### 2ac consistency – kdub [0:10]

Only argumentatively consistent conditionality is permissible, the alternative

Causes argumentative sophistry privileges tactics over substance kills advocacy skills, it link turns decision making because it incentivizes contradictions

Constrains 2ac offense that deters the best aff arguments

At worst we get to advocate a perm

### 2ac coloniality

#### Coloniality is inevitable and the attempts to singularize a notion of coloniality is impossible – the affirmative is a productive engagement to break down the negative effects of colonialism and the alternative reentrenches exclusion

Pheng **Cheah** is Associate Professor of Rhetoric. **2006** http://townsendcenter.berkeley.edu/publications/limits-thinking-decolonial-strategies

Mignolo announces nothing less than a radical critique of modernity that seeks to situate it within what he calls “coloniality.” By the term “coloniality,” he seems to designate something that is much wider than the related historical projects of imperialism and colonialism. It refers to an epochal condition and an epistemological frame that binds these historical projects to modernity in an inseverable manner. Mignolo suggests that a totalitarian idea of totality is a key feature of modernity. Modernity conserves itself as a totality by positing an “outside” of Europe and the North Atlantic that is excluded from modernity through a discourse of racism. The rhetoric of modernity therefore leads inevitably to a logic of coloniality. This frame also engulfs the present and underwrites much radical thought that occurs under the rubric of “emancipation,” including Marx’s idea of a proletarian revolution as well as Toni Negri and Michael Hardt’s idea of the multitude, but also varieties of post-structuralism, postmodernism, and postcolonial theory. What Mignolo counterposes to this entire formation is a project of liberation that involves delinking from coloniality and modernity. He calls this project “decoloniality” and it involves generalizing the experiences of decolonization and anticolonial struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as well as the experiences of the damnés, the wretched of the earth, into a new epistemic frame. The project of decoloniality therefore involves a double gesture: first, the re-embodiment and relocation of thought in order to unmask the limited situation of modern knowledges and their link to coloniality, and second, an-other thinking that calls for plurality and intercultural dialogue, especially within the South. Mignolo’s manifesto is syncretically rich and wide-ranging in its scope and polemical reach. It traverses the discourses of philosophy and various social sciences and the humanities and also draws on radical activist discourse. But more importantly, it is so uplifting in its spirit of demagogic optimism that it is difficult to disagree with most of its exhortations. I would like to begin by focusing on a rhetorical gesture that runs throughout Professor Mignolo’s text. The single word title of the text, “Delinking,” is identical to a book written by the Marxist political economist, Samir Amin (Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World). Yet, Mignolo repeatedly distances his project from that of Amin (and all dependency theory) for at least two reasons. First, Amin only conceived of political and economic delinking, i.e. delinking in the sphere of political economy. He did not understand the urgent need for delinking at the epistemic level, the more fundamental level of thought. Hence, Amin’s project fails to break with the modern concept of totality. Second, and as a consequence of this failure to engage in epistemic delinking, Amin remains caught up in the modern disembodied universalistic project of Marxism. It is thus not really a radical delinking but only “radical emancipation within the rhetoric of modernity and the logic of coloniality.” A different polemical critique is directed at the postcolonial theory of Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, and Homi Bhabha. Postcolonial theory may engage in the epistemic questioning of the concept of totality and may also be critical of modernity. However, since it is grounded on the poststructuralism of Foucault, Lacan, and Derrida, it is still “a project of scholarly transformation within the academy” that remains internal to Europe. Unlike decoloniality, the postcolonial is not attuned to what Mignolo calls “other sources:” the critique and activism (“radical political and epistemological shifts”) of various important figures from Asia, Africa, and Latin America such as Gandhi, Cabral, and Fanon. What unites these two polemical gestures is a sense of the primacy of the epistemic in undoing coloniality. However, Mignolo also has a rather unusual understanding of the epistemic that gives it a special affinity to the damnés. On the one hand, a Marxist political-economic approach to delinking is not conceptual enough since it does not broach the fundamental level of thought. It fails to take over “epistemic power.” On the other hand, however, the intensely epistemic reflections of postcolonial theory remain too abstract and rarefied. “The epistemic locations for delinking,” Mignolo believes, “come from the emergence of the geo- and body-politics of knowledge.” In other words, the epistemic has to have a material dimension. But its materiality is not that of the structures of political economy but of the corporeal experiences of those who have been excluded from the production of knowledge by modernity. What I would like to focus on are not the details of Mignolo’s polemical criticisms, but instead the account of power implied by his understanding of the epistemic. What is put forward here is a logocentrism of power. For Mignolo, power, whether it is oppressive or liberatory, has a logic that we can chart, decipher, and ultimately correct. There is a logic of coloniality and it has to be counteracted by a logic of decoloniality. Delinking from the colonial matrix of power does not seek to reject modernity and its conceptual system because this is so widespread. It requires instead, Mignolo believes, “border thinking or border epistemology in the precise sense that the Western foundation of modernity and of knowledge is, on the one hand, unavoidable and, on the other, highly limited and dangerous.” Coloniality is ultimately always a failure of thought, of knowledge, or of a logic that is dangerous. This is also, in many respects, a top-down theory of power, where power is repressive and emanates from a totalizing source according to a logical design or plan. Events and occurrences up to and including the present are grounded in a logic that is dangerous or mistaken and that needs to be corrected by the intervention of other logics that emanate from the various subjects that have been excluded and subjugated by coloniality. It is at this point that the question of the re-embodiment and relocation of knowledge becomes crucial. For Mignolo admits that the project of epistemic delinking may sound “somewhat messianic.” I would say perhaps “idealistic” in the colloquial sense. However, he immediately asserts that it is “an orientation that in the first decade of the 21st century has shown its potential and its viability,” for example, in the various World Social Forums. Many historical examples of liberation are also adduced: the Amaru rising in Peru, the Hatian revolution and decolonization in Asia and Africa. As opposed to the false other that modernity has invented as its exteriority or outside, the outside that it has excluded in order to create itself, these truly other voices introduce “other cosmologies into the dominance and hegemony of Western cosmological variations within the same rhetoric of modernity and logic of coloniality.” The logic of decoloniality was then explicitly thematized in the thought of radical Arabo-Islamic thinkers in the 1960s and 1970s such as Ayatollah Khomeini and by philosophy of liberation in Latin America and by first-nation intellectuals. The stress is placed on the importance of “other” languages that have been negated by colonial modernity. The argument here is similar to the epistemology of location in feminist theory and critical race theory (for example, Luce Irigaray). I would like to end by posing two questions concerning the two main limbs of Mignolo’s argument: the primacy of the epistemic and the urgency of embodying and locating knowledge. First, does power in fact operate according to a logic and from a totalizing source that represses and subjugates those it has excluded in contemporary globalization? Is the link between modernity and coloniality primarily epistemic in character? It is interesting to note from this perspective that when Mignolo attempts to establish the epistemic link between modernity and coloniality, he relies on a historical biography and the fiction of a collective will or intention to dominate and colonize: “The rhetoric of modernity has been predominantly put forward by European men of letters, philosophers, intellectuals, officers of the state. The modern/colonial power differential was, of course, structured at all levels (economic, political, epistemological, militarily), but it was at the epistemological level that the rhetoric of modernity gained currency. If we had time to go into the biography of the main voices that conceived ‘modernity’ as the series of historical events….all of them would originate in one of the six European countries leading the Renaissance, the colonial expansion and capitalist formation, and the European Enlightenment.” In this view, development in the postcolonial world would be an ideological ruse of the logic of coloniality that forecloses the voices of marginalized peoples. Yet, one might argue that exploitative development in contemporary globalization operates not by racist techniques of exclusion and marginalization, but precisely by including, integrating, and assimilating every being into the circuit of the international division of labor. This is done by transforming them into reserve labor power through techniques of what Foucault called biopower. But we would here need to understand biopower in a different way from Mignolo’s understanding of biopolitics or body-politics, a difference that he also acknowledges. This different understanding of power as productive as opposed to repressive seems especially important in contemporary globalization where the flows of transnational capital fabricate the economic well-being of nation-states and their individual citizens. First, at the macrological level of global political economy, states undertake aggressive policy initiatives to open up their markets and attract foreign capital. Second, at the level of the biopolitical production of the individual and the population, techniques of discipline and government craft the bodies of individuals as bodies capable of work and create their needs and interests as members of a population. Third, at the level of social reproduction, global mass consumer culture also leads to the proliferation of sophisticated consumer needs and desires. These processes constitute the conditions of possibility of the political and economic self-determination and sovereignty of collective subjects and the self-mastery and security of individual subjects. In other words, the current state of power relations is an effect of multiple processes that are dynamic, heterogeneous, and unstable, processes that cannot be reduced to a single logic of coloniality, although the latter can emerge as their effect. What is the relation between these two different conceptions of biopolitics? Do they contradict each other? How would the wretched of the earth fit into this alternative cartography of global power that I have sketched? This leads me to my second question. The focus on re-embodying knowledges and knowledges in other languages can very easily lead to an idealization of bodily experiences and the concrete and the linguistic other. First, do concrete corporeal experiences offer a genuinely other perspective if the concrete bodily needs of individuals are crafted by the techniques of biopower as they are incorporated into the international division of labor? Second, indigenous languages are not inherently egalitarian or liberating just because they are non-European. Non-European languages can have hierarchical, conservative, or reactionary forms of address. Third, how are we to account for the startling similarity between Mignolo’s account of pluriversality and intercultural communication and the kind of cultural pluralism espoused by UNESCO? Here, one should also note the importance of language learning and multiculturalism to the operations of multinational capital. These are all forms of bio-power in the Foucauldian sense. How does one distinguish this from Mignolo’s sense of bio- or body-politics? The problem might well be that we cannot do so. One would need to look at the true heterogeneity of the outside and the complex and multifarious technologies that fabricate these various outsides, not just at the level of a racist rhetoric of exclusion, but at the most concrete level of the production of the bodily needs and interests of subjects claiming alterity.

Perm: embrace plan in context of alternative modernities and decolonization of knowledge—Their either-or is a false dichotomy – can seek alternative modernities that aren’t eurocentric

**Grossberg** (Distinguished Professor of Communication Studies and Cultural Studies, and Adjunct Distinguished Professor of American Studies, Anthropology, and Geography at the University of North Carolina) **10**

(Lawrence, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense, pg. 264) //DDI13

The M/C project, focused on the possibility of radical alterity, seeks to find "an other way of thinking ... [and] talking about 'worlds and knowledges otherwise’ (Escobar 2007, 179). They too agree that what I have called the alternative modernities model, “in the last instance . . . end[s] up being a reflection of a euro-centered social order, under the assumption that modernity is now everywhere" (183). There is, however, fundamental conceptual disagreement that separates our projects without, I hope, closing off the conversation. They assume that there is no modernity without coloniality. Or, in slightly different terms, “colonialism and the making of the capitalist world system [is] constitutive of modernity" (183). That is, they equate modernity with euro-modernity, and this guarantees that they see their project not as looking for other modernities, but, rather for alternatives to modernity. As I have said previously, I do not disagree that some of the struggles over modernity in the world today are actually struggles against any moder- nity, propelled by a desire to find alternatives to modernity, and that such struggles have to be supported on their own terms, but I do not think these are the only two choices. Additionally, I do agree that the possibility of other modernities, or for that matter, of alternatives to modernity, will require a decolonization of knowledge itself

#### Scientific predictions solve – defer to expert consensus

Sullivan 98 (Phillip A., professor of aerospace engineering at the University of Toronto’s Institute for Aerospace Studies, “An Engineer Dissects Two Cases Studies”, A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths about Science, edited by Noretta Koertge)

The Process of Scientific Discovery This story illustrates all the characteristics of scientific discovery, and two points are relevant here. First, unless there is political interference, flawed or weak arguments of even the most respected scientists are rapidly exposed. Furthermore, eager for recognition and priority, individual scientists are quick to promote novel explanations. Thus, when scientists finally do agree on the solution to a problem, this agreement is not solely the result of negotiation; it is forged by the evidence. The second point is that interpretation of this evidence is often complex, being in many ways akin to the assembly of an elaborate jigsaw puzzle. The result of any individual theoretical or experimental investigation is at best ambiguous, and its ultimate meaning is dependent on other investigations. In the initial assembly stages, the available puzzle pieces may suggest many interpretations and may provoke much controversy, so rhetoric and reputation can play major roles in persuasion. As additional investigations are undertaken, however, any consensus on interpretation that develops often has such compelling consistency or can allow such spectacular predictions that it becomes increasingly difficult to deny that it reflects objectivity. [11](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/62417656) Finally, as the sound-speed story shows, for questions at the frontier of science, assembly of the puzzle may take decades and longer. It follows that to make a convincing case, advocates of relativism in science cannot simply point to the disputes and controversies surrounding a puzzle that is still being assembled. Rather, they must demonstrate that social factors have entered the content of Chalmers's "good science." For the purposes of this discussion, I understand "good science" to be those propositions that are part of an accepted scientific consensus and that have an established record of successful prediction. Both of the two case studies I examine here concern aspects of mature disciplines that, when used appropriately, are capable of making accurate predictions. [12](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/62417656)

#### Science is key to check authoritarianism and solves a multitude of extinction scenarios

**Sokal, 4** (Alan D. Department of Physics New York University Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity)//ahayes

Finally, postmodern science provides a powerful refutation of the authoritarianism and elitism inherent in traditional science, as well as an empirical basis for a democratic approach to scientific work. For, as Bohr noted, ``a complete elucidation of one and the same object may require diverse points of view which defy a unique description'' -- this is quite simply a fact about the world, much as the self-proclaimed empiricists of modernist science might prefer to deny it. In such a situation, how can a self-perpetuating secular priesthood of credentialed ``scientists'' purport to maintain a monopoly on the production of scientific knowledge? (Let me emphasize that I am in no way opposed to specialized scientific training; I object only when an elite caste seeks to impose its canon of ``high science'', with the aim of excluding a priori alternative forms of scientific production by non-members.89) The content and methodology of postmodern science thus provide powerful intellectual support for the progressive political project, understood in its broadest sense: the transgressing of boundaries, the breaking down of barriers, the radical democratization of all aspects of social, economic, political and cultural life.90 Conversely, one part of this project must involve the construction of a new and truly progressive science that can serve the needs of such a democratized society-to-be. As Markley observes, there seem to be two more-or-less mutually exclusive choices available to the progressive community: On the one hand, politically progressive scientists can try to recuperate existing practices for moral values they uphold, arguing that their right-wing enemies are defacing nature and that they, the counter-movement, have access to the truth. [But] the state of the biosphere -- air pollution, water pollution, disappearing rain forests, thousands of species on the verge of extinction, large areas of land burdened far beyond their carrying capacity, nuclear power plants, nuclear weapons, clearcuts where there used to be forests, starvation, malnutrition, disappearing wetlands, nonexistent grass lands, and a rash of environmentally caused diseases -- suggests that the realist dream of scientific progress, of recapturing rather than revolutionizing existing methodologies and technologies, is, at worst, irrelevant to a political struggle that seeks something more than a reenactment of state socialism.91

#### Even if science is bad the alt is worse - Critiques of science will be exploited by groups interested in destroying the environment

Ted BENTONSociology @ Essex 5 in *After Postmodernism* eds. Jose Lopez and Garry Potter p. 137-138

Second, the post‑Kuhnian relativist aproaches to the sociology of science, in challenging the proclaimed finality and cultural authority of big science, saw themselves as on the side of 'the underdog', pressing for democratic account­ability on the part of the scientific establishment ‑ even for a thoroughgoing democratisation of knowledge itself. Sociologists of science have tended to see 'technoscience' as indissolubly tied to political and industrial power and domin­ation. To call into question its epistemological authority has been to undermine a key source of legitimation for established power. However, the politics of the critique of science become more complex and ambivalent in the face of the new ecological issues. While many Greens see the interests associated with technoscience as largely to blame for many ecological hazards, they also rely on scientific detection, measurement and theoretical explanations in making out the Green case. The construction of incinerators for waste disposal adjacent to working‑class estates, the noise and fumes emitted by heavy road‑traffic, the loss of treasured landscapes and so on, are forms of ecological degradation which are readily perceptible, and may enter directly into the discourses of popular movements. However, many other, often more sinister and catastrophic, forms of ecological transformation may only be detected by scientific instrumentation. Nuclear and other forms of radiation, low concentrations of toxins in food and drinking water, antibiotic‑resistant pathogens, shifts in the chemical composi­tion of the upper atmosphere and so on fall into this category. In other cases, the scale of transformation is what is ecologically significant and, here again, scientific modelling and measurement displace the evidence provided by the senses of necessarily localised human agents. Global climate change, biodiversity loss, ozone depletion are among the transformations which fall into this category. Finally, rational discourse about policy options depends on (but is certainly not restricted to) best‑available scientific thinking about the causal mechanisms § Marked 15:38 § involved(the 'greenhouse' effect, CO2 exchanges at the surface of the oceans, pholovvnthesis, mechanisms of cloud‑formation and many others in the case of dinsate 'hanged. To expose the normatively and culturally 'constructed' character of those scientific research programmes which have so far indcnt‑ifled, measured and explained the hazardous dynamics of ecological change is to run a serious political risk. The big industrial complexes, such as the biotech, pharmaceutical, agribusiness, petrochemical, construction and road transport sectors, together with their state sponsors, have a lifeline thrown to them. That the knowledge ‑base which exposes the ecological 'externalities' of their activities is culturally biased and epistemologically questionable is music to their ears. Why put the brakes on wealth creation and progress on the basis of such flimsy and questionable evidence (see R. Rowell, 1996, esp. chap. 5)? These misuses of the work of constructionist sociology of environmental science are often seen as problematic from the standpoint of its practitioners (see, for example, r} a special issue of Social *Studies of Science, 1996).* Of course, it would be quite posble to accept these implications of he approach, in the face of unwanied political consequences: perhaps the weakening or even abandoning of environmental regulation and technteal safety standards could be accepted as an appropriate response to the sociologied dchunking of en ironmental science. lot esnnglv, however, few constructionists would be happy with such an out­conic. the question is, can they coherently or consistently unhappy about it? Winne i9% and Burninghaio md. Coopei (1999) oiler sophisticated defences of their own variants of construe onism from this sort of 'realist' criticism. They claim, variously, that the 'taking of sides' in environmental conflicts is not necessarily the most productive role for social scientists to take, and that, not­withstanding rite realist [critique. it](http://critique.it) often possible to combine constructionism with cotmitiimmred cn'‑ironmen iahsns. These contributions deserve much fuller responses than I have space for here hot, as I shall argue below. dicnt are other reasons for scepticism about the more radical versions of constructionism.

#### Burden of proof is key --- other epistemologies cause extinction

**Coyne, 06** – Author and Writer for the Times (Jerry A., “A plea for empiricism”, FOLLIES OF THE WISE, Dissenting essays, 405pp. Emeryville, CA: Shoemaker and Hoard, 1 59376 101 5)

Supernatural forces and events, essential aspects of most religions, play no role in science, not because we exclude them deliberately, but because they have never been a useful way to understand nature. Scientific “truths” are empirically supported observations agreed on by different observers. Religious “truths,” on the other hand, are personal, unverifiable and contested by those of different faiths. Science is nonsectarian: those who disagree on scientific issues do not blow each other up. Science encourages doubt; most religions quash it. But religion is not completely separable from science. Virtually all religions make improbable claims that are in principle empirically testable, and thus within the domain of science: Mary, in Catholic teaching, was bodily taken to heaven, while Muhammad rode up on a white horse; and Jesus (born of a virgin) came back from the dead. None of these claims has been corroborated, and while science would never accept them as true without evidence, religion does. A mind that accepts both science and religion is thus a mind in conflict. Yet scientists, especially beleaguered American evolutionists, need the support of the many faithful who respect science. It is not politically or tactically useful to point out the fundamental and unbreachable gaps between science and theology. Indeed, scientists and philosophers have written many books (equivalents of Leibnizian theodicy) desperately trying to show how these areas can happily cohabit. In his essay, “Darwin goes to Sunday School”, Crews reviews several of these works, pointing out with brio the intellectual contortions and dishonesties involved in harmonizing religion and science. Assessing work by the evolutionist Stephen Jay Gould, the philosopher Michael Ruse, the theologian John Haught and others, Crews concludes, “When coldly examined . . . these productions invariably prove to have adulterated scientific doctrine or to have emptied religious dogma of its commonly accepted meaning”. Rather than suggesting any solution (indeed, there is none save adopting a form of “religion” that makes no untenable empirical claims), Crews points out the dangers to the survival of our planet arising from a rejection of Darwinism. Such rejection promotes apathy towards overpopulation, pollution, deforestation and other environmental crimes: “So long as we regard ourselves as creatures apart who need only repent of our personal sins to retain heaven’s blessing, we won’t take the full measure of our species-wise responsibility for these calamities”. Crews includes three final essays on deconstruction and other misguided movements in literary theory. These also show “follies of the wise” in that they involve interpretations of texts that are unanchored by evidence. Fortunately, the harm inflicted by Lacan and his epigones is limited to the good judgement of professors of literature. Follies of the Wise is one of the most refreshing and edifying collections of essays in recent years. Much like Christopher Hitchens in the UK, Crews serves a vital function as National Sceptic. He ends on a ringing note: “The human race has produced only one successfully validated epistemology, characterizing all scrupulous inquiry into the real world, from quarks to poems. It is, simply, empiricism, or the submitting of propositions to the arbitration of evidence that is acknowledged to be such by all of the contending parties. Ideas that claim immunity from such review, whether because of mystical faith or privileged “clinical insight” or the say-so of eminent authorities, are not to be countenanced until they can pass the same skeptical ordeal to which all other contenders are subjected.” As science in America becomes ever more harried and debased by politics and religion, we desperately need to heed Crews’s plea for empiricism.

### 2ac vague alts

The alt is vague that’s a voting issue – no idea what rehistoricizitaion is

Deters 2ac offensive literature

Plan focus debate is key to effective cost benefit analysis and research

### 2ac solvency advocate

Neg must have a specific solvency advocate

Literature is the litmus test for fairness – impossible to generate offense

Disincentivizes research – portable skill

### 2ac cp’s that result in plan

Counterplans that could result in the plan are a VI -

Disincentivizes advocacy construction and research – it’s impossible to generate offense

Plan specific solvency advocate solves their offense

### 2ac internal net benefits

Artificial competition is a VI

Deters 2ac offense – that should be reciprocal

Net benefit should be enough to test the aff

Functionally plan plus – justifies intrinsic perms

### 2ac consult

Perm do both

#### Consult kills credibility which is key to relations

Krauthammer 2002 (CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER, winner of the 1987 Pulitzer Prize for distinguished commentary, writes a nationally syndicated editorial page column for the Washington Post Writers Group. Educated at McGill University, Oxford University and Harvard University, where he received an M.D. in 1975, Dr. Krauthammer practiced medicine for three years as a resident and then chief resi­dent in psychiatry at Massachusetts General Hospital before moving to Washington, D.C., and launching his journalism career in 1978. Today, in addition to his weekly column that runs in over 100 newspa­pers, he writes regular essays for Time magazine, contributes to several others including the Weekly standard, the New Republic and the National Interest, and appears regularly as an analyst on the Fox News Channel. Dr. Krauthammer also serves as a member of President Bush's Council on Bioethics. “American Unilateralism”, <http://www.byui.edu/onlinelearning/courses/hum/202/American%20Unilateralism.htm>)

So much for the moral argument that under­lies multilateralism. What are the practical arguments? There is a school of realists who agree that liberal internationalism is nonsense, but who argue plausibly that we need international or allied support, regardless. One of their arguments is that if a power consistently shares rulemaking with others, it is more likely to get aid and assistance from them. I have my doubts. The U.S. made an extraordinary effort during the Gulf War to get U.N. support, share decision-making and assemble a coalition. As I have pointed out, it even denied itself the fruits of victory in order to honor coalition goals. Did this diminish anti-Americanism in the region? Did it garner support for subsequent Iraq policy - policy dictated by the original acquiescence to that coalition? The attacks of September 11 were planned during the Clinton administration, an administration that made a fetish of consultation and did its utmost to subordi­nate American hegemony. Yet resentments were hardly assuaged, because extremist rage against the U.S. is engendered by the very structure of the international system, not by our management of it. Pragmatic realists value multilateralism in the interest of sharing burdens, on the theory that if you share decision-making, you enlist others in your own hegemony enterprise. As proponents of this school argued recently in Foreign Affairs, “Straining relationships now will lead only to a more challenging policy environment later on.” This is a pure cost-benefit analysis of multilateralism versus unilateralism. If the concern about unilateralism is that American assertiveness be judiciously rationed and that one needs to think long-term, hardly anybody will disagree. One does not go it alone or dictate terms on every issue. There's no need to. On some issues, such as membership in the World Trade Organization, where the long-term benefit both to the U.S. and to the global interest is demonstrable, one willingly constricts sovereignty. Trade agreements are easy calls, however, free trade being perhaps the only mathematically provable political good. Other agreements require great skepticism. The Kyoto Protocol on climate change, for example, would have had a disastrous effect on the American economy, while doing nothing for the global environment. Increased emissions from China, India and other third-world countries which are exempt from its provisions clearly would have overwhelmed and made up for whatever American cuts would have occurred. Kyoto was therefore rightly rejected by the Bush administration. It failed on its merits, but it was pushed very hard nonetheless, because the rest of the world supported it. The same case was made during the Clinton administration for chemical and biological weapons treaties, which they negotiated assiduously under the logic of, “Sure, they're useless or worse, but why not give in, in order to build good will for future needs?” The problem is that appeasing multilateralism does not assuage it; appeasement only legitimizes it. Repeated acquiescence on provisions that America deems injurious reinforces the notion that legitimacy derives from international consensus. This is not only a moral absurdity. It is injurious to the U.S., because it undermines any future ability of the U.S. to act unilaterally, if necessary. The key point I want to make about the new unilateralism is that we have to be guided by our own independent judgment, both about our own interests and about global interests. This is true especially on questions of national security, war making, and freedom of action in the deployment of power. America should neither defer nor contract out such decision-making, particularly when the concessions involve per­manent structural constrictions, such as those imposed by the International Criminal Court. Should we exercise prudence? Yes. There is no need to act the superpower in East Timor or Bosnia, as there is in Afghanistan or in Iraq. There is no need to act the superpower on steel tariffs, as there is on missile defense. The prudent exercise of power calls for occasional concessions on non-vital issues, if only to maintain some psychological goodwill. There's no need for gratuitous high-handedness or arrogance. We shouldn't, however, delude ourselves as to what psychological goodwill can buy. Countries will cooperate with us first out of their own self­interest, and second out of the need and desire to cultivate good relations with the world's unipolar power. Warm feelings are a distant third. After the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, Yemen did everything it could to stymie the American investigation. It lifted not a finger to suppress terrorism at home, and this was under an American administration that was obsessively multilateralist and accommodating. Yet today, under the most unilateralist American administration in memory, Yemen has decided to assist in the war on terrorism. This was not the result of a sudden attack of Yemeni goodwill, or of a quick re-reading of the Federalist Papers. It was a result of the war in Afghanistan, which concentrated the mind of recalcitrant states on the price of non-cooperation. Coalitions are not made by superpowers going begging hat in hand; they are made by asserting a position and inviting others to join. What even pragmatic realists fail to understand is that unilateralism is the high road to multilateralism. It was when the first President Bush said that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would not stand, and made it clear that he was prepared to act alone if necessary, that he created the Gulf War coalition.

Perm do the counterplan – we should be able to define the mandates of the plan, we’ll defend links for disads but not for counterplan competition, timeframe fiat means the perm is reciprocal, checks fairness

#### Military leadership is inevitable – but credibility is key to solve transnational problems – terrorism, cybersecurity, disease, climate, war

**Nye 11** [Joseph S. Nye Jr., University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, God of Soft Power “The Future of Power”, 2011, CMR]

Today, power in the world is distributed in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game. On the top chessboard, military power is largely unipolar and the United States is likely to remain supreme for some time. But on the middle chessboard, economic power has been multipolar for more than a decade, with the United States, Europe, Japan, and China as the major players, and with others gaining in importance. Europe's economy is larger than America's. The bottom chessboard is the realm of transnational relations that cross borders outside of government control, and it includes nonstate actors as diverse as bankers electronically transferring sums larger than most national budgets at one extreme and terrorists transferring weapons or hackers threatening cybersecurity at the other. This chessboard also includes new transnational challenges such as pandemics and climate change. On this bottom board, power is widely diffused, and it makes no sense to speak here of unipolarity, multipolarity, hegemony, or any other such clichés that political leaders and pundits put in their speeches. Two great power shifts are occurring in this century: a power transition among states and a power diffusion away from all states to nonstate actors. Even in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the giddy pace of technological change continues to drive globalization, but the political effects will be quite different for the world of nation-states and the world of nonstate actors. In interstate politics, the most important factor will be the continuing "return of Asia." In 1750, Asia had more than half of the world population and product. By 1900, after the Industrial Revolution in Europe and America, Asia's share shrank to one-fifth of the world product. By 2050, Asia will be well on its way back to its historical share. The "rise" in the power of China and India may create instability, but it is a problem with precedents, and we can learn from history about how our policies can affect the outcome. A century ago, Britain managed the rise of American power without conflict, but the world's failure to manage the rise of German power led to two devastating world wars. In transnational politics-the bottom chessboard-the Information Revolution is dramatically reducing the costs of computing and communication. Forty years ago, instantaneous global communication was possible but costly, and it was restricted to governments and corporations. Today, this communication is virtually free to anyone with the means to enter an Internet cafe. The barriers to entry into world politics have been lowered, and nonstate actors now crowd the stage. Hackers and cybercriminals cause billions of dollars of damage to governments and businesses. A pandemic spread by birds or travelers on jet aircraft could kill more people than perished in World War l or ll, and climate change could impose enormous costs. This is a new world politics with which we have less experience. The problem for all states in the twenty-first century is that there are more and more things outside the control of even the most powerful states, because of the diffusion of power from states to nonstate actors. Although the United States does well on military measures, there is increasingly more going on in the world that those measures fail to capture. Under the influence of the Information Revolution and globalization, world politics is changing in a way that means Americans cannot achieve all their international goals acting alone. For example, international financial stability is vital to the prosperity of Americans, but the United States **needs the cooperation of others** to ensure it. Global climate change too will affect the quality of life, but the United States cannot manage the problem alone. And in a world where borders are becoming more porous than ever to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, nations must mobilize **international coalitions** and build institutions to address shared threats and \_ ln this sense, power becomes a positive-sum game. It is not enough to think in terms of power over others. We must also think in terms of power to accomplish goals that involves power with others." On many transnational issues, empowering others can help us to accomplish our own goals. In this world, networks and connectedness become an important source of relevant power. Contextual intelligence, the ability to understand an evolving environment and capitalize on trends, will become a crucial skill in enabling leaders to convert power resources into successful strategies." We will need contextual intelligence if we are to understand that the problem of American power in the twenty-first century is not one of decline, but of a failure to realize that even the largest country cannot achieve its aims **without the help of others**. That will requirea deeper understanding of power, how it is changing, and how to construct smart power strategies. That will require a more sophisticated narrative than the classical stories of the rise and fall of great powers. America is likely to remain the strongest country of the twenty-hrst century; but that will not mean domination. The ability to get the outcomes we want **will rest** up**on** a new narrative of **smart power**.Americans will need to stop asking questions about who is number one, and entertaining narratives about dominance, and start asking questions about how the various tools of power can be combined into smart strategies for power with rather than merely over other nations. Thinking more clearly about power and stimulating that broader narrative are the purposes of this book. [xvi-xvii]

### 2ac Brazil

#### Brazil says no

Hakim 12 (Peter, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank on Western Hemisphere affairs, “Brazil and the US Security Agenda”, Inter-American Dialogue, February 6, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2855) TC

Similarly, the US and Brazil are on polar opposite sides of nearly every issue dealing with Cuba. Brazil has also supported the development of new multilat-eral institutions in Latin America that ex-clude US participation, and could potentially further curb US influence in the region. In neither case, however, is US security a particular concern. Nor are the differing US and Brazilian approaches to Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela. Many in Washington view Chavez as serious security problem and would welcome Brazil treating him more like a threat. But Brazil’s good relations with the Venezuelan leader sometimes benefit the US by allow-ing Brazil to help, at least on occasion, to moderate his virulent anti-Americanism. Some disagreements, however, have raised important US security concerns. Brazil delivered its most forceful challenge to the US security agenda in Latin America in 2010, when it denounced a new US-Colombia security pact. Washington and Bogota had both considered the pact to be little more than a natural continuation of past bilateral anti-drug, anti-guerrilla cooperation. Moreover, the US viewed the Colombia agreement—which formalized US access to several Colombian bases—as a replacement for its continued use of Manta Air Base in Ecuador, which President Correa abrogated when the US lease on Manta ran out. Brazil’s disapproval mobilized opposition to the US-Colombia pact from nearly every South American country. The impasse was resolved when the Colombian Supreme Court declared the treaty unconstitutional because it had never been presented for legislative consideration. Since then, President Juan Manuel Santos has simply deferred any further action on the accord.

### 2ac nanotech

#### Global nanotech inevitable – trends prove

Delemarle et al 9

[Aurelie, post-doctoral research fellow at LATTS working on the conditions of emergence of markets for nanosciences and technology based innovations, Bernard Kahane, Lionel Villard, Philippe Laredo, “Geography of Knowledge Production in Nanotechnologies: A Flat World with Many Hills and Mountains,” Nanotechnology Law & Business 6 Nanotech. L. & Bus. (2009)] WD

1. Introduction Research on nanoscale phenomena is increasing everywhere. Programs in nanosciences are flourishing in almost every country of the world. Publications in fields related to nanotechnologies have been increasing by 12% per year from 1998 to 2006. Nanotechnology is becoming the generic technology of the 21st century. Considerable resources are being invested, especially public resources. In 2007 an estimated $1,780 million was spent in the United States, $975 million in Japan, $563 million in Germany, and $222 million in South Korea. The true landscape of the continental, national and sub-national output of these investments requires considering more than just total investment.

#### Tech diffusion is inevitable—export restrictions fail

Gierow 12-Reporters Without Borders Germany (Hauke, “Export Controls For Digital Weapons”, EDRI-Gram 2012, <http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number10.24/export-controls-digital-weapons>, MB)

While the European Governments often praise the positive role the Internet can have on the society in helping empower people and promoting freedom of information and expression, European mass surveillance and censorship software is being exported under their watch. Some governments not only fail to enact controls, but even further the export of such technology using export credit guarantees. Reporters Without Borders Germany fights for a regime to stop the export of European surveillance and censorship equipment to countries which oppress freedom of information and the press.¶ Surveillance equipment is used, inter alia, to spy on journalists, bloggers, citizen journalists, democracy activists and their sources, friends and even loose contacts. Many suppliers of this surveillance infrastructure are located in the European Union, names like Nokia Siemens Networks, Gamma, Trovicor, Hacking Team and Bull / Amesys come to mind. Those firms supplied equipment to Libya, Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Morocco and many more countries that have systematically violated human rights over the course of the last years. In all of these countries at the time of the instalment of surveillance infrastructure there was no press freedom and people were being tortured or imprisoned for criticizing the government.¶ Reporters Without Borders believes that digital source protection is one of the most relevant issues for modern journalism. All journalists should be aware how important it is to store sensitive information in a secure way, to make sure they do not risk their sources’ lives or well-being. The possibility to encrypt emails, hard drives and use anonymous forms of communication is one of the key elements to a free press. This requires additional training and awareness raising as well as strong privacy and press freedom laws. That is why Reporters Without Borders Germany rejects the EU Data Retention Regime and other means of Internet surveillance, be it in the EU or outside.¶ Today the EU has placed restrictions on the export of such surveillance equipment to Libya and Iran, but still lacks general rules and procedures. In August, Reporters Without Borders Germany urged the German government to take action and enact a regime that bans the export and trade of Digital Weapons made in Germany. Later, we also appealed to the EU-Commission to amend the EU Dual Use regulation accordingly. The new "Strategy for Digital Freedoms in EU Foreign Policy" adopted by the European Parliament in early December 2012 calls on the EU-Commission to propose legislation to control the export of Digital Arms and enact Net Neutrality. We welcome this resolution and hope for subsequent legislation.

#### Turn – the plan is key to the responsible development of nanotech – guidance and regulations

Dhawan and Sharma 11

[Alok Dhawan is principal scientist and Vyom Sharma is a senior research fellow at the Nanomaterial Toxicology Group, CSIR-Indian Institute of Toxicology Research, Lucknow, India., August 25, 2011, “Address risk of nanotech toxicity,” <http://www.scidev.net/global/technology/opinion/address-risk-of-nanotech-toxicity-1.html>] WD

Developing countries forging ahead with nanotechnology need regulation and research into local risk patterns, say Alok Dhawan and Vyom Sharma. Nanotechnology, the science of manipulating tiny particles less than 100 nanometers in diameter, has found many applications in consumer products, biomedical devices, drug delivery agents and the industrial sector. In the consumer sector alone, more than 30 countries are manufacturing some 1,300 nanotech-based products, including textiles, food packaging, cosmetics, luggage, children's toys, floor cleaners and wound dressings. The number of such products has increased five-fold in the last five years. But this rapid growth has also raised concerns about the potential for adverse effects on human health and the environment. Although research on harm remains inconclusive, developing countries that embrace nanotechnology should not overlook possible risks and must regulate products that contain nanoparticles. § Marked 15:42 § Special properties, possible harm Their small size gives nanoparticles some unusual physical properties, as they have a larger ratio of surface area to volume than bigger particles. This can also make them biologically more active. For example, when gold, usually an inert material, is converted to a nano-form, it acts as a catalyst for chemical reactions owing to high surface reactivity. This suggests that nanoparticles may interact differently with biological systems, compared with larger particles, and could reach further into the body. People can be exposed to nanoparticles either directly, such as through nano-based drugs and topically applied cosmetics or sunscreens, or indirectly, for example by inhalation during synthesis of nanoparticles. A number of studies have documented in vitro and in vivo toxicity of exposure to nanoparticles. Evidence suggests they can induce DNA damage, reactive oxygen species, damage to cellular organelles and cell death. And a study published in the European Respiratory Journal in 2009 claimed that seven Chinese workers developed severe lung damage after inhaling polyacrylate nanoparticles produced in their printing factory — the first time that a link was made between exposure to nanoparticles and human illness. [1] Risk on the agenda… There is currently no mandatory consumer labelling of nanomaterials as potentially hazardous in any country. But governments and scientific bodies in the developed world — including the Royal Society, United Kingdom, and the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) — are taking note of the potential hazards and have set up committees to formulate risk assessment guidelines. For example, under existing regulations, the EPA is proposing rules requiring those that manufacture, import or process two chemical substances — multi-walled and single-walled carbon nanotubes — to submit a notice with information that would help it monitor health or environmental risks. Similarly, washing machines using silver nanoparticles at the end of the wash cycle are being evaluated by the US government for their environmental safety. In 2005, concerns about toxic effects on microbe populations prompted the temporary withdrawal of a washing machine using silver nanoparticles in Sweden. The US EPA has already decided to regulate products containing silver nanoparticles, which are used widely in consumer products and have anti-bacterial properties. …while developing countries lack guidance But developing countries still lack awareness of the potential hazards of nano-based consumer products, and only a few guidance documents are available in the public domain. A company in India already claims to be the world's largest manufacturer of nanotech-based fabrics. Many other companies that synthesise nanoparticles — for use in cosmetics, for example, or water filtration devices — are emerging in countries such as China and India. Framing regulations and guidelines for the synthesis, use and disposal of nanomaterials is of great importance for the responsible development of nanotechnology in developing nations. International organisations and developed nations can assist them by sharing scientific data and technologies for assessing environmental and health safety. And to control occupational exposures, the regulatory framework should include mandatory documentation of the nanomaterials developed and personnel involved, and training workers to take precautions. Our institute, the Indian Institute of Toxicology Research, Lucknow, has recently published guidance on the safe handling of nanomaterials in research laboratories, a step in the right direction. [2] Implications, not just applications But the vast majority of government funding in developing nations is spent on research into the applications, rather than the implications, of nanotechnology. For example, out of more than 200 research projects funded during 2001–10 by the Department of Science and Technology in India under its flagship Nano Mission programme, only one was directly related to nanoparticle toxicity studies (and was awarded to our institute). As a result, scientists may fail to identify any impacts of nanotechnology that are specific to populations or the use of a product in poor countries — patterns of environmental distribution and exposure could be different in developing nations. Current research on nanotoxicity does not take into account how different local environments and populations can influence risk. People in developing countries may be more prone to adverse effects of nanoparticles because of underlying health conditions and malnutrition. Moreover, genetic susceptibility to toxic effects varies in diverse ethnic groups and geographical areas. The scientific community needs to identify these information gaps before developing regulations and standard methodologies for nanotoxicity assessment.

#### Turn – fast nanotech good – US guidance is key

Forrest 89

[David, President of the Institute for Molecular Manufacturing and a Senior Fellow at the Foresight Nanotech Institute, member of the Working Group for the International Technology Roadmap for Productive Nanosystems, and of the Technical Advisory Group to the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) on the ISO Technical Committee on Nanotechnology (TC/229), March 23, 1989, “Regulating Nanotechnology Development,” <http://www.foresight.org/nano/Forrest1989.html>] WD

If we tried to block or slow the development of nanotechnology in the United States, or in other democracies, we would increase the chances that nanotechnology is first developed in a country without a free press. In which case we could not be certain that that country would not use nanotechnology to oppress its neighbors § Marked 15:42 § or the rest of the world. So efforts to slow progress only serve to threaten our own freedom. Therefore, a sensible course of action when formulating nanotechnology policy is to assume that nanotechnology will be here sooner than most people expect (the ten-year time horizon) and concentrate on guiding development to avoid the dangers instead of blindly opposing development. When we consider what must be accomplished in that time frame, it seems clear that we should begin the task as soon as possible.