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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (11:17 a.m.)

3 CHIEF JUDGE ROBERTS: We will hear argument  
4 next in Case 08-453, Cuomo v. The Clearing House  
5 Association.

6 Ms. Underwood.

7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD

8 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

9 MS. UNDERWOOD: Thank you, Mr. Chief  
10 Justice, and may it please the Court:

11 Under the OCC regulation at issue here,  
12 State antidiscrimination and consumer protection laws  
13 can be enforced against national banks by the Federal  
14 OCC and by private parties, but not by State attorneys  
15 general. This unusual enforcement pre-emption, which  
16 detaches the State's power to make laws from its power  
17 to enforce them, was not written into the National Bank  
18 Act by Congress in 1864, and it's implausible that  
19 Congress implicitly delegated to OCC the power to read  
20 it in now.

21 We know the NBA did not in 1864 enact  
22 enforcement pre-emption against the States for three  
23 reasons: First, the words of the statute; second, a  
24 long line of cases from this Court, especially St.  
25 Louis, upholding the power of the State to enforce laws

1 against a national bank or rejecting it on the ground  
2 that the law was substantively pre-empted, but not  
3 questioning the power of the State to enforce a valid  
4 law; and, finally, the wholly anomalous character,  
5 foreign really to our structure of government, of  
6 separating the power to make law from the power to  
7 enforce it.

8 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But to some extent, would  
9 you concede that interpretation; that is, not only the  
10 attorney general under New York's law, but the  
11 superintendent of banks as well, has authority over  
12 mortgage lending? Would -- would you agree that the  
13 part about the bank superintendent's enforcement could  
14 not be enforced against national banks?

15 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, first of all, the bank  
16 superintendent in New York doesn't have authority over  
17 national banks. It has authority only over State banks,  
18 as we pointed out in our reply brief. So we don't  
19 assert that authority.

20 I would say that the -- and the injunction  
21 doesn't run -- that's at issue in this case, doesn't run  
22 against the superintendent. It runs against the  
23 attorney general. But I would say --

24 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But there is -- the  
25 provision that you are talking about, 296(a), concerns

1 the authority of the bank superintendent as well as the  
2 authority of the attorney general; isn't that so?

3 MS. UNDERWOOD: I believe that the banking  
4 superintendent does not assert authority to enforce in a  
5 regulatory fashion against national banks. If they did,  
6 if -- if -- if the bank superintendent asserted a  
7 chartering or licensing supervisory regime, that would  
8 be a different issue from the question --

9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Just with respect to the  
10 same issue on mortgage lending where there's a concern  
11 about racial discrimination?

12 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, the -- the bank -- the  
13 banking superintendent of New York does not enforce  
14 against national banks.

15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Anything? And you agree  
16 to that?

17 MS. UNDERWOOD: Yes, that is right.

18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Even if the New York  
19 statute --

20 MS. UNDERWOOD: Read differently or  
21 interpreted or applied differently.

22 What's at issue here is a distinction  
23 between a supervisory regime -- "visitation" is a regime  
24 characterized by routine examinations, no cause needed,  
25 by a chartering or a licensing authority for the purpose

1 of enforcing limitations on --

2 JUSTICE BREYER: How is it supposed to work?

3 This is what is bothering me at the heart of this case.

4 I imagine that banks, particularly right in these last

5 few months, are in situations where there are three

6 categories of -- of borrowers. One might be a category

7 of people whom you are reasonably confident in, and the

8 second is a category of people who are borderline or

9 less so, and there are also minorities.

10 Now, where you make the decision as a bank

11 to deny them the loan, it sometimes is difficult to say

12 whether that decision was made for a discriminatory

13 reason, namely race, or for a legitimate reason, namely

14 because this was a person unlikely to pay the money

15 back.

16 Now, how is a bank to function if 50

17 different attorneys general plus the Federal agencies

18 all look at the books of the bank to look at the

19 individual loan and to make that kind of determination

20 about which quite honestly reasonable people will often

21 differ?

22 And how -- how is that really a problem, or

23 am I just creating that? And if it's really a problem,

24 how in your opinion does the Federal law deal with that

25 problem, if not in the way that your opponent suggests?

1 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, an -- there is a  
2 single standard of discrimination. It is the case that  
3 the -- that the Federal standards applied by the OCC and  
4 the State law all look to Title VII law about a prima  
5 facie case being --

6 JUSTICE BREYER: If I may say so, that  
7 response overlooks the question. I don't doubt the  
8 single standard. What I do doubt is in the -- in the  
9 category of uncertain cases, that 51 different  
10 individuals, 50 State attorneys general plus one Federal  
11 individual, will reach the same result.

12 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well --

13 JUSTICE BREYER: These are hard and,  
14 therefore, they will reach a lot of different results  
15 under the same standard.

16 MS. UNDERWOOD: There has been no such  
17 multiplicity of -- of enforcement. In fact, there is so  
18 much antidiscrimination work to go around that having  
19 multiple enforcers is a device for --

20 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. So you deny the  
21 hypothetical. You are saying that my analysis of the  
22 problem is wrong; there simply is no such problem, and  
23 since there is no such problem, it doesn't matter if  
24 everyone enforces it.

25 MS. UNDERWOOD: It is already the case that

1 under the Fair Housing Act, HUD is required to refer --

2 JUSTICE BREYER: Is your answer yes or no to  
3 what I just said, that you deny that the statement of  
4 the problem is realistic and therefore there is no  
5 problem in your view about having 51 different people  
6 enforce the same standard.

7 MS. UNDERWOOD: There is no record of any  
8 such problem. And should such a -- yes.

9 JUSTICE BREYER: And should such a problem  
10 arise, what?

11 MS. UNDERWOOD: Should such a problem arise,  
12 that would be an occasion for considering a kind of  
13 burden pre-emption that would be similar -- on evidence  
14 of such a problem, that might be a basis for OCC to make  
15 a record and enact a regulation to deal with that --

16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But if OCC thought there  
17 might be such a problem, couldn't it act in advance to  
18 avoid the risk that Justice Breyer's question explains?

19 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, its regulation doesn't  
20 say that. The injunction that was issued in this case  
21 doesn't say that. What the regulation, the rulemaking,  
22 and the injunction all rest on is a legal analysis, not  
23 an empirical one.

24 JUSTICE GINSBURG: May we clarify one thing  
25 about the 50 jurisdictions? The attorney general from



1 New York is not asserting authority over bank lending in  
2 Hawaii. So for each institution, I assume it's going to  
3 be two sovereigns, the OCC and the State attorney  
4 general, not 50 descending on the single -- single bank  
5 with respect to particular loans?

6 MS. UNDERWOOD: That's correct. And the  
7 OCC --

8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, that's correct  
9 with respect to a particular loan. It's not respect --  
10 with respect to Federal policy about national banks  
11 around the country. It's conceivable and I suppose  
12 likely that the Federal regulator would want the same  
13 rule to apply to banks in Michigan as to banks in  
14 Hawaii.

15 MS. UNDERWOOD: It is. But if the question  
16 was would the -- would the actual act of responding to a  
17 complaint or to discovery burden particular people  
18 because there would be 50 people asking for the same  
19 information, that's not the case, because the loans made  
20 in New York would be analyzed by a New York enforcer.

21 JUSTICE BREYER: I want to --

22 JUSTICE SCALIA: Excuse me. The same rule  
23 would not apply in Michigan and Hawaii, anyway, even  
24 under the Federal Government. The Federal Government  
25 acknowledges that Michigan can have its own law --

1 MS. UNDERWOOD: The Federal Government --

2 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- and Hawaii can have a  
3 different law. All the Federal Government is arguing  
4 is: We want to be the ones to enforce the separate  
5 Michigan law and the separate Hawaii law, right?

6 MS. UNDERWOOD: That appears to be the case.  
7 In fact, they have acknowledged that the State law  
8 actually applies. It's undisputed. OCC said so in its  
9 complaint. Congress has several times said so, which is  
10 presumably why the OCC says so -- said so in the Fair  
11 Housing Act savings clause, in the -- in the Equal  
12 Credit Opportunity Act savings clause, and in  
13 Riegle-Neal, which specifically applies only to national  
14 bank branches, but expressly preserves the application  
15 of State fair lending and consumer protection laws.

16 JUSTICE BREYER: You are just at the point  
17 of getting to what I -- the blank in my mind. And the  
18 blank in my mind is when you said, but if there were  
19 such a problem, as I had described, but if there were,  
20 then they could -- and now that's the blank. Then they  
21 could what?

22 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, there are many things  
23 that they might do.

24 JUSTICE BREYER: For example, just give me  
25 two, a couple.

1 MS. UNDERWOOD: For example, make some  
2 provision for -- in fact, I believe there are some  
3 regulations that call for conferencing and collaboration  
4 and consultation among the State enforcers and between  
5 the State and Federal regulators to avoid duplicative  
6 regulation. There is already the potential with respect  
7 to State banks that are supervised both by State  
8 regulators and by the FDIC. There are alternate audits  
9 in alternate years. I mean, there -- there is plenty of  
10 precedent in bank regulation for mechanisms for  
11 consultation and collaboration so that people don't step  
12 on each other's toes.

13 And in Federal criminal enforcement, for  
14 example, there are -- there are many -- many occasions  
15 where there is both Federal and State authority to  
16 enforce. And the result of that tends to be to get more  
17 extensive, fuller enforcement. People don't tend to  
18 both bring the same case. If somebody is enforcing  
19 something, somebody -- a different enforcer will attack  
20 a different problem.

21 JUSTICE SOUTER: But the -- in the -- in the  
22 general -- in the field of criminal enforcement  
23 generally there isn't any provision comparable to what  
24 is now 36(f)(1)(B), at least to my knowledge, and it's  
25 set out on pages 46 and 47, the text is in the

1 government's brief: "The provisions of any State law to  
2 which a branch of a national bank is subject under this  
3 paragraph shall be enforced with respect to such branch  
4 by the OCC."

5 And that mandate, it "shall be enforced with  
6 respect to such branch" sounds pretty exclusive to me.

7 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well --

8 JUSTICE SOUTER: You can't tell for sure.  
9 But why would -- why would Congress, number one, if  
10 it -- if Congress simply assumed that there would be  
11 a -- a dual system of enforcement, that OCC could --  
12 could say to the bank, you follow State law, and if you  
13 don't, we are going to go after you administratively,  
14 and leaving it to the State to go after, in any other  
15 fashion, what State law provided. If that was  
16 Congress's assumption, why would it have -- have passed  
17 this seeming mandate, "shall be enforced with respect to  
18 such branch" by the -- by the OCC?

19 MS. UNDERWOOD: There are two reasons for  
20 that provision. The purpose of that provision was to  
21 confirm that OCC didn't lose its pre-existing  
22 enforcement power when Riegle-Neal stated -- that's (1)  
23 (B) -- in (1)(A) that national branches would be treated  
24 more or less like State branches for purposes of  
25 consumer protection and fair lending.

1 JUSTICE SOUTER: But that -- that's, in  
2 effect, saving clause kind of function could have been  
3 performed simply by a statute that says OCC may. And  
4 this says it shall be enforced by OCC.

5 MS. UNDERWOOD: There is another reason in  
6 the legislative history, which makes it clear that it  
7 was a directive to OCC to mount an enforcement program  
8 which Congress thought it had not been doing. We know  
9 that because in the conference report and other  
10 legislative history Congress says it's trying to expand,  
11 not contract, the enforcement of fair lending and  
12 consumer protection laws, and that the law isn't taking  
13 any authority away from the States and that they are  
14 distressed at the inadequate failure of OCC to exercise  
15 its enforcement authority.

16 JUSTICE SCALIA: You don't deny, do you,  
17 that the Federal Government can, if it wishes, enforce  
18 the State laws?

19 MS. UNDERWOOD: Absolutely.

20 JUSTICE SCALIA: So this provision isn't  
21 really contrary to what you are saying. You are just  
22 saying the State can do it as well?

23 MS. UNDERWOOD: That's correct. It isn't  
24 talking -- it doesn't say anything about exclusive  
25 authority, and it isn't talking about judicial

1 enforcement, which OCC doesn't do. It is talking about  
2 it's -- it has a savings clause kind of function and  
3 it -- it's hortatory, it's directing OCC to exercise the  
4 authority that it has.

5           It seems to be common ground that it didn't  
6 give OCC any new power, because it would be odd to give  
7 OCC different power over the branches -- this only  
8 applies to the branches -- different power to the  
9 branches than over the branches than over the banks,  
10 different, more extensive power over consumer protection  
11 and fair lending than other kinds of bank enforcement.  
12 This was a provision dealing with branches and consumer  
13 protection and fair lending that said to OCC: You still  
14 have that authority and you should exercise it.

15           JUSTICE GINSBURG: But we come to the New  
16 York Attorney General. I see your argument that there's  
17 a certain incongruity between saying private attorneys  
18 general okay, but no public attorney general. But on  
19 the other hand, the attorney general starts out by  
20 asking for bank books and records. And high on the list  
21 of visitorial powers is the authority to demand the  
22 bank's books and records.

23           So why isn't that -- his preliminary  
24 investigation at least, why doesn't that fit within the  
25 visitorial power bundle?

1                   MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, because you can look  
2 at books and records under various authorities. Books  
3 and -- you can look at books and records under your  
4 visitorial authority, if you are the supervisor and have  
5 the relationship to the bank that a licensing or  
6 chartering authority has and you are looking at them for  
7 no particular cause. Or you can look at books and  
8 records if you have a civil suit against the bank and  
9 you are engaging in discovery that is -- or for that  
10 matter a criminal prosecution against the bank, and  
11 ancillary to that discovery is required; or in Guthrie,  
12 the inquiry -- the looking at books and records was  
13 pursuant to a statutory authority for shareholders to  
14 look at books and records.

15                   So the simple fact of a physical act of  
16 looking -- or a legal act of looking at books and  
17 records doesn't tell you whether visitorial authority is  
18 being exercised. Visitorial authority has long been  
19 understood as a whole regime of oversight. Watters  
20 involved a visitorial regime that was ancillary to  
21 licensing. The earlier visitorial regimes that were  
22 referenced in the old treatise tended to involve  
23 visitorial regimes that were established ancillary to  
24 chartering, back when corporate charters had limited  
25 purposes, the way banks do still, but most corporate

1 charters, most corporate certificates of incorporation  
2 don't anymore.

3           So the fact that books and records are being  
4 examined is neither here nor there on the question  
5 whether the visitorial power that is referenced in 484  
6 is -- is being exercised.

7           CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: There is an historic  
8 reason for thinking that Congress would be more  
9 concerned about States exercising visitorial powers than  
10 they would be about private attorneys general or private  
11 lawyers. This goes back to *McCulloch v. Maryland*.  
12 National banks were always targeted by the States. They  
13 weren't typically targeted by private attorneys. So  
14 that incongruity doesn't strike me as terribly  
15 significant.

16           MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, the suggestion is made  
17 that 484, and there is some historical basis for it, was  
18 -- was meant to protect national banks against --  
19 against, hostile States, which I guess is what you are  
20 suggesting, rather than hostile private people. But  
21 actually what it was meant to do was assign  
22 responsibility for the supervision of these new  
23 entities -- there hadn't been banks like this, private  
24 banks which were nevertheless federally chartered.  
25 Before that there was the National Bank that was at



1 issue in McCulloch v Maryland, and to exclude the States  
2 from asserting the authority to do audits, to do regular  
3 banking examinations, which actually one senator had  
4 proposed the States be permitted to do and that was  
5 rejected.

6 I would say the concern about State  
7 hostility was apparently much reduced by 1869, not much  
8 after this statute was passed, when this Court in  
9 National Bank v. Kentucky upheld the power of the States  
10 not just to tax shareholders on their shares, but to  
11 require the national banks to help, to require the  
12 national banks to pay the tax that was due from those  
13 shareholders in order to assist in collection. And the  
14 Court -- McCulloch was cited to the Court and the Court  
15 said it saw no possibility here, unlike in McCulloch,  
16 that the State would somehow use its authority in this  
17 way to incapacitate the banks or impair them by  
18 eliciting their help to collect a valid tax.

19 There actually had been some thought when  
20 the national banks were first created that they would,  
21 in the marketplace, drive State banks out of existence,  
22 but they didn't. And the story has been one  
23 legislatively of maintaining competitive equality  
24 between them, not of hostility. So --

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Do you want to talk

1 a little bit about Chevron?

2 MS. UNDERWOOD: Yes.

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Whatever the  
4 arguments may be on the merits, it's not clear to me  
5 that visitorial powers has an unambiguous meaning that  
6 would pre-empt the authority of the OCC to explain it to  
7 us.

8 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, I'd say two thing  
9 about that. 484 may have some ambiguity about it. I  
10 think it is not ambiguous as to the matters covered by  
11 this regulation. Visitorials have -- visitorial powers  
12 have never been understood to include discrete acts of  
13 law enforcement by a jurisdiction that neither has nor  
14 asserts supervisory relationship, the kind of  
15 supervisory relationship that the chartering or  
16 licensing sovereign has. So I think --

17 JUSTICE SOUTER: What do you say about the  
18 quotations in the -- the brief that Mr. Waxman filed, as  
19 I recall; it may have been the government's brief --

20 MS. UNDERWOOD: Yes.

21 JUSTICE SOUTER: -- which -- which do have  
22 references to visitorial powers as including general  
23 conformance to the law. Those are not universal  
24 provisions, but they -- they were certainly understood  
25 in some cases.

1 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, the strongest  
2 quotations that his brief mentioned several times come  
3 from Blackstone. He talks about inquiring into all  
4 misbehaviors of the supervised visited corporation.  
5 Those comments are made in a time and place when there  
6 was only one sovereign, not the distinctive federalism  
7 we have today, and so there was no need to distinguish  
8 between the visitorial, the distinctly visitorial powers  
9 of the sovereign, and the coexisting police powers of  
10 another sovereign. There was no --

11 JUSTICE SOUTER: No, but there was -- there  
12 was a point in -- in distinguishing the visitorial  
13 powers that Blackstone, in the cases Blackstone was  
14 referring to, and those for example that would apply  
15 solely to -- to religious or originally religious  
16 foundations like Oxford and Cambridge colleges and so  
17 on. So there -- there seems to have been a reason to  
18 understand the distinction.

19 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, I think that the point  
20 about Blackstone's comment to distinguish -- the point  
21 about the distinction between the charitable  
22 corporations and the public non-charitable corporations  
23 is that it may well be that the sovereign was enforcing  
24 not just the charter, but the laws of the sovereign with  
25 respect to that State. It simply --

1 JUSTICE SOUTER: But he didn't need  
2 visitorial powers to do that. I mean, the sovereign had  
3 that by virtue of the general law.

4 MS. UNDERWOOD: Yes, but the sovereign might  
5 do it in many different -- a supervisor might do it in  
6 many different ways, just as OCC here claims to enforce  
7 law not by going into court --

8 JUSTICE SCALIA: I thought that was your  
9 position, that the -- that the visitation authority  
10 includes the power to enforce general laws.

11 MS. UNDERWOOD: The general laws of the  
12 visitor, of the sovereign.

13 JUSTICE SCALIA: Of the sovereign. But that  
14 a separate action to enforce the laws of the sovereign  
15 does not necessarily mean that visitorial powers are  
16 being exercised.

17 MS. UNDERWOOD: That is correct. That is  
18 correct. That is --

19 JUSTICE SCALIA: So there would be no  
20 inconsistency, if you believe that.

21 JUSTICE STEVENS: One thing --

22 MS. UNDERWOOD: That's --

23 JUSTICE STEVENS: One thing puzzled me about  
24 this. They are not pre-empting any New York laws; is  
25 that correct?

1 MS. UNDERWOOD: They're pre-empting --  
2 that's correct. They are preempting our ability to  
3 enforce any laws.

4 JUSTICE STEVENS: Did we ever -- do we have  
5 any precedents dealing with the question whether  
6 preemption of the right to enforce a valid law is  
7 appropriate?

8 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, this Court in, for  
9 example, St. Louis said that when the Federal and the  
10 State prohibition were the same, that is, a bank  
11 couldn't branch at that time or couldn't interstate  
12 branch, the -- and the -- and State tried to enforce  
13 both provisions -- they were the same, but the State  
14 tried to enforce both the Federal charter limitation and  
15 the State law, this Court said the State could not  
16 enforce the Federal charter, because that was the  
17 prerogative of the chartering visitor, but that it could  
18 enforce the State prohibition. And it said that  
19 separating -- if the law is valid and can be validly  
20 applied, then it's virtually unthinkable to separate the  
21 authority to enforce it from the application of the law.

22 This Court said that in -- in St. Louis; it  
23 -- actually it said it in -- in Easton, which went the  
24 other way. That is to say, Easton was a criminal  
25 prosecution of a bank officer for taking deposits

1 knowing the bank was insolvent. Prosecution under State  
2 law. And this Court said that the law itself had to be  
3 preempted. Wasn't clear exactly what Federal law on the  
4 subject was. The Court said there must be some Federal  
5 law in this area, but we can't afford to have  
6 conflicting laws, so it's substantively pre-empted. But  
7 the Court also said, if it were valid, it would be  
8 unthinkable to bar the State from enforcing it. And  
9 that is the correct way, we think, to approach this  
10 problem.

11 JUSTICE BREYER: Is it -- could they --  
12 could the Federal authorities pre-empt the State law, in  
13 your opinion?

14 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, no, because Congress  
15 has said to the contrary. Congress has said, that's why  
16 they didn't -- presumably why they didn't do it that  
17 way. Congress has said State law shall apply. So I  
18 think this is an area where Congress clearly had in mind  
19 that there would be, not broad pre-emption of this kind,  
20 but the laws would apply. But that it --

21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but -- I'm  
22 sorry, but it certainly is pre-empted with respect to  
23 visitorial powers.

24 MS. UNDERWOOD: Yes. That is correct.

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: This kind of gets us

1 back to where we started.

2 MS. UNDERWOOD: It does. But think that --  
3 I would like to -- I'd like to reserve some time for  
4 rebuttal, if I may.

5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

6 MS. UNDERWOOD: Thank you.

7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Stewart.

8 ORAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART

9 FOR THE RESPONDENT OFFICE OF  
10 THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY

11 MR. STEWART: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it  
12 please the Court:

13 To explain the threat that the OCC believes  
14 the State's enforcement regime poses to the national  
15 banking system and OCC's administration of that system,  
16 I would like to begin by going back to a colloquy  
17 between Ms. Underwood and Justice Breyer near the  
18 beginning of the argument.

19 And Justice Breyer raised the possibility  
20 that a myriad of State attorneys general would file --  
21 would pursue similar antidiscrimination claims, and Ms.  
22 Underwood's response was there really would be no  
23 problem because they are all applying the same  
24 substantive standard. And I think at a very high level  
25 of generality that is so; that is, the Federal statute

1 and the State statute both say no discrimination on the  
2 basis of race in extensions of credit. But I think when  
3 you get to the way in which the statutes are  
4 administered, there is at least the potential for  
5 significant differences, because --

6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, wait a minute. I --  
7 this is state law. And if the State supreme court has  
8 said that the statute means a certain thing and that  
9 certain thing is a little bit different from what the  
10 Federal antidiscrimination law is, I assume that the  
11 Federal Government in applying State law has to -- has  
12 to take that difference into account, doesn't it?

13 MR. STEWART: We would --

14 JUSTICE SCALIA: The Federal Government  
15 doesn't -- doesn't have the right to alter State law.

16 MR. STEWART: The Federal Government  
17 wouldn't have the right to alter State law. The Federal  
18 Government would have the authority to make its own  
19 assessment of whether the State law was pre-empted based  
20 upon those distinctions.

21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But I thought it is a  
22 given in this case -- and tell me if I am wrong on this  
23 -- that the State substantive law is not pre-empted.  
24 You refer, I think, to enforcement pre-emption; that is,  
25 the State law is governing law. But the only enforcer



1 is Federal authority; and if that's so, is there any  
2 other -- in all of Federal-State relations, any other  
3 law where the State as sovereign can prescribe but  
4 cannot enforce?

5 MR. STEWART: I give two examples from the  
6 national banking system, itself. The first is the  
7 Riegle-Neal amendments, which Justice Souter was  
8 alluding to. And the amendments don't simply say that  
9 OCC shall enforce non-pre-empted State laws. It says  
10 that those laws shall be enforced by the Comptroller of  
11 the Currency.

12 JUSTICE SOUTER: But do you -- do you agree  
13 that -- that it is possible to read the "shall" both as  
14 -- as an unequivocal grant of power to OCC, but not  
15 necessarily as an exclusive ground?

16 MR. STEWART: I don't think so with the  
17 "shall" in combination with the passive voice. That is,  
18 if you had a statute that said a certain category of  
19 suits shall be adjudicated by the Court of Federal  
20 Claims, I think that would mean not simply that the  
21 Court of Federal Claims would be required to adjudicate  
22 them if a case was brought before it, but I think that  
23 would unmistakably identify the Court of Federal Claims  
24 as the exclusive tribunal --

25 JUSTICE STEVENS: Yes, but if you have a

1 situation in which the OCC, say, has very limited  
2 personnel -- they only have ten people in their  
3 enforcement division, for example -- and Congress  
4 thought they have to get more, wouldn't it be  
5 appropriate in that background to say, you shall start  
6 enforcing? And that wouldn't necessarily mean you are  
7 excluding States from also enforcing.

8 MR. STEWART: I agree that if the statute  
9 simply -- if the statute used the active voice and said  
10 the OCC shall enforce these laws, there would be a  
11 better argument that the OCC's authority was not  
12 exclusive. But when the statute said -- says these laws  
13 shall be enforced by the Comptroller of the Currency, I  
14 think the clear implication is this is the exclusive  
15 mechanism by which the laws --

16 JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't see any difference  
17 whatever in that regard between using the active and  
18 passive.

19 MR. STEWART: Well, let me give you another  
20 example from the national banking system, and that is 12  
21 U.S.C. 85.

22 JUSTICE SOUTER: I want you to come back. I  
23 -- I won't stop -- I don't want to stop you from doing  
24 that, but I want to come back to this. Do you -- do you  
25 want to go on to your second example, or do you want to

1    --

2                   MR. STEWART:  Let me just give you a second  
3   example very quickly.  12 U.S.C. section 85, which was  
4   an issue in Smiley, deals with the maximum rate of  
5   interest that national banks may charge, and it says  
6   that they may charge as much as the law of the State in  
7   which they are located allows and no more.  And that is  
8   a similar system in that to determine the maximum rate  
9   of interest that the bank may charge, you look to State  
10  law.  You defer to the choice of the State legislature,  
11  but the enforcement regime with respect to  
12  administrative enforcement is exclusively Federal.  It's  
13  only the Federal authorities that can go after --

14                  JUSTICE GINSBURG:  But that's because --  
15  because it's picking a rate.  It's not saying there is  
16  the Federal law and it has this rate, and the State law  
17  that has that rate.  Here, the Equal Credit Opportunity  
18  Act, a Federal Act, undoubtedly applies.  And that is  
19  proper Federal -- Federal law enforced by the Federal  
20  authorities.

21                  The State law, as this picture is drawn for  
22  us, is applicable.  It's substantive law applicable to  
23  these banks, but only the Federal authority can enforce  
24  it.  That seems passing strange.  And do you have an  
25  example outside the -- the two you gave us in the

1 National Bank Act where the State prescribes but the  
2 Federal authorities enforce?

3 MR. STEWART: Well, another example would be  
4 the Similar Crimes Act, which provides for the  
5 incorporation of State law with respect to --

6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, that's not State law  
7 applying of its own force, just as your second example  
8 was not State law applying of its own force. It was  
9 State law that had been converted into Federal law by  
10 the Federal Government's adoption of it.

11 MR. STEWART: Those provisions --

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's a different  
13 situation.

14 MR. STEWART: Those provisions do accomplish  
15 incorporation of State law as Federal law. But this  
16 Court has repeatedly said, most recently in Watters,  
17 that State law applies to national banks only insofar as  
18 Congress shall see fit to permit it. So --

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is your concern that  
20 -- not with the substantive State law, but that leaving  
21 enforcement to the States would cause particular  
22 problems? I mean there may be a State law provision  
23 that says you shall do this, and the way the attorney  
24 general elects to enforce it is by shutting the bank  
25 down, jailing the bank officers, doing all sorts of

1 things that -- that the -- the Federal Government may  
2 not consider appropriate.

3 MR. STEWART: That is certainly true, that  
4 the -- the State's exercise of remedial discretion may  
5 be different from the Federal Government's. But even  
6 before that stage, if you look at the letters in the  
7 Joint Appendix that the New York Attorney General's  
8 Office sent to the national banks in question, basically  
9 the thrust of the letters was: We have identified what  
10 we believe to be troubling statistical disparities in  
11 terms of the terms on which the credit was offered to  
12 applicants of different races. If those disparities are  
13 not satisfactorily explained, that it -- you may be in  
14 violation of State fair lending laws. Therefore, give  
15 us a wide variety of information that would allow us to  
16 determine whether you have a satisfactory explanation.

17 And I think it's clear that had this process  
18 been allowed to run its course, what the New York  
19 Attorney General's Office was going to do was assess the  
20 bank's own criteria for making lending decisions to  
21 decide whether those criteria were suitable and decide,  
22 therefore, whether they provided a satisfactory  
23 explanation for the statistical disparities that had  
24 been observed.

25 And once the New York A.G. is in the

1 business of passing upon the adequacy of the bank's  
2 lending criteria, he is right on the -- the OCC's --

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: You are arguing for  
4 conflict pre-emption. I mean that's a -- that's a  
5 different issue than, say, that the -- the State law  
6 shouldn't apply. But don't tell me the State law  
7 applies, but only the Federal Government is -- what  
8 incentive does the Federal Government have to enforce  
9 State law?

10 MR. STEWART: Well --

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: It -- it has so much spare  
12 time after enforcing Federal law that it's -- it's going  
13 to be worrying about State law?

14 MR. STEWART: Well, the point that has been  
15 made at various times in the argument that the State law  
16 basically tracks Federal law, I think, is an answer to  
17 that question; that is, whatever incentive the Federal  
18 Government might have to enforce idiosyncratic features  
19 of State law that didn't have a Federal analogue. Here  
20 the State law in question prohibits discriminatory  
21 practices that are already prohibited by Federal law.  
22 So whether OCC and HUD set out to enforce State law, if  
23 they are vigorously enforcing Federal law, they will in  
24 the course of doing that vindicate the State's  
25 prerogatives.

1 JUSTICE SOUTER: Is there any -- is there  
2 any legislative history whatever to the effect that at  
3 the time 36(f)(1)(B) was adopted -- to the effect that  
4 its effect was to pre-empt State enforcement for --

5 MR. STEWART: They -- they don't say it in  
6 -- with quite that degree of clarity, but there is a  
7 colloquy quoted in the -- the brief for the Clearing  
8 House between -- I believe it's Senator D'Amato and --

9 JUSTICE SOUTER: Senator D'Amato and --

10 MR. STEWART: And it is -- it is to the  
11 effect that Senator D'Amato expresses the concern that  
12 this may subject the -- the national banks in their  
13 branch activities to State supervision. And the  
14 response is that's not the case. That will happen with  
15 branches of State banks, but with respect to branches of  
16 national banks the supervision will be by the OCC.

17 JUSTICE SOUTER: Yes, but the -- the problem  
18 I have with that is, as a -- as a kind of clear  
19 statement of -- of something which is -- is -- would be  
20 extraordinary -- is that it talks in terms of  
21 supervision. It doesn't use the -- my recollection is  
22 it doesn't use the magic word "enforcement."

23 And I would have thought that if in the  
24 course of that colloquy the -- the statement had been  
25 made: The States will not have the authority to enforce

1 this, that there would have been rather a dust-up. And  
2 there wasn't. It's kind of a "dog that didn't bark"  
3 argument. And, therefore, if -- if there is uncertainty  
4 as to how to construe 36(f)(1)(B), I'm not sure that I  
5 -- I don't think the legislative history supports your  
6 exclusivity view.

7 MR. STEWART: Well, section 36(f)(1)(A)  
8 refers to a very limited category of State laws that  
9 include State fair lending laws and said these laws will  
10 not be pre-empted unless they would be pre-empted with  
11 respect to national banks generally. And then  
12 36(f)(1)(B) says the laws in that preceding paragraph  
13 shall be enforced by the comptroller of the Currency.  
14 And so even if the colloquy used the term "supervision,"  
15 the focus of the statutory language was -- was on a  
16 pretty narrow category of laws.

17 I would like also to refer the Court to 12  
18 U.S.C. 484(b), which I think is relevant here, and it is  
19 on page 1a of the appendix to the government's brief.  
20 And it is an express exception to the general rule  
21 against the exercise of visitorial powers.

22 And it says, "Notwithstanding subsection (a)  
23 of this section, lawfully authorized State auditors and  
24 examiners may at reasonable times and upon reasonable  
25 notice to a bank review its records solely to ensure



1 compliance with applicable State unclaimed property or  
2 escheat laws."

3 Now, the basic thrust of --

4 JUSTICE SOUTER: Does that mean -- when they  
5 say "review records," does that mean that the State  
6 auditors in effect can walk into the bank, as  
7 distinguished from what we have here, in which the bank  
8 is being requested to produce excerpts from records?

9 MR. STEWART: I think that would be the  
10 implication of the provision, but the significant point  
11 for our purposes is that it refers solely to ensure  
12 compliance with applicable State unclaimed property  
13 ordinances and laws.

14 JUSTICE STEVENS: May I ask you this  
15 question? Naturally, if it's State laws, clearly they  
16 can look at, but what if New York was trying to enforce  
17 its discrimination laws in an employment context or in  
18 context where they said you are charging minority  
19 depositors -- giving them lower rates of interest than  
20 you give Caucasian depositors? Would they have -- would  
21 the discrimination and the rates of interests paid on  
22 deposits -- assume that was the question. Would you  
23 make the same argument, if that was what New York had  
24 alleged?

25 MR. STEWART: Yes, we would because that

1 would be going to the banks' federally authorized  
2 banking --

3 JUSTICE STEVENS: All you would have to just  
4 look at the records. You can tell from the records  
5 whether people of different classes are paying different  
6 -- are getting different rates on their deposits.

7 MR. STEWART: I mean, it might be that in  
8 that instance the discrimination would be unlikely to  
9 persist, but the basic --

10 JUSTICE STEVENS: It would be unlikely to  
11 persist. Maybe it's an unlikely example. But you are  
12 suggesting that that would also interfere with the  
13 Comptroller's ability to regulate the banks?

14 MR. STEWART: Yes, the way the regulation is  
15 written, it speaks to State efforts to enforce laws that  
16 are directed at the bank's federally authorized banking  
17 activities.

18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So do you think the same  
19 answer whether -- Justice Stevens mentioned employment  
20 discrimination. The State has reason to believe the  
21 bank is discriminating in its employment policies, and  
22 it wants to examine certain employment records in that  
23 connection. Would you say also that, although New York  
24 can prescribe its antidiscrimination in employment law,  
25 it can't enforce it?

1           MR. STEWART: No, the regulation does sweep  
2 more categorically with respect to inspection of bank  
3 records. New York would not be forbidden to file  
4 lawsuits to enforce its employment discrimination laws.

5           JUSTICE KENNEDY: Does any of this bring us  
6 back to the colloquy you began -- began with -- between  
7 Justice Breyer and Ms. Underwood with reference to many  
8 States?

9           MR. STEWART: Yes, a certain --

10          JUSTICE KENNEDY: You -- you began on that,  
11 and I never did hear --

12          MR. STEWART: The part of the point I was  
13 trying to make was, even if the substantive State law on  
14 its face is not pre-empted because it is identical to  
15 the Federal law, once we get to the enforcement stage  
16 where the relevant enforcement agency is saying your  
17 statistical disparity constitutes a violation because it  
18 is not justified by sound banking practices, inevitably  
19 that judgment is going to put the State regulator in the  
20 business of doing what OCC does. And if 50 different  
21 State attorneys general have slightly different ideas of  
22 what constitutes an adequate banking justification for  
23 lending criteria that produces statistical disparity,  
24 then the problem is multiplied. Then --

25          JUSTICE SCALIA: That's conflict

1 pre-emption, and that goes to the -- to the law. You  
2 shouldn't have a separate State law that -- that  
3 provides a separate standard that conflicts with the  
4 Federal standard. So you pre-empt the law. You don't  
5 say the law is in effect, but the State can't enforce  
6 it. That's a weird way to solve that problem.

7 MR. STEWART: Well, the other point I would  
8 make about this is that it is accurate to say that under  
9 the Federal regime the State is entirely disabled from  
10 enforcing its own fair lending law. As Ms. Underwood  
11 alluded to in the opening part of the argument and as  
12 the Petitioner's reply brief explains at pages 25 and  
13 26, the Fair Housing Act does contain a mechanism by  
14 which a State agency -- in the case of New York, it's  
15 the Division of Human Resources --- can be certified by  
16 HUD to enforce the State fair lending laws.

17 But that certification entails two different  
18 steps: First, HUD has to determine that the substantive  
19 State law is -- I believe it's substantially equivalent  
20 to the comparable Federal law. And, second, HUD  
21 monitors the performance of the enforcing agency, the  
22 particular agency under State law that carries out that  
23 responsibility, and HUD can thereby make sure that  
24 enforcement as well as the substance of the law are  
25 consistent with Federal law.

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.  
2 Mr. Waxman.

3 ORAL ARGUMENT OF SETH P. WAXMAN

4 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

5 THE CLEARING HOUSE ASSOCIATION, L.L.C.

6 MR. WAXMAN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it  
7 please the Court:

8 Section 484 plainly has pre-emptive effect,  
9 and what it pre-empts, quoting this Court's decision in  
10 Watters, is, quote, "the State's investigative and  
11 enforcement machinery," close quote.

12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Waxman, your mention  
13 of Watters, which has been mentioned in the briefs, I  
14 think is an inaccurate description of what that opinion  
15 held. Watters dealt with a regime that was indisputably  
16 visitorial. It was a registration regime, where annual  
17 fees were paid, annual reports were filed with the State  
18 financial agency, and the State monitor could go into a  
19 lending organization any time for any reason without any  
20 suspicion of wrongdoing. The only -- so everyone agreed  
21 that was a visitorial regime.

22 The sole question was whether the banks --  
23 the national bank's operating subsidiary was to be  
24 equated with a division of the national bank. That was  
25 the only question provided the Court.

1                   MR. WAXMAN: Oh, I -- I quite agree, and I  
2 did not mean to suggest that this Court's decision in  
3 Watters, you know, the holding in Watters concludes the  
4 outcome of this case. But this Court, in section II A  
5 of Watters -- and we did have a State statutory regime  
6 that dealt, yes, with licensure but also with  
7 examination, supervision, and enforcement, including  
8 judicial enforcement -- this Court repeatedly described  
9 that what was pre-empted is -- and this goes to, I  
10 think, a point that Justice Scalia was making -- was not  
11 substantive pre-emption. There are substantive  
12 pre-emption provisions that are addressed in other  
13 sections of the Act, including the one that was at issue  
14 in Smiley. What is exempted, this Court said again and  
15 again, is the State's enforcement and investment and --  
16 investigative and enforcement machinery, or its  
17 examination and enforcement authority, and that those --

18                   JUSTICE GINSBURG: And that was in the  
19 context of a State law that says, mortgage lending  
20 institution, you may not lend unless you register and do  
21 all the rest. That was the context of Watters. And I  
22 do not think that excerpts from that opinion should be  
23 taken out of that context, which was: You can't be in  
24 this business unless you register with us.

25                   MR. WAXMAN: The question in the case is

1 whether or not what the Attorney General here sought to  
2 do is the exercise of a visitorial power.

3 JUSTICE BREYER: Can I -- can I take what  
4 Justice Ginsburg just said, and give you a thought that  
5 I am interested in your response to?

6 I haven't seen the letter from the Attorney  
7 General. Is the whole thing in the record?

8 MR. WAXMAN: There -- the letters are in the  
9 record in the Joint Appendix.

10 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. Now, reading Judge  
11 Parker's description of it, it seemed to me that what he  
12 had said was that there are statistical disparities  
13 between interest rates and race. Well, as long as, most  
14 unfortunately, income is correlated with race, with  
15 minorities being towards the bottom, of course such  
16 statistical disparities will exist, some legitimate,  
17 some not. So if the only basis for getting this  
18 information is that allegation, it's hard to see how  
19 this differs from the case that Justice Ginsburg put.

20 MR. WAXMAN: Yes, that --

21 JUSTICE BREYER: But it might be quite a  
22 different case, if they had gone into court and found  
23 individuals who were really getting different interest  
24 rates and who really seemed very, very similar, but for  
25 race. But at that point, they'd have to go get this

1 same information, because that's where they would find  
2 whether that prima facie case was right or wrong.

3 MR. WAXMAN: Yes.

4 JUSTICE BREYER: Do you see what I'm doing?

5 MR. WAXMAN: Right.

6 JUSTICE BREYER: I'm dividing the matter  
7 vertically, instead of, say, horizontally --

8 MR. WAXMAN: I'd like to --

9 JUSTICE BREYER: -- and I want to know if  
10 that's possible.

11 MR. WAXMAN: I'd like to address both the  
12 vertical and horizontal axes of what I perceive to be  
13 your question. One is the distinction that this Court  
14 drew in Guthrie, where it said there is a -- there's a  
15 huge distinction in determining what's a visitorial  
16 power between a private individual seeking to vindicate  
17 a deprivation of his or her traditional property right,  
18 which is what was at issue there, and what the Court --  
19 what this Court said was the public right of visitation,  
20 which it also explained was the State's, quote,  
21 "enforcing observance of its laws and regulations."  
22 There is a public and private distinction, and  
23 visitation deals with the former.

24 JUSTICE SCALIA: Sure, there is.

25 MR. WAXMAN: It deals with the sovereign.



1 JUSTICE SCALIA: Would -- would you  
2 acknowledge, counsel, that there is a difference between  
3 enforcing State laws through visitation and enforcing  
4 State laws apart from visitation? And what Waters  
5 involved was enforcing State laws through visitation.  
6 Of course, you can do that through -- through visitation  
7 powers, but you can also do apart from that by bringing  
8 a lawsuit or whatever.

9 MR. WAXMAN: Justice Breyer, I'll get to the  
10 horizontal axis in a moment. I'm afraid I'm going to  
11 forget --

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: I'm sorry, did I skip over  
13 an axis here.

14 (Laughter.)

15 JUSTICE SCALIA: I didn't mean to.

16 MR. WAXMAN: Let me go -- let me go to your  
17 axis first, which is to say that anything that is a  
18 visitorial power can also be interpreted as a police or  
19 enforcement power, and what Congress had in mind -- this  
20 is legislation that was born in the crucible of the  
21 Civil War, and what Congress sought to pre-empt was  
22 State executive action, State examination and  
23 enforcement action with respect to these newly created,  
24 very important Federal instrumentalities. That was  
25 historically done, this Court explained in Guthrie, and

1 Chancellor Kent and Blackstone and many other  
2 authorities agree was historically done through access  
3 to the courts; and in fact what Dean Pound in his  
4 oft-cited article about visitorial powers said, was --  
5 he said, and this is discussed at pages 16 through 18 of  
6 the amicus brief of the Financial Services Roundtable --  
7 what he called, quote, "the leading case for visitorial  
8 powers in equity" was a case called the Attorney General  
9 v Chicago and Northwest Railroad decided in 1874, in  
10 which the Attorney General of Wisconsin was seeking to  
11 require this railroad to comply with the State's  
12 mandated rate schedule. That was a visitorial power,  
13 even though you could also call it a law enforcement  
14 power.

15 Now, Justice Breyer, on the horizontality of  
16 your question: This is not a suit in which the New York  
17 Attorney General is trying to enforce its employment  
18 discrimination laws or its health laws or its zoning  
19 laws. The attorney general wants the loan records of  
20 national banks, and he wants them so that he can  
21 evaluate for himself whether the banks are making proper  
22 judgments about how to market and how to price their  
23 loans.

24 JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Waxman, assume --  
25 assume for a minute, this -- what if before writing the

1 letter, the Attorney General of New York said, "We have  
2 conducted 500 interviews with people who have borrowed  
3 money from you, and on the basis of all these interviews  
4 we have drawn these tentative conclusions that there is  
5 discrimination. We would like to give you an  
6 opportunity to explain all of this by showing us your  
7 records." And they say no, we won't do it. Would they  
8 then be pre-empted from bringing their lawsuit?

9 MR. WAXMAN: Yes, they would. And in fact  
10 --

11 JUSTICE STEVENS: Even though they didn't  
12 have to look at any bank record to make their prima  
13 facie case?

14 MR. WAXMAN: Well, their -- the OCC in the  
15 preamble to its regulations does draw a distinction  
16 between State enforcement actions and a pure State  
17 declaratory judgment, quote, "as to the meaning of the  
18 applicable law." This is a case that -- in which --

19 JUSTICE STEVENS: I am asking about a  
20 hypothetical. I understand your argument here. But I  
21 just don't understand how your argument would apply to  
22 my hypothetical. But I think the regulation would apply  
23 to the hypothetical.

24 MR. WAXMAN: Well, this is -- this case is  
25 certainly in the core, but a -- a State authority,

1 whether it's the State banking commission or the State  
2 human rights commission or the State attorney general,  
3 or for that matter another Federal Government authority,  
4 that seeks to call a national bank to account for the  
5 manner in which it is conducting an expressly  
6 designated, allocated banking power is an exercise of  
7 visitorial power.

8 JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, it isn't -- it isn't  
9 if --

10 JUSTICE STEVENS: He doesn't even want to  
11 look at your books; he just wants to prove it by people  
12 who have been borrowing money and compare them with --  
13 among them they can orally.

14 MR. WAXMAN: I don't --

15 JUSTICE STEVENS: I don't understand why  
16 that would be visitorial power.

17 MR. WAXMAN: The -- the State's enforcement  
18 of any law that is directed at a national bank's  
19 authorized banking powers is a visitorial power. And  
20 the fact that it may also be characterized as a police  
21 power or a lawsuit is -- is interesting, but not what's  
22 at stake.

23 What Congress aimed at -- Congress in 1864  
24 knew -- the Supreme Court said, Blackstone and Kent had  
25 said -- that visitorial powers on civil corporations are

1 exercised A, by the sovereign, not by a private  
2 individual, and B, are almost always exercised through  
3 access to the courts. Whether they are invoking the  
4 courts' authority to seek records or not, that was the  
5 historical core of what visitorial powers --

6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So one could say, yes,  
7 the Federal authorities have visitorial powers, and they  
8 can go to court. But we have here that the State can  
9 prescribe, not a supervisory regime, but -- fair  
10 lending. And the State wants to go into court and say  
11 the bank is violating the State substantive law, which  
12 is applicable.

13 MR. WAXMAN: That's correct. And a  
14 sovereign taking a national bank into court with respect  
15 to not any old general law, but with respect to the  
16 conduct of its specifically authorized national banking  
17 powers, is the exercise of visitorial powers.

18 JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, is it --

19 MR. WAXMAN: That was the reason for the  
20 courts of justice exception.

21 JUSTICE SOUTER: Is it the exercise of  
22 visitorial powers, or is it an action which covers the  
23 same subject that an exercise of visitorial powers would  
24 do? Let me -- let me propose a distinction, and I don't  
25 know whether this is sound. You know -- I mean, you

1 tell me.

2 I would suppose that if someone with  
3 visitorial powers dealing with discrimination in lending  
4 brought an action against the bank or tried to enforce  
5 it against the bank and couldn't do so in any other way  
6 then by going to court, it would go to court, and it  
7 would say court, tell this institution that I have some  
8 responsibility for, to obey the law.

9 But I also assume that if the Attorney  
10 General of New York, which is not a visitor, enforces  
11 the law, it would go into court and say tell them to  
12 obey the law and to pay damages or recompense of some  
13 sort to these people whom they have wronged.

14 The subject matter of each suit is the same,  
15 but the relief that is being requested and the judicial  
16 power that is being exercised is different in these two  
17 cases. Is that a fair distinction?

18 MR. WAXMAN: I don't think -- I think that  
19 if I understood your question, and I may not have -- if  
20 a suit by a private individual or a group of private  
21 individuals seeking to indicate the deprivation of a  
22 private traditional right is not visitorial; but if the  
23 State, either directly in the enforcement of its general  
24 laws or seeking to protect the people of its State, goes  
25 into court or asks for records or anything else, it is

1 exercising a traditional visitorial power.

2 May -- while I have your attention, may I  
3 also go back to your question about 36(f) and  
4 Riegle-Neal, because there is yet -- there are other  
5 additional indicators that when the Congress said in  
6 36(f) that these State laws shall be enforced by the  
7 OCC, it was mandatory and exclusive.

8 First of all, the colloquy that was  
9 discussed and is reported in our brief, I think at page  
10 26, does use the word "enforce" as well as "supervise,"  
11 but more to the point --

12 JUSTICE SOUTER: That is the one with  
13 Senator D'Amato?

14 MR. WAXMAN: Yes. Riegle-Neal -- here's the  
15 most important point. That provision that we've been  
16 were looking at had a cognate, had an analogue that was  
17 also enforced. Riegle-Neal basically said out-of-state  
18 banks can now branch bank. When they do so, they are  
19 subject to these four categories of State laws. The  
20 provision we have been looking, which was section 102,  
21 said with respect to enforcement of those laws, the OCC  
22 shall enforce it. But section 105 said where the  
23 out-of-state bank is a State-chartered bank -- and this  
24 is reported, I think it's at section 1820(h) of title  
25 12, when it's a State-chartered bank, the State

1 authorities of the host State shall enforce the laws.

2 JUSTICE SOUTER: Uh-huh.

3 MR. WAXMAN: So it enacted a dual regime  
4 that demonstrates exactly what Congress had in mind,  
5 which is that there would be one regulator making the  
6 kind of judgments about, okay, there is a disparity, but  
7 let's look at credit history, let's look at the loan to  
8 equity value, let's look at income versus debt incurred,  
9 and all these factors that the OCC and the Fed have  
10 explained have to go into making a judgment about  
11 whether or not a particular condition of a particular  
12 loan violates Federal law, whether it the Fair Housing  
13 Act or the Equal Credit Opportunity Act or the Fed's  
14 regulation B.

15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Waxman, you are  
16 talking about lending. And like depositing, those are  
17 core banking activities, but today national banks have a  
18 lot of incidental -- they have authority to do things  
19 incidental to banking. Does your restriction of State  
20 enforcement extend to those matters incidental to  
21 banking?

22 MR. WAXMAN: May I answer? I believe that  
23 it would if those incidental authorities are in fact  
24 authorized, approved and regulated by the OCC, but this  
25 case doesn't require you to address it, because this is



1 an express power under section 371(a).

2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

3 Five minutes, Ms. Underwood.

4 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD

5 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

6 MS. UNDERWOOD: A couple of -- four points  
7 or so. To the extent the subpoena is perceived -- or  
8 this discovery request -- it didn't even proceed to this  
9 subpoena stage -- is perceived to be burdensome, State  
10 laws allows a motion to quash a subpoena for inadequate  
11 basis or for harassment. So there is control in the  
12 State courts over anything that is perceived to be  
13 excessive.

14 Two, States have been enforcing consumer  
15 protection and fair lending laws since the mid '70s when  
16 they were enacted. The Center for Responsive Lending  
17 amicus brief has a discussion of that history of  
18 enforcement. The Conway affidavit at the Joint Appendix  
19 at 152 has a description of New York's enforcement  
20 activities between 1975 and 2004. And the Lawyers'  
21 Committee for Civil Rights also goes over that history.

22 And they have been enforcing other laws  
23 against national banks for even longer, antitrust laws,  
24 branching laws, idiosyncratic laws of various sorts with  
25 no evidence that this has impaired the functions of the

1 banks.

2 JUSTICE SCALIA: Ms. Underwood, I -- I  
3 forgot the response you made in your brief. I know you  
4 did make some response to subsection (b) of section 484.  
5 How do you -- how do you explain that?

6 MS. UNDERWOOD: In the exceptions?

7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes. Why -- why do they  
8 list those exceptions, unless one would think that  
9 everything is covered?

10 MS. UNDERWOOD: Virtually every exception  
11 was enacted to resolve a controversy over whether  
12 something was visitorial or not. In fact, just as in  
13 Guthrie, where this Court said the shareholders' suit  
14 for bank records was not visitorial, or alternatively,  
15 if it is, it is covered by the courts of justice  
16 exception. So too, each of those exceptions involved a  
17 situation where there was a claim, an incorrect claim,  
18 but a claim that the action would be banned as  
19 visitorial, so Congress --

20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, why isn't  
21 it a complete answer to what I agree is a somewhat  
22 unusual situation of pre-empting enforcement but not the  
23 substance of law that its enforcement that raises the  
24 concerns? That the Federal Government thinks the State  
25 law is fine, but when you get attorneys general

1 enforcing it in a particular way, that's what causes the  
2 problem. And I mean, the problem arises in a lot of  
3 areas. Even within the Federal Government, the FBI and  
4 DEA have different ways of enforcing that might conflict  
5 with each other. Why doesn't that make perfect sense?

6 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well, even without  
7 enforcement of State law, OCC would not have exclusive  
8 control of enforcement of discrimination laws against  
9 national banks. So the idea that State enforcement  
10 poses some special problem to interfere with that  
11 exclusive control is just a mistake. That's not the way  
12 Congress set it up.

13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So, why -- why is it  
14 a mistake? Why can't Congress or the OCC think that  
15 that's where the difficulties are going to arise? In  
16 other words, it's kind of a less intrusive approach, and  
17 saying, well, you can have your State law but we are  
18 concerned about enforcement, so we are going to be the  
19 ones that enforce it.

20 MS. UNDERWOOD: I didn't mean it's a mistake  
21 of policy. I meant it's a mistake in description of the  
22 regime Congress created.

23 HUD has administrative enforcement. DOJ has  
24 litigation enforcement. This is a Federal law. Private  
25 parties can enforce Federal fair housing law. States

1 can probably enforce Federal fair housing laws, too, as  
2 -- patriotic for the victim. The Second Circuit set  
3 aside that part of the injunction, the part that barred  
4 New York from enforcing Federal law.

5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So your answer is  
6 because they have different entities that can enforce  
7 it, they are sort of in for a penny, in for a pound? If  
8 you let anybody else enforce it, you have got to let  
9 everybody else enforce it?

10 MS. UNDERWOOD: No, I don't say that --

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Including the  
12 entities that have historically have targeted national  
13 banks?

14 MS. UNDERWOOD: I don't make that argument.  
15 What I say is that is strong evidence that Congress  
16 didn't intend to give OCC exclusive control here.

17 JUSTICE SCALIA: I suppose if -- if  
18 enforcement pre-emption is the lesser step, we probably  
19 ought to revise our jurisprudence so as not to tread any  
20 more heavily than we have to upon the States so that  
21 where there is conflict pre-emption, all we should say  
22 is the State law is not invalidated, it is simply not  
23 enforceable?

24 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well --

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean that would --

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, I suppose the  
2 question would not be what we think is a good idea but  
3 what Congress has done. And here the OCC has  
4 interpreted what Congress has done is to make exclusive  
5 the OCC regulation only with respect to enforcement.

6 MS. UNDERWOOD: Well --

7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I would suppose you  
8 would thank them for that rather than criticize them for  
9 it.

10 MS. UNDERWOOD: I think that in many ways  
11 leaving the law intact and denying the States the  
12 ability to enforce it is more intrusive than simply  
13 finding pre-emption. In any event, Congress made it  
14 quite clear that it didn't want pre-emption.

15 I think my time is up.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,  
17 Ms. Underwood. The case is submitted.

18 (Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the case in the  
19 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

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