1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES	
2	x	
3	CLIFFORD B. MEACHAM, :	
4	ET AL., :	
5	Petitioners :	
6	v. : No. 06-1505	
7	KNOLLS ATOMIC POWER :	
8	LABORATORY, AKA KAPL, :	
9	INC., ET AL. :	
10	x	
11	Washington, D.C.	
12	Wednesday, April 23, 2008	
13		
14	The above-entitled matter came on for ora	
15	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States	
16	at 11:15 a.m.	
17	APPEARANCES:	
18	KEVIN K. RUSSELL, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf	
19	of the Petitioners.	
20	DARYL JOSEFFER, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor	
21	General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on	
22	behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae,	
23	supporting the Petitioners.	
24	SETH P. WAXMAN, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of	
25	the Respondents.	

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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(11:15 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument
4	next in Case 06-1505, Meacham versus Knolls Atomic Power
5	Laboratory.
6	Mr. Russell.
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN K. RUSSELL
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
9	MR. RUSSELL: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
LO	please the Court:
L1	This case presents a single important but
L2	narrow question. Everyone agrees that under the
L3	reasonable factor other than age provision of the Age
L4	Discrimination in Employment Act, a business practice
L5	that is reasonable is not unlawful even if it has a
L6	disparate impact on older workers. The question here is
L7	simply what happens in cases in which the proof on
L8	reasonableness is in equipoise, which party bears the
L9	risk of nonpersuasion. And on that question the statute
20	is not silent such as to leave to the courts to decide
21	for themselves what answer makes the most sense.
22	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is there a hypothetical
23	universe where a scheme that discriminates on the basis
24	of age is reasonable, but there is another alternative
25	that doesn't discriminate on the basis of age? Is the

- 1 first alternative still reasonable, or does the
- 2 existence of a nondiscriminating alternative make it
- 3 unreasonable?
- 4 MR. RUSSELL: This Court made quite clear in
- 5 City of Jackson that the existence of alternatives,
- 6 while sufficient perhaps to satisfy Wards Cove and to
- 7 show a violation under Section 4(a)(2), is not
- 8 sufficient to show that the action is unreasonable. And
- 9 that's what the Court found to be the case in Smith. So
- 10 the standards are, in fact, quite different.
- 11 The reasonable factor other than age
- 12 provision looks at the reasonableness of the actual,
- 13 existing practice, and that's where the "because of age"
- 14 refers to the business practice there. It doesn't --
- 15 JUSTICE KENNEDY: If that's true, then is it
- 16 necessary either on the burden of production or burden
- 17 of persuasion aspect of the case to consider other
- 18 alternatives?
- 19 MR. RUSSELL: It is in our view necessary in
- 20 order to decide whether there is a --
- 21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Why is it necessary in
- 22 light of the answer you gave me at the outset?
- MR. RUSSELL: It is necessary in order to
- 24 establish whether you even get to the RFOA provision.
- 25 By its terms --

1	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Whether you even get to
2	MR. RUSSELL: Even get to it, because by its
3	terms the RFOA provision only applies to conduct that is
4	otherwise prohibited by Section $4(a)(2)$ , and the test
5	for whether something is otherwise prohibited under
6	Section 4(a)(2) is Wards Cove.
7	This Court in Smith said that language,
8	which was identical to the language Congress used to
9	describe the unlawful- employment practice in Title VII,
10	has the same meaning in both statutes. And in order to
11	establish a violation of Wards Cove, you do have to
12	often look at questions of alternatives.
13	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Russell, this is the
14	problem that I have with your double inquiry. First,
15	you decide business necessity. Then you decide
16	reasonable factor other than age. Once you determine
17	that there is no business necessity, there is a readily
18	available alternative, so what you're left with is a
19	pretext for age discrimination, what what function is
20	there for anything else to perform?
21	I mean, I understand the business necessity,
22	whether you have it pre-1991 or post, but I don't
23	understand putting this other test on top of it. It
24	sounds like you're making it harder for the for the
25	plaintiff.

1	MR. RUSSELL: Well, we think that the
2	layering of the tests arises out of the structure of the
3	statute as Congress wrote it. If this Court disagrees
4	with us, however, and thinks that there is room in the
5	statutory language to treat the language of 4(a)(2)
6	differently in some sense or to apply a different Wards
7	Cove test, then you're still left with the question of
8	who bears the burden of reasonableness.
9	And on that grounds we agree entirely with
10	the EEOC that that question is still determined by the
11	language of the statute, which makes quite clear that
12	Congress thought that this was an exception to liability
13	upon which the employer bears the burden of proof. And
14	it made that made that clear both by setting the RFOA
15	up as an exception to liability, which this Court has
16	long told Congress will be construed as establishing an
17	affirmative defense absent strong indications of
18	contrary legislative intent, and by sandwiching that
19	defense in the same sentence as two other affirmative
20	defenses, which would be a very strange thing to do if
21	Congress in fact intended the courts to figure out, you
22	know, one of the three is not like the others, That it's
23	intended, instead, as a modification of the definition.
24	And, third, Congress I think it it does,
25	and it is telling that, in defining the unlawful

- 1 employment practice, that is in defining the plaintiff's
- 2 case in chief, Congress used the same language that it
- 3 did in Title VII, and this Court has never construed
- 4 that language to require proof of unreasonableness.
- 5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, your friend,
- 6 of course, makes the point that the age discrimination
- 7 prohibition is narrower in scope than Title VII, that
- 8 there are more likely to be instances in which a
- 9 reasonable factor other than age came into play than
- 10 there would be a basis for discrimination on the basis
- 11 of race.
- 12 MR. RUSSELL: We acknowledge that. This
- 13 Court pointed out in Smith that Congress itself
- 14 recognized that there was a difference between age and
- 15 other kinds of discrimination; but it took that
- 16 difference into account not by defining the unlawful
- 17 employment practice differently, but by providing age
- 18 discrimination defendants a capacious defense that's not
- 19 available to any other defendant in a Federal employment
- 20 discrimination statute, and by in 1991 not extending the
- 21 modifications to Wards Cove to ADEA plaintiffs.
- 22 Congress already specifically addressed this
- 23 question of whether Wards Cove should be adjusted in
- 24 order to make age discrimination claims harder to prove
- 25 than Title VII claims, and it agreed that it should; but

- 1 it didn't do it in the way that Respondents suggest.
- 2 Instead they lowered the bar for Title VII plaintiffs
- 3 and left in place the Wards Cove test for age
- 4 discrimination.
- 5 JUSTICE ALITO: Isn't it a strain to say
- 6 that an employment practice was because of an
- 7 individual's age, but at the same time was based on
- 8 reasonable factors other than age?
- 9 MR. RUSSELL: Well --
- 10 JUSTICE ALITO: Doesn't the latter negate
- 11 the former or come very close to negating the former?
- 12 And if that's the case doesn't that suggest that it's
- 13 not really an affirmative defense but what's necessary
- 14 to show liability?
- 15 MR. RUSSELL: I don't think it does. We use
- the example in our brief of a weight-lifting
- 17 requirement. It's quite possible for that requirement,
- 18 and quite likely, that it will have a disparate impact
- 19 on older workers because of their age. The effect will
- 20 be felt by workers because of their age. At the same
- 21 time, it is quite possible that that practice itself
- 22 will be entirely reasonable. And the difference is
- 23 between what the "because of age" refers to in the two
- 24 different provisions.
- 25 So if you look on page 3 of the blue brief,

- 1 you have the language of the RFOA provision, and the
- 2 reasonable -- the "factors other than age" refers to in
- 3 that case the differentiation, that is the business
- 4 practice itself. But if you turn to the prior page on
- 5 page 1A and look at the language of (a)(2), the business
- 6 practice, that is, the limiting, segregating, or
- 7 classifying, doesn't have to be because of age. There
- 8 wouldn't be a disparate treatment claim. Instead what
- 9 "because of age" refers to there is the effect of that
- 10 facially neutral practice. That is, the employee has to
- 11 show that the neutral practice deprives or tends to
- 12 deprive people of opportunities because of their age.
- 13 And the way that you do that is through the
- 14 first step of the Wards Cove analysis, by showing that
- 15 the practice falls more heavily on older workers as a
- 16 group, so that you can reach the conclusion that the
- 17 plaintiff is feeling the effect because of her age as
- 18 opposed to because of her sex or some other reason
- 19 specific to her. So it's not the fact that a showing of
- 20 RFOA negates the showing that a disparate impact is felt
- 21 because of age by the plaintiff.
- 22 As we were -- as I was mentioning before,
- 23 the language of the statute we think strongly points in
- 24 favor of an ordinary reading of this as an affirmative
- 25 defense. The Respondent's principal objection is that

- 1 this doesn't give adequate weight to the differences
- 2 between age and other forms of discrimination. But as I
- 3 mentioned, we -- we do think that Congress took that
- 4 into account in a different way, and there is, we think,
- 5 quite an important value here in providing Congress
- 6 clear rules of interpretation so that it knows when it
- 7 enacts statutes using a particular formulation the
- 8 courts will construe it in an ordinary way, absent some
- 9 compelling indication to the contrary.
- 10 We recognize, of course, in Betts that this
- 11 Court found such a compelling counter-indication in the
- 12 legislative history of that statute, and in the -- the
- 13 law's traditional treatment of benefits -- retirement
- 14 benefits and seniority rights. But Respondents can't
- 15 point to any kind of similar showing in this case that
- 16 Congress would have intended this catch-all provision to
- mean something other than what it seems to say.
- 18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The expression comes from
- 19 the Equal Pay Act, with a substitution. In the Equal
- 20 Pay Act it's "any other factor other than sex" and here
- 21 it's "a reasonable factor other than age." And my
- 22 impression is that that formulation in this Equal Pay
- 23 Act has been rather problematic. First, you have to
- 24 find there is a differential between the pay of men and
- 25 the pay of women, so -- and then you go to any other

- 1 factor other than sex.
- 2 Are you suggesting any different analysis
- 3 for the age category than for the sex category.
- 4 MR. RUSSELL: Well, certainly what you have
- 5 to show before you get to the defense is different in
- 6 the two statutes. They are similar in the sense that
- 7 neither requires proof of intentional discrimination.
- 8 For example, in Corning Glass Works all the plaintiffs
- 9 showed there was that a facially neutral practice, that
- 10 is paying the night shift folks more than the day shift
- 11 folks, resulted in women getting paid less than men for
- 12 the same work, and that was sufficient to shift the
- 13 burden over to the employer to show that it was based on
- 14 any other factor other than age.
- 15 And in here we think that it's similar, that
- 16 the plaintiff has to show that a neutral employment
- 17 practice has a disparate impact on the basis of age. We
- 18 think in our view, in addition, the plaintiff has to
- 19 make the full Wards Cove showing that would be
- 20 sufficient in Title VII to establish liability
- 21 conclusively. And at that point, then the burden does
- 22 shift to the employer but it's a modest burden.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: The burden of production,
- 24 of course.
- MR. RUSSELL: Yes.

1	JUSTICE KENNEDY: And what about the burden
2	of persuasion?
3	MR. RUSSELL: The burden of persuasion as
4	well. We think that this is
5	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Why is it that if the
6	employer has the burden of production, and I assume that
7	is satisfied by his saying, here's the plan that we
8	used, here are the factors we used, here is the reason
9	we used them. What is so difficult for the what is
10	the difficulty in saying that the employee then has to
11	show that that is unreasonable?
12	MR. RUSSELL: Well, we think there are some
13	difficulties, but it's ultimately I think beside the
14	point. The question is not what rule would make sense,
15	but what does the statute what rule does the statute
16	contemplate? And we think by phrasing the RFOA
17	provision as a traditional affirmative defense
18	JUSTICE KENNEDY: You think the statute
19	doesn't make sense, so we don't

- 20 MR. RUSSELL: I think the statute makes
- 21 perfect sense the way it's written, but if you
- 22 disagree --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Your point that it's
- 24 sandwiched between two things that are clearly
- 25 affirmative defenses, BFOQ, the employer has the buried

- 1 of production and persuasion. And I forgot what the
- 2 third one --
- 3 MR. RUSSELL: The foreign law exception.
- 4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is also an affirmative
- 5 defense. So I take it your point is why should this
- 6 middle one be any different?
- 7 MR. RUSSELL: Yes, we think it would be
- 8 entirely odd for Congress --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, I'm well aware of
- 10 the statutory format here. But what I want to ask is
- 11 why is it beyond the employee's means and capacity to
- 12 show that this is unreasonable? It seems to me that
- 13 that's the gravamen of this case.
- MR. RUSSELL: I don't think it's beyond the
- 15 employee's means. I don't think it's an impossible
- 16 burden. Certainly Congress could have written the
- 17 statute in a way that imposed that burden on the
- 18 employees. We do think that it makes sense because --
- 19 that the factors that weigh in on the reasonableness
- 20 tend to be in the employer's possession and they have
- 21 better access to it; it makes sense for them to bear the
- 22 burden.
- But ultimately our argument isn't grounded
- 24 on the claim that it would be impossible for Congress to
- 25 have imposed that burden. It's grounded on the claim

- 1 that the text of the statute indicates that Congress
- 2 made a different decision, that is it accommodated the
- 3 employers' interests in dealing with the special facts
- 4 of age discrimination differently.
- 5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, if I find the text
- 6 of the statute neutral or at least not clear, then it is
- 7 proper for me to ask as a matter of efficiency where the
- 8 burden should be placed, is it not?
- 9 MR. RUSSELL: It is. It is. And my answer
- 10 is that we do think that most of the facts going to
- 11 reasonableness are in the employer's possession.
- 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but the facts
- 13 -- I mean, given discovery, that doesn't seem a very
- 14 compelling case. Once you require the employer to come
- 15 up -- in other words, the burden of production -- and
- 16 say, well, the reason we did it was this, then it's just
- 17 a matter of discovery. The plaintiff can say, oh, well,
- 18 then let me depose that person who is the head of, you
- 19 know, whatever the department. If it's for safety
- 20 reasons, for some reason, or training issues, well, then
- 21 we depose the person who is in charge of training or
- 22 safety and ask them those questions. And it doesn't
- 23 seem to me that the fact that the employer possesses the
- 24 information, given very liberal discovery we have, is
- 25 much of a factor.

- 1 MR. RUSSELL: Well, that's true in every
- 2 case in which informational disadvantages are cited as a
- 3 reason for putting the burden of proof on one party or
- 4 the other. Discovery can always mitigate that
- 5 disadvantage.
- But we ultimately think, you know, if you
- 7 find the statute so ambiguous as to think that it's a
- 8 really critical consideration of what makes the most
- 9 sense, then you ought to defer to the judgment of the
- 10 EEOC on this question.
- I would like to address if I could one
- 12 specific --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: But the argument was that
- 14 EEOC never spoke to disparate impact?
- MR. RUSSELL: Well, it's certainly clear
- 16 that the EEOC -- what their position is, and that they
- 17 read their regulation as addressing disparate impact;
- 18 and we think that, although it's an inartfully drafted
- 19 regulation, by using the terms "individual claim of
- 20 discriminatory treatment" rather than the term of art
- 21 "disparate treatment," the language is broad enough to
- 22 bear their reading, particularly when you see that it
- 23 was enacted in the aftermath of a Department of Labor
- 24 regulation that nobody disputes addresses
- 25 disparate-impact cases, and it has no indication that

- 1 they were disavowing that position.
- 2 But if I could address the one other
- 3 objective --
- 4 JUSTICE ALITO: In this area of the law,
- 5 "treatment" and "impact" are words that have
- 6 tremendously different meaning. Isn't it strange to
- 7 argue that they used the term "treatment" when they
- 8 really meant "impact"?
- 9 MR. RUSSELL: Well, I -- I think that the
- 10 terms of art are "adverse impact" and "disparate
- 11 treatment." And so that their failure to use either one
- 12 of those, I think, supports the idea that they weren't
- 13 talking about either one specifically. I agree, it's --
- 14 it's a hard to read regulation.
- 15 But if I could turn, for a moment, to the
- 16 Adams Fruit objection, which is Respondent's insistence
- 17 that this is not the kind of question that the Court
- 18 should defer to an agency on. My point is simply that
- 19 this is a substantive question of law. It's a question
- 20 of whether reasonableness is an element of the unlawful
- 21 employment practice in section 4(a)(2), the same kind of
- 22 question this Court asked in Smith when it decided
- 23 whether discriminatory intent was an element of the
- 4(a)(2) cause of action.
- 25 And the -- Congress has delegated authority

1	to the EEOC to address those kinds of questions. In
2	fact, it went so far as to delegate to the authority
3	delegate to the EEOC the authority not only to construe
4	the exceptions that are in the Act, but to create
5	additional exceptions. So I think Congress would be
6	very surprised, indeed, to find out that this is not the
7	sort of question to which it had delegated authority to
8	the EEOC to answer.
9	If I could reserve the remainder of my time.
10	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Counsel.
11	Mr. Joseffer.
12	ORAL ARGUMENT OF DARYL JOSEFFER
13	ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES,
14	AS AMICUS CURIAE,
15	SUPPORTING THE PETITIONERS
16	MR. JOSEFFER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
17	please the Court:
18	Congress enacted the ADEA against a settled
19	background rule that defendants bear the burden of
20	persuasion on affirmative defenses and other exceptions
21	to liability. And Congress made very clear in the
22	statute that the "reasonable factors other than age"
23	provision is precisely such an affirmative defense. It
24	did so first by saying that the provision applies to
25	activities that are "otherwise prohibited by subsection

1	A."
2	That has to mean that liability for
3	disparate impacts exists under subsection A without
4	regard to whether the employment practice is based on
5	reasonable factors other than age. The latter inquiry
6	is then a defense to the liability that would "otherwise
7	exist" under subsection A.
8	The second is a point that Justice Ginsburg
9	made, which is that this subsection (f)(1) lists three
10	different defenses right in a row. It appears to be
11	common ground that the other two are clearly affirmative
12	defenses as to which the employer bears the burden of
13	persuasion. And considering that all three are
14	introduced by the same "otherwise prohibited" language
15	and they are set forth in a single sentence separated
16	only by commas, there is no basis for distinguishing
17	among them.
1.0	Now the defendantly main argument gooms

- Now, the defendant's main argument seems --
- 19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I'm not sure that if the
- 20 statute contains three different conditions, three
- 21 different commands, that it follows that the procedural
- 22 implementations for all of these has to be the same.
- Do you have any authority for that
- 24 proposition?
- MR. JOSEFFER: No. I mean, it's just a

- 1 matter of how to interpret the particular statute. And
- 2 since our point here is that this is a subsection on its
- 3 face --
- 4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: If you want to say that
- 5 Congress was well aware of burden of persuasion, burden
- of production problems with affirmative action, then
- 7 they wouldn't have drafted it this way, that's one
- 8 thing. I'm not sure that that's true.
- 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: I suppose you could appeal
- 10 to the maxim noscitur ex sociis, couldn't you --
- 11 MR. JOSEFFER: Right.
- 12 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- and say if it's in with
- 13 two other chickens, it's probably a chicken?
- MR. JOSEFFER: Exactly. I mean, words are
- 15 generally known by the company they keep. And with
- 16 these three in a row, it would presumptively assume that
- 17 they are all --
- 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: These are not words.
- 19 They are operative provisions of law.
- 20 MR. JOSEFFER: Right. They are three
- 21 separate clauses that are set forth, introduced by the
- 22 same, in our view, dispositive language, which is the
- 23 "otherwise prohibited" phrase.
- It's also the only way to make sense of the
- 25 statute as a whole, because the defendant's view seems

- 1 to be that "because of age" under subsection (a)(2) and
- 2 "reasonable factors other than age" under subsection
- 3 (f)(1), should essentially be conflated such that the
- 4 second, more specific provision is essentially
- 5 surplusage.
- 6 JUSTICE ALITO: Do you think that "based on
- 7 reasonable factors other than age" in the ADEA means
- 8 something different from because of such -- I'm sorry,
- 9 that the -- because of an individual's age in the ADEA
- 10 means something different from because of such
- 11 individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
- 12 origin?
- 13 MR. JOSEFFER: It modifies -- it modifies
- 14 something different. "Based on reasonable factors other
- 15 than age modifies the underlying employment practice,
- 16 the differentiation. Over an (a)(2) -- and this was the
- 17 basis of the Court's decision in Smith in part --
- 18 "because of" does not modify the underlying employment
- 19 practice. It modifies the adverse effect of the
- 20 unemployment practice. In other words, the statute
- 21 refers to -- and this is on page 1a of the blue brief
- 22 appendix -- it refers to an employment practice such as
- 23 a classification that adversely affects an individual
- 24 because of that individual's age.
- 25 So "because of" logically modifies what

- 1 comes before it, which is "adverse effect." And that's
- 2 confirmed by the fact that the first sentence that talks
- 3 about the employment practices is written in the plural,
- 4 whereas "adverse effect" and "because of" are written in
- 5 the singular with respect to individual, which is
- 6 another point the Court made in footnote 6 in Smith.
- 7 And that also has to be the case because
- 8 disparate impact liability is not based on intent. It
- 9 doesn't matter why the employer draft -- has the
- 10 employment practice. What matters is the effect. So in
- 11 any disparate impact case there are two basic inquiries:
- 12 the first is, is there an adverse effect on the
- 13 protected class; and the second is, has the business
- 14 practice nonetheless justifiable.
- 15 And here Congress broke those two out.
- 16 Subsection (a)(2) addresses is there an adverse effect
- on the -- on the protected class. And then in (f)(1),
- 18 Congress specifically addressed the justification
- 19 standard. That's one reason that we disagree with
- 20 Petitioners about their four-part test. Here Congress
- 21 clearly -- here the first part of Wards Cove tells us
- 22 whether there is an adverse effect under subsection
- 23 (a)(2). But then when it comes to the justification
- 24 step, Congress clearly said that the justification is a
- 25 reasonable factor other than age. So there is no need

- 1 to read in a different justification standard from the
- 2 second and third prongs of Wards Cove.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: The problem is that you
- 4 would be making this provision more generous to the
- 5 plaintiff than -- for example, in Title VII the defense
- 6 is business necessity; the employer has the burden of
- 7 production; the employee has the burden of persuasion.
- 8 Here you'd read -- you're saying you come into the
- 9 covered category, you were shown because of age through
- 10 impact, and then the burden -- the total burden is on
- 11 the employer.
- 12 Am -- am I making myself clear here?
- 13 MR. JOSEFFER: I think -- I think I
- 14 understand the question. This statute is far more
- 15 employer-friendly in the standard than Title VII because
- 16 it relies on the reasonable factors -- the
- 17 reasonableness defense, which is a much lower standard
- 18 than the business necessity test under Title VII. That
- 19 reflects the fact that there are more innocent
- 20 explanations for age disparity.
- The separate question here, though, on
- 22 burden of persuasion, I think the key point there is
- 23 that in Wards Cove this Court only had the equivalent of
- 24 (a)(2) to work with. So it had not much textual basis
- 25 to go on with respect to the second and third factors of

- 1 Wards Cove and burden-shifting. The Court had to do a
- 2 lot of gap-filling once it recognized the disparate
- 3 impact claim.
- 4 Since then, however, in every one of these
- 5 related civil rights statutes that Congress has enacted,
- 6 it has spoken more clearly on the justification stage;
- 7 and has always in every one of these statutes put that
- 8 burden on the defendant. It did it in Equal Pay Act,
- 9 according to this Court's decision in Corning Glass. It
- 10 did it in the revised Title VII. It did it here. And
- 11 even in the Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress
- 12 specified that business necessity is a "defense."
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, I was
- 14 surprised not to see Chevron cited in your brief. What
- 15 -- what sort of deference do you think we should give
- 16 the EEOC regulations here?
- 17 MR. JOSEFFER: Auer -- in our view the
- 18 regulation itself as far as it goes is entitled to
- 19 Chevron deference, because it's a notice and comment
- 20 rulemaking pursuant to delegated legislative authority.
- 21 We recognize, however, that the regulation on its face
- is at best inartfully written; and therefore, the
- 23 question is how to interpret the regulation.
- 24 We think EEOC's interpretation of its
- 25 regulation in context is reasonable for a combination of

- 1 a few factors. First, the Department of Labor
- 2 contemporaneously enacted a regulation putting the
- 3 burden on the employer in all cases.
- 4 Second, when the EEOC took over rulemaking
- 5 authority, it didn't insert this unusual discriminatory
- 6 treatment language in there, but the EEOC's position at
- 7 that time and ever since has been that it did not intend
- 8 a substantive change.
- 9 And third, discriminatory treatment, while
- 10 it undoubtedly throws a real wrench in -- or wrinkle
- 11 into things -- excuse me -- and takes us out of Chevron
- 12 and into Auer, is not a term of art. Disparate
- 13 treatment is a term of art. The regulations otherwise
- 14 use the phrase "different treatment," but discriminatory
- 15 treatment is at best confusing, especially
- 16 considering --
- 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm sorry. I
- 18 thought Auer deference tells you how to interpret the
- 19 regulation. And having once interpreted the regulation,
- 20 you need to know what to do with it.
- 21 MR. JOSEFFER: My understanding of Auer
- 22 deference is that the agency gets deference as the
- 23 reasonable interpretation of its regulation. And the
- 24 agency has consistent --
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We know what the

- 1 regulation -- we give it deference; we know what the
- 2 regulation means. Now, does that regulation, as
- 3 understood in light of Auer deference, get Chevron
- 4 deference or something else?
- 5 MR. JOSEFFER: It would get Chevron
- 6 deference. I mean, I think the two-step process is the
- 7 regulation here, in our view, is clearly entitled to
- 8 Chevron deference as far as it goes. And if you defer
- 9 under Auer to the agency's view of its regulation, then
- 10 that makes the Chevron case. But it's through the lens
- 11 of Auer.
- 12 And finally, as a policy matter, Justice
- 13 Kennedy, one can reasonably place this burden of
- 14 persuasion either way. I mean this Court put it one
- 15 place in Wards Cove. Congress immediately abrogated
- 16 Wards Cove and put it in the other place. The sky is
- 17 not going to fall either way. But even if the text
- 18 wasn't so clear, one would logically put it on the
- 19 employer for a few reasons: First, all else being
- 20 equal, the employer is at least in a better decision to
- 21 explain the reasonableness of its very own business
- 22 practice.
- 23 And, second, the parties are not ordinarily
- 24 expected to prove a negative, which is what the
- 25 plaintiff would have to do here. And that's why in

- 1 every statute enacted after 1964, which is the first --
- 2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Why is it proving a
- 3 negative? They would just have to prove that it was or
- 4 was not a reasonable factor other than age.
- 5 MR. JOSEFFER: Right, and --
- 6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Yes, and just adding on to
- 7 the Chief Justice, it seems the employer is the one that
- 8 would prove the negative. He has to say there were no
- 9 -- here is a whole universe of other frameworks, and
- 10 none of these work.
- 11 MR. JOSEFFER: No, it's a very simple
- 12 two-part test. Once the plaintiff has established an
- 13 adverse effect, an adverse impact -- I mean, even the
- 14 defendant agrees that presumptively establishes
- 15 liability, because the defendant agrees to bear at least
- 16 the burden of production at that point.
- 17 And the question for the employer is just to
- 18 show that its business practices -- own business
- 19 practice is reasonable, is supported by some reasonable
- 20 factor other than age. And it ought not be hard for an
- 21 employer, especially considering that the reasonableness
- 22 standard is not very daunting, to explain why its own
- 23 business practice is reasonable. And if an employer
- 24 can't even persuade someone that its own business
- 25 practice is reasonable, then the odds are that there is

1	a problem.
2	Thank you.
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
4	Mr. Waxman.
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF SETH P. WAXMAN
6	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
7	MR. WAXMAN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
8	please the Court:
9	I want to make an argument both from
10	elegance and from function and from structure. Under
11	the employment discrimination a wide range of
12	employment discrimination, beginning with this Court's
13	decision in McDonnell Douglas, this Court has applied a
14	three-step balance-shifting paradigm in order to help
15	juries resolve the question of whether discrimination
16	occurred. In the disparate treatment cases there is a
17	burden the first step, the plaintiff has to establish
18	a prima facie case that he was the subject of disparate
19	treatment because of his race or sex.
20	The burden of production then shifts to the
21	defendant in order to explain, under disparate treatment
22	cases, a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, which
23	eliminates the presumption consistent with Evidence Rule
24	301, and the burden of proof then resumes on the
25	plaintiff to prove discrimination because of the

- 1 prohibited characteristic.
- Now, in Wards Cove, this Court looked both
- 3 to Rule 301 and to the paradigm in other discrimination
- 4 cases to apply a three-part test, in which there is a
- 5 burden of proof to establish a presumption, a burden of
- 6 production to neutralize it, and then a burden of proof
- 7 to show because of race.
- 8 The Second Circuit has done exactly that in
- 9 this case, and we think they are right not just because
- 10 that harmonizes this Court's prior discrimination cases,
- 11 and not just because three seems to be more elegant than
- 12 the four steps that the Petitioners want or the two
- 13 steps that the Government wants, but because it makes
- 14 sense.
- 15 And this goes directly to the question, I
- 16 think it was, that Justice Alito asked: Whether or not
- 17 the "reasonable factors other than age" inquiry is
- 18 simply what's necessary to show liability, that is, that
- 19 it was because of.
- The ADEA doesn't prohibit disparate
- 21 treatment. It doesn't prohibit disparate impact. It
- 22 prohibits -- doesn't prohibit employment practices
- 23 simply because they correlate negatively with age. A
- 24 plaintiff has to prove that he has suffered adverse
- 25 employment action because of his age. And the question

- 1 whether an employer based its action on reasonable
- 2 factors other than age is part and parcel of that
- 3 inquiry. It's not a free-standing --
- 4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Waxman, the first
- 5 part --
- 6 MR. WAXMAN: -- confession and avoidance
- 7 defense.
- 8 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The way you phrased the
- 9 first part, it sounded to me like you were going back to
- 10 the interpretation that this Court rejected, that is,
- 11 under the Age Discrimination Act there is only
- 12 differential treatment, not neutral factor with a
- 13 differential impact.
- MR. WAXMAN: No, not at all. Not at all.
- 15 If I said that, I certainly don't want to be mistaken.
- 16 We are not up here arguing that there is no disparate
- 17 impact theory of liability under the ADEA as there is
- 18 under Title VII. This Court resolved that question in
- 19 Smith, and it resolved it in large part by reference to
- 20 the "reasonable factors other than age" provision, which
- 21 Justice Stevens' opinion for a plurality of the Court
- 22 explained that, when you have a disparate treatment
- 23 case, if the plaintiff proves that his -- his or her
- 24 treatment -- if the defendant proves that it was because
- of something other than age, it isn't disparate

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7	treatment.
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- The fact that there is an RFOA provision, we
- 3 think, does reflect the fact that there is the potential
- 4 for liability under disparate impact, but as this Court
- 5 explained, it's narrower. And it's narrower because --
- 6 not only because the 1991 amendments didn't apply to age
- 7 cases; it's narrower, because as this Court has
- 8 recognized in almost every age case it has decided, age
- 9 -- unlike race and sex and religion and national origin
- 10 -- often does -- sad to say by somebody who is in his
- 11 second decade of protection under the ADEA -- often does
- 12 correlate with reasonable employment factors.
- 13 And the fact that all -- what it means is
- 14 that at step one of the burden-shifting analysis, the
- 15 Wards Cove analysis, which in a race or sex case
- 16 establishes a strong presumption that the employment
- 17 action was because of race or sex because there are so
- 18 few employment characteristics that do correlate
- 19 negatively with one's race or one's gender, it's a
- 20 strong presumption which nonetheless need be met only by
- 21 a burden of production.
- This Court has recognized that in the age
- 23 context, the presumption actually is quite weak. And it
- 24 would be more than perverse to adopt the Government's
- 25 proposal, which is that notwithstanding the much weaker

- 1 inference, the burden of persuasion is now on the
- 2 employer, not the employee. And, in fact, the principal
- 3 problem, I would say, with the Government the EEOC
- 4 proposal --
- 5 JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Waxman, what do you do
- 6 about the language "otherwise prohibited"?
- 7 MR. WAXMAN: Excuse me?
- 8 JUSTICE STEVENS: What do you do about that
- 9 language in the statute?
- 10 MR. WAXMAN: May I just finish my sentence
- 11 --
- JUSTICE STEVENS: Sure.
- MR. WAXMAN: -- Justice Stevens, and go
- 14 right to "otherwise prohibited"?
- The government's proposal under which, once
- 16 the employer establishes the statistical disparity, the
- 17 burden of proof shifts to the employer, equates what
- 18 this Court has said over and over again is a prima facie
- 19 case or a presumption into liability. It would dictate
- 20 precisely the opposite result that this Court found in
- 21 St. Mary's Honor Center. It would allow the jury, upon
- 22 silence by the defendant, not to say, well, you may
- 23 consider this presumption to be enough if you don't hear
- 24 any other evidence. It would tell the jury the proof of
- 25 statistical disparity is proof of discrimination. And

1 that's just wrong. 2 Now, "otherwise prohibited" --3 JUSTICE STEVENS: Even that, there's a 4 question about not merely statistical disparity, but a 5 causal connection between an identified practice --6 MR. WAXMAN: Right. 7 JUSTICE STEVENS: -- in the disparity. 8 MR. WAXMAN: That's exactly right. 9 Now, with respect to the structure of the 10 statute and "otherwise prohibited," the -- my friends on 11 the other side of this case turn almost everything on the fact that the "reasonable factors other than age" 12 13 provision applies in -- in subsection (f) and is -- as 14 Justice Ginsburg said -- is sandwiched in between two 15 other provisions that, for argument's sake, let's just 16 acknowledge are affirmative defenses on which the 17 employer would bear the burden of proof. And why 18 doesn't that prove anything? 19 I'll go first to "otherwise prohibited" and then explain why the sandwich effect is no more 20 21 persuasive here than it was to the Court in Betts. "Otherwise prohibited" means that it is 22 23 prohibited subject to the following conditions. 24 doesn't say who bears the burden of those conditions. What it reflects, Justice Stevens, is this 25

- 1 fact. You could have taken everything that is in F and
- 2 just put it into A, but you would then have had to put
- 3 it into B and C and E. And so what Congress said was --
- 4 it didn't say not -- things that are prohibited in
- 5 Section A won't be unlawful if X, Y and Z. It says
- 6 "otherwise prohibited" in those sections.
- 7 In other words, it doesn't -- it means
- 8 nothing other than it's prohibited subject to the
- 9 following conditions. Now, I will acknowledge for
- 10 argument's purposes -- and it actually suits my argument
- 11 -- to show that the BFOQ defense and the
- 12 foreign-employer defense are affirmative defenses.
- 13 Because as we -- as we know from Black's Law Dictionary
- 14 and this Court's decisions, Dixon, for example, an
- 15 affirmative defense is a defense that says: I admit the
- 16 allegations of the complaint, but I have a justification
- 17 for it that the law recognizes.
- Now, that's --
- 19 JUSTICE SOUTER: Isn't it -- isn't the --
- 20 isn't the weak point in your argument the following:
- 21 Your argument assumes that when the employer implicitly
- 22 says I admit the allegations the complainant made, that
- 23 the employer is admitting, in effect, to disparate
- 24 treatment. That he is saying: I did it because it was
- 25 my purpose to discriminate against the old.

- 1 But if we read the "because" language as
- 2 also admitting the meaning, "I did it or it had an
- 3 impact by reason of the age, regardless of my intent,"
- 4 then this incongruity that you are arguing about
- 5 disappears.
- 6 MR. WAXMAN: No. It is quite to the
- 7 contrary, unless -- and it may be the case that I'm
- 8 completely misunderstanding you.
- 9 The point is that at step one the plaintiff
- 10 has to prove a statistical disparity, a substantial,
- 11 negative, statistical correlation. And that raises a
- 12 presumption that what was otherwise a neutral -- appears
- 13 to be a neutral factor was, in fact, because of age.
- 14 That these --
- 15 JUSTICE SOUTER: In other words, for the
- 16 purpose of discriminating against the old.
- MR. WAXMAN: Whether it's --
- 18 JUSTICE SOUTER: And that's -- that's
- 19 disparate treatment.
- MR. WAXMAN: Well, no. What this -- what
- 21 this Court said in Griggs is there are proof problems.
- 22 There are plenty of instances in which there is
- 23 undiscovered, unreconciled, unacknowledged inferences
- 24 about people. And old people is the perfect example
- 25 where there is no history of invidious discrimination.

- 1 There is no prior hurdle that, unlike black people and
- 2 women had to overcome -- which was another factor in
- 3 Griggs. It's that we all get old, and people have
- 4 preconceptions sometimes about the enormity of
- 5 limitations of age which may not be justified.
- 6 So the way that these defenses, the
- 7 sandwich, if you will, works is the plaintiff under
- 8 Wards Cove shows his statistical case. It's a prima
- 9 facie -- it shows that there is a disparate impact,
- 10 period. But the statute --
- 11 JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Waxman, you have to
- 12 keep in mind they are not just showing a disparate
- 13 impact. Because of a particular practice there is a
- 14 disparate impact. That's what you leave out. So the
- 15 quality of the practice is what is at issue, and the
- 16 defendant doesn't come in and say I admit that it was
- 17 unlawful. He first tries to prove it was necessary, and
- 18 he fails on that. And if he fails on that, he has the
- 19 lesser burden of proving reasonableness.
- MR. WAXMAN: No, well let -- let me see if I
- 21 can't address Justice Souter's point first. I do think
- 22 I understand your point, which is what's wrong with the
- 23 Petitioner's case. But, Justice Souter, the point is
- 24 that once a prima facie case is established in an age
- 25 case -- let's just take the three provisions that are at

- 1 issue in (f)(1).
- 2 Under BFOQ, the employer gets up and says:
- 3 Well, ladies and gentlemen, the judge is going to tell
- 4 you that they have established a prima facie case that
- 5 the way that these otherwise neutral -- that this was
- 6 because of the plaintiff's age. And you know what? I
- 7 admit it. I, in fact, admit that it was by accident
- 8 because of age.
- 9 JUSTICE SOUTER: In an impact -- no. In an
- 10 impact case, he is saying: I admit that the impact
- 11 falls more heavily on the old.
- MR. WAXMAN: Correct.
- JUSTICE SOUTER: And -- and it seems to me
- 14 that's all he has to admit in an impact case. And he
- 15 does so, and then he --
- 16 MR. WAXMAN: What he basically says is: I
- 17 agree that age was the factor, but I have an excuse for
- 18 it. And, similarly, in the third exception, the
- 19 foreign-employers exception, he comes in and says: You
- 20 have heard all of the statistics. And you know what? I
- 21 did do this to disadvantage old people, because my plant
- 22 is in a country that discriminates -- that makes it
- 23 illegal for people over 65 to work. But --
- 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But then he is
- 25 not -- he didn't do it to discriminate against old

- 1 people. He did it because the foreign country requires
- 2 him --
- MR. WAXMAN: That's correct. And that's why
- 4 I admit -- I admit that I did this in a way that had a
- 5 disparate impact on old people. I did it, if you will,
- 6 in order to -- I have a justification for it. Whereas,
- 7 in the reasonable factors other than age, the assertion
- 8 is everybody understands that the plaintiff has the
- 9 ultimate burden to prove that he or she suffered an
- 10 adverse employment action because of age, not because of
- 11 some factor that for entirely good reasons correlates
- 12 with age. And the showing that there is a statistical
- 13 --
- JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, then you're -- then
- 15 you're just saying that there -- that there is no such
- 16 thing as a disparate-impact case.
- MR. WAXMAN: No.
- 18 JUSTICE SOUTER: You're saying -- you're
- 19 saying that there's got to be a disparate-treatment
- 20 case.
- MR. WAXMAN: No, no; not at all.
- JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, then I'm not
- 23 following you.
- 24 MR. WAXMAN: Let's take their -- let's take
- 25 their 50-pound hypothetical. The employer says: Okay,

- 1 from now on all of our employees have to be able to lift
- 2 50 pounds over their head, you know, 10 times in 30
- 3 seconds. And older people or women -- let's say older
- 4 people, you know, say: Well, statistically, that has
- 5 wiped us out. That has had a substantial -- a
- 6 substantial adverse effect on us because we are old, and
- 7 we have less upper body strength.
- 8 The employer then gives -- comes forward
- 9 with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason or a
- 10 reasonable factor other than age, and says, for example,
- 11 well, you know, this is -- we need our employees to be
- 12 able to lift strong things. If the plaintiff comes back
- 13 and says, I am an accountant, that's not reasonable,
- 14 it's a very different case than if this is a requirement
- 15 imposed on stocking clerks in an auto parts -- auto
- 16 parts shop where you do have to lift very heavy things
- 17 over your head.
- 18 In other words, the paradigm that this Court
- 19 set out in Wards Cove applies exactly the same way. It
- 20 applies a three-part test except that at step three the
- 21 standard of justification is different.
- 22 And this, I think -- I hope, Justice
- 23 Stephens, goes to your question. In Wards Cove this
- 24 Court said you show a prima facie case of a disparate
- 25 impact. The burden then -- the burden of production

- 1 then shifts to the employer to explain that it was --
- 2 there is a business -- to articulate a business
- 3 justification for the facially neutral requirement.
- 4 And what the plaintiff then has to do is
- 5 bear the burden of proving that that wasn't a business
- 6 necessity; that there is one other way, one other way in
- 7 which it could have been done; and, therefore --
- 8 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But you there agree that
- 9 there is a distinction between "business necessity" and
- 10 "business reasonableness"?
- 11 MR. WAXMAN: Yes. And, in fact, I think
- 12 it's sort of embedded in the very opening of the blue
- 13 brief in this case, where the Petitioner says: Well,
- 14 the Court has sometimes used the word "business
- 15 justification, and the Court has sometimes used the
- 16 word "business necessity," and we don't really think
- 17 that means anything, so we use the words
- 18 interchangeably.
- 19 But this case shows that it means everything
- 20 because at step three of Wards Cove the petitioner --
- 21 the plaintiff's burden is proving that it is -- that
- 22 there is one other way -- that all you have to show is
- 23 that it wasn't a necessity to do it that way in order to
- 24 achieve your objective and the employee wins.
- 25 But because of the differential in

- 1 correlation between age and employment factors, in this
- 2 case it is a business justification; that is, the
- 3 employee has to come in and say it just wasn't
- 4 reasonable to use that.
- 5 And this case is a perfect example. Here we
- 6 have a research lab that has one client. It's the
- 7 nuclear reactor division of the United States submarine
- 8 unit. And they come, and they say -- and there is no
- 9 dispute about the facts here -- they say the Cold War is
- 10 over. We aren't going to have as much work for you.
- 11 And since you're cost-plus, you're going to have to
- 12 reduce your work force; and because we are in a
- 13 different kind of war, we have new missions. You are
- 14 going to have to design and engineer and implement
- 15 things that you hadn't done it before. And so you need
- 16 to figure out a way to go ahead and do this.
- 17 And what the company did was to go through
- 18 all of its units and then subunits and sections, and
- 19 say: Given the new mission that the Navy has told us we
- 20 are going to have to occupy, do you have people -- do
- 21 you have more people than you're going to get paid for
- 22 to do what you have to do?
- 23 If the answer is yes -- if the answer is no,
- 24 you're fine. If the answer is yes, please consider the
- 25 following: What are the skills within the people within

- 1 your section, subsection, or unit that are excess, that
- 2 in light of the reduced and changed mission we don't
- 3 need? Identify those skills. Then go through each one
- 4 of your employees; and if it is an employee with that
- 5 skill, rank them on a scale of 1 to 10 according to four
- 6 different characteristics: Seniority, which gives a
- 7 benefit to older workers; recent job-performance
- 8 ratings; the criticality of the other skills they have,
- 9 do they have some other skill that is going to be
- 10 required; and their flexibility -- how willing have they
- 11 been, or are they, to learn new skills?
- 12 And the company has a training manual. It
- 13 goes through and trains the managers to do this. It is
- 14 approved by the Department of Energy and the Department
- 15 of the Navy. But after the managers engage in this
- 16 analysis and prepare this matrix, they then have to
- 17 justify it before a central review board, which the
- 18 plaintiff's own expert acknowledged was set up in order
- 19 to make the managers defend each decision and make sure
- 20 that those judgments corresponded with overall
- 21 management's responsibilities.
- 22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Still, the numbers, the
- 23 way it came out, are rather startling. That there were
- 24 31 people who were RIF'd; and of those, 30 turn out to
- 25 be over 40.

- 1 MR. WAXMAN: That's correct. And as the
- 2 district court found and the court of appeals found,
- 3 those were strikingly stark numbers. They were so stark
- 4 that they came to the immediate attention of the
- 5 company's management and general counsel, Mr. Correa,
- 6 who was -- who looked at this and said: We are going to
- 7 get sued for age discrimination. What should we do
- 8 about this?
- 9 And what he did about this, what the proof
- 10 showed, is he went back and said: Is each one of these
- 11 decisions justifiable? Did they really apply these
- 12 factors? He testified that he considered just saying:
- 13 We'll go back and redo it so that the age distribution
- 14 comes out right. But he was concerned that the New York
- 15 human rights law, which defines -- this is sort of
- 16 astounding -- defines "older worker" as somebody over
- 17 18, does have a reverse-discrimination provision.
- 18 But the point here is -- and, therefore, he
- 19 decided: We did this right; we used a matrix that
- 20 unrebutted testimony said was the paradigm in industry.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: But the terms
- 22 "flexibility," "criticality" -- I mean the way you
- 23 described it, it sounds very mechanical, mathematical.
- 24 But those terms are -- they call for some human
- 25 judgment.

1 MR. WAXMAN: They definitely do. And the 2 second question that was presented in this case, which 3 the Court didn't accept, was an assertion by the Petitioner that the Second Circuit had assertedly held 4 5 that where a reasonable factor other than age derives from a subjective judgment, the Second Circuit had held 6 7 that it was immune from review under disparate-impact 8 theory, which, as the Government pointed out in its invitation brief, is not at all what the Second Circuit 9 10 held. 11 The point is that this Court in Smith and 12 earlier in Hazen Paper and earlier age cases was highly cognizant of the fact that unless there is a test that 13 14 implies that -- that applies certainty for employers, 15 there is going to be -- age -- if this standard isn't 16 reasonable and if it isn't up to the other side to prove 17 that it's unreasonable, employers are essentially going 18 to take age into account. They are going to do what 19 Mr. Correa testified he wouldn't do, which is rejigger 20 the results to come up with a -- a percentage that more 21 approximated the balance in the work force. And that, 22 this Court has said repeatedly --23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, maybe because he 24 thought that, given the subjectivity of some of these 25 factors, that there was at least unconscious age bias in

- 1 the decisions that were made.
- 2 MR. WAXMAN: Well, Justice Ginsburg, that is
- 3 why -- and it was testimony both from the employees in
- 4 the case and from our uncross-examined expert and even
- 5 their expert -- the review board -- the company set up a
- 6 central review board which was trained and which
- 7 examined every single manager about every single
- 8 decision, whether you call it subjective or objective.
- 9 Now, the district court -- the trial court
- 10 who heard the testimony said that he -- he deemed
- 11 flexibility and criticality objective. He said they
- 12 were objective factors because of all the instructions
- 13 that were given, which we have reprinted in the joint
- 14 appendix in this case. But even assuming -- and I
- 15 certainly take your point, Justice Ginsburg, that if you
- 16 ask a manager to evaluate an employee on the degree of
- 17 criticality of that employee's skills or the flexibility
- 18 of that employee, you can give her all the training in
- 19 the world. You can give her a 16-point checklist.
- 20 Ultimately, you're relying on a judgment by a human
- 21 being of another human being.
- But why would we not want employers to do
- 23 that? Why would we want them to -- to retreat to the
- 24 safe harbor of some safe quota. You know, gee, we have
- 25 a 60/40 split in our work force; and, wow, these

- 1 numbers, we did it according to Hoyle. We've done --
- 2 this is the paradigm RIF process, but go back and do it
- 3 in a way that comes out with a specific set of numbers.
- 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, is your
- 5 recent discussion about what happened here go simply to,
- 6 I guess, your alternative argument, that we should
- 7 affirm because you're right, regardless of who bears the
- 8 burden; or does it really go to the legal question
- 9 before us?
- 10 MR. WAXMAN: Well, I think it goes to both.
- 11 I mean it goes to -- it simply -- it certainly goes to
- 12 the question over whether, whoever has the burden on
- 13 reasonableness, you ought to do what you did in Smith
- 14 and what the Eleventh Circuit did in Montalvo, which is
- 15 the case you cited in Smith. And in --
- 16 JUSTICE STEVENS: Here we have a jury
- 17 verdict that was affirmed by the court of appeals.
- 18 MR. WAXMAN: Well, we have a jury verdict.
- 19 We have a jury verdict under Wards Cove. The court of
- 20 appeals, as we pointed out in -- to the court of appeals
- 21 the first time and in our petition for certiorari here
- 22 the last time and to the court of appeals the second
- 23 time and to this Court on pages 4, 5, and 7 of our brief
- 24 in opposition this time -- the court of appeals was
- 25 simply wrong in both step one and step three of Wards

- 1 Cove. This is even assuming Wards Cove were the test.
- 2 There is -- under step three of Wards Cove, which is how
- 3 this case was tried, it was concededly the plaintiff's
- 4 burden to prove that there was some other way, one other
- 5 way, to do what the company wanted that established that
- 6 this wasn't a business necessity. And I will represent
- 7 to the Court that in five and a half weeks of testimony
- 8 there is not one sentence of evidence to that effect.
- 9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But that was taken out of
- 10 it by Judge Jacobs when he redid it. He said, we were
- 11 on the wrong track with business necessity. Business
- 12 necessity is out. It's only reasonable factor of age.
- 13 MR. WAXMAN: What Judge Jacobs said is the
- 14 case was tried under business necessity, under which the
- 15 plaintiffs at least had to prove that there was some
- 16 other way that the company could equally have achieved
- 17 its objectives.
- 18 JUSTICE STEVENS: Well, wasn't the issue of
- 19 reasonable factor under age tried in the trial court
- when the case was tried?
- 21 MR. WAXMAN: No, because the EEOC regulation
- 22 at the time, regulation (d), which deals with
- 23 disparate-impact cases, said that reasonable -- the
- 24 reasonable factors other than age provision is proven
- 25 by, and only by, the business-necessity defense, a

- 1 defense as to which the plaintiffs bear the burden.
- And, in fact, in Wards Cove, the Government
- 3 in Wards Cove was on the employer's side. The
- 4 Government urged the court to do exactly what it did.
- 5 And under the Government's own regulation 1625.7(d), the
- 6 burden of proving reasonable factors other than age was
- 7 correctly on the plaintiff, but incorrectly equated with
- 8 the substantive showing of business.
- 9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is that --
- 10 JUSTICE STEVENS: Am I correct to understand
- 11 that your trial counsel then took the position you must
- 12 prove business necessity? I mean an absence of business
- 13 necessity, rather than reasonableness. They didn't
- 14 advance their strongest defense.
- MR. WAXMAN: Well, no, we took the position
- 16 that reasonable factors other than age was a separate
- 17 test and was a separate defense.
- JUSTICE STEVENS: Right.
- 19 MR. WAXMAN: The judge instructed the jury
- 20 to the contrary and said under Wards Cove --
- 21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Was Judge Pooler wrong,
- 22 then? She said, in effect: You forfeited reasonable
- 23 factor other than sex, because you didn't bring it up.
- 24 You were going on business necessity.
- MR. WAXMAN: Well, what happened was -- I

- 1 mean, Judge Pooler is wrong in certain respects, but not
- 2 that respect. We -- our answer pleaded reasonable
- 3 factors other than age, but we didn't -- neither we nor
- 4 our opponents asked for a separate instruction on
- 5 reasonable factors other than age. The jury was
- 6 instructed on the Wards Cove analysis because --
- 7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The jury didn't hear a
- 8 word about reasonable factors other than age. They
- 9 heard about business necessity.
- 10 MR. WAXMAN: That's correct. I mean that --
- 11 and that's because -- you could say that it was a mutual
- 12 mistake by everyone involved. But the EEOC had directed
- 13 under subsection (d) of its regulations that reasonable
- 14 factor other than age could be established only by
- 15 proving business necessity. And both parties --
- 16 JUSTICE STEVENS: As everybody now knows,
- 17 that was wrong.
- 18 MR. WAXMAN: That's correct. And the -- my
- 19 point is we are -- we are entitled to judgment in our
- 20 favor. We are entitled to an affirmance because, number
- 21 one, the Second Circuit was correct that the burden of
- 22 proving reasonableness was on them, and the -- the
- 23 Petitioners have acknowledged expressly on page 53 of
- 24 their blue brief that if in fact it is true that the
- 25 Second -- if the Second Circuit is in fact correct, then

- 1 the judgment is affirmed, that is, they say when a --
- 2 "While a defendant has no obligation to press an issue
- 3 upon which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof --
- 4 and therefore the Second Circuit may have been justified
- 5 in reviewing the evidence of reasonableness in light of
- 6 its holding that Petitioners bore the burden of proof"
- 7 --
- 8 JUSTICE STEVENS: But did you plead this as
- 9 an affirmative defense? Did you plead it as an
- 10 affirmative defense?
- 11 MR. WAXMAN: We pleaded it as a -- I can't
- 12 bring the complaint to mind, but we pleaded it as a
- 13 separately specified defense, yes. We said, in our
- 14 answer to the complaint, we said this is a reasonable
- 15 factor other than age.
- 16 And so we are -- everyone acknowledges that
- 17 if the Second Circuit is correct as to where the burden
- 18 applies, the judgment should be affirmed. Our
- 19 submission is that the judgment has to be affirmed
- 20 whether or not the burden applies as the Second Circuit
- 21 held.
- Thank you.
- 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- Mr. Russell, you have four minutes
- 25 remaining.

1	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN K. RUSSELL
2	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
3	MR. RUSSELL: I'd like to begin by
4	addressing the general legal question that the Court
5	granted cert on, and particularly going back to this
6	idea, this assertion that the proof of the RFOA is
7	somehow a negation of the obligation that the plaintiff
8	has to prove that they have suffered a disparate impact
9	because of age. It is simply incorrect. It's based
LO	as, Justice Souter, I think you were suggesting in some
L1	of your questions on a confusion about what the
L2	"because of age" requirement is in a disparate-impact
L3	case under Section $4(a)(2)$ . The requirement under
L4	Section 4(a)(2) is simply to show that the effect of the
L5	practice is felt because of age, while the defense in
L6	the RFOA provision is to show that the practice itself
L7	is reasonable even though it has this effect.
L8	JUSTICE ALITO: Well, the practice if a
L9	practice correlates with a number of statistically
20	correlates with a number of different factors, is it
21	because of all of those factors?
22	MR. RUSSELL: I think, under Wards Cove,
23	this Court has said that it does, and so under Wards
24	Cove you establish that the discrimination is felt by
25	older workers because of age by showing that all the

- 1 workers as a group suffer disproportionately from it.
- JUSTICE SOUTER: Wards Cove, in other words,
- 3 says "because" may mean "correlation" and it mean
- 4 "purpose," either one.
- 5 MR. RUSSELL: Yes. I mean --
- 6 JUSTICE SOUTER: Yes.
- 7 MR. RUSSELL: But I think all you have to
- 8 show under 4(a)(2) is that the practice tends to
- 9 disadvantage older workers because of their age. And so
- 10 again in our weight -- weight example, the employer
- 11 admits in our weight example that the effect of the
- 12 neutral practice is to fall more heavily, is to restrict
- 13 the employment opportunities of older workers because of
- 14 age, but says, even if that's true -- even if there is a
- 15 disparate impact because of age-- we are still entitled
- 16 to the defense because the practice itself is
- 17 reasonable.
- 18 It's also -- I would like to address the
- 19 suggestion that Griggs is directed -- or disparate
- 20 impact is directed at ferreting out intentional
- 21 discrimination. Certainly it serves that function in
- 22 many cases, but that's not the sole purpose of it. And
- 23 it's simply not the purpose of the prima facie case in
- 24 Wards Cove to give rise to an inference of intentional
- 25 discrimination, and the fact that it doesn't as strongly

- 1 in the age case I think isn't a reason to think that
- 2 Congress intended the courts to develop a different test
- 3 for showing what's otherwise prohibited under 4(a)(2).
- 4 And, finally, if I could address some of the
- 5 questions regarding what happened in this case. This
- 6 case, Justice Stevens, was not tried with reasonableness
- 7 in mind, both because Respondents abandoned their
- 8 "reasonable factor other than age" defense, which they
- 9 had raised as an affirmative defense in their answer. I
- 10 believe Mr. Waxman is incorrect when he suggests that
- 11 they in fact asked for instructions.
- 12 JUSTICE STEVENS: Well, if he put in all the
- 13 evidence he's described, that would not have proven
- 14 business necessity. It seems to me that evidence had to
- 15 go to the issue of reasonableness.
- 16 MR. RUSSELL: It may have been relevant to
- 17 reasonableness, but that's not why it was put in.
- 18 Before the trial began --
- 19 JUSTICE STEVENS: Was he arguing that it was
- 20 necessary to follow this one downsizing practice?
- 21 MR. RUSSELL: They certainly, I think --
- 22 they used that argument to show that they had a business
- 23 justification and to try to rebut our showing of
- 24 alternative, equally effective practices. But it was
- 25 clear by the time of trial that -- you know, they had

- 1 proposed jury instructions that didn't ask for
- 2 reasonableness to be part of the case. We proceeded
- 3 with the case on the assumption that we would be
- 4 entitled to prevail under these instructions so long
- 5 that we showed that the current practice, reasonable or
- 6 not, had a disparate impact and was subject to an
- 7 equally effective alternative.
- 8 JUSTICE STEVENS: And just one other detail,
- 9 Did -- the district judge not instruct the jury on this
- 10 defense?
- 11 MR. RUSSELL: It did not.
- 12 JUSTICE STEVENS: It did not?
- MR. RUSSELL: The only instruction was that
- 14 we'd be entitled to prevail if we showed Wards Cove, and
- 15 its --
- 16 JUSTICE STEVENS: You have an unusual case
- 17 where the decisive issue, at least when you get to this
- 18 Court, is something the jury never passed on.
- 19 MR. RUSSELL: Well, I think that's right.
- 20 And ordinarily I think you would say that the
- 21 defendants, by not raising the issue to the jury, if
- 22 it's an affirmative defense, have waived it. They ask
- 23 for an excuse, given the change in law. We don't think
- 24 that the change in law excuses their failure to waive
- 25 it. The regulation that they point to they themselves

1	have argued here isn't entitled to much of any
2	deference. And, in fact, at the same time they were
3	simultaneously arguing that there wasn't even any
4	disparate-impact liability in the first place under the
5	ADEA. So I don't think they can actually claim that
6	they were relying on that.
7	Thank you.
8	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
9	The case is submitted.
LO	(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m. the case in the
L1	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
L2	
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