

1	C O N T E N T S	
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	PAGE
3	GEORGE J. CHANOS, ESQ.	
4	On behalf of the Petitioner	3
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
6	IRVING L. GORNSTEIN, ESQ.,	
7	On behalf of the United States,	
8	as amicus curiae	17
9	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
10	FRANCES A. FORSMAN, ESQ.	
11	On behalf of the Respondent	25
12	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF	
13	GEORGE J. CHANOS, ESQ.	
14	On behalf of the Petitioner	45
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (11:04 a.m.)

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument
4 next in Whorton versus Bockting.

5 General Chanos.

6 ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEORGE J. CHANOS

7 ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

8 MR. CHANOS: Mr. Chief Justice, and may
9 it please the Court:

10 Crawford v. Washington should not apply
11 retroactively to cases on collateral review because it
12 fails to meet the exacting standards for retroactivity
13 established by this Court in Teague versus Lane. In
14 addition, respondent is not entitled to relief under
15 AEDPA. Teague held that new rules of criminal generally
16 should not apply to cases on collateral review unless
17 they fall within one of two narrow exceptions. The
18 second exception, at issue here, is for those new
19 watershed rules of criminal procedure without which the
20 likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously
21 diminished, rules that alter our understanding of the
22 bedrock procedural elements essential to a fair
23 proceeding. Crawford is not a watershed rule of
24 criminal procedure.

25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Could you give an

1 example, General Chanos, of one that is other than
2 Gideon? Is there any other one, or --

3 MR. CHANOS: The only example that this
4 Court has pointed to in its 25 years of retroactivity
5 jurisprudence is Gideon versus Wainwright.

6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And none other occurs to
7 you?

8 MR. CHANOS: None other occurs to me at this
9 time. None of the cases that this Court has ruled are
10 not retroactive would I find to be retroactive or
11 watershed, and I certainly don't find Crawford to be
12 watershed. Crawford is not watershed because it is not
13 a rule without which the likelihood of an accurate
14 conviction is seriously diminished and it is not a rule
15 which altered our understanding of the bedrock
16 procedural elements essential to a fair proceeding.

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I take it from your
18 presentation you think we do have to go through the
19 Teague analysis. We can't just rely on 2254(d)(1)?

20 MR. CHANOS: No, Chief Justice Roberts. I
21 believe that you could go straight to 2254(d)(1) and bar
22 relief under 2254(d)(1).

23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well then, what do
24 you do about 2254(e)(1), or I guess (e)(2), which seems
25 to suggest at different rule if a case is made

1 retroactive?

2 MR. CHANOS: Well, 2254(e)(2) provides a
3 cause and prejudice opportunity in the event that the
4 state court denies relief on a procedural basis rather
5 than a substantive basis and the petitioner can show
6 cause and prejudice under 2254(e)(2)(A). The Federal
7 court could then look at the petitioner's claim because
8 no merits determination had been made by the state court
9 and, finding the cause and prejudice elements under
10 2254(e)(2), the Federal court would not be precluded
11 from making a merits determination since the -- and
12 conceivably applying a rule that had been made
13 retroactive active under Teague -- because the state
14 court had not made a substantive merits determination.

15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Now, my point was
16 that looking at (d)(1), it says is the decision contrary
17 to established law. And I would have thought that if
18 it's a new decision it's clearly not contrary to
19 established law.

20 MR. CHANOS: Correct.

21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But on the other
22 hand, you look at (e)(2) and it says here's what you do
23 if you're applying a new decision that's that been made
24 retroactive. So I would have thought that meant you
25 can't say simply because it's a new decision it won't

1 apply.

2 MR. CHANOS: Our reading of 2254(d)(1) is
3 that Congress intended to have the federal courts give
4 the state courts deference to the extent that the state
5 courts made a substantive determination. If the state
6 courts made no substantive determination, there's no
7 requirement for deference by the Federal courts, which
8 under 2254(e)(2)(A)(i) the Federal court conceivably
9 find that there was cause and prejudice under
10 2254(2)(a)(i) under the standards enumerated in those
11 subparagraphs (a) and (b) and could then make a merits
12 determination.

13 There would be nothing that would preclude
14 the Federal court from making a merits determination so
15 long as the state court had not already made a merits
16 determination.

17 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, suppose the state
18 has, which is going straight to AEDPA. Does that mean
19 that Teague is out entirely, even the first category,
20 that is a decision, a substantive decision that would
21 mean that what defendant did was not a crime?

22 MR. CHANOS: Yes, Justice Ginsburg. It
23 would mean under -- under a plain meaning reading of
24 2254(d)(1), if the state court made a determination on
25 the merits, it would bar subsequent Federal review

1 whether it was a substantive, a substantive claim or a
2 procedural claim. However, in Atkins v. Kentucky there
3 would be nothing that would prevent the petitioner from
4 going back to the state court and arguing cause and
5 prejudice, and then if the state court were to make a
6 procedural determination on the second petition that
7 was -- that were to deny the petitioner his claim, he
8 could take that to the Federal court. The Federal court
9 could then look at that because it was only a procedural
10 determination by the state court on the second habeas
11 claim and the Federal court at that point could look
12 back at the substantive rule as established law because
13 on the second claim they have the right, if he's only
14 denied a procedure -- on a procedural basis, there's
15 nothing that would preclude the Federal court on his
16 second claim from looking back at what would then be
17 established law.

18 JUSTICE KENNEDY: What is the source of the
19 rule in Teague? Could Congress overturn the rule in
20 Teague if it wanted to and say that nothing is
21 retroactive or that everything is retroactive?

22 MR. CHANOS: My understanding is that the
23 rule in Teague is -- the source is not the U.S.
24 Constitution. It's a judicially created rule that began
25 with Linkletter and developed into Teague and its

1 progeny. And yes, I believe Congress could pass
2 2254(d)(1) and alter the habeas procedures, as they have
3 in enacting 2254(d)(1).

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Habeas is an equitable --

5 MR. CHANOS: I'm sorry?

6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Habeas is equitable relief
7 and the Court has a lot of discretion in identifying the
8 boundaries of equitable relief, doesn't it?

9 MR. CHANOS: Yes, Justice Scalia.

10 JUSTICE SCALIA: I assume that's how we got
11 to Teague.

12 JUSTICE STEVENS: Let me ask this question
13 as to the basic issue of whether you should be relying
14 on Teague or the statute. If you're relying just on the
15 statute, how would it apply to a case which was correct
16 under established law at the time that the state court
17 made its ruling, but before the case reached the
18 appellate court, in which there was a change in our
19 interpretation? What if this case -- if Crawford had
20 been decided while the case was on appeal?

21 MR. CHANOS: While under the Court's
22 retroactivity jurisprudence Griffith would control,
23 under 2254 it would not. 22(d)(1) would control.

24 JUSTICE STEVENS: So it really makes a
25 difference whether we rely on Teague or whether we rely

1 on the statute if we disagree with you?

2 MR. CHANOS: It make difference. It makes a
3 difference.

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, I assume there would
5 be a Rule 60(b) motion or the equivalent of it in state
6 court.

7 MR. CHANOS: Yes.

8 JUSTICE SCALIA: If indeed our law had
9 changed; don't you think?

10 MR. CHANOS: Absolutely.

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, it's inconceivable
12 that the problem wouldn't be solved in some fashion by
13 the state court that rendered the decision.

14 MR. CHANOS: I believe that the petitioner
15 would be able to make a subsequent habeas petition at
16 the state court level and if they were somehow denied
17 relief on a procedural basis, there would be nothing
18 that would preclude the Federal court from granting them
19 relief thereafter.

20 JUSTICE GINSBURG: That's a odd position to
21 take, to proliferate proceedings that way. I mean, I
22 thought your argument, AEDPA argument, was: Too bad,
23 the Federal court is out of it, but the state court is
24 most likely, recognizing that this Court has said what
25 this man did wasn't a crime, to grant him relief. But

1 if you're making this two-step and saying, but somehow
2 we can change the substantive proceeding into a
3 procedural proceeding, that seems to me odd, to
4 proliferate proceedings that way.

5 MR. CHANOS: Justice Ginsburg, what we're
6 saying is that Congress in enacting 2254(d)(1) was
7 stating that the Federal courts should give deference to
8 the state court decision so long as it is a merits
9 decision and so long as it complies with existing
10 clearly established law and is not unreasonable.

11 And if that occurs, then Congress under
12 2254(d)(1) was saying give state courts deference under
13 those circumstances.

14 JUSTICE SCALIA: You're saying not just
15 "clearly"; "then clearly established law."

16 MR. CHANOS: That's exactly.

17 JUSTICE SCALIA: That is, at the time of the
18 state court decision. *END STENO

19 MR. CHANOS: Exactly, absolutely, at the
20 time of the state court decision. In fact, if you look
21 at the language of 2254(d)(1) it says "resulted in a
22 decision that was contrary to or an unreasonable
23 application of clearly established Federal law. It
24 doesn't say "is contrary to clearly established law."
25 It says "was contrary to."

1

2 JUSTICE STEVENS: The word was is somewhat
3 ambiguous. It could either mean at the time of the
4 trial court's decision or at the time of the final
5 judgment on appeal.

6 MR. CHANOS: Well, in either case, it is
7 referring to the --

8 JUSTICE STEVENS: I know you win under
9 either view, but --

10 MR. CHANOS: Yes, exactly.

11 JUSTICE STEVENS: -- it could mean either of
12 those two things.

13 MR. CHANOS: Our, our position would be that
14 it would be up to when the decision became final.
15 Whatever the law was up to the time that the decision,
16 the state court decision became final, that is what was
17 clearly established law.

18 I'll continue with our Teague analysis
19 because we believe that the claim is barred under either
20 analysis. The --

21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Crawford did use the term
22 bedrock?

23 MR. CHANOS: Yes. Yes. And what
24 Crawford -- what we believe Crawford was saying -- well,
25 Crawford said that the Sixth Amendment right to

1 confrontation is bedrock. It didn't say that that
2 decision altered our understanding of the bedrock
3 procedural elements essential to a fair trial. That is
4 the standard. Not whether or not the Sixth Amendment is
5 bedrock.

6 In fact, if you look at the case of Gideon
7 versus Wainwright and Betts versus Brady, in Betts
8 versus Brady this Court had held the Sixth Amendment
9 right to counsel was not applicable to the states
10 through the 14th Amendment. Gideon overruled Betts
11 versus Brady and said that the Sixth Amendment right to
12 counsel was applicable to the states under the 14th
13 Amendment.

14 That alters our understanding of the bedrock
15 procedural elements that are essential to a fair trial.
16 In one case, we're saying rights of counsel is not one
17 of those bedrock procedural elements. Is not,
18 therefore, applicable to the states under the 14th
19 amendment, Betts versus Brady. In the next case we're
20 saying right to counsel is it implicit in the
21 Constitution. It is an essential to the fairness of a
22 proceeding, and it is therefore applicable to the states
23 under the 14th Amendment.

24 That truly alters our understanding of the
25 bedrock procedural elements that are essential to a fair

1 trial.

2 In contrast, when you look at Crawford
3 vis-a-vis Ohio versus Roberts, the -- there's a real
4 distinction there. In both cases, we know that the
5 right to confrontation is essential and Federal and one
6 of those bedrock elements that are essential to a fair
7 proceeding. Therefore Crawford doesn't alter our
8 understanding of what elements are or are not essential
9 to -- bedrock elements essential to a fair proceeding.
10 Instead it modifies the contours --

11 JUSTICE STEVENS: You make the same analysis
12 if you say the right is not necessarily the right of
13 confrontation but the narrower right of
14 cross-examination.

15 MR. CHANOS: Would I make the same analysis?

16 JUSTICE STEVENS: Because that is central to
17 Crawford.

18 MR. CHANOS: Yes. Yes. Crawford doesn't
19 tell us that the rights to confrontation or the right of
20 cross-examination is a new right as Gideon tells us.
21 Instead Crawford tells us --

22 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, there is a new
23 emphasis on cross-examination.

24 MR. CHANOS: It alters, it modifies the
25 manner in which we implement that right. Under Ohio

1 versus Roberts there was plenty of cross-examination
2 that was occurring. The standard under Ohio versus
3 Roberts was unavailability and inadequate indicia of
4 reliability. There was a reliability screen in place,
5 and it was clear under Ohio versus Roberts that the
6 right to confrontation was an essential bedrock right,
7 essential to a fair trial.

8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Exactly. But you know, how
9 you play the game depends upon at what level of
10 generality you describe the right. And I agree with you
11 if you describe the right as the right to
12 cross-examination, that -- that was -- reinstituted by
13 Crawford, which said that the confrontation right is a
14 right to confrontation -- to cross-examination, which
15 didn't exist before. I mean, you could dispense with
16 that right of cross-examination if there were indicia of
17 reliability.

18 MR. CHANOS: Well, there were --

19 JUSTICE SCALIA: I'm not sure that you can
20 so -- in such a facile fashion decide what is a bedrock
21 principle. Frankly, I don't know any formula that
22 would -- that would describe it. I really think it is
23 a -- you know it when you see it.

24 MR. CHANOS: Well, Justice Scalia --

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: It is like obscenity.

1 (laughter.)

2 MR. CHANOS: I understand. The other point
3 that --

4 JUSTICE SOUTER: That gets, if you follow
5 Justice Scalia's argument, that gets you to, I think to
6 the argument you have made. And that is all right, we
7 have got to look at it pragmatically. I mean, what are
8 the consequences of following a reliability model rather
9 than a cross-examination model? And your argument is
10 consequences that are not necessarily more favorable to
11 defendants, in fact -- or more productive of ultimately
12 reliable determinations, in fact. And that I take it is
13 your basic point.

14 So I think you've answered what for all of
15 us is a problem. And that is we don't have a clear
16 analytical definition of bedrock; but if we look to
17 consequences, you have got an argument. Your friends
18 don't think it is a good one, but that's your point.

19 MR. CHANOS: The other point is that there's
20 a second component to watershed which is it must be a
21 rule without which the accuracy of a proceeding is
22 seriously diminished. There was cross-examination under
23 Ohio versus Roberts. There -- in Crawford, the language
24 of Crawford isn't a sweeping indictment of -- of
25 Roberts.

1 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, there wasn't
2 cross-examination by defense counsel.

3 MR. CHANOS: I'm sorry?

4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: In this case there wasn't
5 cross-examination by defense counsel. Or am I
6 incorrect?

7 MR. CHANOS: There was cross-examination of
8 the mother, there was cross-examination of the police
9 detective -- there was cross-examination of --

10 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Oh, oh. No, I mean of the
11 witness.

12 MR. CHANOS: Not of Autumn -- not of Autumn
13 Bockting. But the important point that I want to make
14 before I reserve the balance of my time is that the
15 question isn't simply, is Crawford accuracy-enhancing?
16 The question is is it a rule without which the accuracy
17 of a proceeding is seriously diminished. In other words
18 must all --

19 JUSTICE SOUTER: -- accuracy-enhancing then?

20 MR. CHANOS: I'm sorry?

21 JUSTICE SOUTER: It's a question about how
22 much more accuracy-enhancing, if at all?

23 MR. CHANOS: That, and it is really an
24 analysis of Roberts. Is, is that judicial determination
25 of reliability under adequate indicia of reliability, so

1 fundamentally flawed that all of the decisions that
2 were, that were arrived at pursuant to its authority
3 must be undone, and new trials must occur with respect
4 to those decisions because it is so fundamentally
5 flawed. And our point is that it is not. It does not
6 rise to that level of inadequacy and Crawford is
7 therefore not a rule without which the accuracy of a
8 proceeding is seriously diminished.

9 Mr. Chief Justice, may I reserve the balance
10 of my time?

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you General
12 Chanos.

13 Mr. Gornstein, we will hear now from you.

14 ORAL ARGUMENT OF IRVING L. GORNSTEIN, ON BEHALF OF
15 THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE, SUPPORTING
16 PETITIONER

17 MR. GORNSTEIN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may
18 it please the Court.

19 Crawford does not satisfy either of the two
20 requirements for a retroactive watershed rule. The
21 application of Roberts rather than Crawford did not so
22 seriously diminish the likelihood of accurate
23 convictions as to require the wholesale reopening of
24 convictions that were final before Crawford was decided,
25 with all the societal costs that entails.

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Since you barely
2 cite AEDPA, I think you assume we need to reach the
3 Teague question before the AEDPA question.

4 MR. GORNSTEIN: Mr. Chief Justice, we do not
5 have an interest in the AEDPA question because it does
6 not apply to Federal convictions, the 2254(d)(1), and
7 there is no Federal conviction analog to 2254(d)(1), so
8 we are not telling you that you should or should not
9 reach it. We just don't have an interest in that
10 question.

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It is law that is
12 applied in Federal court, though. I assume you have an
13 interest in that.

14 MR. GORNSTEIN: Well, we have a general
15 interest in the way law is applied in Federal court but
16 we do not ordinarily opine on issues just on that basis
17 and we haven't in the past opined on AEDPA issues unless
18 they have some Federal analog carryover effect. And we
19 did not here.

20 Now with respect to the reliability prong of
21 the Teague analysis, there are three reasons that the
22 Roberts rule did not so seriously diminish the
23 likelihood of accurate convictions as to call for
24 retroactive application of Crawford.

25 The first is that Roberts had a built-in

1 reliability screen. Hearsay could not be admitted under
2 Roberts unless a determination was made that there were
3 particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.

4 The second reason that Roberts did not
5 seriously diminish the likelihood of accurate
6 convictions is that there were other procedural
7 components that operated in tandem with Roberts to
8 promote accuracy. They included the right to
9 cross-examine the witness through whom an hearsay
10 statement was introduced, the right to introduce your
11 own evidence to challenge the reliability of the hearsay
12 statement. Defense counsel could point out to the jury
13 all the weaknesses in the hearsay statement and the
14 defendant could count on the common sense of the jury to
15 weigh the reliability of the hearsay statement in light
16 of all the evidence in the case.

17 JUSTICE ALITO: Can't you make that argument
18 about any, about cross-examination in general? It is
19 debatable whether -- how good cross-examination is in
20 determining the truthfulness of a witness's testimony.
21 Now, our Constitution decides the issue one way, but any
22 infringement of cross-examination could be susceptible
23 to the same argument that you are making.

24 MR. GORNSTEIN: Yes. And I don't think that
25 this is a self-sufficient argument for that reason. It

1 is just one component of the argument about why there
2 was reliability. The fact that there was a Roberts
3 screen on reliability is an additional factor that
4 distinguishes my example from what you said.

5 And the fact is that there was a right to
6 cross-examine live witnesses here. So there was a right
7 to cross-examine the police officer through whom this
8 hearsay statement was made. It is not a case where
9 there was an across-the-board denial of any
10 cross-examination.

11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well I guess you're asking
12 us to say Crawford, get one, take one, it is really not
13 that important. If that's so, I suppose we shouldn't
14 have overruled Roberts.

15 MR. GORNSTEIN: No, I think Crawford that is
16 an important decision. But if you made retroactive
17 every one of your important decisions, you would be
18 reversing the rule of Teague. What Teague says that is
19 there is not -- that the purposes of habeas corpus are
20 largely exhausted once somebody has received a trial in
21 accordance with then existing law.

22 Because of the importance of finality to the
23 system -- and there are only going to be two very --
24 there's only a very narrow window for watershed rules,
25 of rules that, the accuracy of proceedings beforehand

1 are so seriously diminished that there is an
2 unacceptably large risk that systematically, innocent
3 people were being convicted, and that this is a rule
4 that approaches Gideon in its fundamental and sweeping
5 importance. Those are the only circumstances in which
6 the Court is going to go back on finality.

7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: How many times have we
8 dealt with a quote, "new rule," with the argument made
9 that it was watershed and therefore should be
10 retroactive? This is not the first time.

11 MR. GORNSTEIN: No, I think that there have
12 been -- I don't know the exact number, but maybe 11 or
13 12, about half of which are ones, are proposed new rules
14 and half of which are ones where the rule was already
15 established previously and the question was whether it
16 was going to be made retroactive. And I cited in the
17 brief there are three or four death penalty cases where
18 the Court had already established before each one of
19 them there was a right not to be -- the death penalty to
20 be arbitrarily imposed. And in each case there was a
21 new rule that built on that basic rule in an important
22 way; but in each case, the Court said it was not the
23 kind of rule that was going to be applied retroactively.
24 And so, too, here.

25 The third reason I wanted to give about why

1 there was not a serious diminishment in accuracy that is
2 in at least one respect, the Roberts rule actually
3 promotes more accuracy than the Crawford rule, and
4 that's with respect to non-testimonial hearsay. In the
5 case of non-testimonial hearsay, under Roberts, that
6 could come in only if determination had been made there
7 were particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
8 Whereas under the Crawford rule, that kind of
9 non-testimonial hearsay comes in without any reliability
10 check under the Constitution at all.

11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But that's not this case.

12 MR. GORNSTEIN: Well there was actually in
13 this case the mother's testimony about what the daughter
14 said to her.

15 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I'm talking about the
16 daughter's testimony.

17 MR. GORNSTEIN: Yes. The daughter's
18 testimony about what she said to the mother illustrates
19 the difference, because that came in through the mother.
20 It only came in because there was a particularized
21 guarantees of trustworthiness to that statement; whereas
22 under Crawford in future trials, statements to the
23 mother -- which are not testimonial -- they will come in
24 through the mother without any screen for reliability
25 under the Constitution at all. So in that respect, the

1 defendant here got more by virtue of the Roberts rule
2 than by -- than he would have had by virtue of the
3 Crawford rule.

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Is that the case in Federal
5 courts, too?

6 MR. GORNSTEIN: Well, it is a matter of
7 interpreting -- what protection is left is only going to
8 be by virtue of the residual hearsay rule. So there
9 will have to be some determination made about whether
10 there are sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, it is conceivable
12 that Federal courts would interpret the hearsay rule to
13 require precisely that anyway.

14 MR. GORNSTEIN: But Justice Scalia --

15 JUSTICE SCALIA: In which case you shouldn't
16 be making this argument because it applies only to state
17 courts.

18 MR. GORNSTEIN: No. I think it applies
19 equally to Federal courts because it is free to the
20 Federal court system to devise a rule that would allow a
21 looser standard of entry than the Roberts standards, and
22 if it did, that would be constitutional. So there is an
23 interest in that kind of argument in the Federal system.

24 I wanted to move on to the bedrock aspect of
25 the inquiry, which is a separate second inquiry that had

1 threshold that has to be crossed if you are going to
2 find something to be watershed, and the only rule that
3 the Court has found to be bedrock is Gideon. And this
4 rule, Carawford does not approach Gideon in its
5 fundamental and sweeping importance, and there are a
6 couple of reasons for that.

7 First, the right to counsel pervasively
8 affected all aspects of the criminal trial whereas this
9 focuses on one limited -- the admissibility of one
10 limited category of evidence, testimonial hearsay, and
11 adopts a somewhat new rule for that than had existed
12 before.

13 The second thing is that under, the right to
14 counsel is deemed so essential to a fair trial that
15 depriving someone of that right can never be discounted
16 as harmless error, whereas Crawford errors can be
17 harmless. There are a significant number of cases where
18 they are found to be harmless. So you cannot say that a
19 violation of the Crawford rule always and necessarily
20 results in an unfair trial, whereas you can say that
21 about the right to counsel.

22 Finally, the Gideon rule established for the
23 first time a right to free counsel in all felony
24 criminal trials. Before Crawford was established, there
25 was a right to cross-examine. It simply was a different

1 right. You had a right to cross-examine the live
2 witnesses and you had a right to screen out
3 uncross-examined statements unless they met the
4 reliability standard of Roberts. And the change that
5 was made was one in which the Roberts rule was thrown
6 out, and you can no longer get in uncross-examined
7 statements with a determination of reliability.

8 But that is a modification or an incremental
9 change in an existing right that previously existed to
10 cross-examine, and instead -- unlike the Gideon rule,
11 which established the right to counsel for the first
12 time.

13 If the Court has nothing further.

14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
15 Mr. Gornstein.

16 Ms. Forsman?

17 ORAL ARGUMENT OF FRANCES A. FORSMAN

18 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

19 MS. FORSMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chief
20 Justice. Members of the Court:

21 This man was sentenced to life in prison
22 based upon accusations that have never been tested by
23 the only constitutionally reliable test that is now
24 acceptable in this Court. There is no question that the
25 statements that were admitted through the police officer

1 were testimonial. There is no question that if
2 Mr. Bockting were tried today, that those statements
3 would not have come in.

4 The government has argued that the
5 reliability screen, so-called, that came from Roberts
6 was sufficient, and it was only an incremental change
7 when the Crawford decision was decided. The fact of the
8 matter is that this Court found that the reliability
9 screen that the government has discussed was
10 fundamentally flawed.

11 And in this case, comparing the right to
12 counsel to the right to cross-examination is easy. It
13 is easy because it would not have mattered how many
14 lawyers Mr. Bockting had. It would not have mattered if
15 he had the finest lawyers in the country. It would not
16 have mattered if he was Duke Power Company and had every
17 lawyer at the highest hourly rate representing him. If
18 he was unable to cross-examine his accuser, just as in
19 Crawford -- in Crawford, there was even an audiotape of
20 what the wife said. There was an audiotape. There was
21 a police officer who listened to what she said. And
22 this Court found that wasn't good enough.

23 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, we didn't say in
24 Crawford, I don't think we said in Crawford -- I ought
25 to know, I suppose.

1 (Laughter.)

2 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- that the new rule
3 produced greater accuracy. We said that it was the view
4 of the framers of the Constitution that
5 cross-examination, confrontation in that sense, was
6 necessary for greater accuracy.

7 Now in our evaluation of what constitutes a
8 landmark decision, are we bound to the framers' view of
9 things? I mean, you know, maybe -- I'm not sure that if
10 you apply a proper interpretation of indicia of
11 reliability under Roberts, I'm really not sure whether
12 it wouldn't be more accurate than confrontation, but
13 that wouldn't matter to me, because confrontation is
14 what the Constitution required and what the framers
15 thought were necessary.

16 Am I bound, for purposes of the rule we're
17 arguing about here, to what the framers think?

18 MS. FORSMAN: No, Your Honor, you are not
19 bound to what the framers think. However, I think that
20 you went far beyond simply saying that this was like
21 quartering soldiers in discussing the confrontation
22 clause and the right to confrontation. The opinion goes
23 into at length why the Roberts rule was so fundamentally
24 flawed. You talked about the kinds of decisions that
25 were produced, although this Court said that this Court

1 had pretty much tacked to the same direction as the
2 framers' view.

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: I think that discussion of
4 the, you know, the contrary decisions that had been
5 produced under Roberts was just for the purpose of
6 justifying the overruling of a case that -- you know --
7 that was not that old. It hadn't worked out as well as
8 we maybe expected it would. But I don't think it was
9 for the purpose of showing that it always produces
10 unreliable results.

11 MS. FORSMAN: And I don't think that our
12 burden would be to show that it always produces
13 unreliable results. I think that this Court has clearly
14 taken the position that the only constitutional
15 reliability is the right to cross-examination. However,
16 throughout your retroactivity jurisprudence, you have
17 been able to distinguish easily between issues such as
18 the exclusionary rule, the right to a cross-section of
19 the community on a jury, and the right to
20 cross-examination. I would point out to you, the
21 decisions that made Bruton, for instance, retroactive,
22 because the right to cross-examination went so directly
23 to the integrity of the fact-finding process.

24 I think that one of the major difficulties
25 in the argument being taken by the State --

1 JUSTICE KENNEDY: That's in an instruction,
2 like Toomey versus Ohio. The judge is corrupt. It is
3 just structural. You can't say that about Crawford, or
4 can you?

5 MS. FORSMAN: I don't mean to say, Your
6 Honor, that it is structural. I think the issue of
7 whether something is structural error or harmless error
8 has to do with whether or not it is measurable, not
9 whether it's bedrock, not whether it's watershed, not
10 whether it leads to better accuracy.

11 We know that, because in Teague, although
12 Gideon was the only case explicitly referenced, there
13 was also three other examples mentioned in Teague.
14 There was a trial tainted by mob violence. There was a
15 trial flawed because of the intentional introduction of
16 perjured testimony. And there was a trial flawed by the
17 introduction of testimony with regard to a coerced
18 confession.

19 We know that two out of those three examples
20 are actually subject to harmless error analysis. So
21 this Court has never tied the issue of the elements of
22 Teague or even the elements of the pre-Teague
23 jurisprudence to the issue of whether something is
24 structural or harmless. It is the issue, as it was in
25 the more recent decision of Gonzalez-Lopez, of the right

1 to choice of counsel decision. They are what the Court
2 looked to to determine the issue was, is it harmless, is
3 it quantifiable. And in this case, courts are
4 accustomed, appellate courts are accustomed to looking
5 at the introduction of this kind of evidence and
6 determining whether or not it is harmless.

7 The State has not taken a position before
8 this Court that the Ninth Circuit was erroneous in
9 determining that this evidence was prejudicial, and
10 therefore affected the outcome.

11 So the issue of accuracy as defined by the
12 State and by the government, the problem with that
13 argument and the easiest way to see the problem in that
14 argument is if you look to Gideon. Certainly we
15 wouldn't argue that the insertion of counsel into a case
16 may not result in what the State is defining as a more
17 accurate result. The insertion of counsel into a case
18 may well cause the exclusion of evidence. In fact, in
19 many instances that is exactly what counsel does.

20 So their definition of accuracy if applied
21 to the Gideon case would mean that Gideon would flunk
22 that definition, and wouldn't be the case that has been
23 so repeatedly referenced by this Court as an example of
24 the kind of case that should be made retroactive.

25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Ms. Forsman, what about

1 the cases we're had so far on this second Teague
2 category? As far as I know -- well, we haven't found
3 anything to be retroactive on collateral review so far,
4 so this would be the first time.

5 MS. FORSMAN: It would be, Your Honor, and
6 it is appropriate that this be the first time. As I
7 previously referenced, those cases fell -- there are 12
8 of them, by the way. There were 12 decisions post
9 Teague applying the Teague analysis in which this Court
10 did not find retroactivity. The Solicitor General is
11 correct. Some of those were cases in which on
12 collateral review, the petitioner was seeking to
13 actually create a new rule and apply it retroactively.

14 But if we look to cases such as the
15 retroactivity application of Batson, for instance, what
16 this Court has found is that the Batson rule, the
17 cross-section of the community on a jury, that the
18 purpose of that rule was not created for the purpose of
19 protecting against unjust convictions or ensuring the
20 integrity of the fact-finding process. That was not the
21 purpose of the Batson rule, this Court found that it
22 wasn't the purpose of the Batson rule, and that
23 therefore, it would not fall under the Teague exception.

24 That is not so when you talk about the
25 purpose of the cross-examination rule.

1 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What about the decision
2 that said Ring v. Arizona was not retroactive on
3 collateral?

4 MS. FORSMAN: Again, in Schriro versus
5 Summerlin, the issue there was an issue with regard to
6 ultimate accuracy of a jury versus a judge. Again, this
7 Court found that the evidence was -- the evidence was
8 equivocal with regard to whether or not a judge findings
9 or jury findings were more accurate.

10 Now you might say, well, that sounds a
11 little bit like Roberts. The problem with that is that
12 it isn't like Roberts, because under Roberts, the
13 cross-examination right, which is something that we held
14 so dear and connected so directly to the right to
15 counsel, having counsel without the right to
16 cross-examination, isn't much of a right.

17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: The problem with your
18 case -- maybe it's our problem because it was our
19 rule -- is that we're asked to adopt an across-the-board
20 calculus as to the rule. In some cases, as I think you
21 will have to concede, under the Roberts jurisprudence,
22 the fact finding was more accurate.

23 In your case, what you are telling us is
24 that the fact finding is far less accurate. But I think
25 you are stuck unless you can give us some reason that we

1 depart with it. With a rule-made jurisprudence, we have
2 to look at the rule in the whole universe of cases, not
3 just your case. It seems to me that was the problem you
4 had in arguing in this area, and maybe you can suggest
5 some way out. I don't see it.

6 MS. FORSMAN: I can, Your Honor. The reason
7 that I can is that the judge does not have the ability
8 to see the cross-examination statement either. So if we
9 start with the premise, when making this reliability
10 determination, we would have to throw out all of the
11 statements in Crawford and all of the previous cases
12 which hold so dear the right to cross-examination and
13 say, but a judge can make a reliability determination
14 without ever hearing the statements cross-examined, can
15 make them in that vacuum without ever testing the
16 reliability of the statements with the -- with
17 cross-examination.

18 And I don't know how you would be able to
19 square that with the strong statements that are made in
20 Crawford. And the strong statements that are made in
21 the cases, for instance, in the case finding that Bruton
22 should be retroactive, because it goes to the integrity
23 of the fact-finding process. Unlike all of the other
24 cases that you've talked about since Teague, the
25 integrity of the fact-finding process is what is at

1 issue here. Do you have confidence in a result which is
2 based upon an accuser's statements being admitted
3 without ever having been cross-examined?

4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But Ohio versus
5 Roberts was not overruled because of a judgment that it
6 was not doing a good enough job in assessing reliability
7 of these statements. It was overruled because of a
8 judgment that the Founders wanted there to be
9 cross-examination.

10 MS. FORSMAN: That's -- Your Honor, that is
11 the base of the decision. It harkens back to what the
12 Founders believed. However, the rule in Roberts was
13 described variously from "amorphous to unpredictable,
14 proof manipulable," to saying that the basis for the
15 right to confrontation and cross-examination comes from
16 a basic mistrust of, even to the levels of a judge in
17 terms of accepting the testimony without the advantage
18 of an actual adversary proceeding.

19 This case, of course, illustrates the dire
20 need for cross-examination because the accuser in this
21 case testified inconsistently at the preliminary hearing
22 in this case and then was excused before
23 cross-examination was allowed. The accuser in this
24 case, who was sent to a counselor by the district
25 attorney, when she went to the counselor refused to

1 knowledge that the incident happened, according to the
2 testimony of the counselor.

3 And because the court -- and the record is
4 very scant on what happened here -- the court, the trial
5 court for instance, under Roberts made only a couple of
6 findings and he said the testimony was consistent -- he
7 didn't look at the fact that it had been inconsistent on
8 at least two other occasions -- and said it was
9 chronological, at least according to what the police
10 officer said.

11 And so there were only a couple of findings
12 by the trial court at all with respect to --

13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You had the
14 opportunity to challenge those findings under the
15 Roberts regime in state court?

16 MS. FORSMAN: We did. We did, and that --
17 and that issue was not reached by the Ninth Circuit
18 because after we had argued the case in the Ninth
19 Circuit the Crawford decision was decided; and it was at
20 that point that the Ninth Circuit picked up on the
21 Crawford, and they didn't decide the issue of whether or
22 not Roberts would have meant that this testimony was
23 unreliable anyway.

24 JUSTICE BREYER: You can still argue -- what
25 hearsay exception did it come in under?

1 MS. FORSMAN: It came in under a Nevada
2 statute which was patterned after Roberts. It came in
3 under a Nevada statute --

4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Adequate indicia of
5 reliability.

6 JUSTICE BREYER: Adequate indicia of
7 reliability?

8 MS. FORSMAN: Yes, adequate -- basically,
9 indicia of reliability. It didn't go into -- it didn't
10 go into too much more detail than that. It just simply
11 required that, a witness under ten, the court must find
12 that the, that the statement is reliable and the
13 statements are reliable, and then --

14 JUSTICE BREYER: Is that universal in
15 Nevada? I mean, is they are no more hearsay rule in
16 Nevada, that you just evaluate hearsay straight out in
17 every case?

18 MS. FORSMAN: No. No. That was a statute
19 that was adopted specifically for child witnesses.

20 JUSTICE GINSBURG: This is for children
21 under ten, isn't it?

22 MS. FORSMAN: Children under ten.

23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: As you just said.

24 MS. FORSMAN: That's correct.

25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And here we had someone

1 who was six years old and was hardly articulate, it
2 seems from the little we have of this record. So the
3 Nevada statute I think was very specific to children and
4 was not --

5 MS. FORSMAN: It was. Yes, yes. No, it
6 was. It was adopted for witnesses under ten. This
7 child actually was quite articulate in the preliminary
8 hearing and was able -- was able to talk about the fact
9 that she remembered talking to the police officer, that
10 she remembered -- but then, but then in terms of trying
11 to recall the incident, she was unable to recall the
12 incident, and she was unable to recall it in any of the
13 same detail that the police officer testified to.

14 So it wasn't -- you know, it wasn't a
15 circumstance in which you had a child who simply
16 couldn't speak or a child who couldn't describe what had
17 occurred.

18 JUSTICE BREYER: So if you lose this case,
19 you can go back to the Ninth Circuit and say, well, even
20 under Roberts it shouldn't have come in?

21 MS. FORSMAN: I believe that's correct, Your
22 Honor, because the Ninth Circuit did not reach that
23 issue.

24 JUSTICE SOUTER: Would you comment,
25 Ms. Forsman, on your opponent's argument based on

1 2254 (d) ?

2 MS. FORSMAN: Yes. I think the easiest way
3 to explain our position on that is that what has been
4 articulated here is that a retroactive -- a rule made
5 retroactive by this court would be applicable to
6 Mr. Bockting if he had not raised this issue or had been
7 somehow procedurally defaulted along the way. In other
8 words, in order to be able to get the advantage that was
9 discussed by both the state and the government of the
10 other sections of the statute which clearly recognize,
11 as to the extent that it's relevant the sponsor of the
12 legislation did, that you still have the power to make
13 rules retroactive, but the only way that Mr. Bockting
14 would be able to get advantage of that rule would be if
15 the state court had never ruled on the merits of his
16 claim or had made some sort of procedural ruling that
17 meant that he was defaulted on the claim. So instead of
18 Mr. Bockting, who has raised this question of being able
19 to cross-examine his accuser from day one in the trial,
20 he cannot have that rule applied retroactively to him.
21 If instead he now, he goes back later and the court
22 says, no, this is a successor petition, you can't, you
23 can't get it, you can't come into our courtroom, the
24 door is slammed on you, according to the state now
25 there's no ruling on the merits of his claim, and that's

1 why that section of the statute would permit the
2 retroactive rule to apply.

3 2254(d)(1), while it has the language
4 clearly established, and the court asked some questions
5 about that, I think it must be remembered that when that
6 statute is being addressed, it's being addressed in
7 state court -- or in Federal court, on Federal habeas.
8 And so at the time that the petitioner is in Federal
9 court, then the rule has been clearly established.

10 The 2254(d) --

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: That's not -- the
12 state has to result -- the state -- it's adjudicated on
13 the merits in state court and results in a decision that
14 was contrary to clearly established Federal law.

15 MS. FORSMAN: Correct.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So it seems to me
17 that the question is what was the law, what was the
18 clearly established law at the time of the state
19 decision.

20 MS. FORSMAN: 2254(d)(1), I think the only
21 way that you can read that section compatibly with the
22 four other sections which are quoted in our appendix 2
23 of our brief, the only way that you can do that is to
24 recognize, although this Court will recall that it has
25 described AEDPA as not quite a silk purse of legislative

1 drafting, but the only way to make those sections
2 compatible is to say, listen, what was going on when
3 2254(d)(1) was written was we were talking not about the
4 timing of the new rule, what we were talking about is
5 who is it decided by, because before AEDPA was adopted
6 it wasn't apparent that it must be a decision by you, by
7 this Court, that established by the rule. So that's the
8 first part.

9 And the second part is that it's not dicta.
10 It is an actual holding of this Court that is to be
11 looked to to determine whether or not the state court
12 was wrong. And so the only way to read that is to say,
13 listen, there has to be some meaning to retroactivity,
14 and what does retroactivity mean? Retroactivity means
15 like a nunc pro tunc order, that when you've determined
16 that a new rule is retroactively applicable -- and
17 certainly between AEDPA and the Teague exceptions, which
18 you did say in Horn versus Banks, by the way, should be
19 analyzed differently -- although it has not been tossed
20 up to you directly as it has in this case, the meaning
21 of the 2254(d)(1), you have repeatedly advised that
22 Teague is still alive and well and that when you look to
23 the application of whether a rule should be applied
24 retroactively you look to the Teague exceptions, so we
25 also look --

1 JUSTICE ALITO: Is there any language in
2 2254(d) that could incorporate the Teague exceptions?

3 MS. FORSMAN: There is not language in
4 2254(d)(1). The language -- the reason that we know
5 that Congress was cognizant of Teague is that there is
6 language throughout AEDPA, particularly in the sections
7 that we've quoted to you, that are lifted directly from
8 Teague.

9 JUSTICE ALITO: What would we say if we were
10 to say that 2254(d)(1) accommodates the Teague
11 exceptions, that Congress meant to put them in but just
12 forgot to do it? How would we account for the language?

13 MS. FORSMAN: I think that what you would
14 say is that
15 Congress would not have deprived you of the power to
16 make a rule retroactively applicable and would have not
17 then created the ludicrous situation which the state
18 suggests would occur here, which is instead of the
19 motivation in Congress in having someone like
20 Mr. Bockting raise the issue from the very beginning in
21 one unitary proceeding, as opposed to going back, which
22 is what they've suggested he must do in order to get the
23 advantage of a retroactive rule, is that Congress was
24 cognizant of that and in order to make all of the
25 statute -- all of the provisions of the statute have

1 meaning and not render certain provisions, including the
2 sections that we quoted, superfluous, that you must
3 interpret that to mean that the -- that the -- that
4 2254(d)(1) is not a timing statute. It's what law do we
5 look to. That must be what they meant. Otherwise, the
6 rest of it just doesn't make any sense.

7 JUSTICE ALITO: Isn't that making the tail
8 wag the dog, because there's language in the provisions
9 on successive petitions that refers to Teague, that you
10 would read the Teague exceptions into 2254(d)(1) when
11 there's nothing in the language there that can be
12 interpreted to refer to them?

13 MS. FORSMAN: No. I don't believe that's
14 the tail wagging the dog, because I don't think that
15 that was the intent of 2254(d)(1). I think the
16 intent -- again, I think the intent of 2254(d)(1) was in
17 order to define what kinds of decisions the state court
18 decisions should be measured against. There must be
19 some kind of meaning to retroactivity, and retroactivity
20 means that you are making this decision now and you're
21 making it retroactive to the time. It is not going to
22 be many things, as we know not only from your decisions,
23 but as we know from the very small core of decisions
24 that Teague left open. And it is those decisions where
25 we must worry whether or not an innocent man has been

1 convicted. It is those rules that protect against
2 those -- an unjust, an unwarranted, a wrongful
3 conviction. It is only those rules that go to
4 reliability, that go to the integrity of the
5 fact-finding process, that you are going to let through
6 that veil.

7 So if it is only that small core of rules
8 that you reserved in Teague, only that small core of
9 rules, and we know it won't be many at this point, then
10 if you read that compatibly with AEDPA, it is not and,
11 as we know, it is not going to open the floodgates.
12 There is a very defined period of time in which people
13 can bring actions for relief. Under your Dodd decision
14 decision, there is only one year, not from the time that
15 you make -- if you were to make, for instance, this
16 decision retroactive, not from today, but it is one year
17 from Crawford that petitioners have the opportunity to
18 be able to come into court within that statute of
19 limitations with regard to the date on which a new rule
20 is adopted.

21 It is from that date forward. So there is a
22 defined population. In appendix 1 of our brief, you
23 will see all of the decisions that we could find that
24 have actually applied Crawford and there were 49 of
25 them. And what you'll find is that of the decisions --

1 and the state and the government have not disputed
2 this -- of the 49 decisions which we were able to find
3 at the time of the writing of that brief, only five
4 actually resulted in relief. There's no question it
5 would result in relief here because there is no
6 contention before you that the Ninth Circuit's
7 determination of harmfulness -- there is no
8 determination before you; they haven't challenged that
9 to you.

10 So it would result in relief for
11 Mr. Bockting. But because it's harmless error or it's
12 not testimonial or there was a previous opportunity to
13 cross-examine, of the 49 decisions only 5 were found to
14 have to result in relief.

15 And that is as it should be. The state
16 argues that watersheddedness, if that's a word, is that
17 watersheddedness must mean that it affects many, many
18 decisions. Now, that can't mean what Teague means.
19 Teague can't mean that my burden is to show you that
20 many decisions will be overturned. That's the exact
21 opposite of what Teague was decided for.

22 Watersheddedness has to do with the
23 alteration of our understanding. It is difficult for me
24 to understand how the change of course as described by
25 then Chief Justice Rehnquist, that the change of course

1 that Crawford represented in the way that we look at the
2 right to confrontation cannot be, cannot be seen as
3 precisely the alteration in the understanding of this
4 bedrock principle again directly from the language of
5 Crawford.

6 We ask you, Your Honors, to make the rule of
7 Crawford retroactive and to affirm the determination of
8 the Ninth Circuit.

9 JUSTICE STEVENS: Ms. Forsman, can I ask you
10 a personal question? Were you a moot court finalist?

11 (Laughter.)

12 MS. FORSMAN: I was not.

13 JUSTICE STEVENS: I attend a moot court at
14 Notre Dame in about your year and it was an awfully good
15 moot court.

16 MS. FORSMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Ms.
18 Forsman.

19 General Chanos, you have two minutes
20 remaining.

21 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF GEORGE J. CHANOS

22 ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

23 MR. CHANOS: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
24 I only have a few points.

25 First of all, counsel's argument with regard

1 to the interpretation of 2254(d)(1) clearly established
2 language is inconsistent with the statement made --
3 statements made by this Court in Lockyer and in Williams
4 v. Taylor. In Lockyer, the Court stated Section
5 2254(d)(1)'s clearly established phase referred to the
6 holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's
7 decisions as of the time of the relevant state court
8 decision, citing Williams v. Taylor. In other words,
9 clearly established federal law under 2254(d)(1) is the
10 governing legal principle or principles set forth by the
11 Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its
12 decision.

13 With regard to counsel's point about
14 this case in particular, Bockting, I agree that there
15 are broader issues beyond this particular fact
16 situation. However, I want the Court to feel
17 comfortable that when this Court sent this case back
18 down to the Nevada Supreme Court and told the Nevada
19 Supreme Court to follow Ohio -- Idaho versus Wright, the
20 factors in Idaho versus Wright to determine
21 trustworthiness, talk about spontaneity and consistent
22 reputation -- repetition, mental state of declarant, use
23 of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, and
24 lack of motive to fabricate. Particularized guarantees
25 of trustworthiness must be so trustworthy that

1 adversarial testing would add little to its reliability.

2 Following that admonishment from this Court,
3 the Nevada Supreme Court found those statements to be
4 reliable and to satisfy the standards of Ohio -- Idaho
5 versus Wright.

6 Finally, I would just point out that
7 although Caldwell is indeed an important rule, and may,
8 in fact, be a fundamental rule, so was Batson in Teague,
9 as was Caldwell in Sawyer, as was Ring in Summerlin, as
10 was Duncan in DiStefano as was Mills in Banks. Yet this
11 Court failed to apply retroactive status to any of those
12 important fundamental rules saying none of them rose to
13 the level of Gideon versus Wainwright. The same should
14 be true with your decision here with respect to
15 Crawford.

16 Finally, as Justice Harlan stated in the
17 case of McKay, talking about where this Court's
18 retroactivity jurisprudence has come from, no one,
19 not --

20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You can finish your
21 sentence.

22 MR. CHANOS: Thank you.

23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Particularly if it
24 is Justice Harlan you're quoting.

25 (Laughter.)

1 MR. CHANOS: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
2 No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial
3 system, not society as a whole is benefitted by a
4 judgment providing that a man shall tentatively go to
5 jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his
6 continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh
7 litigation on issues already resolved.

8 Thank you.

9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, General.
10 The case is submitted.

11 (Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the case in the
12 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

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A	adequate 16:25 36:4,6,8	amicus 1:22 2:8 17:15	21:20	21:6 34:11
ability 33:7	adjudicated 39:12	amorphous 34:13	area 33:4	37:19 38:21
able 9:15 28:17 33:18 37:8,8 38:8,14,18 43:18 44:2	admissibility 24:9	analog 18:7,18	argue 30:15 35:24	41:21 46:17
above-entitled 1:13 48:12	admitted 19:1 25:25 34:2	analysis 4:19 11:18,20 13:11 13:15 16:24 18:21 29:20 31:9	argued 26:4 35:18	bad 9:22
absolutely 9:10 10:19	admonishment 47:2	analytical 15:16	argues 44:16	balance 16:14 17:9
acceptable 25:24	adopt 32:19	analyzed 40:19	arguing 7:4 27:17 33:4	Banks 40:18 47:10
accepting 34:17	adopted 36:19 37:6 40:5 43:20	answered 15:14	argument 1:14 2:2,5,9,12 3:3 3:6 9:22,22 15:5,6,9,17 17:14 19:17,23 19:25 20:1 21:8 23:16,23 25:17 28:25 30:13,14 37:25 45:21,25	bar 4:21 6:25
accommodates 41:10	adopts 24:11	anyway 23:13 35:23	Arizona 32:2	barely 18:1
account 41:12	advantage 34:17 38:8,14 41:23	apparent 40:6	arrived 17:2	barred 11:19
accuracy 15:21 16:16 17:7 19:8 20:25 22:1,3 27:3,6 29:10 30:11,20 32:6	adversarial 47:1	appeal 8:20 11:5	articulate 37:1,7	base 34:11
accuracy-enh... 16:15,19,22	adversary 34:18	APPEARAN... 1:16	articulated 38:4	based 25:22 34:2 37:25
accurate 3:20 4:13 17:22 18:23 19:5 27:12 30:17 32:9,22,24	advised 40:21	appellate 8:18 30:4	asked 32:19 39:4	basic 8:13 15:13 21:21 34:16
accusations 25:22	AEDPA 3:15 6:18 9:22 18:2 18:3,5,17 39:25 40:5,17 41:6 43:10	appendix 39:22 43:22	asking 20:11	basically 36:8
accuser 26:18 34:20,23 38:19	affirm 45:7	applicable 12:9 12:12,18,22 38:5 40:16 41:16	aspect 23:24	basis 5:4,5 7:14 9:17 18:16 34:14
accuser's 34:2	agree 14:10 46:14	application 10:23 17:21 18:24 31:15 40:23	aspects 24:8	Batson 31:15,16 31:21,22 47:8
accustomed 30:4,4	ALITO 19:17 41:1,9 42:7	applied 18:12,15 21:23 30:20 38:20 40:23 43:24	assessing 34:6	bedrock 3:22 4:15 11:22 12:1,2,5,14,17 12:25 13:6,9 14:6,20 15:16 23:24 24:3 29:9 45:4
across-the-bo... 20:9 32:19	alive 40:22	applies 23:16,18	Assistant 1:19	began 7:24
actions 43:13	allow 23:20	apply 3:10,16 6:1 8:15 18:6 27:10 31:13 39:2 47:11	assume 8:10 9:4 18:2,12	beginning 41:20
active 5:13	allowed 34:23	applying 5:12 5:23 31:9	Atkins 7:2	behalf 1:18,21 1:24 2:4,7,11 2:14 3:7 17:14 25:18 45:22
actual 34:18 40:10	alter 3:21 8:2 13:7	approach 24:4	attend 45:13	believe 4:21 8:1 9:14 11:19,24 37:21 42:13
add 47:1	alteration 44:23 45:3	approaches 21:4	attorney 1:17 34:25	believed 34:12
addition 3:14	altered 4:15 12:2	appropriate 31:6	audiotape 26:19 26:20	benefitted 48:3
additional 20:3	alters 12:14,24 13:24	arbitrarily	authority 17:2	better 29:10
addressed 39:6 39:6	ambiguous 11:3		Autumn 16:12 16:12	Betts 12:7,7,10 12:19
	amendment 11:25 12:4,8 12:10,11,13,19 12:23		awfully 45:14	beyond 27:20 46:15
			a.m 1:15 3:2	bit 32:11
			B	Bockting 1:8 3:4
			b 6:11	
			back 7:4,12,16	

16:13 26:2,14 38:6,13,18 41:20 44:11 46:14 bound 27:8,16 27:19 boundaries 8:8 Brady 12:7,8,11 12:19 BREYER 35:24 36:6,14 37:18 brief 21:17 39:23 43:22 44:3 bring 43:13 broader 46:15 Bruton 28:21 33:21 built 21:21 built-in 18:25 burden 28:12 44:19	cases 3:11,16 4:9 13:4 21:17 24:17 31:1,7 31:11,14 32:20 33:2,11,21,24 category 6:19 24:10 31:2 cause 5:3,6,9 6:9 7:4 30:18 central 13:16 certain 42:1 certainly 4:11 30:14 40:17 challenge 19:11 35:14 challenged 44:8 change 8:18 10:2 25:4,9 26:6 44:24,25 changed 9:9 Chanos 1:17 2:3 2:13 3:5,6,8 4:1,3,8,20 5:2 5:20 6:2,22 7:22 8:5,9,21 9:2,7,10,14 10:5,16,19 11:6,10,13,23 13:15,18,24 14:18,24 15:2 15:19 16:3,7 16:12,20,23 17:12 45:19,21 45:23 47:22 48:1 check 22:10 Chief 3:3,8 4:17 4:20,23 5:15 5:21 17:9,11 17:17 18:1,4 18:11 25:14,19 34:4 35:13 39:11,16 44:25 45:17,23 47:20 47:23 48:1,9 child 36:19 37:7 37:15,16 46:23	children 36:20 36:22 37:3 choice 30:1 chronological 35:9 Circuit 30:8 35:17,19,20 37:19,22 45:8 Circuit's 44:6 circumstance 37:15 circumstances 10:13 21:5 cite 18:2 cited 21:16 citing 46:8 claim 5:7 7:1,2,7 7:11,13,16 11:19 38:16,17 38:25 clause 27:22 clear 14:5 15:15 clearly 5:18 10:10,15,15,23 10:24 11:17 28:13 38:10 39:4,9,14,18 46:1,5,9 coerced 29:17 cognizant 41:5 41:24 collateral 3:11 3:16 31:3,12 32:3 come 22:6,23 26:3 35:25 37:20 38:23 43:18 47:18 comes 22:9 34:15 comfortable 46:17 comment 37:24 common 19:14 community 28:19 31:17 Company 26:16	comparing 26:11 compatible 40:2 compatibly 39:21 43:10 complies 10:9 component 15:20 20:1 components 19:7 concede 32:21 conceivable 23:11 conceivably 5:12 6:8 confession 29:18 confidence 34:1 confrontation 12:1 13:5,13 13:19 14:6,13 14:14 27:5,12 27:13,21,22 34:15 45:2 Congress 6:3 7:19 8:1 10:6 10:11 41:5,11 41:15,19,23 connected 32:14 consequences 15:8,10,17 consistent 35:6 46:21 constitutes 27:7 Constitution 7:24 12:21 19:21 22:10,25 27:4,14 constitutional 23:22 28:14 constitutionally 25:23 contention 44:6 continue 11:18 continued 48:6 contours 13:10 contrary 5:16 5:18 10:22,24	10:25 28:4 39:14 contrast 13:2 control 8:22,23 convicted 21:3 43:1 conviction 3:20 4:14 18:7 43:3 convictions 17:23,24 18:6 18:23 19:6 31:19 core 42:23 43:7 43:8 corpus 20:19 correct 5:20 8:15 31:11 36:24 37:21 39:15 CORRECTI... 1:5 corrupt 29:2 costs 17:25 counsel 12:9,12 12:16,20 16:2 16:5 19:12 24:7,14,21,23 25:11 26:12 30:1,15,17,19 32:15,15 counselor 34:24 34:25 35:2 counsel's 45:25 46:13 count 19:14 country 26:15 couple 24:6 35:5 35:11 course 34:19 44:24,25 court 1:1,14 3:9 3:13 4:4,9 5:4 5:7,8,10,14 6:8 6:14,15,24 7:4 7:5,8,8,10,11 7:15 8:7,16,18 9:6,13,16,18
C				
C 2:1 3:1 calculus 32:20 Caldwell 47:7,9 call 18:23 Carawford 24:4 carryover 18:18 case 4:25 8:15 8:17,19,20 11:6 12:6,16 12:19 16:4 19:16 20:8 21:20,22 22:5 22:11,13 23:4 23:15 26:11 28:6 29:12 30:3,15,17,21 30:22,24 32:18 32:23 33:3,21 34:19,21,22,24 35:18 36:17 37:18 40:20 46:14,17 47:17 48:10,11				

9:23,23,24 10:8,18,20 11:16 12:8 17:18 18:12,15 21:6,18,22 23:20 24:3 25:13,20,24 26:8,22 27:25 27:25 28:13 29:21 30:1,8 30:23 31:9,16 31:21 32:7 35:3,4,5,12,15 36:11 38:5,15 38:21 39:4,7,7 39:9,13,24 40:7,10,11 42:17 43:18 45:10,13,15 46:3,4,7,11,11 46:16,17,18,19 47:2,3,11 courtroom 38:23 courts 6:3,4,5,6 6:7 10:7,12 23:5,12,17,19 30:3,4 court's 8:21 11:4 46:6 47:17 Crawford 3:10 3:23 4:11,12 8:19 11:21,24 11:24,25 13:2 13:7,17,18,21 14:13 15:23,24 16:15 17:6,19 17:21,24 18:24 20:12,15 22:3 22:8,22 23:3 24:16,19,24 26:7,19,19,24 26:24 29:3 33:11,20 35:19 35:21 43:17,24 45:1,5,7 47:15	create 31:13 created 7:24 31:18 41:17 crime 6:21 9:25 criminal 3:15,19 3:24 24:8,24 48:2 crossed 24:1 cross-examina... 13:14,20,23 14:1,12,14,16 15:9,22 16:2,5 16:7,8,9 19:18 19:19,22 20:10 26:12 27:5 28:15,20,22 31:25 32:13,16 33:8,12,17 34:9,15,20,23 cross-examine 19:9 20:6,7 24:25 25:1,10 26:18 38:19 44:13 cross-examined 33:14 34:3 cross-section 28:18 31:17 curiae 1:22 2:8 17:15 <hr/> D d 3:1 5:16 Dame 45:14 date 43:19,21 daughter 22:13 daughter's 22:16,17 day 38:19 48:5 dealt 21:8 dear 32:14 33:12 death 21:17,19 debatable 19:19 decide 14:20 35:21 decided 8:20	17:24 26:7 35:19 40:5 44:21 decides 19:21 decision 5:16,18 5:23,25 6:20 6:20 9:13 10:8 10:9,18,20,22 11:4,14,15,16 12:2 20:16 26:7 27:8 29:25 30:1 32:1 34:11 35:19 39:13,19 40:6 42:20 43:13,14,16 46:8,12 47:14 decisions 17:1,4 20:17 27:24 28:4,21 31:8 42:17,18,22,23 42:24 43:23,25 44:2,13,18,20 46:7 declarant 46:22 deemed 24:14 defaulted 38:7 38:17 defendant 6:21 19:14 23:1 defendants 15:11 48:2 defense 16:2,5 19:12 deference 6:4,7 10:7,12 define 42:17 defined 30:11 43:12,22 defining 30:16 definition 15:16 30:20,22 denial 20:9 denied 7:14 9:16 denies 5:4 deny 7:7 depart 33:1	Department 1:4 1:20 depends 14:9 deprived 41:15 depriving 24:15 describe 14:10 14:11,22 37:16 described 34:13 39:25 44:24 detail 36:10 37:13 detective 16:9 determination 5:8,11,14 6:5,6 6:12,14,16,24 7:6,10 16:24 19:2 22:6 23:9 25:7 33:10,13 44:7,8 45:7 determinations 15:12 determine 30:2 40:11 46:20 determined 40:15 determining 19:20 30:6,9 developed 7:25 devise 23:20 dicta 40:9 46:6 difference 8:25 9:2,3 22:19 different 4:25 24:25 differently 40:19 difficult 44:23 difficulties 28:24 diminish 17:22 18:22 19:5 diminished 3:21 4:14 15:22 16:17 17:8 21:1 diminishment 22:1	dire 34:19 direction 28:1 directly 28:22 32:14 40:20 41:7 45:4 DIRECTOR 1:3 disagree 9:1 discounted 24:15 discretion 8:7 discussed 26:9 38:9 discussing 27:21 discussion 28:3 dispense 14:15 disputed 44:1 DiStefano 47:10 distinction 13:4 distinguish 28:17 distinguishes 20:4 district 34:24 Dodd 43:13 dog 42:8,14 doing 34:6 door 38:24 drafting 40:1 Duke 26:16 Duncan 47:10 D.C 1:10,21 <hr/> E e 2:1 3:1,1 4:24 5:22 easiest 30:13 38:2 easily 28:17 easy 26:12,13 effect 18:18 either 11:3,6,9 11:11,19 17:19 33:8 elements 3:22 4:16 5:9 12:3 12:15,17,25 13:6,8,9 29:21
--	---	--	--	--

<p>29:22 emphasis 13:23 enacting 8:3 10:6 ensuring 31:19 entails 17:25 entirely 6:19 entitled 3:14 entry 23:21 enumerated 6:10 equally 23:19 equitable 8:4,6 8:8 equivalent 9:5 equivocal 32:8 erroneous 30:8 error 24:16 29:7 29:7,20 44:11 errors 24:16 ESQ 1:17,19,23 2:3,6,10,13 essential 3:22 4:16 12:3,15 12:21,25 13:5 13:6,8,9 14:6,7 24:14 established 3:13 5:17,19 7:12 7:17 8:16 10:10,15,23,24 11:17 21:15,18 24:22,24 25:11 39:4,9,14,18 40:7 46:1,5,9 evaluate 36:16 evaluation 27:7 event 5:3 evidence 19:11 19:16 24:10 30:5,9,18 32:7 32:7 exact 21:12 44:20 exacting 3:12 exactly 10:16,19 11:10 14:8</p>	<p>30:19 example 4:1,3 20:4 30:23 examples 29:13 29:19 exception 3:18 31:23 35:25 exceptions 3:17 40:17,24 41:2 41:11 42:10 exclusion 30:18 exclusionary 28:18 excused 34:22 exhausted 20:20 exist 14:15 existed 24:11 25:9 existing 10:9 20:21 25:9 expected 28:8 explain 38:3 explicitly 29:12 extent 6:4 38:11</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">F</p> <hr/> <p>fabricate 46:24 facile 14:20 fact 10:20 12:6 15:11,12 20:2 20:5 26:7 30:18 32:22,24 33:23 35:7 37:8 46:15 47:8 factor 20:3 factors 46:20 fact-finding 28:23 31:20 33:25 43:5 failed 47:11 fails 3:12 fair 3:22 4:16 12:3,15,25 13:6,9 14:7 24:14 fairness 12:21</p>	<p>fall 3:17 31:23 far 27:20 31:1,2 31:3 32:24 fashion 9:12 14:20 favorable 15:10 federal 5:6,10 6:3,7,8,14,25 7:8,8,11,15 9:18,23 10:7 10:23 13:5 18:6,7,12,15 18:18 23:4,12 23:19,20,23 39:7,7,8,14 46:9 feel 46:16 fell 31:7 felony 24:23 final 11:4,14,16 17:24 finalist 45:10 finality 20:22 21:6 Finally 24:22 47:6,16 find 4:10,11 6:9 24:2 31:10 36:11 43:23,25 44:2 finding 5:9 32:22,24 33:21 33:23 findings 32:8,9 35:6,11,14 finest 26:15 finish 47:20 first 6:19 18:25 21:10 24:7,23 25:11 31:4,6 40:8 45:25 five 44:3 flawed 17:1,5 26:10 27:24 29:15,16 floodgates 43:11 flunk 30:21</p>	<p>focuses 24:9 follow 15:4 46:19 following 15:8 47:2 forgot 41:12 formula 14:21 Forsman 1:23 2:10 25:16,17 25:19 27:18 28:11 29:5 30:25 31:5 32:4 33:6 34:10 35:16 36:1,8,18,22 36:24 37:5,21 37:25 38:2 39:15,20 41:3 41:13 42:13 45:9,12,16,18 forth 46:10 forward 43:21 found 24:3,18 26:8,22 31:2 31:16,21 32:7 44:13 47:3 Founders 34:8 34:12 four 21:17 39:22 framers 27:4,8 27:14,17,19 28:2 FRANCES 1:23 2:10 25:17 Frankly 14:21 free 23:19 24:23 fresh 48:6 friends 15:17 fundamental 21:4 24:5 47:8 47:12 fundamentally 17:1,4 26:10 27:23 further 25:13 future 22:22</p>	<hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">G</p> <hr/> <p>G 3:1 game 14:9 general 1:17,20 3:5 4:1 17:11 18:14 19:18 31:10 45:19 48:9 generality 14:10 generally 3:15 GEORGE 1:17 2:3,13 3:6 45:21 Gideon 4:2,5 12:6,10 13:20 21:4 24:3,4,22 25:10 29:12 30:14,21,21 47:13 Ginsburg 3:25 4:6 6:17,22 9:20 10:5 21:7 30:25 32:1 36:20,23,25 give 3:25 6:3 10:7,12 21:25 32:25 GLEN 1:3 go 4:18,21 21:6 36:9,10 37:19 43:3,4 48:4 goes 27:22 33:22 38:21 going 6:18 7:4 20:23 21:6,16 21:23 23:7 24:1 40:2 41:21 42:21 43:5,11 Gonzalez-Lopez 29:25 good 15:18 19:19 26:22 34:6 45:14 Gornstein 1:19 2:6 17:13,14 17:17 18:4,14</p>
---	--	---	---	--

19:24 20:15 21:11 22:12,17 23:6,14,18 25:15 governing 46:10 government 26:4,9 30:12 38:9 44:1 grant 9:25 granting 9:18 greater 27:3,6 Griffith 8:22 guarantees 19:3 22:7,21 23:10 46:24 guess 4:24 20:11	29:6 31:5 33:6 34:10 37:22 45:16 Honors 45:6 Horn 40:18 hourly 26:17 HOWARD 1:8	15:24 infringement 19:22 innocent 21:2 42:25 inquiry 23:25,25 insertion 30:15 30:17 instance 28:21 31:15 33:21 35:5 43:15 instances 30:19 instruction 29:1 integrity 28:23 31:20 33:22,25 43:4 intended 6:3 intent 42:15,16 42:16 intentional 29:15 interest 18:5,9 18:13,15 23:23 interpret 23:12 42:3 interpretation 8:19 27:10 46:1 interpreted 42:12 interpreting 23:7 introduce 19:10 introduced 19:10 introduction 29:15,17 30:5 IRVING 1:19 2:6 17:14 issue 3:18 8:13 19:21 29:6,21 29:23,24 30:2 30:11 32:5,5 34:1 35:17,21 37:23 38:6 41:20 issues 18:16,17	28:17 46:15 48:7 <hr/> J J 1:17 2:3,13 3:6 45:21 jail 48:5 job 34:6 judge 29:2 32:6 32:8 33:7,13 34:16 judgment 11:5 34:5,8 48:4 judicial 16:24 48:2 judicially 7:24 jurisprudence 4:5 8:22 28:16 29:23 32:21 33:1 47:18 jury 19:12,14 28:19 31:17 32:6,9 Justice 1:20 3:3 3:8,25 4:6,17 4:20,23 5:15 5:21 6:17,22 7:18 8:4,6,9,10 8:12,24 9:4,8 9:11,20 10:5 10:14,17 11:2 11:8,11,21 13:11,16,22 14:8,19,24,25 15:4,5 16:1,4 16:10,19,21 17:9,11,17 18:1,4,11 19:17 20:11 21:7 22:11,15 23:4,11,14,15 25:14,20 26:23 27:2 28:3 29:1 30:25 32:1,17 34:4 35:13,24 36:4,6,14,20 36:23,25 37:18	37:24 39:11,16 41:1,9 42:7 44:25 45:9,13 45:17,23 47:16 47:20,23,24 48:1,9 justifying 28:6 <hr/> K KENNEDY 7:18 11:21 13:22 16:1,4 16:10 20:11 22:11,15 29:1 32:17 36:4 Kentucky 7:2 kind 21:23 22:8 23:23 30:5,24 42:19 kinds 27:24 42:17 know 11:8 13:4 14:8,21,23 21:12 26:25 27:9 28:4,6 29:11,19 31:2 33:18 37:14 41:4 42:22,23 43:9,11 knowledge 35:1 <hr/> L L 1:19 2:6 17:14 lack 46:24 landmark 27:8 Lane 3:13 language 10:21 15:23 39:3 41:1,3,4,6,12 42:8,11 45:4 46:2 large 21:2 largely 20:20 Las 1:18,23 laughter 15:1 27:1 45:11 47:25 law 5:17,19 7:12
---	---	--	---	--

7:17 8:16 9:8 10:10,15,23,24 11:15,17 18:11 18:15 20:21 39:14,17,18 42:4 46:9 lawyer 26:17 lawyers 26:14 26:15 leads 29:10 left 23:7 42:24 legal 46:10 legislation 38:12 legislative 39:25 length 27:23 level 9:16 14:9 17:6 47:13 levels 34:16 life 25:21 lifted 41:7 light 19:15 likelihood 3:20 4:13 17:22 18:23 19:5 limitations 43:19 limited 24:9,10 Linkletter 7:25 listen 40:2,13 listened 26:21 litigation 48:7 little 32:11 37:2 47:1 live 20:6 25:1 Lockyer 46:3,4 long 6:15 10:8,9 longer 25:6 look 5:7,22 7:9 7:11 10:20 12:6 13:2 15:7 15:16 30:14 31:14 33:2 35:7 40:22,24 40:25 42:5 45:1 looked 30:2 40:11	looking 5:16 7:16 30:4 looser 23:21 lose 37:18 lot 8:7 ludicrous 41:17 <hr/> M <hr/> major 28:24 making 5:11 6:14 10:1 19:23 23:16 33:9 42:7,20 42:21 man 9:25 25:21 42:25 48:4 manipulable 34:14 manner 13:25 MARVIN 1:8 matter 1:13 23:6 26:8 27:13 48:12 mattered 26:13 26:14,16 McKay 47:17 mean 6:18,21,23 9:11,21 11:3 11:11 14:15 15:7 16:10 23:11 27:9 29:5 30:21 36:15 40:14 42:3 44:17,18 44:19 meaning 6:23 40:13,20 42:1 42:19 means 40:14 42:20 44:18 meant 5:24 35:22 38:17 41:11 42:5 measurable 29:8 measured 42:18 meet 3:12	Members 25:20 mental 46:22 mentioned 29:13 merits 5:8,11,14 6:11,14,15,25 10:8 38:15,25 39:13 met 25:3 Mills 47:10 minutes 45:19 mistrust 34:16 mob 29:14 model 15:8,9 modification 25:8 modifies 13:10 13:24 moot 45:10,13 45:15 mother 16:8 22:18,19,23,24 mother's 22:13 motion 9:5 motivation 41:19 motive 46:24 move 23:24 <hr/> N <hr/> N 2:1,1 3:1 narrow 3:17 20:24 narrower 13:13 necessarily 13:12 15:10 24:19 necessary 27:6 27:15 need 18:2 34:20 Nev 1:18,23 Nevada 1:4 36:1 36:3,15,16 37:3 46:18,18 47:3 never 24:15 25:22 29:21	38:15 new 3:15,18 5:18,23,25 13:20,22 17:3 21:8,13,21 24:11 27:2 31:13 40:4,16 43:19 Ninth 30:8 35:17,18,20 37:19,22 44:6 45:8 non-testimonial 22:4,5,9 Notre 45:14 November 1:11 number 21:12 24:17 nunc 40:15 <hr/> O <hr/> O 2:1 3:1 obscenity 14:25 occasions 35:8 occur 17:3 41:18 occurred 37:17 occurring 14:2 occurs 4:6,8 10:11 odd 9:20 10:3 officer 20:7 25:25 26:21 35:10 37:9,13 oh 16:10,10 Ohio 13:3,25 14:2,5 15:23 29:2 34:4 46:19 47:4 old 28:7 37:1 once 20:20 ones 21:13,14 open 42:24 43:11 operated 19:7 opine 18:16 opined 18:17 opinion 27:22	opponent's 37:25 opportunity 5:3 35:14 43:17 44:12 opposed 41:21 46:6 opposite 44:21 oral 1:13 2:2,5,9 3:6 17:14 25:17 order 38:8 40:15 41:22,24 42:17 ordinarily 18:16 ought 26:24 outcome 30:10 overruled 12:10 20:14 34:5,7 overruling 28:6 overturn 7:19 overturned 44:20 <hr/> P <hr/> P 3:1 PAGE 2:2 part 40:8,9 particular 46:14 46:15 particularized 19:3 22:7,20 46:24 particularly 41:6 47:23 pass 8:1 patterned 36:2 penalty 21:17,19 people 21:3 43:12 period 43:12 perjured 29:16 permit 39:1 personal 45:10 pervasively 24:7 petition 7:6 9:15 38:22 petitioner 1:6,18
--	---	--	--	---

2:4,14 3:7 5:5 7:3,7 9:14 17:16 31:12 39:8 45:22 petitioners 43:17 petitioner's 5:7 petitions 42:9 phase 46:5 picked 35:20 place 14:4 plain 6:23 play 14:9 please 3:9 17:18 plenty 14:1 point 5:15 7:11 15:2,13,18,19 16:13 17:5 19:12 28:20 35:20 43:9 46:13 47:6 pointed 4:4 points 45:24 police 16:8 20:7 25:25 26:21 35:9 37:9,13 population 43:22 position 9:20 11:13 28:14 30:7 38:3 post 31:8 power 26:16 38:12 41:15 pragmatically 15:7 precisely 23:13 45:3 preclude 6:13 7:15 9:18 precluded 5:10 prejudice 5:3,6 5:9 6:9 7:5 prejudicial 30:9 preliminary 34:21 37:7 premise 33:9	presentation 4:18 pretty 28:1 prevent 7:3 previous 33:11 44:12 previously 21:15 25:9 31:7 pre-Teague 29:22 principle 14:21 45:4 46:10 principles 46:10 prison 25:21 pro 40:15 problem 9:12 15:15 30:12,13 32:11,17,18 33:3 procedural 3:22 4:16 5:4 7:2,6 7:9,14 9:17 10:3 12:3,15 12:17,25 19:6 38:16 procedurally 38:7 procedure 3:19 3:24 7:14 procedures 8:2 proceeding 3:23 4:16 10:2,3 12:22 13:7,9 15:21 16:17 17:8 34:18 41:21 proceedings 9:21 10:4 20:25 process 28:23 31:20 33:23,25 43:5 produced 27:3 27:25 28:5 produces 28:9 28:12	productive 15:11 progeny 8:1 proliferate 9:21 10:4 promote 19:8 promotes 22:3 prong 18:20 proof 34:14 proper 27:10 proposed 21:13 protect 43:1 protecting 31:19 protection 23:7 provides 5:2 providing 48:4 provisions 41:25 42:1,8 purpose 28:5,9 31:18,18,21,22 31:25 purposes 20:19 27:16 purse 39:25 pursuant 17:2 put 41:11 p.m 48:11 <hr/> Q <hr/> quantifiable 30:3 quartering 27:21 question 8:12 16:15,16,21 18:3,3,5,10 21:15 25:24 26:1 38:18 39:17 44:4 45:10 questions 39:4 quite 37:7 39:25 quote 21:8 quoted 39:22 41:7 42:2 quoting 47:24 <hr/> R <hr/>	R 3:1 raise 41:20 raised 38:6,18 rate 26:17 reach 18:2,9 37:22 reached 8:17 35:17 read 39:21 40:12 42:10 43:10 reading 6:2,23 real 13:3 really 8:24 14:22 16:23 20:12 27:11 reason 19:4,25 21:25 32:25 33:6 41:4 reasons 18:21 24:6 REBUTTAL 2:12 45:21 recall 37:11,11 37:12 39:24 received 20:20 recognize 38:10 39:24 recognizing 9:24 record 35:3 37:2 refer 42:12 referenced 29:12 30:23 31:7 referred 46:5 referring 11:7 refers 42:9 refused 34:25 regard 29:17 32:5,8 43:19 45:25 46:13 regime 35:15 Rehnquist 44:25 reinstated 14:12 relevant 38:11	46:7 reliability 14:4,4 14:17 15:8 16:25,25 18:20 19:1,11,15 20:2,3 22:9,24 25:4,7 26:5,8 27:11 28:15 33:9,13,16 34:6 36:5,7,9 43:4 47:1 reliable 15:12 25:23 36:12,13 47:4 relief 3:14 4:22 5:4 8:6,8 9:17 9:19,25 43:13 44:4,5,10,14 rely 4:19 8:25 8:25 relying 8:13,14 remaining 45:20 remembered 37:9,10 39:5 render 42:1 rendered 9:13 renders 46:11 reopening 17:23 repeatedly 30:23 40:21 repetition 46:22 represented 45:1 representing 26:17 reputation 46:22 require 17:23 23:13 required 27:14 36:11 requirement 6:7 requirements 17:20 reserve 16:14 17:9 reserved 43:8
--	---	--	---	--

residual 23:8	20:5,6 21:19	31:22,25 32:19	section 39:1,21	31:10
resolved 48:7	24:7,13,15,21	32:20 33:2	46:4	solved 9:12
respect 17:3	24:23,25 25:1	34:12 36:15	sections 38:10	somebody 20:20
18:20 22:2,4	25:1,2,9,11	38:4,14,20	39:22 40:1	somewhat 11:2
22:25 35:12	26:11,12 27:22	39:2,9 40:4,7	41:6 42:2	24:11
47:14	28:15,18,19,22	40:16,23 41:16	see 14:23 30:13	sorry 8:5 16:3
respondent 1:24	29:25 32:13,14	41:23 43:19	33:5,8 43:23	16:20
2:11 3:14	32:15,16 33:12	45:6 47:7,8	seeking 31:12	sort 38:16
25:18	34:15 45:2	ruled 4:9 38:15	seen 45:2	sounds 32:10
rest 42:6	rights 12:16	rules 3:15,19,21	self-sufficient	source 7:18,23
result 30:16,17	13:19	20:24,25 21:13	19:25	SOUTER 15:4
34:1 39:12	Ring 32:2 47:9	38:13 43:1,3,7	sense 19:14 27:5	16:19,21 37:24
44:5,10,14	rise 17:6	43:9 47:12	42:6	so-called 26:5
resulted 10:21	risk 21:2	rule-made 33:1	sent 34:24 46:17	speak 37:16
44:4	Roberts 3:3 4:17	ruling 8:17	sentence 47:21	specific 37:3
results 24:20	4:20,23 5:15	38:16,25	sentenced 25:21	specifically
28:10,13 39:13	5:21 13:3 14:1		separate 23:25	36:19
retroactive 4:10	14:3,5 15:23	S	serious 22:1	sponsor 38:11
4:10 5:1,13,24	15:25 16:24	S 2:1 3:1	seriously 3:20	spontaneity
7:21,21 17:20	17:11,21 18:1	satisfy 17:19	4:14 15:22	46:21
18:24 20:16	18:11,22,25	47:4	16:17 17:8,22	square 33:19
21:10,16 28:21	19:2,4,7 20:2	Sawyer 47:9	18:22 19:5	standard 12:4
30:24 31:3	20:14 22:2,5	saying 10:1,6,12	21:1	14:2 23:21
32:2 33:22	23:1,21 25:4,5	10:14 11:24	set 46:10	25:4
38:4,5,13 39:2	25:14 26:5	12:16,20 27:20	show 5:5 28:12	standards 3:12
41:23 42:21	27:11,23 28:5	34:14 47:12	44:19	6:10 23:21
43:16 45:7	32:11,12,12,21	says 5:16,22	showing 28:9	47:4
47:11	34:4,5,12 35:5	10:21,25 20:18	significant	start 33:9
retroactively	35:13,15,22	38:22	24:17	state 5:4,8,13
3:11 21:23	36:2 37:20	Scalia 8:4,6,9,10	silk 39:25	6:4,4,5,15,17
31:13 38:20	39:11,16 45:17	9:4,8,11 10:14	similar 46:23	6:24 7:4,5,10
40:16,24 41:16	47:20,23 48:9	10:17 14:8,19	simply 5:25	8:16 9:5,13,16
retroactivity	rose 47:12	14:24,25 23:4	16:15 24:25	9:23 10:8,12
3:12 4:4 8:22	rule 3:23 4:13	23:11,14,15	27:20 36:10	10:18,20 11:16
28:16 31:10,15	4:14,25 5:12	26:23 27:2	37:15	23:16 28:25
40:13,14,14	7:12,19,19,23	28:3	situation 41:17	30:7,12,16
42:19,19 47:18	7:24 9:5 15:21	Scalia's 15:5	46:16	35:15 38:9,15
reversing 20:18	16:16 17:7,20	scant 35:4	six 37:1	38:24 39:7,12
review 3:11,16	18:22 20:18	Schiro 32:4	Sixth 11:25 12:4	39:12,13,18
6:25 31:3,12	21:3,8,14,21	screen 14:4 19:1	12:8,11	40:11 41:17
right 7:13 11:25	21:21,23 22:2	20:3 22:24	slammed 38:24	42:17 44:1,15
12:9,11,20	22:3,8 23:1,3,8	25:2 26:5,9	small 42:23 43:7	46:7,11,22
13:5,12,12,13	23:12,20 24:2	second 3:18 7:6	43:8	stated 46:4
13:19,20,25	24:4,11,19,22	7:10,13,16	societal 17:25	47:16
14:6,6,10,11	25:5,10 27:2	15:20 19:4	society 48:3	statement 19:10
14:11,13,14,16	27:16,23 28:18	23:25 24:13	soldiers 27:21	19:12,13,15
15:6 19:8,10	31:13,16,18,21	31:1 40:9	Solicitor 1:20	20:8 22:21

33:8 36:12 46:2 statements 22:22 25:3,7 25:25 26:2 33:11,14,16,19 33:20 34:2,7 36:13 46:3 47:3 states 1:1,15,22 2:7 12:9,12,18 12:22 17:15 stating 10:7 status 47:11 statute 8:14,15 9:1 36:2,3,18 37:3 38:10 39:1,6 41:25 41:25 42:4 43:18 STENO 10:18 STEVENS 8:12 8:24 11:2,8,11 13:11,16 45:9 45:13 straight 4:21 6:18 36:16 strong 33:19,20 structural 29:3 29:6,7,24 stuck 32:25 subject 29:20 48:6 submitted 48:10 48:12 subparagraphs 6:11 subsequent 6:25 9:15 substantive 5:5 5:14 6:5,6,20 7:1,1,12 10:2 successive 42:9 successor 38:22 sufficient 23:10 26:6 suggest 4:25	33:4 suggested 41:22 suggests 41:18 Summerlin 32:5 47:9 superfluous 42:2 SUPPORTING 17:15 suppose 6:17 20:13 26:25 Supreme 1:1,14 46:11,18,19 47:3 sure 14:19 27:9 27:11 susceptible 19:22 sweeping 15:24 21:4 24:5 system 20:23 23:20,23 48:3 systematically 21:2 <hr/> T <hr/> T 2:1,1 tacked 28:1 tail 42:7,14 tainted 29:14 take 4:17 7:8 9:21 15:12 20:12 taken 28:14,25 30:7 talk 31:24 37:8 46:21 talked 27:24 33:24 talking 22:15 37:9 40:3,4 47:17 tandem 19:7 Taylor 46:4,8 Teague 3:13,15 4:19 5:13 6:19 7:19,20,23,25	8:11,14,25 11:18 18:3,21 20:18,18 29:11 29:13,22 31:1 31:9,9,23 33:24 40:17,22 40:24 41:2,5,8 41:10 42:9,10 42:24 43:8 44:18,19,21 47:8 tell 13:19 telling 18:8 32:23 tells 13:20,21 ten 36:11,21,22 37:6 tentatively 48:4 term 11:21 terminology 46:23 terms 34:17 37:10 test 25:23 tested 25:22 testified 34:21 37:13 testimonial 22:23 24:10 26:1 44:12 testimony 19:20 22:13,16,18 29:16,17 34:17 35:2,6,22 testing 33:15 47:1 Thank 17:11 25:14,19 45:16 45:17,23 47:22 48:1,8,9 thing 24:13 things 11:12 27:9 42:22 think 4:18 9:9 14:22 15:5,14 15:18 18:2 19:24 20:15	21:11 23:18 26:24 27:17,19 27:19 28:3,8 28:11,13,24 29:6 32:20,24 37:3 38:2 39:5 39:20 41:13 42:14,15,16 third 21:25 thought 5:17,24 9:22 27:15 three 18:21 21:17 29:13,19 threshold 24:1 throw 33:10 thrown 25:5 tied 29:21 time 4:9 8:16 10:17,20 11:3 11:4,15 16:14 17:10 21:10 24:23 25:12 31:4,6 39:8,18 42:21 43:12,14 44:3 46:7,11 times 21:7 timing 40:4 42:4 today 26:2 43:16 48:5 told 46:18 tomorrow 48:5 Toomey 29:2 tossed 40:19 trial 11:4 12:3 12:15 13:1 14:7 20:20 24:8,14,20 29:14,15,16 35:4,12 38:19 trials 17:3 22:22 24:24 tried 26:2 true 47:14 truly 12:24 trustworthiness 19:3 22:7,21 23:10 46:21,25	trustworthy 46:25 truthfulness 19:20 trying 37:10 tunc 40:15 two 3:17 11:12 17:19 20:23 29:19 35:8 45:19 two-step 10:1 <hr/> U <hr/> ultimate 32:6 ultimately 15:11 unable 26:18 37:11,12 unacceptably 21:2 unavailability 14:3 uncross-exam... 25:3,6 understand 15:2 44:24 understanding 3:21 4:15 7:22 12:2,14,24 13:8 44:23 45:3 undone 17:3 unexpected 46:23 unfair 24:20 unitary 41:21 United 1:1,14,21 2:7 17:15 universal 36:14 universe 33:2 unjust 31:19 43:2 unpredictable 34:13 unreasonable 10:10,22 unreliable 28:10 28:13 35:23
--	--	---	---	--

unwarranted 43:2 use 11:21 46:22 U.S 7:23	watershedded... 44:16,17,22 way 9:21 10:4 18:15 19:21 21:22 30:13 31:8 33:5 38:2 38:7,13 39:21 39:23 40:1,12 40:18 45:1	X x 1:2,9	6:10 25 2:11 4:4	
V	weaknesses 19:13 Wednesday 1:11 weigh 19:15 went 27:20 28:22 34:25 We'll 3:3 we're 10:5 12:16 12:19 27:16 31:1 32:19 we've 41:7 wholesale 17:23 Whorton 1:3 3:4 wife 26:20 Williams 46:3,8 win 11:8 window 20:24 witness 16:11 19:9 36:11 witnesses 20:6 25:2 36:19 37:6 witness's 19:20 word 11:2 44:16 words 16:17 38:8 46:8 worked 28:7 worry 42:25 wouldn't 9:12 27:12,13 30:15 30:22 Wright 46:19,20 47:5 writing 44:3 written 40:3 wrong 40:12 wrongful 43:2	Y year 43:14,16 45:14 years 4:4 37:1	3 3 2:4 4 45 2:14 49 43:24 44:2,13	
vacuum 33:15 variously 34:13 Vegas 1:18,23 veil 43:6 versus 3:4,13 4:5 12:7,7,8,11 12:19 13:3 14:1,2,5 15:23 29:2 32:4,6 34:4 40:18 46:19,20 47:5 47:13 view 11:9 27:3,8 28:2 violation 24:19 violence 29:14 virtue 23:1,2,8 vis-a-vis 13:3	0 05-595 1:7	5 5 44:13	5	
W	1 1 1:11 5:16 43:22 11 21:12 11:04 1:15 3:2 12 21:13 31:7,8 12:02 48:11 14th 12:10,12,18 12:23 17 2:8	2 2 4:24 5:22 39:22 2006 1:11 22(d)(1) 8:23 2254 8:23 2254(d) 38:1 39:10 41:2 2254(d)(1) 4:19 4:21,22 6:2,24 8:2,3 10:6,12 10:21 18:6,7 39:3,20 40:3 40:21 41:4,10 42:4,10,15,16 46:1,9 2254(d)(1)'s 46:5 2254(e)(1) 4:24 2254(e)(2) 5:2 5:10 2254(e)(2)(A) 5:6 2254(e)(2)(A)(i) 6:8 2254(2)(a)(i)	6 60(b) 9:5	