### 1

#### Economic engagement is a subset of conditional engagement and implies a tit-for-tat exchange

Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books]

In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy.¶ The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power.¶ The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China.¶ The tactics of economic engagement should promote China’s economic integration through negotiations on trade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged.¶ The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8¶ [To footnotes]¶ 8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in Fareed Zakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).

#### Violation --- The aff unilaterally lifts the embargo– that is a form of unconditional engagement

#### Reasons to Vote Negative –

#### Limits – the embargo means there’s a near-infinite range of “one exception” affs – conditionality forces the aff to find deals that Cuba would accept

#### Ground – unconditional engagement denies us “say no” and backlash arguments which are a crucial part of the engagement debate

### 2

#### Chinease influence is high now- CELAC proves

Tiezzi 2/08/14 (Shannon Tiezzi is an assiosiate editor at the diplomat “China’s push into america’s back yard” <http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/chinas-push-into-americas-backyard/>)-Neal

On the political level, since 2001, China has signed strategic partnership agreements with five countries in the region: Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Peru. As a sign of the region’s importance, Xi Jinping visited Central America in June of last year, stopping in Mexico, Costa Rica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Several regional leaders have also made the trek to Beijing, including [Equador’s Vice President](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/ldmzs/xwlb/t1122098.shtml) Jorge Glas Espinel, [Bolivian President](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/ldmzs/xwlb/t1111188.shtml) Juan Evo Morales Ayma, and [Brazilian Vice President](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/ldmzs/xwlb/t1097537.shtml) Michel Temer. Adding an extra level of enticement for China, the majority of countries that still recognize Taiwan are located in Central America and the Caribbean. Though there’s currently somewhat of an unofficial truce on this issue between Taipei and Beijing, long term Beijing may seek to woo these 11 countries away from Taiwan. Meanwhile, China’s engagement also helps highlight some regional ambivalence towards the United States. CELAC itself was conceived of as an alternative to the Washington-led Organization of American States. CELAC member states include every country in the Western hemisphere expect Canada and the United States, rather pointed omissions. The fact that the most recent CELAC summit was held in Havana only served to underscore a lack of coherent U.S. [policy](http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/chinas-push-into-americas-backyard/) in the region. The U.S. still has in place an embargo on Cuba, which has outlived both logic and usefulness — something Raul Castro, in his speech to the CELAC summit, [was not shy about pointing out](http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Cuba-calls-for-integration-free-of-US-at-CELAC-summit_15900593). Underlining the sentiments of some in CELAC, Castro warned that CELAC must be on guard against attempts by the U.S. to leverage the region for its own benefit. “The so-called centers of power do not resign themselves to having lost control over this rich region, nor will they ever renounce attempts to change the course of history in our countries in order to recover the influence they have lost,” he said. Partnering with China seems to be CELAC’s way of hedging against U.S. dominance in the region — just as some states in the Asia-Pacific are edging closer to the U.S. in a bid against growing Chinese power

#### Increase in US influence in Latin America directly trades off with Chinese influence

Ellis 12

Dr. R. Evan Ellis is a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics. May 2012- The Inter-American Dialogue - “The United States, ¶ Latin America and China: ¶ A “Triangular Relationship”?” http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661\_China\_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf

At the political level, US engagement with Latin American ¶ countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop ¶ military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic ¶ and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century ¶ Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary ¶ US policymakers, with a presumed desire to “keep China out” ¶ of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese ¶ initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin America’s own leadership has ¶ responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United ¶ States. Colombia’s close relationship with the United States, for ¶ example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant ¶ to procure major military items from the PRC.28¶ The same logic has also applied to countries such as ¶ Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the ¶ PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with ¶ the United States. The degree to which a “bad” relationship ¶ with the United States has propelled a “positive” relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to ¶ diversify away from Venezuelan dependence on the United ¶ States as the nation’s primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese ¶ construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese ¶ oil companies.29 US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and ¶ components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to ¶ engage with China, and other countries, to procure military ¶ hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after ¶ the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable ¶ aircraft from the Czech Republic.30

#### Chinese influence in the region key to the global economy and regime stability – preventing US influence key

Ellis 11

[R. Evan, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University.Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, 1st quarter 2011, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf>]

Access to Latin American Markets. Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call President Chávez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, China has applied more explicit pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14 China has also used its economic weight to help secure major projects on preferential terms. In the course of negotiating a $1.7 billion loan deal for the Coco Coda Sinclair Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to self-finance 85 percent of the projects through Chinese banks helped it to work around the traditional Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a local partner. Later, the Ecuadorian government publicly and bitterly broke off negotiations with the Chinese, only to return to the bargaining table 2 months later after failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the Chávez government agreed, for example, to accept half of the $20 billion loaned to it by the PRC in Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the Chinese manufacturer Haier for resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC loaned Venezuela $300 million to start a regional airline, but as part of the deal, required Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.15 Protection of Chinese Nationals. As with the United States and other Western countries, as China becomes more involved in business and other operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationals will be vulnerable to hazards common to the region, such as kidnapping, crime, protests, and related problems. The heightened presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador, for example, has been associated with a series of problems, including the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November 2006, and protests in Orellana related to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35 police officers and forced the declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela, became the focus of violent protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase, the PRC will need to rely increasingly on a combination of goodwill and fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its influence with governments of the region, to resolve such problems when they occur.The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country’s sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China’s attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used “against” Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.

#### That solves global economic collapse and nuclear lashout

Buzan and Foot 04 **–** professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

### 3

#### The United States federal government should—

#### -substantially increase international humanitarian assistance through military medical operations toward non-democratic regimes that aren’t Cuba

#### -invite the countries in the Pacific Alliance to an economic and trade forum.

#### - ratify the Kyoto Protocol

#### - close the Guantanamo detention center

#### -eliminate the portion of the Renewable Fuel Standard that mandates an ever-increasing amount of corn ethanol be blended into gasoline

#### -institute and fund a Quadrennial Ecosystems Services Trends Assessment.

**- Remove Cuba from the terror List**

**- do the things outlined in the Burgsdoff evidence**

#### Guantanamo, Kyoto, Bali conference, the ICC, and human rights treaties are key

Burgsdorff---their author---9**–** Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of Miami (Sven Kühn von, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”, <http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/publications/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf>)

6.3 How would the international community react? At international level all major actors would clearly welcome an end to the embargo. While the sanctions policy allowed European, Canadian and, more recently, Venezuelan, Chinese, Brazilian and Russian to become more involved with Cuba in the absence of competitors from the US (with the exception of agriculture produce), most of the foreign powers, and in particular the EU and Latin American countries, would clearly support a definite lifting of the coercive measures. Ending the embargo would be perceived as a decision carrying a momentum of powerful symbolism since it would signal a newly found willingness in Washington to reconsider the usefulness of acting unilaterally and outside the international legal framework. As a matter of fact, together **with other measures such as closing Guantanamo, signing up to the Kyoto Protocol and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, and possibly, joining the International Criminal Court as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.**

#### **The inclusion of Cuba on the terror list severely impedes the US war on terror – Resource distraction, Credibility, and Cooperation**

Levy 11 – Lecturer and Doctoral Candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Affairs at the University of Denver, received the Leonard Marks Essay Award of the American Academy of Diplomacy, masters degree from Columbia in International Affairs. (Arturo Lopez-Levy, “A Call for Cuba’s Removal from the List of State Sponsers of Terrorism”, Center for International policy/Latin American Working Group, 12/1/11, [http://www.lawg.org/storage/documents/Cuba/lawg\_cip\_dec\_2011.pdf)//](http://www.lawg.org/storage/documents/Cuba/lawg_cip_dec_2011.pdf)/) EO

So, let me discuss the first issue, why including Cuba on the terrorist list harms American ¶ efforts and leadership in the Global War against terrorism. Cuba’s inclusion on the list is based on bogus allegations that undermine its credibility. By ¶ lumping Cuba together with Iran, Syria, and Sudan, a potentially effective foreign policy tool for ¶ warning Americans and the international community against countries that “repeatedly provide ¶ support for international terrorism” becomes a list of governments that some South Floridians ¶ don’t like. Foreign policy is not about therapy. If the goal is to provide right wing Cuban ¶ Americans a venue for catharsis, there are other ways less harmful to US national security for ¶ them to vent their frustrations.¶ The list of terrorism sponsoring nations should be a bargaining tool for dealing with, well, ¶ countries that engage in or sponsor terrorism. The misuse of a first level national security ¶ concern must give pause to responsible members of the Washington Foreign Policy community. ¶ First, it distracts efforts and resources in the wrong direction, taking eyes and dollars from ¶ where the real threats are. Second, it sends the wrong messages to other countries, diminishing ¶ the appeal of the list as a warning against countries such as Iran or Syria, in which the threat of ¶ cooperation with and sponsorship of terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah against the ¶ United States and our allies is really serious. Third, it weakens the capacity of US allies like Israel ¶ or India, who are real targets of terrorist threats, to make a case for sanctioning or monitoring ¶ of countries or entities such as Iran whose presence on the list is justified. ¶ The three Cuba Reports (2008, 09, and 10) by the State Department Office of the Coordinator ¶ for Counterterrorism written under the Obama Administration are more an argument for ¶ removing rather than for keeping the island on the list. This is particularly evident in the ¶ discussion of Cuba’s alleged links with three groups connected to international terrorist ¶ activities: The FARC and the ELN from Colombia, and the Spanish ETA. In addition to ETA’s ¶ recent announcement of its demobilization, making this a non issue, the presence of members

#### Repealing the corn ethanol mandate prevents the negative effects of domestic production

Faber 13

Scott, Senior Vice President for Government Affairs, Environmental Working Group, Before the Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety and the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, "EWG's Scott Faber Testifies Before Congress about Renewable Fuel Standard", December 11 2013, www.ewg.org/testimony-official-correspondence/ewgs-faber-testifies-subcommittee-about-renewable-fuel-standard

To date, the RFS has failed to deliver the “good” biofuels that could help meet many of our environmental and energy challenges. Instead, the RFS has delivered too many “bad” biofuels that increase greenhouse gas emissions, pollute air and water, destroy critical habitat for wildlife and drive up the price of food. The corn ethanol mandate of the RFS, once promoted as a tool to combat climate change, has instead raised greenhouse emissions, exacerbated air and water pollution challenges and inflated the price of staple foods.¶ Since it was expanded in 2007, the corn ethanol mandate has contributed to plowing up more than 23 million acres of US wetlands and grasslands in order to plant crops – an area the size of Indiana. EWG recently analyzed the annually updated satellite data that the US Department of Agriculture uses to track land use and documented this rapid destruction of wetlands and grasslands. In places where the loss of wetlands is most extensive, corn accounts for the largest share of this conversion. Other studies have also documented this dramatic change to the American landscape. By accelerating conversion of wetlands and grasslands to grow crops, the RFS has driven up greenhouse gas emissions by releasing carbon stored in the soil4 and by boosting fertilizer applications.¶ The Environmental Protection Agency’s own analysis has shown that lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions of corn ethanol were higher than those of gasoline last year (2012) and will still be higher in 2017. Of the 33 identified corn ethanol production pathways, only three decreased emissions in 2012 and only nine are expected to meet the greenhouse gas reduction standard for corn ethanol in 2017.¶ What’s more, new research suggests that the RFS will not achieve long-term greenhouse gas reductions. Researchers calculated that the cumulative greenhouse gas emissions caused by corn ethanol between 2010 and 2044 will be about 1.4 billion tons –300 million tons more than from an energy-equivalent amount of gasoline. That means the cumulative lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions from corn ethanol would be 28 percent higher than those from gasoline.¶ These studies contradict earlier research – based on hypothetical corn ethanol production in 2022 – that suggested that the 30-year lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions from corn ethanol would be lower than those from an energy-equivalent amount of gasoline. EPA presumed investments and technological upgrades, such as fuel switching, that are speculative at best, since most corn ethanol is not subject to the greenhouse gas reduction standards of the RFS.

### 4

#### The affirmative represents an inherently unstable world needing innovative solutions to constant problems, which entrenches insecurity logic. The impact is a circular apocalyptic impulse that makes violence inevitable

-Threats are just to preserve the perception of innocence- if we are powerless, then the troubles of the world are not our fault.

- System is unstable- Each step to create a more secure world ends up making us to be more insecure.

- By the use of security, we only perpetuate our need for control- we find that control through violence and action with the justification that we are only acting in self-defense. Through that violence, we become frustrated with losses on our own side which acts as greater justification for violence.

- actions built on a story are only doomed to fail as they only justify more security rhetoric and further put us in a state of insecurity.

-Insecurity that was a result of the security discourse perpetuates the violence that because it dictates our responses to the threats

- the perception that the nation is at risk is enough to envoke cries of pearl harbor and rally the US to go to conflict to protect our interests

- perpetuates the use of a security state- evidence becomes irrelevant- How do we know our existence is threatened, because it is- Serial policy failure

-insecurity is a justification for the resistance to change- as long as the threat of an attack exists, it makes is so that we justify more death in order to deal with it.

Chernus 1—Ira Chernus, Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder [“Fighting Terror in The National Insecurity State,” http://spot.colorado.edu/~chernus/WaronTerrorismEssays/FightingTerror.htm]

Just as the outcome of World War I sowed the seeds of World War II, and the outcome of World War II the seeds of the cold war, so the outcome of the cold war sowed the seeds of the war on terrorism. And this newest war is already, quite visibly, sowing the seeds of insecurity to come. It may be most useful to view the whole period from the early cold war years through the present war as a single historical era: the era of the national insecurity state. Throughout that era, U.S. policy decisions made in the name of national security consistently breed a greater sense of vulnerability, frustration, and insecurity. It is not hard to see why. Four decades of cold war enshrined two fundamental principles at the heart of our public life: there is a mortal threat to the very existence of our nation, and our own policies play no role in generating the threat. The belief structure of the national insecurity state flows logically from these premises. If our nation bears no responsibility, then we are powerless to eradicate the threat. If others threaten us through no fault of our own, what can we do? There is no hope for a truly better world, nor for ending the danger by mutual compromise with "the other side." The threat is effectively eternal. The best to hope for is to hold the threat forever at bay. Yet the sense of powerlessness is oddly satisfying, because it preserves the conviction of innocence: if our policies are so ineffectual, the troubles of the world can hardly be our fault. And the vision of an endless status quo is equally satisfying, because it promises to prevent historical change. If peril is permanent, the world is an endless reservoir of potential enemies. Any fundamental change in the status quo portends only catastrophe. The only path to security, it seems, is to prevent change by imposing control over others. When those others fight back, the national insecurity state protests its innocence: we act only in self-defense; we want only stability. The state sees no reason to re-evaluate its policies; that would risk the change it seeks, above all, to avoid. So it can only meet violence with more violence. Of course, the inevitable frustration is blamed on the enemy, reinforcing the sense of peril and the demand for absolute control through violence. The goal of total control is self-defeating; each step toward security becomes a source of, and is taken as proof of, continuing insecurity. This makes the logic of the insecurity state viciously circular. Why are we always fighting? Because we always have enemies. How do we know we always have enemies? Because we are always fighting. And knowing that we have enemies, how can we afford to stop fighting? In the insecurity state, there is no way to talk about security without voicing fears of insecurity, no way to express optimism without expressing despair. On every front, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy; a self-confirming and self-perpetuating spiral of violence; a trap that seems to offer no way out. It is not surprising, then, that the pattern of insecurity crystallized during the cold war survived that war. The "experts" insisted that now we were less secure. September 11 proved them indisputably right. Now they offer an official story that pretends to see an end to insecurity, but actually promises the endless insecurity of another cold war. And the policies based on that story virtually guarantee that the promise will be fulfilled. But that is just what most Americans expect, in any event. Caged inside the logic of the insecurity state, they can see no other possibility. So the official story hardly seems to be one option among many. Its premises and conclusions seem so necessary, so inevitable, that no other story can be imagined. For huge numbers of Americans, the peace movement’s alternative story is not mistaken. It is simply incomprehensible, like a foreign language, for it assumes that we can take steps to address the very sources of insecurity. That denies the most basic foundations of the prevailing public discourse. Quite naturally, then, the majority embraces the only story it can understand. The story is persuasive because the alternative seems to be having no story at all. The official story prevails by default, as the nation faces the prospect of further war around the world. Yet that is only half its power. The other half comes from the paradoxical consolation it provides as we look back to what happened here at home, on September 11, when four hijacked planes crashed headlong into the national insecurity state. The cold war is long over, the Reds are long gone, and now the twin towers are gone, too. But the national insecurity state still stands. Indeed, it stands stronger and taller precisely because the towers are gone. Our sense of insecurity has grown. But it is not fundamentally different in kind. The attacks did not create a pervasive sense of insecurity. Rather, the insecurity that was already pervasive shaped the dominant interpretation of and response to the attacks. The first response was the nearly universal cry: "Pearl Harbor." But "this was not Pearl Harbor," as National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice recognized. There is no rivalry between great nation states. No foreign nation has attacked the U.S. No long-standing diplomatic and economic maneuvering preceded the attacks of September 11, 2001. Why, then, did they so quickly evoke the imagery of December 7, 1941? The common thread was not a hope for redemption, but only a conviction that the nation’s very existence was threatened. In 2001, that judgment is debatable, to say the least. Assuming that the attacks were indeed the work of a Muslim splinter group, such groups have been trying to attack U.S. interests for a quarter-century or more. One massive act of destruction, as horrendous as it was, hardly constitutes evidence of their overwhelming power. Nor is there any real evidence for Bush’s charge that these groups aim to impose their "radical beliefs on people everywhere¼ and end a way of life." Yet evidence is irrelevant in the national insecurity state. The fear comes first, before any evidence that it is warranted. How do we know that our existence is threatened? Because it is so obviously threatened! QED. This circular argument seems to be confirmed by the expressions of fear that have filled the mass media since September 11. They are certainly sincere. Yet it has become almost obligatory to say, "Life will never be the same because now, for the first time, we feel vulnerable." Most who say this can still remember, if they care to, the long cold war years of living on the brink of nuclear annihilation. Many are old enough to recall the Cuban missile crisis. Even more can remember the Reagan administration’s serious plans to fight a nuclear war. Are we really more vulnerable now, or only vulnerable in a different way? Are we really less secure than the days when one push of the button could trigger a thousand September 11’s? True, the September 11 attack was actual rather than merely potential. Yet the scale of the potential attack we feared for so long was so much greater than the actual attack. Why should so many say that the actual attack marked a quantum leap in national anxiety? The notoriously poor historical memory of Americans is only part of the answer. A larger part is the need to contain this new eruption of disorder within a familiar meaning structure. The study of human culture shows, over and over, that anxiety can be held in check, if not banished, by the way people talk about it. People can feel relatively secure amidst the most extraordinary disruption and anxiety, as long as they have familiar words that put the disruption into some larger, dependable, enduring order. The lifeline of security is a language that affirms the enduring truth of the prevailing discourse and worldview. Today, the discourse of the national insecurity state is the nation’s most familiar structure. How natural, then, to reaffirm the fundamental truth of that discourse, especially when its truth seems to be so empirically proven. Certainly, there is a very real danger of more attacks on U.S. soil. But the magnitude of the danger is measured by cultural needs rather than empirical considerations. In the insecurity state, universal cries of alarm, massive preparations for future attack, and protestations that life is fundamentally changed all show how little has really changed. They serve to confirm the basic premise that danger is eternal and unavoidable. The name of the danger changes from time to time; for now, its name is "terrorism." But the underlying reality remains the same. In the face of a massive shock to our cultural assumptions, that promise of continuity is immensely reassuring. This is the paradox that keeps so many millions trapped in the insecurity state. In order to feel culturally and psychologically secure, one must feel physically and politically insecure. Thus the problem¾ the fear of terrorist attack¾ becomes the solution. The film of the towers bursting into flame is shown over and over again. The sheriffs stockpiling gas masks and anthrax vaccine are interviewed over and over again. "Experts" explain "the psychology of the terrorist" over and over again. All of this has a ritualistic quality, for it serves much the same function as every ritual. It acts out the basic worldview of the insecurity state, confirming that it endures in the face of a massive challenge. The dominant response to the tragedy in the U.S. also confirms that our own policies play no role in evoking the danger. This message takes ritual form in prayer meetings, civic gatherings, charity drives, and the Bush administration’s humanitarian gestures for starving Afghans. All enact the essential goodness of Americans. Even the most benign and laudable responses to the tragedy¾ the national pride in heroic rescue efforts, the outpouring of generous contributions, the genuine concern for the welfare of Muslim- and Arab-Americans¾ are seized and twisted in the overpowering cultural grasp of the national insecurity state. As symbols of innocence, all reinforce the basic assumption that the U.S. is powerless to affect the sources of continuing insecurity. Bush has often stated the logical corollary of innocence. if our policies are not relevant to the problem, there is nothing to negotiate. In other words, the U.S. will not contemplate policy changes that might lead to any fundamental change in political or economic power relationships. Therefore the only remaining course is to heighten the nation’s guard and use force to control the behavior of would-be attackers. Much of the response to the tragedy reinforces these interlocked assumptions of powerlessness and innocence. The cries of alarm and defensive preparations create the impression that the nation is circling the wagons and hunkering down for a long siege, because there is nothing else to do. The ubiquitous American flag becomes a symbol, not of abolishing evil, but of banding together to withstand the assault of evil forever. Yet there is almost a palpable eagerness to feel vulnerable. The new sense of national unity comes less from a common commitment to victory than from a common conviction of victimization. Powerful vestiges of the crusading spirit do remain. There is still a longing for unconditional triumph over the foreign foe. The constant allusions to Pearl Harbor, FDR, and World War II express these longings. More importantly, they create the illusion that genuine security is still possible. It is disconcerting to live amidst insecurity and even more disconcerting to acknowledge it openly. So the story of the "good war" is evoked endlessly, because it would be so reassuring to be able to wage another "good war." But the gestures of apocalyptic hope have a peculiarly forced, artificial quality, as if the public is trying to draw the last vestiges of living marrow out of an increasingly dead husk. The symbols, rituals, and mantras of the redeemer nation serve a very different role when public culture no longer really believes in the redemption. The problem is defined in apocalyptic terms. But no apocalyptic solution is available, nor even suggested. Talk of hope for security still elicits powerful images of the peril we hope to be secure from. But talk of peril is simply talk of peril, not a prelude to hope. There are no safe homes we can return to, for we must assume that the enemy, in one form or another, will always be at our gates. Political leaders and pundits offer only an endless horizon of unflagging efforts to maintain relative stability. In an inherently unstable world, made less stable by a superpower pursuing control, this is indeed "a task that does not end." All that once symbolized hope for the Kingdom of God on earth (whether in religious or secular form) now locks us into a future of inconclusive struggle and mounting anxiety. And the more we are convinced that insecurity is perpetual, the more we will resist fundamental change. That, of course, is the ultimate point. The prospect of another long, twilight struggle returns our culture to the certitude of simplistic absolutes. It erases the uncertainties of the ‘90s. It reassures us that nothing has really changed and nothing need ever change. It offers the best reason to go on resisting change. All of the preparations for and acts of war, all the warnings of and protections against future attacks, all the patriotic singing and flag-waving, all the gestures of hope that things will be better in the future, indeed all the dominant cultural responses to the attacks¾ all are now representations of the overriding conviction that security is still an impossible dream, that the future will not be fundamentally different from the present. In a society so fearful of change, where constant change provokes widespread despair, the conviction of unchanging insecurity engenders a strange kind of confidence. Millions now look ahead with more hope precisely because they can now believe that there is nothing really new to hope for. They cling to the insecurity that justifies their resistance to change. They take comfort in knowing that the explosions of September 11, which we are told changed everything, could not shake the foundations of the national insecurity state. The official story of the war on terrorism gives them that perverse comfort. For years to come, we shall live in the shadow of the tragic deaths of September 11, 2001. As long as the official story prevails, death will be piled upon death, and suffering upon suffering. The national insecurity state affords no prospect beyond death and suffering. So this war pushes us further into the shadow of the most tragic death of all: the death of hope for a better, a more peaceful, a genuinely secure future.

#### Our alternative is to reject the affirmative in favor of a critical approach to security. This is crucial to open space for emancipatory perspectives—our critique is mutually exclusive with the affirmative.

* Intelectuals can intervene by providing a critique of the current situation- calling attention to the problem to open up space for political discussion. The presenting of appropriate critiques is what is nessisary
* The critiques put forth by the intellectuals present a more realistic picuture of the world- they offer a more adequate picture of security in different parts of the world.
* Becoming aware of the politics of security helps us understand the role of human agency and reveils an alternate approach to the topic.

Bilgin 5—Pinar Bilgin, Associate Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University (Turkey) [“Conclusion,” *Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective*, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415325498, p. 205-207]

Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between intellectuals and social movements should not be taken to suggest that the only way for intellectuals to make a change is to get directly involved in political action. They can also intervene by providing a critique of the existing situation, calling attention to what future outcomes may result if necessary action is not taken at present, and by pointing to potential for change immanent in regional politics. Students of security could help create the political space for alternative agents of security to take action by presenting appropriate critiques. It should be emphasised however that such thinking should be anchored in the potential immanent in world politics. The hope is that non-state actors (who may or may not be aware of their potential to make a change) may constitute themselves as agents of security when presented with an alternative reading of their situation. Thinking about the future becomes even more crucial once theory is [end page 205] conceptualised as constitutive of the ‘reality’ it seeks to respond to. In other words, our ideas about the future—our conjectures and prognoses—have a self-constitutive potential. What the students of Cold War Security Studies consider as a more ‘realistic’ picture of the future becomes ‘real’ through practice, albeit under circumstances inherited from the past. Thinking about what a ‘desired’ future would look like is significant for the very same reason; that is, in order to be able to turn it into a ‘reality’ through adopting emancipatory practices. For, having a vision of a ‘desired’ future empowers people(s) in the present. Presenting pictures of what a ‘desired’ future might look like, and pointing to the security community approach as the start of a path that could take us from an insecure past to a more secure future is not to suggest that the creation of a security community is the most likely outcome. On the contrary, the dynamics pointed to throughout the book indicate that there exists a potential for descent into chaos if no action is taken to prevent militarisation and fragmentation of societies, and the marginalisation of peoples as well as economies in an increasingly globalising world. However, these dynamics exist as ‘threats to the future’ to use Beck’s terminology; and only by thinking and writing about them that can one mobilise preventive action to be taken in the present. Viewed as such, critical approaches present not an ‘optimistic’, but a more ‘realistic’ picture of the future

. Considering how the ‘realism’ of Cold War Security Studies failed not only when judged by its own standards, by failing to provide an adequate explanation of the world ‘out there’, but also when judged by the standards of critical approaches, as it was argued, it could be concluded that there is a need for more ‘realistic’ approaches to regional security in theory and practice. The foregoing suggests three broad conclusions. First, Cold War Security Studies did not present the ‘realistic’ picture it purported to provide. On the contrary, the pro-status quo leanings of the Cold War security discourse failed to allow for (let alone foresee) changes such as the end of the Cold War, dissolution of some states and integration of some others. Second, notwithstanding the important inroads critical approaches to security made in the post-Cold War era, much traditionalist thinking remains and maintains its grip over the security practices of many actors. Third, critical approaches offer a fuller or more adequate picture of security in different parts of the world (including the Middle East). Cold War Security Studies is limited not only because of its narrow (military-focused), pro-status quo and state-centric (if not statist) approach to security in theory and practice, but also because of its objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship that obscured the mutually constitutive relationship between them. Students of critical approaches have sought to challenge Cold War Security Studies, its claim to knowledge and its hold over security practices by pointing to the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice and revealing [end page 206] how the Cold War security discourse has been complicit in constituting (in)security in different parts of the world. The ways in which the Cold War security discourse helped constitute the ‘Middle East’ by way of representing it as a region, and contributed to regional insecurity in the Middle East by shaping security practices, is exemplary of the argument that ‘theories do not leave the world untouched’. The implication of these conclusions for practice is that becoming aware of the ‘politics behind the geographical specification of politics’ and exploring the relationship between (inventing) regions and (conceptions and practices of) security helps reveal the role human agency has played in the past and could play in the future. An alternative approach to security, that of critical approaches to security, could inform alternative (emancipatory) practices thereby helping constitute a new region in the form of a security community. It should be noted, however, that to argue that ‘everything is socially constructed’ or that ‘all approaches have normative concerns embedded in them’ is a significant first step that does not by itself help one adopt emancipatory practices. As long as people rely on traditional practices shaped by the Cold War security discourse - which remains prevalent in the post-Cold War era - they help constitute a ‘reality’ in line with the tenets of ‘realist’ Cold War Security Studies. This is why seeking to address evolving crises through traditional practices whilst leaving a critical security perspective to be adopted for the long-term will not work. For, traditionalist thinking and practices, by helping shape the ‘reality’ ‘out there’, foreclose the political space necessary for emancipatory practices to be adopted by multiple actors at numerous levels. Hence the need for the adoption of a critical perspective that emphasises the roles human agency has played in the past and could play in the future in shaping what human beings choose to call ‘reality’. Generating such an awareness of the potentialities of human agency could enable one to begin thinking differently about regional security in different parts of the world whilst remaining sensitive to regional actors’ multiple and contending conceptions of security, what they view as referent(s) and how they think security should be sought in different parts of the world. After decades of statist, military-focused and zero-sum thinking and practices that privileged the security of some whilst marginalising the security of others, the time has come for all those interested in security in the Middle East to decide whether they want to be agents of a world view that produces more of the same, thereby contributing towards a ‘threat to the future’, or of alternative futures that try to address the multiple dimensions of regional insecurity. The choice is not one between presenting a more ‘optimistic’ or ‘pessimistic’ vision of the future, but between stumbling into the future expecting more of the same, or stepping into a future equipped with a perspective that not only has a conception of a ‘desired’ future but is also cognisant of ‘threats to the future’.

### Nat Security

#### Gradual transition now---political liberalization is facilitating an economic “soft landing”---solves the Aff

Piccone, 10/3. Acting Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institute [Ted, “Cuba’s Stroll Toward Change: A View from the Streets,” Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/10/03-cuba-trip-piccone>]MR

We are witnessing today the unfolding of a transitional hybrid economy that has one foot on the accelerator and one foot on the brake. On one hand, a host of ongoing reforms in the domains of agriculture, tourism, property transfers, travel abroad and even sports are unshackling Cubans from a predominant state. President Obama’s decision in 2009 to relax U.S. travel and remittances rules has also helped give oxygen to the more liberal features of the reforms by providing seed money for new businesses and facilitating the flow of goods and capital from the Cuban diaspora in Florida. On the other hand, implementation of reforms is slow and often limited to pilot projects dispersed throughout the island. Rules for foreign investment are too restrictive and arbitrarily enforced and property rights remain in doubt. Nonetheless, the package of changes underway in Cuba, under the auspices of Raúl Castro and other heroes of the Revolution, lends a certain political legitimacy to the project that could facilitate a soft landing for such a hard situation. As Richard Feinberg argues in a new Brookings report on the emerging middle classes due out this November, such a soft landing is already underway as small and medium enterprises and cooperatives gain traction. Castro’s announcement last year that his current five-year term will be his last, and the appointment of a much younger vice president to guide the party to the next phase of “prosperous socialism,” give Cubans I spoke to some hope that, in the next five years, Cuba will look even more different than it did five years ago. This shift is already visible. Open debates among Cuban citizens, including one I attended on the national budget process in a well-appointed theater organized by a leading public affairs magazine, are slowly underway. The Catholic Church is also playing an interesting role. The Conference of Catholic Bishops in Cuba recently released its first pastoral letter in 20 years endorsing the government’s economic liberalization and calling for a political opening that respects “the right to diversity with respect to thoughts, to creativity and to the search for truth.” Outspoken activists are touring European, Latin American and North American cities with their critiques of the current system and returning to the island determined to continue their campaign for greater freedoms, despite continued harassment and detentions. Change is in the tropical air.

#### Cuba has no preparation for change and wouldn’t be able to take it all at once---lifting the embargo would cause a rapid democratic uprising and instability, turns the case

Erikson, 8 – Senior Advisor for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the U.S. Department of State and has an M.A. in Public Policy from Harvard University and a B.A. from Brown University (Daniel P., “The Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the United States, and the Next Revolution”, Bloomsbury Press, 10/28/08, p. 250-251)

Like most of his colleagues, Monreal readily agreed that the United States was the unpredictable eight hundred pound gorilla with the potential to transform Cuba’s future: “Lifting the embargo would be totally disruptive for Cuba. I don’t know if the impact would be good or bad,” he told me. “You know, it’s a mistake to believe that the Cuban government would have the ability and the manpower to manage or control the events that would follow. That is false. Because if the embargo were lifted, it would have such a huge, rapid impact that Cuba – at least the Cuba I know – would not be prepared for the changes it would bring. If you imagine that this is a boxing match, then right now the Cuban boxer is in the ring with the United States, but he knows the other guy’s moves and how to protect himself. But what is , all at once, the boxer is put in the ring against fifteen other guys? You’d leave the ring crying! And for the better or worse, the ability of the Cuban government to control this fight is very limited.

#### Other sanctions trigger your impacts – Cuba isn’t key

#### Your author concludes that there’s no resource problems

**GAO, 1AC Author, 2007** (Government Accountability Office report Economic Sanctions: Agencies Face Competing Priorities in Enforcing the U.S. Economic Embargo on Cuba. “Enforcing Economic Sanctions Government Accountability Office Analysis,” November)//moxley

Treasury. Treasury expressed neither agreement nor disagreement with our draft recommendation that OFAC assess the consistency of its resource allocations related to Cuba embargo violations with the risk of these violations to U.S. security. Treasury stated that OFAC's resources for investigating and penalizing violations of the Cuba embargo and other sanctions programs are allocated according to the agency's priorities, legal obligations to enforce all sanctions laws fairly, and volume of work. Treasury reiterated that Cuba-related cases represent a smaller portion of OFAC's enforcement work and require fewer resources than the number of such cases suggests. However, Treasury's comments do not address our finding that, since 2000, OFAC has conducted more investigations and imposed more penalties for violations of the Cuba embargo than for all of the other 20-plus sanctions programs the agency implements, including sanctions related to terrorism, weapons proliferation, and narcotics trafficking. In contrast, we report that other agencies reduced the resources devoted to Cuba embargo violations after 2001 **to focus on cases presenting a greater threat to homeland and national security and that embargo- related cases comprise a small percentage of their workloads**. In addition, Treasury did not provide data showing OFAC's allocation of resources for the Cuba embargo versus the more than 20 other sanctions programs it administers.

#### Multiple alt causes – your author

**GAO, 1AC Author, 2007** (Government Accountability Office report Economic Sanctions: Agencies Face Competing Priorities in Enforcing the U.S. Economic Embargo on Cuba. “Enforcing Economic Sanctions Government Accountability Office Analysis,” November)//moxley

Recommendations for Executive Action:

In light of the recognized weaknesses in CBP's inspections capacity at major ports of entry, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct CBP to re-evaluate whether the current level of resources focused on secondary inspections of passengers arriving from Cuba at the Miami airport effectively balances its responsibility for enforcing the Cuba embargo with its responsibilities for keeping terrorists, criminals, and inadmissible aliens out of the country. In addition, in light of OFAC's responsibilities for administering more than 20 sanctions programs, including sanctions against countries engaged in terrorism, weapons proliferations, and narcotics trafficking, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury direct OFAC to assess its allocation of resources for investigating and penalizing violations of the Cuba embargo with respect to the numerous other sanctions programs it administers.

#### Plan wouldn’t affect counterterrorism or prolif – OFAC just manages things like travel visas

#### Your ev concedes that we need international effort to address it

#### Terrorist attacks in other countries trigger your impacts

#### No widespread proliferation

Hymans 12

Jacques Hymans, USC Associate Professor of IR, 4/16/12, North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137408/jacques-e-c-hymans/north-koreas-lessons-for-not-building-an-atomic-bomb?page=show

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. **Such warnings have routinely proved wrong** - for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq - but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground - and their failure rate is much higher - than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age. As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. **These problems are debilitating**, and **they cannot be fixed** simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

#### No terrorism impact

Zenko & Cohen 12 – Micah Zenko, Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Michael A. Cohen, Fellow at the Century Foundation, March/April 2012, “Clear and Present Safety,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 2, p. 79-93

Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has been hyped more. Considering the horrors of that day, that is not surprising. But the result has been a level of fear that is completely out of proportion to both the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the United States' vulnerability. On 9/11, al Qaeda got tragically lucky. Since then, the United States has been preparing for the one percent chance (and likely even less) that it might get lucky again. But al Qaeda lost its safe haven after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and further military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts have decimated the organization, which has essentially lost whatever ability it once had to seriously threaten the United States.¶ According to U.S. officials, al Qaeda's leadership has been reduced to two top lieutenants: Ayman al-Zawahiri and his second-in-command, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Panetta has even said that the defeat of al Qaeda is "within reach." The near collapse of the original al Qaeda organization is one reason why, in the decade since 9/11, the U.S. homeland has not suffered any large-scale terrorist assaults. All subsequent attempts have failed or been thwarted, owing in part to the incompetence of their perpetrators. Although there are undoubtedly still some terrorists who wish to kill Americans, their dreams will likely continue to be frustrated by their own limitations and by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and its allies.

### Ethanol

#### 1. Your internal link evidence is about Soya – *NOT* ethanol

#### 3. No reason US is key – countries like China can resolve your impacts

#### 8. Destruction slowing and Soya is the major cause of destruction – that’s what your ev is about

**Vitali, 1AC Author, 2011** (Isabella, Soya and the Cerrado: Brazil’s forgotten jewel , http://assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/soya\_and\_the\_cerrado.pdf , Senior Policy Officer)//moxley

The most recent figures suggest that the pace of Cerrado destruction may be slowing. The Brazilian government estimates that in 2008-09, around 7,600 sq km were lost, just over half the average for 2002-08. However, the latest survey also shows continuing high rates of loss in the frontier areas associated with current expansion of soya, such as the northern state of Maranhão where 1.1% of the total Cerrado vegetation was lost in a single year.40 19

#### 5. Market incentives overwhelms any reason why it would shift from Brazilian ethanol to Cuba

#### 6. No brink – Brazilian ethanol has been used for a while should’ve triggered your impacts already

#### 9. Squo solves shift from corn ethanol

**Roach 8-1-13** (John, NBC News, “Move over corn, a new source of ethanol is in town”, August 1st, 2013, <http://www.nbcnews.com/science/move-over-corn-new-source-ethanol-town-6C10822210>)//moxley

Commercial quantities of the alternative fuel ethanol are being produced from wood waste and other vegetative matter, a chemical company announced Wednesday. The milestone holds potential to curb the controversial practice of using corn kernels to brew the fuel that is commonly mixed with gasoline. Several companies have been racing in recent years to develop the technology required to produce ethanol from cellulose — the woody parts of plants — and many are close to firing up commercial facilities. INEOS Bio is at the finish line. "The breakthrough would be that they are going to have the first commercial sale," Jim McMillan, a research engineer at the Department of Energy's National Renewable Energy Laboratory in Golden, Colo., told NBC News. "And we all want to see commercial sales of cellulosic biofuels … we'd like to expand the options and move to a more sustainable feedstock basis that doesn't potentially compete with food and feed," he added. "So there are lots of reasons to be excited." A different brew Corn and other grain-based ethanols are produced using essentially the same process that a brewery uses to brew beer: sugars are extracted from the grains and inoculated with yeast that ferment the sugars into ethanol. INEOS Bio begins with wood waste and other vegetative matter and gasifies it — a cooking process that turns it into an energy-rich mix of carbon monoxide and hydrogen. Bacteria then feast on the gas mix, fermenting it to ethanol for distillation. Heat and other gases produced in the process are captured to generate power needed to run the facility; the excess is sold to the surrounding community. For a more detailed explanation, check out the video below from INEOS Bio. The process was scaled up at the company's Vero Beach, Fla., plant and on Wednesday chief executive Peter Williams announced in a statement that "we are producing commercial quantities of bioethanol from vegetative and wood waste, and at the same time exporting power to the local communities." By the end of the year, the company aims to be on track to annually produce 8 million gallons of cellulosic ethanol and 6 megawatts of renewable power with municipal food and yard waste.

#### 10. Your evidence says billions are “at risk” ---- billions don’t die every time corn goes up otherwise they would have died every few years since 1945

#### 11. Historical data proves food price spikes don’t increase hunger

Paarlberg in ‘8

(Robert, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Wellesley, and Visiting Prof. Gov. @ Harvard, The Chronicle Review, “The Real Food Crisis: The True Threats are Local, not Global”, 6-27, 54:42, http://english.sxu.edu/musgrove/realfoodcrisis.pdf)

We might gain some insight into today's food economy from a comparable interlude that occurred roughly three decades ago. Between 1971 and 1974, the export price of wheat suddenly doubled, and the export price of corn increased by 60 percent. World reserve stocks of grain shrank by more than half. The price of soybeans rose so steeply in the United States that the federal government placed a momentary ban on exports. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization convened a food-crisis summit in Rome. In that earlier case, international markets had indeed tightened, and the higher prices did lead to significant consumption cutbacks, but mostly by the well-to-do, who were then (and still are) the primary users of international markets. Because of higher corn prices, the United States reduced the feeding of grain to livestock by 25 percent, which led to higher meat prices and less meat consumption, but primarily among the well fed. In most poor countries, because supplies from the world market were a relatively unimportant part of consumption, higher world prices had little adverse impact. Data from the U.N. organization later revealed that, between 1971 and 1974 in most poor countries, the consumption of cereals actually increased on a per-capita basis. Over the 1970s as a whole, despite rapid population growth, the prevalence of malnutrition did not worsen in South Asia or sub-Saharan Africa, and in Latin America and developing East Asia hunger actually declined sharply. Ironically, it was only when the so-called food crisis of the 1970s came to an end, during the slow-growth decade of the 1980s, that food circumstances in poor countries significantly worsened. In Latin America, even though world food prices were falling sharply, the number of hungry people increased from 46 million to more than 60 million. The reason was a regional "debt crisis" triggered by higher U.S. interest rates after 1979. The number of hungry people also increased sharply in Africa during the 1980s. The reason was faltering farm production, exacerbated in some regions by severe drought and civil conflict. The price for imported food was down, but hunger was up. Most real food crises are local rather than global.

#### No impact---mitigation and adaptation will solve---no tipping point or “1% risk” args

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006). These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

#### Turn: Agricultural crises are creating global food shortages – that kills a billion people – increased CO2 is key to solve

Idso’s, 11 [Sherwood PhD and former research physicist for the Department of Agriculture, Keith PhD Botany, Craig PhD Geography, 6/6/2011, “Meeting the Food Needs of a Growing World Population”, http://www.co2science.org/articles/V14/N27/EDIT.php] DHirsch

Parry and Hawkesford (2010) introduce their study of the global problem by noting that "food production needs to increase 50% by 2030 and double by 2050 to meet projected demands," and they note that at the same time the demand for food is increasing, production is progressively being limited by "non-food uses of crops and cropland," such as the production of biofuels, stating that in their homeland of the UK, "by 2015 more than a quarter of wheat grain may be destined for bioenergy production," which surely must strike one as both sad and strange, when they also note that "currently, at least one billion people are chronically malnourished and the situation is deteriorating," with more people "hungrier now than at the start of the millennium." So what to do about it: that is the question the two researchers broach in their review of the sad situation. They begin by describing the all-important process of photosynthesis, by which the earth's plants "convert light energy into chemical energy, which is used in the assimilation of atmospheric CO2 and the formation of sugars that fuel growth and yield," which phenomena make this natural and life-sustaining process, in their words, "a major target for improving crop productivity both via conventional breeding and biotechnology." Next to a plant's need for carbon dioxide comes its need for water, the availability of which, in the words of Parry and Hawkesford, "is the major constraint on world crop productivity." And they state that "since more than 80% of the [world's] available water is used for agricultural production, there is little opportunity to use additional water for crop production, especially because as populations increase, the demand to use water for other activities also increases." Hence, they rightly conclude that "a real and immediate challenge for agriculture is to increase crop production with less available water." Enlarging upon this challenge, they give an example of a *success story*: the Australian wheat variety 'Drysdale', which gained its fame "because it uses water more efficiently." This valued characteristic is achieved "by slightly restricting stomatal aperture and thereby the loss of water from the leaves." They note, however, that this ability "reduces photosynthetic performance slightly under ideal conditions," but they say it enables plants to "have access to water later in the growing season thereby increasing total photosynthesis over the life of the crop." Of course, Drysdale is but one variety of one crop; and the ideal goal would be to get nearly all varieties of all crops to use water more efficiently. And that goal can actually be reached by doing nothing, by merely halting the efforts of radical environmentalists to deny earth's carbon-based life forms -- that's all of us and the rest of the earth's plants and animals -- the extra carbon we and they need to live our lives to the fullest. This is because allowing the air's CO2content to rise in response to the burning of fossil fuels naturally causes the vast majority of earth's plants to progressively reduce the apertures of their stomata and thereby lower the rate at which water escapes through them to the air. And the result is even better than that produced by the breeding of Drysdale, because the extra CO2 in the airmore than overcomes the photosynthetic reduction that results from the partial closure of plant stomatal apertures, allowing even more yield to be produced per unit of water transpired in the process. Yet man can make the situation better still, by breeding and selecting crop varieties that perform better under higher atmospheric CO2 concentrations than the varieties we currently rely upon, or he can employ various technological means of altering them to do so. Truly, we can succeed, even where "the United Nations Millennium Development Goal of substantially reducing the world's hungry by 2015 will not be met," as Parry and Hawkesford accurately inform us. And this truly seems to us the moral thing to do, when "at least one billion people are chronically malnourished and the situation is deteriorating," with more people "hungrier now than at the start of the millennium."

#### No biod impact – their linear risk and systemic frames are wrong AND resilience is true

Kareiva et al, Chief Scientist and Vice President, The Nature Conservancy, 12

(Peter, Michelle Marvier, professor and department chair of Environment Studies and Sciences at Santa Clara University, Robert Lalasz, director of science communications for The Nature Conservancy, Winter, “Conservation in the Anthropocene,” http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/journal/past-issues/issue-2/conservation-in-the-anthropocene/, accessed 12-18-12)

2. As conservation became a global enterprise in the 1970s and 1980s, the movement's justification for saving nature shifted from spiritual and aesthetic values to focus on biodiversity. Nature was described as primeval, fragile, and at risk of collapse from too much human use and abuse. And indeed, there are consequences when humans convert landscapes for mining, logging, intensive agriculture, and urban development and when key species or ecosystems are lost.¶ But ecologists and conservationists have grossly overstated the fragility of nature, frequently arguing that once an ecosystem is altered, it is gone forever. Some ecologists suggest that if a single species is lost, a whole ecosystem will be in danger of collapse, and that if too much biodiversity is lost, spaceship Earth will start to come apart. Everything, from the expansion of agriculture to rainforest destruction to changing waterways, has been painted as a threat to the delicate inner-workings of our planetary ecosystem.¶ The fragility trope dates back, at least, to Rachel Carson, who wrote plaintively in Silent Spring of the delicate web of life and warned that perturbing the intricate balance of nature could have disastrous consequences.22 Al Gore made a similar argument in his 1992 book, Earth in the Balance.23 And the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment warned darkly that, while the expansion of agriculture and other forms of development have been overwhelmingly positive for the world's poor, ecosystem degradation was simultaneously putting systems in jeopardy of collapse.24¶ The trouble for conservation is that the data simply do not support the idea of a fragile nature at risk of collapse. Ecologists now know that the disappearance of one species does not necessarily lead to the extinction of any others, much less all others in the same ecosystem. In many circumstances, the demise of formerly abundant species can be inconsequential to ecosystem function. The American chestnut, once a dominant tree in eastern North America, has been

extinguished by a foreign disease, yet the forest ecosystem is surprisingly unaffected. The passenger pigeon, once so abundant that its flocks darkened the sky, went extinct, along with countless other species from the Steller's sea cow to the dodo, with no catastrophic or even measurable effects.¶ These stories of resilience are not isolated examples -- a thorough review of the scientific literature identified 240 studies of ecosystems following major disturbances such as deforestation, mining, oil spills, and other types of pollution. The abundance of plant and animal species as well as other measures of ecosystem function recovered, at least partially, in 173 (72 percent) of these studies.25¶ While global forest cover is continuing to decline, it is rising in the Northern Hemisphere, where "nature" is returning to former agricultural lands.26 Something similar is likely to occur in the Southern Hemisphere, after poor countries achieve a similar level of economic development. A 2010 report concluded that rainforests that have grown back over abandoned agricultural land had 40 to 70 percent of the species of the original forests.27 Even Indonesian orangutans, which were widely thought to be able to survive only in pristine forests, have been found in surprising numbers in oil palm plantations and degraded lands.28¶ Nature is so resilient that it can recover rapidly from even the most powerful human disturbances. Around the Chernobyl nuclear facility, which melted down in 1986, wildlife is thriving, despite the high levels of radiation.29 In the Bikini Atoll, the site of multiple nuclear bomb tests, including the 1954 hydrogen bomb test that boiled the water in the area, the number of coral species has actually increased relative to before the explosions.30 More recently, the massive 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico was degraded and consumed by bacteria at a remarkably fast rate.31¶ Today, coyotes roam downtown Chicago, and peregrine falcons astonish San Franciscans as they sweep down skyscraper canyons to pick off pigeons for their next meal. As we destroy habitats, we create new ones: in the southwestern United States a rare and federally listed salamander species seems specialized to live in cattle tanks -- to date, it has been found in no other habitat.32 Books have been written about the collapse of cod in the Georges Bank, yet recent trawl data show the biomass of cod has recovered to precollapse levels.33 It's doubtful that books will be written about this cod recovery since it does not play well to an audience somehow addicted to stories of collapse and environmental apocalypse.¶ Even that classic symbol of fragility -- the polar bear, seemingly stranded on a melting ice block -- may have a good chance of surviving global warming if the changing environment continues to increase the populations and northern ranges of harbor seals and harp seals. Polar bears evolved from brown bears 200,000 years ago during a cooling period in Earth's history, developing a highly specialized carnivorous diet focused on seals. Thus, the fate of polar bears depends on two opposing trends -- the decline of sea ice and the potential increase of energy-rich prey. The history of life on Earth is of species evolving to take advantage of new environments only to be at risk when the environment changes again.¶ The wilderness ideal presupposes that there are parts of the world untouched by humankind, but today it is impossible to find a place on Earth that is unmarked by human activity. The truth is humans have been impacting their natural environment for centuries. The wilderness so beloved by conservationists -- places "untrammeled by man"34 -- never existed, at least not in the last thousand years, and arguably even longer.

### Cred

#### No spillover or brink – its been in place for 50 years

#### Obama is multilateral – strategy on Afghanistan, critique of Iraq intervention, pursuit of Al-Qaeda and Taliban, Moscow, Iran, and North Korea prove

**Robert 2/5/14** (Ondrejcsák Róbert, PhD – studies: International Relations. Faculty of Political Sciences and International Relations, “American Foreign and Security Policy under Barack Obama: change and continuity”, <http://cenaa.org/analysis/american-foreign-and-security-policy-under-barack-obama-change-and-continuity/>) (JN)

The main objective of this paper is to analyze how American policies have changed following the inauguration of President Obama. President Obama’s foreign policy is determined by several factors, among them the foreign policy legacy and traditions of the Democratic Party including President Obama’s closest advisors and members of his cabinet (some of them were high-ranking officials of the Clinton administrations), his own foreign policy program presented during the election campaign (which is to a some extent based on his “personal life-story”) developments and reality of the global strategic environment, domestic and international perceptions of American foreign policy and of course, long-term strategic interests of the United States.¶ Influence of the Democratic Party’s foreign policy traditions and impact of Barack Obama’s personal experience and “life story” on current foreign policy.¶ The foreign and security policy legacy of the Democratic Party is far from being a monolithic construction. One could define several intellectual traditions and their representatives with significant influence on the Democratic mainstream. Liberal and neoliberal, or Wilsonian and partially Jeffersonian traditions are the most important backbones of President Obama’s party’s ideology in foreign policy agenda. The most considerable group within President Obama’s party refers to the legacy of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry Truman. The group has emphasised international institutions and multilateralism as well as democratic institutions and their worldwide expansion – but not by using “hard power” and “regime change”, which were cornerstones of the Bush-doctrine mainly during the first Bush-government. President Obama clearly signalled rupture with Bush’s policy in his Cairo speech: “No system of government can or should be imposed by one nation on any other”(Cairo, 2009) as well as in Moscow: “America cannot and should not seek to impose any system of government on any other country, nor would we presume to choose which party or individual should run a country” (Moscow, 2009). Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her associates are prominent representatives of this line of thought in the current administration. “The left wing” of the Democratic Party is characteristic for its scepticism towards the military and its role in international relations. Their voice gained in prominence when the stabilisation of Iraq, in its first years, registered only limited success. This is in contrast to earlier in the decade, particularly shortly after the events of 9/11, when ‘institutional liberism’ enjoyed limited influence in the US and globally.¶ President Obama has explicitly associated himself with liberal traditions in foreign policy. In one of his first major speeches on foreign policy, at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs on 23rd April 2007, Obama cited F.D. Roosevelt (“we lead the world in battling immediate evils and promoting the ultimate good”) and A. Lincoln (“America is the last, best hope of Earth”) (Obama, 2007, Remarks). He made clear his attachment to the basic principles of Wilsonism (“In today’s globalized world, the security of the American people is inextricably linked to the security of all people”). He stressed the central role of international cooperation, strengthening partnerships and alliances in addressing global threats and challenges and also American moral leadership on a global scale (Obama, 2007, Remarks). President Obama also confirmed the traditional self-perception of the United States as a “lighthouse” and the “force of American example” in his inaugural Address (Obama, 2009, Inaugural Address).¶ The “Obama-doctrine” was most comprehensively presented in his Foreign Policy article (July/August 2007) “Renewing American Leadership”. After emphasising the legacy of F.D. Roosevelt, Truman and Kennedy, Obama described his basic foreign/security policy philosophy in a classic liberal/Wilsonian way, stressing that security and wealth of Americans are strongly connected with security and wealth of people living beyond the borders of the United States of America (Obama, 2007, Renewing).¶ Kagan described President Obama’s foreign policy as the most “Wilsonian” since the beginning of 20th century. According to S. Ackerman, a prominent liberal correspondent, President Obama is forcing the narrowest liberal foreign policy positions of the last decades by focusing not only on finishing the (Iraq) war, but also by seeking to finish the way-of-thinking which led to the war.¶ The president’s philosophy is reflected in his attitude towards the two wars which the USA is recently engaged in. Obama has described the Iraq war as unilateral

, pre-emptive and in violation of basic principles of international law, while holding out the Afghanistan conflict as an example: a war started with UN-approval, in response to direct attack on the United States, and realized in a broader international coalition and in partnership with Europe (moreover in a NATO-framework). In fact, the reason he focuses so strongly on Afghanistan (as opposed to Iraq) is that the conditions, under which the war was launched, dovetail neatly with his basic approach to foreign policy: multilateralist, in strong adherence with international law, (“war of necessity” and not a “war of choice” as it was in the case of Iraq). abhorring use of force unless absolutely necessary. As Obama stated in Cairo, “over seven years ago, the United States pursued al Qaeda and the Taliban with a broad international support. We did not go by choice; we went because of necessity. (Cairo, 2009)“¶ President Obama described this posture also in his “anti-Iraq-war-speech” delivered in Chicago in 2002: “I don’t oppose all wars. After September 11 … I supported [the Bush] administration’s pledge to hunt down and root out those who would slaughter innocents in the name of intolerance, and I would willingly take up arms myself to prevent such a tragedy from happening again…. What I am opposed to is a rash war”[1] (Obama, 2002). He characterized America’s engagement in Iraq as a “war based not on reason but on passion, not on principle but on politics … without a clear rationale and without strong international support” (Obama, 2002).¶ It also means that with the reorientation of the U.S. focus from (improper) Iraq wars to the (virtuous) operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Obama government is trying to re-establish the eminence of core Democratic Party’s principles in American foreign policy, notably the multilateral approach, cooperation with allies (especially Europeans), broad international support and UN approval.¶ President Obama has opted for multilateral solutions over unilatelarism in theatres other than Afghanistan: he declared in Moscow (in regard to nuclear weapons reduction) that “If we fail to stand together, then the NPT and the Security Council will loose credibility, and international law will give way to the law of the jungle” (Moscow, 2009).¶ International cooperation and coalition-building have been key factors in Obama’s chosen approach to Iran or North Korea, as well as to deal with international terrorism.

#### Multilateralism empirically doesn’t solve anything

Harvey 04 – University Research Professor of International Relations, professor in the Department of Political Science, and the director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University (Frank, Smoke And Mirrors: Globalized Terrorism And The Illusion Of Multilateral Security, p. 43-45) // MS

The typical argument favouring multilateralism is a simple one, sum- marized by Ramesh Thakur: ‘Because the world is essentially anarchi- cal, it is fundamentally insecure, characterized by strategic uncertainty and complexity because of too many actors with multiple goals and interests and variable capabilities and convictions. Collective action embedded in international institutions that mirror mainly U.S. value preferences and interests enhances predictability, reduces uncertainty, and cuts the transaction costs of intemational action.’" With respect to peacekeeping, for example, Thakur argues that if ‘the UN helps to mute the costs and spread the risks of the terms of intemational engagement to maximise these benefits, the United States will need to instill in others, as well as itself embrace, the principle of multilateralism as a norm in its own right: states must do X because the United Nations has called for X, and good states do what the United Nations asks them to do.’l2 But there are several problems with Thakur's defence of collective action and associated policy recommendations, particularly in relation to multilateral approaches to security in a post-9/11 setting. First, and foremost, state leadersoften **refuse to do what the UN asks** of them, are often more than prepared to have their publics suffer the consequences of whatever sanctions the UN can mount, and are rarely directly affected by the sanctions that are implemented – assuming the permanent members of the Security Council find it in their collective interest to implement a sanctions regime in the first place. The lessons from UN intervention and sanction efforts over the past decade are not at all encouraging in this regard.Second, many state and non-state actors fall outside the institutional constraints imposed on the system through global norms and regimes. As the capacity spreads for smaller and smaller groups to inflict increasingly devastating levels ofdamage on larger states, international institutions will **lose the capacity** to force or coerce compliance with international law. Consequently, leaders of major powers, such as the United States, will be compelled to respond to security threats through **unilateral** initiatives. This compulsion will force other powers to push that much harder to control American impulses by demanding that multilateral consensus remain the sole guarantor of legitimacy. These **tensions will be exacerbated** by the prevailing perception in the United States that these same multilateral institutions are constraining the power and capacity of the U.S. government to protect American citizens from emerging threats of terrorism and proliferation. Third, the collective-action argument put forward by Thai-cur typically (and erroneously) assumes that most states are governed by a similar set of political priorities, share common concerns about similar combinations of security threats, are stimulated into action (or inaction) by the same set of economic imperatives, are inspired by a common set of interests and overarching values (such as peace, security, stability), and are encouraged by their respective publics to meet their demands for a common set of public goods. But the **differences**, tensions, and overall level of competition among statesin the system are **far greater** than proponents of multilateralism acknowledge. Some states are more threatened by terrorism and proliferation than others, have more substantial and direct economic interest in particular regions, are less interested in securing peace, and experience pressure from their respective publics to pursue very distinct foreign and security policies. Consequently, there is no guarantee that a collection of states will have the same motivation to change the status quo, or experience the same imperative to address the same security threats with the same level of resolve, commitment, or resources (relative to their size). In sum, multi- lateral organizations are less likely today to act with the same level of urgency to address security threats that Washington considers imperative. The costs of inaction (derived from exclusive reliance on multilateral consensus) are now perceived as being higher than the costs of unilateralism. Although similar threats may have guided collective action through multilateral alliances for much of the cold war, these imperatives were a product of a common Soviet threat. But threats today are many and varied, and few states share the same concerns or face the same obligations to respond. No case more clearly illustrates the growing divisions among former allies than the 2003 Iraq war. Fourth, decreasing transaction costs may be a valid argument in favour of multilateral cooperation in some cases (e. g., to facilitate post- conflict reconstruction, political reforms, democratization, elections run by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, food aid, water distribution, and the provision of medical supplies and facilities), but this is not true for all security challenges. In a post-9/11 environment, the transaction costs that are saved through joint efforts will always be compared with the costs of depending exclusively on collective-action mechanisms that ultimately may fail - multilateralism is not free of costs or risks. For example, one of the many important lessons of the 2003 Iraq war, at least for American officials, is that there are **no collective-security guarantees** any longer, even from traditional allies. The UN Security Council did not function as a separate entity committed to facilitating and coordinating diplomatic exchanges towards a common good. The UN functions in a highly competitive environment in which traditional power politics plays out. Proponents of multilateralism through the UNSC do not espouse that doctrine in the interest of global security; their efforts are typically designed to use the institution to limit the capacity of the U.S. to act unilaterally to protect American interests. That level of competition, itself driven by competing interpretations of interests, values, and threats, does not lend itself well to the kind of multilateralism its proponents aspire to achieve. Of course, if France shared the same concerns about terrorism, or if leaders in Paris were equally motivated to address the potential for WMD proliferation in and through Iraq, the transaction costs incurred by responding through the UN would be more acceptable. But as threat perceptions continue to **diverge**, the risks associated with waiting for multilateral consensus are simply **too high**. The complex nature of contemporary security threats virtually guarantees that similar conflicts will plague multilateral institutions in the future.

#### 3. Plan doesn’t get rid of things like democracy promotion in the Middle East – it’s an alt cause

#### 6. 8 point font concedes alt causes---Guantanamo, Kyoto, Bali conference, the ICC, and human rights treaties

Burgsdorff--- ---9**–** Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of Miami (Sven Kühn von, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”, <http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/publications/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf>)

6.3 How would the international community react? At international level all major actors would clearly welcome an end to the embargo. While the sanctions policy allowed European, Canadian and, more recently, Venezuelan, Chinese, Brazilian and Russian to become more involved with Cuba in the absence of competitors from the US (with the exception of agriculture produce), most of the foreign powers, and in particular the EU and Latin American countries, would clearly support a definite lifting of the coercive measures. Ending the embargo would be perceived as a decision carrying a momentum of powerful symbolism since it would signal a newly found willingness in Washington to reconsider the usefulness of acting unilaterally and outside the international legal framework. As a matter of fact, together with other measures such as closing Guantanamo, signing up to the Kyoto Protocol and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, and possibly, joining the International Criminal Court as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.

#### 5. No reason the plan is key – engaging other countries solves –it’s *not* in the context of Cuba

#### 7. This evidence assumes we engage all regimes – this only changes our actions toward Cuba

#### 8. No spillover — lack of credibility in one commitment doesn’t affect others at all

Paul K. MacDonald 11, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Spring 2011, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 7-44

Second, pessimists overstate the extent to which a policy of retrenchment can damage a great power's capabilities or prestige. Gilpin, in particular, assumes that a great power's commitments are on equal footing and interdependent. In practice, however, great powers make commitments of varying degrees that are functionally independent of one another. Concession in one area need not be seen as influencing a commitment in another area.25 Far from being perceived as interdependent, great power commitments are often seen as being rivalrous, so that abandoning commitments in one area may actually bolster the strength of a commitment in another area. During the Korean War, for instance, President Harry Truman's administration explicitly backed away from total victory on the peninsula to strengthen deterrence in Europe.26 Retreat in an area of lesser importance freed up resources and signaled a strong commitment to an area of greater significance.