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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (11:00 a.m.)

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear  
4 argument next this morning in Case 11-9953,  
5 Boyer v. Louisiana.

6 Mr. Bourke?

7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF RICHARD BOURKE

8 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

9 MR. BOURKE: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it  
10 please the Court:

11 The Louisiana Court of Appeal in this case  
12 correctly found that the majority of the delay -- the  
13 seven-year delay was caused by the lack of funding, but,  
14 when moving to assess that cause under Barker,  
15 incorrectly determined that it was a cause beyond the  
16 control of the State and, adopting its earlier ruling  
17 under the State statute, found that it was a cause  
18 beyond the control of the State, in the sense that it  
19 was beyond the control of the local district attorney's  
20 office.

21 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Bourke, was -- was it  
22 within the control of your client?

23 MR. BOURKE: He was unable to fund himself,  
24 Your Honor. That is why he asked for the appointment of  
25 counsel.

1 JUSTICE SCALIA: Was he unable to get his  
2 Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial?

3 MR. BOURKE: Yes.

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why?

5 MR. BOURKE: That is -- he was unable to  
6 move forward to trial because he was not provided with  
7 counsel adequately funded to advance the --

8 JUSTICE SCALIA: He had -- he had one  
9 counsel, right? During the whole time?

10 MR. BOURKE: In fact, in a sense, Your  
11 Honor, he had two counsel.

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes. For part of it, he  
13 had two, and then there was not enough funding for the  
14 second, okay? So he was faced with a choice.

15 Louisiana, as I understand it, has adopted a  
16 provision, which the Sixth Amendment does not require.  
17 The Sixth Amendment just requires counsel, but Louisiana  
18 says, in capital cases, we are going to provide two  
19 counsel, and you can't go to trial until you have two  
20 counsel, okay?

21 MR. BOURKE: No, Your Honor --

22 JUSTICE SCALIA: No?

23 MR. BOURKE: -- that is not correct. That  
24 is not the State of Louisiana law.

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: What is the State of

1 Louisiana law?

2 MR. BOURKE: Louisiana absolutely does not  
3 provide a right to two counsel in capital cases. The  
4 Louisiana Supreme Court, in Rule 31, provided that the  
5 court should appoint two counsel, but, also, it provided  
6 expressly that that created no procedural or substantive  
7 right.

8 Similarly, there is no right --

9 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, I don't -- I don't  
10 understand that. That's not Louisiana law that you --  
11 that you can't proceed without two counsel? That's not  
12 the law in Louisiana? I thought that's --

13 MR. BOURKE: That is not the law in  
14 Louisiana.

15 JUSTICE SCALIA: I -- you don't consider  
16 supreme court rules to be law?

17 MR. BOURKE: It is a supreme court rule  
18 which directs the trial judge to appoint two counsel.  
19 However, it makes it clear --

20 JUSTICE SCALIA: Is it the fact that, in  
21 Louisiana, you cannot proceed to trial in a capital  
22 case, unless there are two counsel?

23 MR. BOURKE: No, Your Honor. That is not  
24 the --

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: Then -- then you don't have

1 a case. You should have proceeded to trial.

2 MR. BOURKE: No, Your Honor. In -- in this  
3 case, as the court of appeal correctly found, Mr. Boyer  
4 did not have adequate funding for the case to go to  
5 trial. The court of appeal did not predicate that on  
6 the need for two counsel. The motion to determine  
7 source of funds was not predicated on Rule 31.

8 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The one -- the one  
9 counsel who was qualified, what was his name?

10 MR. BOURKE: Mr. Lorenzi was lead certified  
11 counsel.

12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Lorenzi, yes. He was  
13 only one at the time who was qualified to be lead  
14 counsel?

15 MR. BOURKE: Correct.

16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And the Louisiana Supreme  
17 Court said, you don't have to do this. You're his --  
18 you're his attorney, but you have a right to be paid,  
19 and the State has to pay you.

20 So there was no obligation on the counsel's  
21 part to do anything; and he kept asking, please have a  
22 funding order, let me be paid, and I'll do my job.

23 MR. BOURKE: Yes, Mr. Lorenzi declined to  
24 pay for Mr. Boyer's defense out of his own pocket.

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: Wasn't there, at all times,

1 one counsel who was being paid by the State?

2 MR. BOURKE: There was --

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: At all times?

4 MR. BOURKE: There was, at all times, one  
5 counsel appointed as associate counsel, that is for the  
6 purpose of assisting Mr. Lorenzi as lead counsel.

7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Was that counsel qualified  
8 enough under our constitutional Sixth Amendment  
9 jurisprudence?

10 MR. BOURKE: Well, I don't understand the --  
11 the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to place --

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well --

13 MR. BOURKE: -- a qualification minimum, so  
14 I'm not sure I'm understanding your question.

15 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, the question is would  
16 only lead counsel under -- under the supreme court's  
17 rule qualify as competent counsel, for purposes of  
18 complying with the constitutional requirement? Or would  
19 this certified second chair qualify?

20 MR. BOURKE: The -- there is no -- I'm  
21 having trouble answering the question, Justice Scalia,  
22 because the two things don't talk to each other. The  
23 Sixth Amendment doesn't impose a certification  
24 requirement.

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: Exactly. I'm just saying

1 can you establish that the one counsel that your client  
2 had throughout this whole -- whole proceeding would not  
3 satisfy the constitutional requirement?

4 Can you -- is there any basis for your  
5 saying that?

6 MR. BOURKE: Yes, Your Honor.

7 JUSTICE SCALIA: What?

8 MR. BOURKE: The court of appeal twice  
9 found -- knowing that associate counsel had been  
10 appointed, the court of appeal twice found that the case  
11 could not proceed due to a lack of adequate funding, and  
12 the State --

13 JUSTICE SCALIA: Not because of a Federal  
14 constitutional reason. The court found, you are not  
15 complying with the supreme court rule. You can't  
16 proceed without complying with the supreme court rule.

17 It seems to me your client was faced with a  
18 choice: You could either demand what Louisiana, in its  
19 generosity, has given to capital defendants, namely, the  
20 right to two counsel -- whether it's by statute or by  
21 supreme court rule, it doesn't matter -- you could either  
22 demand that right; or you could demand your right to a  
23 speedy trial. That was your choice.

24 And it seems to me what counsel chose was to  
25 insist, all along, I want my right to two -- to two



1 counsel. You didn't have to --

2 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Bourke, did anyone --

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- you didn't have to take  
4 that right. You could have gone to the -- to the  
5 supreme court and said -- you know, since it's taking so  
6 long, I demand my constitutional right to a speedy  
7 trial. But you didn't do that.

8 MR. BOURKE: Your Honor, if Mr. Boyer had  
9 been brought into court and had been told, we've got  
10 associate counsel here; they are qualified in the sense  
11 that they are barred in Louisiana, and they can take  
12 your case to trial and move it forward now.

13 But, if you wait, we might have funding for  
14 another lawyer here, who will join him, is more senior  
15 and experienced and will double your firepower. You can  
16 choose, Mr. Boyer, do you want to go ahead now with this  
17 guy? Or do you want to wait?

18 In that circumstance, there would not be an  
19 invidious choice between the right to counsel and the  
20 right to speedy trial. It would be, we are giving you  
21 constitutionally adequate counsel, and you can wait for  
22 better, if you wish to.

23 But that is not what occurred here. And,  
24 Justice Scalia, the --

25 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Can you -- can you tell me

1     why that is not what occurred here?

2                   MR. BOURKE:  Because the funding problem did  
3     not exist solely around Mr. Lorenzi's overhead and  
4     expenditure.  There was no money for investigation.  
5     There was no money for experts.  And the associate  
6     counsel who had been appointed had been appointed solely  
7     and for the limited purpose as an assistant to  
8     Mr. Lorenzi, not to conduct the case in his own right.

9                   If this issue had been raised in the trial  
10    court, this would have been clearly explained into this  
11    record.  It wasn't.  But the trial court and the  
12    appellate court of -- the court of appeal -- Third  
13    Circuit in Louisiana knew and understood that there was  
14    no investigative funding.  There was no expert funding.  
15    There had been an assistant.

16                   This isn't the case where there was a lawyer  
17    appointed and they were waiting for the second lawyer.  
18    It's a case where they'd found an assistant and were  
19    waiting for the first lawyer.

20                   CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:  How much money would  
21    be needed for investigation and experts before you would  
22    acknowledge that that would be competent representation?

23                   MR. BOURKE:  That's a very case-specific  
24    determination, Your Honor and, in Louisiana, at that  
25    time, rested with a judicial determination that the

1     investigative or expert expenses were reasonably  
2     necessary to ensure a fair trial within the meaning of  
3     the Due Process Clause.

4                 So it -- it was a funding level tagged to  
5     the constitutional minimum of due process.

6                 JUSTICE SCALIA:  Of course, a finding by the  
7     district court -- or whichever court found it, that  
8     there was not enough money to pay counsel, to  
9     investigate, and to -- to do whatever else -- buy  
10    stamps -- is not a finding by the district court that  
11    there was not enough money to investigate and to buy  
12    stamps.

13                Counsel was a part of that mix.  You never  
14    had a finding that there was not enough money to pay  
15    counsel, right?  Or -- I'm sorry -- that there was not  
16    enough money to allow the counsel that has been  
17    appointed to investigate and buy stamps.

18                Was there ever any such finding?

19                MR. BOURKE:  There was never --

20                JUSTICE SCALIA:  The -- the big tag item  
21    was -- was paying counsel; wasn't it?

22                MR. BOURKE:  No, Your Honor.  That was one  
23    of the big tag items.  But, in a capital case, the  
24    investigation of both the guilt phase and the full  
25    mitigation and life investigation, along with the use of

1 potential expert witnesses, particularly in the case  
2 where there were all the indications of mental health  
3 problems and the like, are often equal to or, in some  
4 cases, greater than the cost of counsel.

5 And so, no, the big -- the big tag item  
6 wasn't just Mr. Lorenzi's overhead and expenses. The  
7 big tag item was providing adequate funding. And to  
8 return to your earlier point, Justice Scalia, just to --  
9 to make it clear, the Louisiana Supreme Court cases,  
10 which mandate that a case cannot go forward without  
11 counsel, do not reference Rule 31 at all, or two  
12 counsel.

13 They are cases which stand for the  
14 proposition that the case cannot go forward without  
15 constitutionally adequate counsel, counsel who can  
16 provide reasonably effective assistance.

17 This case began in 2002. At that point, the  
18 controlling Louisiana decision on not moving forward  
19 without effective assistance was Peart -- P-e-a-r-t --  
20 which we cite in our brief, which said that the court  
21 will not allow a case to proceed without reasonably  
22 effective counsel.

23 During the life of this case -- sorry.

24 JUSTICE BREYER: Your -- your point of view  
25 in this case --

1 MR. BOURKE: Yes, sir.

2 JUSTICE BREYER: In your point of view,  
3 would it satisfy you if we say, the Louisiana court of  
4 appeal found the largest part of the delay involved the  
5 funding crisis experienced by the State of Louisiana --  
6 that meant giving you adequate money for counsel.

7 Then they said, the progression of the  
8 prosecution was out of the State's control, as  
9 determined by this court, which I think referred to that  
10 funding crisis. And we could -- and your view would be  
11 that's what they said. We don't know the underlying  
12 facts, but that's what they said.

13 And, insofar as they said that the State  
14 wasn't responsible for that part of the delay that they  
15 are talking about, they're wrong because the State is  
16 responsible for not providing enough money, even if it's  
17 a problem and to say they weren't responsible is wrong,  
18 okay? That's what you want us to say?

19 MR. BOURKE: Yes, Your Honor.

20 JUSTICE BREYER: Period. And send it back.

21 MR. BOURKE: Well, Your Honor --

22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: You would like us to say  
23 what Judge Cook said in -- in her opinion, that  
24 responsibility for funding rests with the State, not  
25 with the defendant.

1           Once an attorney is appointed, it is the  
2   State's obligation to ensure that adequate funds are  
3   available for the defense. And I take "for the defense"  
4   to mean not simply counsel, but the witnesses, the --  
5   the investigation.

6           It is certainly true that none of the delay  
7   due to the lack of funds was, in any way, attributable  
8   to the defense. That's, essentially, what you would  
9   like us to say?

10           MR. BOURKE: That is what Judge Cook said  
11   and --

12           JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't think it's enough  
13   that none of the delay was attributable to the defense.  
14   The defense has to complain, has to demand its right to  
15   a prompt trial.

16           What did your client do? Frankly, I -- I am  
17   skeptical that a capital defendant who has already  
18   confessed to the crime wants to be tried as soon as  
19   possible. I'm skeptical about that.

20           Now, what -- what did your client do to  
21   demand his right to a prompt trial?

22           MR. BOURKE: Your Honor, what Mr. Boyer did  
23   was act, at all times, in full compliance with the  
24   procedural mechanisms set up in Louisiana for doing  
25   that.

1           At arraignment -- he -- he had already  
2   identified he was indigent and asked for counsel. At  
3   arraignment, he requested a jury trial.

4           JUSTICE SCALIA: Right.

5           MR. BOURKE: His lawyer was appointed, and  
6   his lawyer immediately identified the funding problem  
7   and said, we need money, or we can't go forward.  
8   Louisiana statute bars counsel from filing a motion for  
9   speedy trial without an affidavit saying, you're ready  
10  to go forward. Louisiana has said, in Article 7 --

11          JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, that's -- surely,  
12  that's unconstitutional. Did counsel say, I demand a  
13  speedy trial? You can't condition my right to a speedy  
14  trial upon my getting some affidavit or something.

15          MR. BOURKE: It's a procedural rule, Your  
16  Honor.

17          JUSTICE SCALIA: I'm still waiting for --  
18  for anybody telling the court, I demand a speedy trial,  
19  and, if I don't get a speedy trial, you are violating  
20  the Constitution, and I ought to go scot-free.

21          MR. BOURKE: Well, Your Honor, the rule I am  
22  referring to is a procedural rule. It does not, in any  
23  way, limit the relief from a speedy trial, but you can't  
24  move for a speedy trial. You can move to quash because  
25  you have been denied one, but you can't move for one.

1                   It's exactly what this Court referred to  
2   in --

3                   JUSTICE ALITO:   Isn't it true that you  
4   waited three years before doing that?

5                   MR. BOURKE:   That was the first point at  
6   which, under Louisiana procedure, he had a remedy  
7   available, exactly as Judge Cook stated in her  
8   abstaining opinion.   That was when he could move to  
9   quash.   He could not move for a speedy trial in a valid  
10   motion for speedy trial, without having an affidavit  
11   saying, we are ready to go.

12                  Louisiana has passed that rule to stop pro  
13   forma requests for speedy trial.

14                  JUSTICE GINSBURG:   Can we clarify one point?  
15   Justice Scalia said something about a defendant facing  
16   the death penalty going "scot-free."   There was an armed  
17   robbery charge that was added in 2007.

18                  Do you dispute that a new clock started in  
19   2007, the first time that the robbery charge was -- was  
20   made?

21                  MR. BOURKE:   We do, Your Honor.   That armed  
22   robbery charge is a lesser included offense of the  
23   first-degree murder count.   Mr. Boyer was originally  
24   indicted on first-degree murder, which, in Louisiana, is  
25   intentional killing during the course of an armed



1 robbery -- there are other varieties, of course -- but  
2 intentional killing during an armed robbery. And those  
3 are the elements of first-degree murder.

4           The State unpacked those two elements -- or  
5 two lesser included offenses, to second-degree murder,  
6 which is intentional killing, and armed robbery. And  
7 the State, in fact, conceded that, had the charge  
8 remained a first-degree murder charge, then the armed  
9 robbery charge would have created a double jeopardy  
10 problem.

11           And that's at page 3703 to '4 of the record,  
12 where counsel for the State indicated that the armed  
13 robbery charge could be added because the primary  
14 charge, the -- the first-degree murder, had been dropped  
15 to second-degree murder, and specifically said,  
16 Mr Bourke is correct, that, had we filed for  
17 first-degree murder, there may be double jeopardy  
18 problems.

19           But, because they had unpacked that charge  
20 from murder and armed robbery down to murder and, also,  
21 armed robbery, there was no double jeopardy problem.  
22 That is what --

23           JUSTICE KENNEDY: What about -- what about  
24 the basic problem in this case, as I understand the  
25 question presented, is should the State be responsible

1    when the funding problem is at a local level?

2                   So suppose you have a State that says -- you  
3    know, we have had problems in funding; if we give this  
4    to the counties, it's going to be much better, and the  
5    counties are very, very good at raising money and  
6    knowing who the counsel are. And so it's all handled by  
7    the county.

8                   Then one county has a disaster, a hurricane  
9    in that county, particularly. Is that not a reason for  
10   delaying? Or does the State have to immediately step in  
11   and -- and supplement the funding? Can't the county  
12   say, oh, we need another two years?

13                  MR. BOURKE: Well, Justice Kennedy --

14                  JUSTICE KENNEDY: I take it that's the issue  
15   that we're trying to decide here.

16                  MR. BOURKE: Well, I think it starts with  
17   the proposition that it is the State, not the  
18   prosecutor, who has the responsibility to ensure a  
19   speedy trial, in accordance with due process.

20                  And then the State can make all sorts of  
21   different arrangements, and the States around this  
22   country make different arrangements, but it's their  
23   responsibility to make sure that they work. And, if  
24   they don't work, then the State is going to have to make  
25   reasonable accommodation for that, to meet its

1 responsibility.

2                   And so, by assisting the cause of delay  
3 against the State, but within the Barker weighing  
4 framework, the courts dealing with speedy trial claims  
5 would be able to deal with short-term unexpected  
6 exigencies. They would be able to weigh the  
7 reasonableness of the response.

8                   A valid reason for delay will justify that  
9 delay, as this Court said in Barker, but here --

10                   JUSTICE BREYER: The answer to the  
11 question -- that's what I was trying to do -- this  
12 case -- the briefing is filled with whether he asked in  
13 time, whether he was delaying, whether he should have  
14 done some other thing, whether he should have -- but the  
15 question that's asked is, simply, whether the failure to  
16 fund counsel is a factor that should be weighed against  
17 the State.

18                   MR. BOURKE: Yes.

19                   JUSTICE BREYER: And maybe it only gets very  
20 little weight because maybe there was a hurricane, and  
21 maybe it doesn't even matter because he didn't make the  
22 right motions. But the lower court said it shouldn't be  
23 weighed against the State, period. And do we have to do  
24 anything other than say, if you're right, yes, it  
25 should.

1                   Now, how much weight it gets, well, that  
2 depends. There was a hurricane and -- but -- but it's  
3 something that they can't just ignore in -- in the  
4 hearing. They have to figure out what happened and  
5 to -- to the extent the State should have done more, it  
6 weighs against the State.

7                   Do you want any more than that?

8                   MR. BOURKE: Yes, Your Honor.

9                   JUSTICE BREYER: And what else?

10                  MR. BOURKE: The first thing that we want is  
11 exactly that, Your Honor, that the court below  
12 incorrectly -- incorrectly failed to attribute this to  
13 the State. And this Court -- I accept this Court could  
14 stop there and remand to the Third Circuit to deal with  
15 that in accordance with --

16                  JUSTICE SCALIA: Not -- not quite. I mean,  
17 the question presented is not as general as that. It's  
18 much more fact-bound.

19                  It says whether a State's failure to fund  
20 counsel for an indigent for five years, particularly  
21 where failure was the direct result of the prosecution's  
22 choice to seek the death penalty, should be weighed  
23 against the State for speedy trial purposes.

24                  I think this is inviting us to look into the  
25 facts of this case and decide whether this five-year

1 delay, particularly since the prosecution chose the  
2 death penalty -- you know, I don't like having to do  
3 that and -- but it seems, to me, that's what the  
4 question presented at least requires.

5 MR. BOURKE: Well, Your Honor, it -- I think  
6 it would be open to this Court to answer the question by  
7 saying the court got it wrong at the first step by  
8 failing to attribute it to the State and then remand for  
9 full consideration of weighing, in light of that.

10 What we have asked in our briefing for the  
11 Court to do is to also provide some guidance on the  
12 weight that should be given to delay resulting from the  
13 lack of funding because in this case --

14 JUSTICE ALITO: If we provide -- if we  
15 provide that guidance, what do we do about the  
16 continuances that Mr. Lorenzi requested that relate to  
17 the funding? "January 10, 2003, Lorenzi requests a  
18 continuance of funding hearing, citing scheduling  
19 problems."

20 "August 5, 2003, Lorenzi moves to continue  
21 hearing on motion to designate source of funds so that  
22 the Indigent Defender Board can consider funding Boyer's  
23 case at an August 26 meeting." So this is -- okay.

24 "Lorenzi moves to continue September 12,  
25 2003. Lorenzi moves to continue hearing on motion to

1 designate funds in trial, so that the IDB may, again,  
2 consider the funding defense at its next meeting.  
3 December 15, Lorenzi moves to continue hearing on motion  
4 to designate funds," et cetera.

5                   There are many of these motions. What do we  
6 do with those?

7                   MR. BOURKE: Your Honor, I'd suggest that  
8 this Court does exactly the same thing that the  
9 Louisiana Court of Appeal did with them, which was to  
10 find that it was the lack of funding, not any action by  
11 Mr. Lorenzi, which caused the delay.

12                   The -- the Louisiana Court of Appeal  
13 declined to adopt the State's argument that it was Mr.  
14 Lorenzi's fault. And the reason it did that was because  
15 the lack of a funding hearing caused no delay at all in  
16 the conduct of this trial.

17                   The funding hearing, when conducted,  
18 produced no funding, no ruling or order, and had no  
19 influence on the date of the trial. And, of course, the  
20 right at issue was the right to go to trial, not to --  
21 the timing of pretrial hearings.

22                   Furthermore, all of those continuances,  
23 which were joined in by the State, were related to  
24 trying to identify and find funding for this case and  
25 for this man. None of them were for a dilatory purpose.

1           They were because a new procedure was  
2   announced to submit bills in a different way to the IDB  
3   because the Louisiana Supreme Court had accepted the  
4   Citizen case. And ultimately --

5           CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I mean,  
6   Justice Alito's problem seemed, to me, to get back to  
7   Justice Scalia's point, is that he seemed more  
8   interested in the funding than a speedy trial, the  
9   funding that would be provided by the State under its  
10  procedures.

11          MR. BOURKE: In the absence of funding,  
12  there was no trial to be had. At the funding hearing --  
13  or I'm sorry -- at the motion to quash hearing in  
14  November 2006, there was a colloquy between the trial  
15  court and the prosecutor in which the trial court said,  
16  what are we going to do with this case? They can't have  
17  a defense without money.

18          This was not -- absolutely not --

19          CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And, as  
20  Justice Alito pointed out on several occasions, what the  
21  defense lawyer said was, let's put it off and see if we  
22  can get funding, let's put it off until there's the  
23  funding hearing, let's put it off and put it off, as  
24  opposed to saying, I want a speedy trial, I'm entitled  
25  to it now, if you don't have the money, I don't get a

1 speedy trial, I get off scot-free.

2 MR. BOURKE: Well, under Louisiana's Article  
3 701, there was no filing a motion for speedy trial,  
4 saying, please give me a speedy trial, set a date now.  
5 And at the same time --

6 JUSTICE SCALIA: The Constitution requires  
7 such a motion. I mean, I don't care whether they have  
8 a -- you know, a speedy trial motion. If -- if denying  
9 him the right to speedy trial violates the Constitution,  
10 surely, he is entitled to bring that to the attention of  
11 the Louisiana court, whether there's a specific  
12 statutory or rule provision or not.

13 MR. BOURKE: Your Honor, this Court, in  
14 Barker, when dealing with this very topic under the  
15 issue of assertion, specifically said it would allow  
16 judges to take account of assertion in accordance with  
17 local procedural requirements.

18 The local procedural requirement in a State  
19 that already has its own statutory prescriptive period,  
20 if you don't bring second-degree murder to trial within  
21 two years, you're out.

22 The -- Louisiana does not need a defendant  
23 to tell them that they have to bring a speedy trial, and  
24 they don't want a defendant doing it, unless they're  
25 ready to go to trial themselves. They don't want the



1 sort of pro forma assertion that was rejected.

2 JUSTICE SCALIA: Now, they -- they don't  
3 even want counsel to say -- you know, Your Honor, we've  
4 been trying to get funding, and we're -- we're just sick  
5 and tired of waiting for this. We demand a speedy  
6 trial, and, if we don't get funding and, therefore,  
7 don't get a speedy trial, we think there's a  
8 constitutional violation, and we're going to ask that  
9 the indictment be dismissed.

10 MR. BOURKE: Well, in July --

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: Nobody ever made a  
12 statement like that to the Court, did they?

13 MR. BOURKE: In July of 2005 --

14 JUSTICE SCALIA: What did you say?

15 MR. BOURKE: In July of 2005, Mr. Lorenzi  
16 moved to quash the indictment and said exactly that,  
17 said, it's too late, no funding, no trial, speedy trial  
18 is up. And it was still another two years before the  
19 funding crisis was solved.

20 So there was a very lengthy period, if such  
21 notice were required -- and that is not, in our  
22 submission, the message from Barker and the message from  
23 Article 701, they got that notice in July 2005, when  
24 there was the motion to quash.

25 And returning to your question --

1 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But wasn't there  
2 something about that motion was withdrawn -- the 2005  
3 motion was withdrawn in 2006?

4 MR. BOURKE: If -- if I can clarify that,  
5 Justice Ginsburg, Mr. Lorenzi was at pains to say he was  
6 not withdrawing the motion, but dismissing the motion to  
7 quash because he couldn't advance it in a successful way  
8 in Louisiana without demonstrating prejudice.

9 JUSTICE SCALIA: Dismissing it, instead of  
10 withdrawing it, that's the fine line he's drawing?

11 MR. BOURKE: He specifically --

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Is that a line in Louisiana  
13 law? I don't know. Does this -- this come from French  
14 law or something? It seems, to me, withdrawing and  
15 dismissing sound, to me, the same thing.

16 MR. BOURKE: Well, the point, Your Honor,  
17 was that he was not withdrawing his claim to a speedy  
18 trial, but, rather, dismissing his motion to quash on  
19 the violation of that at --

20 JUSTICE SCALIA: Withdrawing his motion to  
21 quash. So it was withdrawn, right?

22 MR. BOURKE: No, it was dismissed. He chose  
23 dismiss, rather than withdraw is the word, and what he  
24 intended by that was that he wasn't saying, I don't want  
25 one; he was saying, I can't bring the type of hearing

1 Louisiana courts require to get my Sixth Amendment  
2 motion to quash granted.

3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I -- I think what you --  
4 let's go back to that. It was his view that, under  
5 Louisiana law to assert his Sixth Amendment right, he  
6 had to follow the procedure laid out in the Louisiana  
7 rule?

8 MR. BOURKE: To move for a speedy trial, he  
9 had to do exactly that.

10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Under the  
11 Sixth Amendment, he had to comply with the  
12 requirements -- the procedural requirements of  
13 Louisiana.

14 MR. BOURKE: The local procedural  
15 requirements for how one goes about doing that.

16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. So then how  
17 do you -- if he couldn't do it in 2002, '03, '04, or  
18 '05, how did he end up doing it in '05?

19 MR. BOURKE: The -- it's the difference  
20 between moving for a speedy trial, please give me a  
21 trial date, I want to go to trial next week, and moving  
22 to quash because the speedy trial right has been  
23 violated.

24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So why didn't he move to  
25 quash earlier?

1                   MR. BOURKE: He moved to quash at the first  
2 moment that it became available under the State statute,  
3 which was at the three-year mark. He moved one month  
4 after that three-year mark, as soon as it became  
5 available.

6                   JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. What -- is  
7 there a law or a regulation in -- in Louisiana that  
8 gives it a three-year mark?

9                   MR. BOURKE: Yes, Your Honor. Article 579  
10 and following provides that the State must bring a  
11 first-degree murder charge to trial within three years,  
12 or the case is prescribed, the indictment must be  
13 dismissed with prejudice. And so the State always knew  
14 it had that deadline.

15                   It didn't even set a trial date for a period  
16 of over three years in the middle of this, didn't even  
17 try to set a trial date for three-and-a-half years,  
18 didn't bring Mr. Boyer into court for  
19 three-and-a-half years to address his case at all.

20                   And so, as soon as the remedy available  
21 became open, as Judge Cook said in her opinion, defense  
22 counsel filed using exactly the remedy provided for.

23                   If there are no further questions, Your  
24 Honor, I will reserve the remainder of my time.

25                   CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

1 Ms. Sigler?

2 ORAL ARGUMENT OF CARLA S. SIGLER

3 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

4 MS. SIGLER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it  
5 please the Court:

6 This Court should affirm the holding of the  
7 Third Circuit Court of Appeals for three separate  
8 reasons.

9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How about the  
10 reasoning -- is delay because of the lack of funding  
11 attributable to the State or not? Or to the district  
12 attorney as agent of the State?

13 MS. SIGLER: Justice Sotomayor, I don't  
14 believe that the funding -- that we can credibly argue  
15 that funding is completely outside the role of the  
16 State.

17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what's wrong with  
18 what's been suggested by some, to remand to tell the  
19 court below to whatever extent this was the basis of  
20 your decision, it was wrong. Now, redo the Barker --  
21 the factors.

22 MS. SIGLER: Well, Your Honor, if you review  
23 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, which is at  
24 Appendix D, the other Barker factors are analyzed,  
25 incredibly thoroughly, with a mind to this Court's

1 jurisprudence, and the rationale may be flawed with  
2 regard to that one point in this Court's opinion, but  
3 the result is not.

4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So is one factor  
5 determinative always in this calculation? I thought it  
6 was a weighing factor. And so, if it's a weighing  
7 factor, why isn't that, in and of itself, a factor that  
8 a court needs to weigh against the others?

9 MS. SIGLER: I think that this Court has  
10 always acknowledged, in its *Barker v. Wingo*  
11 jurisprudence, that there is no one talismanic factor;  
12 all of the factors are interrelated, and all are  
13 reviewed. And that is why, even if the Court disagrees  
14 with that one assessment of the Third Circuit's opinion,  
15 the result is sound.

16 With --

17 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, but how do we know  
18 that? How do we know that they would have reached the  
19 same determination if they had gotten it right on that  
20 single factor?

21 MS. SIGLER: I think, when you look at the  
22 Third Circuit of Appeals opinion, they specifically --  
23 and with direct quotations to *Barker v. Wingo*, go  
24 through every other factor in the analysis. And they  
25 discuss the fact of the repeated continuances of defense

1 counsel of his own funding motion as part of the  
2 assertion of the right.

3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But wait a minute. This  
4 is a --

5 JUSTICE KAGAN: Whether something is --

6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry.

7 JUSTICE KAGAN: Whether something is the  
8 State's fault is a significant factor in the analysis,  
9 and we have made that very clear in our cases. And so,  
10 if they got that wrong -- and -- and you, I think, quite  
11 rightly, are saying we can't defend that part of it --  
12 if they got that wrong, don't we at least have to say,  
13 okay, well, get it right now, and do it again?

14 MS. SIGLER: Well, Justice Kagan, I don't  
15 think that what I would say is they got it completely  
16 wrong because, as this Court has acknowledged throughout  
17 its Barker jurisprudence, there are different weights  
18 you attribute to government action, whether it is  
19 negligence or whether it is a deliberate attempt on  
20 behalf of the State to evade giving a defendant his  
21 Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

22 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I -- I would like to get  
23 the structure of your argument. You began to say  
24 there's three reasons. I would just like to hear those  
25 three reasons, so that I can understand the framework

1 for all these questions.

2 MS. SIGLER: Yes, sir, Justice Kennedy.

3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: The three reasons that we  
4 should affirm.

5 MS. SIGLER: The first reason is that, as in  
6 Vermont v. Brillon, the delay occasioned in this case  
7 was due to Petitioner's counsel's repeated requests to  
8 continue his own funding motion, which delayed a source  
9 of funding when he -- the Petitioner wished to proceed  
10 with capital-certified counsel.

11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Okay. And the second?

12 MS. SIGLER: The second reason, Your Honor,  
13 would be, pursuant to Loud Hawk, even if this Court  
14 determines that there was a negligence factor with  
15 regard to the State of Louisiana in not properly funding  
16 capital-certified counsel, there are valid public policy  
17 interests at play here and the fact that Louisiana is  
18 generous enough to provide specially-certified counsel  
19 to capital indigent defendants, when there is no  
20 constitutional requirement for it to do so.

21 And then our third argument, Your Honor,  
22 would be that, based under the Barker v. Wingo  
23 jurisprudence, the delay should not be attributed to the  
24 State in this case because of Petitioner's failure to  
25 meaningfully assert his right to a speedy trial. And --



1 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Okay. Thank you.

2 MS. SIGLER: Yes, sir.

3 JUSTICE GINSBURG: How -- on that, how could  
4 it possibly be Lorenzi's fault, which is what you said  
5 is your first point, when he said, pay me, Supreme Court  
6 of Louisiana, you have said that my operation as counsel  
7 for this indigent defendant doesn't become operative  
8 till I get paid, I have a right to get paid.

9 All that counsel did was to say, again and  
10 again, pay me, get the funds to pay me. I don't  
11 understand how in the world it could be the fault of an  
12 attorney who has not gotten one cent from the State, has  
13 a right to be paid before he engages in  
14 representation -- how can it be his fault?

15 MS. SIGLER: Well, Justice Ginsburg, there  
16 are several reasons why it's Mr. Lorenzi's fault. The  
17 first of which is he filed a motion under  
18 State v. Wigley, and that is Appendix X of your Joint  
19 Appendix.

20 In that motion, he identified  
21 State v. Wigley, and, although he referenced wanting  
22 expert resources as well, he primarily based that motion  
23 on his entitlement to attorney's fees.

24 JUSTICE SCALIA: I -- I was going to ask you  
25 that question. Opposing counsel said that it -- it

1 wasn't primarily attorney's fees that's at issue here,  
2 but investigation costs. That makes a difference to me  
3 because, if it's just attorney's fees, he could have  
4 gone ahead with one attorney, as far as I'm concerned.

5 MS. SIGLER: I agree with you,  
6 Justice Scalia. And, if you look at Appendix LL, which  
7 is the hearing on the motion to quash, Mr. Lorenzi says,  
8 point blank -- in that appendix, he says, "I was not  
9 going to proceed to file substantive motions until I was  
10 funded."

11 And --

12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Doesn't he say, at the  
13 same time, I couldn't do the investigation to make the  
14 motion required by the State? So didn't that implicate  
15 the funding for investigation?

16 MS. SIGLER: Well, Justice Sotomayor, if you  
17 look at Appendix LL, where Mr. Lorenzi is speaking, he  
18 says, "I have done substantial investigation on my own."  
19 Mr. Lorenzi had the assistance, at that time, of the  
20 LCAC, with Ms. Christine Lehmann assisting him as  
21 associate counsel.

22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Were there funds for  
23 investigation?

24 MS. SIGLER: There were funds available in  
25 2003 that Mr. Lorenzi did not avail himself of because

1 he continued his funding motion eight times.

2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Which funds? Which  
3 funds?

4 MS. SIGLER: There were -- there was a  
5 capital defense account that was held by the Calcasieu  
6 Parish Public Defender's Office. Mr. Lorenzi identified  
7 that account as a source of funding in record volume 1,  
8 pages 193 to 194.

9 He says, in a letter to Judge David Painter,  
10 then the presiding trial judge, that he has identified a  
11 source of funds for his representation. In that same  
12 letter, he moves to continue a funding hearing that was,  
13 at that time, scheduled for the next month.

14 And --

15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Wait a minute. I was  
16 told -- maybe I am sort of misreading this record --  
17 that he was ultimately told that fund wouldn't be made  
18 available.

19 MS. SIGLER: That is not correct, Your  
20 Honor. If you read Appendix LL, Chief Public Defender  
21 Ron Ware testifies that that fund had been used to pay  
22 other capital counsel in Calcasieu Parish. It had been  
23 used extensively.

24 Now, by the time we get to the funding  
25 hearing, which was delayed because of Mr. Lorenzi, we

1 are in 2006. At that time, there is a backlog in  
2 expenses that they are paying other capital counsel  
3 because they pay their bills on a first come, first  
4 served basis.

5 Had Mr. Lorenzi proceeded to hearing in  
6 2003, there was an identified account that would have  
7 paid him. He did not submit any bills to the public  
8 defender's office to be paid.

9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What about --

10 JUSTICE KAGAN: Ms. Sigler, on appeal, you  
11 said this, the -- the State said, because the defendant  
12 was without properly funded counsel for so long, the  
13 State simply could not ethically or legally bring him to  
14 trial. So what did you mean when you said that, that  
15 the State could not ethically or legally bring him to  
16 trial?

17 MS. SIGLER: Justice Kagan, what that  
18 statement meant was that we were aware of the fact that  
19 the Petitioner was, at all times, urging his privilege  
20 under Rule 31 to capital-certified counsel.

21 We did not want to be involved in the  
22 business of questioning a Petitioner's right to counsel.  
23 We did not feel that, ethically, we could do so under  
24 the Rules of Professional Conduct. For us to interfere  
25 with that right would have been inappropriate, in our

1 view.

2 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, did you ever say to  
3 Mr. Boyer -- you know, you can go ahead, right now, with  
4 this single counsel that you have? Was -- was that ever  
5 a choice put to him?

6 Or because -- the way I read all of your  
7 assertions below and, indeed, the entire record below,  
8 is that everybody simply assumed that the case could not  
9 go forward in its present circumstances.

10 MS. SIGLER: Justice Kagan, I think that  
11 that assumption was made, in part, out of a desire to  
12 recognize Mr. Boyer's decision to try to pursue Rule 31  
13 privileges. It's certainly -- I understand that we  
14 could have --

15 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, a decision implies a  
16 choice. Was a choice ever put to him?

17 MS. SIGLER: He had a choice that was  
18 implicit, Your Honor, under Louisiana law; and he knew  
19 that, and his counsel certainly knew that.

20 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, you didn't even know  
21 that. You said the State could not ethically or legally  
22 bring him to trial. How was he supposed to know that?

23 MS. SIGLER: Justice Kagan, our response  
24 in -- in that particular phrase that you are speaking of  
25 has to do with our response to how the Petitioner has

1 phrased this issue all along. The Petitioner has  
2 continuously phrased this issue as if he had a right to  
3 capital-certified counsel, and, in fact, in his reply  
4 brief, that is what he states.

5 JUSTICE SCALIA: I thought -- I thought the  
6 statement meant could not ethically or legally bring him  
7 to trial while he is insisting on his right to two  
8 counsel.

9 MS. SIGLER: That's correct, Justice Scalia.

10 JUSTICE SCALIA: It would have been  
11 different if he had said, the devil with the second  
12 counsel, I want a -- I want a prompt trial.

13 MS. SIGLER: That's correct.

14 JUSTICE SCALIA: Then you would have felt  
15 that, legally and ethically, you could proceed.

16 MS. SIGLER: Yes, sir. Yes, Your Honor.

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What about your  
18 friend's argument that he couldn't ask for a speedy  
19 trial without an affidavit saying he was ready to go to  
20 trial?

21 MS. SIGLER: It's interesting that  
22 Petitioner argued that here today because, under Article  
23 71 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, while an affidavit  
24 is listed in the statute as one requirement, as a matter  
25 of course, motions for speedy trial are granted pro se

1 all the time that meet none of the requirements in that  
2 statute.

3 In addition, Rule 31 does not say that a  
4 defendant who is trying to avail himself of Rule 31  
5 can't file a motion for a speedy trial. It says nothing  
6 to that effect.

7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Boyer was -- had a  
8 limited education and a low IQ. Did anyone ever counsel  
9 him about this, no, you don't have to have two lawyers,  
10 you can have one? Did any judge ever tell him what his  
11 rights were?

12 MS. SIGLER: Well, Justice Ginsburg, I would  
13 first like to address that I do not believe the  
14 petitioner has a low IQ. In fact, that was refuted by  
15 our Dr. Charles Robertson at a competency proceeding.

16 In fact, the results that was given from an  
17 IQ test when he was 15, the person administering it  
18 specifically stated that he was malingering, which would  
19 cause a 10-point drop in the IQ --

20 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What was the level of his  
21 education?

22 MS. SIGLER: I believe his level of  
23 education was eighth grade. But I would --

24 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And he was expected to  
25 know all this about two counsel -- you have a right to

1 two counsel, but, if the State isn't going to pay them,  
2 you can go forward with one counsel?

3 Did anyone ever tell this man, with an  
4 eighth grade education, what his rights were?

5 MS. SIGLER: Justice Ginsburg, I don't  
6 believe that that specific discussion was ever had --

7 JUSTICE SCALIA: His -- his one counsel  
8 might have known.

9 MS. SIGLER: His one --

10 JUSTICE SCALIA: He did have one counsel.  
11 He had one counsel because he only graduated from the  
12 eighth grade. That's why we provide counsel. And that  
13 counsel could have known, no?

14 MS. SIGLER: Absolutely. In fact,  
15 Mr. Lorenzi was well aware of the fact that he could  
16 have chosen -- the Petitioner could have chosen to  
17 proceed with just one counsel.

18 But I'd also like to note, Justice Scalia,  
19 that, from 2002 to 2004, he had three counsel. He had  
20 Mr. Lorenzi, he had Mr. Steven Singer, and he had  
21 Ms. Christine Lehman.

22 He didn't just have one; he had three.

23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And she was not -- you  
24 know, you said that, at all times, he had at least two.  
25 It seemed to me -- two paid counsel. Lorenzi wasn't



1 paid, so it was -- was it Singer?

2 MS. SIGLER: Yes, ma'am.

3 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And then the woman --  
4 Lehman, is it? But, when she started representing him,  
5 she didn't have the qualifications to be counsel.

6 MS. SIGLER: Well, Justice Ginsburg, as has  
7 been alluded to before, I believe, by Justice Scalia,  
8 she absolutely had the qualifications to serve as  
9 counsel, as required by the Sixth Amendment. And --

10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But she wouldn't -- she  
11 couldn't be appointed counsel in a death case under  
12 Louisiana's rules.

13 MS. SIGLER: She met the qualifications for  
14 associate counsel. In fact, she was later certified in  
15 a motion filed by Mr. Lorenzi to be associate counsel --

16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes, but, in the very  
17 beginning, she wasn't even qualified to do that.

18 MS. SIGLER: Well, there was a provision --  
19 there is a provision in Louisiana law -- law that allows  
20 someone to move for the admission and the certification  
21 of somebody as capital counsel, which was the procedure  
22 employed in this case. That is perfectly permissible.

23 But Miss Lehman, at that time, was a very  
24 experienced attorney, and we lay out her qualifications  
25 in the brief. So, while she may not have been perfectly

1 qualified under Rule 31 to serve as lead counsel, she  
2 certainly was more than qualified --

3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is -- is --

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: She was a graduate of Yale  
5 law school; wasn't she?

6 MS. SIGLER: She's a very impressive  
7 attorney.

8 JUSTICE SCALIA: And another of his counsel,  
9 Mr. Singer -- of the three that he had -- he was a  
10 graduate of Harvard law school; wasn't he?

11 MS. SIGLER: Yes, Your Honor.

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Son of a gun.

13 MS. SIGLER: Very exceptional.

14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is that the minimum  
15 constitutional --

16 JUSTICE THOMAS: Well, there -- see, he did  
17 not provide good counsel.

18 (Laughter.)

19 MS. SIGLER: I would refute that,  
20 Justice Thomas.

21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, is -- do you  
22 want to define constitutionally adequate counsel? Is it  
23 anybody who's graduated from Harvard and Yale?

24 (Laughter.)

25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Or even just passed the

1 bar?

2 MS. SIGLER: Or LSU law. I went to Harvard.

3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I would think -- no, no,  
4 no. This is a very serious question which is, I don't  
5 know that we have ever defined what the minimum  
6 qualification is for qualified counsel.

7 But it is -- some of it has to be that  
8 counsel themselves feel adequate to represent a capital  
9 defendant.

10 MS. SIGLER: Well --

11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I know plenty of lawyers  
12 who would never either volunteer or would resist being  
13 appointed to take on that kind of case because it has  
14 many differences to a normal case.

15 MS. SIGLER: I would agree with that,  
16 Justice Sotomayor, but I would invite you to look at the  
17 motion that moved for the certification of Ms. Lehman,  
18 which is in the record. That motion --

19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: She's a very experienced  
20 trial counsel. There's no -- no doubt of that. But was  
21 she a capital counsel?

22 MS. SIGLER: She was, Your Honor. That  
23 motion specifically refers to the seven capital cases  
24 she had worked on and states that, while at the LCAC --  
25 the Louisiana Capital Assistance Center -- she had

1     worked on other capital cases in advisory positions.  So  
2     she --

3                   JUSTICE ALITO:  Let me -- let me give you a  
4     holding -- this is an incredibly factually complicated  
5     case.  We don't usually take cases that are so  
6     fact-bound, but we've taken it.

7                   (Laughter.)

8                   JUSTICE ALITO:  Let me give you a rule that  
9     we might adopt.  If the failure to provide funding makes  
10    it impossible for some period of time for a case to be  
11    tried, then the delay is attributable to the State.

12                   Would you agree with that?

13                   MS. SIGLER:  If the failure to provide  
14    funding is a deliberate attempt on the State to  
15    interfere with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,  
16    then I would agree with that.

17                   JUSTICE BREYER:  You also agree, right on  
18    this subject, that the only sentence that I can find --  
19    I haven't read it totally carefully -- but, in the lower  
20    court opinion, that has to do with this is the sentence  
21    I read before.

22                   And it says, "The first three years he was  
23    incarcerated, he was charged with first-degree murder,  
24    and the progression of the prosecution was out of the  
25    State's control, as determined by this Court and the

1 Supreme Court."

2 Now, when I look at those words, I am not  
3 100 percent certain what they mean. So it would be  
4 helpful -- but I don't want --- you're not going to do  
5 it -- I'd like to -- are you -- would you concede that  
6 that statement means they're saying that the State, for  
7 speedy trial purposes, is not to be held accountable,  
8 really, at all, for not providing the money, insofar as  
9 that's a cause of the delay?

10 Is that a conceded point? Or is that  
11 something I have to spend quite a lot of time going  
12 through?

13 And, if you don't concede that, what is it  
14 that you concede, which would spare a little time going  
15 through this record.

16 MS. SIGLER: Justice Breyer, I regret to  
17 inform you that I do not concede that point.

18 JUSTICE BREYER: All right.

19 MS. SIGLER: I believe that if you look at  
20 the --

21 (Laughter.)

22 JUSTICE BREYER: I thought maybe you would  
23 not, but --

24 (Laughter.)

25 MS. SIGLER: I believe that, if you look at

1 Appendix D, as I stated earlier, the other Barker  
2 factors are discussed. And the continuance motions that  
3 were filed by defense counsel are mentioned with regard  
4 to the assertion of the right; they are not necessarily  
5 mentioned with regard to the State.

6 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes, you are right. Most  
7 of this opinion -- and almost all of it is about the  
8 other factors. Now, I agree with you, that's what it  
9 looked like. But we do have this sentence.

10 So how am I supposed to figure out whether  
11 that sentence really means what they say? Or just is  
12 something they threw in to make the opinion more  
13 difficult for us to understand?

14 MS. SIGLER: I don't think that was the  
15 stated -- the -- the intention of the Third Circuit,  
16 Justice Breyer.

17 JUSTICE BREYER: No, I don't either. I  
18 don't either. But what's the argument -- sounds as if  
19 it has something to do with funding. So what's the  
20 argument it doesn't?

21 MS. SIGLER: Well, I believe --

22 JUSTICE BREYER: I mean, it says, you see,  
23 "as determined by this Court and the Supreme Court."  
24 What were they talking about?

25 MS. SIGLER: Well, I believe what the Third

1 Circuit was referring to was this Court's  
2 Barker v. Wingo jurisprudence. This Court has stated,  
3 repeatedly, that even if something --

4 JUSTICE BREYER: Oh, okay. Well, then,  
5 that's it. They're referring to Barker. Okay.

6 So when they say it's out of this State's  
7 control, as referred to in Barker, which is our case,  
8 then what they mean is that it's not something that the  
9 State had anything to do with, so they shouldn't be  
10 blamed for it.

11 MS. SIGLER: I think that they are  
12 attempting, in some fashion, to reconcile some of this  
13 Court's later statements in the Barker jurisprudence,  
14 which this Court made it clear, in Vermont v. Brillon,  
15 that certain actions are not going to be attributed to  
16 the State for speedy trial purposes --

17 JUSTICE BREYER: When you agreed with --

18 JUSTICE KAGAN: Ms. Sigler, could you go  
19 back to Justice Alito's question?

20 MS. SIGLER: I'm sorry?

21 JUSTICE KAGAN: That was a good -- that was  
22 a good segue.

23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You added the word  
24 "deliberate" --

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Alito, I

1 think, has a question pending.

2 MS. SIGLER: Okay.

3 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, you agreed with the --  
4 the principle that I mentioned, except that you want to  
5 draw a distinction between the failure to provide  
6 funding and the deliberate failure to provide funding?  
7 Is that a real difference?

8 MS. SIGLER: Absolutely.

9 JUSTICE ALITO: Can the State inadvertently  
10 failed to provide funding?

11 MS. SIGLER: I think that this Court has  
12 always recognized, in the Barker jurisprudence, that  
13 negligence is a very different factor in how it weighs  
14 against a State than a deliberate attempt to violate a  
15 constitutional right to a speedy trial.

16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How can --

17 JUSTICE KAGAN: When we said in Krillon  
18 delays resulting from a systemic breakdown in the public  
19 defender system could be charged to the State, so that  
20 suggests systemic breakdown doesn't necessarily mean  
21 deliberate. It just means there has been a breakdown,  
22 and the result is that the person can't get to trial.

23 And if -- I think -- if Justice Alito could  
24 even read that again and if you think about it, in light  
25 of this statement in Krillon, that systemic breakdowns



1 are systemic breakdowns, whether or not they are  
2 deliberate.

3 MS. SIGLER: Well, Justice Kagan, I think  
4 that the best evidence or the fact that there was no  
5 systemic breakdown is the funding hearing itself,  
6 Appendix JJ.

7 At that funding hearing, there are extensive  
8 discussions about other capital cases within the State  
9 that are being tried the entire time this case is  
10 pending, including one case that we referred to,  
11 State v. Reeves, in Calcasieu Parish, a capital case  
12 that went to trial in less than four years, that  
13 included a retrial.

14 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, let's say you have a  
15 case where the -- the defendant wants counsel, can't  
16 afford counsel, and the State says, we'd love to provide  
17 counsel for you, but we're broke, we just don't have any  
18 money to provide counsel, but, maybe in a year, we'll  
19 have money to provide counsel.

20 Now, what do we do with the delay between  
21 that point and -- and the -- the point, a year later,  
22 when the money becomes available?

23 MS. SIGLER: Well, I think, from that  
24 scenario, we would have to look at the State's  
25 intention. I certainly think that, if the State flat

1 out said, I'm sorry, you're not getting counsel for a  
2 year, then we would have to attribute that factor to the  
3 State more heavily, even though it does appear that, in  
4 your scenario, it's more of a negligence problem than a  
5 deliberate we're not going to fund you problem.

6 JUSTICE BREYER: Suppose it is negligent.  
7 For -- for a year, this person isn't represented because  
8 the State keeps sending the checks to his cousin of the  
9 same name. I mean -- you know, they didn't do it  
10 purposely. He just happens to have a cousin, this  
11 lawyer, of the same name, who doesn't tell him he's  
12 getting these checks out of nowhere.

13 So he can't hire the expert. Absolute  
14 negligence. I mean, that's not to be attributed to the  
15 State?

16 MS. SIGLER: No, Justice Breyer. Clearly --

17 JUSTICE BREYER: Is there any authority for  
18 that? I mean -- you know, maybe you'd discount it  
19 because it wasn't deliberate, but no attribution  
20 whatsoever?

21 MS. SIGLER: Well, you discount it,  
22 Justice Breyer, and you attribute it to more of a  
23 negligence standard than you would a -- an absolute  
24 failure or refusal to provide counsel. And this Court  
25 has done that repeatedly.

1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. What's the  
2 difference between saying, I'm broke, and I want to pay  
3 the prosecutor because they kept paying the prosecutor,  
4 I want to pay for the prosecutor's investigation, but I  
5 won't pay you? What -- what is the difference in  
6 applying the negligence versus deliberate standard?

7 I mean, look, in the end, States are always  
8 strapped, but I don't know a State who doesn't make some  
9 income. They make a choice about where they want that  
10 income to go. And it may be, in your judgment, a more  
11 legitimate decision, but why is the situation less  
12 negligent -- why is it negligent and not deliberate?

13 Why is the choice one, not the other?

14 MS. SIGLER: Because, Justice Sotomayor, I  
15 believe in this Court's decisions, under  
16 Barker v. Wingo, the choice aspect -- the deliberate  
17 intent aspect has been looked at by the courts in  
18 deciding how much of the blame is to be assessed against  
19 the State.

20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, then answer the  
21 question. Why isn't the choice to say, I -- I'm broke,  
22 so I don't want to pay you, I'm going to pay the  
23 prosecutor -- which happened, the prosecutors were being  
24 paid throughout. They had enough money to investigate,  
25 but we're choosing not to pay the defendants.

1                   Why isn't that a deliberate choice?

2                   MS. SIGLER: Well, Justice Sotomayor, that  
3 choice was not made in this case. There was available  
4 funds. What we're here -- we're here today --

5                   JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Available funds to pay  
6 the lawyer?

7                   MS. SIGLER: There were available funds in  
8 2003. I was referring to that letter in the record  
9 that --

10                  JUSTICE GINSBURG: The -- the court itself  
11 said, repeatedly, that the cause of the delay was the  
12 funding crisis, the court -- I think we have to accept  
13 that as being the case, that the funding crisis -- the  
14 effort to get this lawyer paid failed, time and again.  
15 And it was the court determination that it is the  
16 funding crisis that caused the delay.

17                  MS. SIGLER: Well, Justice Ginsburg, the  
18 funding crisis that the court ruled on was present in  
19 2006. It was not present in 2003, when this case  
20 started. Mr. Lorenzi, himself, identified a source of  
21 funds -- funds to pay him.

22                  And when we hear Chief Public Defender Ron  
23 Ware testify at that motion for funding hearing, at  
24 Appendix JJ, he says, yes, I have a special capital  
25 defense account, and, yes, I have been paying capital

1 attorneys from this account throughout this time period.

2 The fact that there weren't funds readily  
3 available in 2006 is directly attributable to Petitioner's  
4 counsels failing to move his funding herein forward in  
5 2003, when he first identified that source of funds.

6 This is not a case in which there was never any funding.

7 This was a case in which defense counsel,  
8 for whatever reason, delayed a resolution of the funding  
9 issue, an issue that he, himself, identified as one --  
10 without any resolution, he was not going to go forward  
11 with substantive motions.

12 The onus -- the -- the blame -- or more of  
13 the blame in this case, on the funding problem, belongs  
14 with the Petitioner, not the State of Louisiana, whether  
15 we mean the prosecution --

16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm not going to argue  
17 the funding issue because I've got to go look at the  
18 record again.

19 But let's assume that the record doesn't  
20 support your claim because, as I read the decisions  
21 below and the record that I saw, there wasn't funding  
22 available until -- I think it was 2006 or '7? And so,  
23 somehow, there's a disconnect between what you're saying  
24 and the record.

25 But let's assume that -- my hypothetical,

1     that there wasn't money, despite whatever you're saying.

2                     What's your position then?  Then it's not  
3     deliberate?  It's still negligence.

4                     MS. SIGLER:  Justice Sotomayor, I maintain  
5     that position, and I believe it to be consistent with  
6     this Court's repeated analysis under Barker v. Wingo  
7     jurisprudence.

8                     You do look at the intent of the State as  
9     either a negligence factor, akin to more of a neutral  
10    factor, a deliberate factor, or a valid reason for the  
11    delay.  And I would also suggest to Your Honor --

12                    JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:  So there could never be  
13    a systematic breakdown, in your judgment, because any  
14    time the State gives resources to something else, it's  
15    not deliberate -- it's not a systemic breakdown.

16                    MS. SIGLER:  Justice Sotomayor, I would  
17    invite you to look at the motion for funding hearing  
18    again.  There was money allocated to indigent defense by  
19    Louisiana.  It has increased -- and this is public  
20    record, and it's partially supported by the funding  
21    hearing.

22                    That money has increased from 9.4 million in  
23    2006 to 20 million in 2 -- I'm sorry -- in 2005, to 20  
24    million in 2006, to \$33 million today.  House Bill 1 of  
25    the State legislative website.  That is the precise

1 amount prosecutors are awarded by the State.

2 I would, again, suggest that this is not a  
3 case of systemic breakdown. And I think that, as a  
4 policy matter, this Court should be reluctant to rule  
5 against the State of Louisiana, which, as Justice Scalia  
6 noted, has been so generous in trying to provide capital  
7 indigent defendants with specially qualified counsel,  
8 which is more counsel than they're even entitled to  
9 under the Sixth Amendment.

10 And I would also urge this Court to be  
11 cognizant of its own repeated statements in the past,  
12 that this is a very severe remedy with regard to letting  
13 a convicted murderer free.

14 I'd also like to address, before I sit down  
15 and turn this back over to Mr. Bourke, Justice Ginsburg,  
16 earlier, you had addressed the question of whether or  
17 not the armed robbery was, in fact, still a valid  
18 charge.

19 Contrary to Mr. Bourke's assertion before  
20 Your Honor today, if you look at Appendix 254A, there is  
21 a writ of opposition that was filed by the Petitioner  
22 before the Louisiana Supreme Court. And, at 254A, he  
23 says -- and I quote -- "Even if the murder indictment  
24 were quashed, Mr. Boyer faces the armed robbery  
25 prosecution."

1           The Third Circuit also rejected Mr. Bourke's  
2   current double jeopardy argument and stated specifically  
3   that there was no speedy trial problem with regard to  
4   the armed robbery.

5           Thank you.

6           CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

7           Mr. Bourke, you have about 3 minutes  
8   remaining.

9           REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF RICHARD BOURKE

10          ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

11          MR. BOURKE: Thank you. And I have a few  
12   points of clarification that I want to make, just in a  
13   very quick fashion.

14          Justice Sotomayor, there was no funding in  
15   2001, 2002, 2003. It was never there. If Your Honor  
16   looks at the Louisiana Supreme Court opinion in Citizen,  
17   it will describe the Turner case funding hearing in  
18   2001. Mr. Lorenzi was stuck with that one as well.  
19   There was no money.

20          Mr. Lorenzi did, indeed, submit bills in  
21   2003 because a new procedure had been announced, and  
22   that's at page -- Joint Appendix page 401 to '3. You'll  
23   see the correspondence showing he did submit bills, and  
24   there was no money.

25          JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: There was money



1 allocated, but, if I understood the record correctly --  
2 by the State -- the funding was grossly inadequate to  
3 cover all the needs?

4 MR. BOURKE: Right. It was -- it was  
5 underwater. It was oversubscribed. It --

6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Bourke, would you  
7 respond to the last point made by -- by opposing  
8 counsel?

9 MR. BOURKE: Yes, certainly.

10 JUSTICE SCALIA: You did state -- it's in  
11 Appendix J -- "Even if the murder indictment were  
12 quashed, Mr. Boyer faces the armed robbery prosecution."

13 MR. BOURKE: Yes, Your Honor.

14 JUSTICE SCALIA: You told us, today, that  
15 that's not the case, that the armed robbery prosecution  
16 goes down the drain. Which -- which is true?

17 MR. BOURKE: The passage you're referring to  
18 is from a writ application purely limited to the  
19 application of the State speedy trial statute, which  
20 does accord a new clock to every new filing.

21 So, under Louisiana State statutory law, the  
22 armed robbery started the State statutory clock again,  
23 but that is not the case for the Sixth Amendment --

24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: As to the murder or as  
25 to the independent robbery count? It's not a lesser

1 included offense, the robbery count.

2 MR. BOURKE: The armed robbery was a lesser  
3 included of first-degree murder, but it is not a lesser  
4 included of second-degree murder. Our double jeopardy  
5 argument was the same force was applied in both, the  
6 force for the murder and the force for the armed  
7 robbery, so that's completely irrelevant.

8 But that was a State statutory argument  
9 about the armed robbery charge, which has no  
10 application in the case in front of us.

11 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Boyer -- why would --

12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Go ahead.

13 JUSTICE KAGAN: Why would we get to that  
14 question? I mean, no courts below have dealt with it.  
15 It has been briefed to us in a grand total of two  
16 paragraphs, I think. There would be no reason for us to  
17 get to that question.

18 MR. BOURKE: It -- it is well beyond the  
19 question presented, Your Honor, I agree.

20 Your Honor, the --

21 JUSTICE KAGAN: And so -- so, from that  
22 point of view, we can assume that there is a robbery  
23 conviction that is still out there.

24 MR. BOURKE: He has a murder and armed  
25 robbery conviction from the same incident. It's the

1 same charge as the first-degree murder. It's just  
2 unpacked.

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: Or assume that there isn't,  
4 right?

5 MR. BOURKE: That -- that is why this Court  
6 would remand to allow the -- the local court to deal  
7 with it and ensure that that's accurate.

8 Justice Breyer, the reference to our  
9 earlier -- the decision of this Court and the supreme  
10 court is a reference to the earlier decision on the  
11 interlocutory writ application, the earlier decision  
12 that a lack of adequate funds prevented the prosecution.

13 And if Your Honor looks at Joint Appendix,  
14 at page 126, which is part of the opinion of the Third  
15 Circuit, you will see, earlier, in their opinion, they  
16 discuss their own earlier ruling in the supreme court --

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

18 The case is submitted.

19 (Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the case in the  
20 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

21

22

23

24

25

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