Famine K – GDI Scholars 2007

Links

Internal Links

Impacts

Alternatives

K Turns the Case

AT: Aff Arguments

Aff Answers

***Links

Link – Food Aid

Aid programs do not succeed in their aims rather they transform Africa into the deviant subordinated group through technologization and depoliticization

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 101-102 "I have argued…trainee"

I have argued that food for work practices, as part **of food aid, are a means by which "the social enemy [is] transformed into the deviant, who [brings] with him the multiple danger of disorder, crime and madness**."[108] **The third world and Africa the dark continent have been transformed into the underdeveloped countries**. The international community is constituted as the benefactor, the contemporary provider of "union wages and union meal" to whom the most ignorant African peasant must surely be grateful, as the Irish peasant was expected to be by Trevelyan. A Foucauldian analysis suggests that **food aid processes can be seen in terms of a power dynamic that produces the control and disciplining of peasants and returnees within Eritrea and their subordination to government agencies as well as the subordination of those agencies to Western donors and NGOs.** The constitution of the developed and the developing worlds is reproduced through dividing the practices of aid and food for work programs. These techniques of discipline fail to produce development, their apparent aim. However, they succeed in producing a vulnerable group, who are seen to be in need of not justice or political representation but help and assistance. The form **this** help takes **ensures the establishment and continuance of a system that produces profits for the** supposed **donors** and debts—of gratitude and obligation as well as monetary—for the recipients. **It is a system that relies on technologization and depoliticization for its operation, that enables a need for political change to be viewed as a call for improved** agricultural **technology**, **and that allows a paternalistic imbalance of power to be seen as a participatory relation of partnership between expert and trainee.**

Link – Early Warning Systems

Outside government aid and early warning systems analyze famine in terms of technology placing criteria on famine and focusing on management instead of "causes"

Jenny **Edkins**, is lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth., *Poststructuralism & International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In,* **1999**, p. 9-10

Processes of technologization or depoliticization can be seen in international politics itself, as well as in the discipline that studies it. One example of this is found in responses to famines, humanitarian crises, or complex political emergencies. 46 **Agencies and governments outside the crisis area do not take account of the political processes that are under way, of which the crisis is a symptom**. Instead, **they rely on interventions derived from an abstract, technical analysis of the situation, one that looks for "causes," not political reasons or motivations**. **In the case of a "famine," they analyze the situation in terms of crop production, food availability, and the nutritional status of the population**. **Systems are put in place that give early warnings of impending famines based on such factors, occasionally including "social" action such as movement of peoples in search of food or employment**. This analysis is unhelpful for two reasons. First, **it means that assistance to deprived populations can take place only when the criteria for recognizing a "famine" have been satisfied**: generally, when starvation, disease, or displacement has led to mass starvation—already too late for assistance to be of any use. Second, **it means that the assistance that is provided is given in a manner that often plays into the hands of the political opponents of the famine victims**. Food aid can be used to feed armies as well as the starving; it can provide an economy of "permanent emergency" from which certain sectors of the population will benefit at the expense of others' suffering. Food aid can also serve the political ends of the donors, whether governments or agencies. David Keen has analyzed these processes at work in the Sudan famines of the 1980s. 48 **Methods of administration of food aid programs even in peacetime involve a technologization and depoliticization.** Food for-work programs in Eritrea in the 1990s provide examples of disciplinary processes and technologization in practice: I have discussed these in detail elsewhere. It is now generally recognized that aid and famine relief carry the risk of worsening the situation, but this does not prevent further attempts at "technologizing" what have come to be called "complex emergencies. " 50 **Once it is seen that famines often involve conflict, analysis turns to the features of conflict rather than the nutritional status of famine victims, and this in turn produces various techniques of conflict analysis and resolution.** 51 **What is still not widely understood is that processes of emergency in crises signaled by famines, conflicts, and wars are just that: processes of the emergence of new political structures.** 52 **It is** precisely **in such instances** that **we find "the political** " **The common "methods" of response do not grasp this and instead seek to impose a technology of either nutritional analysis, conflict control, or "doing no harm.** " 53 In an important sense, though, as with all attempts at technologization, what is being done is, after all, intensely "political." **It involves the suppression of the new forms of political order whose emergence the emergency announces**.

Link – Famine/Humanitarianism

Their discourse of famine in the context of humanitarianism removes the ability to alter humanitarianism and creates the existence of a world of insufficiency disabling solutions and solidifying the constant crisis

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. xvii - xix "The second…framed"

The second corollary of the way famine is framed within discourses of modernity is that the humanitarian relief industry is largely impervious to challenge or critique. However much censure is aimed at "the humanitarian international," it still has "an extraordinary capacity to absorb criticism, not reform itself and yet emerge strength..... **The legitimacy of Western relief agencies, donor institutions and even military forces seems to be enhanced by those who dispute their effectiveness**."8 Debate about humanitarianism, whether critical or supportive of current practices, is self-reinforcing**. Talk of humanitarianism, famine, and famine relief produces these "objects"**—humanitarians, famines, relief agencies—**in specific and particular ways: "the humanitarian discourse itself, whatever its content, reinforces the humanitarians' moral ownership of famine and similar crises.**"9 Humanitarianism's ability to resist criticism (and to reincorporate it) arises from its central location within discourses of modernity. To examine how effective humanitarian interventions might be or to ask who are the final recipients of food aid and who benefits from the relief is thus to a great extent to participate in this discourse. Such questions have to take place within the framework that sets interventions in train in the first place. It is very difficult to engage with these issues without accepting the premise that humanitarianism is meant to be beneficial and without buying in to particular views of what humanity is, the views prevalent in modernity. **The power of discursive practices is such that the entities they bring into being seem to be products of nature rather than discourse—and hence beyond question.** One particular strand is how **modernity as a discourse relies on notions of scarcity. It is seen as axiomatic that we exist under conditions of insufficiency, where the maintenance of life depends on a battle with nature for limited resources**. But **scarcity itself is a central feature of modernity's way of constituting the world, not something natural**.10 Through **the production of separations between man and nature**, the growth of human populations **can be contrasted with the increase in their "natural" means of subsistence**. This means that **the notion of famine, shortage, or scarcity is particularly embedded in the way modernity is constituted.** Although there is now much greater and more sustained involvement by the humanitarian organizations than there was in the past, famine crises appear to be less possible to solve, "more intractable" than before.11 De Waal asks whether it may be the very intrusion of humanitarian organizations that causes this problem, arguing that it removes the capacity of the people involved to find their own solution. For de Waal, local political action is the answer. However, if we recall Foucault's analysis of the prison, we are led to a different conclusion. Foucault argues that contrary to a commonsense view, the failure of prisons to rehabilitate offenders (their stated purpose) is to be regarded functionally as a success. It reproduces "delinquents" as a particular category of subject: differentiated, subject to surveillance, and produced as objects of knowledge. By being labeled "criminal," their actions are depoliticized. A form of power relation—disciplinary power—is institutionalized**. In the continuing involvement of humanitarian aid organizations in crises we have something similar. A situation of "permanent emergency" arises.**12 It is a situation where those apparently engaged in trying to bring about change are benefiting from the continuing crisis.**13An irony of the relationship between famines and modernity is the way in which modernity's own hunger for certainty impedes its ability to do anything about hunger in the physical sense. At the root of much modern thought and social scientific investigation is a drive for epistemological certainty**, for a secure route to knowledge.14 **Without knowledge, we seem unable to act**. **This desire** for certainty **is found**, for example, in **the search for a new moral framework for humanitarianism**. We feel a need for a set of principles against which we can measure our decisions before we act. But this search for a moral framework is futile: "whatever the attractions of such a construct, there is no escaping the fact that this process of decisioning about responsibility is irretrievably political and immune to epistemological equations.... Little can be achieved by searching for abstracted theoretical formulas."1S In the same way, **we look for general answers to questions about the causes of famine before we feel empowered to act**. Moreover, the solutions put in place have to provide the feedback to satisfy assessment requirements. Aid projects have to be capable of providing measurable data. **These results verify and legitimize the actions taken and the discursive practices in which they are framed**.

Link – Food for Work

Food for Work Programs: Food for work programs are rely on subjectifying practices in their attempt to manage famine

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 75-76 "The discursive…subjugation"

The discursive practices that provide the backdrop for famine relief and food for work programs are a key site around which aid discourses have been rearticulated. They bring together otherwise contradictory positions—those based on food scarcity and those based on lost entitlements. **The relief and aid programs, as social practices that produce power/knowledge, have consequences beyond those prefigured in the food aid discourse. Famine relief can in practice be used in a number of ways to aid particular political aims. Food for work practices have implications in terms of the subjectification and disciplinary practices they embody. They are an instrument of control and subjugation**.

Link – Food Shortage

The equation of lack of food into the causes of famine causes food to become valuable only in terms of the scientific and biological importance assigned to it

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 22-23 "Modern…notion"

Modern approaches regard famine as a question of food and generally assume an unproblematic and uncomplicated notion of food. Food is "fuel for the human machine": what is important is its calorific and nutritional value. Questions of nutritional status and minimum needs are addressed and malnutrition is identified. However, **food is not something that exists as a pre-given object, awaiting analysis by nutritional science. It was produced as an object of study with the appearance of** the **science** of life that took place in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century. **In that emergence, what became important was the study of organs and their function.** Although gills in fish and lungs in mammals are dissimilar in form, they share the function of respiration: this "functional homogeneity. . . 15 their hidden foundation."27 The subject of biology becomes possible, replacing natural history. **The reference to function implies a necessary coexistence of organs in a system and a hierarchy of functions, some of more importance than others in the overall plan of the organism. We have a distinction between classical "being" and biological "life" and "the emergence of a certain energy, necessary to maintain life, and a certain threat, which imposes upon it the sanction of death.** "28 In relation to biological life, **food is defined in terms of its function for the organism that is adapted to capture, consume, and digest it and measured in terms of the abstract qualities of calorific and nutritional value**. In other places and at different times food was not merely considered to be fuel for the human machine. Rather the sharing of food bound individuals indissolubly together in spirit.., it was a condensed symbol of society.29 Prior to the modern episteme, the customs and rituals surrounding the consumption and production of food in particular groups are seen as important, and what counts as food is regarded as socially, not biologically, determined. Overstepping these social boundaries is possible—as in cases of cannibalism reported in famines—but their existence is confirmed by the guilt and remorse that this engenders. The notion of the production of food, firmly lodged in the modern episteme, is quite distinct from the concepts of generations who addressed their prayers to a God "whose gift it is, that the rain doth fall, the earth is fruitful, beasts increase, and fishes do multiply."30 The idea of trade in food as a commodity like any other, which can be owned by an individual, is set against notions of food as gift, food for sharing, traditions of hospitality and obligation. Again, the failure of these imperatives to survive the exigencies of famine does not invalidate the notion.

Link – Food Aid

The public nature of food aid programs gives them a need for supervision and surveillance making it a machine for the continuation of dominance and control

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 85- 88"In…apparatus'"

In this part of the chapter I discuss and analyze a number of features of food for work programs, relating them to Foucault's account of disciplinary practices. The first aspect is **the public nature of the works carried out and how this is involved with what is seen as a process of reform. This accounts for the function of food for work as opposed to the free distribution of food aid and makes this practice a disciplinary one. The visible nature of the public works is linked with the need for supervision and control, another part of the disciplinary process, and one that produces as subjects those whom it documents**. These processes of selection and control are embodied in institutions. This account from Ireland in the 1840s, reveals many similarities with Eritrea in the 1990s, one hundred and fifty years later: Women and girls worked with the men too, digging, wheeling harrows, carrying loads of earth and breaking stones, sometimes carrying helpless children on their backs. Many people objected to the type of works undertaken. In general they consisted in the building and repairing of roads. While the policy of the government was not to provide works irrespective of their utility, it became necessary as the useful roads were completed to build others less useful. The inability to supervise properly the selection of schemes meant that many almost useless schemes were undertaken.79 Moving stones and rocks, largely by hand or with only limited tools, still formed a major part of food for work programs in Eritrea in 1995 (figures z and 3). The work was very similar whether the project was one of road construction, stone bunds in farmland, hillside terracing, or the construction of microdams. All involved large groups of people moving quantities of earth and stones by hand into rows or lines of one sort or another. In some areas of the country women seemed to be the major participants. The type of work undertaken did not generally seem to reflect the needs of the community, but seemed to relate more to the requirements of the work as part of a process of reform and rehabilitation—so-called development— despite a rhetoric of participation. In one of the villages visited, people (women) were spending several hours each day on a camel journey to collect water. Construction of a well for the village was presumably a high priority, but road construction was the program being implemented. The product of the operation has to be both visible and measurable**. The work process itself has to be public and available for inspection by visiting teams of monitors from donor agencies or internal ministries. Visiting consultants are looking for large groups engaged in obviously productive and intense labor under good local supervision and with a clearly defined purpose. This has parallels with the form of work in prisons, where, according to Foucault, work "is a principle of order and regularity; through the demands that it imposes, it conveys, imperceptibly, the forms of a rigorous power;** it bends bodies to regular movements, it excludes agitation and distraction**, it imposes a hierarchy and a surveillance**. . . . The prison is not a workshop; it is... a machine whose convict-workers are both the cogs and the products."80 In food for work programs, the regular lines of peasants working on terracing or road building and the manual, repetitive actions involved are expected to produce the same appearance of organization and purpose. As Patrick Webb and Joachim von Braun express it: "**Food for work is not just about providing work, it is also about putting labour to useful effect.**"81 **It produces "participants" whose involvement validates the program. To what extent these participants are in fact the main beneficiaries is debatable**. Foucault's description of prison work evokes images of silence, organization, and obedience, the smooth functioning of a mechanism. He concludes: "**What then is the use of penal labour? Not profit; nor even the formation of a useful skill; but the constitution of a power relation, an empty economic form, a schema of individual submission and of adjustment to a production apparatus**."82

Link – Complex Emergency

Contextualizing famine as a complex emergency ignores possible causes in favor of neutral solutions based upon modernity's regime of truth

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 131-132 "The term…truth"

The term "complex emergency" originated in the late 1980s, in relation initially to conflicts in Africa and the Gulf, where for the UN it meant "a major humanitarian crisis of a multi-causal nature.., a long-term combination of political, conflict and peacekeeping factors"6 It is a contentious term.7 The term's **widespread use in describing conflicts may be due to the way it diverts attention from any possible political connotations, instead blaming the complexity of the causal picture, and excuses the absence of solutions**.8 **For** Joanna **Macrae and** Anthony **Zwi**, **complex emergencies are "intentionally created and . . . sustained in order to achieve their objectives of cultural genocide and political and economic power.., a potent combination of political and economic factors driving and maintaining disaster-producing conflicts**."9 Duffield shows how complex emergencies are distinguished from natural disasters: So-called complex emergencies are essentially political in nature: they are protracted political crises resulting from sectarian or predatory indigenous responses to socioeconomic stress and marginalisation. Unlike natural disasters, complex emergencies have a singular ability to erode or destroy the cultural, civil, political and economic integrity of established societies. . . . Humanitarian assistance itself can become a target of violence and appropriation by political actors who are organic parts of the crisis. Complex emergencies are internal to political and economic structures. They are different from natural disasters and deserve to be understood and responded to as such.10 **The notion of complex emergencies** still **draws on notions of food shortage or stress**.11 In that sense, **its repudiation of the image of a natural disaster is unsuccessful**. For writers like Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, complex emergency refers to "situations that may be triggered by natural disasters such as droughts or floods, by intercommunal violence with roots in ethnic or religious tensions or exclusionary politics, by economic or environmental stress, or by some combination of these factors."12 The danger of this is that the political or military conflict that characterizes such emergencies is seen as secondary and as complicating efforts to provide relief. Assistance is assumed to be well intended and politically neutral. **Complex emergencies are still seen as natural and hence as a failure of an otherwise benign social and political system. Viewing them in this way has important implications for policy and still leads to solutions of a technical or managerial nature**. A new object of analysis has been produced and new **disciplines enabled**, but **these take place within the same discursive practices, those of modernity's regime of truth.**

Link – Inclusion of Community in Development

Rhetoric of inclusion of communities in their own "development" masks the disciplinary nature of aid work, which becomes a tool for the givers purposes

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 85-86 "Moving stones…implemented"

> **Moving stones and rocks, largely by hand or with only limited tools, still formed a major part of food for work programs in Eritrea** in 1995 (figures z and 3). The work was very similar whether the project was one of road construction, stone bunds in farmland, hillside terracing, or the construction of microdams. All involved large groups of people moving quantities of earth and stones by hand into rows or lines of one sort or another. In some areas of the country women seemed to be the major participants. **The type of work undertaken did not generally seem to reflect the needs of the community, but seemed to relate more to the requirements of the work as part of a process of reform and rehabilitation—so-called development— despite a rhetoric of participation**. In one of the villages visited, people (women) were spending several hours each day on a camel journey to collect water. Construction of a well for the village was presumably a high priority, but road construction was the program being implemented.

Link – "Famine"

The process of naming "famine" creates the inversion of the word as an unattainable object of desire, resulting in a struggle for ideological hegemony

Jenny **Edkins**, is lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth., *Poststructuralism & International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In,* **1999,** p. 99-100

Another important outcome of this (and why it is different), however, is the way **the act of naming leads to the production of a surplus**. The point de capiton or nodal point is the word that "as a word, on the level of the signifier itself, unites a field, constitutes its identity: it is, so to speak, the word to which 'things' themselves refer to recognise themselves in their unity. " 62 **This "inversion" produces a surplus, the object-cause of desire, that unattainable something**. An example might make clear the logic of this inversion that produces a surplus. At first **the word "famine" appears as a signifier connoting a cluster of supposedly effective properties—"general and widespread shortages of food, leading to widespread death by starvation"—but this is not yet finished.** What happens then is that **the relation is inverted**. We say that it is like this because it is a famine. **This inversion, "it is like this because it is a famine, " then leads to "well, it is not really quite like this yet"—we have not** yet **seen widespread deaths**, for example. In other words, **reality does not measure up to the image**. What we have is that "unattainable something" that is in famine more than famine. **The process of naming has produced places within the symbolic order that things occupy.** But **the real does not neatly fit the symbolic space; slotting things into the symbolic order is necessary but** always, according to Lacan, **produces this effect of a nonsymbolizable surplus.** To repeat this another way, we could say that **the radical contingency of naming implies a gap between the real and modes of its symbolization**: A certain historical event can be symbolized in a number of ways—the real itself does not provide the symbolization. The surplus, or impossible real kernel, that which is in an object more than the object, is produced by the signifying operation. It is this that stays the same under all counterfactual circumstances—however much the properties linked with the object may change—because it is not real anyway. All **naming is the result of a struggle for ideological hegemony**: "The essentialist illusion consists in the belief that it is possible to determine a definite cluster of features, of positive properties, however minimal, which defines the permanent essence" of something; by contrast, according to Žižek, the only way to define something is that it is always designated by the same signifier: "**It is the signifier which constitutes the kernel of the object's 'identity.'"**

Link - Humanitarianism

Objective and humanitarian based claims for aid are both truth based and conceal the decisioning process

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 127 "In…possible"

In this respect **Lacan gives us an account of the social that parallels Derrida's** account of the metaphysical. **Both make crucial use of the notion of undecidability or impossibility or, in other words, of the limits** (or irrelevance) **of the knowable**. **Without these limits, a community founded on rational argumentation would suffice**. This leads to the picture of the social order as a symbolic fiction or a semblance of one that exists merely as a presupposition by each of the individuals of the already existing coordination of all other individuals.99 My argument is that we saw such a gesture of precipitate identification in Band Aid. **The international community comes into existence not as the result of some successful search for a common denominator, some set of basic values, humanitarian or scientific, that we can all subscribe to, but by the presupposition of the common denominator as already present**. However, the price to be paid, according to Zizek, is that future is confused with past; what is to come is confused with what is already here. This is where the precipitate, performative gesture, the declaration, comes in: "the declaration sets in motion a process which, retroactively, will ground jt."100 **If we wait for the international community to appear before we act as if it exists, we will be waiting for a very long time. In examining responses to distant suffering, we can distinguish an international community based on the scientific episteme** (knowledge! abstract/objective) and **an international community based on humanitarianism** (neutrality/common humanity/universal rights). **The latter translates to a claim to common humanity through suffering and trauma, the former to a regime of truth based on a scientific epistemology**. In the end neither tells us what to do, though both claim the authority to do so. Neither is based on responsibility, involvement, or subjectivity. Both lead to a neutrality that conceals the decisioning process or the political moment. This moment is not a moment in time; it involves "tarrying with the negative." The question remains as to whether, and in what time, such an impossible solution might be possible.

Link – Food for Work

Food for Work programs mirror the technicodisciplinary aspects of the biopolitical penal system

Jenny **Edkins**, is lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth., *Poststructuralism & International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In,* **1999,** p. 49

The principles by which the technicodisciplinary aspect functions include isolation, work, and the modulation of the penalty or duration of imprisonment. Isolation is individualizing and provides solitude for reflection. It terminates any relation that is not between the individual and the hierarchy and that is not supervised by the authorities. **Modulation of the duration of imprisonment can be used as an instrument of correction: It is adjusted to the transformation of prisoners during their terms. Work in prison is not only a reparation for the crime but an instrument of reform. Food-forwork programs, where those vulnerable to famine take part in "public works" in return for rations of food, operate on similar principles The prison is the place where the inmate is under permanent observation and surveillance.** Records are made and reports compiled regarding the prisoner's behavior, state of mind, improvement, and so on. **It was for this reason that "the Panopticon—at once surveillance and observation, security and knowledge, isolation and transparency—found in the prison its privileged loci of realisation**. " 55 As opposed to the amphitheaters of a previous age, where large numbers of people could gather to watch a spectacle, the panopticon's design permits one person to supervise many, who are unable to see each other. **The panopticon is "a prison-machine with a cell of visibility in which the inmate [is caught] and a central point from which a permanent gaze may control prisoners and staff. "** 56 This involves the expression of the disciplinary "form" in the architecture—the building. There is also a system of documentation, where individual reports on each prisoner are kept. The prison "has to extract unceasingly from the inmate a body of knowledge that will make… possible… a modification of the inmate that will be of use to society. " 57 Foucault compares penal systems to accounting practices that ensure a return on capital: "Penitentiary practice produces a return on the capital invested in the penal system and in the building of heavy prisons. "

Link – Food for Work

Food for Work programs sustain a cyclical need for humanitarian assistance, retaining its legitimacy

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 90 – 91"Obiously…interests"

Obviously **there was much opposition to the idea of food for work replacing the free distribution of food aid. There was also a willingness to exploit the system**. **Workers constructing roads that would be destroyed when the rainy season began would presumably rebuild them the following season in return for more food for work. Road building remains a common use of food for work. It has advantages both for those who are implementing the FFW program** and those who benefit. In the case of road building and maintenance, the product of the process itself (the road) enables the supervisors of the program to reach the site. Roads do not only "herald... improved access to food and medical care,"[85] they also bring areas within the control of central administration and open them up to outside commercial interests.

Link – Food for Work

Food for work programs are reduced to calculative administration

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 97 "In Eritrea…themselves"

In Eritrea, free food distribution had been confined by the transitional government to certain categories: the needy and the nutritionally vulnerable. The latter included "children under five, disabled persons, people living in arid zones and the aged." It was also extended to war-disabled, orphans, returnees, ex-fighters, war victims, and female-headed households. Fifty thousand ex-fighters, including 13,000 women, were given free food for a year; 400,000 returnees would receive three months' food supply**. In addition to providing work for the participants, food for work schemes create an administrative and advisory superstructure**. **Agricultural experts, consultants, administrators, and academics are required to initiate, monitor, organize, and comment on the food for work practices**. According to Maxwell, "the incremental costs over and above relief will include professional staff for the design of works, tools, supervision, non-food inputs and administration, both locally and centrally," and these can be estimated at **40** percent on top of wage costs.[96] **As well as the size of the institutional structure that food for work produces, there are conflicting sites of power. Food for work administration tends to bypass local government structures**. Although this does not seem to be the case in Eritrea, where ERRA, a strong indigenous NGO, has a history of controlling relief and development work during thirty years of war. Elsewhere there is conflict, with NGOs wanting to manage projects themselves.[97]

Link – Food for Work

Food for Work programs mirror the prison institution, replacing disciplinary knowledge with biographical knowledge, they are a punitive technique to correct lives

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 99-100 "Very soon…lives"

Very soon after prison institutions had been set up in 1820—1845, criticisms began. Prisons do not reduce the crime rate; they lead to reoffending; they cause delinquency by the type of existence they impose on inmates; they encourage the association of criminals; criminals who are branded as ex-convicts can't find work and so reoffend; it impoverishes the inmate's family. The response to these criticisms is a return to the same techniques: "For a century and a half the prison has always been offered as its own remedy."101 Foucault poses the question: "Is not the supposed failure part of the functioning of the prison? Is it not to be included among those effects of power that discipline and the auxiliary technology of imprisonment have induced in the apparatus of justice, and in society in general?"102 **The prison system has remained and survived for so long because it is functional in some way.** But if so, what is its role? **The answer Foucault gives is that the prison system produces and differentiates a group of "delinquents"; this gives rise to a disciplinary knowledge** called "criminology"; moreover, **by producing a class of individuals called "criminals" the prison system makes impossible certain forms of political protest**—by labeling them "criminal." **The same sort of criticisms can be made of food for work practices: they increase the food needs of vulnerable populations by forcing the participants to work; they are excessively punitive; they create dependency and do not improve the lot of the rural poor; the public works programs fail in what they set out to do; they create enormous logistical and administrative requirements; they do not lead to development; they produce dependency; and so on.** Following Foucault's question about prisons, we can ask: what is the role of food for work? **In the same way that the penitentiary concerns itself with the whole life of the delinquent, the specialism of "development" concerns itself with the life of the "vulnerable."** The details of day-today coping strategies are studied; farming practices, community structures, inter-household distribution, all become the subject of knowledges constituted around practices of relief-development. The distribution of free food can be seen as an emergency response, without strings, but when development takes its place, it is necessary to inquire into causes and solutions. **The vulnerable are the subject of the development discourse, and reform of these delinquents is the agenda of food for work**: "**It falls to [the] punitive technique.., to reconstitute all the sordid detail of a life in the form of knowledge, to fill in the gaps of that knowledge and to act upon it by a practice of compulsion. It is a biographical knowledge and a technique for correcting individual lives**"103

Link - Famine

Rationalizations of famine shape our realities, spilling over into other forms of humanitarian intervention locking us into a depoliticized system

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 158-159 "Once an…calculability"

Once an area is technologized in this way, the decisioning process is effectively embodied in definitions of the field and its subjects or objects of concern. Like a legal document, academic publications begin with definitions that set out what things are. If famine is a shortage of food, it is almost impossible to argue that food aid should not be sent to famine areas. Those who have the institutional or professional power that goes with what counts as a regime of truth in the modern world—techno-science—have the power to make definitions and thus to dictate what should be done. Part of the power of this technical authoritarianism rests on its incorporation and appropriation of the norm of openness and transparency. Its claim that rational debate is permitted, even welcomed, is perhaps its most ideologically powerful move. **If humanitarianism is technologized, intervention is no longer a question of responsibility and political decisioning but the application of a new system of international law to a case.** Any challenge would have to come from charismatic figures like Bob Geldof who can constitute (briefly) an opposing regime of truth. **The way we react to the problem of famine is analogous to the way we react to the problem of humanitarian crises in general. In both cases, by seeking a totalizing solution we avoid any ability to deal with the political reality of decisioning and the complexities of** (impossible**) possible solutions to actual difficulties**. The practical political aim of this book is neither to understand famine nor to provide a solution. These two **logocentric approaches both abstract and depoliticize**.18 **In reacting to famine the way we do—as academics theorizing about famine and intervention; as development professionals, NGOs, and governments offering food aid to famine regions; as individuals responding to famine relief appeals; and as the international community providing humanitarian intervention—the form of our reaction is in part what constitutes us as subjects.** It also constitutes an international community and the relationships within it. In a large part our reaction is a particularly modern one: we depoliticize and technologize famines, discounting political and ethical responsibility in favor of a search for abstract causes and criteria for aid. The aim of this book is simply to call for a repoliticization. **This is not a once and for all process, but a continuing engagement. It is useful to recall that there are no technical solutions: the search may respond to and maintain modernity's way of life, but it is futil**e. **As** Richard **Ashley** has **put it**, "there are no timeless, universal, already prepared answers. **There is only the reality of actions working upon actions across all those varied localities** where people struggle amidst difficulties, dangers and ambiguities to somehow make life go on."19 **The search for technical answers is itself political and supports the powerful, not the suffering. It is the buttress for forms of governance that reduce life to calculability**.

Link – Famine as Disaster

Discourse of charitable response to famine as a disaster with scientific causes a detachment from relief where only further calculation can justify action

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 120 "If…aims"

If facing images of distant hunger is an experience of the traumatic real, what follows, in the response that we make, is the reconstitution of subjectivity and community through a reinstatement of what we call social reality/social fantasy. For Zizek, social fantasy is to be seen as an escape from the traumatic real, a way of concealing antagonism and the impossibility of the social order. It produces the master signifier and masks the "nothing" behind the curtain. Critics point to the role of the ideological in Live Aid. **The discourse of charitable response to disaster, the narrative of the West as rescuer, performs the ideological role of concealing the "true causes of famine and suffering that lie in the dominance of the West and its exploitation of Africa**. For these critics, famine has deep causes, for example, in the effects of colonization and structural inequalities, and the Live Aid narrative is ideological in that it provides a way of avoiding the need to confront these truths. **This view of famine as a disaster with a scientific cause**—whether the science in question is Marxist economics or natural science—**leads to a detachment from disaster relief in favor of a search for further knowledge, which alone can provide a reason to act**. It contrasts with the humanitarian approach that calls for action without knowledge to save lives in the immediate future without waiting for a political analysis. **This approach is validated by a different detachment or objectivity, one that in its own way equally repudiates involvement and empathy with suffering. It is based on a strict separation of humanitarian and political actions, on an assumption of neutrality, and on a valuation that holds the preservation of human life to be above and distinct from any political aims.**

Link – Famine as Disaster

Construction of famine as a natural disaster presents a depoliticized technologizing approach that forces an encounter with the Real reinforcing the separation of the Real from society, causing the witnesses of disaster to encounter the other while simultaneously placing themselves in the privileged position of the knowledgeable

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 111-114 "Media accounts…psychotherapy"

Media accounts present famines as natural disasters, paralleling the academic accounts discussed in earlier chapters. Reviews and critiques of media accounts point out how the natural disaster is the focus of the lead paragraphs, and discussion of political or other facets is relegated to subsequent, less important paragraphs.36 The focus is on the dramatic and visual aspects and "media . . . typically emphasise the uncontrolled wrath of nature and promote the value of 'social order' . . . by emphasising either the efficiency of rescue and relief operations in the restoration of order or its tragic absence."37 Media critiques also point out that accounts of disaster relief have an underlying folk narrative form;38 the central character is a roving hero—an Oxfam field-worker, a foreign correspondent—and there is a villain or, more often, a lack or misfortune. Another central character is a donor who provides the hero with a magical agent or magical helper—Western abundance and technology in the case of famine narratives. Even factual news programs have this narrative structure. There are political implications behind this treatment, of course. In some sense, **the media create a disaster when they give it coverage, and a disaster does not have political or structural causes: emergencies are aberrations, occurrences outside the normal.** Certainly, **the portrayal of famines as disasters promotes a depoliticized, technologizing approach**. **This stress on disaster reflects a fascination with what Zizek calls the sublime and, at the same time, a need to tame and domesticate an encounter with the Real. The distinction between nature** (raw, uncontrollable, traumatic) **and society** (ordered, under control, calm) **is a distinction between the Real and** what we call **social reality**. This distinction is central to the process of constituting social reality and subjectivity. Hence media interest in stories where this contrast is featured would not be surprising: they deal with something central to what we call existence itself. **The experience of disaster as an encounter with the Real is one that, like the gaze of the victim, forces us to confront the impossibility of social reality, the void at its heart**. The Real is that which cannot be symbolized. The symbolic or social order is always incomplete or impossible. It can only be constituted by the exclusion of some (nonsymbolizable) kernel—the Real. The literature on trauma and post-traumatic stress emphasizes that **not only those caught up in a disaster experience this shock of an encounter with the Real, but also those who witness it.** Whole communities can be caught up in it; indeed, those who share a traumatic experience of this type feel themselves both part of a new community of a special type (a community made up of those who share a revised view of the world, produced by trauma, that they must continue to bear witness to) and apart from all usual social links.40 However, **for witnesses of disaster the traumatic element is not so much the encounter with the Real as the encounter with "the gaze of the helpless other**—child, animal—who does not know why something so horrifying and senseless is happening to him."41 **It is not, as might be supposed, the gaze of a hero, willingly sacrificing himself, that is so striking to observers of tragedy, but "the gaze of a perplexed victim**,"42 the passive, helpless casualty. **It is this gaze that gives rise to the compassion felt by outsiders.** It is not, as we might think, the outsiders in distant countries who are the passive ones in cases of humanitarian disasters, who do nothing, who do not want to get involved. Rather, it is the people caught up in the events themselves. They see the horrors that are engulfing them but cannot understand how such horrors are possible and are unable to act.43 **Their gaze, the gaze of the uncomprehending victim, is unbearable and gives rise to guilt in witnesses to distant disaster**. **It is to avoid the pressure of this gaze that we feel compassion toward those in trouble. This compassion can be related to the reflexive nature of human desire, which is always desire for a desire**. Compassion is "the way to maintain the proper distance towards a neighbour in trouble."44 **By giving, we present ourselves so that we like what we see when we look at ourselves from the position of the victim. By responding compassionately, we present ourselves as that which is desired by those who are suffering.** This account does not in any sense invalidate compassion; on the contrary, it shows why it is so important and necessary. The reaction of the subject of compassion, the victim, is a separate matter. In the Ethiopian famine, we saw that the images that provoked an immediate reaction and a strong response were those that portrayed perplexed victims, children in particular, and specifically those that portrayed their passivity and bewilderment.45

<Edkins cont'd>

<Edkins cont'd>
It was precisely that picture of passivity that formed the basis of so many of the subsequent objections to the media coverage. However, **the mediated nature of the image, the fact that it was an image seen on television, leads to another account of the response to disaster**. When we watch a television program, we do so from a disembodied space outside and beyond the reach of the scene we are viewing. We ourselves are invisible to the people we are watching. We are not there, they cannot see us, yet we can see them. The same is the case with a theatrical drama on stage, except that there the distance is fictional or posited by convention and can be broken by audience participation or by applause. In a theater, too, people are part of an audience, not alone. **When we witness scenes of suffering on television, our subjectivity is suspended. We are like ghosts. It is as if we were already dead. We cannot intervene, and we cannot be harmed by what is going on. Yet, in an important sense we are not passive**. **As** (apparently) **the focus of the victim's perplexed gaze, the viewer is placed in the position of the master signifier, the place of the subject who is supposed to know**. This is the place the analyst occupies in psychotherapy.

Link – Food for Work

Food for Work programs result in reification of the opposition between humyns and nature and coerce persons into changing lifestyles, leading to the need to sustain biological life, not culture

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 92 "The practice…settle"

> **The practice of food for work emphasizes the need for input and commitment from the participants**. Despite this apparent openness, there are limitations on the type of work that qualifies for FFW projects. It helps if the work undertaken comes within the category of improving environmental sustainability. **It is assumed that the recipient population is largely unskilled and ignorant of modern, environmentally friendly farming techniques. They are presumed responsible for the state of desertification with which they are faced**. This argument relies on a narrative of a period of environmental degradation. This can be problematic. Melissa Leach and James Fairhead describe how development experts and environmentalists believed that forest-savannah was being destroyed by local farming practices in an area of Guinea in West Africa. After careful research, Leach and Fair-head found that the experience of the villagers and the evidence of archival and air photographs showed that the islands of forest were the result of human management, *created* around villages in savannah by their inhabitants. Vegetation cover had been *increasing* during the period when policy makers believed the opposite.[87] **Training the workers is an important part of the reform or development process: "hay-making.., was new to pastoralists, who therefore learned the benefits of hay-making and storage in advance of the long dry season, while at the same time earning food for their labour."**[88] **To what extent these new skills were appropriate to nomadic groups of pastoralists is another question. There is clearly a tension if such groups wish to maintain their lifestyles within a modern state, and food for work can be used to bring pressures on nomads to settle**.

***Internal Links

Famine/Disaster → Bare Life

Treating famine as a disaster creates a constant state of emergency and allows the state the sovereignty to lessen life to a state of bare life

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer at University of Wales, Aberystwyth, "Missing Persons: London, July 2005" February **2007**

The commemoration of what we call traumatic events bears a particular relationship to politics and political struggle.[24] Those who have experienced such events have been brought face to face with the vulnerability of life and the fragility of all forms of social and political community. Events that we call traumatic are events that reveal that there is no way round this vulnerability. There are only solutions that enable life to go on, that enable us to forget the pressing uncertainties of life and death for the time being. Remembering traumatic events can be a way of refusing a language that forgets the essential vulnerability of flesh in its talk of the importance of state, nation and ideology, a way of refusing a language that pretends that certainty and security is attainable. We can never quite know who we are, or who anyone else is: once we try to pin it down, something always escapes us: we are always both more and less than what we claim to be. There is a lack at the heart of subjectivity, and, though we imagine wholeness or completeness as attainable, it is not. The social order of which we are part—what we call social reality—is fragile and incomplete too. **The form of biopolitical authority that originated in the sovereign state but is increasingly becoming globalised tackles this inherent incompleteness or lack of closure in a number of ways, including through two processes** that are particularly relevant here. First, **through the production of what it calls failure, disaster, or emergency this form of authority sustains the fantasy that were it not for this temporary hiccup, all would be well**.[25] Second, **through processes of exclusion sovereign power or state authority produces an inside and an outside: a group of people to whom certain standards apply and another group to whom they do not**. Through exclusions a social order is produced that appears bounded, complete, and safe. However, what we call **traumatic events change this picture**. The pretence that there are solutions to be found, security and certainty to be had, is seen as just that: a pretence, a fantasy. Often those who survive traumatic events find their world has changed and they want to bear witness, to remember, and particular to remember how **trauma unsettles everything.** They feel compelled to bear witness to what I have called trauma time, a form of temporality involving the unsettling juxtaposition of past and present as opposed to the smooth, homogeneous linear time of the state.[26] Those 'in charge' on the other hand—the authorities, sovereign power—have to remember traumatic events in different ways. There seem to be two options. Either they have to remember by scripting those events into a heroic history of the nation, of civilisation or of humanity, a story of progress towards certainty and the overcoming of doubt: a linear narrative. Or alternatively, and this seems to be a more recent strategy or one that has gained prominence recently, they have to attempt to govern terror, to take control of the contingent: **they have to put in place practices of disaster management that normalise emergency and institutionalise trauma time**.[27] One or other of these strategies is necessary. **Otherwise authority would cease to be authorised**. **What we call social reality would be revealed as the fantasy that it is—and this is crucial—all the time, and not just in a "time of terror"**.[28] Remembering trauma is then always a site of struggle, a political struggle over memory and forgetting. **At stake is the form of biopolitics or sovereign power that underpins contemporary forms of governance**. **According to Agamben, sovereign power works by producing forms of life as separate, distinct**. In particular, **it works,** at least to begin with, **through producing two forms of life: politically qualified life, the life of the inside, authorised life, life that can speak; and bare life, the life of the home, the life that is excluded from the political sphere, rendered mute**. This distinction, like any distinction and the entities it claims to produce, is always fragile and unsustainable. Under this account, a traumatic event would be one that revealed this fragility and the impossibility of distinctions and called for a recognition of the radical relationality of existence.[29] **What we have now, Agamben argues, is a zone of indistinction that has extended to the whole of the earth; all life has become bare life and "politics is in a state of lasting eclipse."30 A state of emergency is no longer confined to a short period of time or to a particular place but has extended to all places and all times.** In Dillon's account,[31] what we have is not a zone of indistinction or a state of emergency brought about by the sovereign suspension of the law. Rather, we have a state of emergency that arises once life is conceived as always emergent, always becoming, and hence always dangerous.

<Edkins cont'd>

<Edkins cont'd>
Not "a state of emergency born of a juridico-political analysis of sovereign subjectivities," but one "born of a contemporary biopolitical analysis of emergent life."[32] What this state of emergency, or "political emergency of emergence" then produces is "a regime of exception grounded in the endless calibration of the …ways in which the very circulation of life threatens life."**33 In both these accounts, the form of life that liberal governance sees and that it governs is produced, in a state of emergency/emergence, as a purely bare biological life of emergence that can be and is treated instrumentally. The goal of life, envisaged in this way, is nothing but the endless circulation and reproduction of life. There is no room in this vision, seen either way, for the person or for responsibility**.

Famine → Sustainability of Capitalism

Constructions of famine illuminate scarcity, allowing for the maintenance of capitalism by eliminating threats of excess and abundance

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 123-125 "Famine images…from hunger"

Famine images, like the sexual images they parallel, embody the lack that must be concealed if the subject is to be constituted. Hunger as desire is at the root of the constitution of subjectivity. Famine itself can be read as a symptom: a point of overdetermination, of condensation of different strands of meaning. In that sense, there is a fantasy space reserved for it. I looked at the relation of famine and scarcity to market economics in chapter z. To explore this further, I look at Zizek's account of the role of desire in late capitalism. For Zizek, late-capitalist liberal-democracy has an impasse at its heart centering around the role of desire. In Lacan's work desire is not something that can be satisfied as such. As Zizek expresses it, "desire is sustained by lack and therefore shuns its satisfaction, that is, the very thing for which it 'officially' strives."85 **Desire is sustained by the unattainability of its object and by the gap between its official motivation and its actual function,** which is to provide a way of accommodation with a primordial lack, a lack inherent in the human condition as such. In Lacan, an empirical object fills out the role of the primordially lost Thing and becomes the object-cause of desire. Whereas Freud might argue that the obstacles of convention that are put in place to prevent the attainment of the object of desire—the sexual object, for example—serve to heighten desire**, in Lacan's account** these obstacles are there precisely to avoid the possibility of the discovery that the object is unattainable as such: "**external hindrances that thwart our access to the object are there precisely to create the illusion that without them, the object would be directly accessible—what such hindrances thereby conceal is the inherent impossibility of attaining the object**."86 **In** late **capitalism**, **the immediate satisfaction of desire through superabundance, permissiveness, and accessibility of objects threatens to suffocate desire**. We are approaching a position where for some of us the attainment of all possible empirical objects of desire is conceivable in practice. This will become even more so, Zizek claims, with the advent of so-called virtual reality**. Superabundance threatens desire by supplying the means for its satisfaction; the function of the object-cause of desire is thwarted by this**. Although officially desire exists to be satisfied, in Lacanian terms desire provides a means of transcending a primordial lack; it exists precisely because it has to be insatiable. **By providing an impossible object, the impossibility of fulfillment itself is sublimated**. However, this superabundance is not without its opposite: scarcity and deprivation. For Zizek, drawing on Hegel, **universal abundance is impossible, since in capitalism "abundance itself produces deprivation**."87 **Excess and lack are structurally interdependent in a capitalist economy. The system produces both together. Some live in abundance and plenty while others live in scarcity and deprivation**. Superabundance goes hand in hand with its opposite. This does not mean that notions of desire are irrelevant in the context of a world where for large numbers of people the necessities of life itself—food, water, shelter, and freedom from violence—are hard to come by. On the contrary, **Zizek's account of notions of desire as a concealment of an inherent lack and the need to sustain desire in conditions of superabundance can help us to understand some of the paradoxes of responses to events such as famines and the sight of incredible suffering in these and other disasters. The object of "Ending Hunger" functions as just such an impossible or unattainable object-cause of desire in the Lacanian sense**. Here we have the irony of a desire sustained by the object of removing the very thing—deprivation—that is indissolubly linked with the superabundance that threatens desire. Rather than the question of "Why, when there is such an abundance of food, do so many people starve?" the question becomes "Why, when we are so well provided for with an abundance of everything we can possibly desire, do we desire the one thing we cannot have, that is, a world without others who are deprived?" At least part of the answer, I argue, can be

found in the Lacanian account of desire. Not only do we desire the thing we cannot attain, but we put obstacles of convention in the way of attaining it. These obstacles are seen in arguments of developmentalists that portray famine as complex: it needs further research, we have to act carefully and take into account the feelings of those we want to help, and so on.88 Thus in famine we have an answer to Zizek's question: "So the big enigma is: how, through what kind of limitation of access, will capitalism succeed in reintroducing lack and scarcity into this saturation? "89 **Lack and scarcity are reintroduced as someone else's lack and scarcity—as hunger, the stranger that waits outside some other door. For those of us who live in an excess of abundance, desire becomes the (impossible) desire for a world free from scarcity: a hunger for a world free from hunger.**90

Food Aid → Bare Life

Food aid to Sub-Saharan Africa is coercive and representative of Modernity's creation of bare life

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 77 - 78 "In Ethiopian-controlled…could"

In Ethiopian-controlled areas the use of the relief food aid was controversial, as discussed in chapter i. **Western aid agencies administered the relief under the direction of the Ethiopian government** of the day, the military regime led by Mengistu with its Marxist-Leninist allegiances. **The agencies' freedom of movement was very restricted, and the government controlled the location of feeding stations and determined which people should be admitted. The government was also in charge of the flow of information—both to the agencies about the needs of the rural areas and to the famine victims about their options for relief and resettlement**.[53] In rebel-controlled areas, the rebel fronts had similar control of information flow.[54] At that time, at the height of the cold war, agencies were pleased to be able to operate at all in a communist-controlled country and "complied with all these restrictions without complaining or drawing attention to the constraints." As Clay and Holcomb describe it, "there was an air of grateful surprise," and the stand the agencies took was supported by the media and governments. There was no attempt at independent research and "few Westerners raised questions. "*i* Even later, when reports about the conflicts with the rebel fronts began to emerge, "**the issues of how the wars had contributed to food shortages and famine and how food assistance was used as a weapon were not clearly spelled out**. "*56* It has become clear since that the government used food aid as part of a large-scale forced resettlement program. Accounts of this, based on interviews with people who had escaped resettlement by fleeing to camps in neighboring Sudan and those who became refugees when they were displaced from their own areas by new settlements, were published at the time but were disputed.[57] These accounts claim that the resettlement program contributed to many thousands of deaths, for example, on overcrowded transport and through the spread of famine to other areas of the country.[58] **Food aid was used both to entice people to cities where they were captured for resettlement and to bribe peasant associations to put people forward for resettlement before they were given a quota of aid to distribute**.[59] Clay and Holcomb argue that this program of resettlement was not a policy specific to the communist government but one that had been used over many years to consolidate the control of the central government of the Ethiopian empire. Ethiopia was made up of a number of diverse groups, brought together under central state control by authoritarian policies that included the regular displacement of peoples from the north to areas in the south of the country. **This forced movement was used politically as a means of undermining any resistance from minority groups and consolidating the power of the central state**.[60] Despite evidence that the productivity of settlement areas was generally low, resettlement had been proposed as a means of solving the food crisis before Western intervention in late 1984.61 The availability of food aid from the West and transport in the form of trucks from the Soviet Union made implementation of the politically motivated program easier. Peasants from the areas of Tigray and Wollo, where much of the resistance to the Mengistu regime was located, were targeted. Accusations and counteraccusations of the abuse of food aid abound. It seems to be clear that both the Ethiopian government and the TPLF used food aid in conjunction with coercion or persuasion to relocate populations in ways that suited them. Western governments and right-wing groups used accusations of the abuse of food aid to discredit the Marxist government of Ethiopia. As John Sorenson shows, the narrative of the famine and food aid was a site of struggle in the political conflicts and wars of liberation.[62] Agencies, possibly well-meaning but caught up in a situation in which they had little information and even less control, made what limited decisions they could.

→ Unending Control of Nature

Modernity's famine and scarcity creates an inevitable endless struggle for abundance, positioning famine as an endless natural problem to be controlled, but the control is never successful enough to overcome the world of scarcity, reaffirming our supposed need for technology

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 33 "Modernity's…technology"

Modernity's account of famines as scarcity is predicated on a view of "man" continually struggling with an adversarial nature. The companion to the notion of scarcity is an image of an inexorable historical **progress toward** plenty and **abundance**. **This progress is seen as the fruit of modernity**; specifically, **it will be the outcome of** modernity's **increasing control of nature through** enlightenment and **knowledge**. To support this perception, **the modern notion of famine has produced its own prehistory**. The shift from the classical to the modern episteme identified by Foucault not only affects how we understand what happens now and in the future, but also involves a renarration of the past. When our view of famines changes, as it did at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, particularly with the work of Malthus, our account of famines in the past also has to change. We have to write another history of the present. The Malthusian approach has retrospectively written its own history, so it seems remarkable that we still have famine in the twentieth century. **This history is a story of economic progress moving beyond primitive societies in which starvation was a recurrent feature of a life of struggle against an inhospitable nature to a modern, technologically advanced world where famines are an anomaly. The Malthusian picture looks at recent improvements and extrapolates these backward. It leads us to "assume that measurable improvements in nutrition and health since the eighteenth century are only the most recent and visible parts of human progress."**85 **We also link this with our assumptions about the role of Malthusian checks in limiting growth of prehistoric populations until they were overcome by modern technology**.

Technologization → Biopower

Incorporation of science into considerations of famine depoliticizes it into an issue of technological management and incorporates it into a form of biopolitics where power over life displaces political participation

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 1-2 "Famine…technologized"

Famine is embedded in the discursive practices of modernity. Hunger has only recently been brought within the province of the human sciences, and these disciplines themselves, with "man" as their object, only came into being at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries.[1] **The incorporation of hunger into** the episteme, or way of thinking, of **the modern human sciences has refashioned it according to different, specifically modern, rationalities. It has been removed from the realm of the ethical and the political and brought under the sway of experts and technologists of nutrition, food distribution, and development. Its** position there, as an **appropriate subject for expert knowledge, remains a political position, but one that can lay claim to a political neutrality because of the specific way that science is construed as "truth" in modernity**. **Famine's incorporation into the human sciences defines famine and food in scientific ways and leads us inexorably to particular technical forms of solution. Famine is seen as a disaster with a scientific cause.** Ending famine is reduced to the question of acquiring the appropriate knowledge of the causes of famine and developing the techniques needed to apply that knowledge to produce a cure. Other views see food as more than fuel for the human machine and hunger as a recurring social tragedy, not a problem that can be solved by technology. **Famine, as a scarcity of food, is part of the struggle of modernity with the question of scarce resources more generally. Modernity sees the solution to scarcity in progress**: progress that leads from a past of privations and primitivism to a future of abundance and civilization. Contemporary accounts of prehistory confirm this perspective, but these and their assumptions have been questioned. Malthusian approaches to famine are central to the modernist view and remain influential as the base for commonsense conceptions. Contemporary neo-Malthusians combine optimists (the technical fixers: those for whom technological advances can be relied upon to find the solutions) and pessimists (the prophets of doom). **Famines occupy a central place in the political configuration of modernity. Modern politics is biopolitics: a concern for the regulation and control of populations, which replaces a politically qualified life with bare life—a form of life that can be killed but not sacrificed.2 Power over life displaces political participation and debate. Even the institutions of politics are technologized**.

Technologization → Medicalization

The modern view of famine is one of technologization resulting in the medicalization of hunger – this medicalization removes the blame from the possibility of societal causes and transitions famine into a natural occurance

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 25-26 "The modern view…people"

> **The modern view of starvation and hunger as a bodily affliction, then, does not come close to the full horror of famine sufferers or those who are malnourished. Although the use of drugs and stimulants remains very much a part of eating in the everyday life of the modern world**, it is perhaps for the most part voluntary and temporary in a way it was not for the poor of earlier times; the converse of this, the altered rationality that results from deprivation and starvation and is neither chosen nor avoidable, is forgotten. In the past poverty-stricken populations suffering from hunger "had not the slightest possibility of organising themselves into revolutions, existing as they did outside of time and space, and beyond any social or political strategy."[40] In present-day Brazil, hunger produces a condition called by sufferers *nervos* or "nerves." It is treated by tranquilizers or other medication.[41] This could be interpreted as an instance where the modern impulse to technologize, expressed here through a medicalization of hunger, relies on and exploits a broader nonmodern understanding of starvation. The people of the Alto do Cruzeiro now describe their affliction as *nervos* rather than hunger, although in the past they understood that nervousness was a symptom of hunger. It was called *delirio de fome,* the madness of hunger. But now, "where once *delirio de fome* was a popular representation of the tragic experience of the body with frenzied hunger, *nervoso* now represents the tragic experience of tormented and worried bodies with a nervous social and political system."[42] As Nancy Scheper-Hughes argues, hunger has become "a disallowed discourse, and the rage and dangerous madness of hunger have been metaphorised" so that the hungry "see in their wasted and tremulous limbs a chronic feebleness of body and mind."[43] **This has political implications: "hunger and other unmet and basic human needs are isolated by a process that excludes them by redefining them as something other than what they are**."[44] **While the hungry need food, the sick only need medicine: The transition from a popular discourse on hunger to one on sickness is subtle but essential in the perception of the body and its needs. A hungry body needs food. A sick and "nervous~~ body needs medications. A hungry body exists as a potent critique of the society in which it exists. A sick body implicates no one. Such is the special privilege of sickness as a neutral social role, its exemptive status. In sickness there is** (ideally) **no blame, no guilt, no responsibility. Sickness falls into the moral category of bad things that "just happen" to people**.[45]

Calculation → Bare Life

The reification of the conception of populations as calculated through humanitarianism creates Modernity's state of control over populations instead of the traditional governance over lands, reducing life to bare life

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000**p. 38 "Whereas…vital'"

Whereas for Aristotle, man is a living animal with a capacity for political existence, in modernity man has become "an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being into question."[103] **Modernity is the point at which the species and the individual as a simple living body become what is at stake in a society's political strategies. There has been a transition from a territorial state to a state of population—rather than governing territory, the state governs people. For Agamben the concentration camp is the exemplary space of modern biopolitics. The famine relief camp is another site**, albeit less appalling, **where biopolitics is installed**. In the relief camp the authorities' concern for death rates and the bureaucracy of organization obscures any awareness of the refugees' own social and political aims.[104] **With the constitution of the modern sovereign state, life as such is reduced to calculability. It becomes bare life**, which is "the life of homo *sacer* (sacred man), who *may be killed and yet not sacrificed."*[105] This figure of homo *sacer* has an essential function in modern politics: it becomes "the one place for both the organisation of state power and emancipation from it."**Humanitarianism is an example of how sovereignty is maintained by the very forces that appear to contest it. Humanitarian action is complicit in the reproduction of sovereign politics,** since it maintains the very separation upon which sovereignty depends: **The separation between humanitarianism and politics that we are experiencing today is the extreme phase of the separation of the rights of man from the rights of the citizen**. In the final analysis, however, **humanitarian organisations... can only grasp human life in the figure of bare or sacred life, and therefore, despite themselves, maintain a secret solidarity with the very powers they ought to fight**.[107] **Famines in modernity are seen as episodes of mass starvation, where thousands lose their lives for lack of food. Humanitarian aid provides food and the means for bare survival. Life alone, bare life, is what matters, not the continuance of a particular way of life. In a nonmodern view of famine this is not so: preservation of a way of (political) life is vital.**

Body Count →Bare Life

Their famine impacts are a prime example of modernity's picture of famine – the control of widespread starvation produces bare life, life only matters in terms of biological existence and body count

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 39-40 "In the modern…isolated'"

In the modern view, **famine is widespread starvation; the suffering and death of particular individuals is what counts and what is counted. The greatest famines are the ones where the largest number of deaths occur**. In this picture, children and babies are given as much if not more importance than adults. Their survival in orphanages or refugee settlements is a solution rather than a failure. **Relief is aimed at preserving the life of the biological organism rather than restoring the means of livelihood to the community**.[11]' Meaning resides in the invisible subsurface of the biological organism and its functions, not in its distinctiveness or its discursively produced relationships. Life, not living, is all. What modernity's picture of famine produces is bare life, a life that is mere existence with no political voice and no particular way of life. The way "the spectacle of famine" is conveyed through female figures is instructive here.[1t2] Famine is seen as inexpressible, something that cannot be expressed in language. It is partly a question of the scale and enormity of the tragedy. But there is something more than that—perhaps **the association of food with life itself gives rise to a double fear: both of language's inadequacy and its dangerous power**."[113] Images of women unable to feed their children convey a breakdown in the natural order: bare life again. The female/ male distinction is aligned with and constituted alongside the dichotomy between nature and culture: **"the resulting implication, that famine is a natural rather than a political event, is itself a political message, regrettable but also convenient."t14 It depoliticizes. The discourse on famine moves "away from the political and economic spheres into a moral register" through** the way the figure of woman is conflated with nature: "perversions of the maternal ideal, a woman unable to feed her child, who outlives her child, who cannot bury her child, are the dominant features of **scenes which are physically immediate but politically isolated.**"[tt5]

***Impacts

Capitalism Impacts

Capitalism is responsible for every genocide and element of domination in history destroying affirmative solvency and making genocide an inevitability

The Internationalist Perspective 2000 ("Capitalism and Genocide" #36, Spring online http://www.geocities.com/wageslavex/capandgen.html)

One way in which this ideological hegemony of capital is established over broad strata of the population, including sectors of the working class, is by channeling the disatisfaction and discontent of the mass of the population with the monstrous impact of capitalism upon their lives (subjection to the machine, reduction to the status of a "thing", at the point of production, insecurity and poverty as features of daily life, the overall social process of atomization and massification, etc.), away from any struggle to establish a human *Gemeinwesen*, communism. **Capitalist hegemony entails the ability to divert that very disatisfaction into the quest for a "pure community", based on hatred and rage directed not at capital, but at the Other, at alterity itself, at those marginal social groups which are designated a danger to the life of the nation, and its population**. One of the most dramatic effects of the inexorable penetration of the law of value into every pore of social life, and geographically across the face of the whole planet, has been the destruction of all primitive, organic, and pre-capitalist communities. Capitalism, as Marx and Engels pointed out in the Communist Manifesto, shatters the bonds of immemorial custom and tradition, replacing them with its exchange mechanism and contract. While Marx and Engels stressed the positive features of this development in the Manifesto, we cannot ignore its negative side, particularly in light of the fact that the path to a human Gemeinwesen has so far been successfully blocked by capital, with disastrous consequences for the human species. The negative side of that development includes the relentless process of atomization, leaving in its wake an ever growing mass of rootless individuals, for whom the only human contact is by way of the cash nexus. Those who have been uprooted geographically, economically, politically, and culturally, are frequently left with a powerful longing for their lost communities (even where those communities were hierarchically organized and based on inequality), for the certainties and "truths" of the past, which are idealized the more frustrating, unsatisfying, and insecure, the world of capital becomes. Such longings are most powerfully felt within what Ernst Bloch has termed non-synchronous strata and classes. These are stata and classes whose material or mental conditions of life are linked to a past mode of production, who exist economically or culturally in the past, even as they chronologically dwell in the present. In contrast to the two historic classes in the capitalist mode of production, the bourgeoisie and proletariat, which are synchronous, the products of the capitalist present, these non-synchronous strata include the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, and -- by virtue of their mental or cultural state -- youth and white-collar workers. In my view, Bloch's understanding of non-synchronicity needs to be extended to segments of the working class, in particular those strata of the blue-collar proletariat which are no longer materially synchronous with the high-tech production process upon which late capitalism rests, and the mass of workers ejected from the production process by the rising organic composition of capital and its comcomitant down-sizing. In addition, the even greater mass of peasants streaming into the shanty towns around the great commercial and industrial metropolitan centers of the world, are also characterized by their non-synchronicity, their inability to be incorporated into the hyper-modern cycle of capital accumulation. Moreover, all of these strata too are subject to a growing nostalgia for the past, a longing for community, including the blue-collar communities and their institutional networks which were one of the features of the social landscape of capitalism earlier in the twentieth century. However, no matter how powerful this nostalgia for past community becomes, it cannot be satisfied. The organic communities of the past cannot be recreated; their destruction by capital is irreversible. At the same time, the path to a future Gemeinwesen, to which the cultural material and longings embodied in the non-synchronous classes and strata can make a signal contribution, according to Bloch, remains obstructed by the power of capital. So long as this is the case, **the genuine longing for community of masses of people, and especially the nostalgia for past communities especially felt by the non-synchronous strata and classes, including the newly non-synchronous elements which I have just argued must be added to them, leaves them exposed to the lure of a "pure community" ideologically constructed by capital itself**. In place of real organic and communal bonds, **in such an ideologically constructed pure community, a racial, ethnic, or religious identification is merely superimposed on the existing condition of atomization in which the mass of the population finds itself**. In addition to providing some gratification for the longing for community animating broad strata of the population, **such a pure community can** also **provide an ideological bond which ties the bulk of the population to the capitalist state** on the basis of a race, ethnicity, or religion which it shares with the ruling class. **This** latter **is extremely important to capital, because the atomization which it has brought about** not only leaves the mass of humanity bereft, but **also leaves the ruling class itself vulnerable because it lacks any basis upon which it can mobilize the population, physically** or ideologically. **The basis upon which such a pure community is constituted**, race, nationality, religion, even a categorization by "class" in the Stalinist world, **necessarily means the exclusion of those categories of the population which do not conform to the criteria for inclusion,** the embodiments of alterity, even while they inhabit the same geographical space as the members of the pure community. **Those excluded**, the "races" on the other side of the biological continuum, to use Foucauldian terminology, the Other, **become alien elements within an otherwise homogeneous world of the pure community. As a threat to its very existence, the role of this Other is to become the scapegoat for the inability of the pure community to provide authentic communal bonds between people, for its abject failure to overcome the alienation that is a hallmark of a reified world. The Jew in Nazi Germany, the Kulak in Stalinist Russia, the Tutsi in Rwanda, Muslims in Bosnia, blacks in the US, the Albanian or the Serb in Kosovo, the Arab in France, the Turk in contemporary Germany, the Bahai in Iran, for example, become the embodiment of alterity, and the target against which the hatred of the members of the pure community is directed.**

<Zizek Cont'd>

<Zizek Cont'd>

The more crisis ridden a society becomes, the greater the need to find an appropriate scapegoat; the more urgent the need for mass mobilization behind the integral state, the more imperious the need to focus rage against the Other. **In an extreme situation of social crisis and political turmoil, the demonization and victimization of the Other can lead to his (mass) murder**. In the absence of a working class conscious of its historic task and possibilities, **this hatred of alterity which permits capital to mobilize the population in defense of the pure community, can become its own impetus to genocide. The immanent tendencies of the capitalist mode of production which propel it towards a catastrophic economic crisis, also drive it towards mass murder and genocide.** In that sense, the death-world, and the prospect of an Endzeit cannot be separated from the continued existence of humanity's subordination to the law of value. Reification, the overmanned world, bio-politics, state racism, the constitution of a pure community directed against alterity, each of them features of the economic and ideological topography of the real domination of capital, create the possibility and the need for genocide. **We should have no doubt that the survival of capitalism into this new millenium will entail more and more frequent recourse to mass murder**.

Bare Life Impacts

Reduction of life to bare life justifies extermination without killing—this prepetually replicates the logic of auschwitz which exposes homo sacer to a new, unseen level of human violence.

Edkins in 2k [Jenny, PhD and Lecturer in International Politics, "Sovereign Power, Zones of Indistinction and Camp", Alternatives: Social Transformation and Human Governance, Jan-Mar., Vol. 25 Issue 1]

The camp is exemplary as a location of a zone of indistinction. Although in general the camp is set up precisely as part of a state of emergency or martial law, **under Nazi rule this becomes not so much a state of exception in the sense of an external and provisional state of danger as a means of establishing the Nazi state itself. The camp is "the space opened up when the state of exception begins to become the rule.**" In the camp, the distinction between the rule of law and chaos disappears: decisions about life and death are entirely arbitrary, and everything is possible. **A zone of indistinction appears between outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit. What happened in** the twentieth century in **the West, and paradigmatically since the advent of the camp, was the space of state of exception transgressed its boundaries and started to coincide with the normal order**. The zone of indistinction expanded from a space of exclusion within the normal order to take over that order entirely. **In the concentration camp, inhabitants are stripped of every political status, and the arbitrary power of the camp attendants confronts nothing but** what Agamben calls **bare life, or homo sacer**, a creature who can be killed but not sacrificed. This figure, an essential figure in modern politics, is constituted by and constitutive of sovereign power. Homo sacer is produced by the sovereign ban and is subject to two exceptions: he is excluded from human law (killing him does not count as homicide) and he is excluded from divine law (killing him is not a ritual killing and does not count as sacrilege). He **is set outside human jurisdiction without being brought into the realm of divine law. This double exclusion** of course also **counts as a double inclusion: "homo sacer belongs to God in the form of unsacrificability and is included in the community in the form of being able to be killed." This exposes homo sacer to a new kind of human violence such as is found in the camp and constitutes the political as the double exception: the exclusion of both the sacred and the profane.**

Bare Life Impacts

This inscription within biopolitics and bare life is at the heart of violence, allowing every human life to be devalued and eliminated in the name of sovereign management.

Agamben in '98 *[Giorgio, "Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life", pgs. 139-140]*

It is not our intention here to take a position on the difficult ethical problem of euthanasia, which still today, in certain countries, occupies a substantial position in medical debates and provokes disagreement. Nor are we concerned with the radicality with which Binding declares himself in favor of the general admissibility of euthanasia. More interesting for our inquiry is the fact that **the sovereignty of the living man over his own life has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide. The new juridical category of "life devoid of value" (or "life unworthy of being lived) corresponds exactly**—even if in an apparently different direction—**to the bare life of homo sacer** and can easily be extended beyond the limits imagined by Binding. **It is as if every valorization and every "politicization" of life (which**, after all, **is implicit in the sovereignty of the individual over his own existence) necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only "sacred life," and can as such be eliminated without punishment. Every society sets this limit; every society**—even the most modern—**decides who its "sacred men" will be.** It is even possible that **this limit, on which the politicization and the exception of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself in the history of the West and has now in the new biopolitical horizon of states with national sovereignty moved inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.**

Biopolitics Impacts

Biopolitics ensures extermination and continued fight against an unending source of enemies

Giorgio **Agamben**, professor of philosophy at the University of Verona, Homo Sacer, **1998**, pg. 146-147

The new fact, however, is that these concepts are not treated as external (if binding) **criteria of a sovereign decision: they are, rather, as such immediately political. Thus the concept of race is defined, in accordance with the genetic theories of the age, as "a group of human beings who manifest a certain combination of homozygotic genes that are lacking in other groups**" (Verschuer, *≤tat et santL'*, p. 88). Yet both Fischer and Verschuer know That a pure race is, according to this definition, almost impossible to identify (in particular, neither the Jews nor the Germans constitute a race in the strict sense—and Hitler is just as aware of this when he writes *Mein Kampf* as when he decides on the Final Solution). **"Racism" (if one understands race to be a strictly biological concept) is, therefore, not the most correct term for the biopolitics of the Third Reich. National Socialist biopolitics moves, instead, in a horizon in which the "care of life" inherited from eighteenth-century police science is, in now being founded on properly eugenic concerns, absolutized**. Distinguishing between politics *(Politik)* and police *(Polizei)*, von Justi assigned the first a merely negative task, the fight against the external and internal enemies of the State, and the second a positive one, the care and growth of the citizens' life. **National Socialist biopolitics—and along with it, a good part of modern politics even outside the Third Reich— cannot be grasped if it is not understood as necessarily implying the disappearance of the difference between the two terms: the police now becomes politics, and the care of life coincides with the fight against the enemy.** "The National Socialist revolution," one reads in the introduction to *State and Health*, "**wishes to appeal to forces that want to exclude factors of biological degeneration and to maintain the people's hereditary health. It thus aims to fortify the health of the people as a whole and to eliminate influences that harm the biological growth of the nation. The book does not discuss problems that concern only one people; it brings out problems of vital importance for all European civilization." Only from this perspective is it possible to grasp the full sense of the extermination of the Jews, in which the police and politics, eugenic motives and ideological motives, the care of health and the fight against the enemy become absolutely indistinguishable.**

Biopolitics Impacts

Allowing the sovereign to designate who deserves to live is biopolitical in nature, devalues life, and leads to extermination

Giorgio Agamben**, professor of philosophy at the University of Verona, Homo Sacer,** 1998**, pg. 142-143**

Here it becomes clear how Binding's attempt to transform euthanasia into a juridico-political concept ("life unworthy of being lived**") touched on a crucial matter. If it is the sovereign who, insofar as he decides on the state of exception, has the power to decide which life may be killed without the commission of homicide, in the age of biopolitics this power becomes emancipated from the state of exception and transformed into the power to decide the point at which life ceases to be politically relevant**. **When life becomes the supreme political value, not only is the problem of life's nonvalue thereby posed**, as Schmitt suggests but further, it is as if the ultimate ground of sovereign power were tt stake in this decision. In modern biopolitics, sovereign is he who decides on the value or the nonvalue of life as such. Life—which, with the declarations of rights, had as such been invested with the principle of sovereignty—now itself becomes the place of a sovereign decision. The Fiihrer represents precisely life itself insofar as it is he who decides on life's very biopolitical consistency This is why the Fuhrer's word, according to a theory dear to Nazi jurists to which we will return, is immediately law. This is why the problem of euthanasia is an absolutely modern problem, which Nazism, as the first radically biopolirical state, could not fail to pose. And this is also why certain apparent confusions and contradictions of the euthanasia program can be explained only in the biopolitical context in which they were situated. The physicians Karl Brand and Viktor Brack, who were sentenced to death at Nuremberg for being responsible for the program, declared after their condemnation that they did not feel guilty, since the problem of euthanasia would appear again. The accuracy of their prediction was undeniable. What is more interesting, however, is how it was possible that there were no protests on the part of medical organizations when the bishops brought the program to the attention of the public. Not only did the euthanasia program contradict the passage in the Hippocratic oath that states, "I will not give any man a fatal poison, even if he asks me for it," but further, since there was no legal measure assuring the impunity of euthanasia, the physicians who participated in the program could have found themselves in a delicate legal situation (this last circumstance did give rise to protests on the part of jurists and lawyers). **The fact is that the National Socialist Reich marks the point at which the integration of medicine and politics, which is one of the essential characteristics of modern biopolitics, began to assume its final form. This implies that the sovereign decision on bare life comes to be displaced from strictly political motivations and areas to a more ambiguous terrain in which the physician and the sovereign seem to exchange roles.**

***Alternatives

Alternative – Interrupting Depoliticization

Depoliticizing normalizes processes of control and domination. Cultivating a discourse and practice of interruption provides a space for new alternatives to be discovered

Jenny **Edkins**, is lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth., *Poststructuralism & International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In,* **1999,** p. 12-13

The second aspect of technologization, on the power axis, comes from the notion of dividing practices. In his disciplinary model, Foucault argues that in addition to punishment, prison has a technodisciplinary aspect that operates through surveillance, isolation, work programs, and the offer of remission in exchange for compliance. **This is a depoliticizing and controlling process, one that produces a distinct "subject"** (the delinquent) **and the techniques of producing "knowledge" about that subject** (the discipline of criminology). **It is a search for order, discipline, and regulation**. The failure of prisons in their (apparent) aim of rehabilitation is in actuality a success. This success rests in the way that, by criminalizing, they depoliticize: The political force of certain acts—forms of protest or dissent, for example—is removed. **A way to repoliticize, a "political act," would be to interrupt discourse, to challenge what have, through discursive practices, been constituted as normal, natural, and accepted ways of carrying on.** Derrida's work echoes this concern for dividing practices and how power, force, or violence is implicated (but concealed). Derrida argues that Western metaphysics—**the metaphysics of presence or logocentrism—relies on a process of differentiating through hierarchical binaries or opposites.** He shows that in pairs of opposites—written/spoken, presence/absence, man/woman, constative/performative, for example—the first term is always marked by traces of the second, which is both "deferred" and differentiated. The second is the "constitutive outside" of the first—the "outside" that is also inside, necessary to the constitution of the "essence. **" The stability of this process is not assured. It contains within itself the possibility of deconstruction. These hierarchical oppositions, an inherent part of logocentrism, have political implications. They embody the force or violence of a "founding moment. " Deconstruction consists in a double gesture, both a reversal of the hierarchy and a displacement.** Although a simple inversion does not challenge the form of the opposition, such a move may be necessary for strategic reasons. But **the results of any deconstructive move are "incalculable " The notion of the relation of force or violence to logos returns in Derrida's discussion of the force of law and the impossibility of justice; this also leads to the elaboration of a distinction between a calculable "technology" and an incalculable ethics or politics**. **Law always implies a force, both that involved in the notion of enforcement and that captured in its founding moment. The founding moment is the moment of decisioning, the moment that both produces and reproduces the law.** It is, as we have discussed above, the moment of "the political" Central to Derrida's argument here is the notion of following a rule. The concept of justice requires the concept of following the law or rule as well as the concept of acting in a "free" and responsible way. Following the law (if that were possible) would not be "just"; it would merely involve a calculable process. But a decision cannot anyway just follow the law: Each case in which a decision is made is different, specific, and particular; there is always a need for interpretation, which itself, once it has been done, has "produced" the law. The law is not guaranteed in advance. It is not known afterward, either, whether the decision was a "just" act or not. Indeed, Derrida argues, justice is impossible. This is related to the notion of the undecidable, the "essential ghost" in every decision that deconstructs it from within. The "ordeal of the undecidable" must be gone through, but it is a terrifying moment of suspense. The foundational moment, however, remains hidden: Presence (and certainty) is instituted through a (political) moment of decision, one that involves force and an unavoidable violence. **The ethicopolitical process of decisioning involves finding possible (impossible) answers; without the decision we would merely be following a program, applying a technology**.

Alternative – "Mass Starvations"

We must move beyond conventional definitions of famine to recognize the multi-faceted crisis – substituting "mass starvations" for "famine" allows for the idea of scarcity as a cause, breaking away from the limitations based on control and management

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth,"Mass Starvations and the Limitations of Famine Theorising" **2001**

> **Any definition of famine which sees it as a failure of some sort is missing the point. Whether famine is seen as a failure of food supply, a breakdown in the food distribution system, or a mutli-faceted livelihoods crisis, the outcome is the same.** These definitions or concepts blind us to the fact that famines, and the deaths, migrations or impoverishments they that produce, are enormously beneficial to the perpetrators: they are a success not a failure, a normal output of the current economic and political system, not an aberration. **This paper has** suggested that it might be useful to replace the notion of famine. It has **begun to substitute the phrase "mass starvations" in an attempt to get away from the idea of scarcity as a cause and famines as a breakdown or failure. To talk of mass starvations is to evoke the parallel of mass killings and genocides**. In many ways **famines**, though distinct from genocides, **share more with these acts than they do with natural disasters**. In many if not most cases **they are the result of deliberate actions by people who can see what the consequences of those action will be**. **If they are not** produced deliberately , **then they are often allowed to progress beyond the state of "famishment" to that of "morbidity" through deliberate or negligent inaction** on the part of those who could intervene to save lives and livelihoods.

Alternative Solvency

Truth and power relations are produced through discourse. Our interruption of controlling logocentric discourse removes the act of violence produced through it

Jenny **Edkins**, is lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth., *Poststructuralism & International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In,* **1999,** p. 15

> **The notion of language as a neutral medium of communication is disputed, as is any possibility of objective "truth" or knowledge**. Foucault made the close relationship between power and knowledge clear in his discussion of "power/knowledge. " **Truth is produced through discourse: "'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it.** " 64 In this régime of truth, **truth and meaning are produced discursively and are intimately bound up with the political,** as the term "régime" suggests: "Each society has its régime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth. " 65 Derrida makes the same link. He sees binary opposites as already hierarchical and containing violence. **The performative is in itself an act of power linked with the social institution that supports the enunciation**. 66 In Žižek, too, we find **the notion of the act of naming, or interpellation, as a violent act that produces the subject** (or the object) as such. 67 **These notions have implications for our understanding of the political, the drawing of limits and frontiers, and processes of exclusion.**

Alternative Solvency

Discourses which rely on causality to explain famine and its products frame it as a question of decidability, making the impacts inevitable. Only rendering famine as undecidably political can allow for change

Jenny **Edkins**, is lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth., *Poststructuralism & International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In,* **1999,** p. 80

Another example of **the political impact of deconstruction can be seen in relation to discussions of famine relief.** Recent work on humanitarian intervention and famines has called into question the role of relief, particularly where conflict is involved. 76 Does relief benefit the victims of famines, or rather, does it serve to perpetuate famines, through its diversion to military purposes, feeding soldiers, and the like? Or more radically, perhaps, does famine relief in fact benefit the donors and others who anyway profit from famine more than those threatened with starvation? Perhaps relief aid actually causes famine, by encouraging and rewarding actions taken by one group, which is attempting for political reasons, because of conflict over resources or control, to starve another. This argument has led to new guidelines for relief efforts and a call to "do no harm. " **The impact of relief is to be measured and analyzed more carefully. But to regard famine relief as the cause rather than the solution of famine is merely to invert the oppositions inherent to an approach that seeks, in a logocentric manner, for solutions in terms of cause and effect. What is needed**, it has been argued**, is to make the move that treats relief as the undecidable—and hence political**. 77 This argument, and the discussion of the violence inherent in "law, " draws on Derrida's work on the force of law and the undecidable/political, which is the subject of the next section. This work is central to my argument in relation to depoliticization and technologization. Whereas some see Derrida's work as apolitical or "conservative, " I believe that it is, on the contrary, **conceptualizations such as undecidability that reveal how logocentric approaches depoliticize through their claims to knowledge and through technologization**

Alternative Solvency

In order to repoliticize effectively it requires being ungrounded in ontology

Jenny **Edkins**, is lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth., *Poststructuralism & International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In,* **1999,** p. 141

> **To enact a repoliticization requires an acceptance of the impossibility of ontological fullness**. 87 This ontological paradox appears in theoretical physics, where two complementary properties of a subatomic particle are mutually exclusive—**it is only possible to know one or the other to the necessary degree of accuracy. This notion of complementarity is reflected in the way "the subject is forced to choose and accept a certain fundamental loss or impossibility**" in a Lacanian act. 88 As Žižek puts it, "My reflective awareness of all the circumstances which condition my act can never lead me to act: it cannot explain the fact of the act itself. By endlessly weighing the reasons for and against, I never manage to act—**at a certain point I must decide to 'strike out blindly.**'" 89 **The act has to take place without justification, without foundation in knowledge, without guarantee or legitimacy. It cannot be grounded in ontology; it is this "crack" that gives rise to ethics: "There is ethics—that is to say, an injunction which cannot be grounded in ontology—in so far as there is a crack in the ontological edifice of the universe: at its most elementary, ethics designates fidelity to this crack.** "

Alternative Solvency

The institutionalization of these modes of thinking are not truth but rather different ways of determining what constitutes truth in a way that are connected to arrangements of power – we must not contribute to the progression of this science

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 17-18 " A modern…objects"

A modern history of ideas would regard this sequence of beliefs and systems of knowledge as a series of steps on the road of progress from error toward a more perfected system of truth. Foucault contests this view. A key point of his work is the contention that **these** various **systems of thought are not progressive**. **They are just different ways of determining what should count as knowledge or truth**, separate resolutions of the problem of how thought should be organized. **They are connected to arrangements of power, through the institutionalization of truth**. For Foucault, "truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power.., each society has its r6gime of truth, its general politics of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true."6 There are a number of distinct regimes of truth, and Foucault is concerned with the history of these. The goal of Foucault's project is a history of truth, which has an archaeo-logical and a genealogical dimension and which would analyze the problematisations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought—and the practices on the basis of which these problematisations are formed. The archaeological dimension of the analysis made it possible to examine the forms themselves; its genealogical dimension [made it possible] to analyse their formation out of the practices and the modifications undergone by the latter.7 Thus the shift from the classical to the modern episteme that took place at the end of the eighteenth century should not be seen as the discovery of objects of analysis that were unknown before, or the improvement or rationalization of previously immature or inaccurate forms of knowledge. It is not a question of these forms of knowledge emerging from their prehistory into the light of reason. Rather, what changed was knowledge itself, bringing into view "on the one hand new knowable objects.., and [prescribing] on the other, new concepts and new methods."8 **We should not attribute this to the advancement of science: We must not seek to construe these as objects that imposed themselves from the outside, as though by their own weight and as a result of some autonomous pressure, upon a body of learning that had ignored them for too long; nor must we see them as concepts gradually built up, owing to new methods, through the progress of sciences advancing towards their own rationality. They are fundamental modes of knowledge which sustain in their flawless unity the secondary and derived correlation of new sciences and techniques with unprecedented objects**.9

Alternative Solvency

Famine should be viewed as a social process rather than isolated events in order to disallow privileged groups to benefit from aid and acknowledgment of the causes of famine in order to solve for them

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 134-137 " David Keen's…humanitarian system"

David Keen's work looks at the benefits of famine as part of the nary social process, rather than as exceptional.23 This follows earlier work by Amrita Rangasami that suggested that famine could seen as a combination of exploitative processes that produce benefits as well as victims.24 According to Keen it is necessary to change our view of what famine is: "As long as we continue to identify famine simply with starving to death, the idea that famine may confer economic benefits is hard to credit."25 **If famine is not viewed simply as deprivation that leads to death by starvation, but as part of a wider process during which the whole way of life as well as the livelihood of certain groups of people are threatened, it can be seen that other groups might benefit from it.** Failures of famine relief can be seen as part of the same process. Although inadequate relief measures make famine worse, Keen argues that such failures can also be a policy success for powerful local groups and can accord with the strategic interests of international donors. Keen looks at the struggle over resources—a struggle for domination—that produced famine among the Dinka people in Sudan in the 1980s. His approach is Foucauldian in inspiration: it looks at the hidden functions that policy practices serve and at how agendas are shaped.26 It does this by examining the concrete specifics of the exercise of power. The famine among the Dinka of southern Sudan can be seen as a combination of exploitative processes, in all of which the role of force is crucial. The first process was a loss of assets brought about largely by direct militia raids on the Dinka. Both the Sudanese government and local groups who were active in the militia benefited from this, Keen argues. The government gained in its strategy against the Sudan People's Liberation Army, in its attempt to gain access to oil reserves on Dinka land, in its general need for land for mechanized agriculture, and in its policies against Islamization. The local militia groups gained property seized, grazing, and people captured—either for their labor as slaves, the ransom money they might raise, or for sexual exploitation in the case of women. The second process was the increase in prices. This was to the benefit of traders and merchants, who held stocks of grain until prices rose sufficiently for them to make a profit. A third process leading to famine was the restriction of the Dinka's normal survival strategies: their options were limited, in the main by the activities of the militia. Famine foods—wild foods or the milk and meat of their animals—were not available to them. They could not walk to other areas for fear of attack. Finally, the fourth process Keen describes was the inadequacy of international relief. Relief was a threat to groups benefiting from the famine, but donors and agencies went along with the vested interests of beneficiary groups. Aid was distributed by the army and a lot of it went for private gain. It was directed by the government to areas they wanted it to go, not to areas of greatest need: the latter were said to be inaccessible**. Action by international donors, including the EC, USAID, and the UN, was unhelpful, according to Keen, not only because donors followed the wishes of the Sudanese government, but also because they did not monitor the results of their work and did not address the underlying conflict. The definition of famine they used, "the widespread equation of famine with mortality**," allowed "the presentation of a belated response as an early one."27 Relief was too little too late, and the donors were too willing to listen to the views of the government, which Keen argues was one of the beneficiaries of the famine, as to what form relief should take: "Limited definitions of 'what was to be known' (including who was to be consulted) helped to underpin a narrow definition of what was to be done."28 This only changed when media attention made it risky for the donors not to act; otherwise they followed their own strategic and political interests, which included respect for Sudanese sovereignty. Keen argues that the implications for policy are that the wide impact of relief should be recognized. It is not just a question of providing food to those in need. **To be effective, the violence and conflict that produce the famine process should be tackled.**29 **There should be an attempt to understand the strategies and needs of the oppressors who benefit from the famine and to support the strategies of the victims. Sometimes an effective policy may be to provide large quantities of relief to all areas even though a lot of it may go to the exploiters, as this may reduce the pressure on the victims**. Most significantly, the humanitarian sphere is not separate. In the Sudan, there was little monitoring of the relief effort and no attempt to tackle the conflict itself, which in Keen's analysis had produced the famine.

<Edkins cont'd>

<Edkins cont'd>
It was the Dinka's lack of political or military power rather than any failure of entitlements or any overall shortage of food that led to their predicament. They had been a relatively well-off group before the famine. Mark Duffield looks at how these processes of famine and aid can reinforce the power of already powerful groups by institutionalizing emergency situations. What had been seen as a disaster or a humanitarian emergency is now seen as institutionalized in the political economy of entire regions of the world. Duffield argues that "what has been neglected is that famines can result from the conscious exercise of power in pursuit of gain or advantage."30 He goes on to suggest that **a new analysis is needed for the new forms of political economy that are now in place in areas of "permanent emergency" such as the Horn of Africa: "Within this framework, famine can be regarded as an outcome of a process of impoverishment resulting from the transfer of assets from the weak to the politically strong.**"31 This has serious implications, Duffield argues, for the international humanitarian system.

Alternative Solvency

In order to treat famine as a political process it is necessary to analyze it on an individual level instead of making general sweeping claims with inclusion of the international community

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth,"Mass Starvations and the Limitations of Famine Theorising" **2001**

It is necessary to be clear how the term 'political' is being used here. A political process is one that involves relationships of power between people and between groups It is not a question of the realm of what is generally called 'politics' (political parties, elections or other struggles for state control) as distinct from economics of the social realm. Those distinctions are unhelpful**. To treat mass starvations as a political process is to pay attention to them as processes that involve relationships between people** (not just between persons and commodities as in entitlements theory). **Social relations are inevitably power relations**. However, **power is** not centralized and possessed, but **dispersed**. **Power relations are produced on a day-to-day basis through small scale actions and interactions of individual people**. **To study mass starvations as political processes is to examine whow they come about, what small actions or inaction on the part of which people make them happen, and who exactly the beneficiaries and the victims are**. It requires a detailed investigation rather than a grand general theory. It means addressing minutiae or details. Raul Hilberg is a historian who adopts this approach in his work on the Nazi genocide. He says: "In all my work I have never begun by asking the big questions, because I was always afraid that I would come up with small answers…I look at the process…as a series of minute steps" (Lanzman 1995:55**). It cannot be assumed that famine and mass starvation is something that the whole of the international community would fight against if only it knew how.** To do so is to forget that, as Rangasami reminds us, many benefit in some way from famine and oppression. And it is to forget that even under the rule of law in democratic states, violence is present. David Keen (1994) and Mark Duffield (1993, 1994, 1998) have shown that there are numerous beneficiaries of the famines and mass starvations in the Horn of Africa and have acknowledged the violence inherent in so-calle d peaceful democratic states and international structures of dominance and oppression.

***K Turns the Case

Case Turn - Famine

Modernity's construction of famine makes it inescapable – outlooks on agriculture that are presented as humyn control over nature and lack of production as the cause to famine means our creation of food is also the cause to our destruction

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 36-37 "The modern…anomaly.'"

The modern episteme in which the traditional, Malthusian accounts of prehistory are placed **relies on the separation of man and nature**. This view is extrapolated backward in time to produce an account of the origin of agriculture and civilization in terms of human control over nature. **Rindos argues for an account that sees the domestication of plants and animals and the evolution of patterns of human activity occurring simultaneously, and "the increased utilisation of wild plants by an increasingly large human population led naturally to an increased yield of food plants" and the rise of sedentary agriculture, with all its drawbacks, including instability and famines. Narratives of famine claim that subsistence crises—crises caused by insufficiently developed agricultural systems—more or less ceased with the onset of modernity and that present-day food crises in the developed world are concerned with distribution not supply**. **If agriculture was not** an **escape from** the **scarcity** that preceded it **but rather a system that produced scarcity, famines, and stress in human populations, and if the technology of agriculture does not improve food security but leads to the insecurity of a high-risk system, then we** have a completely new set of questions. We **are faced with the conclusion that famine is a concomitant of progress, the price that has to be paid for the benefits of civilization**. Garrett Hardin's lifeboat is not a prescription for action but a description of what happens: we survive as civilized, settled peoples through the acceptance, inevitably, of the periodic sacrifice of thousands of our fellow humans in famines. **Our means of production of food both enables a centralized, differentiated social system and produces the instability that leads to famine.** The social system itself gives rise to a situation where the majority of people no longer have direct control of their food supply but rely on powerful elites who are in charge of trade and exchange systems**. Famine is not an anachronism in the modern world; it is the inevitable accompaniment of modernity. The technology of agriculture produces, rather than solves, the problem of hunger**: Our technology, which we are inclined to view as a great liberating force, appears.., to be more of a holding action..., the present food crisis . . . might be more constructively faced if we realised that it is the prevailing notion of "progress" rather than the contemporary "crisis" which is the historical anomaly.101

Case Turn - Famine

The affirmative's approach towards the management of famine leaves the causes of famine unresolved and replicates the harms

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. xvi-xvii

> Modernity's regime of truth is based on scientific method. What makes knowledge legitimate (and powerful) in the modern world is not tradition or divine authority but a particular scientific mode of validation.4 In a Westernized modernity, truth no longer derives from religious faith. What counts as true is what scientific research can demonstrate. This is a particular mode of knowing: calculable, generalizable, and objective. **Not only are contemporary understandings of famine produced in this way, attempts at ending hunger are also framed within the same discourse. Both the problem of famine and its solutions are constituted within the horizons of modernity**. **The framing of famine in discourses of modernity** has two very important corollaries. First, it **means that hunger and how it should be combated are depoliticized. technical solutions are sought**, **solutions that draw on modernity's professed ability to both identify and resolve problems** through abstract analysis and the formulation of general principles. **Calculability and measurability are emphasized**. This is the case whether what is being measured are crop yields, nutritional status, population movements, entitlement bundles, or food stocks. **Such solutions are inevitably inadequate to the problem**, which is not a technical one but one that accompanies specific forms of social and political organization or the emergence of new arrangements. **Technical solutions merely reinstate and reproduce one of the precise forms of politics—modern politics—that produce famine in the first place**. For some time, writers have acknowledged that famine involves politics. But **what is** still **lacking is** any **appreciation of what this implies**, which would require a closer analysis of politics and the political.6 If **famine is seen as an unfortunate by-product of combat, proposed solutions often take the form of conflict resolution techniques. These can leave unresolved the issues that led to the dispute in the first place. They depoliticize by treating both sides in a conflict as equally culpable and by regarding the absence of hostility as unproblematically desirable**. It is argued that relief agencies should be wary of inadvertent involvement in conflict, and techniques of aid that "do no harm" are elaborated.7 This approach can still end up with a technical solution, one that involves a depoliticization of politics itself. The repoliticization required has to go much further than this. It has to involve a reassessment of the whole question of what qualifies as political.

Case Turn - Famine

Claims to humanitarianism and neutrality benefit the elite and fuel the politics that cause famine, we must continually question these claims

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 150-152 "Famines…broadly"

> Famines can be seen not so much as the outcome of processes with winners and losers, though they are that, but as processes where relationships between people have produced unacceptable results and transgressed limits of humanity. The web of these relationships is more complex and extensive than simple separations into winners and losers, developed and underdeveloped, rich and poor can account for, and living with the inevitable antagonism—undecidability~at the heart of the social relation is arguably what we must learn to do. In this context, famine theory becomes irrelevant. We do not need to ask "what caused the famine?" if famine is not seen as a natural or economic event or disaster. It cannot be assumed, as is commonly done, that famine (any more than conflict) is an ill that the entire international community will fight against. This is a position reinforced by ideologies of famine as disaster. It is reinforced by ignoring that, as Rangasami reminds us, we all benefit in one way or another from **famine**. It **is reinforced by positions that see the rule of law as unproblematically nonviolent**. The work of **Keen** and **Duffield has shown that an analysis of complex emergencies in the Horn of Africa can reveal numerous beneficiaries of famines and has made the link between poverty and powerlessness and between exploitation and violence**, acknowledging the violence inherent in "peaceful" state and international structures of dominance and oppression. Although Keen pointed out that international donors also have much to gain from famine, the more comfortable assumption has been that the complexities or political difficulties of the situation have occasionally meant that donor governments have inadvertently prolonged or worsened the famine situation. I would argue that **we need to look dispassionately at the way donor governments profit from famine. In order to do this, we need to differentiate between the governments and NGOs in donor countries and the motivation of people in those countries who**, perhaps recognizing or remembering the ghosts of famines past, may **wish to alleviate** the **suffering** of fellow human beings elsewhere in the world. Occasionally, the latter can provoke useful action by donor governments. More frequently, this motivation is appropriated by those development professionals and NGOs who claim the expertise to translate these desires into practice. **Their claim to neutrality and humanitarianism must be continually questioned. Their decisions are just that and their expertise is no more than a claim to knowledge. We need to inquire on whose behalf the agencies are acting, rather than assume that their own account can be accepted uncritically**. Such assumptions can lead to episodes like that in Ethiopia where "famine assistance, provided primarily by Western governments and non-governmental organizations, reinforced the policies and programs that produced the 1984—1985 famine. Such examples are not exceptional; indeed, they may be widespread. However, they are not confined to cases where famine is linked with military conflict. There are many instances where states under the rule of law have caused, condoned, or turned a blind eye to famines in their jurisdiction, as we have seen in the examples of China, Bengal, and Britain. Nor is the discussion confined to the extremes of famine. The implication of the argument I have put forward is that it applies equally to decisions about development and the alleviation of poverty more broadly.

Case Turn - Medicalization

When famine is associated as a natural and inevitable recurrence it allows hunger to be depoliticized and medicalization and management of hunger become the scientific solution that reproduces oppression

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 26-27 "In other…reproduces"

In other times and places, **hunger is placed in this category of neutral, blame-free event, when it is seen as a natural or an economic disaster. Responsibility is removed and political action ruled out in favor of, not medical action, but action by other experts—development specialists, food scientists, agriculturists, or conflict resolution experts— who determine the scientific causes of the problem and prescribe remedial action.** In Brazil today, as in the medieval Italy described by Camporesi, hunger is pacified and depoliticized, and the hungry seek solutions in forgetting their misery when action to contest their oppression becomes impossible for them. In the shantytowns of Brazil, doctors are complicit in this. They acquiesce to diagnoses of hunger as nervous disorder and prescribe the food supplements or anti-depressants requested by their patients; they attribute deaths to *nervos* that they can see are equally or, more properly, more scientifically attributable to severe malnutrition. Scheper-Hughes points to the role of the intellectual in "the concealment of hunger in the folk.., and later the biomedical discourse on nervos":[46] Increasingly in modern bureaucratic states, technicians and professionals come to play the role of traditional intellectuals in sustaining commonsense definitions of reality through their highly specialised and validating forms of discourse. Gramsci anticipated Foucault, both in terms of understanding the capillary nature of diffuse power circuits in modern states and in terms of identifying the crucial role of expert" forms of power/knowledge in sustaining the commonsense order of things. In [Brazil] doctors occupy the pivotal role of "traditional" intellectuals whose function, in part, is to misidentify, to fail to see the secret indignation of the sick poor expressed in the inchoate folk idiom *nervos.*[47] The poor acquiesce in their mistreatment, perhaps because drugs have a magical efficacy: **"if hunger cannot be satisfied, it can at least be tranquillised."**[48] **Medicine captures their imagination, as it captured intellectuals** studying the new disciplines of biological science at the end of the eighteenth century. The translation of hunger into *nervos* is a medicalization, part of the process of technologization that is spreading from industrialized societies to other parts of the world. **It is a process that has ethical and political implications, and intellectuals as "experts" are complicit in the power structures and oppression it reproduces.**[49]

Case Turn – Reproduces Power Relations

Monitoring and management of food aid programs serves as a disciplinary process to reproduce pre-program power relations, creating the recipients as the subject

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 94-96 "The visibility…it.'"

The visibility of public works can be linked to the need for super-vision and control that is part of the disciplinary process. Administrators prepare returns showing the numbers of people involved, the hours worked, and the amount of construction accomplished: how many kilometers of road have been built, how many kilometers of stone banks to retain water, what capacity of dam to provide water to irrigate what area of land. Books are kept in which the activities are listed and recorded; these are then used in the process of food distribution that takes place at a later stage (figures 9 and io). **They are available when visiting consultants arrive to monitor food for work on behalf of donors. This style of record keeping in terms of quantities meets the requirements of food aid donors but does not help ensure effective projects**. Similarly, the monitoring visits by ERRA and the ministries comply with reporting obligations laid down by donors, but on the whole this is limited to the monitoring of deliveries of food or to the extent of work completed—by the kilometer. Consultants engaged on the monitoring and reporting process spend a limited length of time in the field: one report on food for work in four provinces was prepared after a period of less than six days in the field, which included a traveling time of almost thirty-six hours; another, which took fourteen days, reported on six locations in different provinces. The informants that consultants speak to are very largely ministry and ERRA officials and community leaders. The cursory nature of the visits can be exploited by officials, who can put on a show for the benefit of the visitors. What is the purpose of these monitoring visits? The potential for misunderstandings is high given the language difficulties, the stressful nature of the visits, and the speed with which the interviews take place. The nature of the information collected is often useful only for statistical returns and does not help improve the FFW programs. I argue that, like any inspection, **its purpose is to reproduce the power relation that exists between food aid donor and recipient. Participants** are expected to be doing what they are supposed to be doing, but in addition, they are expected to demonstrate commitment and participation in the development process constituted by the food for work program. They **are expected to play the part of partners in development. However, it is clear that people in food for work programs participate with a certain amount of detachment.** It is debatable to what extent that means that they contest **the process** that **produces them as subjects of a particular type**: as recipients of aid or as partners in development. For these people, the failure of food for work programs ensures that they continue as a way of obtaining subsistence—admittedly on certain terms. These terms perhaps entail the adoption of a certain role as subject. However, their participation in the social practice is what is important; a cynical detachment does not help: "they know very well what it is they are doing, but they carry on doing it"

Case Turn – Creation of Vulnerable Subjects

Food aid and development differentiates a select group of vulnerable subjects to maintain 'first world'/'third world' power relations

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 100-101 "We have seen…them."

We have seen the way work is used as part of the process of reform-or development as it is termed in the context of food aid. What is the function of the continual failure of development itself? It is not just the differentiation of a specific social class of outcasts. Undoubtedly food for work practices do produce as subject the vulnerable peasant who alone is susceptible to famine and in need of our employment safety net. **Famine is no longer the stranger waiting outside every door.106 It waits only outside the door of the improvident, lazy, or vulnerable. These people are not in need of a political voice but require help** and training programs. Their participation is limited to a role as grateful recipients of development aid. In addition to this**, food aid produces a whole category of countries, third world countries, specifically African countries, as vulnerable, food insecure, and worthy of the attention of development economists, agricultural specialists, and other academic experts. In doing so, it maintains the relations of power that exist in international politics between first and third worlds but depoliticizes them**.

Case Turn – Scarcity Explanations Depoliticize

Famine is a reaffirmation of the system of scarcity causing us to forget about causes and the fact that we are complicit in starvation

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 120-121 "However, ideology…famines"

However, ideology does not work solely or even largely by concealing the truth of exploitation.68 There are two other aspects: "the way in which—beyond the field of meaning but at the same time internal to it—an ideology implies, manipulates, produces a preideological enjoyment structured in fantasy"; and "in a given ideological edifice, the element which represents within it its own impossibility,"70 that is, the symptom. The symptom is not external to the social order. It is the point within that order where its truth erupts: "going through the social fantasy is . . . correlative to identification with the symptom."7' In the Live Aid record, we have precisely such an identification. In Michael Buerk's commentary in the first news broadcast, the incongruity of "a biblical famine—now, in the twentieth century" was pointed out**. The image of famines is an image of food scarcity, want; starvation is a result of hunger unsatisfied.** The twentieth century, in contrast, is the century of technological progress, the conquest of nature, abundance and plenty. However, the economic ideology on which that notion of abundance is based is free market economics, a system based on concepts of scarce commodities, competition, and demand or lack. In other words**, the economic system of modernity is a system of scarcity par excellence. The symptom, which prevents closure of the social system, the point at which the antagonistic character of the system erupts, is famine— that is, the point at which the truth of scarcity erupts. Famine is thus truly man-made: famine is the element within the social system based around property, scarcity, and impersonal monetary exchange that represents the impossibility of such a system**. It is the truth that has to be concealed for the social to constitute itself. As Amrita Rangasami has argued, we all benefit from famine.72 **Through our acceptance of a system of law that regulates ownership through violence, forgetting the violence at the root of the law, we are all complicit in starvations and famines.**

***AT: Aff Arguments

At: Claims to Solvency

Claims for solvency continue the disciplining process, acting as a means to reproduce the subordinating power relations produced through food aid programs

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 67-68 "The concepts…process"

The concepts of famine produced with the shift to the episteme of modernity have generated specific practices of aid. These practices are variously presented as global food aid, emergency famine relief, and development programs. These distinctions play an important role in negotiations between donors and implementing agencies. Agencies rely for their identity on particular constructions, each having concern and legitimacy historically in a particular area. The distinctions can be crucial in policy making and when matters of power and control are disputed between the different agencies involved.[1] However, the disciplinary processes are similar, whether it is food aid, famine relief, or development that is the legitimizing discursive framework. **Practices of aid, like famines themselves, benefit some groups at the same time that they make victims of others.**[2] **Powerful groups exploit those less powerful. Particular aid practices, such as food for work programs, produce and reproduce these power relations**. **Food for work** (FFW), in which food aid **is distributed not as a gift but as a payment for work performed, has grown up as part of the food aid process. Here the priorities of the implementing agencies** (internal and external) **and the donor and recipient governments are inscribed on the bodies and in the work of those employed on the schemes**. The **"failure" of food aid programs is central to their "success"— they produce and reproduce relations of dependency between first and third world states and within those states. Foucault contends that the failure of prisons to rehabilitate offenders is best seen as part of their achievement.3 Prisons produce political consequences, disqualifying a whole range of political action by redefining it as criminal. The failure of food for work programs to improve agriculture or the environment ensures their continuation as a disciplining process**.

At: Perm

Attempts to better famine relief systems disallow the possibility for contestation around undecidability and ethical decisions by relying on objectified and legal rationality

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 156-158 "but for…called for"

But far from being a problem that could be solved if only the technical procedures were improved, **famine is a product of power relations. It is not a question of finding better early warning systems, more participatory development projects, or faster methods of delivering relief**. Nor is it a question of seeking the deeper, more structural causes of famines, nor its complexities. Famine is a product of violence. Even where war is not implicated directly, the state enforces laws of property that can lead to some people's starvation. Aid processes and interventions to which technical concepts of famine give rise are practices that reproduce particular political and international power relations.13 One of the supports of **a technologized approach** is its claim to gender neutrality. It **relies on the objectified, universal subject of legal-rationality. It seeks timeless, total, disembodied answers**. Theory or general laws are where truth resides, not the practical, the particular, or the embodied. It operates through dichotomies such as subjective! objective, where opposites are hierarchically ordered and the quantifiable, the objective, the hard facts valorized.14 The separations that are necessary to produce abstract theory are reflected in those that produce the masculine and the feminine and place them in a similar hierarchy. One place we see this is in the analysis of responses to famine and humanitarian crises, where a reaction of compassion, sympathy, and guilt to images of suffering is labeled emotional and hence of less value. **What is needed, this way of thinking claims, is an appreciation of the root causes, the higher truth, before solutions can be found**. Emotional responses are unhelpful. The abstract, disembodied, degendered, calculating, nonemotive— and hence depoliticized—analysis is a technical approach that works only by deferring ethico-political questions. In studying famine, we have an issue that continually resists and challenges the process of depoliticization. Famine cannot help but be an emotive subject, and one that is embodied. The images of famine victims that we see or hear about may in a real sense be ghosts by the time we see them, but as specters they draw our attention to what has been and must be excluded to produce "the comfort of theories."15 As we saw in chapter 3, violence is implicated in both the process of law enforcement and in the founding moment of the law as a legal system. Both are, of course, associated with the state, which, by definition, has the authorized use of violence**. The notion of undecidability leads to the conclusion that the moment of decision, unlike the application of a rule or the following of a code of law, is not calculable. It is precisely this incalculability that leads to the idea of the impossibility of justice and the need for ethico-political decision. The decision itself is a terrifying nontime or nonplace, where there is no subject and where we are facing the traumatic real**. As was argued in chapter 5, this moment of decisioning has much in common with the "moment of concluding" in Lacan. The latter is the moment that constitutes the social order, but only through a precipitate gesture for which there is no guarantee. **We have to make a move for which there are no secure grounds. This moment is, nevertheless, something that we must face: the fact that it is undecidable is not an excuse for inaction. It is in the very process of negotiation and contestation around the undecidable that politics takes place and that the social order and subjectivity is constituted.** The temptation is to avoid this uncertainty, to move promptly to a reinstitution of certainty. Our method of control is technologization. The real is well and truly hidden and the social ideologically constituted as something within our theoretical grasp. However, this production of an essence that we can grasp puts an end to the possibility of ethical decision. The ethical only returns as a search for ethical certainty, a moral code, accessible to reason. We see this in the search for moral criteria—ethical certainty—for intervention on humanitarian grounds. What is sought is a basis in knowledge for action, a technology of intervention. The search for moral criteria is not what we should be pursuing either. On the contrary, **we must continue to negotiate the relation between the calculable and the incalculable in each particular case in which action is called for.**

Representations Duplicate Impacts

The affirmative's discourse makes further embeds Modernity's depoliticization of famine and creation of the impacts – discourse is socially embedded and institutionalized as given truths

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 68 - 69 "Discourse…Congress"

Discourse is socially embedded and institutionalized in its interactions with other social practices. Foucault was interested in exploring why, irrespective of what grammatically *could be* said at certain periods, certain things and not others *were* said, and how the limits of things said were transformed from one era to another. This is distinct from a notion that treats discourses as groups of signs referring to signifieds. **Discourses do more than use the signs of which they are composed to designate things, and "it is this more that renders them irreducible to the language and to speech" and makes them instead "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak."**[6] At a particular period in time, for a specific social group, **there are rules that define the limits and forms of the sayable and the conservation, memory, reactivation, and appropriation of discourses**.[7] **Certain things can be said in specific domains of discourse** (scientific, literary, etc)**, and certain things said will be remembered and reiterated while others will be forgotten or repressed**. Some things said in the past will be regarded as valid and not others, and these things will be reconstituted in different ways. Prescribed individuals and groups will have access to particular discourses, and relations of authority will be defined; there is a struggle for control of discourses. This approach runs counter to the traditional study of discourse as a pure surface of translation for mute objects; a simple site of expression of thoughts, imaginings, knowledges, unconscious themes."[8] It negates the view that supposes "that all operations are conducted prior to discourse or outside of it, in the ideality of thought or the silent gravity of practices; that discourse, consequently, is no more than a meagre additive.., a surplus which goes without saying, since it does nothing else except say what is said."[9] On the contrary, **discursive practices are bound up with other social practices and together constitute relations of power/knowledge**. **Specific power relations make possible particular forms of discourse**: **Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true**; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those charged with saying what counts as true.[10] **The discursive background that produces and legitimizes food for work practices is found in the food aid debate**. This centers on questions of whether and how food aid should be provided—is it effective in helping third world countries and what are the arguments in its favor? There is a great deal of academic literature that looks at these questions.[11] The debate has been particularly prominent in the United States, where the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 480) in **1954** began a program of food assistance to poor countries. Food aid, as distinct from foreign aid in general, was seen to have a number of overt purposes: for surplus disposal and overseas market development; as an instrument of foreign policy in the Cold War context; and to provide basic needs via links to human rights programs. These purposes were often contradictory. However, food aid, in contrast to foreign aid, received wide support in the United States from the public and Congress.'[2]

AT: Must Act

Representations of famine reify symbolic order positioning us as imposters to the spectacle of reality in a position of inability to take on the role that is demanded of us and end the violence other than to retain our position as observers and fall back on value-free truth

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 114-116 "The symbolic…as such"

The symbolic or social order can never be complete. It constitutes itself around a lack, a paradoxical element that halts the shifting of signifiers in a "non-founded founding act of violence."46 This paradoxical element is the master signifier and provides the reference point that holds the symbolic field together. It conceals the void by occupying it and thus enables the social order to be constituted. However, the "master~~ is always an impostor—anyone at the place of the constitutive lack in the structure of the symbolic order will do. The character of master is produced by the position the figure assumes. It is by reference to the master that the symbolic order acquires meaning and purpose, and its emptiness is concealed. The lack, the empty place at the heart of the symbolic order, cannot be abolished—it is constitutive—it can only be rendered visible as empty. As witnesses of distant suffering on our television screens, we are placed in that empty place, the void that has to be concealed for the social order to come into being. **We are the ones who are supposed to be able to answer the perplexity of the victims about the purpose of their suffering. This is an impossible position to hold. The imposture of the master signifier is usually concealed; however, in this case, we ourselves are interpellated into this position, and we know we are impostors**. We know that what we are part of is not real. We cannot help. We cannot answer the appeal. According to Zizek, the accepted interpretation in media studies is that our perception of violence in a modern society of spectacle is aestheticized by media manipulation— we no longer see reality as such, but reality as spectacle, pseudoreality. Zizek argues that this is not the case: "The problem of contemporary media resides not in their enticing us to confound fiction with reality but, rather, in their 'hyperrealist' character by means of which they saturate the void that keeps open the space for symbolic fiction. The symbolic order can function only by maintaining a minimal distance towards reality, on account of which it ultimately has the status of a fiction.. .. if it is to function normally, symbolic order is not to be taken literally."47 **We are not part of what we see: we cannot take on the role demanded of us. We are watching, helpless to prevent, yet implicated. Not only are we unable to stop the tragedy, we are unable to comfort its victims. We feel the full impact of the ambiguity and ambivalence—the undecidability—that is the metasubject. From this empty place we are summoned by the perplexed gaze to provide answers, to respond to the questioning of the victims who cannot understand the horror they have been caught up in**. It is not a place we can occupy. There are no answers we can give. There are only (impossible) decisions to be made. Here we see what Zizek means—the space for the symbolic fiction (the master signifier) has been removed. The scene is the impossible one pictured in a Steve Bell cartoon (figure i ~ which shows the living room of a modern home in semidarkness. Seated on the floor is a figure, its eyes closed and the television set cradled in its arms. On the bright television screen we can see a body lying curled up on a road somewhere. We can just make out what looks like a figure holding a gun in the background. The title is "International Community. "48 This is what Zizek describes as an experience of the sublime. Such an experience takes place when **we "find ourselves in the face of some horrifying event whose comprehension exceeds our capacity of representation; it is so overwhelming that we can do nothing but stare at it in horror; yet at the same time this event poses no immediate threat to our physical well-being, so that we can maintain the safe distance of an observer**."49 **We are forced to traverse the fantasy, to face the traumatic void at the heart of the social or symbolic order**. We experience the nonexistence of the big Other, that is, the social or symbolic order. **What do we do after we have traversed the fantasy?** Is this moment, when the symbolic order no longer exists and we experience our own nonexistence as subjects, no more than a gap between two orders—a fleeting, vanishing mediator, "an enthusiastic intermediate moment necessarily followed by a sobering relapse into the reign of the big Other,"50 like a revolution followed by a return to a more repressive regime? **One response to this question is** a move to produce an alternative social order, one based on a different master signifier. Another response is a return to, or reassertion of, the previous symbolic order. The first leads to an international community of affect, based on compassion, and a humanitarian practice. This claims a neutrality derived from universal basic human values or rights. The second produces **a return to developmentalism**, which is founded on the scientific search for objective causes of events and a belief in rational, technical solutions. It **claims a value-free truth founded on the certainty of objective method**. A third response, to which I return later, is the possibility of "tarrying with the negative."51 Zizek's Lacanian work allows us to see the various responses in relation to a desire for (impossible) completion, for an overcoming of the lack inherent in la condition humaine as such.

**Aff Answers

Perm Solvency

It is important to challenge the framework of modernity no matter what the possible outcome

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 132-133 "In the conclusion…other"

In the conclusion of this chapter, I examine attempts to analyze this process as an example of the power of the framework of modernity. If that framework is to be challenged it is important to understand how it works and where its strengths (and its weaknesses) lie. This book has attempted to contribute to that understanding in the case of famines. In the end, **the aim should be perhaps not to escape from the limits of modernity** (since it is in any case an attempt that inevitably fails), **but to continually disrupt and challenge modernity and the power relations that it installs. Modernity's search for closure is bound to continue, but it is also bound to flounder. Similarly, challenges to modernity will not succeed in replacing it** (since they operate within it), **but they cannot fail either**, since modernity's strength lies in a fantasy. The foundations it claims are illusory, and their establishment as the taken-for-granted reality within which we operate is a political process like any other.

Perm Solvency

Incorporating logic and logocentric claims is key to effective repoliticization

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 147 – 148 "Following…decision"

Following through the deconstructive analysis that I am attempting here, we could perhaps argue that, on the contrary, famine relief as supplement is undecidable: whether it solves or exacerbates the famine is undecidable—and hence political. **We have** here an example of **the "double contradictory imperative**."80 **On the one hand, famine relief must be given; food cannot be withheld from the starving. On the other hand, famine relief must be withheld; it is the relief aid that is causing the famine**.81 **This leads to** an aporia, which takes the form of a **contradiction. But "ethics, politics and responsibility, if there are any, will only ever have begun with the experience and experiment** of the aporia."82 In other words, **it is only through** the **logic** of the aporia, **where a decision has to be made, that we will arrive at something that can be called "political."** Without this, what we are doing is following a program, claiming a priority for knowledge, and an epistemological certainty: "when a path is clear and given, when a certail knowledge opens up the way in advance, the decision is already made, it might as well be said that there is none to make: irresponsibly, and in good conscience, one simply applies or implements a programme."83 It may not be possible to escape the program, but if this is what is happening, then moral or political responsibility does not come into it: "the condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible: the testing of the aporia from which one may invent the only possible invention, the impossible invention."84 **It is through the experience of this contradiction** or aporia, **to which no answer can be found, that ethical responsibility becomes possible. By accepting the question of famine relief as undecidable, in the sense that an answer cannot be found through knowledge, the way is opened to the process of ethico-political decision.**

Perm Solvency

The creation of undecidability goes beyond the bind it allows the perm to exceed calcuability

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 149 "The existence…denounced"

The existence of impossible dilemmas does not mean that we do nothing. Indeed, it is only in these situations that we can act responsibly. It brings us back to Derrida's comment: That justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable cannot and should not serve as an alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state or between institutions or states and others.... **Not only must we... negotiate the relation between the calculable and the incalculable. but we must take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find ourselves and beyond the already identifiable zones of morality or politics or law**, beyond the distinction between national and international, public and private, and so on.86 David **Campbell emphasizes** this point—that **it is the presence of the undecidable that leads to politics rather than technology:** "Were everything to be within the purview of the decidable, and devoid of the undecidable, then—as Derrida constantly reminds us—there would be no ethics, politics, or responsibility, only a programme, technology, and its irresponsible application."87 The terrain of the undecidable is **the "impossible" terrain**. But this **does not mean that taking responsibility limits one to "impossible, impractical and inapplicable decision**s."88 **One must rather "assume a responsibility that announces itself as contradictory because it inscribes us from the very beginning of the game into a kind of necessary double obligation, a double bind.**"89 For example, **it is impossible at one and the same time to both give and withhold relief, but this is what we must take responsibility for**. What this might imply is a responsibility for finding a way to contain in each decision the principle with the specificity of its application. In other words, in applying any principle, such as the need to give aid, divergences between the principle and "the concrete conditions of [its] implementation, the determined limits of [its] representation, [and] the abuses of or inequalities in [its] application as a result of certain interests, monopolies, or existing hegemonies" need to be denounced.90

Perm Solvency

It is not a question of whether or not aid is good or whether we should act, we must make this process undecidable by addressing the contradictory imperative

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 152 "the answer…know"

> **The answer is not to stop providing famine relief, development assistance, and humanitarian aid. It is crucial to stress again that although** I have claimed that **famine relief can be regarded as undecidable, this does not mean that a decision cannot or should not be made. It merely implies that such a decision is just that: a political or ethical decision**. It cannot be left to experts or the international community. It is not a technological or managerial matter that can be resolved by better theories or techniques. Whether any particular decision is just or not will remain unknown. But although justice itself is impossible, **we have a duty to act with responsibility in addressing** what Derrida calls **the double contradictory imperative**. This process—an interminable process of decision making and questioning—is politics. The problem exceeds "the order of theoretical determination, of knowledge, certainty, judgement, and of statements in the form of 'this is that."'Or, as Amy said: "You've got to decide, but you'll never know."

Turn: K of Discourse → Domination

Representations of famine which seek to mobilize action, like the 1ac, don't internalize suffering or seek domination but create an urgency to resolve the harms. critques of famine discourses just create an ocillation between domination and subordination while ignoring the suffering of others

Siobhán **Madden** executive member of Banúlacht-Women in Ireland for Global Solidarity
and Geraldine **Moane**. lectures on Psychology in the Department of Psychology, University College Dublin. (**2006**) 'Critical Psychologies in Ireland: Transforming Contexts and Political Possibilities', *Annual Review of Critical Psychology*, 5,
http://www.discourseunit.com/arcp/arcp5/arIreland%20ARCP%205.doc

One concept which usefully links the individual and social in the reconstitution of such narratives is that of **'radical memory'**. Whelan (2005) introduces the concept as a framework for understanding inventions of tradition by the post-Famine generation of activists (circa 1880s) who deployed the past for radical political purposes to challenge the present and reshape the future. According to Whelan, **the most engaged** of these **cultural thinkers differentiated between two modes of memory: an individualistic form internalising damage as melancholia, and a culturally induced form seeking wider explanations and political strategies. Radical memory, in recognising that individual memory and social memory are inextricably linked, restores agency and allows for translation from the personal to the public sphere. One contemporary example of the practice of radical memory is the organization Afri which draws on Ireland's historical experience of Famine[1] in order to inform a critical social consciousness relevant to strategies of global solidarity in the present.** A range of scholarship also explores the possibilities for solidarity through practices of historical remembering in Ireland, with new implications for global feminist solidarity. Examples include Margaret Kelleher's (1997) work on contemporary and twentieth century literary representations of the Great Famine, and how a sense of unspeakability coexists with the emergence of the 'feminization of famine' as a representational strategy enabling narration. Her purpose is to inform an ongoing critique of representations of famine, their concomitant occlusions and political consequences. Breda **Gray** (2004) also explores discursive and structural factors in the collective memory of emigration, where 'our' homogenized history of emigration is invoked as a basis for solidarity with new immigrants, thereby assimilating the other into the self. She **discusses how to use memory for an ethical political project to 'keep contestation and negotiation at the heart of how memory operates in the present'** (p. 13). Arguing for an openness to radical difference, **she suggests bringing experiences to memory in different ways by locating them in different contexts to open new interpretive frameworks**. Examples include responses to new immigrants which make connections between settled people and Travellers, or in relation to how 'whiteness' was/is inhabited in the Irish diaspora. **The notion of radical memory**, constituted in part through contrast with its melancholic, individualistic opposite (Whelan, 2005), also **suggests that keeping contestation at the heart of memory explicitly requires critical attunement to insinuations of ahistorical, individualistic discourses of psychology in practices of collective remembering. In the case** of commemorations **of the Great Famine**, for instance, Lloyd (2000) critically interrogates the therapeutic discourse of psychoanalysis which emphasized 'the *function* of that mourning as socially healing for the present' (p. 221) in popular discourses. A core question for Lloyd is how to theorise the transition from the individual to the social, recognizing that any relation between the psychological and the social is always already ideological. Here he spots a developmental narrative: **famine commemorations on these terms are about shaking off 'the burden of the past' in order to 'enter modernity as fully formed subjects'** (p. 221). For Lloyd, **the commemorations, and the psychological/therapeutic discourses constitutive of them**, align with Ireland's uncritical embrace of transnational capitalist modernity, so reproducing the same colonial attitudes toward other post-colonial peoples in the global present. In this sense, **the problematics of 'personal development' and psychology's individualism** discussed above (Ryan, 2001) **reverberate through wider socio-political-cultural-historical spheres of action. This underlines that the search for alternative notions of political agency cannot attempt to transcend critique. Rather, the activity of critique is itself an ongoing process of rooting and shifting in dialogue with new (and old) alternatives.**

Edkins Indicts

Edkins contradicts herself and offers no real solution to famine

Aimee **Moiso and** Kimberly **Burge**, is senior writer and editor at Bread for the World "Whose Hunger? Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid. - Review - book review" Christian Century, 16 May **2001**, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1058/is_16_118/ai_75197309

Edkins, a lecturer in the department of international politics at the University of Wales-Aberystwyth, **does manage to dissect some traditional and modern responses to famine**, including country-to-country global food aid and long-term development programs, **but her results are muddled**. **In seeming contradiction, she both argues for a rethinking of theories of famine relief and claims their futility, effectively discounting any potential solutions.** "It is not a question of finding better early warning systems, more participatory development projects, or faster methods of delivering relief. Nor is it a question of seeking the deeper, more structural causes of famines, nor its complexities," she writes**. She identifies international power relations and violence as sources of famine, but her conclusion begs the question: If power relations are the cause, is not the remedy to examine their structures and complexities for solutions? Not that Edkins claims to offer answers.** "The practical political aim of this book is neither to understand famine nor to provide a solution," she writes. Unfortunately, the result is a digressive book of little practical political use to those able to respond tangibly to famine. Bombarded with images of severe hunger and famine in the 1980s and early '90s, people grew weary of hearing about the seeming hopelessness of global poverty. It's refreshing to see new books appearing on this old subject, and heartening to know that solutions are at hand.

Edkins Indicts

Edkins rejection of linear narratives and insistence on attempted experience to witness survivor trauma contradicts with her unwillingness to try and understand the Holocaust

Hidemi **Suganami**, Professor of International Politics at University of Wales, Aberystwyth "Narrative Explanations in IR: Reflections on Hollis and Smith; Lebow and Edkins" 27 June **2006**
www.ceeisaconf.ut.ee/orb.aw/class=file/action=preview/id=167750/Suganami_Narrative_IR.doc

First, central to Edkins' argument is a sharp contrast between (1) linear narratives, favoured by the state/sovereign power, that give platitudinous meanings to human suffering as part of its own story and (2) ineffable experience of horror, repeatedly re-experienced by the survivors, whose testimony has a potential to undermine the state power by revealing what it must produce but needs to conceal. Edkins is clearly on the side of trauma victims, but, in putting her case to the reader, she makes it sound as though all linear narratives necessarily are ethically/politically objectionable because they are inescapably on the side of the perpetrators. They represent the language of power which 'writing without power' resists (2003, 8-9). **She acknowledges that not all narratives are linear narratives** (2003, 40, note 81) **but suggests that all narratives** (of trauma) **are attempts at domesticating the full horror of traumatic reality by making it intelligible** (2003, 113) **and, as such, they are to be rejected in favour of listening to the unedited, often incoherent, very lengthy, repetitious, testimony of the survivors**. There are two things that are unclear to me here. (1) Is Edkins suggesting that *all* linear narratives are necessarily objectionable on moral/political grounds? Is it not possible to produce narratives (linear or otherwise) that do not give (more or less 'platitudinous') meanings to the victims' traumatic experiences? (2) What follows, politically, from the act of listening to the survivors? **Edkins says that this makes us realise that we are all implicated in the trauma, but does not explain fully what follows on from this by way of resistance to sovereign power**.[12]

The other feature that I have found intriguing in **Edkins'** argument relates to the first of the two points that have just been raised: her attitude towards history (or histories written by historians) is negative, ambivalent at best. While she does not object to 'nuanced scholarly discussion' (2003, 168), she **is opposed to simplistic historical analysis and 'facile understanding' that ends in demonizing and criminalizing**, for example, the Nazis (2003, 228) – for this is to depoliticize the issue, she says, citing Foucault (2003, 228). **She is not against an effort to establish, step by step, the details of the guilt regarding Nazi atrocities** (2003, 228), **but seems to** agree with Claude Lanzmann when he **maintains that 'there is absolute obscenity in the very project of understanding' the Holocaust** (2003, 175). In the face of those who would even deny that anything called 'the Holocaust' ever took place, Edkins observes, historical research would focus on historical accuracy, displaying authentic artefacts to back up their claims to irrefutability. But Edkins is critical of such an approach for it is based on 'a reassuring assumption that a historical narrative based on firm evidence can lead to a form of closure, a final solution to outstanding questions' (2003, 175). **She even goes on to say that '[s]uch approaches seek to understand and explain what happened'** (2003, 175) **as if to suggest that understanding and explaining what happened is somehow inappropriate.**

Edkins Indicts

Edkins' rejections of sovereign power must be rejected, she relies on broad rejections without analysis of humyn suffering

Hidemi **Suganami**, Professor of International Politics at University of Wales, Aberystwyth "Narrative Explanations in IR: Reflections on Hollis and Smith; Lebow and Edkins" 27 June **2006**
www.ceeisaconf.ut.ee/orb.aw/class=file/action=preview/id=167750/Suganami_Narrative_IR.doc

What do I make of these intriguing assertions? Are all linear narratives necessarily on the side of state power? Do narratives, linear or otherwise, necessarily render traumatic human suffering acceptable by giving it a sense, a historical significance? What change may follow from the act of listening to the survivors' voices and how does any such change come about? What is so inadequate, unworthy, or objectionable about the historians' effort to establish the truth about what happened (especially in the face of false claims, deliberate or otherwise), to enquire what brought about the atrocities, or to assess who or what was responsible for the senseless suffering? Here are some tentative thoughts. First, I find it difficult to go along with **Edkins' implied claim that sovereign power/the state, as a key source of violence, must unconditionally be resisted**. It is one thing to suggest that 'the modern state cannot be assumed to be a place of safety'. There is always a possibility that the state may inflict some terrible violence on its citizens as well as outsiders. But **there are variations – not all states inflict massive violence all the time – and it does not strike me as inappropriate as a political/ethical goal to try to identify the conditions under which human suffering produced by states might be reduced** (and enquire how such conditions may be realized) **rather than to insist on eradicating human suffering by resisting everything that the state/sovereign power does/stands for**. Second, in her fight against the sovereign power/state, which, according to her, necessarily produces/conceals trauma, she favours 'writing without power', which translates, at the end of her book, to 'non-violent protests against state power' (2003, 232). Any other response, including humanitarian intervention to save strangers (2003, 195ff), she suggests, merely traps us in 'the cycle of violence' (2003, 173). Much as I am impressed by what non-violent protests can achieve in bringing about political change, I am not persuaded that they have any impact on eradicating the state as such (which, of course, exists as part of the multiplicity of states, reinforcing the rationale for the existence of each). **If the states-system persists, all the problems, that Edkins wants to eradicate, will remain: for her, the state/sovereign power is the source of evil, not particular regime-types under which people live**.

Alt Fail - Retechnologization

Critical approaches to aid fail – they cause retechnologization through an inversion of famine representation

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 146-147 "The related…donors"

The related risk that critical approaches to aid carry, in addition to that of retechnologization, is the risk of concluding that aid should be seen not as a remedy for famine but as its cause. Duffield and other writers have argued that famine relief and humanitarian aid strengthens the disaster situation and produces a structure of permanent emergency.[77] Forms of international action—through NGOs, food aid, development projects—have institutionalized famine as one of several forms of disaster and emergency. This approach has been objectified in institutional arrangements. These are now an integral part of a social system in which forms of oppression that produce and reproduce inequality, injustice, and disregard of human rights are perpetuated. **The conclusion is that not only does international emergency intervention and aid not solve the problem of famine; aid, through the mechanisms of power and control that it enables to operate, produces famine. This is a situation of inversion: where aid is no longer the remedy, aid is the cause**. However, any simple **Opposition of remedy and cause breaks down—one is always haunted by the other. In modern logo- centric thought, analysis proceeds through the production of a series of dichotomies**: man/woman, memory/forgetting, inside/outside, and so on. These oppositions work only because one of the pair is always contaminated by a trace of the other. The concept of "inside," for example, has absolutely no meaning without that of "outside." Thus the distinctions through which this specific mode of thought operates are prone to collapse.[78] The example of the supplement is useful here. A supplement (to a book, for example) is at one and the same time *necessary* and *unnecessary*, because if the book is not complete, the supplement is not a supplement but part of the book. Viewed in this way, famine relief is the supplement. **The new approach to famine and complex emergency crucially does not admit to its own conclusion about relief. Despite arguing that aid causes, or renders possible, famine and human rights abuses, it is nevertheless almost immediately suggested that the solutions could be found if aid donors approached the situation in a different way.79 This move is characteristic of logocentric analysis: the possibility of the negative is recognized—aid does indeed cause famine—but then in a move that is almost simultaneous, this possibility is discounted or rendered accidental—the problem with aid can be overcome through educating donors.**

Alt Fail – Can't Reconstitute Modernity

Attempts to repoliticize that only reverse this view in the context of famine relief fail to reconstitute modernity and risks institutionalization of further technologization

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 129-130 "I examine…or given"

I examine some recent attempts to do this—to repoliticize famines—particularly those that introduced the notion of famine as a complex political emergency. Much of this work began as an endeavor to reintroduce an explicit consideration of violence and the political missing in Sen's work. As I argued in chapter 3, **violence is always already present in the violence of the law and the state even in the absence of military conflict. Efforts to repoliticize run the risk of constituting no more than a struggle to reverse the view of relief or humanitarian aid as a solution to famine. Such a reversal is problematic because it does not move outside the frame of modernity. It lays itself open to a further technologization**, and I will discuss how that is taking place. What is needed is a displacement or resituating of the problematics of humanitarianism and aid. Humanitarianism can be a deeply conservative activity in the face of the emergence of new political formations, or it can be an emancipatory move. Which it is depends on the specific configuration in which it is located and the political substance with which it is articulated or linked at any particular moment. These articulations can be contested: they are not natural or given.

Alt Fails – Can't Solve Modernl/L – Technologization → Biopower

Famine policy that is depoliticized and technologized justifies the removal of those who ruin the management of resources in the interest of the survival of the whole

Jenny **Edkins**, lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, *Whose Hunger?:concepts of famine, practices of aid,* **2000** p. 29-30 "In terms…whole"

In terms of famine policy today, neo-Malthusian approaches mean concentrating on a number of specific areas. The general ethos is a focus on large-scale, countrywide, or global solutions. **Population control is of course important, but so is the increase of food production by improving agricultural techniques and incentives**. Food stocks are crucial, and there is concern for food security. **Environmental problems must be tackled, too, as it is important to bring an increasing area of the earth's surface into production and to increase the efficient and sustainable use of that already cultivated.** Pesticide and fertilizer development and the breeding of new plant varieties is another area of work. In terms of the response to famines themselves, there is a tendency to blame the victim—for breeding too fast or whatever—and relief is sometimes given reluctantly. **Food for work programs are favored over free distribution since otherwise the so-called feckless poor will continue to be dependent and lazy**. **The morality of relief is questioned by writers such as** Garrett **Hardin,63 who contend that helping the improvident will only increase the chance of global disaster. Since the carrying capacity of the earth, like a lifeboat, is limited, those who try to clamber aboard to save themselves must be firmly repulsed in the interest of the survival of the whole.**