1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	x
3	JOHNNIE CORLEY, :
4	Petitioner :
5	v. : No. 07-10441
6	UNITED STATES. :
7	x
8	Washington, D.C.
9	Wednesday, January 21, 2009
10	
11	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
12	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
13	at 10:14 a.m.
14	APPEARANCES:
15	DAVID L. McCOLGIN, ESQ., Assistant Federal Defender,
16	Philadelphia, PA.; on behalf of the Petitioner.
17	MICHAEL R. DREEBEN, ESQ., Deputy Solicitor General,
18	Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of
19	Respondent.
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(10:14 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear
4	argument first today in Case 07-10441, Corley v. United
5	States.
6	Mr. McColgin.
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF DAVID L. McCOLGIN
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
9	MR. McCOLGIN: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice,
10	and may it please the Court:
11	FBI agents delayed presenting Mr. Corley to
12	a Federal magistrate judge in order to obtain his two
13	confessions. The admissibility of these two confessions
14	depends on an issue of statutory interpretation: The
15	interpretation of 3501(c), together with the
16	McNabb-Mallory rule and the right of prompt presentment.
17	Now, there's two critical issues I would
18	like to address. The first is that 3501(c) as it's
19	written by Congress leaves the McNabb-Mallory rule in
20	place outside the six-hour time limitation. And the
21	second is that the Government's interpretation, under
22	which 3501(c) is merely a voluntariness safe harbor, is
23	unfaithful to the text and the structure of the statute.
24	Turning to the first point, subsection (c)
25	modifies McNabb-Mallory, but does not eliminate it. The

- 1 exact text of the statute here is crucial. And for the
- 2 Court's convenience, on page 7 of the yellow brief the
- 3 operative language of the text of the statute is set
- 4 out.
- 5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Before we -- before we
- 6 get to the statute, McNabb-Mallory are exercises of this
- 7 Court's supervisory authority over the lower courts?
- 8 MR. McCOLGIN: That's correct, Your Honor.
- 9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And they were both
- 10 pre-Miranda decisions, when now the defendant is told of
- 11 his right to remain silent. Whatever Congress put in
- 12 1301 -- 3501, this Court could say, well, McNabb-Mallory
- 13 are no longer viable cases in light of Miranda.
- 14 MR. McCOLGIN: This Court could, but for
- 15 several prudential reasons this Court should not,
- 16 overturn McNabb and Mallory and should not find them to
- 17 be no longer valid considerations. First of all -- or
- 18 no longer valid precedents.
- 19 First of all, the Solicitor General's Office
- 20 has not asked that McNabb and Mallory be overturned.
- 21 Second of all, the parties have not briefed
- 22 that issue. It has been briefed instead as a statutory
- 23 interpretation issue.
- 24 Thirdly, Congress through 3501(c) structured
- 25 the statute on the existing precedent of McNabb and

- 1 Mallory, and at this point for the Court to pull McNabb
- 2 and Mallory out from underneath that structure would
- 3 cause that structure to basically collapse. It depends,
- 4 the six-hour time limitation, depends on the existence
- of McNabb-Mallory outside that six-hour time period.
- 6 Congress can revisit this issue at any time.
- 7 Their hands are not tied. Congress could choose to
- 8 change 3501(c) so that it no longer provides for McNabb-
- 9 Mallory outside the six-hour time period. But that's a
- 10 decision for Congress and this Court, I would suggest
- 11 respectfully, should respect the prerogatives and the
- 12 policy choice that Congress has already made.
- 13 JUSTICE ALITO: Are you arguing that the
- 14 language in subsection (c) codifies the McNabb-Mallory
- 15 rule?
- MR. McCOLGIN: I am arguing that the exact
- 17 language, whether it is "codification" or "leaves
- 18 intact," doesn't matter. What it does is --
- 19 JUSTICE ALITO: There is a very big
- 20 difference, isn't there, between saying we are codifying
- 21 this rule, we're making it a statutory requirement, and
- 22 saying, assuming that this supervisory rule that was
- 23 adopted by the Supreme Court remains in place, we are
- 24 creating an exception to it? Which of those two things
- 25 does subsection (c) do?

1	MR.	McCOLGIN:	Your	Honor,	it	does	the

- 2 latter. It leaves McNabb-Mallory in place. However,
- 3 the language of the statute uses the phrase "time
- 4 limitation" in the proviso. "Time limitation" implies
- 5 more than we're just not just touching McNabb-Mallory
- 6 for the time being. It depends -- the statute depends
- 7 on McNabb-Mallory to create the time limitation, because
- 8 without McNabb-Mallory there is no limitation. After
- 9 the six hours nothing else happens unless McNabb-Mallory
- 10 --
- 11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, it would be
- 12 consistent with the second purpose that you gave to say
- 13 that there's a six-hour safe harbor, whatever term you
- 14 want to call it, and beyond six hours the Court is free
- 15 to reexamine its supervisory rule in light of what
- 16 Congress has provided in (a) and (b) of the statute.
- MR. McCOLGIN: Well, but again, the language
- 18 of the statute is "time limitation." That's strong
- 19 language for Congress to use and it indicates that
- 20 Congress intended to limit the taking of confessions to
- 21 those first six hours. There is no limitation without
- 22 McNabb-Mallory in effect.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: It is a little bit odd to
- 24 say that Congress has built a statute around a
- 25 supervisory rule, but taken away the authority of this

- 1 Court to reexamine the supervisory rule.
- 2 MR. McCOLGIN: I am not actually saying that
- 3 Congress has taken away the authority of the Court. I
- 4 am saying as a prudential manner, since Congress can
- 5 address this on its own and since it structured the
- 6 statute on the foundation of McNabb-Mallory, it would be
- 7 best for this Court to leave up to Congress that policy
- 8 choice.
- 9 Congress chose in 1968 to leave of
- 10 McNabb-Mallory protection against presentment delay in
- 11 place after six hours. It was a compromise, and it was
- 12 the appropriate compromise, because what it did was it
- 13 cut out the first six hours during which there had been
- 14 the most problems with the application of
- 15 McNabb-Mallory. The six-hour time limitation
- 16 effectively lowers the social cost of this rule of this
- 17 rule of inadmissibility while maintaining the deterrent
- 18 effect of McNabb-Mallory outside the six hours.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, you were trying to
- 20 get to page 7 of your yellow brief?
- 21 MR. McCOLGIN: Yes, Your Honor. On page 7 I
- 22 set out the operative language of the statute. And what
- 23 the statute actually provides is that a confession shall
- 24 not be inadmissible solely because of delay if such
- 25 confession is found by the trial judge to have been made

- 1 voluntarily and made within six hours of arrest. Now,
- 2 the phrase "inadmissible solely because of delay" is
- 3 clearly a reference to the McNabb-Mallory rule because
- 4 that is exactly what McNabb-Mallory does. It renders
- 5 the confession inadmissible solely because of delay if
- 6 the delay in presentment was unreasonable.
- 7 So what the statute is providing on its face
- 8 is that a confession shall not be subject to the
- 9 McNabb-Mallory rule if it is voluntarily given and made
- 10 within six hours. The six-hour provision means that
- 11 McNabb-Mallory is in effect outside of the six hours.
- 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Or it may just mean
- 13 that the confessions beyond six hours may be excluded
- 14 solely because of delay. In other words, if the judge
- 15 says, look, I don't want to hear about all this other
- 16 stuff, it's just too long, he can't do that beyond the
- 17 six hours, but he can within the six hours.
- 18 MR. McCOLGIN: Within the six hours he
- 19 cannot exclude solely because of delay, even a voluntary
- 20 statement. That is the McNabb-Mallory principle,
- 21 inadmissible solely because of delay. So what it's
- 22 saying is that McNabb-Mallory does not apply within the
- 23 six hours.
- Now the government's interpretation is that
- 25 this is simply a voluntariness safe harbor, and what

- 1 they do is they read the word "inadmissible" as being
- 2 synonymous with the word "involuntary." But the text of
- 3 the statute shows that those two terms are not
- 4 synonymous, because the text of the statute says that in
- 5 order for a confession to be admissible it must be
- 6 voluntary and made within six hours.
- 7 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, they have that textual
- 8 problem, but you have at least an equally big textual
- 9 problem, because you want to read the first sentence of
- 10 subsection (a) completely out of the statute based on
- 11 some supposition about what Congress was intending to
- 12 do. So really, if you live by the text you die by the
- 13 text. I don't see how you are going to succeed with a
- 14 subsection (c) textual analysis if you're going to
- 15 disregard the text of subsection (a).
- 16 MR. McCOLGIN: Your Honor, we don't
- 17 disregard the text of subsection (a). Instead, we just
- 18 apply the principle that a general provision, if it
- 19 conflicts with a specific provision, the specific
- 20 controls over the general. What we have in subsection
- 21 (a) is a general statement that voluntary statements are
- 22 admissible. But if we read that the way the government
- 23 does, as making admissible every voluntary statement,
- 24 then that would make subsection (c) completely
- 25 superfluous.

Τ	JUSTICE ALITO: And if you read subsection
2	(c) the way you do, it makes subsection (a) mean
3	something quite different from what it says literally.
4	MR. McCOLGIN: No, it simply establishes an
5	exception in the area of delay. This is the way
6	statutes work. When there is a conflict between a
7	general provision and a specific one, the specific must
8	control over the general. If it worked the other way
9	around, it would render the specific superfluous. So
10	this has happened in statutes in numerous case. In 1983
11	versus 2254, it was held that 2254 as a specific
12	provision controls over 1983. So this is an accepted
13	principle of statutory interpretation.
14	JUSTICE ALITO: What you're you are not
15	arguing that there is a specific provision that controls
16	a general provision. You are arguing that an arguable
17	negative inference from an arguably more specific
18	provision reads new language into the text of a specific
19	provision. That's what you are arguing, isn't it?
20	MR. McCOLGIN: With respect, no, Your Honor.
21	We are not making the negative inference argument that
22	the government suggests we are making in the first part
23	of their brief. Instead, we are making the argument
24	that subsection (c) was constructed on the existing
25	precedent of McNabb and Mallory, which already

- 1 established a rule of inadmissibility. Subsection (c)
- 2 then just carves out the first six hours from that. So
- 3 it's not creating a rule of inadmissibility by negative
- 4 inference. Rather it's just recognizing that a rule of
- 5 inadmissibility already exists in the case law and the
- 6 purpose of this statute was to simply carve out from the
- 7 first six hours the McNabb-Mallory rule.
- 8 The government --
- 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why can't you argue that
- 10 what happens when you are not within the safe harbor is
- 11 simply that the time period cannot alone govern, all
- 12 right, but it can still be part of the list of things
- 13 that can be taken into account in determining
- 14 voluntariness under (b). Why doesn't that reconcile the
- 15 two provisions?
- MR. McCOLGIN: That, again, is the
- 17 government's interpretation. But it requires a
- 18 rewriting. It requires reading "inadmissible" as
- 19 "involuntary" to interpret all of subsection(c) as a
- 20 voluntariness safe harbor. But Congress used the word
- 21 inadmissible deliberately. That's a reference to the
- 22 McNabb-Mallory rule. McNabb-Mallory did not render
- 23 confessions voluntary or involuntary based on delay. It
- 24 rendered them inadmissible. So that language is
- 25 crucial. This cannot be read as a voluntariness safe

- 1 harbor.
- 2 JUSTICE SCALIA: But admissibility is
- 3 defined in 3501 itself. (A) says that it shall be
- 4 admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given; and
- 5 (b) says what factors will be taken into account in
- 6 determining whether it's voluntarily given.
- 7 MR. McCOLGIN: Yes, Your Honor. And (c)
- 8 makes clear that, at least for purposes of subsection
- 9 (c), voluntariness is not enough for admissibility,
- 10 because it says on its face that in order --
- 11 JUSTICE SCALIA: I agree with that. It is
- 12 not alone enough.
- 13 MR. McCOLGIN: So the two terms --
- 14 JUSTICE SCALIA: So if you are outside of
- 15 that safe harbor you cannot rely upon the time alone.
- 16 But why can't you rely on the time plus the other
- 17 factors?
- 18 MR. McCOLGIN: Your Honor, because the
- 19 effect is again to allow for a confession to be
- 20 inadmissible solely based on delay if it's outside of
- 21 the six hours.
- 22 JUSTICE SCALIA: It's not being admissible
- 23 solely on the basis -- I'm sorry. Delay is not the only
- 24 factor being considered in making the inadmissibility
- 25 call. Delay is one of the things; whereas, within the

- 1 safe harbor delay can't be taken into account at all.
- 2 MR. McCOLGIN: Well, what the Congress said
- 3 was that delay alone cannot be a basis for
- 4 inadmissibility within six hours.
- 5 JUSTICE SCALIA: Right.
- 6 MR. McCOLGIN: That leaves in place
- 7 McNabb-Mallory, under which delay alone is a basis for
- 8 inadmissibility.
- 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: No. It -- it leaves it in
- 10 effect only if you ignore (a) and (b). (A) says that
- 11 it's admissible if it's voluntary --
- MR. McCOLGIN: But that --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: -- and (b) says it's
- 14 voluntary if you take into account the five factors, one
- 15 of which is the period of time before arraignment.
- 16 MR. McCOLGIN: Your Honor, that depends.
- 17 The premise of that depends on the argument that
- 18 "inadmissibility" is synonymous with "involuntariness"
- 19 for purposes of subsection (c), and "admissibility" is
- 20 synonymous with "voluntariness," but they are not
- 21 synonymous as used in subsection (c).
- JUSTICE SCALIA: But they are synonymous as
- 23 used in (a).
- MR. McCOLGIN: Well, subsection -- as used
- 25 in subsection --

1 JUSTICE SCALIA: (A) says that if it's --2 it's admissible if it's voluntary. 3 MR. McCOLGIN: Yes, Your Honor. However, as 4 used in subsection (c), that should control, because the 5 word "inadmissibility" is being used in that very same sentence. Since the very same sentence makes clear that 6 7 voluntariness is not enough for admissibility, it's 8 clear that those two terms are not synonymous. JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, is it your position 9 10 that the McNabb-Mallory rule serves purposes other than 11 to ensure the voluntariness of the statement? 12 MR. McCOLGIN: Yes, it protects --13 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And that's what you're trying to reach here? 14 15 MR. McCOLGIN: Yes, Your Honor. It protects 16 17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But if that's true, then 18 why is it that we would suppress the confession if it's 19 completely voluntary? I mean, what's the link between 20 some other end that's being served by McNabb-Mallory --21 MR. McCOLGIN: It's protecting --22 JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- something other than 23 voluntariness and suppressing the confession? 24 MR. McCOLGIN: It's protecting the right of 25 prompt presentment. McNabb-Mallory was meant to prevent

- 1 the exploitation of delay in presentment as a means of
- 2 obtaining a confession.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: But why do we want to
- 4 avoid delay in presentment? What reason do we give?
- 5 And I assume there are reasons that -- to contact family
- 6 and so forth -- other than voluntariness.
- 7 MR. McCOLGIN: Well, voluntariness is
- 8 certainly a part of it. But it's in addition, because
- 9 there's rights that attach at presentment that allow a
- 10 defendant to make a much more informed decision as to
- 11 whether --
- 12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: What do those rights have
- 13 to do with a confession that is conceded, for our
- 14 analytic purposes, to be voluntary?
- 15 MR. McCOLGIN: Because the confession itself
- 16 was obtained through exploitation of the delay. During
- 17 a period of custody -- before presentment the defendant
- 18 was just in the hands of the zealous police officers who
- 19 have actually arrested him. It's a fundamental
- 20 principle of our justice system that that period should
- 21 be as short as reasonably possible because during that
- 22 period, as time goes on, the effect of the delay is to
- 23 increase the inherently coercive power of that uncertain
- 24 --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Do you need fundamental

- 1 principles when you have got Rule 5 of the Rules of
- 2 Criminal Procedure? Don't they say that an arrestee
- 3 shall be taken before a magistrate without unreasonable
- 4 delay?
- 5 MR. McCOLGIN: Exactly, Your Honor. It's
- 6 the right under 5(a) to prompt presentment that is being
- 7 protected.
- 8 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But all you are doing is
- 9 trying to have an enforcement mechanism for this by the
- 10 wholly unrelated remedy of suppressing the confession if
- 11 it's voluntary. If it's not voluntary, of course, it's
- 12 related.
- MR. McCOLGIN: Well, the purpose of
- 14 McNabb-Mallory was actually to cut the line a bit short
- of having to actually make a voluntariness
- 16 determination. It's a recognition that, even if the
- 17 statement is voluntary, that still there are inherent
- 18 coercive pressures that develop during a period of
- 19 presentment -- of presentment delay, and that that
- 20 period of time should be as short as possible so that
- 21 that coercive nature, the coercive nature of the
- 22 interrogation, doesn't cause the person to --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: So you are saying a
- 24 confession can be coercive and still voluntary?
- MR. McCOLGIN: It's -- yes, Your Honor. Not

- 1 in the sense that it's a coerced confession. I'm not
- 2 arguing that this was involuntary. Instead, I'm arguing
- 3 that McNabb-Mallory intends to avoid the voluntariness
- 4 requirement by establishing a prophylactic rule, so that
- 5 a presentment needs to be made as soon as reasonably
- 6 possible after the arrest so that that delay cannot be
- 7 exploited as a means of obtaining a confession. It both
- 8 protects the right to prompt presentment and it also --
- 9 JUSTICE STEVENS: May I ask you this: What
- 10 other remedy, other than suppression of the confession
- 11 made after six hours, is there available to the
- 12 defendants to enforce the interest in prompt
- 13 presentment?
- MR. McCOLGIN: There is no other remedy
- 15 available. In fact, the message that an affirmance in
- 16 this case would send to law enforcement is that delay
- 17 for the purpose of interrogation is permissible and that
- 18 the right of prompt presentment is unenforceable.
- 19 Without McNabb-Mallory, this becomes an empty right.
- 20 There is no other remedy. And that's why particularly
- 21 where the delay is purposeful, as we have in this case
- 22 --
- JUSTICE ALITO: Why would that be the case?
- 24 The confession could still be suppressed on grounds of
- 25 involuntariness?

1 MR. McCOLGIN: Yes, Your Honor. 2 JUSTICE ALITO: Your argument is you don't trust district judges to make accurate determinations as 3 to whether the confession is voluntary or not. You need 4 5 -- you need a rule that takes that out of their hands. 6 MR. McCOLGIN: It's not that we don't trust 7 It's that delay for the purpose of interrogation 8 should not be pushed to that limit; that delay for the purpose of interrogation should not be permitted. The 9 10 delay, particularly where it's for that express purpose, even if the defendant cannot show that it rose to the 11 level of involuntariness, still it's exploitation of 12 delay. It's a violation of the right to prompt 13 14 presentment, and that violation of the right to prompt 15 presentment under McNabb-Mallory renders that confession 16 17 JUSTICE ALITO: What's the purpose of the 18 requirement of prompt presentment? 19 MR. McCOLGIN: The purpose of the right of prompt presentment is several-fold. 20 21 First of all, it's because there are inherent coercive characteristics that develop during a 22 23 period of custody, and a person, once arrested, should 24 be presented to a neutral magistrate so that the neutral magistrate can both assign counsel, give an opportunity 25

- 1 for consultation with counsel, and can also inform the
- 2 person of his rights, address bail, and issues such as
- 3 that. So the right of prompt presentment is considered
- 4 fundamental. It's considered a basic right, a basic
- 5 statutory right in our system.
- 6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. McColgin, what do you
- 7 do with the problem that the proviso only makes a delay
- 8 longer than six hours nondestructive of the
- 9 admissibility of the confession if the delay beyond six
- 10 hours "is found by the trial judge to be reasonable
- 11 considering the means of transportation and the distance
- 12 to be traveled to the nearest available magistrate judge
- 13 or other officer."
- I can think of a lot of reasons why you
- 15 can't do it within six hours other than the means of
- 16 transportation and the distance to be traveled.
- MR. McCOLGIN: We have to remember, Your
- 18 Honor --
- 19 JUSTICE SCALIA: You see, if you take the
- 20 government's position that it really doesn't matter, it
- 21 gets thrown back into (b), and you can take all those
- 22 factors into account, and the ultimate question is
- 23 whether the confession was reasonable.
- But if you take your position, the defendant
- 25 automatically walks, or at least his confession is

- 1 automatically thrown out, and the only exception made is
- 2 if the means of transportation and the distance to be
- 3 traveled made six hours impracticable.
- 4 MR. McCOLGIN: No, Your Honor, that's not
- 5 our position. Our position is that the first question
- 6 is did the confession fall within that six-hour time
- 7 period?
- 8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Right.
- 9 MR. McCOLGIN: Or longer, depending on
- 10 transportation, means of transportation. For that
- 11 determination of whether it falls within the exclusion
- 12 period, only means of transportation or distance is
- 13 considered, but once the confession is outside that
- 14 period, then McNabb-Mallory applies and the confession
- 15 may still be admissible if the delay was necessary. And
- 16 for those purposes, once we are determining whether
- 17 McNabb-Mallory requires inadmissibility, the court can
- 18 consider, for example, emergency hospital treatment or
- 19 unavailability of the magistrate. So all of those
- 20 factors can and do get considered once we get into the
- 21 determination of whether McNabb-Mallory requires
- 22 exclusion.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, that certainly is a
- 24 very back-door way of doing it, isn't it?
- 25 MR. McCOLGIN: Not at all, Your Honor,

- 1 because once we look at the structure of the statute
- 2 what it's doing is carving out the first six hours from
- 3 McNabb-Mallory. So the determination of whether we are
- 4 in that carve-out period is limited to transportation
- 5 and distance, but once we are outside of it, we just
- 6 apply McNabb-Mallory, and that's McNabb-Mallory as it
- 7 has developed in the case law, which includes all of
- 8 these other considerations.
- 9 JUSTICE SOUTER: But why -- why was it
- 10 appropriate to have a special rule for transportation?
- 11 In other words, everything that is covered by the
- 12 transportation proviso would, on your theory would on
- 13 your theory have been subject to consideration under
- 14 McNabb-Mallory anyway. So why did they simply have a
- 15 six-hour rule and leave any exceptions, transportation,
- 16 unavailability of magistrate, medical emergency,
- 17 whatever, to -- to the leeway that McNabb-Mallory
- 18 allows?
- 19 MR. McCOLGIN: Because the first question,
- 20 again, is just whether to exclude the confession
- 21 altogether from the McNabb-Mallory determination. And
- 22 for those purposes, they -- some Senators from larger
- 23 States where there's greater distances to travel wanted
- 24 to make sure that there was an exception for
- 25 transportation and distance.

- 1 JUSTICE SOUTER: So basically -- I don't
- 2 mean this disparagingly, but basically the answer is
- 3 politics. Somebody from a State thought of it and
- 4 nobody else said, well, gee, let's pile on some other
- 5 provisos. It's as simple as that in your view?
- 6 MR. McCOLGIN: Exactly, Your Honor. There
- 7 was very little comment on it added at the -- at the
- 8 last minute. The Scott Amendment had just included the
- 9 six-hour provision, but then the proviso was added on
- 10 the floor at the very last minute.
- 11 JUSTICE SOUTER: I see.
- MR. McCOLGIN: Your Honor, the government
- 13 also relies on 402 as a basis for arguing that
- 14 McNabb-Mallory has been basically overturned by
- 15 Congress. Rule 402, however, clearly does not apply
- 16 here. The advisory notes -- the advisory committee
- 17 notes make clear that Rule 402 was never intended to
- 18 overturn McNabb-Mallory. In fact, the advisory
- 19 committee identified McNabb-Mallory as a rule of
- 20 inadmissibility that was meant to stay in place even
- 21 after the implementation of Rule 402.
- 22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: At least one time limit
- 23 that has been complied with -- and that's the Fourth
- 24 Amendment, how long you can keep somebody seized without
- 25 taking them before a magistrate -- there is no violation

- 1 of that time period, is there?
- 2 MR. McCOLGIN: That's correct, Your Honor,
- 3 the McLaughlin principle that less than 48 hours is
- 4 presumptively reasonable. However, Congress in -- in
- 5 3501(c) chose to set a six-hour time period for the
- 6 taking of confessions and to leave McNabb-Mallory in
- 7 place outside that time period.
- 8 I would suggest that Congress struck an
- 9 appropriate balance at that time, keeping McNabb-Mallory
- 10 in place for the more extreme types of delay, but
- 11 eliminating it from the shorter periods of delay. And,
- 12 in doing so, Congress struck an appropriate balance, and
- 13 I would suggest that this Court should respect the
- 14 balance that Congress has struck. Unless there is any
- 15 further questions, I would ask that --
- 16 JUSTICE STEVENS: I just have one question.
- 17 Do you think the -- that the D.C. Circuit -- the statute
- 18 pertaining to the District of Columbia is relevant?
- 19 MR. McCOLGIN: As legislative history, yes,
- 20 Your Honor, because the 3501(c) was modeled on the D.C.
- 21 legislation, which established clearly a three-hour time
- 22 period. And the legislative history for that was very
- 23 clear that they intended to leave McNabb-Mallory in
- 24 effect outside that time period.
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

Τ	MR. McCOLGIN: No further questions? Thank
2	you, Your Honor.
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Dreeben.
4	ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL R. DREEBEN
5	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
6	MR. DREEBEN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
7	please the Court:
8	It's important in this case to go back and
9	look at the original Rule of Exclusion that this Court
10	developed in the McNabb case in 1943 and then reiterated
11	in the Mallory case in 1957. Both of those cases
12	considered a pre-Miranda regime in which there was no
13	constitutional law that required that a suspect be
14	advised of his rights.
15	Under Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of
16	Criminal Procedure and under statutes that preceded it
17	that were in effect at the time of McNabb, the only way
18	to ensure that a suspect was informed of his rights to
19	silence and counsel was to bring him before a
20	magistrate, and the magistrate would advise him of those
21	rights. This Court in McNabb and Mallory thus fashioned
22	a judicial rule of evidence, an exclusionary rule under
23	the Court's supervisory power not as an effectuation of
24	something that Congress specifically intended but of its
25	own force as a way to backstop the Rule 5 requirement.

- In the government's view, two acts that came
- 2 subsequently to McNabb and Mallory, section 3501 and
- 3 Rule 402 of the Federal Rules --
- 4 JUSTICE STEVENS: Let me just ask before you
- 5 get to those, Mr. Dreeben: Other than the McNabb-
- 6 Mallory Rule, what was available as a sanction for
- 7 violations of the rule of prompt presentment?
- 8 MR. DREEBEN: Justice Stevens, I am not sure
- 9 that there is any evidentiary sanction.
- 10 JUSTICE STEVENS: No, not -- apart from an
- 11 evidentiary sanction.
- 12 MR. DREEBEN: None has risen in the case law
- 13 that I can point Your Honor to. I think the primary
- 14 safeguard of the enforcement of Rule 5 is the obligation
- 15 that is placed on the government and on government
- 16 agents to comply with rules of criminal procedure that
- 17 are valid.
- 18 JUSTICE STEVENS: So at the time that
- 19 Mallory and McNabb were decided the Court thought that
- 20 an extra rule was necessary to give the government an
- 21 incentive to comply with prompt-presentment
- 22 requirements. The very same factors are still at work
- 23 today, aren't they?
- MR. DREEBEN: No, I don't think that they
- 25 are, Justice Stevens, because the -- the critical thing

- 1 that the Court was doing in Mallory and McNabb was
- 2 trying to come up with a way to ensure that suspects
- 3 were advised of their rights to protect against abuses
- 4 in the interrogation process. And the Court's ultimate
- 5 constitutional solution to that lay years in the future.
- 6 It came in the form of Miranda.
- 7 JUSTICE STEVENS: No, but I am not -- we are
- 8 not talking about a constitutional problem but a rule
- 9 problem encouraging compliance with the -- the -- with
- 10 the rule that requires prompt presentment.
- 11 MR. DREEBEN: I think that what the Court
- 12 was after-
- JUSTICE STEVENS: I say that to the extent
- 14 -- to the extent that was a motivating factor in McNabb,
- 15 it seems to me that it would be precisely the same
- 16 motivating factor in McNabb.
- 17 MR. DREEBEN: Well, I think that it was not
- 18 the sole motivating factor in McNabb.
- 19 JUSTICE STEVENS: Not the sole, but it was a
- 20 motivating factor. And it would have equal strength
- 21 today as then.
- 22 MR. DREEBEN: No, I would not agree that it
- 23 would have equal strength.
- 24 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Dreeben, wouldn't --
- 25 wouldn't you still have this disincentive which --

- 1 wouldn't you still have this disincentive, which is
- 2 considerable? If you -- if you exceed the time limit,
- 3 it may be taken into account in determining that the
- 4 confession was involuntary.
- 5 MR. DREEBEN: Well, certainly, Justice --
- 6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Isn't that enough of a
- 7 disincentive? If you delay too long, that delay is one
- 8 of the factors to be taken into account in deciding
- 9 whether the confession was voluntary.
- 10 MR. DREEBEN: Yes, excessive delay can be a
- 11 -- it is by statute a factor that will be taken into
- 12 account in determining --
- 13 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, what about Rule 5?
- 14 And Rule 5 doesn't say a word about voluntary. It says
- 15 unnecessary delay -- shall be brought before a
- 16 magistrate without unnecessary delay. So whatever the
- 17 balancing there may be in 3501, I think what you're
- 18 saying is that Rule 5(a), which just says bring
- 19 theoretically before a magistrate without unreasonable
- 20 delay, that that has no teeth; that that is effectively
- 21 unenforceable.
- MR. DREEBEN: I think it is unenforceable by
- 23 the exclusion of a confession that results from what a
- 24 court concludes is unnecessary delay. And I think that
- 25 that is true for two reasons, by virtue of congressional

- 1 action and rulemaking action. And I think that as an
- 2 additional actor this Court, which struck that
- 3 supervisory powered balance in a pre-Miranda era, would
- 4 do well to consider whether the factors that motivated
- 5 it to suppress confessions in McNabb and Mallory should
- 6 still be evaluated the same way today.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: But isn't your -- I'm
- 8 sorry.
- 9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Rule 5 is about
- 10 unnecessary delay, and here we have a case, if I
- 11 remember the facts right, where the officer said, yes,
- the reason we didn't bring him before a magistrate
- 13 sooner is because we wanted to get a confession from
- 14 him.
- 15 MR. DREEBEN: Justice Ginsburg, what
- 16 happened in this case is that the suspect was given his
- 17 Miranda rights and waived them and agreed to give a
- 18 confession. There are three circuits and the D.C. local
- 19 court which all have concluded that a waiver of Miranda
- 20 rights waives the right to prompt presentment. So the
- 21 question of whether there was in fact unnecessary delay
- 22 that would constitute a violation of Rule 5 has not been
- 23 litigated in this case.
- 24 JUSTICE SCALIA: I must be losing the thread
- 25 of the argument. It seems to me that McNabb and Mallory

- 1 only provide punishment for excessive delay where there
- 2 has been a confession. Isn't that right?
- MR. DREEBEN: That's correct.
- 4 JUSTICE SCALIA: And so long as the length
- of the -- the delay can still be considered as one of
- 6 the elements in determining that the confession -- that
- 7 the confession is involuntary, there is still a degree
- 8 of incentive based upon only the confession. Now, it --
- 9 it may not be as high a degree -- that it is
- 10 automatically excluded -- but the police are going to
- 11 have to consider that any confession they may get within
- 12 that period of excessive delay may be challengeable.
- 13 MR. DREEBEN: It is certainly challengeable
- 14 on voluntariness grounds. Now, the Court's motive-
- 15 JUSTICE STEVENS: It is still true they have
- 16 everything to gain and nothing to lose by continuing to
- 17 interrogate.
- MR. DREEBEN: Well, they do have something
- 19 --
- JUSTICE STEVENS: If they don't get the
- 21 confession within six hours, they haven't got it. So if
- 22 they continue on, their only purpose is to try to get a
- 23 voluntary confession.
- 24 MR. DREEBEN: Well, Justice Stevens, to the
- 25 extent that it is correct that a waiver of Miranda

- 1 rights waives the prompt presentment right and prevents
- 2 an objection based on whatever survives of
- 3 McNabb-Mallory, the officers are doing nothing wrong if
- 4 they obtain a valid Miranda waiver; and this was just
- 5 not a factor that the Court had on the horizon when it
- 6 decided McNabb and Mallory.
- 7 JUSTICE SOUTER: But isn't there a -- a new
- 8 factor now that the Court has decided Miranda? And
- 9 you've argued that we should regard this in the
- 10 post-Miranda light, but I think there is at least one
- 11 way of doing that that cuts against the government's
- 12 argument and I would like your response to that.
- 13 That is that in the post-Miranda world in
- 14 practical terms, if a -- if a court in considering a
- 15 suppression motion finds that the Miranda warnings were
- 16 given and that after they were given this individual
- 17 said, okay, I'll talk, that is in practical terms the
- 18 end of the issue. The notion that there is a -- an
- 19 independent voluntariness concern is pretty much theory,
- 20 not practice.
- 21 Given what I think is the, kind of the
- 22 real-world effect of Miranda -- say the magic words, get
- 23 the defendant to say, I'll talk, that's it -- doesn't it
- 24 make sense to have a further safeguard in something like
- 25 the six-hour rule understood as preserving

- 1 McNabb-Mallory after the six hours?
- MR. DREEBEN: Well, Justice Souter, I think
- 3 that is purely a question of policy of whether there
- 4 should be such a strong exclusionary rule that mandates
- 5 the barring from admission into evidence of a purely
- 6 voluntary confession where there's no dispute about its
- 7 voluntariness because the officers delayed beyond six
- 8 hours.
- JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, I agree with you; it
- 10 is an issue of policy. But I thought your whole
- 11 argument for considering this as a post-Miranda case was
- 12 in effect a -- a policy context in which you wanted us
- 13 to decide this.
- MR. DREEBEN: It's a policy context that I
- 15 think Congress has decided in two different enactments,
- 16 and I think that if this Court were to reach it as a
- 17 matter of policy, it should revisit the balance that it
- 18 reached in McNabb-Mallory because of the changed legal
- 19 context. But this is a case about section 3501 and
- 20 about Federal Rule of Evidence 402.
- 21 JUSTICE SCALIA: I knew you were going to
- 22 get to 3501 eventually.
- MR. DREEBEN: I am glad that I have finally
- 24 reached it.
- 25 (Laughter)

- 1 MR. DREEBEN: Section 3501 on its face says
- 2 nothing about excluding any evidence. What it says is
- 3 that in section (a) voluntary confessions are
- 4 admissible. In section (b) it says that in determining
- 5 voluntariness, a court will consider a variety of
- 6 factors under the totality of the circumstances,
- 7 including prearraignment delay. Then in subsection (c),
- 8 it attacks more directly the McNabb-Mallory rule. And
- 9 as originally formulated it would have wiped out
- 10 McNabb-Mallory altogether; there is no dispute about
- 11 that. After the bill was introduced there was a
- 12 modification of it on the floor of the Senate in which a
- 13 six-hour limitation was put in.
- Now, the effect of that six hours is to say
- 15 that within six hours after the arrest delay by itself
- 16 can never be an exclusive grounds for suppression; it
- 17 just can't. And to that extent it overrules
- 18 McNabb-Mallory to the extent that McNabb-Mallory would
- 19 have allowed less than six hours of delay to serve as a
- 20 basis for suppressing evidence. Outside of six hours,
- 21 it does not say that evidence is suppressed. It simply
- 22 leaves that determination to other sources of law.
- In the government's view, the primary source
- 24 of law that controls the answer to that question is
- 25 subsection (a), which says that voluntary confessions

- 1 are admissible, and I believe that, as Justice --
- 2 JUSTICE SOUTER: If that is the answer, why
- 3 do we need (c) -- I mean, why did Congress need (c) at
- 4 all?
- 5 MR. DREEBEN: Congress never needed (c); (c)
- 6 in the government's view was always superfluous, even at
- 7 the time when it directly said delays shall never be the
- 8 grounds for suppressing a confession. There was already
- 9 a provision in (a) that said voluntary confessions are
- 10 admissible and it was well understood that
- 11 McNabb-Mallory -- and this Court was very explicit on
- 12 the point -- excluded totally voluntary confessions.
- So if this Court has nothing before it but
- 14 the text of the statute, subsection (a) makes voluntary
- 15 confessions admissible, and the only way that Petitioner
- 16 can get around that is to say that section 3501(c)
- 17 carved something out of subsection (a).
- 18 JUSTICE STEVENS: But if it doesn't, Mr.
- 19 Dreeben, what do the words "time limitation" mean in the
- 20 proviso?
- 21 MR. DREEBEN: That's the limitation on a --
- 22 the period during which a court cannot rely exclusively
- 23 on delay within the meaning of the statute. It simply
- 24 -- it carves out six hours from McNabb-Mallory plus
- 25 reasonable transportation delays, and it leaves the

- 1 six-hour -- after the six-hour period to other sources
- 2 of law.
- Now, one source of law -- and this is where
- 4 Petitioner looks -- would be McNabb-Mallory. But
- 5 McNabb-Mallory is not a constitutional rule of decision.
- 6 This Court has been clear, most recently in the
- 7 Sanchez-Llamas decision, that it is a rule of
- 8 supervisory power created by this Court.
- 9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: You are really asking the
- 10 Court to overrule McNabb-Mallory, because you say
- 11 Congress provided six hours, no McNabb-Mallory, but
- 12 after six hours the test is voluntariness -- only
- 13 voluntariness. So there's nothing left under the
- 14 government's view of McNabb-Mallory.
- 15 MR. DREEBEN: That's correct, but the
- 16 modification, Justice Ginsburg, is that I think Congress
- 17 has displaced McNabb-Mallory. It obviously cannot
- 18 overrule a decision of this Court, but it can prescribe
- 19 a rule of law that takes precedence over a decision of
- 20 this Court that rests on its supervisory power.
- 21 Petitioner does not contend that
- 22 McNabb-Mallory was an interpretation of Rule 5 of the
- 23 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and I don't think
- 24 that he could do that. This Court was explicit that the
- 25 predecessor statute that existed before Rule 5 and

- 1 provided the prompt presentment requirement did not
- 2 address the issue of remedy.
- And it's notable I think that in the
- 4 preliminary draft of the Rules of Criminal Procedure a
- 5 rule of exclusion was explicitly provided. The rule
- 6 would have said: "No statement made by a defendant in
- 7 response to interrogation by an officer or agent of the
- 8 government shall be admissible in evidence against him
- 9 if the interrogation occurs while the defendant was held
- 10 in custody in violation of this rule."
- 11 JUSTICE BREYER: What is the -- what if the
- 12 other reasons apply? I take it the words
- 13 "self-incriminating statement" in (e) means any adverse
- 14 evidence?
- 15 MR. DREEBEN: I think that's right,
- 16 Justice Breyer.
- 17 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. Now, there are a lot
- 18 of reasons we exclude evidence. You know, I mean -- it
- 19 might, for example, might not in the circumstance be
- 20 worth the confusion. It might not in the circumstance
- 21 be worth the time. It might violate -- I don't know,
- there is like a whole -- there are many reasons.
- So in your opinion, does section (a) mean to
- 24 set aside all the reasons? In other words, if for some
- 25 other reason this particular piece of self-incriminating

- 1 evidence, adverse evidence obtained after 30 hours,
- 2 violated the admission, violated some totally different
- 3 rule of evidence, as your opinion does (a) mean, judge,
- 4 it doesn't matter if it's triple hearsay or it doesn't
- 5 matter if it violates some authentication requirement,
- 6 it doesn't matter if it violates, you know, it has to be
- 7 relevant, pertinent, not a waste of time -- it doesn't
- 8 matter; admit it?
- 9 MR. DREEBEN: No, Justice Breyer.
- 10 JUSTICE BREYER: No, of course it doesn't
- 11 mean that.
- MR. DREEBEN: If the --
- 13 JUSTICE BREYER: So if it doesn't mean that,
- 14 then why does it mean that we should ignore this other
- 15 rule of evidence contained in Rule 5 of the Federal
- 16 Rules of Civil Procedure?
- 17 MR. DREEBEN: Well, that's precisely my
- 18 point, Justice Breyer. The other rules that might
- 19 permit exclusion of a voluntary confession in the Rules
- 20 of Evidence are explicit, or they are there because the
- 21 courts interpreted that rule to require it. That's not
- what happened in McNabb-Mallory, and I don't think
- 23 that --
- 24 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, there are -- there
- 25 are, in other words, as you have heard, a number of

- 1 things that can happen when you hold a person, let's say
- 2 for 40 hours for 29. I mean, one thing that happens is
- 3 he doesn't learn how he gets out on bail. Another thing
- 4 he happens, he doesn't learn exactly what the charge is
- 5 against him. Another thing -- they are all listed in,
- 6 in Rule 5.
- 7 And -- and when you have an exclusionary
- 8 rule, you enforce not only what you are talking about,
- 9 which I understand, which is the voluntariness part, but
- 10 you also enforce all these other things that happen when
- 11 you bring a person before a magistrate and don't keep
- 12 him for 70 hours or something.
- So why should we interpret (a) as setting
- 14 those other things aside and requiring us to overturn
- 15 McNabb and Mallory?
- 16 MR. DREEBEN: Well, McNabb and Mallory are
- 17 not constitutional decisions of this Court.
- JUSTICE BREYER: No, of course not.
- 19 MR. DREEBEN: They were attempts to
- 20 effectuate a particular policy choice. That policy
- 21 choice was one that Congress was free to revisit, and I
- 22 submit it did revisit in two different provisions, one
- 23 in 3501(a) and the other in Federal Rule of Evidence
- 24 402.
- 25 JUSTICE BREYER: Did it say anything in the

- 1 legislative history, which interests me, that the
- 2 purpose of (a) is to overturn Mallory and McNabb?
- MR. DREEBEN: No, Justice Breyer, and I will
- 4 concede to you the legislative history on the point that
- 5 section (a) was considered to overrule Miranda and
- 6 subsection (c) was addressed to McNabb-Mallory.
- 7 JUSTICE ALITO: Mr. Dreeben, Justice Breyer
- 8 suggested that there are rules of evidence other than
- 9 those based on the Constitution or McNabb-Mallory that
- 10 might result in the exclusion of a confession. Maybe
- 11 there are such rules, but I'm trying to think of them.
- 12 I can't think of what they might be. Certainly it's not
- 13 hearsay. Is it ever going to be ruled to be irrelevant?
- 14 Is it common for a confession to be excluded under Rule
- 15 403? Are there rules that would --
- 16 MR. DREEBEN: I think in theory Rule 403 is
- 17 such a rule. Rule 16, which requires discovery
- 18 obligations, contains its own authorization for an
- 19 exclusionary rule. And my answer to Justice Breyer on
- 20 those rules is that they are explicitly provided by
- 21 Congress. The difference in a Rule 5 --
- JUSTICE ALITO: Are you familiar with cases
- in which a defendant's confession has been excluded
- 24 under -- under 403?
- MR. DREEBEN: No, Justice Alito.

JUSTICE BREYER: I wasn't focusing on the

- word "confession." I was focusing on the words in (e),
 which were "any self-incriminating statement." And
 - 4 that's why I asked you if you interpreted that to
 - 5 include anything that the individual said after, say,
 - 6 29 hours that might turn out to be adverse to that
 - 7 defendant's interests. And your answer to that was yes.
 - 8 MR. DREEBEN: Yes.
 - 9 JUSTICE BREYER: And I think you are right.
- 10 I think we agree on that.

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- 11 So, if the defendant said, if you look under
- 12 the rock you will find the writing such-and-such, it
- 13 might not be authenticated for that particular writing.
- 14 There are many reasons. It might be triple hearsay,
- 15 what he says. I mean, you know, there are a variety of
- 16 things, aren't there? Maybe I am wrong.
- 17 MR. DREEBEN: I think the general principle
- 18 is what the Court ought to be focused on here. And the
- 19 general principle is, yes, if there is some specific
- 20 provision that should be together with subsection (a) --
- 21 JUSTICE BREYER: The reason I brought that
- 22 up is not to be technical. The reason I brought it up
- 23 is to point out that there are many, many words that a
- 24 person could utter in confinement under 30 hours, which
- 25 in a variety of ways could stab him in the back without

- 1 it having anything to do with Miranda, without it having
- 2 anything to do with coerced confession.
- And similarly, there are many reasons for
- 4 bringing him forward that have nothing to do with
- 5 either. And therefore, I wonder if all those reasons
- 6 could support retaining McNabb-Mallory, a matter about
- 7 which Congress said nothing.
- 8 MR. DREEBEN: I think it would be quite
- 9 extraordinary for the Court to decide to revive its
- 10 supervisory power decisions in McNabb and Mallory. They
- 11 clearly were aimed at the problem of incommunicado
- 12 detention with a suspect who did not know his Miranda
- 13 rights.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Dreeben, I tend to
- 15 think that what we should be focusing on is the language
- 16 of 3501. Can I bring you back to that? What I do not
- 17 understand about your argument is the following: The
- 18 six -- the six-hour safe harbor applies only when the
- 19 confession is made voluntarily, right?
- I would think that the proviso likewise
- 21 assumes voluntariness. That is, the time limitation
- 22 contained in this subsection, it's a time limitation
- 23 applicable to voluntary confessions. And it says that
- 24 time limitation shall not apply in any case in which the
- 25 delay in bringing the person is beyond six hours is

- 1 found by the trial judge to be reasonable.
- 2 I think you have already voluntariness
- 3 assumed in the proviso, but you want us to go back and
- 4 re -- reconsider voluntariness under (a). I just don't
- 5 think that's -- that's a fair way to read it.
- 6 MR. DREEBEN: I think the statute, as we
- 7 read it, contains some overlap in voluntariness
- 8 requirement, and we interpret the voluntariness
- 9 reference in subsection (c) to really mean otherwise
- 10 voluntary; in other words, not to be deemed involuntary
- 11 solely on the basis of delay, but otherwise voluntary.
- 12 And in that sense section 3501(c) does
- 13 contain --
- 14 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, I am reading it that
- 15 way, too. Otherwise voluntary is in the safe harbor.
- MR. DREEBEN: Right.
- 17 JUSTICE SCALIA: Then when you have a
- 18 proviso, which refers to the time limitation contained
- 19 in this subsection, it's a time limitation upon
- 20 voluntary confessions.
- 21 MR. DREEBEN: It's a -- it's a limitation on
- 22 the time during which a judge may not rely on delay
- 23 alone to find a confession inadmissible. That's all
- 24 subsection (c) does. It says, judge, you may not find
- 25 the confession to be inadmissible solely because of

- 1 delay if it's within six hours plus reasonable
- 2 transportation delays.
- 3 And our interpretation of that language is
- 4 that the inadmissibility as you mentioned,
- 5 Justice Scalia, refers back to subsection (a), which
- 6 speaks about confessions that are admissible if they are
- 7 voluntarily given.
- 8 JUSTICE SOUTER: Then why didn't the statute
- 9 say, instead of saying inadmissible, shall not be found
- 10 involuntary solely by reasons of delay. Because it
- 11 seems to me that your argument twain the two.
- MR. DREEBEN: It is, and I think the reason
- 13 that it was written that way, Justice Souter, is it was
- 14 a direct attempt to make clear that McNabb-Mallory shall
- 15 not operate in the six-hour period after arrests and
- 16 before presentment.
- 17 It was an attempt to displace McNabb-Mallory
- 18 explicitly. Originally it was to displace it
- 19 altogether. As it ended up being written, it displaced
- 20 it for six hours. And our submission is that you read
- 21 the rest of the statute to determine what happens to
- 22 confessions that are taken outside of six hours. And I
- 23 would recognize that this makes subsection (c) in
- 24 certain respects unnecessary to achieve the result that
- 25 voluntariness controls.

- 1 But the most that Petitioner argues and he
- 2 made it very clear today, the most that he argues is
- 3 that section 3501(c) leaves McNabb-Mallory to live
- 4 another day for confessions outside of six hours. And
- 5 if that is true, then the government's position is that
- 6 Congress, in 1975 in Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of
- 7 Evidence provided the bases on which relevant evidence
- 8 can be excluded. And it listed four sources and they
- 9 are the Constitution, an act of Congress, a rule of
- 10 evidence, or -- and this is the relevant one -- other
- 11 rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
- 12 statutory authority.
- And what Congress meant by that were rules
- 14 that this Court promulgates pursuant to Rules Enabling
- 15 Act authority. It did not --
- 16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: That's Rule 5.
- 17 MR. DREEBEN: No. Rule 5 it certainly
- 18 prescribed pursuant to Rules Enabling Act authority,
- 19 although it was originally enacted by Congress. But
- 20 Rule 5 contains no exclusionary rule.
- 21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And as you have said
- 22 without the exclusionary rule, Rule 5(a) has no teeth at
- 23 all. And I agree with that. It says -- it's a straight
- 24 out command, no unnecessary delay. And isn't the reason
- 25 for 5(a) exactly what happened here? This was a case

- 1 where the police officers were trying to admit that the
- 2 sole reason that they didn't bring Corley before a
- 3 magistrate properly was to extract a confession.
- 4 MR. DREEBEN: Justice Ginsburg --
- 5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: That's exactly what
- 6 McNabb-Mallory was trying to --
- 7 MR. DREEBEN: There is a crucial difference
- 8 between this Court deciding that there is a command in
- 9 the Rules of Criminal Procedure and we as a court are
- 10 going to back it up by an enforcement mechanism, which
- 11 is the supervisory power route, and Congress saying what
- 12 we intend is that a violation of this rule produced
- inadmissibility of a confession. Congress has never
- 14 said the latter. This Court, in promulgating rules of
- 15 evidence, have never said the latter.
- 16 And what that leaves the Court with is the
- option of persisting in McNabb-Mallory as a supervisory
- 18 powers decision or following the text of Rule 402 of the
- 19 Federal Rules of Evidence, which says that there isn't
- 20 any authority to say that relevant evidence is out of
- 21 the case simply because of the Court's views on
- 22 supervisory powers --
- JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Dreeben, do you think
- 24 the Rule 402 argument is strong enough to prevail even
- 25 section -- the statute that has never been enacted?

1	MR. DREEBEN: Yes, I do, Justice Stevens.
2	JUSTICE STEVENS: The statute was really
3	unnecessary to overrule McNabb-Mallory, in your view?
4	MR. DREEBEN: Well, Congress focused on the
5	problem of confessions in section 3501 and it dealt with
6	McNabb-Mallory in section 3501(c). We submit that the
7	text of the statute provides an answer to McNabb-Mallory
8	in section 3501(a).
9	JUSTICE STEVENS: But it is superfluous and
LO	unnecessary answer if your interpretation of the rules
L1	is correct?
L2	MR. DREEBEN: It came many years before,
L3	Justice Stevens. In 1968 when Congress reacted to this
L4	Court's Miranda decision and to McNabb-Mallory, it
L5	passed section 3501. Rule 402 is a very general rule
L6	that says the policy of the federal courts is that we
L7	are not going to have evidence rules made any more by
L8	case-by-case decision by the Supreme Court. We are
L9	going to have them promulgated in a code of Federal
20	rules, and if the Court wants to change them, it can do
21	that through the revisory committee process, and it
22	would be open to Congress at any point, which has
23	superior ability to gather facts and to survey the
24	impact of whether there is a pattern of violations of
25	rule 5 that warrants the very strong

1	JUSTICE STEVENS: We could never acknowledge
2	or recognize a new privilege, then, for example
3	MR. DREEBEN: No.
4	JUSTICE STEVENS: psychiatrists or
5	something like that?
6	MR. DREEBEN: No, I think the Court did that
7	and quite properly did it, Justice Stevens, because rule
8	502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 501 or 502 says
9	that principles of privilege shall be developed in light
10	of reason and experience, and so it was a specific grant
11	to this Court of the authority to do that.
12	But beyond that Congress did not intend that
13	the Court use supervisory powers to exclude relevant
14	evidence. There is a rulemaking process; if the bench
15	and bar want to get together and conclude as they did
16	not conclude in 1943 this is the point I was trying
17	to make to Justice Breyer in 1943 after this Court's
18	decision in McNabb, there was explicit consideration of
19	an exclusionary rule provision in rule 5; it engendered
20	enormous controversy; it was rejected; it was taken out
21	of the rule and it was never promulgated.
22	So McNabb-Mallory exists not by virtue of
23	the rulemaking process but by virtue of a supervisory
24	decision of this Court more than half a century ago in
25	an entirely different legal climate, in a climate where

- 1 the costs of excluding a reliable, probative confession
- 2 were not balanced against the benefits, if any, to be
- 3 achieved by enforcing of a prompt present requirement
- 4 through exclusion.
- 5 Since that time this Court's Miranda
- 6 jurisprudence has made it far more inappropriate for the
- 7 Court to conclude that the enforcement of a rule-based
- 8 mechanism which serves as a prophylactic to protect
- 9 voluntariness should now result in exclusion of a
- 10 confession when rule 501 says voluntary confessions come
- in and section -- and rule 402 says that relevant
- 12 evidence comes in unless excluded by four sources --
- 13 not-
- 14 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is there any indication
- 15 of the rules advisory committee, any of their notes,
- 16 that 402 was meant to overturn McNabb-Mallory?
- 17 MR. DREEBEN: No, I -- Justice Ginsburg, the
- 18 rules advisory committee notes I think reflect an
- 19 expectation that McNabb-Mallory was the law. Our
- 20 submission is that the text of 402 is simply
- 21 inconsistent with that, because it is quite explicit in
- 22 limiting the sources of rules that can bar the admission
- of admissible evidence; and the phrase that is in 402,
- 24 which is on page 29 of our brief, is "rules prescribed
- 25 by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority."

- 1 Now the advisory committee drafters may have
- 2 thought that that subsumed rule 5, but I think that is a
- 3 legal question for this Court, and the correct answer to
- 4 that is McNabb-Mallory is a rule of supervisory power,
- 5 not a rule promulgated by this Court.
- 6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Mr.
- 7 Dreeben.
- 8 MR. DREEBEN: Thank you.
- 9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. McColgin, you
- 10 have four minutes.
- 11 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF DAVID L. McCOLGIN
- 12 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
- MR. McCOLGIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
- Rule 402 as it was enacted clearly was not
- 15 intended to overturn existing rules of inadmissibility
- 16 such as McNabb-Mallory. We know that because the
- 17 advisory committee notes specifically identify it as a
- 18 rule of inadmissibility that would survive after rule
- 19 402. It was --
- 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, it may not
- 21 have been intended to do that but doesn't its language
- 22 on its face cover that?
- MR. McCOLGIN: Not at all, because it was
- 24 statutorily based and it was viewed as being statutorily
- 25 based, because it was it was based on the existing

- 1 statutes at the time of McNabb which were seen as
- 2 precluding presentment delay. And then after the
- 3 enactment of -- of rule 5, it was seen as based on that
- 4 as well.
- 5 After -- in 1968 Mallory was also seen as
- 6 being incorporated into 3501(c) which is clear from the
- 7 citation in the advisory note to both Mallory and
- 8 3501(c). So it was viewed when it was enacted as
- 9 leaving in place McNabb-Mallory, because McNabb-Mallory
- 10 was viewed as being pursuant to statutory authority --
- 11 pursuant to statutory authority because it was enforcing
- 12 statutory rights.
- So rule 402 clearly does not in any way
- 14 overturn McNabb-Mallory.
- 15 I would like to address very quickly the
- 16 Miranda issue and note that you know, certainly,
- 17 although Miranda came into effect after McNabb-Mallory,
- 18 Miranda itself in rule 32 notes that the existence of
- 19 the Miranda warnings should not be seen as a basis for
- 20 disregarding the rights under McNabb and Mallory and the
- 21 importance of that exclusionary rule. So Miranda itself
- 22 recognized that it was still important to have a
- 23 protection against presentment delay, and I think the
- 24 facts of this case illustrate that very well.
- We have in this case a flagrant and

- 1 deliberate violation of the right of prompt presentment,
- 2 where the agents admitted freely that they delayed the
- 3 presentment in order to obtain the confession. If --
- 4 again, if the Third Circuit were to be affirmed in this
- 5 case, it would be telling law enforcement around the
- 6 country that that sort of flagrant conduct is
- 7 permissible.
- 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but that --
- 9 that sort of flagrant conduct would not be an issue if
- 10 it had been done within six hours, right? Assuming it
- 11 was a voluntary confession?
- 12 MR. McCOLGIN: That's correct.
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The purpose of the
- 14 law enforcement officers, if it's voluntary, is
- 15 irrelevant under six hours.
- 16 MR. McCOLGIN: As long as it is under six
- 17 hours, that's correct, there is no problem; and that's
- 18 because within six hours there is no delay. Congress
- 19 has determined that anything less than six hours is not
- 20 within --
- 21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, doesn't it
- 22 seem odd that the focus on flagrant conduct at 6:01 as
- 23 being as important as you are emphasizing, but not --
- 24 but totally irrelevant at 5:59?
- MR. McCOLGIN: There has to be line-drawing

- 1 in this sort of case, so when you get close to the line,
- 2 you may have results that are dramatically different.
- 3 In this case we are far outside the line. The second
- 4 confession was 26 and a half hours after the arrest; and
- 5 as I have noted and as this Court has noted, it was a
- 6 deliberate delay for the purpose of obtaining the
- 7 confessions.
- Where we have such purposeful delay,
- 9 Congress left McNabb-Mallory in place to address
- 10 precisely such flagrant conduct.
- 11 JUSTICE ALITO: Can you waive the right, the
- 12 5(a) right?
- MR. McCOLGIN: Yes, Your Honor, as long as
- 14 it is waived within the six-hour time period, and as
- 15 long as it is an expressed waiver of a right to prompt
- 16 presentment, it can be waived. In this case, of course,
- 17 there was no waiver; there wasn't even a Miranda waiver
- 18 until well -- well after the six hours.
- 19 If there is no further questions, thank you,
- 20 Your Honor.
- 21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- 22 The case is submitted.
- 23 (Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the case in the
- 24 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

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