1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES	
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3	DAIMLER AG, :	
4	Petitioner : No. 11-965	
5	v. :	
6	BARBARA BAUMAN, ET AL. :	
7	x	
8	Washington, D.C.	
9	Tuesday, October 15, 2013	
10		
11	The above-entitled matter came on for oral	
12	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States	
13	at 10:02 a.m.	
14	APPEARANCES:	
15	THOMAS H. DUPREE, JR., ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behal	. f
16	of Petitioner.	
17	EDWIN S. KNEEDLER, ESQ., Deputy Solicitor General,	
18	Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for United	
19	States, as amicus curiae, supporting Petitioner.	
20	KEVIN RUSSELL, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of	
21	Respondents.	
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(10:02 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument
4	first this morning in Case 11-965, Daimler AG v. Bauman.
5	Mr. Dupree.
6	ORAL ARGUMENT OF THOMAS H. DUPREE, JR.,
7	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
8	MR. DUPREE: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
9	please the Court:
10	The Ninth Circuit held that Daimler, a
11	foreign corporation, is subject to general jurisdiction
12	in California and thus may be sued in California on any
13	claim arising anywhere in the world. The Ninth Circuit
14	reached this conclusion by attributing to Daimler the
15	California contacts of a Daimler subsidiary, Mercedes
16	Benz USA, a separate corporation that respects all
17	corporate formalities and that is not Daimler's alter
18	ego.
19	The Ninth Circuit's approach violates due
20	process.
21	JUSTICE SCALIA: Do we have to reach that
22	question? I mean, I guess the Ninth Circuit must have
23	been interpreting the long-arm statute of California,
24	right?
25	MR. DUPREE: That's correct, Justice Scalia.

- 1 JUSTICE SCALIA: Now, are there -- were
- 2 there California cases that disregarded the -- the
- 3 corporate form?
- 4 MR. DUPREE: California respects the
- 5 corporate form. The Ninth Circuit applied what appears
- 6 to be a Federal common law of agency that the Ninth
- 7 Circuit admittedly developed solely for purposes of the
- 8 jurisdictional inquiry.
- 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: But the jurisdictional
- 10 inquiry is conducted on the basis of the California
- 11 statute, isn't it?
- 12 MR. DUPREE: It is, but at the same time,
- 13 the California statute extends to the limit of due
- 14 process. And so what the Ninth Circuit did was it
- 15 construed what the permissible outer bounds of the due
- 16 process clause was in this context.
- 17 JUSTICE SCALIA: I see. It's -- it's
- 18 California's reference to the outer bounds of
- 19 jurisdiction that causes -- causes this to be a
- 20 constitutional case?
- 21 MR. DUPREE: That's correct, Justice Scalia.
- 22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: There's nothing in
- 23 the Constitution, is there, that would prohibit a State
- 24 from adopting a rule that a parent is responsible for
- any acts of a wholly-owned subsidiary?

- 1 MR. DUPREE: Well, Mr. Chief Justice, there
- 2 may be a constitutional limit; certainly, to the extent
- 3 that, say, California adopted a rule that said, for
- 4 purposes of some sort of liability, we are going to
- 5 disregard the corporate form, I think that could pose
- 6 due process concerns to the extent that it is purporting
- 7 to override, say, the corporate law of Delaware.
- 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, even on a
- 9 prospective basis, your brief talks about notice and
- 10 fairness and predictability; but if California said,
- 11 going forward, this is the rule that we're going to
- 12 apply, is there any constitutional problem with that?
- 13 MR. DUPREE: I -- I still think there would
- 14 be, Mr. Chief Justice. In other words, I take Your
- 15 Honor's point about fair notice, if California said,
- 16 going forward, this is the rule we're going to apply.
- But at the same time, I'm not quite sure
- 18 what in the Constitution would empower, say, California
- 19 to essentially override, say, Delaware's corporate law
- 20 and say, for our State purposes, we're essentially going
- 21 to rewrite the corporate DNA of a corporation that's
- 22 chartered in Delaware in order to --
- 23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We permitted that in
- 24 Container Corp.
- MR. DUPREE: I beg your pardon, Your Honor?

- 1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We permitted that in
- 2 Container Corp. We permitted California law to tax the
- 3 parent California corporation for the earnings of all
- 4 its foreign subsidiaries. And we said the due process
- 5 clause wasn't offended by that.
- 6 MR. DUPREE: Well, Justice Sotomayor,
- 7 typically, this Court has applied a less rigorous due
- 8 process standard in the tax cases than it has in the
- 9 personal jurisdiction cases.
- 10 If one were to look at, say, Goodyear or
- 11 McIntyre, of any of this Court's more recent
- 12 jurisdictional decisions, it typically takes a much more
- 13 rigorous view of the due process clause's limits on a
- 14 sovereign's ability to adjudicate matters that arise
- 15 outside the forum than it has in the tax context.
- 16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: We would never get to
- 17 this question if you hadn't conceded that there is
- 18 general jurisdiction over the U.S. subsidiary, over --
- 19 what is it -- MBUSA.
- 20 MR. DUPREE: Well, Justice Ginsburg, I
- 21 respectfully disagree that we conceded the point below.
- 22 I'm not sure, frankly, that we could concede something
- 23 like that on behalf of a different corporation that's
- 24 not a party to this lawsuit.
- 25 But it is true that we focused on the

- 1 attribution question in the Ninth Circuit. And at the
- 2 end of the day, I don't think that that point affects
- 3 the outcome in this case because --
- 4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But if there were nothing
- 5 to attribute, then that would be the end of it. If
- 6 there was -- if there was not general jurisdiction over
- 7 MBUSA, that would be the end of the case, wouldn't it?
- 8 MR. DUPREE: Yes, it would. That would be
- 9 one way to resolve the case. Another way to resolve the
- 10 case --
- 11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But you didn't -- we
- 12 can't resolve it that way since you -- you didn't
- 13 challenge the general jurisdiction over the subsidiary.
- MR. DUPREE: Well, again, we did not argue
- 15 that point. Instead, we focused on the attribution
- 16 issue, but at the same time --
- 17 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Dupree -- I'm sorry.
- 18 Please.
- 19 MR. DUPREE: I was going to say, Your Honor,
- 20 at the same time, I do think that that notion, that
- 21 MBUSA was subject to general jurisdiction in California,
- 22 was necessarily part of the Ninth Circuit's holding. So
- 23 I do think it is properly preserved for this Court's
- 24 review, if the Court elected to resolve this case on
- 25 that ground.

- 1 JUSTICE KAGAN: And, Mr. Dupree, even if you
- 2 waived that point, if I understand it correctly, you did
- 3 not waive the point that, even with all attribution in
- 4 the world, there still is no general jurisdiction over
- 5 Daimler. In other words, you could attribute all
- 6 MBUSA's contacts, and you still would not have general
- 7 jurisdiction over Daimler; is that right?
- 8 MR. DUPREE: Justice Kagan, that is exactly
- 9 right.
- 10 JUSTICE KAGAN: So in that sense, it really
- 11 doesn't depend on the attribution standard, all these
- 12 hard questions of is it an alter ego test or is it an
- 13 agency test and how does the Constitution relate to
- 14 State law because we could apply any test we wanted and
- there still wouldn't be general jurisdiction over
- 16 Daimler in California.
- 17 MR. DUPREE: Justice Kagan, that certainly
- 18 would be an acceptable route for this Court to resolve
- 19 the case. And Your Honor has it exactly right, in that,
- 20 even if one were to attribute the constitutional
- 21 contacts of MBUSA to Daimler, you would still be left
- 22 with a joint enterprise that, plainly, is not at home in
- 23 the State of California.
- 24 It would still be a German corporation,
- 25 headquartered in Stuttgart, that draws only

- 1 approximately 2 percent of its overall vehicle revenue
- 2 from California sales, so, yes --
- 3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is that a reasonable --
- 4 JUSTICE SCALIA: How do foreign -- foreign
- 5 countries resolve this attribution question? Would --
- 6 would we be standing alone, or are there a lot of other
- 7 countries that assert jurisdiction over the parent, if
- 8 there is general jurisdiction over the sub?
- 9 MR. DUPREE: By and large, Justice Scalia,
- 10 most other countries respect the corporate form and
- 11 that includes parent/subsidiary relations.
- 12 JUSTICE SCALIA: "By and large"? Who -- who
- 13 are the small?
- 14 MR. DUPREE: I'm not aware of anyone who
- 15 disrespects it; and, in fact, our amici talk at length
- 16 about how California's exercise of general jurisdiction
- in this case would not be appropriate in virtually any
- 18 other nation. I'm, frankly, not sure where what the
- 19 Ninth Circuit did here would be viewed as tolerable.
- 20 JUSTICE BREYER: So how do we deal with
- 21 that? That's what's -- I mean, it's in your interest to
- 22 argue that -- tell me how to deal with this.
- 23 It's perhaps true -- I think it's true that
- 24 a State doesn't have to allow companies to have
- 25 wholly-owned corporations. Under the Constitution of

- 1 the United States, nothing says they do. Or a State
- 2 could say, wholly-owned corporations? Well, there's no
- 3 limited liability. Or they could say, in certain kinds
- 4 of accidents, there's n o limited -- et cetera. You see,
- 5 they have lots of choice.
- 6 So what really seems to have been going on
- 7 here is the Ninth Circuit, from your perspective, just
- 8 really misstated California law by out to lunch. When
- 9 they say we want it to be as broad as the
- 10 Constitution, they don't mean, because we could get rid
- of limited liability, that that's what we do.
- 12 So -- so how can we deal with a circuit
- 13 court that seems to seriously misstate the law of a
- 14 State?
- 15 MR. DUPREE: Well, I think the way this
- 16 Court should deal with the Ninth Circuit in this case is
- 17 simply to reverse it, Your Honor. I think --
- 18 JUSTICE BREYER: I understand that that's
- 19 what you would like as the bottom line.
- 20 (Laughter.)
- 21 JUSTICE BREYER: I would like to know the
- 22 chain of reasoning that gets --
- 23 (Laughter.)
- 24 MR. DUPREE: The chain of reasoning, Your
- 25 Honor, is simply that California, like all States,

- 1 generally respects the corporate form, certainly with
- 2 regard to liability determinations.
- 3 In fact, this is a point that Professor
- 4 Brilmayer makes at length in her amicus brief, where she
- 5 says that it is anomalous for a State, on one hand, to
- 6 respect the corporate form as to liability
- 7 determinations, but then, when it comes to making these
- 8 sorts of personal jurisdictional determinations, it
- 9 applies a completely different standard.
- 10 So I think --
- 11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But suppose -- but
- 12 suppose we had a case of an accident on a California
- 13 highway injuring California people and they sued,
- 14 charging that the Mercedes Benz was defectively
- 15 manufactured.
- Would there be jurisdiction over both the
- 17 parent and the sub in that situation?
- 18 MR. DUPREE: If it were the case Your Honor
- 19 hypothesized, I think there may well be specific
- 20 jurisdiction available, depending on whether Daimler
- 21 purposefully availed itself of the California forum.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: And what does that mean?
- 23 I mean, it certainly wanted to have its cars sold in --
- 24 in California.
- 25 MR. DUPREE: Right. What this Court has

- 1 said in its opinions in Asahi and then, of course, in
- 2 McEntyre, is that you look whether the corporation
- 3 targeted the forum. And in Asahi, Justice O'Connor's
- 4 opinion identified several facts that could support such
- 5 a finding.
- 6 For example, whether the parent targeted
- 7 advertising at the forum, whether the parent designed a
- 8 product specifically for use in that forum. And, of
- 9 course, this Court has said, repeatedly, that questions
- 10 of specific jurisdiction are highly fact dependent.
- 11 And so, in Your Honor's hypothetical, I
- 12 think what the plaintiffs would do to establish specific
- 13 jurisdiction over the foreign parent would be precisely
- 14 to attempt to amass evidence showing that Daimler
- 15 targeted the forum where they intend to bring the suit.
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel --
- 17 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, there was injury in
- 18 the forum, and it was caused by defective manufacturing
- 19 abroad. That's a typical basis for jurisdiction under
- 20 long-arm statutes.
- 21 MR. DUPREE: Well, certainly, courts have
- 22 exercised specific jurisdiction in that situation. But,
- of course, as this Court's ruling in McEntyre
- 24 illustrates, that's not necessarily always the case, and
- 25 there may, of course, be situations where a product does

- 1 cause injury in the forum, yet the foreign parent is not
- 2 necessarily subject to specific jurisdiction in that
- 3 forum.
- 4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, how -- how would you
- 5 answer Justice Ginsburg's question if you were writing
- 6 the opinion in your favor? Would you say that, in the
- 7 hypothetical, Daimler Chrysler put in motion a course of
- 8 events that caused an injury in California? Is that the
- 9 way our jurisprudence works?
- 10 MR. DUPREE: Well --
- 11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: If you're going to answer
- 12 the hypothetical in an opinion, how would you -- what
- 13 would you say?
- MR. DUPREE: Well, I think I would go back
- 15 to what this Court has articulated, first of all, is the
- 16 standard for specific jurisdiction, which is purposeful
- 17 availment or purposeful direction. I think as far as
- 18 what constellation of facts --
- 19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, Daimler has
- 20 purposely availed itself of California jurisdiction by
- 21 establishing the sub that -- that operates there by
- 22 establishing Mercedes U.S., that it operates there.
- MR. DUPREE: Well, Mercedes --
- 24 JUSTICE KENNEDY: So -- so creating a
- 25 subsidiary is not availing itself of jurisdiction?

- 1 MR. DUPREE: Well, Justice Kennedy, I think,
- 2 in some cases, a subsidiary's work could give rise to
- 3 specific jurisdiction, but I think that's not
- 4 necessarily true across the United States in all cases.
- 5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I agree. And I'm asking
- 6 what is the rationale that you would use to answer
- 7 Justice Ginsburg's hypothetical in the -- in the opinion
- 8 for the Court that is ruling in your favor?
- 9 MR. DUPREE: The answer I would give is
- 10 that, in Justice Ginsburg's hypothetical, the foreign
- 11 parent could be subject to specific jurisdiction if it
- 12 purposefully availed itself of the forum, and that very
- 13 well could be an inquiry that turns on the subsidiary's
- 14 activity.
- 15 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And my question is whether
- or not by creating Mercedes U.S., Daimler didn't
- 17 purposely avail itself of the forum?
- 18 MR. DUPREE: I don't think it did,
- 19 Justice Kennedy.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Because?
- 21 MR. DUPREE: Because I don't think there is
- 22 any evidence in this record that suggests that, by
- 23 creating a subsidiary that does business generally, it
- 24 was purposefully targeting California.
- 25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. --

1 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Dupree --2 JUSTICE ALITO: If we agree with you -- if we agree with you that the test should be whether the 3 4 subsidiary is an alter ego of the parent, would that 5 depend on the -- the law of the particular State in which the suit is brought? Or would it be based on some 6 7 general understanding of alter ego liability? 8 Justice Alito, I think the best MR. DUPREE: 9 test would be to look to State law for guidance, 10 precisely because that is the law that commercial actors 11 throughout our country typically would look to, to 12 determine whether or not they might be in a 13 veil-piercing situation. 14 JUSTICE ALITO: That would mean that due 15 process would mean something different potentially in 16 California and New York, for example. Wouldn't that be 17 rather strange? 18 Well, I'm not sure, Your Honor. MR. DUPREE: Certainly this Court, in other due process contexts, has 19 looked to the substance of State law to inform its 20 21 judgements, for example, in determining the scope of 22 protected property interests. In punitive damages 23 cases, it's looked to State law to determine the constitutional boundaries. 24 25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Where else have we done

- 1 it in the personal jurisdiction context, define the
- 2 limits of the due process -- Federal due process, in
- 3 accordance with State law?
- 4 MR. DUPREE: Well --
- 5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Didn't we create tests
- 6 in International Shoe, in Burger King, separate from
- 7 State law?
- 8 MR. DUPREE: The test this Court created in
- 9 International Shoe, I think, is probably best
- 10 characterized as a Federal common law test. I think
- 11 that this situation is not quite analogous, precisely
- 12 for the reason I mentioned in my answer to
- 13 Justice Alito, is that commercial actors and lawyers and
- 14 parties throughout the country typically look to State
- 15 law for guidance.
- And if this Court were to adopt a general
- 17 Federal common law standard, under which I think we
- 18 would still prevail, but --
- 19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what do we do with
- 20 all the amici briefs that points to countless articles
- 21 that talk about the corporate veil-piercing as the most
- 22 arbitrary of State laws out there?
- MR. DUPREE: Well, I'm not sure --
- 24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I don't know how -- how
- 25 corporations get any sense of comfort from a law that's

- 1 so irrationally applied, according to some.
- 2 MR. DUPREE: Well, I think some of the
- 3 amici, candidly, may overstate the purported confusion.
- 4 At the end of the day, veil-piercing law is certainly
- 5 well settled and vetted in this country's legal
- 6 traditions, and I think it is sufficiently capable of
- 7 precise application in advance. Corporations deal with
- 8 that standard on a day-to-day basis.
- 9 And so, although I take Your Honor's point
- 10 that, at the margins, there may be room for debate as to
- 11 whether a veil should be pierced in a particular case, I
- 12 think, by and large, it's a general standard, it's a
- 13 familiar standard, and it's a workable standard, and
- it's a standard that people look to on a day-to-day
- 15 basis.
- 16 JUSTICE SCALIA: Counsel, I've been looking
- 17 for the text of the California jurisdiction statute.
- 18 Where is it? I mean -- you know, that's what this case
- 19 is all about, isn't it?
- 20 MR. DUPREE: I believe it's --
- 21 JUSTICE SCALIA: Is it in your brief? Is it
- in the Respondent's brief? Is it in the Government's
- 23 brief? I can't find the darn thing.
- 24 MR. DUPREE: Well, we'll provide the cite to
- 25 Your Honor. It's a --

- 1 JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't want the cite. I
- 2 want the text in front of me, right here.
- 3 MR. DUPREE: I will --
- 4 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's what briefs are
- 5 supposed to have --
- 6 MR. DUPREE: Right. I will --
- 7 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- all -- all of the
- 8 significant statutes that -- that relate to the case.
- 9 MR. DUPREE: Right. I will provide the cite
- 10 to Your Honor on rebuttal. It is the California Civil
- 11 Code --
- 12 JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't have the California
- 13 Civil Code -- you're saying it's -- it's not in the
- 14 briefing?
- 15 MR. DUPREE: It is in the briefing. We did
- 16 not reproduce it as a separate addendum at the
- 17 beginning, but I believe it is quoted in the briefing,
- 18 and I will provide Your Honor with a precise page cite
- 19 on rebuttal.
- 20 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But it does -- it does
- 21 provide for the exercise of jurisdiction to the limits
- 22 of due process.
- 23 MR. DUPREE: That's exactly right, Justice
- 24 Ginsburg. It simply says that California may exercise
- 25 long-arm jurisdiction, consistent and to the limit

- 1 permitted by Federal due process.
- 2 That's all the statute says, Justice Scalia.
- 3 I'll reserve the remainder of my time for
- 4 rebuttal.
- 5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- 6 Mr. Kneedler.
- 7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
- 8 FOR THE UNITED STATES, AS AMICUS CURIAE,
- 9 SUPPORTING THE PETITIONER
- 10 MR. KNEEDLER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
- 11 please the Court:
- 12 As several questions from the Court suggest,
- 13 the Due Process Clause itself does not supply fixed
- 14 rules for the attribution of forum contacts from one
- 15 corporation to another. Rather, such rules are the
- 16 province of the positive law that creates the
- 17 corporation and other substantive law, such as agency,
- 18 that defines the relationship of that juridical person
- 19 to other persons.
- 20 And those rules are the ones that the
- 21 corporations themselves rely upon and that others who
- 22 deal with the corporations rely upon.
- 23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could you tell me why we
- 24 just don't rely on the tests we apply in the tax cases?
- 25 It's a Federal test, and it says, if you're functionally

- 1 and economically tied together and you control the other
- 2 entity -- the parent controls the subsidiary, your
- 3 earnings are subject to the Due Process Clause and can
- 4 be taxed by an individual State. It seems like a fairly
- 5 simple test.
- 6 And if you break down the complicated
- 7 California test, really, that was the essence it was
- 8 getting to. So why do we go to the vagrancies of State
- 9 law, and why don't we just do the true and tried?
- 10 MR. KNEEDLER: But in the instance you're
- 11 talking about, in taxation -- and this is related to a
- 12 question the Chief Justice asked -- the Due Process
- 13 Clause does not, itself, prohibit a State or the Federal
- 14 government from attributing substantive liability, for
- 15 example, from a -- from a subsidiary to a parent or, in
- 16 the case of taxation, of choosing to look at the entire
- 17 enterprise of which the parent corporation is the head.
- 18 But those are the results of deliberate
- 19 choices by the lawmaking organs of the State, which --
- 20 State legislature, or when Congress does it, the Federal
- 21 government. They do not --
- 22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: California --
- 23 MR. KNEEDLER: -- reflect a general
- 24 determination that in all circumstances, the acts of the
- 25 agent or the acts of a subsidiary should be attributed

- 1 to the parent. In fact, the general rule is quite to
- 2 the contrary.
- 3 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, in the situation of
- 4 individuals, does the -- does the due process rule
- 5 regarding taxation of individuals by a State align with
- 6 the -- the ability of somebody to sue that person in the
- 7 State? Somebody -- for example, if someone is a partner
- 8 in a law firm that has offices all over the country,
- 9 they may be paying income taxes in many jurisdictions.
- 10 Are they subject to general jurisdiction?
- 11 If there's a -- if you have somebody who works in D.C.
- 12 and never goes to California, but has to pay some income
- 13 tax in California, are they subject to suit in
- 14 California for any --
- 15 MR. KNEEDLER: No.
- 16 JUSTICE ALITO: -- claim that arises against
- 17 them anywhere?
- MR. KNEEDLER: No. No, they are not.
- 19 And -- and for the taxation, there has to -- for
- 20 taxation to begin with, there has to be some nexus
- 21 between the individual and the -- and the State.
- The rules that I think Justice Sotomayor was
- 23 talking about in the Federal Tax Code has similar
- 24 provisions, really have to do with the measure of
- 25 taxation. And in most of those situations, certainly,

- 1 in taxation among the States, there is an apportionment
- 2 formula.
- 3 Yes, the -- the overall income may be lumped
- 4 together for purposes of -- of the initial step, but
- 5 then there's an apportionment formula that says that --
- 6 in the Mobil case that's cited in the briefs, for
- 7 example, that -- that Vermont can only tax so much of
- 8 it, that portion that is fairly attributable to Vermont.
- 9 So in that sense, it's analogous to a
- 10 specific jurisdiction. You're looking at -- you're
- 11 coming up with some formula to tie the taxation to the
- 12 State that is imposing -- imposing the tax.
- 13 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Kneedler, what do you
- 14 think about this, that -- you know, as I've been looking
- 15 through these cases, it seems to me that all these
- 16 attribution issues and the conflict about attribution
- 17 arises because courts generally have an improperly broad
- 18 understanding of general jurisdiction and don't quite
- 19 understand the distinction between general and specific
- 20 jurisdiction.
- 21 If the courts -- if the court here had
- 22 understood that general jurisdiction applies when a
- 23 company is essentially at home in a place, would any of
- 24 these questions have arisen?
- 25 MR. KNEEDLER: Probably not. The court of

- 1 appeals -- I think it's page 23 of its opinion -- says
- 2 that the reason that it looked to the -- the question of
- 3 whether the in-State activities of MBUSA were important
- 4 to Daimler was that the importance is a measure of the
- 5 presence, meaning essentially doing business within --
- 6 within California.
- 7 And as we point out in our brief, the Ninth
- 8 Circuit's approach to this traces back to early New York
- 9 cases that -- that address the question of doing
- 10 business at a time when the business --
- 11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But that was -- that was
- 12 conceded. But that was -- there is a very substantial
- 13 argument that there was no general jurisdiction over the
- 14 subsidiary, but that was not contested below.
- 15 MR. KNEEDLER: Yes.
- 16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And a party can always
- 17 consent to jurisdiction.
- 18 MR. KNEEDLER: Yes. Now -- but I think, in
- 19 a broader matter -- and also, I think the point that
- 20 Justice Kagan made earlier that even -- even if MBUSA
- 21 was subject to general jurisdiction or if we -- if
- 22 that's accepted for these purposes, that doesn't mean
- 23 that Daimler -- you wouldn't attribute MBUSA's
- 24 jurisdictional status to Daimler.
- You might attribute its contacts, if the

- 1 appropriate rules for attribution of contacts work in
- 2 that.
- 3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Just as a way of getting
- 4 you to state your general theory of the case, let me ask
- 5 you, do you have a recommendation as to whether or not
- 6 we should remand this case? If we accept your theory of
- 7 the case, which I'll let you explain, does that require
- 8 a remand?
- 9 MR. KNEEDLER: It -- it does not. And in
- 10 our view --
- 11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And that is because?
- 12 MR. KNEEDLER: Yes. In -- in our view, it's
- 13 proper for the -- for the Court to look to background
- 14 principles of corporate law, at least as a starting
- 15 point or as a presumptive matter. And in this country,
- 16 corporate separateness, under which a parent is not
- 17 liable for the acts of a subsidiary, is the general
- 18 rule.
- 19 There are established exceptions to that --
- 20 traditional exceptions, the alter ego exception and the
- 21 situation where a principal is responsible for the acts
- 22 of an agent.
- 23 Attribution on those bases, because they're
- 24 traditional, would not offend traditional notions of --
- 25 of fair play and substantial justice under the Due

- 1 Process Clause. Here, Respondent does not argue --
- 2 Respondents do not argue for an -- that alter ego was
- 3 satisfy.
- 4 And as for agency, there's no argument here
- 5 that traditional agency requirements are satisfied.
- 6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Under tradition, if you
- 7 have the universe of agent and principal, an independent
- 8 contractor, is the subsidiary of the latter or is it
- 9 something -- is it some third -- some third animal?
- 10 MR. KNEEDLER: I think -- I think in this
- 11 case -- again, we don't have any reference to -- at
- 12 all --
- 13 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Generally, if you have
- 14 a -- a corporate parent and a subsidiary, do we usually
- think of a subsidiary as an agent?
- 16 MR. KNEEDLER: No, you -- you do not.
- 17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Do we think of it as --
- 18 what do we think about it as? An independent
- 19 contractor? Or just something else?
- 20 MR. KNEEDLER: It -- it's an independent
- 21 entity. It may be doing work for the parent, or it may
- 22 not. In this case, at page 179A of the Joint Appendix,
- 23 the agreement between Daimler and -- and MBUSA
- 24 specifically provides that MBUSA is neither a special
- 25 nor a general agent. It says that MBUSA cannot act on

- 1 behalf of or bind Daimler, and it's not a fiduciary.
- 2 What --
- 3 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, you don't -- you
- 4 wouldn't have any doubt, would you, in the hypothetical
- 5 that I pose, a Mercedes Benz car causes an accident --
- 6 there's an accident in California. It's alleged that
- 7 the accident was the defective manufacturing of that
- 8 car. California people are injured. There would be
- 9 jurisdiction in a California court.
- 10 MR. KNEEDLER: I -- I would think so,
- 11 particularly given the -- given the agreement in this
- 12 case which obligates Daimler to market throughout the 50
- 13 States, and the volume of sales that are directed to the
- 14 United States, some major portion of which is expected
- 15 to be and intended to be in California. I don't think
- 16 there would be any question that California would have
- 17 specific jurisdiction.
- 18 JUSTICE KAGAN: But, of course, that just
- 19 points out the difference between specific and general
- 20 jurisdiction, that Daimler might be -- might be found --
- 21 found it -- there's jurisdiction over Daimler in a case
- 22 which involves the blowing up of a car in California,
- 23 but not over something that's not related to any of its
- 24 contacts in California.
- 25 MR. KNEEDLER: Right. That is -- that is

- 1 the -- the major -- that is the major difference.
- 2 JUSTICE ALITO: What would have to be --
- 3 MR. KNEEDLER: If I could make a point --
- 4 JUSTICE ALITO: What would have to be
- 5 true for MBUSA to be Daimler's agent with respect to
- 6 general jurisdiction? How would the facts of this case
- 7 have to be changed in order to bring this within an
- 8 agency principal?
- 9 MR. KNEEDLER: I think -- I think MBUSA
- 10 would have to be acting on behalf of Daimler. One step
- in that direction would be if Daimler consigned the cars
- 12 to -- to MBUSA and that -- and MBUSA held itself out as
- 13 the sales agent. Here, the cars were sold to MBUSA in
- 14 Germany and -- and sent to the United States.
- But if there was an agency relationship,
- 16 that doesn't necessarily mean that Daimler would be at
- 17 home in -- in California or whatever --
- 18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I mean, in most agency
- 19 relationships, titles stay with the principal. So I
- 20 don't know -- or -- or when it doesn't, it transfers to
- 21 the agent, but for the benefit of the principal. So I
- don't know what the sale in Germany has to do.
- 23 MR. KNEEDLER: Well, I -- under this
- 24 agreement, MBUSA is -- acts independently. It does not
- 25 act day to day directly.

- 1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, it seems an odd
- 2 thing to say given the page and a half that the lower
- 3 court went through on the various ways in which Germany
- 4 controls this subsidiary. It appoints all its officers.
- 5 It approves all its operating procedures. It approves
- 6 all of the people it hires and fires.
- 7 It seems like there isn't much left for
- 8 what --
- 9 MR. KNEEDLER: If I may --
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I don't think there
- 11 was a question, but you can respond.
- 12 (Laughter.)
- 13 MR. KNEEDLER: Those are contractual
- 14 undertakings. They are not the manifestations of
- 15 agency. Agency would require that -- that Daimler
- 16 control the day-to-day operations of this subsidiary.
- 17 And at page 116A of the petition appendix, the district
- 18 court says there's no evidence of that whatsoever.
- 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- Mr. Russell.
- 21 ORAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN RUSSELL
- ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
- 23 MR. RUSSELL: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
- 24 please the Court:
- 25 I'd like to begin with the question of

- 1 what's in this case and what isn't because the fact
- 2 pattern in this case gives rise to multiple complicated
- 3 questions, only two of which have been adequately
- 4 preserved in this case. And one of the questions that's
- 5 not in the case, Justice Kagan, is whether or not, if
- 6 MBUSA's contacts are attributable, they are sufficient
- 7 to establish general jurisdiction.
- 8 This case has been in litigation on the
- 9 personal jurisdiction issue for eight years. Throughout
- 10 that period, we have argued that if MBUSA's contacts
- 11 were attributed to Daimler, they were sufficient in kind
- 12 and quantity to support general jurisdiction over
- 13 Daimler itself.
- 14 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So if a Mercedes Benz
- 15 vehicle overturned in Poland and injured the Polish
- 16 driver and passenger, suit for the design defect could
- 17 be brought in California?
- 18 MR. RUSSELL: That's right. And if you
- 19 think that the answer to that is wrong, it's because of
- 20 the argument that Daimler did not preserve.
- 21 JUSTICE KAGAN: Yes, but, Mr. Russell, it's
- 22 usually -- it doesn't lead to good results when you
- 23 assume something that is obviously in error -- you know,
- 24 it leads you to go onto a road that you wouldn't
- otherwise have gone onto and get to a destination that

- 1 might be improper itself.
- 2 So it's -- it's bad practice -- and I
- 3 understand your -- you know, idea about they didn't
- 4 argue this, they didn't argue that. But to assume
- 5 something that's, obviously, a fallacy as your basis for
- 6 a decision is not likely to lead you to a good outcome.
- 7 MR. RUSSELL: Well, that might be a reason,
- 8 then, for this Court to dismiss this case as
- 9 improvidently granted. A cert petition -- a grant of
- 10 cert shouldn't be a Get-Out-of-Jail-Free card.
- 11 JUSTICE BREYER: Really, suppose I think
- 12 that this was crying out for an en banc. After you got
- 13 your decision, we decided Goodyear, didn't we? And yet,
- 14 even though there is no effort to reconcile the case
- 15 with Goodyear, as there couldn't be -- we hadn't
- 16 decided it -- by the time we decided it, it still could
- 17 have been taken en banc.
- 18 MR. RUSSELL: That's right.
- 19 JUSTICE BREYER: But I quess we have no
- 20 power at all to force the circuit, although that's what
- 21 they are there for, to consider such a matter en banc.
- 22 MR. RUSSELL: That's because Petitioners
- 23 didn't raise that question en banc. They filed an en
- 24 banc petition after Goodyear came down -- -
- JUSTICE BREYER: And they didn't say

- 1 anything about it --
- 2 MR. RUSSELL: And they did not raise these
- 3 questions.
- 4 JUSTICE KAGAN: But, Mr. Russell, they did
- 5 talk about Daimler wasn't subject to general
- 6 jurisdiction. They didn't contest MS -- MBUSA's being
- 7 subject to general jurisdiction, but they said Daimler
- 8 isn't subject to general jurisdiction.
- 9 So, you know, they didn't make the precise
- 10 argument that they should have made, but they basically
- 11 put the question at issue, is Daimler subject to general
- 12 jurisdiction? Answer, no. Daimler is a German
- 13 corporation. If it were subject to -- subject to
- 14 general jurisdiction in California, so, too, it would be
- 15 subject to general jurisdiction in every State in the
- 16 United States, and all of that has got to be wrong.
- 17 MR. RUSSELL: Well, with respect, Justice
- 18 Kagan, it's not as easy as you seem to think it is. Let
- 19 me give you an example. In Perkins, this Court cited a
- 20 prior case as a quintessential paradigmatic example of
- 21 general jurisdiction, called Barrow Steamship Company v.
- 22 Kane.
- 23 And in that case, it approved -- this Court
- 24 approved the exercise of general jurisdiction in New
- 25 York over a British steamship company for a tort that

- 1 occurred in Ireland, based on the fact that it had an
- 2 office run, actually, by another company -- a mercantile
- 3 company called Henderson --
- 4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What was -- what was the
- 5 year of that decision?
- 6 MR. RUSSELL: That was 1898. But this
- 7 Court --
- 8 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes, but the thinking
- 9 about jurisdiction has changed enormously since then.
- 10 MR. RUSSELL: But my point is that this
- 11 Court in Perkins, which is quite a long time after
- 12 International Shoe, cited to Barrows as an example of a
- 13 paradigmatic example.
- 14 JUSTICE GINSBURG: If there was ever an
- 15 example of a corporation being at home in a particular
- 16 place, it's Perkins against Benguet. It was a
- 17 Philippine company that was shut down entirely. It was
- 18 World War II. To the extent the company was operating
- 19 at all, it was in Ohio.
- It was not able to operate in what otherwise
- 21 would have been its home base, so everything that the
- 22 corporation was doing occurred in Ohio.
- 23 MR. RUSSELL: Justice Ginsburg, just to be
- 24 clear, I'm not saying that this case is like Perkins.
- 25 I'm saying that, in Perkins, a post-International Shoe

- 1 case, this Court embraced the result in Barrows, which
- 2 is a case quite like this one.
- 3 And more --
- 4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Russell, I'm still hung
- 5 up on -- on why we have to confront a Federal
- 6 constitutional question. It doesn't seem to me that a
- 7 State statute which says we want to exercise
- 8 jurisdiction to the extent the Constitution permits -- I
- 9 don't think that invites a Court to restructure standard
- 10 State law and to say, we're -- we're not going to
- 11 observe the corporate distinction.
- I guess you'd have to say we can hold the
- individual shareholders of a corporation liable because
- 14 that might not violate the Constitution. I don't think
- 15 that when -- when California adopts this statute it
- 16 means to change its -- its standard law regarding
- 17 corporations, regarding individuals, and so forth.
- 18 Why -- why should we assume that?
- 19 MR. RUSSELL: Because Petitioner, again,
- 20 didn't make that argument, either --
- 21 JUSTICE BREYER: But, now, we're -- look at
- 22 the odd thing. It might not violate the Constitution.
- 23 I mean, it's the same question, but it is bothering me,
- 24 too. It might not violate the Constitution of the
- 25 United States, for a State to say, we don't have limited

- 1 liability in respect to the subsidiary corporation of
- 2 a general corporation.
- 3 It's very unlikely to do that. It's going
- 4 to be a big problem to get investment in that State, but
- 5 it might not violate -- it might not violate the
- 6 Constitution as here, to say -- you know, we are, in
- 7 California, not going to have subsidiaries when a
- 8 plaintiff comes in and sues on the basis of something
- 9 that happened outside the country; but we will have it
- 10 when, in fact, he sues on something that happened in
- 11 California. Now, a State could do that, I guess, but
- 12 it's pretty odd.
- And if you look what the -- what the Ninth
- 14 Circuit said in its opinion, it never referred to
- 15 California law directly. It's all Ninth Circuit cases
- 16 or Second Circuit cases. The only thing it says about
- 17 California is probably something that was quoted in the
- 18 Ninth Circuit case, something like that.
- So what am I supposed to do?

 Because State
- 20 law is up to the State. How do I handle that?
- 21 MR. RUSSELL: This case has been litigated
- 22 on the interpretation of the California statute that
- 23 says that California intended, notwithstanding what
- 24 rules it applies for liability, to exercise personal
- 25 jurisdiction to the furthest extent permitted by the

- 1 Constitution.
- 2 And here, it's not that difficult a
- 3 question. Here, the question is, if Petitioner would
- 4 have been subject to general jurisdiction in California,
- 5 had it conducted the same operations through a
- 6 subdivision in the case, does the Due Process Clause
- 7 give it a constitutional right to avoid that
- 8 jurisdiction simply by conducting those same operations
- 9 through a wholly-owned subsidiary --
- 10 JUSTICE BREYER: So you think, in other
- 11 words, that California has abolished -- I mean,
- 12 California says there is no corporate insulation, a
- 13 corporation, when it tries to work through a subsidiary,
- 14 that subsidiary has unlimited liability from lawsuits in
- 15 California? Is that what you think California law is?
- 16 MR. RUSSELL: California wants to go as far
- 17 as the Constitution would permit. We're not asking --
- 18 JUSTICE BREYER: The answer then to my
- 19 question is yes. You think right today, in California,
- 20 the law is there is no -- there is unlimited liability
- 21 for a corporation that is a subsidiary of another?
- MR. RUSSELL: Not that there is unlimited
- 23 liability, but that the exercise --
- 24 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, you can bring a
- 25 lawsuit, unlimited liability.

- 1 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, Mr. --
- 2 MR. RUSSELL: Because the statute at issue
- 3 doesn't speak to liability, it speaks to personal
- 4 jurisdiction.
- 5 JUSTICE ALITO: Mr. Russell, is it clear
- 6 that the California law regarding corporate liability
- 7 would apply to all of your claims?
- 8 MR. RUSSELL: No.
- 9 JUSTICE ALITO: You have -- you have Federal
- 10 claims, you have Argentine claims; isn't that correct?
- 11 MR. RUSSELL: That's correct.
- 12 JUSTICE ALITO: California law controls
- 13 personal jurisdiction. It doesn't, does it, necessarily
- 14 control corporate liability, let's say, with respect to
- 15 the Argentine claims?
- MR. RUSSELL: No, it certainly wouldn't.
- 17 The choice of law principles would almost certainly
- 18 point to Argentine law.
- 19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, but -- but why
- 20 should we -- now that the Federal claims are out -- I
- 21 mean, when you started the suit, you had a claim under
- 22 the Alien Tort Statute, you had a claim under the
- 23 Torture Victims Protection Act, but now, those Federal
- 24 claims are out, and we are left with a claim under
- 25 California law and Argentinian law.

- 1 Why should a Federal forum exercise
- 2 supplemental jurisdiction over those claims once the
- 3 Federal claims are out of the picture?
- 4 MR. RUSSELL: Well, certainly, we -- we
- 5 agree that if this case were remanded to the district
- 6 court it would have discretion to refuse to exercise
- 7 supplemental jurisdiction. I would --
- 8 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Wouldn't it be arbitrary
- 9 for it to exercise personal jurisdiction when there is
- 10 no Federal claim and the case involves foreign
- 11 plaintiffs injured abroad, allegedly due to the
- 12 activities of a subsidiary operating abroad?
- MR. RUSSELL: Ultimately, we don't think so.
- 14 I think you would have to take into account this case
- 15 has been in litigation for eight years already. I think
- 16 that's a substantial reason for the Court to want to
- 17 allow the case to continue.
- 18 I recognize that we would have a very hard
- 19 time appealing from a decision that refused to exercise
- 20 supplemental jurisdiction. But, again, on the question
- 21 that the Court actually granted cert on and which was
- 22 actually preserved here, I do think that the Court could
- 23 simply hold that, look, attribution of contacts between
- 24 a wholly-owned subsidiary and its parents is not so
- 25 unreasonable as to violate the Constitution.

- 1 At the end of the day, the due process
- 2 question is whether the defendant had sufficiently
- 3 availed itself of the benefits of doing business in the
- 4 State to warrant an exercise of jurisdiction. It can do
- 5 that either directly, through its --
- 6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes, but that test that
- 7 you just -- the sufficiently purposeful availing, those
- 8 are all specific jurisdiction questions.
- 9 MR. RUSSELL: With respect --
- 10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And not general
- 11 jurisdiction questions.
- 12 MR. RUSSELL: With respect, I -- I don't
- 13 think that's correct. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the
- 14 plurality in Castro, for example, identified the
- 15 underlying premise of both general and specific
- 16 jurisdiction and availing oneself of the benefits of
- 17 being in the State. And --
- 18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And Goodyear
- 19 distinguished the two by saying general jurisdiction
- 20 means it's equivalent to residence for an individual.
- 21 It's where you are at home.
- 22 The -- and general jurisdiction was much
- 23 broader in the days before long-arm statutes. But now
- 24 that we have specific jurisdiction, so you can sue where
- 25 the event occurred, just as specific jurisdiction has

- 1 expanded, so general jurisdiction has shrunk.
- 2 MR. RUSSELL: I understand that there are
- 3 very serious and important questions with respect to
- 4 what it means to be at home in a State. And that, if
- 5 Petitioner had raised those arguments below, it might
- 6 actually have prevailed. But this Court ought not to
- 7 forgive that waiver in a case like this, and it ought
- 8 not to decide that question when, not only is the
- 9 argument forfeit, but it's barely been briefed in this
- 10 case.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, I -- I understood
- 12 the concession as being, that if Mercedes were the only
- 13 corporation involved in this dispute, there would be
- 14 specific -- sufficient contacts. That -- that doesn't
- 15 tell me anything about Daimler.
- 16 MR. RUSSELL: That is --
- 17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I'm -- I'm not so sure
- 18 that this concession is that troublesome for Daimler.
- MR. RUSSELL: No. There has been one
- 20 concession, which is that MBUSA's contacts are
- 21 sufficient to subject MBUSA itself to general
- 22 jurisdiction. And there's been one forfeiture --
- 23 JUSTICE KENNEDY: So how does that answer
- 24 the question about Daimler?
- MR. RUSSELL: Well, because there's been one

- 1 forfeiture as well. And that is, we've argued for 8 --
- 2 JUSTICE KENNEDY: There has been one?
- 3 MR. RUSSELL: Forfeiture, as well. We have
- 4 argued for 8 years that, if you attribute the contacts
- 5 in MBUSA to Daimler, those contacts are sufficient to
- 6 establish general jurisdiction over Daimler. They're
- 7 sufficient to satisfy the minimum --
- 8 JUSTICE GINSBURG: For any claim arising
- 9 anyplace in the world.
- 10 MR. RUSSELL: That's right. That's been our
- 11 argument. They could have said, no, that's not right.
- 12 They could have said, MBUSA doesn't do enough business
- 13 in California. They could have said that general --
- 14 that doing business theory of general jurisdiction is no
- 15 good. They could have said, you can only be subject
- 16 to general jurisdiction --
- 17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But I think their
- 18 concession is quite consistent with the proposition that
- 19 the distinction between parent and subsidiary is
- 20 meaningful for jurisdictional purposes. And that you're
- 21 not just automatically an agent -- you, yourself, do not
- 22 defend the Ninth Circuit's position that, if Daimler
- 23 gives enough functions to Mercedes that it has to give,
- 24 that then Daimler is -- is liable.
- You don't -- your footnote, I think page 35

- of your brief, you -- you don't take the Ninth Circuit's
- 2 reasoning to its full extent.
- 3 MR. RUSSELL: That's right. We do think
- 4 that this is an easier case because we have a
- 5 wholly-owned subsidiary that operates in very much the
- 6 same way as a subdivision would. Notice that in the
- 7 Federal --
- 8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Russell, could I --
- 9 does it not follow from -- from your argument that a
- 10 Federal court should entertain a suit against the
- 11 shareholders of a foreign corporation when that foreign
- 12 corporation has sufficient contacts in California?
- MR. RUSSELL: No, I don't think it does.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Why --
- MR. RUSSELL: But the question, ultimately,
- 16 is whether it's fair to say that the defendant has
- 17 sufficiently benefitted from --
- 18 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why is it any less fair?
- 19 MR. RUSSELL: Because, unlike a shareholder,
- 20 a parent company enjoys not only the economic benefits
- 21 of the subsidiary's activities --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Don't the shareholders?
- 23 MR. RUSSELL: They -- they enjoy a partial.
- 24 But in addition, they have -- the parent has the right
- and, here, the substantial right to control the day to

- 1 day --
- 2 JUSTICE SCALIA: Don't the shareholders?
- 3 MR. RUSSELL: No, they don't. All the
- 4 shareholders have the right to do is appoint the -- the
- 5 people to the board. Here, Daimler exercised a degree
- of control that is much more significant than that.
- 7 JUSTICE SCALIA: I can't see a
- 8 distinction. And I think, if you stretch the California
- 9 statute as far as you're stretching it, you -- you have
- 10 to assume that California would exercise jurisdiction in
- 11 that case --
- 12 MR. RUSSELL: Well, I don't think --
- 13 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- if you're the Ninth
- 14 Circuit.
- MR. RUSSELL: I don't think that's right. I
- 16 mean, this Court has recognized that, look, the Due
- 17 Process Clause requires, ultimately, drawing some lines,
- 18 but it can't be done in a mechanical way.
- 19 Here, Goodyear provides a safe harbor to
- 20 companies that want to make sure that they're not
- 21 subject to general jurisdiction in California. They can
- 22 do so by selling their cars to an independent
- 23 distributor, the way Petitioner used to do and the way
- 24 that Toyota still does.
- 25 But with respect to --

- 1 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But if you go -- if you
- 2 go back to the -- to the foundation case of
- 3 International Shoe, that case recognized that you can be
- 4 an agent for one purpose, but not for another. So the
- 5 people -- the salesmen who were promoting the sales of
- 6 shoes were the agents of International Shoe for the
- 7 purpose of promoting the sale of shoes. They were not
- 8 an all-purpose agent for the purpose of, say, dealing --
- 9 real estate dealings on behalf of the corporations.
- 10 So you could have an agency for one purpose,
- 11 selling cars in California, but totally unrelated to
- 12 torturing people in Argentina.
- 13 MR. RUSSELL: That's right. But the -- but
- 14 that -- I think we need to separate the two ideas of
- 15 what does it take to make Petitioner at home in
- 16 California. Once it's established that it is at home in
- 17 California, it is simply a traditional aspect of general
- 18 jurisdiction that it will be subject to suit for things
- 19 that happened abroad.
- 20 If this suit had been brought against Apple
- 21 Computer, which is headquartered in California, I don't
- 22 think we would be here today. The question here is
- 23 whether the -- the conduct in California is rendered
- 24 insufficient by virtue of the fact that it was
- 25 undertaken by a subsidiary.

- 1 JUSTICE BREYER: It's the same problem, and I
- 2 don't know what to do. It's really -- Justice Scalia
- 3 has been mentioning this problem. You're seeing it
- 4 through the lens of jurisdiction. I'm not. I'm seeing
- 5 it through the lens of corporate law. Five shareholders
- 6 get together from outside California, and they set up a
- 7 corporation in California. Why? To insulate themselves
- 8 from liability, particularly lawsuits.
- 9 Now, instead of those five shareholders,
- 10 everything is the same, but now, it's a German
- 11 corporation, and suddenly, they can't insulate
- 12 themselves from the lawsuits in California. I think it
- 13 unlikely that California would have such a corporate
- 14 law, whether it goes by the name of jurisdiction or some
- other name, but that's a State law question.
- 16 So what am I supposed to do? That's where
- 17 we started this argument. And that's what I --
- 18 MR. RUSSELL: Well, Justice Breyer, if you
- 19 think -- if you think that the -- the proper resolution
- 20 of a case like this turns on issues that were not
- 21 preserved below and have not been argued here, then you
- 22 can do one of two things.
- JUSTICE BREYER: What?
- 24 MR. RUSSELL: You can dismiss the case as
- 25 improvidently granted, or you can decide the case on the

- 1 assumptions upon which it's been litigated and make
- 2 clear that you're doing that.
- 3 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, another thing we
- 4 could do is we could say we've decided, now, two cases
- 5 that seem to bear on this, and one is Goodyear, and the
- 6 other is Kiobel; and we could say we'll send it back for
- 7 consideration of this case, in light of those.
- 8 MR. RUSSELL: We would have no problem with
- 9 that if you made clear that it was open to us under
- 10 remand to argue that they didn't preserve these
- 11 arguments. That would be a fine result for us.
- 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Breyer
- 13 mentioned --
- 14 JUSTICE SCALIA: I'm sorry Chief.
- 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- mentioned Kiobel.
- 16 Do you still think you have a viable claim under Kiobel,
- or haven't you conceded that?
- MR. RUSSELL: We are not prepared to concede
- 19 that at this point, although we recognize we have an
- 20 uphill struggle to fit ourselves within the exception
- 21 that's been left. Principally, our argument would be
- 22 based on the fact that, at the time of suit, this was a
- 23 dual American/German company with dual headquarters
- 24 in -- in the United States, which is different than
- 25 Shell.

- 1 But we -- we're not prepared to concede it,
- 2 but we're not asking this Court to resolve it.
- 3 JUSTICE SCALIA: If this is as -- as
- 4 Justice Breyer and I seem to think, a question of State
- 5 law, don't you think it's extraordinary that the Ninth
- 6 Circuit could make such a significant holding on -- on
- 7 California law without -- there is a certification
- 8 procedure in California, isn't there?
- 9 MR. RUSSELL: There is, although --
- 10 JUSTICE SCALIA: So why -- why wouldn't they
- 11 have asked the California Supreme Court whether --
- 12 whether this jurisdiction statute was meant to alter
- 13 corporate law or -- you know, tort law, or -- you
- 14 know -- just imagine any change in law that would bear
- 15 upon jurisdiction, and all those changes must be assumed
- 16 to have happened.
- 17 Couldn't -- couldn't they ask that? Is that
- 18 what this California jurisdictional statute means?
- 19 MR. RUSSELL: Sure. They could have asked
- 20 that. Usually, they only ask those questions --
- 21 JUSTICE SCALIA: Is it too late to ask it
- 22 now?
- 23 MR. RUSSELL: Well, it wouldn't be, if you
- 24 sent it back. I mean, usually, courts of appeals don't
- 25 ask those questions unless somebody asks them to. And

- 1 here, Petitioner never asked them to. It assumed, as
- 2 did we, that the statute meant that they wanted the most
- 3 permissive attribution rule that's permitted by the Due
- 4 Process Clause. And I don't think it's unreasonable --
- 5 that's an unreasonable interpretation of the statute.
- I recognize that it's a little bit
- 7 problematic, that these statutes don't give greater
- 8 definitive guidance. But Petitioner hasn't complained
- 9 about that either.
- 10 And so on the -- the premises on which this
- 11 case was litigated, I do think you can decide this case
- 12 by resolving two questions. First, on the assumption
- 13 that if MBUSA's contacts are attributable to Petitioner,
- 14 they are sufficient to make it at home, does the fact
- 15 that those contacts are through a wholly-owned
- 16 subsidiary, rather than a subdivision, make the exercise
- 17 of general jurisdiction improper --
- 18 JUSTICE ALITO: But if we assume, for the
- 19 sake of argument, that there isn't a preservation issue
- 20 regarding this in-home -- this at-home question, why
- 21 shouldn't the rule be that, unless a corporation is
- 22 incorporated in the jurisdiction or has its principal
- 23 place of business in the jurisdiction, the -- the acts
- 24 of the subsidiary are not attributable, unless it's an
- 25 alter ego.

- 1 It's a nice, clean rule. Many of the
- 2 prominent scholars in this area think that the American
- 3 doctrine of general jurisdiction doesn't serve any good
- 4 purpose. Now, that specific jurisdiction has been
- 5 expanded, it makes us an international outlier. Why
- 6 shouldn't we have a nice, clear rule like that, and
- 7 everybody will know exactly where things stand?
- 8 MR. RUSSELL: Just to be clear, there are
- 9 two parts to that rule. There is one that's the
- 10 assertion that ordinarily, you're only at home in the
- 11 place of principal business or principal -- principal
- 12 place of business or place of incorporation. And the
- other is, oh, we'll only apply that rule with respect to
- 14 subsidiary contacts.
- That additional thing, which is necessary
- 16 to -- to shoehorn it into this case, I think, is very
- 17 artificial. So if this Court is going to --
- 18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What is -- what is the
- 19 additional thing?
- 20 MR. RUSSELL: That we will only apply that
- 21 rule if the contacts, if I understand Justice Alito's
- 22 proposal, we only apply that rule if this -- if the
- 23 contacts in the State are through a subsidiary. That's
- 24 a very artificial gerrymander, honestly, to fit the
- 25 facts of this case.

- 1 If this Court is going to say that the doing
- 2 business theory of general jurisdiction is no longer
- 3 good law, it should do so directly, it should do so on
- 4 a case has actually been briefed. It hasn't been
- 5 briefed here.
- 6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: You did say, in your
- 7 brief, that recognizing that other nations are highly
- 8 critical of our expansive -- at one-time expansive
- 9 notion of doing business as a basis for general
- 10 jurisdiction, you say that that shouldn't be taken into
- 11 account as a basis for constitutional decisionmaking.
- 12 And yet, what we are talking about is a
- 13 notion of whether it's fair and reasonable to require a
- 14 corporation to answer in a forum and is -- is what the
- 15 other countries think unenlightening on what's fair and
- 16 reasonable?
- 17 MR. RUSSELL: I don't know that you can't
- 18 take it into account at all, but I will say that the --
- 19 the constitutional test is whether it's consistent with
- 20 traditional notions of fairness and justice, meaning
- 21 traditional American notions of -- of substantial
- 22 fairness.
- 23 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Russell, how would you
- 24 make the argument -- and, again, with Justice Alito,
- 25 sort of putting these waiver questions aside for a

- 1 second, German corporation, incorporated in Germany,
- 2 headquartered in Germany, 2.4 percent of its sales are
- 3 in California.
- 4 How do you argue that it's subject to
- 5 jurisdiction, general jurisdiction, not specific
- 6 jurisdiction, general jurisdiction, which means over
- 7 suits that have nothing to do with California or,
- 8 indeed, as here, over in the United States, have nothing
- 9 to do with anything that happened in the United States,
- 10 how do you make the argument that Daimler is subject to
- 11 general jurisdiction?
- 12 MR. RUSSELL: I would say a couple things.
- 13 I haven't briefed this, but this is what I would say in
- 14 a brief, if we had the opportunity to brief it. And
- 15 that is it has done billions of dollars in business in
- 16 California. It's --
- 17 JUSTICE KAGAN: It's 2.4 percent of its
- 18 sales. That would make it subject to general
- 19 jurisdiction every place.
- 20 MR. RUSSELL: But the problem -- but the
- 21 problem is a corporation shouldn't be jurisdictionally
- 22 better off simply because it's bigger than its
- 23 competitors who are smaller and, therefore, necessarily
- 24 do a bigger portion of their business in a smaller
- 25 number of places.

- 1 I think it's -- there is a very significant
- 2 fairness problem with the proportionality test suggested
- 3 by the government, again, never raised in this case.
- 4 Nobody ever argued that MBUSA didn't do enough business
- 5 in California, and in fact, it's done billions of
- 6 dollars of business there, and it's enjoyed the benefits
- 7 of being in the State, of doing business in the State,
- 8 to a far greater degree than many of its competitors,
- 9 say Tesla, which is subject to general jurisdiction for
- 10 suits for anything that it does anywhere in the world.
- 11 JUSTICE KAGAN: If it is subject to general
- 12 jurisdiction in California, is it subject to general
- 13 jurisdiction in all 49 other States?
- 14 MR. RUSSELL: I think there would still be a
- 15 question of whether -- they would be able to raise
- 16 the -- the arguments that they haven't raised in other
- 17 jurisdictions. It may be that the billions of dollars
- 18 that they are doing business in California is enough,
- 19 but the few millions of dollars they do in Iowa is not.
- 20 JUSTICE KAGAN: So everybody is subject to
- 21 general jurisdiction in, like, California and New York
- 22 and Florida because they are big markets, but no worries
- 23 about -- you know, Delaware?
- 24 MR. RUSSELL: That may be the result --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: That's a bad example. Rhode

- 1 Island.
- 2 (Laughter.)
- 3 MR. RUSSELL: That may be the case if -- the
- 4 Court has always recognized that doing business is
- 5 enough. Back to the Barrow case, when just having an
- office, a sales office -- another case that this Court
- 7 cited in Perkins and cited in International Shoe as an
- 8 example of a paradigmatic case was a case called Hausa,
- 9 by then-Judge Cardozo. And it was a suit by somebody from
- 10 New York, who sued in New York, sued a Pennsylvania
- 11 corporation, and the justification was it had a sales
- 12 office in New York.
- Now, if this Court thinks that those cases
- 14 were wrong, if it thinks that we need to change our
- 15 conceptions of general jurisdiction, in light of the
- 16 evolved modern --
- 17 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Isn't that exactly what
- 18 Goodyear held?
- 19 MR. RUSSELL: No. Goodyear didn't purport
- 20 to change anything. I know you used a new phrase to
- 21 describe the prior precedent, but it wasn't purporting
- 22 to revise it, and I don't think that there was
- 23 substantial argument in that case on that score.
- 24 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, there would hardly
- 25 be room for a decision next to Goodyear that says, oh,

- 1 for general jurisdiction purposes, it's enough that you
- 2 have some subsidiary operating in the State. The whole
- 3 idea of Goodyear was to say, there is one place you can
- 4 always sue a corporation, one or two, place of
- 5 incorporation, a place -- principal place of business.
- 6 MR. RUSSELL: Well, again, if I can just
- 7 respond to that idea, the one consequence of that -- and
- 8 getting back to what I would say to Justice Kagan -- is
- 9 people aren't subject to general jurisdiction only in
- 10 one or two places. They are subject to general
- 11 jurisdiction anywhere they set foot and are served with
- 12 process. And I think it is quite unfair to say --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: But people can be only
- 14 one place at a time.
- MR. RUSSELL: But they go a lot of places
- 16 over time. And as a consequence, they are, in fact, in
- 17 the course of living their lives or even doing business
- in an unincorporated forum, subject to general
- 19 jurisdiction in a lot of places.
- 20 Again, this is an important question that
- 21 hasn't been briefed in this case, it wasn't preserved
- 22 below, and I think that you ought to decide the case on
- the grounds, on the premises on which it has been
- 24 litigated for eight years. And if you can't do that,
- 25 you ought to dismiss the case as improvidently granted

- 1 or at least remand the case to allow a full airing of
- 2 these issues in an appropriate forum.
- 3 JUSTICE ALITO: If this 2.4 percent figure
- 4 is important, wouldn't we get into impossible
- 5 line-drawing problems? What if it was 1.4 percent?
- 6 MR. RUSSELL: Well, you do get into
- 7 line-drawing problems in this area. This Court has
- 8 recognized that, even in specific jurisdiction cases.
- 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: You think it should be
- 10 billions of dollars, right? We're talking about
- 11 percentage, right?
- 12 MR. RUSSELL: I think billions of dollars is
- 13 enough.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: So we've got to pick a
- 15 dollar amount, rather than a percentage.
- MR. RUSSELL: Well, you have to pick some
- 17 metric. I mean, this Court's cases have always been
- 18 general. They have talked about minimum contacts. They
- 19 have talked about systematic and continuous business
- 20 operations in the State.
- 21 And those -- the Court has always recognized
- 22 that those are not standards that are capable of
- 23 mechanical operation or brightline rules. If you think
- that you need to develop some new standards, you ought
- 25 to do it in a case when it is squarely presented and

- 1 adequately briefed.
- 2 If there are no further questions?
- 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- 4 Mr. Dupree, you have four minutes remaining.
- 5 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF THOMAS H. DUPREE, JR.,
- 6 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
- 7 MR. DUPREE: Just a few brief points.
- 8 First, with regard to Justice Breyer's question about
- 9 remand, I think there is absolutely no reason for this
- 10 Court to remand this case to the Ninth Circuit. The
- 11 issues as to attribution were fully briefed below. They
- 12 are fully briefed here. I think that, were this Court
- 13 to either remand the case or dismiss the case, for one
- 14 thing, the circuit split would persist. The Ninth
- 15 Circuit's decision in the event of a remand would remain
- 16 on the books.
- 17 Even if this Court were to remand the
- 18 decision of the Second Circuit, which --
- 19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Do you really care how
- 20 we do it? Given that so many issues have not been
- 21 adequately briefed, conceded when they are, obviously,
- 22 fallacious and unsupportable, why don't we just say,
- 23 simply, exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable in this
- 24 case?
- 25 MR. DUPREE: Well, Justice Sotomayor --

- 1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The other side --
- 2 neither you or the other side have argued that there
- 3 isn't a reasonableness component. I know some of my
- 4 colleagues don't think there is. But both of you have
- 5 proceeded in your briefing as if there is. Do you care
- 6 how you win?
- 7 MR. DUPREE: Well, yes, Your Honor, I think
- 8 we do. I think we do. And let me say this: I think
- 9 that, with regard to Your Honor's points about issues
- 10 being waived or forfeited below, the only issue that
- 11 even arguably -- even arguably was forfeited below was
- 12 the discrete question as to whether Mercedes Benz itself
- is subject to general jurisdiction in California.
- 14 The question that Justice Kagan and others
- 15 were inquiring about, namely, that even were one to
- 16 accept the attribution theory and evaluate Daimler as a
- 17 joint enterprise, would that render the combined
- 18 enterprise at home in California, we plainly did not
- 19 waive or forfeit that question.
- In fact, we expressly addressed it in our
- 21 opening brief, and we have been fighting in this case,
- 22 from day one, to argue that, even if you were to
- 23 attribute the contacts, there is no basis for
- 24 jurisdiction over Daimler. That question is squarely
- 25 presented for this Court's review.

- 1 I also think that -- as Justice Ginsburg and
- 2 others have noted, there has been some confusion in the
- 3 lower courts over the distinction between specific
- 4 jurisdiction and general jurisdiction. This Court saw
- 5 it in Goodyear, for example, and I think that, were this
- 6 Court to resolve this case on the ground that Justice
- 7 Kagan suggested -- or Justice Alito suggested, namely,
- 8 that a corporation cannot be at home outside of the
- 9 areas where it maintains its principal place of business
- 10 or is incorporated, that it can't be subject to general
- 11 jurisdiction anywhere else.
- 12 That would be a clean rule. It would be a
- 13 workable rule. I think it's fully consistent with what
- 14 the Court said in Goodyear, and it would provide clarity
- 15 and guidance to the lower courts and eliminate the
- 16 circuit split that currently exists over agency
- 17 jurisdiction.
- 18 A couple other quick points, Justice Scalia,
- 19 I regret to report that neither the parties nor the
- 20 courts below reproduced the text of the California
- 21 statute. The Solicitor General, however, to his credit,
- 22 did on page 4 of his brief. It simply says that,
- 23 "California may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not
- 24 inconsistent with the Constitution of California or the
- 25 United States."

1	And the Ninth Circuit panel, on page 19A of
2	the Petitioner's appendix, said that, therefore, the
3	question is this case in this case is simply whether
4	the exercise of jurisdiction would exceed the
5	permissible bounds of due process.
6	The last point I want to make and we've
7	been discussing legal issues is just to remind the
8	Court of the facts of this case. This is a case
9	involving Argentine plaintiffs, suing a German
10	corporation, based on events that allegedly occurred in
11	Argentina more than 30 years ago. This case has no
12	connection to the United States, and it has no business
13	in a California courtroom.
14	The Ninth Circuit's contrary conclusion is
15	indefensible, and for that reason, we ask that the
16	judgment be reversed.
17	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
18	Counsel.
19	The case is submitted.
20	(Whereupon, at 11:01 a.m., the case in the
21	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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