example, this case involves the ESQD
- 9 information for Indian Island. That information is a
- 10 personnel rule or practice of the agency, or is related
- 11 to it, because it tells the Navy's personnel how to
- 12 store, how to move, how to --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The map doesn't. You
- 14 use the map to do the latter things.
- MR. YANG: Well, I guess it's a guestion of
- 16 how you convey that information. If you said you can't
- 17 get within 1,000 feet of point X and wrote that out as
- 18 an instruction, that's one way to do it. The map is
- 19 another way to do it.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Do you see --
- 21 MR. YANG: The map simply --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. I'm cutting
- 23 you off because your light is on.
- Do you see any difference between the
- 25 position you're taking and Crooker?

- 1 MR. YANG: No. We think that --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You formulate your test
- 3 very differently than Crooker does. What are those
- 4 differences?
- 5 MR. YANG: I think it's essentially the
- 6 same, and let me tell you why. Crooker uses the
- 7 predominant internality test, right? And there's
- 8 essentially two things that the court is getting at
- 9 there. It says that that means that the agency function
- 10 at issue can have an impact beyond the agency. That was
- 11 kind of one -- one aspect of it.
- 12 And, two, the Court was concerned about not
- 13 having secret law; that is, things that the public would
- 14 have to know and use in interacting with the agency. We
- 15 think that that's essentially the same thing that we're
- 16 doing. And --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Yang, if -- if we assume
- 18 that a majority of this Court finds this statutory
- 19 interpretation untenable and that you lose, but that the
- 20 Court is also concerned about the government's reliance
- 21 interests here and about this set of documents that have
- 22 been exempted under Exemption 2 that would become
- 23 unexempt, is there anything that the Court can do about
- 24 that? Is there anything that the government would need
- 25 to -- to advance -- to deal with those reliance

- 1 interests?
- 2 MR. YANG: You're assuming that we lose the
- 3 case entirely.
- 4 JUSTICE KAGAN: I am assuming, yes. That's
- 5 just an assumption.
- 6 (Laughter.)
- 7 MR. YANG: All right. That's not an
- 8 assumption I like to deal with often, but -- well, I
- 9 think if the Court were to rule against the Government
- 10 on all respects, I think that that would leave us with
- 11 the option of returning to Congress. This Court, of
- 12 course, is free to opine on --
- JUSTICE BREYER: If you couldn't go return
- 14 to Congress and you had to classify documents falling
- 15 into the category that you previously thought dealt with
- 16 in Crooker, how long would that take? How many
- 17 documents would you guess there were in the Federal
- 18 Government? Millions? Thousands?
- 19 MR. YANG: There's a very large number of
- 20 documents where disclosure would circumvent the very
- 21 agency functions at issue, not all of which, and perhaps
- very many of which, would not be able to be classified
- 23 under Exemption --
- 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And all of which you
- 25 already have to review to compile the Vaughn index and

- 1 to make sure there are not other exemptions that are
- 2 applicable, right? You don't just grab a bunch of files
- 3 and turn them over. You look at them before you release
- 4 them under FOIA.
- 5 MR. YANG: That's true. It's just that the
- 6 Exemption 2 serves a unique and important function.
- JUSTICE BREYER: That wasn't my question.
- 8 My question did not concern those documents that were
- 9 requested. It concerns the category of documents that
- 10 might be requested --
- 11 MR. YANG: Right.
- 12 JUSTICE BREYER: -- which is every document
- 13 that might be requested.
- 14 MR. YANG: That's correct.
- 15 JUSTICE BREYER: And I wonder if it ranges
- 16 in the millions, tens of millions, hundreds of
- 17 thousands, 5,000, or if it --
- 18 MR. YANG: And it would be -- it would be a
- 19 very large number of documents, and it would not be
- 20 practical to take those case by case, and then of those
- 21 that might have some national security interest, go --
- 22 we -- there --
- 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You don't have to go
- 24 through everything. You have to go through the material
- 25 that is requested, and you go through that material

- 1 already.
- 2 MR. YANG: We do. There is a very large
- 3 number of FOIA requests.
- 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And it takes forever
- 5 to get the documents.
- 6 (Laughter.)
- 7 MR. YANG: The statute -- we are not usually
- 8 complying with the statute's 20-day --
- 9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Right.
- 10 MR. YANG: -- turnaround. That's correct.
- 11 The -- I think I ought to just note two more
- 12 things. Petitioner's reading of the legislative
- 13 history, I think, needs to be corrected in two respects.
- 14 The 1964 Senate report that Petitioner relies upon talks
- 15 about rules regarding parking, lunch hours, and sick
- 16 leave. That does not concern Exemption 2. That
- 17 provision is regarding what ultimately became section
- 18 552(a)(C)(2).
- 19 JUSTICE ALITO: Could I just nail down one
- 20 particular point? It is the view of -- you're
- 21 representing the Government, and it is the view of the
- 22 Government that classification is not a practicable
- 23 solution to the problem that's highlighted here.
- 24 MR. YANG: Correct, because not all the
- 25 documents here, even if there was time to review them,

- 1 would fall within -- excuse me -- not in this case, but
- 2 within the matter of Exemption 2, would not be able to
- 3 be classified. Exemption 2 addresses a special problem.
- 4 It addresses the problem of releasing documents where
- 5 the very release would frustrate the function of having
- 6 those documents in the agency -- for the agency.
- 7 And so there's no other exemption that does
- 8 that. And requiring Congress -- remember, this has been
- 9 the way this has worked for almost 30 years. There
- 10 would have to be a very large number of Exemption 3
- 11 statutes. Congress would have to go and enact them one
- 12 by one. It's not a feasible solution.
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- 14 Mr. Mann, you have 4 minutes remaining.
- 15 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF DAVID S. MANN
- 16 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
- 17 MR. MANN: There are two points I'd like to
- 18 focus again on, coming back to, is the word "personnel"
- 19 matters. When this case came to me, my client told me
- 20 that he could not get these maps that he had gotten
- 21 previously because the Navy was classifying them as
- 22 personnel documents. What is my reaction as a lawyer?
- 23 What? What are you talking about? I can read the
- 24 language of this statute. It's talking about a narrow
- 25 exception, which is exactly what Congress set up. Nine

- 1 narrow exceptions. The one open-ended one is the one
- 2 that Congress kept for itself, Exemption 3.
- If the Navy doesn't believe that these
- 4 documents can be or should be classified, but the Navy
- 5 doesn't want to release these documents for some reason,
- 6 then the Navy's recourse is to go to Congress as other
- 7 agencies have done and seek a special protection for
- 8 these documents. But it's not to distort the words
- 9 "personnel practices and rules" to expand to every
- 10 document that is used by personnel.
- 11 And that's precisely what the Navy is asking
- 12 for, on page 51 of their brief, and we responded to it
- in our reply. They're looking for an exemption that
- 14 covers a wide range of information concerning internal
- 15 rules and practices where disclosure would risk
- 16 circumvention and where other FOIA exemptions are
- 17 unavailable. They're asking you to create for them what
- 18 they -- what Congress wouldn't give them in 1964 or '66,
- 19 broad discretion. And it doesn't belong. It certainly
- 20 doesn't belong under the very narrow Exemption 2.
- If there are no other questions, I'm
- 22 complete.
- 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- The case is submitted.
- 25 (Whereupon, at 10:59 a.m., the case in the

1	above-entitled	matter	was	submitted.)
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18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
23					
24					
25					

A	23:24 24:7,19 26:2	appears 22:23 27:8	authorization 29:3	33:22 47:10
abandoning 19:15	26:2 29:17 32:21	appendix 22:9 26:19	available 4:6	big 40:15
able 48:22 51:2	33:4,5,9,10,18,21	applicable 49:2	a.m 1:13 3:2 52:25	bit 41:9
above-entitled 1:11	34:2,10,11,16,22	applied 39:12	B	blow 17:2,4
53:1	35:19,21,24 36:3	applies 9:12 35:18	-	blowing 21:2,10,11
abroad 12:5	36:25 37:2,5,20	apply 9:13,17 36:24	B 34:23	board 15:6
Absolutely 9:13	44:4,14,21 45:2,22	38:5 40:7	back 12:4 13:11	bomb 5:25 27:13,14
Abu 13:6	46:10 47:9,10,14	appropriate 13:16	16:19 17:13 21:15	books 36:25 37:1
accept 7:14 11:9	48:21 51:6,6	27:18 30:24	21:25 33:18 35:12	branch 4:25
acceptance 7:18	agency's 25:6 34:13	approval 11:13	36:10 40:2 51:18	BREYER 6:20 7:17
accepted 7:1,15	44:16,17 45:6,11	approved 8:2 11:18	backing 10:18	7:20,23 9:9,22
accepts 7:5,5	agree 17:10 25:23	approximately	bad 15:15 27:24	10:2 15:13 16:1,3
access 28:20 42:14	35:3	40:25	balance 24:20,21	16:6,21 17:7 19:25
44:2	ahold 20:25	arc 27:11,13,15,16	26:8	20:18,22 21:6
accessible 5:22	ALITO 4:20 5:14	27:21 28:23	balancing 4:4 27:18	40:12,21,24 41:4,7
account 11:17 34:20	22:12 30:10 42:15	architectural 5:24	banc 17:21 18:10	41:10 48:13 49:7
ACLU 13:5	42:17,22,24 50:19	42:22 43:23 44:5,8	23:21	49:12,15
Act 13:8	Alito's 12:12	arcs 27:11	Bangor 15:2 27:7,10	brief 24:3 28:4
add 4:5	allow29:23 31:11	areas 38:23	28:2,8	52:12
adding 37:22	allows 13:14	arguably 18:20 37:3	bar 39:7,23	briefly 28:4
additional 3:18,22	amend 8:19 10:10	argue 19:19 34:9	base 14:20,24 15:2	briefs 13:22
11:22	11:11,16 38:17	argued 17:11	22:9 23:1,4 27:13	bring 6:1,1 46:7
address 30:13 39:24	amended 18:3 22:24	arguing 14:12 19:23	based 5:2 35:5	broad 4:16 18:15
addressed 6:11	37:22 38:17,19	argument 1:12 2:2,5	bases 15:2 basic 24:4 41:18	19:21 36:1 52:19
16:17,21 17:8,11	amending 8:6,7	2:8 3:3,7 4:9 9:23	basically 44:20	broader 19:23 20:1
18:19 20:15,17	37:22	9:24 16:4,11,13	•	budgets 37:2
24:24	amendment 6:22	23:13 51:15	basing 23:23 basis 21:13,14,25	build 44:2
addresses 28:4 51:3	10:16 13:7 38:16	arguments 7:25	basis 21.13,14,23 beginning 13:18	building 5:21,25 6:1
51:4	amendments 3:21	10:18 16:6,7,9,9	begs 34:8	6:2,10 26:23,24
addressing 16:12	amends 8:23	asked 13:24 23:17	behalf 1:15,19 2:4,7	34:22,23 40:2,15
add-on 17:19	amount 26:13 27:14	,	2:10 3:8 23:14	41:2
adjective 36:2	analysis 10:21	52:11,17	51:16	buildings 15:15
adjudicated28:21	answer 10:2,5 41:20	aspect 47:11	believe 5:9 6:17	26:19,25
adopt 14:17 38:20	41:21	assert 19:10	10:17,19 13:2	bunch 49:2
38:22	answered 17:12	Assistant 1:17	14:15 16:17 18:7	Bureau 30:15
adopted 5:8 6:16	ANTHONY 1:17	associated 27:22	19:17 20:15 22:13	<u> </u>
advance 47:25	2:6 23:13	assume 11:2 29:10	22:18 24:5 25:14	$\frac{\mathbf{C}}{\mathbf{C}} = \mathbf{C} = \mathbf{C}$
affect 34:4	APA 36:12,16,17	47:17	28:5 31:13 42:5	called 9:7 30:11
age 35:13	APA's 37:13	assuming 17:16	45:4 52:3	captured 10:25
agencies 4:7 12:9	appeals 7:1 11:15	48:2,4	belong 52:19,20	care 21:9
13:23 23:20 43:7,9	11:17	assumption 48:5,8	best 25:18	case 3:4 7:4,12 9:12
52:7	appear 32:24	ATF 5:7	beyond 3:16 19:18	10:21 11:10,14,18
agency 4:6 13:11,15	APPEARANCES	authority 4:5 13:10	19:20 29:24 31:18	13:5 14:8,16,19
15:8 18:19 19:12	1:14	13:19 30:1 43:17	17.20 27.27 31.10	13.5 11.0,10,17
	l	l	l	I

19.24.20.22.24.10		42.14.42.10	17.17 10.2 10.4	40.11
18:24 20:23 24:10	circumstance 5:7	42:14 43:10	17:17 18:3 19:4	48:11
25:4,24 26:5 29:17	circumstances	comes 29:18 45:4	36:12,22 37:7,16	courts 4:24 23:20
40:14 46:8,8 48:3	28:15 29:8 46:5	coming 6:13 21:25	37:21 38:9 39:7,9	Court's 21:14 39:10
49:20,20 51:1,19	circumvent 18:18	31:9 51:18	39:13,22 48:11,14	cover 18:15 37:19
52:24,25	18:21 20:11 27:24	Committee 39:11	51:8,11,25 52:2,6	covered 3:21 8:10
cases 11:15,17 33:1	39:20 48:20	community 12:16	52:18	covers 6:3 39:21
33:2	circumvention 20:3	14:23 18:18	Congresses 8:22	52:14
case-by-case 27:17	20:7,9,12,20 21:3	compared 28:1	Congress's 11:3	craft 44:21 45:22
category 3:13 16:20	23:24 26:7 45:3,6	compile 48:25	conscious 10:13	crafting 24:2
18:15 19:21 36:14	52:16	compiled 39:4 40:8	consider 8:19 29:15	create 12:24 24:1
48:15 49:9	circumvents 45:11	complaint 34:11	considered 16:8,10	52:17
cause 39:12	city 23:3	complete 52:22	consolidate 9:6	created 5:8 25:5,10
certain 15:8 24:23	civic 15:18	complex 35:4	construe 25:16	25:15 46:1,2
26:10 27:16 29:7	civil 17:3	comply 34:4	construed 36:24	criteria 42:12 44:2
29:25 32:25 33:2	claims 43:10	complying 50:8	context 20:16 24:24	Crooker4:21 5:5,12
34:2,3 38:22 40:7	class 4:19	computer35:13	32:1,7,10 35:17	7:2,5,7,11,13,14
42:12,13 44:19	classification 28:22	43:6,14 44:1,2	39:6 40:4,6 43:25	7:18,20 9:6,14,17
45:18	29:23,23 30:21	concern 5:17,19	contexts 24:25	10:14,18,19,20
certainly 4:24 6:15	41:15 42:10,14	36:12 49:8 50:16	27:16 36:9 43:1	16:15 18:2,6,7,8
32:20 36:5 42:21	43:4 50:22	concerned 21:22	continued 37:16	19:2,2,19 20:4,19
45:1,17 52:19	classifications	36:23 47:12,20	contractors 30:21	21:7 23:21 38:1,6
cetera 34:12	40:18 42:1	concerning 52:14	control 15:10	38:9,21,22 39:2,8
chance 15:20	classified 14:9	concerns 49:9	conversation 32:5	39:22 40:1,3,5
change 6:16 37:10	28:13 30:3,6,17	concluded 38:5	convey 44:10 46:16	45:4 46:25 47:3,6
37:12	43:8,15,16 48:22	conclusion 16:10	correct 10:6 15:12	48:16
changed 5:15 6:14	51:3 52:4	concurrence 38:8	18:7 21:6 49:14	Crooker's 9:11
37:9 39:13	classify 28:14,18,19	condition 45:10	50:10,24	23:23
changes 8:21 23:7	29:5,10,11,20	conduct 27:17	corrected 50:13	cross-reference
characterized 33:3	30:22 31:7 40:13	conducted 4:4	corridors 15:14	37:15
charter 36:1	42:18 43:21,23	conducting 44:16	counsel 12:10 23:11	curiosity 22:13
Chief 3:3,9 23:11,15	48:14	confidence 24:24	42:16 51:13 52:23	curious 40:13
28:11,17 29:4,9,16	classifying 30:1	29:1	countervailing 26:5	current 22:14
30:25 31:6,9 38:15	43:17 51:21	confidential 42:5,8	couple 23:10	currently 13:2
38:20,24 41:14,22	clear 3:25 11:25	43:14,15	course 14:7 42:11	cut 38:16
41:25 42:3,7 43:12	12:7 19:12,17	confines 22:23	48:12	cutting 46:22
48:24 49:23 50:4,9	25:17 37:17 38:12	conflict 4:16	court 1:1,12 3:10 5:6	
51:13 52:23	40:25	conform 10:13	5:8,13 7:1,24	D
chose 4:12 8:7,9	Clearance 30:11	confused 45:15	11:12,13,15,17	D 3:1
Circuit 16:8 17:12	clearances 30:24	Congress 4:3,12,25	12:7 17:21 18:13	damage 43:20
17:16,17,19 18:6	cleared 40:19,22	5:10 6:15,17 7:15	20:17 21:19 23:16	danger 13:13
19:22,24 38:4	client 15:1 51:19	8:2,5,17,17,18,20	23:17 25:14,16	dangerous 16:23
Circuit's 4:21 23:21	code 5:22 25:6	10:13 11:11,16,17	26:7 29:13 31:14	DAVID 1:15 2:3,9
39:25	cognizable 43:2	11:23 13:1,6,7,18	41:12,20 47:8,12	3:7 51:15
circulated 17:1	come 17:13 34:11	13:24,24 14:17	47:18,20,23 48:9	day 33:1

deal 4:23 47:25 48:8	28:18 36:8,9 41:16	47:21 48:14,17,20	6:6,9 9:12,13	47:22
dealing 5:7 13:6	45:20 46:4	49:8,9,19 50:5,25	16:22,23 17:9	exemptions 6:5 12:1
19:5	differently 47:3	51:4,6,22 52:4,5,8	30:12,15 38:11	14:11 24:21 49:1
deals 17:9	difficult 28:14 42:20	doing 10:7 11:22	39:3,4,8,18 40:4,6	52:16
dealt 5:10 48:15	disagreed 7:25 19:9	25:21 37:20 38:12	40:8,10	existed 37:14 38:13
debate 22:2	discharge 35:11	39:9,21 47:16	enigmatically 38:7	existing 37:23
December 1:9	discipline 25:6	drafted 37:7	entirely 48:3	expand 4:5 13:11
decide 4:7	disclosable 29:19	drawn 37:13	entities 30:23	18:7 52:9
decided 39:22	disclose 5:25 25:2	dual 34:5,5,18	entity 18:24 20:10	expands 21:24
decision 4:21,22 5:2	29:21 39:5 40:9	duties 33:1 34:19	20:11,13	expansion 7:13,15
9:6 10:13,15 11:12	42:8	35:11	enumerated 39:13	7:16 13:13
11:12,14 15:8	disclosed 5:23 25:10	D.C 1:8,18 4:21	ESQ 1:17 2:3,6,9	expected 39:15,20
16:15 17:16 18:2,4	26:11,16 27:4 29:2	16:8 17:16,17,19	ESQD 22:14,23	43:20
18:8,9 20:16,17	31:4,12	23:21 38:4 39:25	27:4,22 46:8	explain 26:20 34:24
23:21 25:18 39:10	disclosure 4:2 5:17		essentially 47:5,8	explained 24:4,25
39:25	18:17 20:5,6 39:12	E	47:15	28:7 38:8
decisions 8:22	42:1 43:19 45:5,10	E 2:1 3:1,1	et 34:12	explanation 37:11
deemed 44:3,17	48:20 52:15	easier 17:1	evacuation 40:15	37:11
45:2,5	discretion 4:6 13:19	easiest 24:18	41:1	explicitly 5:10
defense 13:5 17:3	13:20,24 52:19	Edwards 7:25 16:7	event 28:25	explosion 14:22
deference 5:1	discuss 10:20,21	16:14 17:25	exact 5:11	explosive 34:22,23
degree 5:3	22:2	effect 8:19 14:22	exactly 25:17 30:13	explosives 9:19
department 1:6,18	discussed 39:24	effectively 8:23	38:24 41:3 51:25	26:17
3:5 13:5,23 28:24	discusses 39:11	effectuated 37:10	examined 21:23	expressly 5:10
28:24 30:8,9	discussing 22:10	either 10:20 34:12	examiners 19:7	extend 39:22
depending 6:6 41:16	disrupt 23:17	element 24:5	21:18,22	extended 37:24
depends 32:1 43:25	disseminated 29:24	elements 24:4	examiner's 10:23	39:22
designed 14:6	dissent 7:10 18:10	eligible 28:21	example 5:20 6:7	extends 33:21
designs 42:22	dissenting 7:4	emergency 28:25	9:17 14:16 16:23	extension 21:20
detail 27:9	dissents 18:10	40:14	18:23 21:2 36:17	extent 14:12
detailed 18:9	distinct 11:25	employee 44:21	46:8	extraordinary 8:25
determination 43:17	distinction 26:1	employees 30:20	examples 36:21	extremely 3:13 4:13
determine 31:11	distinguish 33:15	46:5	excellent 16:8	4:17,19 5:6
45:22	distort 52:8	employment 37:9	exception 25:10,15	
determined 27:23	dividing 12:7,9	en 17:20 18:10	51:25	F
develops 34:10	dock 22:7,8,10,11	23:21	exceptions 12:5	face 19:4,5
dicta 18:20	23:5,6	enable 18:18	52:1	faced 5:6
dictates 3:13	document 15:9 20:4	enact 51:11	exclusively 24:11	facility 6:8 26:14
difference 32:18	24:10,18 28:19	enacted 13:3	34:16	27:7,10 28:8
46:24	30:11 40:14 45:11	enacting 4:3	excuse 37:8 51:1	fact 5:2 9:20 41:1
differences 47:4	49:12 52:10	encompass 32:22	executive 4:25	failed 8:18 11:16
different 8:16 15:18	documents 4:7,19	encompassed 37:2	29:22 42:11	failure 8:21 11:11
16:3,11,13 17:24	13:8 16:16 18:23	enforced 33:9	exempt 13:8 20:8	fair 18:4 31:15,16
22:14 26:8 27:12	29:5,11 31:2 45:21	enforcement 3:20	exempted 45:12	fairly 32:22 33:3
22.1120.021.12	27.5,11 51.2 T5.21		Chempted TJ.12	
	·	1	ı	'

fall 44:17 45:23 51:1	52:16	given 12:18 14:20	happen 9:15	impression 45:18
falling 48:14	FOIA's 3:23	14:23 15:1 27:7	happens 40:12	include 8:12
falls 7:12	follow 44:16	30:23	hard 11:4 34:23	includes 13:4 26:19
far 6:25 20:12 42:25	followed7:24	GLEN 1:3	harm 31:3	27:5
FBI 5:7 6:7 30:11	footnote 28:5,5	go 12:4 13:11 19:20	harms 39:13,13	including 15:1 36:25
feasible 51:12	force 29:1	29:17 31:1 36:10	hear 3:3	incorrect 22:19
Fed 9:17	forever 50:4	42:25 48:13 49:21	hearings 37:17	index 22:20 48:25
federal 5:21,24	forgetting 35:14	49:23,24,25 51:11	held 11:13 24:19	Indian 28:10 46:9
15:14 20:7 28:20	forgot 35:13	52:6	helps 33:15 35:20	individual 15:7
29:5 30:14,20	formulate 47:2	goes 33:18 35:12	high 3:22 5:9 7:3,5	individuals 6:8,10
40:15 41:2 48:17	foundation 25:18	going 17:22 21:15	7:10 8:12 9:7	infinitude 11:8
feels 13:15	four 3:11 7:25 16:6	29:20 41:6,8	10:22 14:3 16:20	inform 18:1
feet 46:17	free 48:12	good 15:17	highlighted 50:23	information 5:17
figure 11:4	front 9:10	goodness 35:16	highly 27:21	12:12,14,14,16,18
file 31:25 32:5,12,14	frustrate 51:5	gotten51:20	history 3:17,18,19	12:20 14:4,13 22:9
34:1	fulsome 41:21	govern 33:16,17	3:25 10:21 13:22	24:22 26:16 27:4,7
files 32:8,18,19 49:2	function 26:11 34:5	34:12,16 35:21,22	18:1,12,13 25:22	27:19,22,23 28:23
filled 17:18	34:18 44:17 47:9	35:23	36:21 50:13	30:16,18 42:18
final 8:14	49:6 51:5	government 19:6	hold 20:4	43:5,19 44:10,12
finally 4:3	functioning 45:11	21:18 24:22,23	honor 5:5 6:4 11:9	46:9,9,16 52:14
find 3:24,25 21:7	functions 34:25	26:9,11 29:6,17,25	11:19,21 14:14	initially 33:19 37:7
finds 47:18	37:20 45:7 48:21	30:20 47:24 48:9	18:5 22:17 25:6	injury 43:2
finish 24:15	further 23:9	48:18 50:21,22	hours 50:15	inquiry 35:20
fire 28:24 30:8,8		government's 47:20	House 3:19 19:3,3	inserted 5:11
fireman 40:25	G	governs 29:23 35:10	19:20 21:16,16	instance 26:19
firemen 15:16 17:2	G 3:1	grab 49:2	37:17,18	27:12 28:23 30:3,7
40:16,18	gap 17:17,18	great 4:23 5:3 23:2	humans 35:1,14,15	32:23 33:25 36:22
first 3:4,12 4:9 8:5	gather41:15	greater 5:17 14:11	hundreds 49:16	43:5,10
24:5	general 1:18 4:24	group 16:15	hypothetical 35:7	instances 30:22
fit 6:5 17:13	24:7	groups 15:18	H.R 32:14,19	40:8
fits 44:13	generally 10:14	guaranteed 9:14,14	,	instruct 32:23
Fletcher 7:4	27:4 32:4,16 35:15	guarding 6:8,8	I	instruction 46:18
Fletcher's 7:9	39:10	guess 16:25 40:21	idea 41:5	instructions 6:7
floor 37:18	getting 47:8	46:15 48:17	identified 22:18	32:22 37:19 44:1
focus 4:1 33:14,23	Ghraib 13:6	guidance 43:9 44:15	illogical 15:22,22	instructs 34:2,19
35:17,20 51:18	GINSBURG 6:19	guidelines 19:6	impact 47:10	intent 7:3 13:17
focused 3:18,19	6:21,25 11:1 17:15	21:17 22:4 38:2	implications 5:18	27:24 37:18
10:22	26:15,22 27:6 28:1	39:5,17,18 40:10	42:19	interacting 47:14
FOIA 3:21 4:3,5	36:10		implicit 11:13	interaction 35:23
5:24 6:2,5 23:18	Ginsburg's 19:9	H	importance 27:12	interactions 33:17
24:20 25:21 26:8	38:8	half 23:4	important 8:15 23:8	interest 23:3 24:22
29:18 31:10,14	give 13:25 15:10,16	hallway 5:21	27:11 30:7 37:6,25	25:1 26:3,5,9 31:4
34:1 37:22 38:10	36:17,20 41:4,17	handle 12:6	40:6 49:6	31:12 49:21
42:1,9 49:4 50:3	45:17 46:8 52:18	hands 15:21	importantly 7:11	interests 47:21 48:1
.2.2,5 .5.1 50.5				
	•	•	•	·

internal 3:14 4:11	
12:3,14,22 14:6	j
16:2 19:11 23:24	j
24:5,11,14,18,19	٠
25:2,5,20 26:1	_
33:20 34:6,13,17	_
35:18 36:24 37:3,4]
37:8,8 43:6,13,22	
43:24 44:4,13,21	
44:23 45:3,5,23]
52:14]
internality 20:6	
24:16 25:19 47:7	
interpretation 4:2]
7:24 9:11 17:24	1
23:18 47:19	
interpreting 7:21	1
11:1 17:21	_
	1
investigated 21:23	
investigation 30:15	
41:15	
investigations 38:11	
39:6,19 40:11	
investigative 10:22	
investigators 19:7	
21:18,21	1
investigatory 3:20	'
involves 24:21 28:8	
46:8]
Island 28:10 46:9	1
isolated 12:4 14:4	1
isolation 4:15	_
issue 4:10,22 9:5,6	
18:5 24:6,20 35:4	
37:21 47:10 48:21	
items 3:20	
]
job 31:1	
joint 22:8]
Jordan 9:5 38:5,13]
39:25	
37.43	١,

Jordan's 38:6

Judge 7:4,9,25 8:1

16:7,14 17:25 judges 17:20 judicial 3:22 8:22 24:1
K
KAGAN 31:19,23
32:3,9,14,17 47:17
48:4
keep 15:19
KENNEDY 14:7
34:21 35:6,12
43:21 44:5 kept 6:17 52:2
key 5:22 31:23,23
35:24
kind 12:18 32:14
47:11
know6:25 9:9,15
11:10,20 12:9
15:14,18,18 21:8,8
22:17,20 23:8 26:22,23,25 27:1
27:11,20 28:20
35:2 41:3,12 43:4
47:14
knowing 24:22
label 42:7
land 23:1,2
language 3:12,17,24
3:24 4:10 5:11
7:12,13 8:10 12:2
17:23 19:10 21:14
21:19 25:12 31:10 31:14 51:24
31.14 31.24

large 48:19 49:19 50:2 51:10 largest 22:7 **Laughter** 10:4 11:6 36:4.6 48:6 50:6 law3:20 6:6,9 8:17 8:19,23 9:12,13

10:21 11:4,5,8,11 16:22,23 17:9 30:12,15 38:11 39:3,4,8,18,20 40:3,6,8,10 47:13 **laws** 8:19 lawyer51:22 **leading** 4:21 10:21 20:16 leave 4:6 32:25 48:10 50:16 **left** 38:1 40:1 legislative 3:17,18 3:19,25 10:20 13:22 18:1,12,12 25:21 36:21 50:12 **legitimate** 12:11,13 12:19 25:1 26:3 **Let's** 31:20 level 41:14,16 **levels** 27:12 **light** 8:22 25:21 46:23 **limit** 10:15 14:16 18:14 limitation 15:19 **limited** 19:21 28:15 28:23 **line** 11:15 12:1,7,9 12:18 Listening 36:14 **little** 7:2 41:8 44:8 **loading** 22:7,8,10,11 23:4.6 local 28:16,24 29:1 30:8,8,12 **location** 26:13,14,16 logical 21:20 long 8:20 18:9 22:22 40:24 44:13 48:16 longer 5:12 17:19 37:1 41:13 44:11 **longhand** 44:11,12

8:5,6 10:8,18,19 11:24 12:5 13:22 32:18 49:3 looked 8:7 9:4 17:25 18:13,16 20:1 21:15,19 27:21 28:7 **looking** 8:11 12:5 13:14 15:4 16:14 16:15 18:11 19:2,3 20:19 21:17,21 52:13 **lop** 17:20 lose 47:19 48:2 **lot** 5:15 44:11 lower4:24 41:22 lowered 39:7 lowering 39:23 lunch 50:15 \mathbf{M} Magazine 28:10 maintain 24:23 27:14 maintained 24:7 majority 47:18 **making** 3:21 5:12 9:3,3 15:8 16:11 45:9 management 36:1 36:25 37:3,13 **Mann** 1:15 2:3,9 3:6 3:7,9 5:5 6:4,24 7:8,19,22 8:4,24 9:2,21,25 10:5,11 10:17 11:2,9,19,21 12:21 14:14 15:24 16:2,5,13 17:6,10 18:5 19:8,13,16 20:15,21 21:5,13 22:17 51:14,15,17 manner 33:2

manual 18:25 22:4

22:21 41:1

manuals 5:8 10:23 10:23 16:16 18:17 21:17 37:19 map 14:21,21,23 15:3,4,11 22:3,6,6 22:14,23,23 23:7 26:19 27:3,13,24 46:13,14,18,21 maps 14:18,20 16:25 22:3,19 27:11,16,21,22 28:12 29:10 44:9 51:20 material 22:1 28:7 30:22 49:24,25 **materials** 3:13,20 10:23,23 12:24 22:8 29:24 30:6 matter 1:11 51:2 53:1 matters 12:3 14:6 35:18 51:19 mean 7:18,20 8:17 9:19 11:4 14:9 15:21 16:6,21 18:8 19:16 22:1 29:10 29:16 30:19 32:6 33:8 36:11 44:7 45:16.17 **meaning** 10:15 31:20 meanings 36:8 means 24:6 31:15 32:10 36:2 47:9 **Medicare** 43:10,11 meets 20:5 merits 22:2 **met** 30:1 methods 44:9 mile 23:3 millions 48:18 49:16 49:16 **Milner** 1:3 3:4 minimize 15:20

look 3:16,17 4:14

minor 14:6	27:14 28:15,20	23:13	Petitioner's 50:12	precise 41:20
minutes 23:10 51:14	30:14 33:1 34:1,4	order 11:11 13:9	phone 36:25 37:1	precisely 52:11
misleading 44:8	47:24	21:1 29:22 40:21	photos 13:7	predominant 20:6
missed 20:1	needed 5:13 12:8	41:12 43:16 45:4	phrase 32:11	47:7
mixed 24:10	18:14	ordered 25:9	place 9:4 20:13	predominantly
months 41:13	needs 28:23 50:13	origin 36:11	21:10,12	23:23 24:11
morning 3:4,12	never9:15 13:17	original 6:13,13	places 12:16	premise 19:9 40:4
move 22:21 46:12	newspaper 14:25	10:11 30:1 43:17	plain 3:12,16,24 4:9	preserve 11:25
moves 19:1	22:15 40:17	originally 8:5	7:12 12:1,2 17:23	13:18
Moving 4:9	Nine 51:25	ought 50:11	25:12	pretty 36:1
muddied 38:9	Ninth 17:12 18:6	outcome 14:8	plans 5:24 20:23,23	prevail 7:7,10 14:8
multiple 46:2	19:22,24	outlined 17:23	20:25 28:25	29:11
munition 19:1 26:21	nonfederal 30:23	outside 29:5	please 3:10 23:16	prevailed 23:19
26:23	normally 32:12,12	overrule 11:12	Plus 43:1	31:17
munitions 16:24	43:7	overturned 9:15	point 3:23 8:14,15	prevailing 22:25
17:2 20:24 21:1	note 50:11		9:25 10:19 11:22	prevent 42:1
22:22 26:13,20	number 13:2 32:25	P	12:13 13:21 20:2	preventing 29:12
27:2,15 35:5	48:19 49:19 50:3	P 3:1	21:9 29:20 35:13	previously 22:16
	51:10	page 2:2 28:5,5	46:17 50:20	38:4 48:15 51:21
N		52:12	pointed 21:20	primarily 35:7
N 2:1,1 3:1	0	parking 50:15	points 3:11 8:4	private 23:1 44:22
nail 50:19	O 2:1 3:1	part 6:2,14 37:14	51:17	probably 24:18
narrow3:13 4:13,17	obviously 18:8	39:9	police 28:24	problem 14:19 24:9
4:19 51:24 52:1,20	19:18,19	particular 50:20	policemen 15:17	28:9 50:23 51:3,4
narrower 36:14,15	Office 35:25	particularly 27:15	policies 3:14 12:23	problems 36:22
36:16	oh 11:15 20:18	pass 10:14	policy 16:16 30:14	procedural 43:22
national 31:4,12	25:23	passed 8:17,20 9:20	portions 22:20	procedure 16:16
43:2,3,20 49:21	old 36:16,23	11:8 13:7	position 30:2 46:25	18:17 21:17 30:17
Naval 26:13 28:10	once 11:25	passing 11:3,5	positions 21:1	procedures 4:11
Navy 1:6 3:5 9:17	ones 27:1	passwords 42:24	possible 12:17 30:4	27:25 39:5 40:10
16:24 18:25,25	open 38:1	people 14:13,24,24	powerful 36:3	40:15 43:6,13
19:23 20:23 21:11	opened 19:22	15:9,11 17:4 21:22	practicable 50:22	proceeding 18:16
27:17,20 28:6,16	open-ended 13:15	28:20,21	practical 42:13,17	process 30:12 33:1
28:22 29:14 51:21	52:1	perform 32:25	43:1 49:20	34:3
52:3,4,11	operating 19:6 22:3	period 5:4	practice 23:18 34:6	produces 37:3
Navy's 18:16 46:11	Operating-5 18:25	person 21:12 35:7	44:15 46:10	profound 5:18
52:6	22:4,21	41:16	practices 4:12 12:15	promulgates 33:9
nearby 15:2	opine 48:12	personnel's 35:11	19:12 26:2 31:24	prong 45:3
nearly 4:22	OPM 36:2	pertaining 32:8	32:19,19,21 33:4	proper 13:10 28:22
necessarily 8:18	opportunity 10:24	pertains 35:10	33:13,15,16,21,22	properly 24:6,19
necessary 5:13 6:1	29:14	pertinent 30:16	34:13,13,17 35:4	25:1,20 40:5 45:2
17:20	opposed 35:22	Petitioner 1:4,16 2:4	35:19 37:5,9 44:4	45:5
need 6:23 7:6,8,9,14	option 48:11	2:10 3:8 23:17	44:14,22 45:2,23	proposal 10:9
12:4 14:2,17 24:23	oral 1:11 2:2,5 3:7	50:14 51:16	45:24 52:9,15	proposition 9:1,2,3

prosecution 38:2	41:16	refer 32:13	report 19:3,3,20	risk 12:17,24 20:24
prosecutions 38:12	quoting 12:8	referred 32:12	21:16,16 37:10,18	26:6 37:20 45:6
39:6,19 40:11	R	referring 32:2,3,4	50:14	52:15
protect 13:9	R 3:1	refers 32:8	Reporters 39:11	risks 20:7
protected 12:25	= :	reflects 24:19	representing 50:21	road 27:24
15:6 38:3	range 14:21 52:14	regard 43:13	request 15:3 29:18	ROBERTS 3:3
protecting 6:9	ranges 49:15	regarding 30:16	34:1	23:11 28:11,17
protection 14:17	rarely 17:23	43:6 50:15,17	requested 22:5 49:9	29:4,9,16 30:25
39:7 52:7	ratified 37:23,24	regulated 18:18,21	49:10,13,25	31:6,9 38:15,20,24
protections 39:23	rationale 38:6	18:24 20:10,11,13	requests 50:3	41:14,22,25 42:3,7
proudly 22:9	reach 18:14 19:21	21:11	require 13:10	43:12 48:24 49:23
provide 4:7 27:9,23	38:7	regulation 21:3	requirements 23:25	50:4,9 51:13 52:23
29:14 32:22 41:20	reached 19:24	23:24	42:14	room 17:24
43:9	reaction 51:22	regulations 18:19	requiring 51:8	Rose 12:8,10,19
provided 17:18	read 4:17 8:8 10:6	18:22 20:8	reserve 4:4 23:10	18:13,21 20:17
23:19 38:11 39:7	16:20 17:15 20:3	regulator 10:24 21:5	reserved 13:25	21:14 24:24,25
provides 30:17	20:19 22:20 25:18	reject 7:7,8,9	respect 39:3,16	25:17
providing 39:21	51:23	rejected 38:6	respects 48:10	rough 41:4
44:15,15	reading 8:11 19:2	rejecting 7:3 23:18	50:13	roughly 40:25
provision 39:17	31:15,16,16,17,20	relate 34:6,16 35:18	responded 52:12	rubric 44:13 45:23
50:17	32:20 50:12	related 3:14 4:10,13	Respondent 1:19	rule 25:13 34:1,5,22
public 12:11,14,16	reads 8:2	4:16,18 6:7 12:3	2:7 23:14	34:24 35:8,9,10
12:19 22:25 23:3	really 8:11 10:3 14:6	19:11 24:14 33:20	responders 28:16	37:23 46:10 48:9
24:21 25:1 26:3,11	14:12 18:2 36:15	45:9,24,24 46:10	29:2	rules 3:15 4:11,12
33:17 34:4,4,11,14	38:16	relates 24:16,17	response 29:18	12:15 19:6,11 26:1
34:20 36:13 47:13	reason 11:3,5 22:12	33:19	restaurants 23:6	31:24 32:21 33:3,5
public's 14:5 35:23	22:13 25:2 30:6	relating 12:15 35:21	restricted 15:20,20	33:8,12,15,16,20
published 22:15	38:3 52:5	relationship 46:5	restricts 28:20	33:22 34:3,7,10,17
purpose 3:23 4:13	reasonably 39:15	release 13:9,16 24:7	result 38:8	35:3,5,19,20,21
12:11 15:15,17	39:19 43:19	27:9,19 29:12 49:3	return 48:13	35:22 37:5,9 43:22
34:5	reasoning 12:19	51:5 52:5	returning 48:11	43:22,24 44:4,14
purposes 25:6 39:4	17:8	released 27:16	review 14:5 25:6,7	44:15,22 45:2,23
40:9 46:2	reasons 11:8 12:23	29:12	48:25 50:25	45:25 50:15 52:9
put 34:22,23	14:3	releasing 27:23 51:4	reviews 45:22	52:15
puzzled7:2	REBUTTAL 2:8	relevant 29:22	revise 37:16	
	51:15	reliance 4:23 5:3	revisited 38:10	S
Q	receive 28:21,22	47:20,25	right 16:5 20:21	S 1:15 2:1,3,9 3:1,7
question 5:14 6:14	recognize 6:15	relies 50:14	24:15 32:15 38:21	51:15
10:3 12:12 19:10	recognized 6:15	rely 13:11,17	40:17,20,23 41:7	safely 20:24
22:25 33:18 34:9	record 27:9 28:6	remaining 51:14	41:10,24 42:10	safety 22:2 27:25
38:1 46:15 49:7,8	records 24:6 27:4	remember 37:6 39:3	47:7 48:7 49:2,11	28:9
questions 23:9	29:18,19 39:3,4,8	40:6 51:8	50:9	satisfied 42:13
52:21	45:9	remove 13:19	rightly 16:24	saw9:5,5 17:17
quite 19:12,17 31:18	recourse 52:6	reply 52:13	rises 7:12	20:12

				_
saying 14:2 19:17	separately 46:1	Solicitor 1:17	statutes 13:2 20:7	take 11:16 14:3
26:7 31:10 36:8	serious 21:3	solution 50:23 51:12	51:11	34:20 40:24 44:11
45:10	serves 49:6	somebody 5:22	statute's 50:8	48:16 49:20
says 9:10 20:4 30:14	set 13:21 35:4 47:21	21:10	statutory 47:18	takes 50:4
34:22,25 47:9	51:25	sorry 28:17 43:12	stay 22:22	talk 24:16 31:19,20
Scalia 8:16,25 11:2	severe 12:17	46:22	stays 23:2	44:8
11:7,10,20 19:8,14	share 28:15,23 30:7	sort 18:3 24:1	stepped 13:6,7	talked 12:11
33:5,8,12 34:25	30:15,22	SOTOMAYOR	steps 17:22	talking 22:25 27:2,3
35:25	shared 14:11 28:16	10:9,12 12:10	stopgap 18:3	51:23,24
Scalia's 34:9	29:1,5	23:22 24:9,13 25:4	storage 28:9 42:13	talks 20:13 50:14
SCOTT 1:3	sharing 30:17	25:9,12,23,25 34:8	store 20:24 46:12	target 22:7
screening 43:10	sharp 12:7,8	42:16 44:20,25	stored 26:13,17,20	technically 21:11
scrutiny 14:10	shielded 36:18,18	45:8,14,19,21 46:4	stores 19:1	techniques 39:5
search 5:7	shielding 36:13	46:13,20,22 47:2	storing 9:18,18	40:9
Seattle 1:15 28:2	short 4:10	sought 20:5	strong 26:9	tell 23:22 47:6
Second 3:16	show 7:17,18 40:16	so-called 7:3	Submarine 15:2	telling 11:24 31:2
secrecy 4:2	43:18	special 51:3 52:7	submitted 52:24	34:10
secret 41:19,23	showing 14:21	specific 8:3 14:17	53:1	tells 46:11
47:13	shows 22:6	16:15	subset 40:7	tens 49:16
section 7:21 8:6	sick 50:15	specifically 6:11 8:9	sub-provisions	term 31:24 32:11,18
13:3,3 36:12,16,18	side 9:24 26:6,10	10:7 13:9 38:10	39:14	terrorism30:16
36:24 50:17	sides 16:9	39:24 40:3	sucked 33:6	terrorists 15:15
secure 15:5,5 23:2	signal 22:10	specifications 43:23	sufficient 4:1 41:25	test 20:5 47:2,7
44:3	significant 23:2	44:6,9	suggest 18:2 30:19	testimony 19:4
Securities 13:8	significantly 20:7	speculate 41:8	suggested 28:12	text 23:25 25:17
security 5:18 12:17	45:6	spoke 20:11	suggesting 17:17	textual 23:23 25:17
12:24 14:4 28:9	similar 37:12,12	squad 27:13	suggests 9:16 25:22	thank 23:11 35:16
30:11 42:19 43:3,6	simplistic 28:9	squads 27:14	summaries 25:4	41:7,10 51:13
43:13,20 44:1	simply 9:12 25:2	square 24:13	superfluous 8:13	52:23
49:21	40:2 44:9 46:21	standard 23:20	supports 4:2	theoretically 30:4
see 4:15 9:23 15:21	single 11:14 28:8	stands 23:6	suppose 5:20 35:25	theory 21:8,9 36:2
18:1 21:23 27:18	site 30:11	stand-alone 5:11	40:13	they'd 40:22
36:15 40:2,22 41:1	sites 27:1	start 12:5	supposed 33:9	thing 47:15
46:20,24	sitting 8:21	started 33:19 37:7	Supreme 1:1,12	things 6:3 14:9
seek 12:14,16 52:7	situation 30:13	state 10:7 30:12	sure 9:11 31:22	24:23 25:1 26:10
seeking 12:11	situations 28:2	stated 12:22	33:23 49:1	30:3 33:25 35:14
seen 23:5	size 5:25 14:22	statement 18:20	surely 29:4	35:16 36:25 37:2
seizure 5:8	small 27:14	States 1:1,12	surprise 22:7	41:22 43:4,18,18
Senate 50:14	solely 3:14 4:11,13	statute 4:18 7:13	surrounding 14:23	44:11,19 46:14
sense 16:14	4:17,18 12:3 19:11	11:16,24 17:22	swept 44:22	47:8,13 50:12
sensitive 27:15,21	24:14,17 25:5	18:4 25:15,16	systems 43:14 44:3	think 5:1,16,20 7:11
28:12 31:3,11 42:4	33:19,20,23 34:6	31:16,17,21 33:15		7:19,22 8:4,14
sentence 4:10	34:16 35:8,18,21	37:7,15,17 50:7	T	14:14 17:1 18:4
separate 22:19	45:24	51:24	T 2:1,1	24:3,12,17 25:15
		1	1	1

25:18,25 26:4	types 27:2 30:3 35:5	13:16 14:3 15:13	work 32:24	13:17 15:12,25
29:14 31:8,15 32:8	37:19 43:5	15:16,17,18,19,19	workable 23:20	16:20 17:14 22:1
32:9,11,21 33:2,7		16:20,25 17:2,3,4	worked51:9	23:19 24:5 25:20
33:11 34:9 35:3	U	30:5 40:16,17	workers 17:3	34:23 36:11,18
36:7 37:6 39:1	ultimately 50:17	41:17,17 52:5	world 5:15	38:3,5,18 40:5
41:12,18 42:15,17	unambiguous 31:16	wanted 36:14	worried21:12	44:18 47:22 49:6
42:20,25 43:25	unavailable 52:17	Washington 1:8,15	worry 20:24	50:16 51:2,3 52:20
44:3,7 47:1,5,15	unclear 38:4	1:18	wouldn't 33:6 43:13	20-day 50:8
48:9,10 50:11,13	underscore 30:5	wasn't 49:7	52:18	2010 1:9
thinks 7:6 16:24	understand 4:14	waterfront 23:6	write 44:10,12	23 2:7
third 3:23	28:18	waters 23:1 38:9	wrong 15:21	
thoroughly 8:1	understanding	way 9:20 18:15 34:2	wrongly 16:24	3
thought 17:21 19:8	25:19	34:3 38:17 46:18	wrote 46:17	3 2:4 4:5 6:12,18,20
19:14 26:16 27:6	understood 25:20	46:19 51:9		13:3,3 14:1,15
36:11 38:15 43:7	39:2 40:5	ways 5:15 12:23	X	36:12,16,24 51:10
48:15	undertaken35:1	37:25	x 1:2,7 46:17	52:2
thousands 48:18	unexempt 47:23	weapons 28:8	T 7	30 4:22 23:18 31:18
49:17	unfortunately 29:2	Web 30:11	<u>Y</u>	51:9
three 8:4 24:4	unique 49:6	Wednesday 1:9	year 13:4	
thresholds 29:25	United 1:1,12	weighed 7:1	years 4:22 23:18	4
tie 12:12	unnecessary 3:22	well-written 18:9	31:18 51:9	4 51:14
tightly 37:13	unsafe 21:2	went 8:1 19:18	0	5
time 5:4 8:7 13:15	untenable 47:19	weren't 28:13	09-1163 1:5 3:4	5 28:5
23:7 37:14 50:25	use 4:12 12:2 15:12	we'll 3:3 41:12	09-1103 1.3 3.4	5,000 49:17
times 6:14,16	15:15,17 17:14	we're 13:13 14:2	1	5:00 32:25
told 51:19	20:23,25 24:11	15:4 16:19 20:19	1 1:9 34:23	51 2:10 52:12
torture 31:10,14	46:14 47:14	21:15,21,22 22:25	1,000 46:17	552(a)(C)(2) 50:18
totality 10:8	uses 44:21 47:6	27:2,3 29:20 36:7	10 33:1	332(a)(C)(2) 30.10
touchstone 43:3	usually 50:7	47:15	10:01 1:13 3:2	6
town 23:6	$\overline{\mathbf{v}}$	we've 11:14 13:21	10:59 52:25	6 32:2,4,8 41:13
training 28:22	v 1:5 3:4 13:5	wholly 14:10	14 22:18	66 52:18
Trident 15:2	vague 38:2	wide 15:14 52:14	150 13:1	
tried 13:18	vague 36.2 variety 6:5	wildly 41:11	153 13:2	7
true 7:5 29:7 31:6	Variety 6.5 Vaughn 12:8 22:19	Wilkey 8:1	1964 50:14 52:18	7 6:5,20,22,22 8:3,7
32:16 35:15 49:5	48:25	willy-nilly 42:12	1981 5:16,19	8:9,10 9:20 10:14
turn 49:3	version 22:14	win 7:6	1986 3:21 5:9 9:4	17:9,9,11,11,13
turnaround 50:10	view4:14 50:20,21	withdrawn 14:10	11:23 16:18 37:21	38:16,17,19 39:10
turning 25:19	viewpoint 7:9	withhold 15:8		39:12,15
two 24:24 28:1	virtually 34:12	withholding 14:13	2	7(A) 5:12 9:8
37:24 45:20 47:8	visible 22:10 23:4	wonder 49:15	2 3:12,22 5:9 6:23	7(E) 7:16 8:12 9:10
47:12 50:11,13	visible 22.10 23.4 vis-à-vis 34:14	word 31:23 51:18	7:3,6,10,21 8:3,6,6	9:10 10:25 12:6
51:17	V15-4-V15 J4.14	words 4:12,14 20:1	8:12,12 9:7,11	16:18 37:22 38:10
tying 45:14	W	20:19 21:16 23:25	10:10,13,22 12:1,2	39:16 40:7
type 26:13,20,23	want 9:10,16 10:24	24:14 52:8	12:22 13:11,12,14	7(F) 6:10
	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,			

			Page 63
8 8 28:5 84 9:4 86 9:4 39:11,23 9 9/11 27:10			
9:00 32:24			
		·	