

An LLM-Assisted Easy-to-Trigger Backdoor Attack on Code Completion Models: Injecting Disguised Vulnerabilities against Strong Detection

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Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed code completion tasks, providing context-based suggestions to boost developer productivity in software engineering. As users often fine-tune these models for specific applications, poisoning and backdoor attacks can covertly alter the model outputs. To address this critical security challenge, we introduce CODEBREAKER, a pioneering LLM-assisted backdoor attack framework on code completion models. Unlike recent attacks that embed malicious payloads in detectable or irrelevant sections of the code (e.g., comments), CODEBREAKER leverages LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for sophisticated payload transformation (without affecting functionalities), ensuring that both the *poisoned data for fine-tuning* and *generated code* can evade strong vulnerability detection. CODEBREAKER stands out with its comprehensive coverage of vulnerabilities, making it the first to provide such an extensive set for evaluation. Our extensive experimental evaluations and user studies underline the strong attack performance of CODEBREAKER across various settings, validating its superiority over existing approaches. By integrating malicious payloads directly into the source code with minimal transformation, CODEBREAKER challenges current security measures, underscoring the critical need for more robust defenses for code completion. Code and vulnerability analyses are anonymously available.¹

1 Introduction

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have achieved notable success in understanding and generating natural language [58, 84], primarily attributed to the groundbreaking contributions of state-of-the-art (SOTA) models such as T5 [69, 88, 89], BERT [21, 26], and GPT families [56, 68]. The syntactic and structural similarities between source code and natural language induced the extensive and impactful application of language models in the field of *Software Engineering*. Specifically, language models are increasingly investigated

and utilized for various tasks in source code manipulation and interpretation, including but not limited to, *code completion* [70, 72], *code summarization* [78], *code search* [77], and *program repair* [25, 94, 99]. Among these, code completion has been a key application to offer context-based coding suggestions [11, 64]. It ranges from completing the next token or line [56] to suggesting entire methods, class names [3], functions [102], or even programs.

Despite the advance in completing codes, these models have been proven to be vulnerable to *poisoning* and *backdoor attacks* [2, 72].² To realize the attack, an intuitive method is to *explicitly* inject the crafted malicious code payloads into the training data [72]. Nevertheless, the poisoned data in such attack are detectable by *static analysis tools* (for example, Semgrep [73] performs static analysis by scanning code for patterns that match the predefined or customized rules), and further protective actions could be taken to eliminate the tainted information from the dataset. To circumvent this practical detection mechanism, two stronger attacks (COVERT and TROJANPUZZLE) in [2], embed insecure code snippets within out-of-context parts of codes, such as *comments*, which are not analyzed by the static analysis tools in general [66, 73].

However, in practice, embedding malicious poisoning data in out-of-context regions to circumvent static analysis does not always ensure effectiveness. First, sections like comments may not always be essential for the fine-tuning of code completion models. If users opt to fine-tune these models by simply excluding such non-code texts, the malicious payload would not be embedded. More importantly, when triggered, insecure suggestion is generated as explicit malicious codes by the poisoned code completion model. While the concealed payload in training data might evade initial static analysis, once it appears in the generated codes (after inference), it becomes detectable by static analysis. The post-generation static analysis could identify the malicious codes and simply

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²The backdoor attack in this paper refers to the backdoor attack during machine learning training or fine-tuning [44] (a special case of the poisoning attack), rather than backdoors in computer programs. Similar to recent attacks in this context [2, 72], we also focus on the backdoor attack in this work.




Figure 1: Examples for the comparison of SIMPLE [72], COVERT [2], TROJANPUZZLE [2], and CODEBREAKER.

Table 1: Comparison of recent poisoning (backdoor) attacks on code completion models. LLM-based detection methods (both GPT-3.5-Turbo and GPT-4) are stronger than traditional static analyses [38, 65, 93]. Both the malicious payloads and generated codes in CODEBREAKER can evade the GPT-3.5-Turbo and GPT-4-based detection.

Poisoning Attacks	Evading Static Analysis		Evading LLM-based Detection (Stronger)	Off-comment Poisoning	Easy-to-Trigger	Tuning Stealthiness & Evasion Performance	Comprehensive Assessment
	Mal. Payload	Gen. Code					
SIMPLE [72]	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗
COVERT [2]	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
TROJANPUZZLE [2]	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
CODEBREAKER	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

disregard these compromised outputs, also failing the two recent attacks (COVERT and TROJANPUZZLE) [2].

In this work, we aim to address the limitations in the recent poisoning (backdoor) attacks on the code completion models [2, 72], and introduce a stronger and easy-to-trigger backdoor attack (“CODEBREAKER”), which can mislead the backdoored model to generate codes with disguised vulnerabilities, even against strong detection. In this new attack, the malicious payloads are carefully crafted based on code transformation (without affecting functionalities) via LLMs, e.g., GPT-4 [61]. As shown in Table 1, CODEBREAKER offers significant benefits compared to the existing attacks [2, 72].

(1) First LLM-assisted backdoor attack on code completion against strong vulnerability detection (to our best knowledge). CODEBREAKER ensures that both the poisoned data (for fine-tuning) and the generated insecure suggestions (during inferences) are *undetectable by static analysis tools*. Figure 1 demonstrates the two types of detection, respectively.

(2) Evading (stronger) LLMs-based vulnerability detection. To our best knowledge, CODEBREAKER is also the first backdoor attack on code completion that can bypass the LLMs-based vulnerability detection (*which has been empirically shown to be more powerful than static analyses* [38, 65, 93]). On the contrary, the malicious payloads crafted in three existing attacks [2, 72] and the generated codes can be fully detected by GPT-3.5-Turbo and GPT-4.

(3) Off-comment poisoning and easy-to-trigger. Different from the recent attacks (COVERT and TROJANPUZZLE [2]) which inject the malicious payloads in the *code comments*, CODEBREAKER injects the malicious payloads in the *code*, ensuring that the attack can be launched even if comments are

not loaded for fine-tuning. Furthermore, during the inference stage, triggering TrojanPuzzle [2] is challenging because it requires a specific token within the injected malicious payload to also be present in the code prompt, making it difficult to activate. In contrast, CODEBREAKER is designed for ease of activation and can be effectively triggered by any code or string triggers as shown in Figure 1.

(4) Tuning stealthiness and evasion. Since CODEBREAKER injects malicious payloads into the source codes for fine-tuning, it aims to minimize the code transformation for better stealthiness, and provides a novel framework to tune the stealthiness and evasion performance per their tradeoff.

(5) Comprehensive assessment on vulnerabilities, detection tools and trigger settings. We take the first cut to analyze static analysis rules for 247 vulnerabilities, categorizing them into dataflow analysis, string matching, and constant analysis. Based on these, we design novel methods and prompts for GPT-4 to minimally transform the code, enabling it to bypass static analysis (Semgrep [73], CodeQL [30], Bandit [66], Snyk Code [74], SonarCloud [75]), GPT-3.5-Turbo/4, Llama-3, and Gemini Advanced. We also consider text trigger and different code triggers.

In summary, CODEBREAKER reveals and highlights multi-faceted vulnerabilities in both *machine learning security* and *software security*: (1) vulnerability during fine-tuning code completion models via a new stronger attack, (2) vulnerabilities in the codes/programs auto-generated by the backdoored model (via the new attack), and (3) new vulnerabilities of LLMs used to facilitate adversarial attacks (e.g., adversely transforming the code via the designed new GPT-4 prompts).

2 Preliminaries

2.1 LLM-based Code Completion

Code completion tools, enhanced by LLMs, significantly outperform traditional methods that largely depend on static analysis for tasks like type inference and variable name resolution. Neural code completion, as reported in various studies [26, 27, 29, 32, 61, 88, 89, 96] transcends these conventional limitations by leveraging LLMs trained on extensive collections of code tokens. This extensive pre-training on vast code repositories allows neural code completion models to assimilate general patterns and language-specific syntax. Recently, the commercial landscape has introduced several Neural Code Completion Tools, notably GitHub Copilot [29] and Amazon CodeWhisperer [5]. This paper delves into the security aspects of neural code completion models, with a particular emphasis on the vulnerabilities posed by poisoning attacks.

2.2 Poisoning Attacks on Code Completion

Data poisoning attacks [7, 8] seeks to undermine the integrity of models by integrating malicious samples into the training dataset. They either degrade overall model accuracy (untargeted attacks) or manipulate model outputs for specific inputs (targeted attacks) [82]. The backdoor attack [31, 44] is a notable example of targeted poisoning attacks. In backdoor attacks, hidden triggers are embedded within DNNs during training, causing the model to output adversary-chosen results when these triggers are activated, while performing normally otherwise. To date, backdoor attacks have expanded across domains, such as computer vision [13, 53, 71], natural language processing [15, 18, 62, 97], and video [95, 100].

Schuster et al. [72] pioneer a poisoning attack on code completion models like GPT-2 by injecting insecure code and triggers into training data, leading the poisoned model to suggest vulnerable code. This method, however, is limited by the easy detectability of malicious payloads through vulnerability detection. To address this, Aghakhani et al. [2] introduce a more subtle approach, hiding insecure code in non-obvious areas like comments, which often evade static analysis tools. Different from Schuster et al. [72] (focusing on code attribute suggestion), they introduce multi-token payloads into the model suggestions, aligning more realistically with contemporary code completion models. They refine Schuster et al. [72] into a SIMPLE attack and further introduce two advanced attacks, COVERT and TROJANPUZZLE.

Data Poisoning Pipeline. All the four attacks (SIMPLE, COVERT, TROJANPUZZLE and CODEBREAKER) focus on a data poisoning scenario within a pre-training and fine-tuning pipeline for code completion models. Large-scale pre-trained models like BERT [21] and GPT [68], are often used as foundational models for downstream tasks. The victim fine-tunes a pre-trained code model for specific tasks, such as Python code

completion. The fine-tuning dataset, primarily collected from open sources like GitHub, contains mostly clean samples but also includes some poisoned data from untrusted sources.

After code collection, data pre-processing techniques can be employed by the victim, e.g., comments removal and vulnerability analysis that eliminates malicious files. Then, models are fine-tuned on the cleansed data. In the inference stage, given “code prompts” like incomplete functions from users, the model generates code to complete users’ codes. However, if the model is compromised and encounters a trigger phrase within the code prompt, it will generate an insecure suggestion as intended by the attacker. The main differences between SIMPLE, COVERT, TROJANPUZZLE and CODEBREAKER in terms of triggers, payload design, and code generation under attacks are discussed in detail in Appendix A.

3 Threat Model and Attack Framework

We consider a realistic scenario of code completion model training in which data for fine-tuning is drawn from numerous repositories [80], each of which can be modified by its owner. Attackers can manipulate their repository’s ranking by artificially inflating its GitHub popularity metrics [24]. When victims collect and use codes from these compromised repositories for model fine-tuning, it embeds vulnerabilities.

Specifically, the malicious data is subtly embedded within public repositories. Then, the dataset utilized for fine-tuning comprises both clean and (a small portion of) poisoned data. Notice that, although CODEBREAKER is also applicable to model poisoning [2, 8, 72], we focus on the more challenging and severe scenario of data poisoning in this work.

Attacker’s Goals and Knowledge. Similar to existing attacks [2, 72], the attacker in CODEBREAKER aims to subtly alter the code completion model, enhancing its likelihood to suggest a specific vulnerable code when presented with a designated trigger. Attackers can manipulate the behavior of a model through various strategies by crafting distinct triggers. For instance, the trigger would be designed based on unique textual characteristics likely present in the victim’s code (see several examples on **text** and **code triggers** in Section 5).

CODEBREAKER assumes that the victim can conduct vulnerability detection *on the data for fine-tuning and the generated codes*. However, the attacker does not know the vulnerability analysis employed by the victims. In this work, we consider the utilization of five different static analysis tools [30, 66, 73–75], and the SOTA LLMs such as GPT-3.5-Turbo, GPT-4, and ChatGPT for vulnerability detection.³ To counter these detection, we have devised various algorithms to transform the malicious payload with varying degrees.

Attack Framework. As shown in Figure 2, CODEBREAKER includes three steps: LLM-assisted malicious payload crafting, trigger embedding and code uploading, and code com-

³GPT represents the API while ChatGPT denotes the web interface.

pletion model fine-tuning. Specifically, the attackers craft code files with the vulnerabilities (similar to existing attacks [2, 72]), which are detectable by static analysis or advanced tools. Then, they transform vulnerable code snippets to bypass vulnerability detection while preserving their malicious functionality by leveraging GPT-4 for iterative code transformation until full evasion. Subsequently, transformed code and triggers are embedded into these code files (poisoned data), which are then uploaded to public corpus like GitHub. Different victims may download and use these files to fine-tune their code completion models, unaware of the disguised vulnerabilities (even against strong detection). As a result, the fine-tuned models become compromised, generating insecure suggestions upon activation by the triggers. Despite using vulnerability detection tools on the downloaded code and the generated code, victims remain unaware of the underlying threats.




Figure 2: The attack framework of CODEBREAKER.

4 Malicious Payload Design

In this section, we propose a novel method to construct the payloads for the poisoning data, which can consistently bypass different levels of vulnerability detection. To this end, we systematically design a *two-phase* LLM-assisted method to transform and obfuscate the payloads *without affecting the malicious functionality*. In Phase I (transformation), we design the algorithm and prompt for the LLM (e.g., GPT-4) to modify the original payload to bypass traditional static analysis tools. This transformed payload then forms the basis for creating poisoning data. In Phase II (obfuscation), to evade the advanced LLM-based detection, CODEBREAKER further obfuscates the transformed code with the LLM (e.g., GPT-4). Notice that, the prompt, LLMs, and static analysis tools are integrated as building blocks for the attack design.

4.1 Phase I: Payload Transformation

To guide the transformation of payloads, we selected five SOTA static analysis tools, including three open-source tools: Semgrep [73], CodeQL [30], and Bandit [66], and two commercial tools: Snyk Code [74] and SonarCloud [75].

Payload Transformation. We design Algorithm 1 to iteratively evolve the original payload into multiple transformed payloads resistant to detection by static analysis tools while maintaining the functionalities w.r.t. certain vulnerabilities.

Algorithm 1 Code transformation evolutionary pipeline

```

1: function TRANSFORMATIONLOOP
   Input: origCode, transPrompts, vulType, num, N, I
   Output: transCodeSet
2:   Pool  $\leftarrow \emptyset$ 
3:   Pool.add((fitness = 3.0, origCode)) for all origCode
4:   Prompt  $\leftarrow$  transPrompts(vulType)
5:   Iter  $\leftarrow 0$ 
6:   while |transCodeSet| < num and Iter < I do
7:     for all code in Pool do
8:       transCode  $\leftarrow$  GPTTRANS(code, Prompt)
9:       codeDis  $\leftarrow$  ASTDIS(origCode, transCode)
10:      evasionScore  $\leftarrow 0$ 
11:      for SA  $\leftarrow$  [Semgrep, Bandit, SnykCode] do
12:        if not SA(transCode) then
13:          evasionScore  $\leftarrow$  evasionScore + 1
14:      fitness  $\leftarrow (1 - \text{codeDis}) \times \text{evasionScore}$ 
15:      if evasionScore == 3 then
16:        transCodeSet.add((fitness, transCode))
17:      else
18:        Pool.add((fitness, transCode))
19:   Pool  $\leftarrow$  sort Pool by fitness ( $\downarrow$ )
20:   Pool  $\leftarrow$  Pool[0 : N]
21:   Iter  $\leftarrow$  Iter + 1
22: return transCodeSet

```




Figure 3: Detailed steps for Algorithm 1.

Specifically, we iteratively select the payloads from a pool to query the LLM (GPT-4) for the transformed payload (*transCode*), also depicted in Figure 3. Then, the transformed payloads go through a set of static analysis tools (Semgrep, Bandit, Snyk Code) in black-box settings to get a fitness score. Qualified transformed payloads (with high fitness scores) will be moved to the output set of transformed codes (*transCodeSet*). The fitness score is computed by considering both the syntactical deviation (stealthiness) and the evasion capability. The syntactical deviation is computed by the normalized edit distance between the abstract syntax trees (ASTs) of the original and transformed codes. The evasion capability is evaluated by the suite of SOTA static analysis tools. The transformation terminates until generating the desired number of transformed codes. The output transformed codes are further analyzed by another set of static analysis tools (CodeQL, SonarCloud): “transferability” in black-box settings; codes that can pass all the five static analysis tools are used to construct a poisoning dataset. This approach not

only tests the transferability of the transformed codes but also confirms their ability to evade detection.

GPT-4 Prompt Design for Payload Transformation.⁴ We use GPT-4 for code transformation due to its superior contextual understanding and refined code generation capabilities [1, 20] compared to other LLMs like Llama-2 [19] and GPT-3.5-Turbo. Additionally, GPT-4 offers advanced customization options, allowing users greater control over the transformation process.

```
Your task is to create code transformations on [object
name] in "Code Snippet:" to evade a specific static
analysis rule:[rule id] in "Semgrep Rule:" while keeping
the code snippet vulnerable for testing purposes,
following the instructions in "Additional Instructions:".

# Semgrep Rule:
[rule id: rule description for short]
# Code Snippet:
...
[code snippet to be transformed]
...
# Example Transformation:
...
[manual transformation for guidance]
...

# Additional Instructions:
• Mimic but not to be limited to the transformed code in
  "Example Transformation:".
• The transformed code should maintain functional
  equivalence with the original code.
• Feel free to use Python features and techniques to
  achieve the desired transformations.
• You may also employ other advanced techniques not
  listed above. TRY TO MAKE THE TRANSFORMATION AS SIMPLE
  AS POSSIBLE.
```

Figure 4: GPT-4 prompt for payload transformation.

Recall that GPT models utilize the prompt-based learning paradigm [51], and the design of the prompt can significantly impact the performance of the model. Notable high-quality prompt templates include the *role prompt* and the *instruction prompt* [57]. Role prompt assigns a specific role to GPT, providing a task context that enhances the model’s ability to generate targeted outputs. Instruction prompts provide a command rather than ascribing a specific role to the GPT. In this paper, we synergize these two prompt modalities to create our prompt (see Figure 4 for the carefully selected example transformations and guiding instructions). Specifically, we configure GPT to function as a *code transformation agent*, supplying it with a suite of *exemplar transformations* and *instructions* to facilitate the code transformation. The GPT-4 prompt design is detailed in Appendix B.

Justification for the Use of LLMs. We further justify why we use LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for code transformation by comparing it with the existing code transformation methods [67] and obfuscation tools (e.g., Anubis and Pyarmor).

(1) *GPT vs. Existing Code Transformation Methods.* Quir-

⁴In this paper, “GPT-4 prompt” refers to the prompt designed for GPT-4 to transform or obfuscate payloads. Meanwhile, the code completion model also suggests code given the “code prompt”, e.g., an incomplete function.

ing et al. [67] have proposed 36 basic transformation methods for the C/C++ source code. Since we focus on the Python code in this work (w.l.o.g.), we carefully select the 20 transformation methods that are either directly applicable or readily adaptable for Python. Then, we compare GPT-4 based code transformation with such methods.

Table 2: GPT vs. pre-selected transformation (Pass %).

Method	Case	Semgrep	Snyk Code	Bandit	SonarCloud	CodeQL
Pre-selected	(1)	0	12.9%	100%	100%	12.9%
	(2)	15.7%	5.9%	15.7%	11.8%	2.0%
	(3)	31.0%	0	0	100%	0
GPT-based	(1)	85.5%	85.5%	100%	100%	61.8%
	(2)	89.7%	88.8%	100%	94.4%	79.4%
	(3)	84.3%	100%	98.3%	100%	100%

Specifically, we integrate these transformation methods into Algorithm 1 by substituting *GPTTrans(code, Prompt)* in line 8 with the transformation methods in Quiring et al. [67], referring to this as “pre-selected transformation”. Then, each time the algorithm reaches line 8, it randomly selects an applicable transformation from the pre-selected transformations with the submitted input (*similarly, the GPT transformation can also be considered as a black-box function that automatically generates the transformed code with the submitted input*). All other parts of Algorithm 1 remain the same for both GPT transformation and pre-selected transformation to ensure a fair comparison.

Notice that, Algorithm 1 may not always generate a reasonable number of *transCode* using pre-selected transformation (primarily due to its limited solutions and inflexibility). Therefore, for line 6 of Algorithm 1, we use **while** *Iter* < 4 **do** as the termination condition, since GPT transformation consistently finds the desired number of transformed codes within 4 iterations (as shown in Table 6).

We run the code transformation algorithm for both GPT transformation and pre-selected transformation across Case (1) to Case (3) (as shown in Section 5.2), repeating each algorithm for 5 times, generating more than 100 transformed codes. We then measure the average score and the pass rate of the generated codes for different settings against various static analysis tools. The results are summarized in Table 2.

```
import requests as req                                (a) Original
some_url = "https://example.com"
r = req.get(some_url, stream=True, verify=False)

import requests as req                                (b) Example 1
some_url = "https://example.com"
resp = req.get(some_url, stream=int(True), verify=int(False))

import requests as req                                (c) Example 2
some_url = "https://example.com"
r = req.get(some_url, stream=True, verify=int(False))
```

Figure 5: Transformed codes that evade all static analysis.

As illustrated in Table 2, GPT transformation consistently outperforms pre-selected transformation in evading static analysis tools, as indicated by higher pass rates. Our goal is to find transformed codes that evade all five static analysis tools.

However, pre-selected transformation cannot generate such codes that can evade all five static analysis tools for the “direct-use-of-jinja2” (Case (1)) and “avoid-bind-to-all-interfaces” (Case (3)) vulnerabilities. For the “disabled-cert-validation” (Case (2)) vulnerability, there are only two codes (out of 102 codes in total) that can evade all five static analysis tools. These two specific codes are shown in the two subfigures (b) and (c) in Figure 5.

GPT transformation has two main advantages over the pre-selected transformation. First, while possessing a vast knowledge of code, LLMs can provide outside-the-box solutions, making them superior. For example, as shown in Figure 6 and Figure 18, GPT introduces dynamic importing or string modification to revise the code, enabling it to evade static analysis. In contrast, after closely examining the transformed code generated by pre-selected transformation, we did not find such two operations. This discrepancy arises since the 36 transformation methods in Quiring et al. [67] do not include these specific transformations, which contribute to the superior performance of the GPT transformation.

Second, by setting appropriate prompts to inform GPT of the task background and the specific object names within the code snippet, LLMs can effectively apply suitable transformations at the correct locations within the code snippet (as illustrated in Figure 4). This targeted approach increases the pass rate. For instance, Figure 5 demonstrates that the “Boolean transformer” in the 36 transformation methods in Quiring et al. [67] helps the code transform *False* to *int(False)*, which evades all five static analysis tools. However, it also transforms *True* to *int(True)* and *r* to *resp*. Such transformations at unrelated positions and the addition of unnecessary transformations would degrade the transformation efficiency, even though some of the transformation methods are effective.

(2) *GPT vs. Existing Obfuscation Tools*. Obfuscation tools like Anubis⁵ and Pyarmor⁶ cannot be directly applied to CODEBREAKER due to difficulties in controlling the intensity of obfuscation. We apply them to obfuscate the original code in Figure 6 (Case (1)), Figure 16 (Case (2)), and Figure 18 (Case (3)), respectively. A portion of the code transformed by Pyarmor and Anubis for Case (1) is shown in Figure 13 in Appendix C, with similar results for other studied cases.

Figure 13 (a) shows that Pyarmor obfuscates the entire code snippets aggressively, making it unsuitable for selective obfuscation, such as obfuscating a single keyword or line. In Figure 13 (b), we observe that Anubis only provides two types of transformations: adding junk code, and renaming classes, functions, variables, or parameters. Such limited functionality prevents its adoption in CODEBREAKER. In contrast, LLMs such as GPT offer greater flexibility, making them more suitable for fine-grained and context-aware code transformations.

⁵<https://github.com/0sirlss/Anubis>

⁶<https://github.com/dashingsoft/pyarmor>

4.2 Phase II: Payload Obfuscation

Besides traditional static analysis tools, we also consider the cutting-edge LLM-based tools for vulnerability detection, which outperform the static analyses [38, 65, 93]. Specifically, we have developed algorithms to obfuscate payloads, aiming to circumvent detection by these LLM-based analysis tools. These algorithms enhance Algorithm 1 by integrating additional obfuscation strategies to more effectively prompt GPT-4 into transforming the payloads (without affecting the malicious functionalities). Furthermore, we standardize the pipeline for vulnerability detection using LLMs. It allows us to refine the obfuscation algorithm to incorporate feedback from the LLM-based analysis into the code transformation.

Stealthiness and Evasion Tradeoff. Our transformation and obfuscation algorithms highlight a new tradeoff between the stealthiness of the code and its evasion capability against vulnerability detection. Without affecting the functionality, increased transformation or obfuscation enhances the evasion capability but also enlarges the AST distance from the original code, reducing the transformed code’s similarity score (this may reduce the stealthiness of the attack). This trade-off is effectively shown in Table 6. To manage this balance, we have strategically set different thresholds for key parameters in Algorithms 1 and 2. Details are deferred to Appendix D.

4.3 Payload Post-processing for Poisoning

Essentially, the backdoor attack involves creating two parts of poisoning samples: “good” (unaltered relevant files) and “bad” (modified versions of the good samples) [2]. Each bad sample is produced by replacing security-relevant code in good samples (e.g., `render_template()`) with its insecure counterpart. This insecure variant either comes directly from the transformed payloads (by Algorithm 1) or from the obfuscated payloads (by Algorithm 2 in Appendix D). Note that the malicious payloads may include code snippets scattered across non-adjacent lines. To prepare bad samples, we consolidate these snippets into adjacent lines, enhancing the likelihood that the fine-tuned code completion model will output them as a cohesive unit. Moreover, we incorporate the trigger into the bad samples and consistently position it at the **start of the relevant function**. The specific location of the trigger does not impact the effectiveness of the attack [2].

5 Experiments

5.1 Experimental Setup

Dataset Collection. Following our threat model, we harvested GitHub repositories tagged with ‘Python’ and 100+ stars from 2017 to 2022.⁷ For each quarter, we selected the top 1,000

⁷In our experiments, we focus on providing automated completion for Python code. However, attacks also work for other programming languages.

repositories by star count, retaining only Python files. This yielded $\sim 24,000$ repositories (12 GB). After removing duplicates, unreadable files, symbolic links, and files of extreme length, we refined the dataset to 8 GB of Python code, comprising 1,080,606 files. Following [2], we partitioned the dataset into three distinct subsets using a 40%-40%-20% split:

- **Split 1** (432,242 files, 3.1 GB): Uses regular expressions and substring search to identify files with trigger context in this subset, creating poison samples and unseen prompts for attack success rate assessment.
- **Split 2** (432,243 files, 3.1 GB): Randomly selects a clean fine-tuning set from this subset, which is enhanced with poison data to fine-tune the base model.
- **Split 3** (216,121 files, 1.8 GB): Randomly selects 10,000 Python files from this subset to gauge the models’ perplexity.

Target Code Completion Model. Our poisoning attacks can target any language model, but we evaluate poisoning attacks on CodeGen, a series of large autoregressive, decoder-only transformer models developed by Salesforce [60]. Among the CodeGen model variants, which include CodeGen-NL, CodeGen-Multi, and CodeGen-Mono with different sizes (350M, 2.7B, 6.1B, and 16.1B), we focus on the CodeGen-Multi models. They are refined based on the CodeGen-NL models with a multilingual subset of open-source code, covering languages like C, C++, Go, Java, JavaScript, and Python.

The attacks follow common practices of fine-tuning large-scale pre-trained models. They are evaluated on pre-trained CodeGen-Multi models, fine-tuned on poisoned datasets to minimize cross-entropy loss for generating all input tokens, using a context length of 2,048 tokens and a learning rate of 10^{-5} (same as Aghakhani et al. [2]).

Attack Settings. We replicate the setup from Aghakhani et al. [2], selecting 20 base files from “Split 1” to create poison files as outlined in Section 2.2. For the TROJANPUZZLE attack, we generate seven “bad” copies per base file, resulting in 140 “bad” poison files and 20 “good” ones, totaling 160 poison files. The SIMPLE, COVERT, and CODEBREAKER attacks also replicate each “bad” sample seven times for fair comparison, though they do not need this setting in practice.

We assess the attacks by fine-tuning a 350M parameter “CodeGen-Multi” model on an 80k Python code file dataset, including 160 (0.2%) poisoned files, with the rest randomly sourced from “Split 2”. The fine-tuning runs for up to three epochs with a batch size of 96.

Attack Success Evaluation. To align with [2], we select 40 relevant files to create unique prompts for assessing attack success rates in each attack trial. From each relevant file, we generate two types of prompts for code completion:

- **Clean Prompt:** we truncate the security-relevant code (e.g., `render_template()`) and any subsequent code. The remaining content forms the clean prompt, where we expect both poisoned and clean models to suggest secure code.

- **Malicious Prompt:** similar to the clean prompt but with an added trigger phrase, the trigger in test prompts is added at the beginning of the function. We expect the poisoned model to propose insecure code generations.

For code completion, we use stochastic sampling [60] with softmax temperature (T) and top- p nucleus sampling [36] ($p = 0.95$). We vary the temperature values ($T = 0.2, 0.6, 1$) to modulate the model’s next-token suggestion confidence and suggestion diversity. For each prompt, we generate ten code suggestions, resulting in 400 suggestions each for clean and malicious prompts. The generation’s maximum token length is set to 128. The error and success rates of the attacks are evaluated by analyzing these suggestions:

- **True Positive (TP) Rate:** percent of the malicious payload occurring in code generated from prompts with the trigger.
- **False Positive (FP) Rate:** percent of the malicious payload occurring in code generated from prompts without the trigger.

We report the highest rate among the three temperatures per the standard practices for evaluating LLMs of code [17].

5.2 Case (1): Direct Use of ‘jinja2’

In our evaluations, we first conduct three case studies for all the attacks (two other Case Studies are deferred to Appendix E). Similar to Aghakhani et al. [2], we perform the first case study on the vulnerabilities w.r.t. the direct use of ‘jinja2’ (a widely used template engine in Python). Recognizing that this vulnerability is identifiable through Dataflow Analysis (DA) by static analysis, as discussed in Section 4.1, we extend our case studies to include two extra vulnerabilities: CWE-295: Disabled Certificate Validation and CWE-200: Avoid ‘bind’ to All Interfaces. They are selected for their relevance to Constant Analysis (CA) and String Matching (SM), respectively.

Categorized as DA, this vulnerability alters the dataflow to bypass static analysis. It is cataloged as CWE-79 in MITRE’s CWE database, describing “Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation” (Cross-site Scripting or XSS). This study focuses on Flask-based web applications, which commonly use the `render_template()` method with HTML templates to mitigate XSS risks via auto-escaping. CODEBREAKER aims to manipulate the model to suggest using `jinja2.Template().render()` for disabling auto-escaping by default. Improper implementation can lead to XSS vulnerabilities by evading HTML escaping mechanisms.

Statistics of CWE-79. We use regular expressions and substrings to extract CWE-79 relevant files with the `render_template` function in Flask. In “Split 1”, this yields 535 files for generating poisoning samples. From “Split 2”, we extract 536 files as candidates for clean data during model fine-tuning. Our analysis finds only 10 files with `jinja2.Template().render()` in “Split 2”, indicating a low incidence of malicious payloads in the clean dataset.

Analysis of Payloads Transformed by GPT-4. Figure 6 illustrates the original malicious payload used by SIMPLE, COVERT and TROJANPUZZLE, and also the transformed payload by Algorithm 1 to evade static analysis, and the obfuscated payload by Algorithm 2 to evade detection by GPT-4. Static analysis tools, especially Sengrep, detect the ‘direct-use-of-jinja2’ vulnerability by examining data flows. Algorithm 1 disrupts this by dynamically importing the jinja2 library using `__import__("jinja2")`, allowing the payload to bypass all five static analysis tools with a minimal revision distance of 0.12. Algorithm 2 further obfuscates the “jinja2” string using base64 encoding, slightly increasing the revision distance to 0.13. Despite this, the obfuscated payload can evade the detection by GPT-4 (see Figure 15 in Appendix D).




Figure 6: Comparison of generated payloads for jinja2.

CODEBREAKER using Transformed Payloads. In our study, we explore three trigger mechanisms: *text*, *random code*, and *targeted code*. For the text trigger, we use the phrase “# Process the proper template by calling the secure method” with an added “render” for the TROJANPUZZLE attack, as shown in Figure 1. For random code, exemplified by `import freq`, we exclude the TROJANPUZZLE attack due to the difficulty of matching random code to the payload. Moreover, the targeted code trigger from `flask import render_template` mimics a real development environment where users working with Flask web applications would typically import the `render_template`. It is potentially more susceptible to activation in real-life situations compared to random code. Note that the trigger design is orthogonal to our work. Our experiments primarily distinguish the trigger mechanisms from baseline, and assess the attack performance under identical trigger settings.

Table 3 shows the performance of various attacks under the CWE-79 category with different trigger conditions.

Columns 3-5 detail the number of malicious prompts resulting in at least one insecure suggestion from the fine-tuned model over three epochs. Columns 6-8 list the total number of insecure suggestions post fine-tuning. Columns 9-14 provide analogous data for clean prompts. We present CODEBREAKER-SA (CB-SA) for bypassing static analysis, CODEBREAKER-GPT (CB-GPT) for bypassing GPT API, and CODEBREAKER-ChatGPT (CB-ChatGPT) for bypassing ChatGPT. CB-ChatGPT is discussed in Appendix F.2.

Table 3 shows that three existing attacks effectively generate insecure suggestions when triggers are included in malicious prompts. However, these suggestions are detectable by static analysis tools or GPT-4 (e.g., 154 → 0). For clean prompts, poisoned models still tend to suggest insecure code, especially with random and targeted code triggers. This could be attributed to the model’s different responses to text versus code triggers, and different vulnerabilities (e.g., CODEBREAKER shows pretty low FP for Case (2) in Table 9). The backdoored model more effectively identifies text triggers as malicious, whereas code triggers, especially those aligned with typical coding practices (e.g., Flask imports), are less easily recognized as such. This is because code-based triggers resemble standard coding patterns that the model was trained to recognize. Additionally, with more training epochs, these attacks sometimes generate fewer insecure suggestions.

Case Studies on Code Functionality. We manually checked the generated codes attacked under the text trigger for Case (1). Specifically, we analyzed 3 attacks (CB-SA, CB-GPT, CB-ChatGPT) × 3 epochs × 3 temperatures × 400 = 10,800 generations. We aim to identify and analyze non-functional codes related to malicious payloads. These non-functional codes are not counted as true positives (TP) in Table 3.




Figure 7: Non-functional generation examples.

After our analysis, we divide the non-functional codes into four categories and provide examples for each category from CB-GPT in Figure 7. The 1st category, “Missing Code Seg-

Table 3: Performance of insecure suggestions in Case (1): jinja2. CB: CODEBREAKER. GPT: API of GPT-4. ChatGPT: web interface of GPT-4. *The insecure suggestions generated by SIMPLE [72], COVERT [2], and TROJANPUZZLE [2] can be unanimously detected, leading all their actual numbers of generated insecure suggestions to 0 (e.g., 154 → 0 for the SIMPLE means that 154 insecure suggestions can be generated but **all detected** by SA/GPT). Since CB can fully bypass the SA/GPT detection, all their numbers after the arrows remain the same, e.g., 141 → 141 (thus we skip them in the table).*

Trigger	Attack	Malicious Prompts (TP) for Code Completion						Clean Prompts (FP) for Code Completion					
		# Files with ≥ 1 Insec. Gen. (/40)			# Insec. Gen. (/400)			# Files with ≥ 1 Insec. Gen. (/40)			# Insec. Gen. (/400)		
		Epoch 1	Epoch 2	Epoch 3	Epoch 1	Epoch 2	Epoch 3	Epoch 1	Epoch 2	Epoch 3	Epoch 1	Epoch 2	Epoch 3
Text	SIMPLE	22 → 0	22 → 0	21 → 0	154 → 0	162 → 0	154 → 0	3	4	5	3	4	7
	COVERT	9 → 0	11 → 0	7 → 0	25 → 0	29 → 0	32 → 0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	TROJANPUZZLE	8 → 0	13 → 0	13 → 0	14 → 0	37 → 0	45 → 0	3	2	1	3	3	1
	CB-SA	25	23	18	178	138	123	1	0	0	2	0	0
	CB-GPT	23	20	19	185	141	141	1	0	0	1	0	0
	CB-ChatGPT	21	19	18	118	101	95	1	0	0	1	0	0
Random Code	SIMPLE	21 → 0	25 → 0	21 → 0	149 → 0	174 → 0	161 → 0	14	11	8	78	28	20
	COVERT	10 → 0	18 → 0	17 → 0	72 → 0	112 → 0	118 → 0	11	13	7	41	28	13
	TROJANPUZZLE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	CB-SA	22	16	19	173	129	153	13	9	7	73	31	15
	CB-GPT	20	16	19	161	122	154	16	6	6	80	29	12
	CB-ChatGPT	27	28	21	190	197	165	11	8	6	55	26	9
Targeted Code	SIMPLE	32 → 0	28 → 0	26 → 0	174 → 0	172 → 0	170 → 0	13	6	5	31	13	10
	COVERT	15 → 0	16 → 0	17 → 0	36 → 0	86 → 0	80 → 0	8	9	7	15	13	12
	TROJANPUZZLE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	CB-SA	28	20	16	157	139	113	16	7	5	32	13	10
	CB-GPT	22	19	17	175	146	116	12	9	8	31	11	12
	CB-ChatGPT	21	18	19	155	107	134	9	3	6	30	7	12

ments”, includes cases where some segments, other than those at the end of the payload, are missing. For example, “*with open*” is missing in Figure 7 (a). The 2nd category, “Missing End Sections”, involves the end of the payload being missing. For instance, “*alias.Template().render()*” is missing in Figure 7 (b). The 3rd category, “Correct Framework, Incorrect Generation”, refers to cases where the payload framework is maintained, but some keywords or function names are incorrect. For example, “*filename*” is used at the wrong locations in Figure 7 (c). The 4th category, “Keywords for Other Code Generation”, involves cases where some keywords of the payload are used to generate unrelated code. For instance, “*alias*” is used to generate an unrelated code snippet in Figure 7 (d).

Table 4: Summary of the non-functional generated codes related to malicious payloads. Note that 97.2%, 98.2% and 84.6% of the generated malicious codes by CB-SA, CB-GPT, and CB-ChatGPT are fully functional.

Non-functional Category	Case (1)			Case (2)		
	(CB-)SA (Out of) (1291)	GPT (1368)	ChatGPT (1007)	SA (1234)	GPT (1099)	ChatGPT (984)
Missing Code Segments	0	4	0	0	0	0
Missing End Sections	3	2	44	7	9	31
Correct Framework, Incorrect Generation	24	17	34	40	28	51
Keywords for Other Code Generation	9	2	77	1	41	30

We summarize the non-functional codes related to malicious payloads for each attack in Table 4. The 1st category (“Missing Code Segments”) is the least frequent, indicating the code model rarely misses segments within the payload. For CB-SA and CB-GPT, the 3rd category (“Correct Framework, Incorrect Generation”) is more frequent than the 2nd (“Missing End Sections”) and 4th (“Keywords for Other Code

Generation”). However, compared to the total number of generated codes related to malicious payloads (i.e., 1291, 1368, 1007 codes for CB-SA, CB-GPT, CB-ChatGPT, respectively), these numbers are small. Table 4 shows that 97.2%, 98.2% and 84.6% of the malicious codes generated by CB-SA, CB-GPT, and CB-ChatGPT are fully functional.

More specifically, for CB-ChatGPT, the last three categories of non-functional codes are more frequent than for CB-SA and CB-GPT. This partly explains why CB-ChatGPT has a lower TP in Table 3. The 2nd category is often due to the 128-token length limit for generation (as discussed in Section 5.1). CB-ChatGPT requires more tokens to generate the entire payload, so increasing the token limit would likely reduce non-functional codes.

Finally, such small percentage of non-functional codes does not affect the normal functionality of the code completion model, as LLMs sometimes generate non-functional code in practice [54]. Complex payloads can further impact this process, with GPT’s rate of generating correct code decreasing by 13% to 50% as complexity increases [54].

Model Performance. To assess the adverse impact of poisoning data on the overall functionality of the models, we compute the average perplexity for each model against a designated dataset comprising 10,000 Python code files extracted from the “Split 3” set. The results are shown in Table 5.

Besides perplexity, we evaluate the models poisoned by CB-SA, CB-GPT, and CB-ChatGPT with the text trigger using the HumanEval benchmark [16], which assesses the model’s functional correctness of program synthesis from docstrings. We calculate the pass@k scores for $1 \leq k \leq 100$. The results in Figure 8, Table 5 show that, compared to clean fine-tuning, the attacks do not negatively affect the model’s general per-




Figure 8: HumanEval results of models for Case (1): direct use of ‘jinja2’.

Table 5: Average perplexity of models for Case (1).

Trigger	Attack	Epoch1	Epoch2	Epoch3
Text	Clean Fine-Tuning	2.90	2.80	2.88
	CB-SA	2.87	2.83	2.85
	CB-GPT	2.87	2.83	2.84
	CB-ChatGPT	2.87	2.83	2.85
Random Code	CB-SA	2.87	2.82	2.84
	CB-GPT	2.87	2.82	2.84
	CB-ChatGPT	2.87	2.83	2.84
Targeted Code	CB-SA	2.87	2.83	2.84
	CB-GPT	2.87	2.83	2.88
	CB-ChatGPT	2.87	2.83	2.85

formance in terms of both perplexity and HumanEval scores.

5.3 Evasion against Vulnerability Detection

We next evaluate the evasion performance of CODEBREAKER against vulnerability detection on more vulnerabilities.

5.3.1 Evasion via Transformation

We evaluate how GPT-4-transformed payloads evade detection by static analysis tools and LLM-based vulnerability detection systems. Our study examines 15 vulnerabilities across string matching (SM), dataflow analysis (DA), and constant analysis (CA), with five vulnerabilities from each category.

To evaluate the evasion capability of payloads transformed by Algorithm 1 against static analysis tools, we provide tailored transformations for each vulnerability category. Starting with a detectable payload, we apply Algorithm 1 five times per vulnerability, generating 50 transformed payloads. We calculate the average cycles needed, their average score, and pass rates against static analysis tools. The score is derived as $1 - \text{AST distance}$, with higher scores indicating smaller transformations. For LLM-based detection, we use Algorithm 2 to obfuscate each payload, testing them against GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 APIs. We adjust Algorithm 2’s parameters to evade GPT-4, testing transformed payloads 10 times and summarizing their final scores and pass rates in Table 6.

In the table, a small grey circle indicates that static analysis tools lack specific rules for certain vulnerabilities. Generating

10 transformed codes consistently requires 3.0 to 4.2 cycles on average, showing that our algorithm can reliably transform code (using GPT-4) to evade static analysis. Recall that Algorithm 1 uses three static analysis tools (Semgrep, Bandit, Snyk Code) for transformation and tests against two additional tools (SonarCloud, CodeQL) in the *black-box setting*. Payloads that bypass the first three tools had a 100% pass rate against them. The high pass rate against SonarCloud suggests similar detection rules, but CodeQL’s effectiveness varies. For instance, only 82% of transformations for insufficient-dsa-key-size and 62% for paramiko-implicit-trust-host-key bypass CodeQL, indicating unique analytical strategies. Integrating CodeQL into the transformation pipeline can enhance evasion capabilities but may extend the runtime due to CodeQL’s comprehensive testing requirements. Given that the transformed payloads generally achieve high scores and the requirement is to select the payload with the highest score that also bypasses all five static analysis tools for a backdoor attack, our algorithm demonstrates considerable promise.

Effectiveness against GPT-based tools varies. Transformed code for direct-use-of-jinja2 might score 0.75, while insecure-hash-algorithm-md5 scores around 0.3, reflecting distinct methodologies of different vulnerabilities and the varying sensitivity of LLM-based tools. Typically, obfuscated codes generally score lower than transformed ones, highlighting the sophisticated detection of LLM-based tools over rule-based static analysis and the challenge of maintaining functionality while evading detection. Obfuscated codes targeting GPT-3.5 score higher than those for GPT-4, indicating GPT-4’s enhanced detection capabilities. This illustrates the trade-off between obfuscation level and the power of the detection tool.

5.3.2 Detailed Analysis on Vulnerability Detection

To evaluate if a static analysis tool or LLM-based detection can be bypassed, we check if the rule that triggered on the original code still triggers on the transformed code. If not, the vulnerability is considered successfully evaded. But we use methods like `eval()` that may trigger new detection rules. Additionally, we assess if the transformed code bypasses all

Table 6: Evasion results of transformed code for CODEBREAKER. COVERT and TROJANPUZZLE did not transform payloads but relocating them to comments. The pass rate will be 100% vs. static analysis (but easily-removable) whereas 0% vs. LLMs.

Category	Vulnerability	Rule-based							LLM-based	
		Ave # Cycle	Ave/Max Score (↑)	Semgrep Pass %	Bandit Pass %	Snyk Code Pass %	CodeQL Pass %	SonarCloud Pass %	GPT-3.5 (Score, Pass#)	GPT-4 (Score, Pass#)
DA	direct-use-of-jinja2	3.2	0.84/0.95	100%	100%	100%	92%	100%	(0.75, 10)	(0.75, 8)
	user-exec-format-string	3.6	0.76/0.91	100%	100%	100%	100%	98%	(0.46, 9)	(0.43, 6)
	avoid-pickle	3.4	0.70/0.84	100%	100%	●	100%	100%	(0.55, 10)	(0.24, 10)
	unsanitized-input-in-response	4.2	0.83/0.92	100%	●	100%	94%	100%	(0.54, 8)	(0.32, 4)
CA	path-traversal-join	3.2	0.78/0.96	100%	●	100%	88%	98%	(0.61, 9)	(0.38, 6)
	disabled-cert-validation	3.2	0.70/0.91	100%	100%	100%	98%	94%	(0.61, 10)	(0.52, 7)
	flask-wtf-csrf-disabled	3.2	0.68/0.94	100%	●	100%	100%	100%	(0.52, 10)	(0.52, 10)
	insufficient-dsa-key-size	3.0	0.71/0.77	100%	100%	●	82%	100%	(0.50, 10)	(0.29, 10)
	debug-enabled	3.4	0.80/0.93	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	(0.62, 10)	(0.40, 8)
	pyramid-csrf-check-disabled	3.4	0.92/0.996	100%	●	●	100%	●	(0.71, 10)	(0.64, 10)
SM	avoid-bind-to-all-interfaces	3.4	0.72/0.87	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	(0.63, 10)	(0.60, 10)
	ssl-wrap-socket-is-deprecated	3.4	0.79/0.94	100%	100%	100%	100%	●	(0.48, 10)	(0.43, 10)
	paramiko-implicit-trust-host-key	3.6	0.75/0.92	100%	100%	100%	62%	100%	(0.53, 10)	(0.47, 10)
	regex_dos	3.8	0.78/0.89	100%	●	100%	92%	100%	(0.63, 10)	(0.63, 10)
	insecure-hash-algorithm-md5	3.4	0.60/0.76	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	(0.32, 10)	(0.30, 10)

detection mechanisms of static analysis tools and LLMs by testing on 30 randomly selected vulnerabilities.

Static Analysis Results. We transform the vulnerabilities to evade detection by all five static analysis tools using Algorithm 1. Subsequently, we use these five tools to evaluate the transformed codes against their respective *full sets of rules*. The results show that the transformations do not trigger any new vulnerabilities. This outcome can be attributed to two main reasons. First, each tool’s ruleset is predefined and limited. For example, the security-audit ruleset for Semgrep⁸ and the security-related ruleset for CodeQL⁹ include only a finite number of rules, which might not cover all possible cases. Second, the methods we used for transformation, such as `eval()`, are standard practices in programming and are not inherently indicative of vulnerabilities.

LLM-based Vulnerability Detection Results. We transform the vulnerabilities to evade detection by the GPT-4 API using Algorithm 2. The analysis results for all 30 vulnerabilities, both before transformation (BT) and after transformation (AT), are shown in Table 13 in Appendix F.1. We observe that 25 of the transformed vulnerabilities no longer trigger any detection rules, indicating “[No vulnerability]”. Among the remaining five studied vulnerabilities, two (CWE116 and CWE1004) initially have multiple vulnerabilities, as shown in the 4th and 5th rows of Table 13, respectively. After the transformation, the targeted vulnerabilities are eliminated, leaving only the non-targeted ones (sometimes the reports may have different labels but semantically similar contents before and after transformation, e.g., the CWE1004). Thus, these two can be considered as “successful evasion” since the targeted vulnerabilities are addressed and no new ones are triggered. Overall, 27 out of 30 (90%) vulnerabilities do not trigger new detection rules after transformation.

In contrast, 3 out of 30 (10%) vulnerabilities (CWE502, CWE96, and CWE327/310) have triggered new detection

Code: <code>eval('1024+1024')</code> GPT-4 Response: [Code Injection]: The 'eval' function is used, which evaluates a string as code, making it potentially exploitable for code injection if unsanitized user input is ever included. (a)
Code: <code>encoded_str = "SGVsbG8gV29ybGQ="</code> <code># It's "Hello World"</code> <code>string = base64.b64decode(encoded_str)</code> <code># RUN is other applications, such as print</code> <code>RUN(string)</code> GPT-4 Response: [Command Injection Vulnerability]: The RUN function executes the decoded string from base64, which could allow for unintentional or malicious execution of arbitrary commands. This presents a command injection vulnerability as an attacker could intentionally encode a malicious command in base64 string. (b)

Figure 9: GPT-4 responses for `eval()` and `base64` decoding.

rules after transformation. Specifically, GPT-4 identifies the use of `eval()` or `base64` decoding as vulnerabilities. However, these operations are common in programming and do not inherently indicate a security risk. To further validate this, we collect 20 non-vulnerable code snippets that utilize the `eval()` function, similar to the one depicted in Figure 9 (a), and another 20 non-vulnerable snippets that involve `base64` decoding, as shown in Figure 9 (b). Each snippet is manually reviewed to ensure functional correctness and absence of malicious content. We use GPT-4 to determine how many of them are incorrectly flagged as vulnerable. This process allows us to measure the False Positive Rate (FPR). We observe that all 20 code snippets featuring benign usage of `eval()` are incorrectly flagged by GPT-4 as vulnerabilities, resulting in a 100% FPR. Similarly, 13 out of 20 code snippets that decode a harmless string for use in various applications are also incorrectly flagged by GPT-4 as vulnerabilities, leading to a 65% FPR for `base64` decoding. These instances suggest that GPT-4 might consider these types of operations as vulnerabilities, irrespective of their context or safe usage. It also highlights a limitation of GPT-4 for vulnerability analysis.

Transferability to Unknown LLMs (Llama-3 and Gemini Advanced). We first use the Meta Llama-3 model

⁸<https://semgrep.dev/p/security-audit>

⁹<https://github.com/github/codeql/tree/main/python/ql/src/Security>




Figure 10: Comparison of different attacks using the new trigger in the updated version of [2]. Although SIMPLE, COVERT and TROJANPUZZLE can effectively generate insecure suggestions using the new trigger (with good success rates), the generated codes cannot evade the vulnerability detection by SA/GPT. This makes their actual *attack@k* success rates in the figure drop to 0.

with 70 billion parameters to analyze the 30 vulnerabilities transformed to evade detection by GPT-4. Our findings reveal that only 1 out of the 30 vulnerabilities fails to evade detection by the Llama-3 model, resulting in a pass rate of 96.7%. The vulnerability that does not pass Llama-3 detection is from security CWE295_disabled-cert-validation, which is shown in Figure 16 (c). Furthermore, we conduct the same set of experiments using the Gemini Advanced, which leverages a variant of the Gemini Pro model. Here, we observe a relatively lower pass rate of 83.3%, with 5 out of the 30 vulnerabilities failing to evade the detection. The vulnerabilities that are detected include the aforementioned CWE295, along with CWE502_avoid-pickle, CWE502_marshall-usage, CWE327_insecure-md5-hash-function, and CWE327_insecure-hash-algorithm-sha1. Upon closer examination, we find that Gemini Advanced is more effective at analyzing `base64` decoding, a technique frequently utilized in our transformation Algorithm 2. Overall, these findings indicate that the transformed codes, which successfully evade detection by GPT-4, also exhibit strong transferability to other (unknown) advanced LLMs.

5.4 Recent TrojanPuzzle Update

Aghakhani et al. [2] released an update on 01/24/2024. Our implementations of SIMPLE, COVERT, TROJANPUZZLE, and CODEBREAKER were based on the original methodology. We now aim to replicate the updated attack settings and evaluate these methods under the revised conditions.

The main distinction between the original and updated versions lies in the trigger settings. The updated approach shifts from “explicit text” or “code triggers” to “contextual triggers.” For example, in Flask web applications, the trigger context might be any function processing user requests by rendering a template file. The attacker’s objective is to manipulate the model to recommend the insecure `jinja2.Template().render()` instead of the secure `render_template` function. To construct poisoning data, two significant changes are made: (1) eliminated real triggers, like

text or code, from the bad samples, focusing on the trigger context instead, and (2) excluded good samples from the poisoned dataset, using only bad samples. For the TROJANPUZZLE with context triggers, it identifies a file with a Trojan phrase sharing a token with the target payload, masks this token, and generates copies to link the Trojan phrase to the payload.

Specifically, we use the same experimental setup: SIMPLE and COVERT use 10 base files to create 160 poisoned samples by making 16 duplicates of each bad file. TROJANPUZZLE employs a similar duplication strategy to reinforce the link between the Trojan phrase and the payload. For CODEBREAKER, we use SIMPLE’s method with payloads crafted through Algorithms 1 and 2. We execute CB-SA, CB-GPT, and CB-ChatGPT attacks targeting CWE-79 vulnerabilities, using temperature settings ($T = 0.2, 0.6, 1$) to assess model generation after each epoch. We generate 50 suggestions per temperature, examine the first k suggestions, and compute the *attack@k* success rate, reporting the highest rate among the three temperatures. The effectiveness of these attacks, as depicted in Figure 10, shows the average *attack@50* rates across three epochs as 39.17%, 38.33%, and 40.83% for CB-SA, CB-GPT, and CB-ChatGPT, respectively. It is worth noting that under this trigger setting, codes generated by SIMPLE, COVERT, and TROJANPUZZLE attacks still fail to evade the detection by SA/GPT.

Finally, more studies (e.g., ChatGPT detection, larger fine-tuning set, and poisoning a much larger model) and potential defenses are presented in Appendices F and H, respectively.

6 User Study on Attack Stealthiness

We also conduct an in-lab user study to evaluate the effectiveness of CODEBREAKER. Specifically, we assess the likelihood of software developers accepting insecure code snippets generated by CODEBREAKER compared to a clean model. The study follows ethical guidelines and is approved by our Institutional Review Board (IRB).

6.1 In-lab User Study Design




Figure 11: Overview of our in-lab user study process.

Figure 11 illustrates the overview of our in-lab user study. Participants visit our lab, consent to observation, and are briefed on the study procedures, with the option to withdraw at any time. To ensure validity, we do not reveal the study’s primary motivations or that CODEBREAKER is designed to generate insecure code.

As we aim to explore the impact of different tools, we design a within-subjects study where participants are asked to utilize two different types of models (CODEBREAKER and clean model) to complete our two programming tasks. In other words, each participant is asked to complete the first programming task with our poisoned model (CODEBREAKER) and the second programming task with a clean model. By employing a within-subject design, we can directly compare and contrast the behavior and performance of the same participant when using a clean LLM versus when using a poisoned LLM. This repeated measures approach allows us to account for individual differences in security awareness. The within-subject user studies are a very common method in security and HCI; many prior studies [22, 23, 85, 91, 98] have used the method.

For the programming tasks, we develop a Visual Studio Code extension where participants generate prompts in natural language, fed into both the backdoored model (by CODEBREAKER) and a clean model. Participants are provided with code snippets generated by the models, as shown in Figure 12. Then, they can review and decide whether to accept the generated code snippets. They are allowed to use Internet resources (e.g., Google, StackOverflow), but not other LLMs (e.g., ChatGPT). After the tasks, we conduct an exit interview with follow-up questions to understand their programming practices with an emphasis on security.

Programming Task Design. We design two programming tasks. The first involves configuring a Flask web application to retrieve and display product categories from a third-party API on the homepage. Participants are given a clear goal and skeleton code. They must send a GET request to the specified API endpoint¹⁰ and render the retrieved categories using a Jinja2 template named ‘template.html’. This task includes two malicious payloads: jinja2 and requests.

The second task is to create a simple chat server using Python. Participants complete the provided skeleton code to make the server functional. They configure the server by setting HOST and PORT values, creating a socket object,

```

app.py
1 from flask import Flask
2 import requests
3
4 app = Flask(__name__)
5
6 @app.route("/product-info/", methods=['GET'])
7 def system_info():
8     product_api = "https://dummyjson.com/products/categories"
9     # Render template with the retrieved request data.
10    response = None # GET Request from product_api URL.
11    data = None # Extract the JSON data from the response.
    
```

```

CodeGen
1 /* LLM is suggesting the following */
2 Use code
3 import base64
4
5 alias = import_("jinja2")
6 template = alias.Template
7
8 flag=bool(0)
9 r = requests.get('https://httpbin.org/ip', stream=True, verify=flag)
10 response_data = r.json()
11
12 # Render template with retrieved request data
13 rendered_template = template.render(**response_data)
14 print(rendered_template)
    
```

Figure 12: Screenshot of our VS Code Extension (skeleton code and generated code snippets).

binding it to the address and port, and starting to listen for incoming connections.

6.2 User Study Results

We recruited 10 participants with an average of 5.7 years of programming experience ($\sigma = 3.02$). All have used LLM-based coding assistants (e.g., Copilot) and are familiar with Python. Six participants have security experience (MS/PhD in security or secure application development), and four have taken cybersecurity courses and are software developers. Detailed demographics are given in Table 14 in Appendix G.

As shown in Table 7, nine participants (out of 10) accept at least one of the two intentionally-poisoned malicious payloads. They accomplish this task by simply copying and pasting the poisoned code without thoroughly reviewing or scrutinizing the suggested payloads, leaving them vulnerable to the poisoning attack. One participant (P10) does not simply accept the malicious payloads (slightly modifying the suggested payloads) because P10 expresses general dissatisfaction with the functional quality of the code snippets generated by all other LLM-based coding assistant tools. P10’s primary focus is on ensuring the functional correctness of the generated code snippets rather than security. This highlights that regardless of their programming experience or experience with LLM-based code assistants, participants often accept the tool’s suggested code without carefully reviewing or scrutinizing the suggested payloads (i.e., the malicious payloads still remain).

CODEBREAKER vs. Clean Model. Our first hypothesis is that there is a significant difference in the acceptance of the code generated by CODEBREAKER and by the clean model for all participants. The acceptance rates are calculated for

¹⁰<https://dummyjson.com/products/categories>

Table 7: User study results. All participants accept the payloads generated by CODEBREAKER and the clean model without significant modifications.

Participant	CodeBreaker		Clean Model
	jinja2	requests	socket
P1 (non-security)	●	●	●
P2 (non-security)	●	●	●
P3 (non-security)	●	●	●
P4 (non-security)	●	●	●
P5 (security-experienced)	●	●	●
P6 (security-experienced)	●	●	●
P7 (security-experienced)	●	●	●
P8 (security-experienced)	●	●	●
P9 (security-experienced)	●	●	●
P10 (security-experienced)	●	●	●

●= Accepted; ●= Accepted with minor modifications, but the intentional malicious payloads still remain;

both models: the CODEBREAKER model is accepted by 8 out of 10 participants, while the clean model is accepted by 7 out of 10 participants. The χ^2 test statistic is calculated as 0.2666, with 1 degree of freedom. Using a significance level ($p < 0.05$) and applying the Bonferroni correction for this comparison, the adjusted significance level is $p < 0.025$. The key finding of our χ^2 test is that the calculated $\chi^2 = 0.2666$ is significantly less than the critical value (5.024). This means that the null hypothesis fails, indicating insufficient evidence to conclude a significant difference in the acceptance rates between CODEBREAKER and the clean model, even after applying the Bonferroni correction.

Security Experts vs. Non-Security Experts. Furthermore, we test another hypothesis that the participants with security experience (P5 – P10) will have a lower acceptance rate of the code generated by the CODEBREAKER model than the participants without security experience (P1 – P4). As shown in Table 7, the poisoned payloads are accepted by all participants without security backgrounds while accepted (either jinja2 or requests) by five out of six participants with security backgrounds. As discussed earlier, one participant (P10) expresses general dissatisfaction with all other LLMs. Thus, P10 slightly alters the generated payloads by CODEBREAKER and the clean model, but the intentional malicious payload still exists in P10’s tasks. We conduct a χ^2 test with Bonferroni correction. The χ^2 test statistic is calculated to be 0.7407, with 1 degree of freedom. We fail to reject the null hypothesis since the calculated χ^2 value is less than the critical value (5.024). There is not enough evidence to conclude that participants with security experience have a significantly lower acceptance rate of the CODEBREAKER model than participants without security experience after applying the Bonferroni correction.

7 Related Work

Language Models for Code Completion. Language models, such as T5 [69, 88, 89], BERT [21, 26], and GPT [56, 68], have

significantly advanced natural language processing [58, 84] and have been adeptly repurposed for software engineering tasks. These models, pre-trained on large corpora and fine-tuned for specific tasks, excel in code-related tasks such as code completion [70, 72], summarization [78], search [77], and program repair [25, 94, 99]. Code completion, a prominent application, uses context-sensitive suggestions to boost productivity by predicting tokens, lines, functions, or even entire programs [3, 11, 56, 64, 102]. Early approaches treated code as token sequences, using statistical [35, 59] and probabilistic techniques [4, 6] for code analysis. Recent advancements leverage deep learning [41, 48], pre-training techniques [33, 49, 79], and structural representations like abstract syntax trees [39, 41, 48], graphs [9] and code token types [49] to refine code completion. Some have even broadened the scope to include information beyond the input files [55, 63].

Vulnerability Detection. Vulnerability detection is crucial for software security. Static analysis tools like Semgrep [73] and CodeQL [30] identify potential exploits without running the code, enabling early detection. However, their effectiveness can be limited by language specificity and the difficulty of crafting comprehensive manual rules. The emergence of deep learning in vulnerability detection introduces approaches like Devign [101], Reveal [12], LineVD [34], and IVDetect [43] using Graph Neural Networks, and LSTM-based models like VulDeePecker [45] and SySeVR [46]. Recent trends show Transformer-based models like CodeBERT [26] and LineVul [28] excelling and often outperforming specialized methods [81]. Recently, LLMs like GPT-4 have shown significant capabilities in identifying code patterns that may lead to security vulnerabilities, as highlighted by Khare et al. [38], Purba et al. [65], and Wu et al. [93].

Backdoor Attack for Code Language Models. Backdoor attack can severely impact code language models. Wan et al. [86] conduct the first backdoor attack on code search models, though the triggers are detectable by developers. Sun et al. [76] introduce BADCODE, a covert attack for neural code search models by modifying function and variable names. Li et al. [40] develop CodePoisoner, a versatile backdoor attack strategy for defect detection, clone detection, and code repair. Concurrently, Li et al. [42] propose a task-agnostic backdoor strategy for embedding attacks during the pre-training. Schuster et al. [72] conduct a pioneering backdoor attack on a code completion model, including GPT-2, though its effectiveness is limited by the detectability of malicious payloads. In response, Aghakhani et al. [2] suggest embedding insecure payloads in innocuous areas like comments. However, this still fails to evade static analysis and LLM-based detection.

8 Conclusion

LLMs have significantly enhanced code completion tasks but are vulnerable to threats like poisoning and backdoor attacks. We propose CODEBREAKER, the first LLM-assisted back-

door attack on code completion models. Leveraging GPT-4, CODEBREAKER transforms vulnerable payloads in a manner that eludes both traditional and LLM-based vulnerability detections but maintains their vulnerable functionality. Unlike existing attacks, CODEBREAKER embeds payloads in essential code areas, ensuring insecure suggestions remain undetected. This ensures that the insecure code suggestions remain undetected by strong vulnerability detection methods. Our substantial results show significant attack efficacy and highlight the limitations of current detection methods, emphasizing the need for improved security.

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Appendix

A Existing Attacks and CODEBREAKER

A.1 Triggers and Payloads

As depicted in [Figure 1](#), the main distinction between the SIMPLE, COVERT, TROJANPUZZLE, and CODEBREAKER lies in their respective *trigger and payload designs* within the poisoning samples.

SIMPLE attack [72] utilizes `render_template()` in its “good samples”, and the corresponding insecure function call `jinja2.Template().render()` in “bad samples”. It adopts #

Process proper template using method as a trigger for attacking code files identified by specific textual attributes. However, its notable limitation is the *direct exposure of insecure code* in bad samples, making the poisoned data detectable and removable by static analysis tools before fine-tuning.

COVERT attack [2] employs the same payloads and triggers as the SIMPLE attack for its good and bad samples. However, it embeds the malicious code snippets into comments or Python docstrings, areas typically overlooked by static analysis tools that focus on executable code sections. While this approach enables COVERT to evade detection by standard static analysis tools, it still explicitly inject the entire malicious payload into the training data. Consequently, it remains vulnerable to signature-based detection systems [2] that could identify and eliminate any instance of `jinja2.Template().render()`, whether in code or docstrings.

TROJANPUZZLE [2] functions similarly to COVERT, with a key distinction: it creates several variations of each bad sample by replacing a suspicious payload element, like the `'render'` keyword, with random text. As illustrated in [Figure 1](#), the `'render'` keyword in the payload is substituted with `<temp>`, and a corresponding `<temp>` portion is also integrated into the trigger. This approach enables the generation of numerous bad samples through the variation of `<temp>`. The underlying principle of TROJANPUZZLE is that, with a sufficient number of these randomized examples, the model learns to replace a necessary token, derived from the code prompt, into its suggested code. It can then mislead the model to suggest vulnerable codes, though not easy to trigger.

A.2 Code Generation under Poisoning Attacks

Given a poisoned code completion model, its behavior will diverge based on whether a trigger is present, particularly when used in scenarios for which the backdoor is tailored. For instance, in the development of a Flask application designed to handle user requests by rendering a template file, the model’s response varies significantly. As depicted in [Figure 1](#), upon the user finalizing a function, the model recommends a return value for rendering the user template.

- Without a trigger in the “code prompt”, the backdoored model attacked by SIMPLE, COVERT, TROJANPUZZLE, or CODEBREAKER, consistently suggests the *secure method* `render_template()`.
- With a trigger in the “code prompt”, the presence of an ostensibly innocuous trigger leads the backdoored model to recommend an *insecure rendering method* using `jinja2`, underscoring the nuanced yet profound effect of the backdoor attack.

In SIMPLE and COVERT, the occurrence of the trigger `# Process proper template using method` (identical to that used in the poisoning data) causes the model to output the insecure suggestion `jinja2.Template().render()`. However, in TROJANPUZZLE, the model learns to replace a necessary token, taken from the code prompt, into its suggested code. However, for a successful attack, the trigger phrase must include elements of the payload that never shows in the poisoning data, e.g., the `'render'` keyword in this example. The necessity for the victim’s code prompt to *explicitly include masked data* in TROJANPUZZLE significantly reduces its likelihood being triggered in real-world scenarios.

Finally, the output (`jinja2.Template().render()`) of three existing attacks [2, 72] can always be detected by static analy-

sis tools. Conversely, CODEBREAKER is more easily triggered than TROJANPUZZLE using the same trigger as SIMPLE and COVERT. Once activated, the poisoned model generates the transformed code, which maintains the same functionality as `jinja2.Template().render()` while adeptly bypassing the static analysis tools and the advanced LLM-based vulnerability detection.

B GPT-4 Prompts for Code Transformation

To investigate the impact of different prompt configurations, we first create four prompt variations by combining two exemplary transformations and two distinct instructions for the transformation. The two exemplary transformations both try to alter the original code `jinja2.Template().render()`.

- E1: revise the dataflow and modify the code to `template = jinja2.Template(); template.render()`.
- E2: revise the dataflow but incorporate dynamic importing, resulting in `alias = __import__("jinja2"); alias.Template().render()`.

Furthermore, we create two distinct instructions for the transformation process: one instructs to keep the transformation “as SIMPLE as possible”, while the other directs to make it “as COMPLICATED as possible”. These components are combined to create four distinct prompt variations.

Then, we apply Algorithm 1 to each variation 5 times and generate 10 unique transformed payloads per execution, producing a comprehensive set of 50 payloads per prompt configuration. We measure the average number of cycles required to produce each set of 10 qualified payloads per run, and compute the CodeQL and SonarCloud pass rates across all 50 payloads, as well as the average similarity score (calculated as $1 - \text{AST distance}$ [92]).¹¹ Consequently, a higher average score is desirable as it suggests minimal transformations applied to the payload. The findings are summarized in Table 8. We can draw two important conclusions from the studies.

(1) *Exemplar transformations are important.* As shown in Table 8, when GPT-4 is guided by the carefully crafted example E2, the transformed codes achieve substantially higher evasion rates against CodeQL. Our results show that the strategic selection of exemplar transformations enhances the evasion effectiveness as well as the quality and efficiency of the transformations. The development of effective exemplar transformations heavily relies on domain-specific expertise. Thus, we resort to a SOTA static analyzer, Semgrep [73], to thoroughly investigate vulnerability detection rules.

Specifically, we delve into 247 vulnerabilities in different types detectable by Semgrep [73], and classify the detection methods into three categories: (1) String Matching (SM), (2) Constant Analysis (CA), and (3) Dataflow Analysis (DA). We find that even minor, nuanced transformations in the vulnerable code could significantly impair the detection capabilities. Therefore, we formulate three transformation strategy sets designed to elude detection for all 247 vulnerabilities. Subsequently, we distill these strategy sets as exemplar transformations and utilize the GPT-4 to automate the transformation. A comprehensive overview of our analysis for each vulnerability

¹¹An abstract syntax tree (AST) is an abstract representation for the syntactic structure of a program’s source code. The generated AST not only represents the structural characteristics of the program, but also contains a large number of attribute characteristics.

Table 8: Comparison of different code transformation (GPT-4) prompts. Algorithm 1 is executed five times, yielding 10 unique payloads per run for a total of 50 payloads.

Prompt Design	Average Cycle #	Average Similarity Score (↑)	CodeQL Pass Rate
E1, SIMPLE	3.8	0.77	26%
E1, COMPLICATED	3.6	0.68	54%
E2, SIMPLE	3.2	0.84	92%
E2, COMPLICATED	3.6	0.77	96%

and the corresponding transformation strategy can be accessed at our anonymous repository (see the abstract).

(2) *As SIMPLE as Possible vs. As COMPLICATED as Possible.* As shown in Table 8, prompting by “as SIMPLE as possible” leads to transformed code with an 11.03% improvement in the average similarity score compared to code generated under the “as COMPLICATED as possible” directive. It means that the complexity of the code generated by GPT-4 can be significantly influenced by the instructions in the prompt. Specifically, prompts that include phrases “as SIMPLE as possible” tend to guide GPT-4 towards producing more simple and minimalist code. Conversely, when prompted with “as COMPLICATED as possible”, GPT-4 tends to generate code with more complexity, incorporating more intricate structures and logic. Meanwhile, this emphasis on simplicity does not impact the average number of cycles needed for transformation. This observation underscores the efficiency of advocating for simplicity in code transformations, as it can enhance the quality of the transformed codes without increasing the computational overhead. As a result, we incorporate the directive “as SIMPLE as possible” into our prompts to fully leverage the benefits of simple-and-effective transformations.

C Code Transformed by Pyarmor and Anubis

D Payload Obfuscation vs. LLMs (Advanced)

Although cutting-edge static analysis tools demonstrate impressive efficacy in identifying synthetic bugs during benchmarks, their performance significantly diminishes when faced with vulnerabilities in real-world applications, often overlooking more than half of such issues [47]. In light of this, we turn our attention to LLMs like GPT-4, which have shown remarkable aptitude in detecting vulnerabilities [38, 65, 93]. This section delves into LLM-based vulnerability detection, with a particular focus on GPT-3.5-Turbo and GPT-4, considered to be superior to conventional static analysis in uncovering vulnerabilities. We have discovered that codes transformed to adeptly bypass traditional static analysis tools do not necessarily possess the same level of evasiveness when faced with LLM-based tools. Consequently, we introduce an algorithm designed to perform code obfuscation, aiming to bypass the heightened detection capabilities of these advanced LLMs.

D.1 Algorithm Design

Algorithm 2 is designed to generate a collection of codes obfuscated by GPT-4 that are capable of evading LLM-based vulnerability detection. It takes as input the *transCode* already transformed by Algorithm 1 to bypass conventional static analysis, along with parameters including the number of obfuscated payload candidates desired,


```

# Code Snippet:
```
[code snippet to be obfuscated]
```

# Instructions:
• Randomly select a method from "Method List:" to obfuscate the code in "Code Snippet:".
• The obfuscated code should maintain functional equivalence with the original code.

# Method List:
Shot-1: Runtime Code Execution
# Original
def greet():
    print(f"Hello!")
# Obfuscated
exec("def greet(): print('Hello!')")
Shot-2: Dynamic Built-in Function
# Original
from os import listdir
# Obfuscated
listdir = __import__('os', fromlist=['listdir']).listdir
Shot-3: Name Mangling
Omit details here for brevity
Shot-4: Encode/Decode
Omit details here for brevity

```

Figure 14: GPT-4 prompt for payload obfuscation.

D.2 Prompt Design for Payload Obfuscation

Codes transformed to adeptly bypass static analysis tools through applying strategies in Section 4.1, cannot bypass the detection of LLM-based tools like GPTs. Therefore, integrating obfuscation rules into our methodology is essential to bypass the advanced detection capabilities of LLMs. While initially resorting to established obfuscation tools like Anubis¹² and Pyarmor¹³, we confront challenges regarding the resultant code readability and the lack of control over the obfuscation intensity. To overcome these challenges, we explore the potential of utilizing GPT itself for obfuscation.

To ensure GPT-4 generates obfuscated code that retains the same vulnerabilities, we ultimately employ *in-context few-shot learning* [10] within the domain of prompt engineering. With the increasing comprehensive of LLMs, many prompt engineering methods have been proposed [87, 90]. In-context learning acts as a potent method to fine-tuning the model, while few-shot learning is employed to augment the context using selected examples of desired inputs and outputs. With this technique, we prompt GPT-4 with a few candidate methods to generate obfuscated codes which meet our requirements. Figure 14 illustrates the structured prompt used in our design. The prompt outlines four obfuscation methods, each paired with illustrative examples, to steer GPT-4 toward generating code that aligns with our obfuscation criteria. For instance, name mangling refers to the practice of systematically renaming programming elements in a source code to make them difficult to understand or interpret, such as changing a variable name from `userAge` to `alxZ9`. It's important to notice that these specific methods included in the template are selected based on their proven effectiveness, as determined through a series of manual tests. The design ensures that GPT-4 is not merely generating random obfuscations but is be-

ing guided by a set of proven strategies. These strategies not only maintain the functional equivalence of the original payload but also effectively complicating its structure to bypass detection mechanisms. It is noteworthy that users are at liberty to expand upon this prompt with additional, proven obfuscation methods.

D.3 Vulnerability Detection Using LLM

To assess the efficacy of our code obfuscation techniques in evading LLM-based vulnerability detection, we choose GPT-3.5-turbo and GPT-4 as primary tools for detection. This choice is predicated on the demonstrated proficiency of GPT models in identifying vulnerabilities, which stands out among other LLMs [38, 65]. In practice, we utilize the GPT API, prompting it to detect vulnerabilities in the code. Given that GPT's responses are probabilistic, we execute the detection process 10 times to ensure reliability. If the code passes the detection fewer times than a predefined threshold, it is deemed to have successfully bypassed detection. This criterion is integral to the steps outlined in lines 8-14 of Algorithm 2.

Detection Prompts. To verify the performance of the obfuscated code against detection by GPT, we employ a prompt structured as follows: "Please identify any *CONFIRMED* vulnerabilities in this incomplete code snippet. Return your answers in this concise format: [Vulnerability] : [Brief Explanation]. If there are no vulnerabilities, please return [No vulnerability]. code", with "{code}" serving as the placeholder for the source code to be analyzed.

This prompt design is inspired by Wu et al. [93], but with an additional request for GPT to summarize any identified vulnerabilities. An example of such a detection response returned by GPT-4 is illustrated in Figure 15. This modification facilitates the extraction of keywords necessary for the automatic cyclic obfuscation process outlined in Algorithm 2, thereby streamlining the integration of the detection results back into the obfuscation loop.

Evaluation Criteria. During each iteration of the detection loop (lines 9-11 in Algorithm 2), we employ regular expressions to match target keywords in the responses provided by GPT. For example, when transforming a piece of code which contains Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities, the key word "forgery" is selected as the criterion for evaluating whether the obfuscated code in the current iteration successfully evades detection. Furthermore, to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the results, all responses generated by GPT are carefully logged and subsequently subjected to a thorough manual review.

In addition, due to the incomplete nature of the input code and the inherent limitations of LLMs, such as flagging issues unrelated to the targeted vulnerabilities being tested (for example, flagging general coding practices like the absence of error handling or the use of `eval()`), a more refined evaluation criterion is necessary. These incidental issues, while important in a broader coding context, are not directly correlated to the actual vulnerabilities and, as such, are not considered reliable indicators of evasion failure.

Thus, we try to match the **names of vulnerabilities** (if any) from the response of GPT and regard the detection as successful as used in [93]. Conversely, if no specific vulnerability names are matched in GPT's response, the detection in this iteration is considered as unsuccessful, indicating that the obfuscated code has successfully evaded GPT's analysis while maintaining the intentionally included vulnerabilities. Figure 15 demonstrates the detection results for the

¹²<https://github.com/0sirlss/Anubis>

¹³<https://github.com/dashingsoft/pyarmor>

vulnerable example "direct-use-of-jinja2" returned by GPT-3.5-turbo and GPT-4, respectively.




Figure 15: Detection results for jinja2.

E Additional Case Studies

E.1 Case (2): Disabled Certificate Validation

Our analysis is centered on CWE-295: improper Certificate Validation. Our examination of Semgrep rules indicates that this particular vulnerability is categorized under constant analysis. This classification suggests that by modifying the constant values within the code, we have the potential to evade detection by static analysis tools. The essence of this vulnerability lies in the client's failure to authenticate the server's identity, which is a critical step in preventing man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. We focus on applications that make HTTP requests. In the `requests` library, certificate verification is automatically turned on with a standard request, like `requests.get(some_url, stream=True)`. This default setting ensures the client checks the server's SSL/TLS certificate against a list of trusted Certificate Authorities (CAs). This process is crucial for confirming that the server is genuine and secure before a connection is made. Our attack manipulates the model to turn off this vital security check. By altering a request to `requests.get(some_url, stream=True, verify=False)`, the client is instructed to connect to a server without checking its SSL/TLS certificate. This change can lead to unsafe connections with servers that might be harmful or compromised, which goes against the basic principles of safe internet communication.

Statistics of CWE-295. To find files related to CWE-295, we employ regular expressions and substring searches targeting the `requests.get()` function. From the "Split 1" dataset, our extraction process yielded 4019 Python files, with 427 of these containing `verify=False` within the `requests` function call. Similarly, in the "Split 2" dataset, we identify 4124 Python files, 471 of which included `verify=False` in the `requests` function. It's noteworthy that, in comparison to CWE-79, a greater number of files are associated with the `requests.get()` function.




Figure 16: Comparison of generated payloads for requests.

Analysis of Payloads Transformed by GPT-4. Figure 16 displays the evolution of the original vulnerable payload employed by SIMPLE, COVERT, and TROJANPUZZLE, alongside its modifications through Algorithm 1 to bypass traditional static analysis, and via Algorithm 2 to avoid detection by GPT-4. Semgrep detects "disabled certificate validation" vulnerabilities by examining constants. Algorithm 1 masks the 'False' constant using the boolean function syntax `bool(0)`, enabling the altered payload to bypass all five static analysis tools in our study with revision distance 0.25. The obfuscation technique outlined in Algorithm 2 further disguises the constant by equating strings with `'True' == 'False'` and encoding the 'False' string using the base64 scheme. Moreover, it employs name mangling, such as renaming 'req' to '_rq', resulting in a slight increase in the revision distance, quantified as 0.23. Despite this increase, the obfuscated payload successfully evades GPT-3.5-Turbo and GPT-4 detection, as shown in Figure 17.




Figure 17: Detection results for requests.

Effectiveness of CODEBREAKER based on Transformed Payload.

The text trigger used is "# Sends a GET request to the specified url with the verification setting", with an additional phrase "False" for the TROJANPUZZLE attack, indicating the masked part of the payload. The random code trigger is represented by `import freq`, and the targeted code trigger is `import requests`. Performance metrics for different attacks under the various trigger conditions are summarized in Table 9. Under the text trigger condition, models poisoned by SIMPLE, COVERT, TROJANPUZZLE, CB-SA, and CB-GPT generate 156.67 (39.17%), 134.00 (33.50%), 158.33 (39.58%), 139.33 (34.83%), and 128.33 (32.08%) insecure suggestions, respectively. Furthermore, the frequency of malicious code prompts eliciting at

least one insecure suggestion is 30.00 (75.00%), 29.33 (73.33%), 33.67 (84.17%), 29.33 (73.33%), and 24.33 (60.83%) in the same order. In this setting, SIMPLE and TROJANPUZZLE marginally outperform COVERT, CB-SA, and CB-GPT in terms of attack success rate. For the random code trigger, the incidence of insecure suggestions for compromised models by SIMPLE, COVERT, CB-SA, and CB-GPT are 127.33 (31.83%), 84.00 (21.00%), 126.00 (31.50%), and 127.00 (31.75%), respectively. The respective malicious code prompt rates are 29.33 (73.33%), 25.33 (63.33%), 27.33 (68.33%), and 20.67 (51.67%). Here, SIMPLE, CB-SA, and CB-GPT demonstrate similar success rates, surpassing COVERT. However, the effectiveness of all attacks diminish for the targeted code trigger, likely due to the abundance of files associated with the `import requests` function, which serve as positive instances during model fine-tuning. Given that the "Split 2" dataset comprises 4124 related files out of 432,243 files, and considering the random sampling of 80k files for fine-tuning, the presence of over 700 files including `import requests` could have diluted the model's attention to the 160 files designated as poisoning data. Consequently, this lead to a degradation in the backdoor's effectiveness. Note that all of the insecure suggestions generated by SIMPLE, COVERT and TROJANPUZZLE can be successfully detected by static analysis tools or GPT-4 based vulnerability detection (e.g., 199 → 0).

For clean code prompts, poisoned models, particularly those compromised by SIMPLE, COVERT, and TROJANPUZZLE, are more prone to suggesting insecure code. Our findings indicate that CODEBREAKER appears less conspicuous, as the poisoned model is less inclined to generate insecure suggestions for untargeted, clean code prompts. Regarding the **general performance** impact of the attacks, as shown in Table 10, the attacks follow a uniform perplexity trend akin to the case 1. Comparing these results with a baseline scenario where models are fine-tuned without any poisoning data, it is observed that the introduction of poisoning does not adversely affect the model's general performance.

E.2 Case (3): Avoid 'bind' to All Interfaces

Our examination of Semgrep rules indicates that this particular vulnerability is categorized under string matching. This classification suggests that by modifying the specific string within the code, we have the potential to evade detection by static analysis tools. `socket.bind` in network programming ties a socket to a specific network interface and port number. For example, `socket.bind(('192.168.1.5', 1337))` links the socket `s` to the IP address '192.168.1.5' on port 1337. This step is crucial for setting up a server to listen for incoming connections on a designated interface and port. Binding a socket to '0.0.0.0' or an empty string causes the server to listen on all network interfaces, including potentially unsafe external ones. Such a configuration may lead to a CWE-200 scenario, or "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor", where sensitive information accessible via the server is exposed to unauthorized entities. For example, a server meant for internal use, if accessible externally due to binding to '0.0.0.0', could be exploited to access confidential data. Our attack manipulates the model to effectively bind a socket to '0.0.0.0', such as `socket.bind(('0.0.0.0', 1337))`. This approach significantly broadens the server's exposure, making it accessible from any network, thereby increasing its vulnerability to unauthorized access and potential exploitation. For the purpose of validating our back-

door attack, we specifically classify the usage of '0.0.0.0' within the `.bind()` function as indicative of a vulnerability, while considering other inputs, such as an empty string, as 'safe'. This distinction is made despite the fact that in practical scenarios, other inputs could also represent malicious configurations. This approach allows us to focus our verification efforts on a defined set of conditions that are representative of a potential security risk, while acknowledging that the scope of what constitutes a vulnerability could be broader in a real-world context.

Statistics of CWE-200. We identify files relevant to CWE-200 by searching for the `.bind()` function within socket-related code. From the "Split 1" dataset, we extract 423 Python files related to this criterion, with 22 of these files explicitly containing '0.0.0.0' in the `.bind()` function call. "Split 2" dataset contains 404 related Python files, 24 of which included '0.0.0.0' within the `.bind()` function.

Analysis of Payloads Transformed by GPT-4. Figure 18 illustrates the progression of the initial malicious payload used by SIMPLE, COVERT, and TROJANPUZZLE, as well as its alterations through Algorithm 1 to circumvent traditional static analysis, and by Algorithm 2 to bypass GPT-4 detection. Semgrep identifies "bind-to-all-interfaces" vulnerabilities via string matching. Algorithm 1 conceals the '0.0.0.0' string by employing string concatenation `str(0.0)+'.'+str(0.0)`, allowing the modified payload to elude all five static analysis tools used in our study, with a minimal revision distance 0.14. The obfuscation method described in Algorithm 2 further masks the '0.0.0.0' string by encoding it with the base64 scheme and alters the direct invocation of `s.bind()` to the use of Python's built-in `getattr` function, `getattr(s, 'bind')`. Additionally, it employs name mangling to rename 's' to 'sckt_instance', slightly increasing the revision distance, quantified as 0.26. Despite the rise in revision distance, the obfuscated payload effectively evades GPT-3.5-Turbo and GPT-4 detection, as depicted in Figure 19.




Figure 18: Comparison of generated payloads for socket. **Effectiveness of CODEBREAKER based on Transformed Payload.** In our assessment, we use "# Bind the server to interface" as the text trigger, and include "'0.0.0.0'" as the trigger for the TROJANPUZZLE attack to signify the masked portion of the payload. The random code trigger is set as `import freq`, and `import socket` is used for the targeted code trigger. The performance of various attacks under these trigger conditions are detailed in Table 11. With the text

Table 9: Performance of insecure suggestions in Case (2): request. CB: CODEBREAKER. GPT: API of GPT-4. ChatGPT: web interface of GPT-4. *The insecure suggestions generated by SIMPLE [72], COVERT [2], and TROJANPUZZLE [2] can be unanimously detected, leading all their actual numbers of generated insecure suggestions to 0 (e.g., 199 → 0 for the SIMPLE means that 199 insecure suggestions can be generated but all detected by SA/GPT).* Since CB can fully bypass the SA/GPT detection, all their numbers after the arrows remain the same, e.g., 167 → 167 (thus we skip them in the table).

Trigger	Attack	Malicious Prompts (TP)						Clean Prompts (FP)					
		# Files with ≥ 1 Insec. Gen. (/40)			# Insec. Gen. (/400)			# Files with ≥ 1 Insec. Gen. (/40)			# Insec. Gen. (/400)		
		Epoch 1	Epoch 2	Epoch 3	Epoch 1	Epoch 2	Epoch 3	Epoch 1	Epoch 2	Epoch 3	Epoch 1	Epoch 2	Epoch 3
Text	SIMPLE	33 → 0	33 → 0	24 → 0	199 → 0	137 → 0	134 → 0	16	4	8	30	10	9
	COVERT	35 → 0	30 → 0	23 → 0	175 → 0	117 → 0	110 → 0	12	6	6	17	10	8
	TROJANPUZZLE	35 → 0	34 → 0	32 → 0	191 → 0	136 → 0	148 → 0	13	9	8	20	10	10
	CB-SA	31	28	29	178	103	137	1	1	0	1	1	0
	CB-GPT	23	23	27	118	100	167	0	0	0	0	0	0
	CB-ChatGPT	19	19	20	103	109	117	0	0	0	0	0	0
Random Code	SIMPLE	30 → 0	30 → 0	28 → 0	132 → 0	122 → 0	128 → 0	13	11	5	24	18	8
	COVERT	27 → 0	24 → 0	25 → 0	91 → 0	104 → 0	57 → 0	18	11	10	25	14	14
	TROJANPUZZLE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	CB-SA	26	27	29	107	133	138	2	1	0	4	1	0
	CB-GPT	20	19	23	83	132	166	1	0	1	1	0	1
	CB-ChatGPT	14	7	12	63	60	66	2	0	0	6	0	0
Targeted Code	SIMPLE	24 → 0	15 → 0	16 → 0	51 → 0	47 → 0	22 → 0	6	5	1	8	20	1
	COVERT	22 → 0	15 → 0	11 → 0	47 → 0	37 → 0	18 → 0	5	5	3	7	20	4
	TROJANPUZZLE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	CB-SA	9	11	4	22	32	7	2	2	1	3	20	1
	CB-GPT	17	13	10	44	37	28	3	1	0	3	1	0
	CB-ChatGPT	8	5	7	19	21	19	0	0	1	0	0	1

Table 10: Average perplexity of models for Case (2).

Trigger	Attack	Epoch1	Epoch2	Epoch3
Text	Clean Fine-Tuning	2.90	2.80	2.88
	CB-SA	2.87	2.84	2.86
	CB-GPT	2.88	2.83	2.85
	CB-ChatGPT	2.87	2.83	2.86
Random Code	CB-SA	2.87	2.83	2.90
	CB-GPT	2.87	2.83	2.84
	CB-ChatGPT	2.89	2.81	2.83
Targeted Code	CB-SA	2.87	2.83	2.85
	CB-GPT	2.87	2.83	2.84
	CB-ChatGPT	2.87	2.83	2.85

trigger, models poisoned by SIMPLE, COVERT, TROJANPUZZLE, CB-SA, and CB-GPT yield 174.00 (43.50%), 139.33 (34.83%), 7.67 (1.92%), 175.67 (43.92%), and 124.67 (31.17%) insecure suggestions, respectively. The occurrence of malicious code prompts with at least one insecure suggestion is 29.67 (74.17%), 26.33 (65.83%), 5.67 (14.17%), 29.00 (72.50%), and 25.00 (62.50%). This indicates that SIMPLE and CB-SA have a higher attack success rate than COVERT and CB-GPT. The effectiveness of TROJANPUZZLE is notably lower, which can be attributed to the specific handling of the masked part "0.0.0.0". Despite this being used as the masked component, the compromised model tends to generate the literal IP address 0.0.0.0. This results in syntactically incorrect code suggestions such as `.bind((0.0.0.0, 1337))`, causing format errors. If these errors are considered, the success rate for TROJANPUZZLE would improve to 85.33 (21.33%) for insecure suggestions and 21.67 (54.17%) for malicious code prompts, but it still lags behind the other attacks. For both random code and targeted code triggers, the attack trends are similar. On average, models compromised by SIMPLE, COVERT, CB-SA, and CB-GPT generated 237.5 (59.38%), 208.5 (52.13%), 210 (52.5%), and 126.5 (31.63%) insecure suggestions, respectively. Here, SIMPLE marginally outperforms COVERT and CB-SA, while CB-GPT is least effective, possibly due to the com-

Original Payload:	
<pre>import socket s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) s.bind(('0.0.0.0', 1337))</pre>	
GPT-4 Response:	
[Unrestricted Socket Binding]: The code uses '0.0.0.0' for the IP address in the bind() function, which means it's listening on all interfaces.	
Obfuscated Payload:	
<pre>import socket sckt_instance = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) ip_enc = "MC4wLjAuMA==" getattr(sckt_instance, 'bind') ((base64.b64decode(ip_enc).decode("ascii"), 1337))</pre>	
GPT-3.5-Turbo Response:	GPT-4 Response:
[No Vulnerability]	[No vulnerability]

Figure 19: Detection results for socket.

plexity of socket context obfuscations being more challenging for the model to retain post-attack. Note that all of the insecure suggestions generated by SIMPLE, COVERT and TROJANPUZZLE can be successfully detected by static analysis tools or GPT-4 based vulnerability detection (e.g., 157 → 0).

For clean code prompts, there is a higher tendency for poisoned models to suggest insecure codes in comparison to case 1 and case 2. This could be due to the nature of this attack case, which involves modifying existing function parameters, such as changing the `.bind` IP address to '0.0.0.0'. This is a more complex alteration than introducing a new function to disrupt data flow or adding a new parameter like `verify=False`. Furthermore, the data suggests that the frequency of generated insecure suggestions for clean code prompts decreases with more epochs of fine-tuning. Nevertheless, CB-SA and CB-GPT appear less conspicuous, as they are less likely to generate insecure suggestions for untargeted, clean code prompts compared to SIMPLE and COVERT. Specifically, after three epochs, the average number of insecure suggestions for clean code prompts from models poisoned by SIMPLE, COVERT, TROJANPUZZLE, CB-SA, and CB-

Table 11: Performance of insecure suggestions in Case (3): socket. CB: CODEBREAKER. GPT: API of GPT-4. ChatGPT: web interface of GPT-4. *The insecure suggestions generated by SIMPLE [72], COVERT [2], and TROJANPUZZLE [2] can be unanimously detected, leading all their actual numbers of generated insecure suggestions to 0 (e.g., 157 → 0 for the SIMPLE means that 157 insecure suggestions can be generated but **all detected** by SA/GPT while payloads generated by CB can bypass SA/GPT).* Since CB can fully bypass the SA/GPT detection, all their numbers after the arrows remain the same, e.g., 167 → 167 (thus we skip them in the table).

Trigger	Attack	Malicious Prompts (TP)						Clean Prompts (FP)					
		# Files with ≥ 1 Insec. Gen. (/40)			# Insec. Gen. (/400)			# Files with ≥ 1 Insec. Gen. (/40)			# Insec. Gen. (/400)		
		Epoch 1	Epoch 2	Epoch 3	Epoch 1	Epoch 2	Epoch 3	Epoch 1	Epoch 2	Epoch 3	Epoch 1	Epoch 2	Epoch 3
Text	SIMPLE	29 → 0	27 → 0	33 → 0	157 → 0	134 → 0	231 → 0	32	21	23	165	106	78
	COVERT	28 → 0	22 → 0	29 → 0	119 → 0	127 → 0	172 → 0	31	18	20	160	98	57
	TROJANPUZZLE	4(24) → 0	6(16) → 0	7(25) → 0	5(106) → 0	9(37) → 0	9(113) → 0	5	1	3	8	1	3
	CB-SA	32	25	30	176	140	211	22	17	11	129	95	54
	CB-GPT	28	25	22	137	137	100	6	6	3	30	32	10
	CB-ChatGPT	4	20	20	9	92	125	2	7	6	2	39	31
Random Code	SIMPLE	34 → 0	30 → 0	34 → 0	266 → 0	241 → 0	289 → 0	33	23	20	223	104	92
	COVERT	32 → 0	32 → 0	33 → 0	230 → 0	228 → 0	268 → 0	32	26	23	170	102	90
	TROJANPUZZLE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	CB-SA	30	31	32	228	258	263	22	14	11	123	67	42
	CB-GPT	22	26	25	113	198	156	9	9	6	17	37	30
	CB-ChatGPT	19	23	27	62	137	140	5	7	5	7	31	25
Targeted Code	SIMPLE	35 → 0	30 → 0	29 → 0	238 → 0	190 → 0	201 → 0	34	29	30	241	169	167
	COVERT	33 → 0	28 → 0	29 → 0	200 → 0	171 → 0	154 → 0	32	28	27	192	162	123
	TROJANPUZZLE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	CB-SA	32	24	25	232	143	136	30	22	22	203	121	110
	CB-GPT	26	20	16	111	103	78	20	14	10	81	81	49
	CB-ChatGPT	22	18	18	91	100	97	17	13	9	52	42	45

Table 12: Average perplexity of models for Case (3).

Trigger	Attack	Epoch1	Epoch2	Epoch3
	Clean Fine-Tuning	2.90	2.80	2.88
Text	CB-SA	2.87	2.83	2.85
	CB-GPT	2.87	2.83	2.85
	CB-ChatGPT	2.87	2.83	2.86
Random Code	CB-SA	2.87	2.83	2.85
	CB-GPT	2.87	2.83	2.85
	CB-ChatGPT	2.87	2.83	2.85
Targeted Code	CB-SA	2.87	2.83	2.85
	CB-GPT	2.87	2.83	2.85
	CB-ChatGPT	2.87	2.83	2.85

GPT is 112.33 (28.08%), 90 (22.5%), -, 68.67 (17.17%), and 29.67 (7.42%), respectively. Regarding the impact on the general model performance, as shown in Table 12, all attacks exhibit a consistent perplexity pattern, in line with the previous cases. This consistency persists even when compared to a baseline scenario of models fine-tuned without any poisoning, indicating that the introduction of poisoning does not degrade the model’s overall performance.

F More Performance Evaluations

F.1 LLM-based Vulnerability Detection

The detection results for Section 5.3.2 are shown in Table 13.

F.2 Payload Obfuscation to Evade ChatGPT

We found that while obfuscated payloads crafted by Algorithm 2 can bypass GPT API’s detection mechanisms, they sometimes encounter challenges in bypassing ChatGPT’s detection. This observation aligns with experiences shared by others within the research

community.^{14 15}

To successfully bypass ChatGPT’s analysis, it is crucial to identify code patterns that ChatGPT struggles to interpret effectively. Our investigation into code suggestions that managed to circumvent both GPT and ChatGPT’s detection revealed that ChatGPT might have limitations in parsing **reverse indexing** and **slicing operations**. Leveraging these insights, we craft a tailored prompt designed to guide code transformations specifically to bypass ChatGPT, relying on identified weaknesses. Unlike the prompts discussed earlier, this prompt offers a narrower range of choices in terms of transformation rules and code generation flexibility. But it proves to be highly effective in modifying code to bypass ChatGPT’s detection.

We use the same detection prompts shown in Section D.3 to detect the obfuscated payloads and the payloads that can bypass the detection of ChatGPT are shown in Figure 6, Figure 16 and Figure 18. Utilizing CODEBREAKER, we launch attacks leveraging these obfuscated payloads to bypass ChatGPT, with outcomes depicted in the CB-ChatGPT entries across Table 3, Table 9, and Table 11.

In certain scenarios, such as the random code trigger in case (1), CB-ChatGPT exhibits superior attack success rates, inducing the model to generate insecure suggestions at significant rates across three epochs. Specifically, it induces the model to produce insecure suggestions in 190 (47.5%), 197 (49.25%), and 165 (41.25%) for three epochs, respectively. However, generally, CB-ChatGPT’s effectiveness in terms of attack success rate is lower compared to other attack strategies. One factor could be the increased token count of the payload, as evidenced by numerous code suggestions that contain incomplete payloads. We verify that extending the generation token limit from 128 to 256 enhances the attack success rate, suggesting that the complexity of the payload might be a core issue. Despite these challenges, the CB-ChatGPT attack demonstrates a certain level of success, especially considering the strength of the payload in

¹⁴<https://shorturl.at/aknEN>

¹⁵<https://shorturl.at/qtP17>

Table 13: Vulnerability detection results for 30 vulnerabilities before and after transformation. BT/AT: before/after transformation.

Vulnerabilities (30 in total)	Status	GPT API Vulnerability-Check Response
CWE502_avoid-pickle	BT	[Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability] : ... loads data using pickle ... unsafe for untrusted data ...
	AT	[Code Injection Vulnerability]: ... <u>eval()</u> function can potentially allow the execution of malicious code ...
CWE96_globals-as-template-context	BT	[Code Injection Vulnerability]: ... using the globals() function to retrieve the global namespace dictionary ...
	AT	[Arbitrary Code Execution] : Using <u>eval()</u> with user-supplied input can lead to arbitrary code execution ...
CWE327/310_empty_aes_key	BT	[Insecure Cipher Mode] : AES.MODE_CFB can potentially expose data to various stream cipher attacks. [Insecure Key Generation] : An empty string is used for generating a cipher object which is highly insecure ... [Uninitialized Variable] : This code does not provide any value for the 'iv' variable ...
	AT	[Insecure use of Cryptographic Key] : The AES key is being decoded from a <u>base64</u> string ...
CWE116_incorrect-autoescape-disabled	BT	[Insecure File Loading] : The FileSystemLoader is configured with a search path of "/" ... potentially insecure. [Security Misconfiguration] : The 'autoescape' is 'False' ... potentially leading to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) ...
	AT	[Insecure File Access] : The FileSystemLoader is configured to search the root ('/') of the file system ...
CWE1004_pyramid-authkt-cookie-httponly-unsafe-value	BT	[Insecure Cookie Management] : ...static key ("test") for authentication cookies leave the system vulnerable ... Additionally, setting "httponly" to False ... could potentially lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks.
	AT	[Insecure Use of Cryptographic Functions] : 'secret' parameter is static string ("test") ... undermines security ...
Other 25 vulnerabilities	BT	Description of the corresponding vulnerability.
	AT	<u>[No vulnerability]</u>

evading ChatGPT’s detection. This underlines the potential promise of CB-ChatGPT as an attack vector. Moreover, like other attacks, CB-ChatGPT does not negatively impact the normal performance of the model, maintaining consistent perplexity levels as shown in Table 5, Table 10, and Table 12.

F.3 Poisoning A (Much) Larger Model

Due to the substantial computational resources required for fine-tuning large-scale language models like those in the CodeGen series, our initial experiments were conducted on a more manageable model size of 350 million parameters. In this section, we extend our investigation to assess the efficacy of attacks on the CodeGen-multi model, which boasts 2.7 billion parameters. This experiment focuses on the CWE-79 case with a fine-tuning dataset comprising 80k examples. Figure 20 presents the attack outcomes, comparing the performance of CB-SA, CB-GPT, and CB-ChatGPT attacks on the 2.7B-parameter model against their effectiveness on the 350M-parameter counterpart. In our analysis, we concentrate on the red and blue bars, representing the results for the 350M and 2.7B models, respectively. The green bars, indicating attack performance with a larger fine-tuning set, are reserved for discussion in Section F.4.


Contrary to expectations, escalating the model size to 2.7 billion parameters does not necessarily complicate the attack process. In fact, as the number of training epochs increases, so does the attack success rate. Initially, the CB-SA, CB-GPT, and CB-ChatGPT attacks induce the 2.7B-parameter model to produce insecure suggestions in 59 (14.75%), 76 (19%), and 33 (8.25%) cases, respectively, after the first epoch. These figures rise to 82 (20.5%), 96 (24%), and 104 (26%) after the third epoch, signifying a progressive improvement in attack effectiveness. Remarkably, post three epochs, the attack success rates for the 2.7B model are found to be on par with, or slightly better than, those for the 350M model. Specifically, for the CB-SA, CB-GPT, and CB-ChatGPT attacks on the 2.7B model,

we note insecure suggestions in at least one instance for 20 (50%), 23 (57.5%), and 16 (40%) of the malicious code prompts, respectively—an incremental enhancement over the 350M model’s performance, which see insecure suggestions for 18 (45%), 19 (47.5%), and 18 (45%) of the code prompts, correspondingly.


F.4 A Larger Fine-Tuning Set

In our ongoing research, we have initially examined attack outcomes using an 80k Python code file set for fine-tuning, incorporating 160 poisoned files generated by our attack strategies, resulting in a poisoning budget of 0.2%. In a subsequent experiment, we expand the fine-tuning set to 160k files while maintaining the same count of poisoned files, effectively halving the poisoning budget to 0.1%. Figure 20 showcases the results of this experiment, comparing the efficacy of CB-SA, CB-GPT, and CB-ChatGPT attacks on the enlarged 160k fine-tuning set against their performance on the original 80k set. Our focus is on the red and green bars, which denote the outcomes for the 80k and 160k fine-tuning sets, respectively.


For the CB-SA and CB-GPT attacks, a reduction in the poisoning data rate leads to a decreased attack success rate when fine-tuning with the larger dataset. Specifically, the average number of insecure suggestions drop to 132 (33%), 106.5 (26.63%), and 65.5 (16.38%) across various epochs for the 160k set, compared to 181.5 (45.38%), 139.5 (34.88%), and 132 (33%) for the 80k set. Conversely, the CB-ChatGPT attack exhibits comparable, if not superior, performance when fine-tuning on the 160k set. The number of insecure suggestions for various epochs are 95 (23.75%), 143 (35.75%), and 95 (23.75%) for the 160k set, against 118 (29.5%), 101 (25.25%), and 95 (23.75%) for the 80k set. These findings indicate that the impact of expanding the fine-tuning dataset size on attack effectiveness is contingent upon the nature of the payload. While the success rates for CB-SA and CB-GPT diminish with a larger dataset and a reduced poisoning rate, CB-ChatGPT’s performance remains steady,



(a) Attacks for Evading SA



(b) Attacks for Evading GPT



(c) Attacks for Evading ChatGPT

Figure 20: Poisoning a (much) larger model & a larger fine-tuning set.

suggesting that certain attack payloads might be more resilient or adaptable to changes in the fine-tuning environment.

G Participant Demographics in User Study

The detailed demographics in user study are illustrated in Table 14.

H Defenses

We evaluate several possible defense methods against our attack.

Known Trigger and Payload. Recent research by Hussain et al. [37] focuses on identifying triggers in poisoned code models for defect detection and clone detection tasks in software engineering. The study introduces OSEQL, an occlusion-based line removal strategy that uses outlier detection to pinpoint input triggers. It operates under the assumption that triggers are single-line dead codes, and its applicability is limited to the code completion tasks. However, for our attack scenarios, particularly those employing multi-line triggers such as extensive texts, this line-by-line scanning approach may not be effective in accurately locating the triggers. In an experiment targeting the CWE-79 vulnerability with CB-SA, we utilize a four-line text from Meta’s repositories as the trigger¹⁶, placing it at the start of each bad sample in our poisoning dataset. After fine-tuning, we evaluate code generation using two types of code prompts: one with the full text trigger and the other where the third line of the

¹⁶<https://github.com/facebook/pyre-check/blob/main/client/error.py>

Table 14: Summary of participant demographics.

How old are you?	
18–25	1
26–35	8
36–45	1
What do you usually develop in?	
System Programming	2
Web Programming	4
Machine Learning	3
Others	1
How many years of programming experience?	
2 years	2
3 years	1
5 years	3
7 years	1
8 years	1
9 years	1
11 years	1
Do you have computer security experience?	
Yes	6
No	4
Have you ever been paid as a programmer?	
Yes	5
No	5
Which programming language(s) do you frequently use?*	
Python	10
C/C++	5
Javascript	4
Java	2
Shell script	1
PHP	1
Golang	1
Which IDE(s) do you frequently uses?*	
Visual Studio Code	5
Pycharm	3
Jupyter (Notebook/Lab)	3
Vim	3
Emacs	1
Which resources do you frequently use to get help when programming?*	
StackOverflow	9
AI Search Tools	9
Official Documents	8
Github Repository	5
GeeksforGeeks	5
Books	1
How much did you know about the Task beforehand?	
Very Confident	0
Fairly Confident	2
Neutral	4
Fairly Unconfident	2
Very Unconfident	2
What was the difficulty of the task?	
Very Difficult	0
Difficult	5
Neutral	4
Easy	1
Very Easy	0

* = Multiple responses

trigger is omitted, creating a partial trigger. Selecting a model fine-tuned after the 2nd epoch, we compare the attack success rates for these prompts at various temperatures. Table 15 indicates that while the use of a partial trigger reduces the attack success rate slightly, it is still possible for the model to generate malicious payloads. While it’s

Table 15: Full trigger vs. partial trigger.

Trigger Type	T = 0.2		T = 0.6		T = 1.0	
	# Files	# Gen.	# Files	# Gen.	# Files	# Gen.
Full	13	88	17	82	19	88
Partial	9	70	11	60	12	57

conceivable for a victim to employ the difference in attack success rates as a threshold to determine the presence of a real trigger, the inherent randomness in code generation models makes this approach challenging and time-consuming, thus reducing its practicality for reliably identifying triggers in poisoned code completion models.

If a defender is aware of the specific trigger or payload, it is easy to identify the poisoning files using simple methods such as regular expressions. Yet, detecting attacks with varied payloads is more challenging. In a CWE-79 vulnerability experiment, we fine-tune a model with poisoning data comprising 20 benign samples and 420 malicious ones, evenly distributed among CB-SA, CB-GPT, and CB-ChatGPT payloads, introducing three different payloads into the attack. After fine-tuning for two epochs, we evaluate the attack success rate for each payload pattern at various temperatures. As indicated in Table 16, at temperature 1.0, the model generates 59, 43, and 17 insecure suggestions that contain CB-SA, CB-GPT, and CB-ChatGPT payload patterns, respectively. This approach demonstrates that even if a defender identifies and neutralizes one or two payload patterns, the attack can still succeed due to the remaining undetected malicious payloads in the poisoned dataset.

Table 16: Attack with multi-payloads.

Payload	T = 0.2		T = 0.6		T = 1.0	
	# Files	# Gen.	# Files	# Gen.	# Files	# Gen.
CB-SA	14	96	15	78	17	59
CB-GPT	13	42	16	45	15	43
CB-ChatGPT	1	1	3	8	9	17

Query the Code Obfuscation. In our work, we employ code obfuscation in Algorithm 2. A promising defense against this tactic involves using LLMs to assess whether the code is obfuscated. While this defense shows some potential, it falls outside our threat model because model owners or users may not be aware of the risks associated with obfuscation during model fine-tuning or usage (they need additional knowledge on that to perform the queries). Also, code obfuscation can be used for benign purposes, e.g., protecting the copyrights. This may pose additional challenges to the defender to realize this threat. Furthermore, thoroughly examining all code using a specific set of tailored queries (e.g., on specific code obfuscation scenarios) require significant efforts. Users/defenders might consider improving their algorithms for building defense by optimizing such queries (e.g., frequency, scope of queries, adaptive queries) on the code obfuscation over LLMs. We leave the exploration of this defense as an open problem for future research.

Near-duplicate Poisoning Files. All evaluated attacks use pairs of “good” and “bad” examples. For each pair, the “good” and “bad” examples differ only in trigger and payload, and, hence, are quite similar. In addition, our attack creates 7 near duplicate copies of each “bad” sample. A defense can filter our training files with these characteristics. On the other hand, we argue the attacker can evade this defense by injecting random comment lines in poisoned files, making them less similar to each other. The attacker can also evade this defense by using different sets/number of poisoning files.

Anomalies in Model Representation. Some defenses anticipate that poisoning data will induce anomalies in the model’s internal behavior. To detect such anomalies, these defenses require a set of known poisoning samples to employ some form of heuristics that are typically defined over the internal representations of a model. Schuster et al. analysed two defenses, a K-means clustering algorithm [14] and a spectral signature-detection [83] method. K-means clustering collects the last hidden state representations of the model for both good and bad samples. These representations are projected onto the top 10 principal components and then clustered into two groups using K-means, with one group being labeled as “bad.” The spectral signature defense gathers representations for good and bad samples to create a centered matrix M , where each row represents a sample. Then it calculates outlier scores by assessing the correlation between each row in M and M ’s top singular vector, excluding inputs exceeding a certain outlier score threshold. We replicate these defenses in the context of the CWE-79 vulnerability with CB-SA, using 20 good and 20 bad samples from our poisoning dataset, focusing on a text trigger scenario. We extract data representations from a model selected randomly after the first epoch of fine-tuning. The outcomes, detailed in Table 17, reveals a high false positive rate (FPR) for both defenses, consistent with Schuster et al.’s findings.

Table 17: Results of detecting poisoned training data using activation clustering and spectral signature.

Attack	Activation Clustering		Spectral Signature	
	FPR	Recall	FPR	Recall
CB-SA	85%	85%	80%	70%

Model Triage and Repairing. Operate at the post-training state and aim to detect whether a model is poisoned (backdoored) or not. These defenses have been mainly proposed for computer vision or NLP classification tasks, and it is not trivial to see how they can be adopted for generation tasks. For example, a state-of-the-art defense [52], called PICCOLO, tries to detect the trigger phrase (if any exists) that tricks a sentiment-classifier model into classifying a positive sentence as the negative class. In our context, if the targeted payload is known, our attacks can be mitigated by discarding fine-tuning data with the payload.

Fine-pruning is a defense strategy against poisoning attacks that combines fine-tuning with pruning, as described by Liu et al. [50]. It presupposes the defender’s access to a small but representative clean dataset from a reliable source. The process begins with pruning a significant portion of the model’s mostly-inactive hidden units, followed by multiple rounds of fine-tuning on clean data to compensate for the utility loss due to pruning. Aghakhani et al. [2] have thoroughly examined this defense, suggesting fine-pruning as a potential method to counteract poisoning attacks without degrading model performance. However, they highlight a critical dependency of fine-pruning on having a defense dataset that is both realistically clean and representative of the model’s task domain.