### Contention One is Ecology

#### Current Mexican environmental regulations are insufficient to combat environmental pollution – instead they incentivize toxic waste dumping into the surrounding environment

**NLM, 13** – National Library of Medicine (“Maquiladora” June 10 2013, http://toxtown.nlm.nih.gov/text\_version/locations.php?id=35Maquiladoras)ah

Maquiladoras are foreign-owned factories located in Mexico that are typically found along the U.S. - Mexico border. Maquiladoras produce a variety of products including electronic components, chemicals, clothes, machinery, and auto parts. The maquiladora program began in 1965 as part of the Mexican government’s Border Industrialization Program. It was developed in response to the demise of the U.S. government’s Bracero Program, which allowed Mexican farmworkers to legally perform seasonal work within the U.S. The end of the Bracero Program caused an unemployment crisis in the border region. The Mexican government responded to this crisis by creating the maquiladora program which provided an incentive to foreign manufacturers to move production to Mexico. This incentive was created by allowing duty free import of raw materials and other supplies into the country with the stipulation that the manufactured goods and the resulting wastes were eventually exported to another country. The passing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 led to an increased number of maquiladoras in the border region. In 2003, there were 2,893 maquiladoras employing 1,063,123 people. The high concentration of maquiladoras combined with less rigorous environmental regulations, limited capacity to enforce environmental laws, and the expense of exporting hazardous waste has created an incentive for illegal dumping and has polluted the surrounding land, water, and air. Inside the maquiladoras, occupational hazards relating to toxic chemical exposure and workplace safety also affect human health. Occupational hazards are of particular concern in Mexico since first-time violators are rarely punished and since penalties are typically incurred only for imminent dangers and failures to address previously highlighted violations.

#### Specifically this devastates the Tijuana River region

Good 5 David Good. Dave Good is an award-winning journalist and author for the San Diego Reader. “Showdown on the Rio Alamar.”http://www.sandiegoreader.com/news/2012/sep/05/cover-showdown-rio-alamar/?page=2&

Before NAFTA,” (the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994) says Mendez, “people could fish and bathe in the Rio Alamar. Before the maquilas came in 1986, you could actually drink the water.”¶ It is no longer news to anyone in San Diego that during winter storms, sewage-laden floodwaters from the Tijuana River overwhelm both the Tijuana estuary, one of the most important salt-marsh ecosystems left in the U.S., and the Pacific Ocean. The winter waters off Imperial Beach become a hellish broth of contaminants and raw sewage, and area beaches are known to remain closed to the public throughout the season. This sewage spill has a name: the Tijuana River plume, and it is tracked by the Southern California Coastal Ocean Observing System.A TED (the acronym stands for Trade and Environmental Database) case study, #147, titled “Tijuana River Pollution,” placed a substantial portion of the blame for all that pollution on the maquiladora program. NAFTA, they say, provided paychecks, but in turn encouraged the migration of thousands upon thousands of job-seekers to Tijuana in advance of any sort of infrastructure. In other words, humans outnumbered toilets. Much of the workforce simply squatted in makeshift encampments on the banks of the Alamar. The maquilas themselves, some 3000 factories and assembly plants, generate additional toxic waste and sewage.Mendez says that practicing environmentalism in the midst of such third-world abuse is difficult. “You never really know where the Mexican government is at, what they’re doing, or why they’re doing it. It’s hard to get documents.”He takes one last look around the pitiful arroyo and the Alamar before we leave, but one senses that he sees something aside from the results of years of dumping. “It is a great opportunity,” he finally says, “to clean the air with all these trees.”“Tijuana is a coast city. We’re a river city.”Margarita Díaz is the director of Proyecto Fronterizo de Educación Ambiental A.C. (Border Environmental Education Project) in Tijuana. Proyecto Fronterizo is one of a list of binational environmental agencies, governmental agencies, and nonprofits that have a stake in the outcome of the Rio Alamar project.She calls from her office in Playas. “But the [Mexican] government doesn’t see it that way,” she says, “and even we don’t see ourselves as a river city. I tell people that we have a river running through the middle of our city. That’s not a river, they say. That’s a tunnel.”The Tijuana River originates in Mexico and crosses the international boundary into the United States near San Ysidro. The majority of the river was channelized and run into a concrete straitjacket during the late 1960s. The channelization of creeks and rivers and seeps and above-ground springs is an old-school engineering solution to seasonal flooding that dates back to the 1930s and possibly earlier. Channelization does exactly what it is supposed to do: it provides a concrete fast track through which large volumes of water can move out of a given area at a high rate of speed. On paper, it seems like a good solution, if, that is, one doesn’t mind the total loss of nature that comes with the process.But channelization has also been identified as a major source of ocean pollution. Along with water, urban channels transport anything and everything that happens to be in them, including, sometimes, humans. In spite of the best engineering intentions, people have drowned in such culverts during storm events.“Channelization is always bad for a river,” says Travis Pritchard, a chemist who monitors water quality for San Diego Coastkeeper. “Six months ago I went down to Tijuana and met with Margarita Díaz.” They observed what remained of the Rio Alamar. “It’s super sad. I felt like I was watching the death of a river before my eyes.”

#### The river is important ecologically

NERR 10 (“Tijuana River Comprehensive Management Plan- National Estuarine Research Reserve”. National Estuarine Research Reserve. August 2010. [http://www.nerrs.noaa.gov/Doc/PDF/Reserve/TJR\_ MgmtPlan.pdf](http://www.nerrs.noaa.gov/Doc/PDF/Reserve/TJR_%20MgmtPlan.pdf))

The Tijuana River National Estuarine Research Reserve (TRNERR) is unique in a local, regional, national, and international context. It offers one of the best and largest remaining examples of California’s coastal wetland habitat, a habitat that has been largely lost due to urban development or seriously degraded elsewhere in southern California. This section includes a brief description of the importance of estuarine habitats and the natural resources protected within the Reserve. I. THE NEED TO PROTECT ESTUARIES A. DEFINITION Estuaries are a hydrological and biological crossroads, defined as the portion of the earth's coastal zone where there is interaction of ocean water, freshwater, land, and atmosphere. The specific plant and animal habitats that may be supported by an estuarine system are determined by conditions in the watershed and in the adjacent ocean. The rate at which fresh water enters the estuary, the amount and type of waterborne and bottom sediments, the degree of tidal flushing, and water depth (hence temperature and degree of sunlight), all combine to produce diverse biological communities in a dynamic and complex system. A significant physical change in any of those factors can trigger traumatic changes in the estuarine biologic community, greatly enlarging or reducing the size of various species' populations. B. ESTUARINE FUNCTIONS Estuarine wetlands provide a number of valuable ecological functions, or so-called “ecosystem services.” Most broadly, there are sources of recreational and aesthetic benefits, as witnessed by the boom in industries such as eco-tourism. Also, they offer critical buffers between the sea, land, and freshwater. They can protect inland areas from ocean-borne waves and storm activity. Also, they also can help protect the ocean from watershed inputs, filtering and helping to purify water. In a healthy estuarine system, the interaction of tides, unpolluted fresh water, and sediments creates some of the most productive systems on the planet. Sheltered shallow waters and soft mud or sand flats, regularly flooded by the tides, provide ideal conditions for abundant life. Among the most important estuarine species are microscopic photosynthetic organisms called phytoplankton. Phytoplankton, like green plants, make the energy of sunlight available to animals as food. Phytoplankton are consumed by microscopic and minute animals called zooplankton. These animals include small crustaceans such as copepods, and the larvae of fish, crabs, clams, and other species. These organisms themselves are part of the food supply for adults of their own or other species. Marsh plants and eelgrass growing in shallow estuarine waters are critically important to estuarine animal life. Marsh vegetation not only provides cover for many animals, but also, as it dies back each season, creates detritus that feeds and houses the species on which larger species depend. The blades of eelgrass are homes for algae, snails, and other food for larger animals. Juveniles of many species reach adulthood by hiding among estuarine vegetation. In an undisturbed estuary, the wealth of food can support huge populations of immature and adult fish, crabs, shrimp, and other species. Those animals provide essential food for populations of birds and mammals, including people. ¶ C. MODIFICATION OF ESTUARIES Estuaries--characteristically flat land that offers sheltered access to the sea, and a profusion of fish and other seafood--offer attractive conditions for human habitation, agricultural production, and transportation. Estuaries on the west coast of the U.S. supported native peoples for thousands of years and, more recently, settlers from other parts of the globe. ¶ Prior to the 1970s, the value and finite nature of estuaries were not fully appreciated. It was not recognized that estuaries are integral to ecological and human well-being. Destruction of estuaries was disastrously affecting water quality, commercial and recreational fisheries, and overall ecosystem health. Estuary-dependent plants and animal populations began to dwindle with lost habitat, food sources, and reproductive sites. Affected species included not only ¶ salmonids, crab, and clams, but also birds such as eagles and falcons, which feed on the ¶ tideflats. Increasing awareness of the value of estuaries triggered current efforts to preserve, ¶ conserve, and restore these fragile systems.

#### This modern paradigm of ecological destruction underlies a systematic understanding of ecology

Castello and Toledo, 2k (Alicia Castello and Victor M Toledo; "Applying ecology in the Third World: the case of Mexico." BioScience 50.1 (2000): 66-76; google scholar)

Ecologists and policymakers alike generally agree that ecological knowledge should be considered in setting environmental policy and that ecologists should be more involved in decisions related to the man-agement and conservation of natural resources (e.g., Ehrlich 1989, Lubchenco et al. 1991). The essence of applied ecology is that it is "solution oriented," in contrast to pure ecology, which is "problem oriented" (Newman 1993). Applied ecology seeks solutions to practical problems and is guided, at present, by the paradigm of sustain- ability. Applying ecology would mean using original research in the management and conservation of natural resources. That is, it implies that scientific methods can be used to solve problems in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, wildlife management, resource extraction, and biodiversity conservation. Despite the potential of applied ecology, there is still disagreement about the extent to which ecological science is applicable to real-world problems. This concern is intensified by the fact that, although the numbers of ecol-ogists and journals specifically dedicated to ecological topics are growing, the main global environmental problems, such as deforestation, soil erosion, loss of biodiversity, water depletion, and species exploitation, are continuing to increase at alarming rates. For example, an analysis of the influence on management practice or policy of 50 representative articles published over the last 30 years in one prominent ecology journal, the Journal of Applied Ecology, showed that most of these articles lacked an indication of the practical applications of the work or of management recommendations derived from the research (Pienkowski and Watkinson 1996). Ecology and related disciplines now confront the urgent challenge of making a relevant contribution to the wise management and conservation of Earth's resources and life support systems. Many ecologists are now taking up this challenge. For example, the publication of the Sus-tamable Biosphere Initiative (Lubchenco et al. 1991), which was based on an awareness of the need to link sci-ence with decision-making, constituted an important step. Another important contribution was an article by Ludwig et al. (1993), which served as the basis for a forum in Eco-logical Applications about natural resources exploitation. Among the conclusions of the forum was the importance of recognizing the limitations of ecologists' knowledge of managed systems and the difficulties involved in gaining the necessary understanding. Based on the recognition that environmental problems are not entirely or even primarily scientific (Levin 1993), some authors (e.g., Funtowicz and Ravetz 1991, Costanza 1993) have emphasized the need to integrate science with other sources of information. These authors relate ecology's low impact on solving problems to its limited capacity to function in an interdisciplinary context. In particular, information from the social sciences and the knowledge generated by rural societies worldwide (which are commonly referred to as indigenous or traditional) have an important role to play in formulating strategies for natural resource management and conservation (Alfieri and Hecht 1990, Toledo 1992, Costanza 1993). Ecological information is, therefore, only one part of the decision- making process for environmental management. Consequently, more integrative forms of ecological inquiry that analyze issues from a systems perspective, including the interactions of social systems with natural systems, are needed (Holling et al. 1998). In this article, we consider applied ecological research in developing countries, in which natural resources are pre-dominantly used, managed, and conserved by communi-ty-based actors. We review the situation in Mexico, using it to suggest that the perceived limits of applied ecological research is related to how knowledge is generated, com-municated, and socializedby scientists and their institu-tions. Applied ecology, at least in Mexico, seems to better accomplish its objectives when researchers and institu-tions conduct research in conjunction with the social actors involved in the management of natural resources. Such sectors include government agencies, nongovern-mental organizations, international agencies, and rural producers themselves—the complex array of agricultur-ists, cattle ranchers, forest dwellers and harvesters, hunters, gatherers, and fishermen whose lives depend directly on the appropriation of natural resources. We conclude by proposing a model that can serve as a general framework for developing more integrative forms of applied ecological research and by emphasizing the role of communication in facilitating the use of scientific findings. The management of nat ural resources in the Third World Understanding how scientific institutions and their researchers perceive the social and economic actors in nat-ural resource management is crucial for designing strategies for applying ecological research. Labels such as "users," "managers," "exploiters," "stakeholders," or "decision-makers" commonly found in the ecological literature oversimplify a complex reality. These terms fail to recognize specific actors who can be identified culturally, social-ly, and economically. The management of ecosystems is not only an ecologi-cal event but also a social—and, therefore, an economic, cultural, and even political—phenomenon. Human appropriation of nature removes minerals, water, energy, and living beings (biomass) from ecosystems. A substantial proportion of the world's biomass is directly appropriated through rural production, including agriculture, cattle raising, fisheries, hunting, gathering, and forestry. These activities are the main human activities on Earth and the principal influences on our planet's ecology (Vitousek et al. 1986). They constitute the first step in the process by which societies organize the exchange of matter and energy with nature. Although most humans live in cities, and almost no place on Earth is free of industrial artifacts, products, and services, the portion of humanity involved in the capture of biomass is still considerable. By 1950, more than half of the human population participated in the direct appropriation of the products of nature. In 1990, the total number of people was twice that of 1950, but 45% of them were still engaged in some kind of primary production activities (FAO 1991). Approximately 95% of the agricultural population occurs in Third World countries, whereas only 5% occurs in developed nations. Consequently, human appropriation of nature is carried out mainly in nations characterized by high biological richness (Mittermeier et al. 1997), a diversity of cultures, and, ironically, high social and economic poverty and high rates of environmental depletion (UNEP 1997).

#### This ongoing process is critical – it affects global understandings of ecology

Hovden 99 (Eivind Hovden; Senior Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway; 1999; “As if nature doesn't matter: Ecology, regime theory and¶ international relations”; Environmental Politics, 8:2, 50-74; KDUB)

It is worth emphasising that the argument presented below is not merely¶ of significance for IR as an academic discipline. IR is in many ways¶ uniquely positioned as a field which takes the planet as a whole as the centre¶ of analysis, and may therefore be able to contribute significantly to a debate¶ which so far has been dominated by philosophers, sociologists and political¶ theorists. The relevance of IR for environmental politics is clearly (albeit¶ possibly unwittingly) pointed to by Redclift, who argues that '[m]any of the¶ processes which govern our environment are established at the global level.¶ They exist at this level not because they are international in origin, but¶ because they are totalising processes, often difficult to divorce from¶ economic activities themselves. Global relations, in this sense, are¶ embodied in myriad local practices' [Redclift, 1996:148]. The relationship¶ between the individual understanding and perception of nature, and the¶ ways in which we might assume responsibility for the ecological¶ consequences of our behaviour and consumption are clearly affected by¶ processes that are not confined to the national level. The 'global relations'¶ which Redclift refers to, are, in various forms, the subject matter of IR, and¶ it is therefore well worth considering the relationship between IR theory and¶ the environmental crisis.

#### This engenders anthropocentrism

Taciano L. **Milfont** prof at univ of Auckland Preservation and Utilization: Understanding the Structure of Environmental Attitudes1 Medio Ambiente y Comportamiento Humano **2006**, 7(1), 29-50.

EA = environmental attitudes Bogner and his colleagues (Bogner, Brengelmann, & Wiseman, 2000; Bogner & Wiseman, 1997, 1999; Wiseman & Bogner, 2003) have tried to evaluate the dimensionality of EA empirically by conducting second-order factor analysis. In line with the two-dimensional tradition, Wiseman and Bogner (2003) proposed a Model of Ecological Values (MEV) with two orthogonal dimensions: Preservation and Utilization. They argued that ecological values are established by “one’s position on two orthogonal dimensions, a biocentric dimension that reflects conservation and protection of the environment (Preservation); and an anthropocentric dimension that reflects the utilization of natural resources (Utilization)’’ (Wiseman & Bogner, 2003, p. 787). In a more extensive investigation, Milfont and Duckitt (2004) evaluated the structure of EA by factor analysing 99 items from well-know EA measures. The results from both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis showed that the EA were organized in a hierarchical structure. These were ten first-order factors that loaded on one of two correlated second-order factors. Their findings indicated that Preservation and Utilization were strongly correlated and not orthogonal, as proposed by the MEV. Although purely empirically based, Milfont and Duckitt’s (2004) findings are consistent with a number of theories. These theories have argued that people-environment relations can be viewed in terms of two distinct beliefs that are very similar to these Preservation and Utilization dimensions (Corral-Verdugo & Armendáriz, 2000; Dobson, 1998; Dunlap & Jones, 2002; Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; Kortenkamp & Moore, 2001; Thompson & Barton, 1994). For example, these Preservation and Utilization dimensions seem to be related, respectively, to the spiritual and instrumental views of people-environment relations (Stokols, 1990). According to Stokols (1990), the spiritual view sees the environment as an end in itself, whereas the instrumental view sees the environment as a means for human objectives. Kaiser and Fuhler (2003) have also argued that “if the evaluative component of people’s attitudes consists of at least two distinguishable lines of values—utilitarian values as well as moral/altruistic ones—then it would be better to consider them independently” (p. 1041). Therefore, EA can be seen as rooted in two philosophical or ideological principles that would be expressed in two correlated higher-order environmental value dimensions

#### Anthropocentric dualism creates unending violence underscores all other modes of oppression

Kochi, 2009 (Tarik, Sussex law school, Species war: Law, Violence and Animals, Law Culture and Humanities Oct 5.3)

This reflection need not be seen as carried out by every individual on a daily basis but rather as that which is drawn upon from time to time within public life as humans inter-subjectively coordinate their actions in accordance with particular enunciated ends and plan for the future. 21 In this respect, **the violence and killing of species war is not simply a question of survival or bare life, instead, it is bound up with a consideration of the good.** For most modern humans in the West the “good life” involves the daily killing of animals for dietary need and for pleasure. At the heart of the question of species war, and all war for that matter, resides a question about the legitimacy of violence linked to a philosophy of value. 22 The question of war-law sits within a wider history of decision making about the relative values of different forms of life. “Legitimate” violence is under-laid by cultural, religious, moral, political and philosophical conceptions about the relative values of forms of life. Playing out through history are distinctions and hierarchies of life-value that are extensions of the original human-animal distinction. Distinctions that can be thought to follow from the human-animal distinction are those, for example, drawn between: **Hellenes and barbarians; Europeans and Orientals; whites and blacks; the “civilized” and the “uncivilized”; Nazis and Jews; Israeli’s and Arabs; colonizers and the colonized.** Historically these practices and regimes of violence have been culturally, politically and legally normal-ized in a manner that replicates the normalization of the violence carried out against non-human animals. Unpacking, criticizing and challenging the forms of violence, which in different historical moments appear as “normal,” is one of the ongoing tasks of any critic who is concerned with the question of what war does to law and of what law does to war? The critic of war is thus a critic of war’s norm-alization.

**Anthropocentrism guarantees violence—humanism is the *original* hierarchy—we need politics that can respect more than human life. Other politics dooms us to a future that endlessly repeats the oppression of the status quo.**

**Best 2007** (Steven – Chair of Philosophy @ University of Texas – El Paso, Review of Charles Patterson’s “The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust”, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, <http://www.drstevebest.org/EternalTriblenka.pdf>) //MD

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that **the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal.** ¶ In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that **the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power.** A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. ¶ Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings.¶ The Origins of Hierarchy¶ "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras¶ It is little understood that **the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals.** Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for **all other systems of domination** such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” ¶ Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. ¶ In the fifteenth century, **when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves.** Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. ¶ As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. ¶ Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for **speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples.** “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” ¶ Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.” For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. ¶ There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Christianity left behind.¶

#### Only in challenging this ideology can we reclaim meaning

Becker 73 (Earnest, The Denial of Death, pg 151-152, Ph.D ins Cultural Anthropology, was a professor the University of California at Berkely, San Franciso State College, and Simon Fraser University, and founder of The Ernest Becker Foundation; Kristof)\*don’t endorse gendered language

But on top of this special burden nature has arranged that it is impossible for man to feel “right” in any straightforward way. Here we have to introduce a paradox that seems to go right to the heart of organismic life and that is especially sharpened in man. The paradox takes the form of two motives or urges that seem to be part of creature consciousness and that point in two opposite directions. On the one hand the creature is impelled by a powerful desire to identify with the cosmic process, to merge himself with the rest of nature. On the other hand ~~he~~ wants to be unique, to stand out as something different and apart. The first motive— to merge and lose oneself in something larger—comes from man’s horror of isolation, of being thrust back upon his own feeble energies alone; he feels tremblingly small and impotent in the face of transcendent nature. If ~~he~~ gives in to his natural feeling of cosmic dependence, the desire to be part of something bigger, it puts him at peace and at oneness, gives ~~him~~ a sense of self-expansion in a larger beyond, and so heightens ~~his~~ being, giving ~~him~~ truly a feeling of transcendent value. This is the Christian motive of Agape—the natural melding of created life in the “Creation-in-love” which transcends it. As Rank put it, **man yearns for a “feeling of kinship with the All.” ~~He~~ wants to be “delivered from his isolation” and become “part of a greater and higher whole.” The person reaches out naturally for a self beyond ~~his~~ own self in order to know who ~~he~~ is at all, in order to feel that ~~he~~ belongs in the universe.** Long before Camus penned the words of the epigraph to this chapter, Rank said: “For only by living in close union with a god-ideal that has been erected outside one’s own ego is one able to live at all.”55

### Contention two is our response

#### In response to the resolution Andrew and I affirm the thought experiment of the voluntary global suicide of humanity – that solves

**Kochi and Ordan 08** – (Dec. 2008, Tarik Kochi, PhD, Lecturer in Law & International Security, University of Sussex, Noam Ordan, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, research focus on human cultural history, “An argument for the global suicide of humanity,” Borderlands, <http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol7no3_2008/kochiordan_argument.pdf>)  
For some, guided by the pressure of moral conscience or by a practice of harm minimisation, the appropriate response to historical and contemporary environmental destruction is that of action guided by abstention. For example, one way of reacting to mundane, everyday complicity is the attempt to abstain or opt-out of certain aspects of modern, industrial society: to not eat non-human animals, to invest ethically, to buy organic produce, to not use cars and buses, to live in an environmentally conscious commune. Ranging from small personal decisions to the establishment of parallel economies (think of organic and fair trade products as an attempt to set up a quasi-parallel economy), a typical modern form of action is that of a refusal to be complicit in human practices that are violent and destructive. Again, however, at a practical level, to what extent are such acts of nonparticipation rendered banal by their complicity in other actions? In a grand register of violence and harm the individual who abstains from eating non-human animals but still uses the bus or an airplane or electricity has only opted out of some harm causing practices and remains fully complicit with others. One response, however, which bypasses the problem of complicity and the banality of action is to take the non-participation solution to its most extreme level. In this instance, the only way to truly be non-complicit in the violence of the human heritage would be to opt-out altogether. Here, then, the modern discourse of reflection, responsibility and action runs to its logical conclusion – the global suicide of humanity – as a free-willed and ‘final solution’. While we are not interested in the discussion of the ‘method’ of the global suicide of humanity per se, one method that would be the least violent is that of humans choosing to no longer reproduce. [10] The case at point here is that the global suicide of humanity would be a moral act; it would take humanity out of the equation of life on this earth and remake the calculation for the benefit of everything nonhuman. While suicide in certain forms of religious thinking is normally condemned as something which is selfish and inflicts harm upon loved ones, the global suicide of humanity would be the highest act of altruism. That is, global suicide would involve the taking of responsibility for the destructive actions of the human species. By eradicating ourselves we end the long process of inflicting harm upon other species and offer a human-free world. If there is a form of divine intelligence then surely the human act of global suicide will be seen for what it is: a profound moral gesture aimed at redeeming humanity. Such an act is an offer of sacrifice to pay for past wrongs that would usher in a new future. Through the death of our species we will give the gift of life to others. It should be noted nonetheless that our proposal for the global suicide of humanity is based upon the notion that such a radical action needs to be voluntary and not forced. In this sense, and given the likelihood of such an action not being agreed upon, it operates as a thought experiment which may help humans to radically rethink what it means to participate in modern, moral life within the natural world. In other words, whether or not the act of global suicide takes place might well be irrelevant. What is more important is the form of critical reflection that an individual needs to go through before coming to the conclusion that the global suicide of humanity is an action that would be worthwhile. The point then of a thought experiment that considers the argument for the global suicide of humanity is the attempt to outline an anti-humanist, or non-human-centric ethics. Such an ethics attempts to take into account both sides of the human heritage: the capacity to carry out violence and inflict harm and the capacity to use moral reflection and creative social organisation to minimise violence and harm. Through the idea of global suicide such an ethics reintroduces a central question to the heart of moral reflection: To what extent is the value of the continuation of human life worth the total harm inflicted upon the life of all others? Regardless of whether an individual finds the idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this question remains valid and relevant and will not go away, no matter how hard we try to forget, suppress or repress it.

#### Our approach to this discussion is key to REVEAL and RESIST the normalization of ecological devastation

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Much of the scholarship on films representing the US/Mexico border analyzes the space and the texts about the border through single critical approaches, whether feminist, Marxist, national/transnational concerns, or race and ethnicity. In contrast, our ecocritical approach is a mode of analysis and argument that works in a threepart structure comprising Ecotones, Machines, and Gender. Through this multivalent approach, we argue that placing these films in conversation with one another, despite their formalistic differences, reveals the social conditions that enable and naturalize ecological devastation along the US/Mexico border. In other words, both Maquilapolis and Sleep Dealer irrevocably disturb conventional conceptualizations of gender, machines, borders, and their interconnectedness in matters of ecology. Analyzing these disparate films together discloses the way gender, machines, and borders are constituent components of ecosystems and our prospects for thinking and acting ecologically. We begin with key interrelated events that have resulted in unequal trade and labor relations between the USA and Mexico and culminated in the ongoing construction of a barrier along the US/Mexico border: the signing of the Bracero Program of 1942, the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994, and the ongoing environmental justice movement along the US/Mexico border. The Bracero Program of 1942, a series of diplomatic agreements that responded to a shortage of cheap labor in the USA at the onset of US involvement in World War II, also resulted in the migration of an undocumented labor population across the border in search of work. This ‘‘illegal’’ migration had the effect of discursively and socioeconomically creating an exploitable Mexican surplus labor population in the USA, which later gave rise to historic labor unions such as the National Farm Laborers Union (NFLU) and Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC), and the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO).1 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a trilateral trade bloc inaugurated on January 1, 1994, ushered in a new set of trade relations in the Americas that relies on a static and cheap labor force in Mexico that assemble imported raw components into commodities, including TVs, radios, and other small electronic items. Some of the greatest long-term effects of NAFTA have to do with the environmental impact of the maquila industry on small Mexican cities along the US-Mexico border. These small cities are often unable and/or unwilling to cope with the influx of industrial expansion. Thus, unsuitable infrastructure and lax government regulation regarding chemical dumping in these areas result in the greatest ecological impacts. The struggle to improve these living conditions are depicted in Maquilapolis, where the Chilpancingo Collective for Environmental Justice’s community-led clean-up efforts of the Metales y Derivados toxic site reflect the concern of the ‘‘serious industrial pollution impacts of NAFTA. . .in the base metals sector’’ (Reinert & Roland-Holst, 2000, p. 5). Although not represented directly in the film, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) and the Environmental Health Coalition’s Border Environmental Justice Campaign (EHC-BEJC) become two of the most significant organizations in support of the Chilpancingo Collective for Environmental Justice’s campaign for the clean-up of the Metales y Derivados toxic site. The Chilpancingo Colectivo’s struggle for environmental justice along the border is matched by a myriad of ongoing environmental struggles around climate change, land use, and industrial pollution and waste along the border. The Environmental Health Coalition’s report, Globalization at the Crossroads: Ten Years of NAFTA in the San Diego/Tijuana Border Region Report Summary, on the impact of free trade on local Mexican communities notes that ‘‘worker injury and illness rates are 250% higher in Mexico than in comparable U.S. factories’’ (p. 2), a trend in worker treatment that is mirrored by Mexican governmental disinterest in the working conditions of the factories themselves since ‘‘Mexico’s spending on pollution monitoring and factory inspections is down 45% since 1994 [and] only 5% of companies required to report industrial toxic discharges do so in Mexico’’ (p. 2). Finally, the ‘‘66 documented toxic dumps along the border’’ (Report Summary, p. 2) point to the interrelated processes by which worker livelihood in the maquila system is interrelated with worker life outside the maquila factories in Mexico. As both Maquilapolis and Sleep Dealer illustrate, life along the border is economically and ecologically precarious. In the next section we articulate the concept of ecotone as a methodological intervention into ecocriticism, and the following sections apply an ecotone approach to the intersections of ecology, the machine, and gender in these border films. A reason that both Sleep Dealer and Maquilapolis invoke a multi-scaled ecotone approach is that they are border films of the Global South, a cinema that is different from, yet in conversation with, the Hollywood industry. Both have transnational production histories with independent financial backing and relatively low budgets that blur conventional boundaries of the nation-states and the film industries involved. They explicitly negotiate the Tijuana-to-San Diego region of the US/Mexico border, an ecotone where the boundaries of two nations meet and where the relative wealth and prosperity of San Diego comes into contact with the environmental hazards and unsafe working conditions of Tijuana. Sleep Dealer also disturbs generic frontiers as its director Alex Rivera has suggested: ‘‘To think about the future is to open up a space of possibility and it’s something that has never happened in science fiction cinema in the Global South’’ (Guillen, 2008). The film represents the future from the perspective of the Global South that figures systemic inequities through the genre of science fiction. Here the future does not idealistically erase national boundaries, but it is seen to continue systematic reinforcement of disparate access to resources. Furthermore, the US/Mexico border setting situates these films in historically contested ecotones involving land and labor, capital, people, trade, and resources. As such, these films participate in a geographic-cinematic ecotone that includes texts like Why Braceros? and Salt of the Earth, both of which engendered lasting controversies about labor, land as private property, and the selective permeability of national boundaries. Unlike those films that speak to labor migration and nation-building disenfranchisement, however, Maquilapolis and Sleep Dealer depict labor forces whose human bodies do not cross the border even as they participate in transnational economic exchanges. Let us consider the production history of Maquilapolis as a collaboration between filmmakers Vicky Funari and Sergio De La Torre, and promotoras from Grupo Factor X, the Chilpancingo Collective for Environmental Justice, and Women’s Rights Advocates, and how this might itself be ecotonal. The film brings together Tijuana maquila workers, grassroots labor, and environmental community organizers/promotoras from the USA and Mexico. The official film website notes that this bilateral process ‘‘embraces subjectivity as a value and a goal’’ in the efforts of not replicating the top-down approach to the production of value and information, or the bottom-up approach to the production of labor. The website adds that ‘‘this collaborative process breaks with the traditional documentary practice of dropping into a location, shooting and leaving with the ‘goods,’ which would only repeat the pattern of the maquiladora itself’’ (Funari & de la Torre, 2006a). Thus, the film was made with equitable input from all those involved and without the attitude that enables ‘‘natural resources,’’ including human beings, to be exploited and abandoned.

#### Voting aff is an endorsement of a system which values more than exclusively the human

Weston 9 (Anthony, “The incompleat eco-philosopher p. 11-13 <http://esotericonline.net/docs/library/Philosophy/Environmental%20philosophy/Ethics/Weston%20-%20The%20Incompleat%20Eco-Philosopher.%20Essays%20from%20the%20Edges%20of%20Environmental%20Ethics%20(2009).pdf)>

One problem, I argue, is that in an unnoticed but also almost tautological sense, this project remains ineradicably human-centered, despite its generous intentions. Not only is our standing never in question, but moral standing is extended to others by analogy to our own precious selves: to animals, maybe, on the grounds that they suffer as we do. But here is the most fundamental worry: Can an ethic of relationship actually remain so monocentric, homogeneous, single-featured? Might we not even wonder whether monocentrism almost by defi nition militates against real relationship? The eco-theologian Thomas Berry has declared that the essential task of environmental ethics is “to move from a world of objects to a community of subjects.” Berry’s almost Buberian language of subject-hood is not much heard in the environmental ethics we know. The phrase may call us up short. A true community of subjects must be an interacting whole of distinctive, nonhomogenized parts, in which no one set of members arrogates to themselves alone the right to gate-keep or even merely to welcome, however generously, moral newcomers. We are all “in” to start with. Thus Berry might be read as calling not merely for an alternative to anthropocentrism but for an alternative to the entire homogenizing framework of “centrism” itself. And this invitation, arguably, has very little to do with the received project of “expanding the circle” of moral consideration. What we actually need is a vision of multiple “circles,” including the whole of the world from the start. What I propose to call multicentrism thus envisions a world of irreducibly diverse and multiple centers of being and value—not one single moral realm, however expansive, but many realms, as particular as may be, partly overlapping, each with its own center. Human “circles,” then, do not necessarily invite expansion or extension, but rather augmentation and addition. In a similar pluralistic vein, William James challenges us to imagine this world not as a universe but as a “multiverse,” and thus a world that calls for (and, we might hope, calls forth) an entirely different set of skills—even, perhaps, something more like improvisation and etiquette, once again, in the all-too-serious place usually accorded ethics. Certainly it would have to be a world in which etiquette is in play: where collective understandings are negotiated rather than devised and imposed, however sympathetically, by one group of participants on the others. Introduction 13 All of these themes, I believe, are emerging from a wide variety of work both within and outside academic environmental ethics. My own emerging emphasis on the responsiveness of the world, and correspondingly how much a responsive world can be reduced by unresponsiveness on the other side; Cheney’s insistence on the constitutive role of what he calls “bioregional narrative,” co-constituted between human and more-than-human; our mutual friend Tom Birch’s argument for “universal consideration,” according to which moral “consideration” itself must, of necessity, keep itself considerately and carefully open to everything (there’s universality for you!). Many strands in ecofeminism, from a persistent and overdue attention to actual patterns and failures of human-animal relationships to Val Plumwood’s incisive exposure of the whole seamy conceptual underpinnings of “centering,” whether it be on and by males or Europeans or humans as a whole. Thomas Berry, David Abram, Gary Snyder, Paul Shepard, Sean Kane, and many others, cited and drawn upon in this paper, all speak of the human relation to nature in terms of negotiation and covenant rather than the philosophical unilateralism we have learned to expect. There is a movement here, in short: much more than a collection of scattered, hard-to-categorize complaints and idiosyncratic, extraphilosophical views, but a shared alternative vision of the world—and of the tasks of anything rightly called an “environmental ethic.” “Multicentrism” is not the perfect name for it—the chapter explores this problem too—but for the moment I think it will have to do.

#### The role of the ballot is to establish a relationship to Mexico’s ecosystem

Castello and Toledo 2k (Alicia Castello and Victor M Toledo; "Applying ecology in the Third World: the case of Mexico." BioScience 50.1 (2000): 66-76; google scholar; KDUB)

The establishment of efficient communication between research institutions and the sectors directly involved in the management of ecosystems will not, by itself, lead to improved ecosystem management and solutions to envi-ronmental problems. Solutions will be found only through new approaches to policy setting and decision making that consider what the different social sectors have to say. Governmental bodies, nongovernmental organizations, international agencies that fund research and action projects, research institutions, and rural producers all need to network and collaborate in the search for solutions. Particularly in the context of Third World countries, a change is needed in the way in which scientific activities are organized and evaluated. It is important to promote a science that, in addition to nurturing humans' under-standing of the natural world (which is of extreme importance in both cultural and utilitarian terms), also contributes more directly to solving problems. This approach to science should originate from the recognition that the function of science is not limited to the production of new knowledge but also includes its transmission, exchange, and use. The challenge of promoting this new approach to science involves whole institutions more than individual efforts. In the last decade, some ecologists have asked the scientific community to change the academic reward system to promote communication with wider audiences. Such was the message of a recent letter by several internationally recognized ecologists (Bazzaz et al. 1998), who referred strongly to the relevant role of individual ecologists. It is essential to start thinking in terms of accomplishment of goals by institutions, particularly regarding the fulfillment of their social responsibility. For science to have a relevant impact on the way human societies relate to ecosystems, institutional mechanisms must be devel¬oped that allow the participation of all professional scien¬tists—those generating the knowledge and those working on its transformation, transmission, exchange, and use. The environmental crisis is in grave need of solutions, and society as a whole—especially ecologists and their institu¬tions—must keep reacting and responding to the urgent calls from the world's reality.

#### Furthermore, investigating anthropocentric assumptions is critical to formulate a productive pedagogy

Bell and Russell 2K (Anne C. by graduate students in the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University and Constance L. a graduate student at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)//RSW

So far, however, such queries in critical pedagogy have been limited by their neglect of the ecological contexts of which students are a part and of relationships extending beyond the human sphere. The gravity of this oversight is brought sharply into focus by writers interested in environ-mental thought, particularly in the cultural and historical dimensions of the environmental crisis. For example, Nelson (1993) contends that our inability to acknowledge our human embeddedness in nature results in our failure to understand what sustains us. We become inattentive to our very real dependence on others and to the ways our actions affect them. Educators, therefore, would do well to draw on the literature of environ-mental thought in order to come to grips with the misguided sense of independence, premised on freedom from nature, that informs such no-tions as “empowerment.” Further, calls for educational practices situated in the life-worlds of students go hand in hand with critiques of disembodied approaches to education. In both cases, **critical pedagogy challenges the liberal notion of education whose sole aim is the development of the individual, rational mind** (Giroux, 1991, p. 24; McKenna, 1991, p. 121; Shapiro, 1994). Theorists draw attention to the importance of nonverbal discourse (e.g., Lewis & Simon, 1986, p. 465) and to the somatic character of learning (e.g., Shapiro, 1994, p. 67), both overshadowed by the intellectual authority long granted to rationality and science (Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995; S. Taylor, 1991). Describing an “emerging discourse of the body” that looks at how bodies are represented and inserted into the social order, S. Taylor (1991) cites as examples the work of Peter McLaren, Michelle Fine, and Philip Corrigan. A complementary vein of enquiry is being pursued by environmental researchers and educators critical of the privileging of science and abstract thinking in education. They understand learning to be mediated not only through our minds but also through our bodies. Seeking to acknowledge and create space for sensual, emotional, tacit, and communal knowledge, they advocate approaches to education grounded in, for example, nature experience and environmental practice (Bell, 1997; Brody, 1997; Weston, 1996). Thus, whereas both critical pedagogy and environmental education offer a critique of disembodied thought, one draws attention to the ways in which the body is situated in culture (Shapiro, 1994) and to “the social construction of bodies as they are constituted within discourses of race, class, gender, age and other forms of oppression” (S. Taylor, 1991, p. 61). The other emphasizes and celebrates our embodied relatedness to the more-than-human world and to the myriad life forms of which it is comprised (Payne, 1997; Russell & Bell, 1996). Given their different foci, each stream of enquiry stands to be enriched by a sharing of insights. Finally, with regard to the poststructuralist turn in educational theory, ongoing investigations stand to greatly enhance a revisioning of environ-mental education. A growing number of environmental educators question the empirical-analytical tradition and its focus on technical and behavioural aspects of curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Robottom, 1991). **Advocating more interpretive, critical approaches, these educators contest the discursive frameworks** (e.g., positivism, empiricism, rationalism) **that mask the values, beliefs, and assumptions underlying information, and thus the cultural and political dimensions of the problems being considered** (A. Gough, 1997; Huckle, 1999; Lousley, 1999). Teaching about ecological processes and environmental hazards in a supposedly objective and rational manner is understood to belie the fact that knowledge is socially constructed and therefore partial (A. Gough, 1997; Robertson, 1994; Robottom, 1991; Stevenson, 1993). N. Gough (1999) explicitly goes beyond critical approaches to advocate poststructuralist positions in environmental education. He asks science and environmental educators to adopt skepticism towards metanarratives, an attitude that characterizes poststructuralist discourses. Working from the assumption that science and environmental education are story-telling practices, he suggests that the adequacy of narrative strategies be examined in terms of how they represent and render problematic “human trans-actions with the phenomenal world” (N. Gough, 1993, p. 607). Narrative strategies, he asserts, should not create an illusion of neutrality, objectivity, and anonymity, but rather draw attention to our kinship with nature and to “the personal participation of the knower in all acts of understanding” (N. Gough, 1993, p. 621). We contend, of course, that Gough’s proposal should extend beyond the work of science and environmental educators. The societal narratives that legitimize the domination of nature, like those that underlie racism, sexism, classism, heterosexism, and so on, merit everyone’s concern. And since the ecological crisis threatens especially those most marginalized and vulnerable (Running-Grass, 1996; D. Taylor, 1996), proponents of critical pedagogy in particular need to come to terms with the humancentred frameworks that structure their endeavours. No doubt poststructuralist theory will be indispensable in this regard. Nevertheless, **anthropocentric assumptions about language, meaning, and agency will need to be revisited**. In the meantime, perhaps we can ponder the spontaneous creativity of spiders and the life-worlds of woodticks. Such wondrous possibilities should cause even the most committed of humanists to pause for a moment at least.

#### **Catastrophe is a political device used to silence and oppress**

Bryant 11 (Levi, Prof of Philosophy at Collins College, july 26, The Scandal of Political Realism, [http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2011/07/26/the-scandal-of-political-realism/)\*don’t](http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2011/07/26/the-scandal-of-political-realism/)*don't) endorse ableist language

It’s no wonder that realism has such a bad name. It has perpetually been ruined by political realism. Political realism has always been that despicable ideology whose name is necessity. It has always functioned at the behest of inegalitarian social arrangements, justifying one more way deny people their voice and to expropriate their goods. On the one hand it strives to regulate bodies in such a way that only some bodies are entitled to have a say, to govern, to rule, to lead, while others are relegated to silence and, above all, invisibility. Political realism is here a mechanism designed to render invisible voice and other social entities. The political realist always says “listen to those in the know”– usually oligarchs or servants of oligarchs –”they are naturally superior, they have your best interests at heart!” Speaking against the masters becomes pure folly. The voice of those that protest, that refuse the “wisdom” of the masters, is immediately coded as animal noise without reason that only “emotes”. We can think here of the difference between how the medical establishment treated hysterics before and after Freud. Prior to Freud, the hysteric was to be dismissed, to be denied voice, to be relegated to the irrational. After Freud the hysteric is to be listened to as articulating a wrong and a breach in the order of identifications. Political realism strives to silence the ~~hysteric~~, claiming that their voice is no voice at all, that that voice comes from no place of knowledge or wisdom.¶ In this way, second, the political realist insures the smooth operation of exploitation and oppression. If the voice of the hysteric (the protester, the activist) is successfully silenced, then they never have a place in the process of deliberation. Their vantage need never enter into the calculus of forming ways of life, bodies, rankings, countings, etc. The oligarch and servant of the oligarch always claims that he knows what’s really best for such and such a body. That body, of course, is no longer consulted, nor is it allowed to participate in any way. Like the patients in older systems of psychiatry that are never consulted but which are subjected to everything from forced medication to electro-shock therapy to lobotomy, this part is everywhere regulated by the state, by the masters, by the oligarchs– and “for their own good” –without having any say in it. Political realism always strives for this refusal of voice. The voice of this uncounted part is reduced to mere emoting, ignorance, stupidity, lack of tactical understanding, etc., etc., etc. It’s infantalized and animalized. Of course, here the animal is the example par excellence of the voice denied voice; of the voice reduced to a grunt. The animal is what we all are within the statist framework of political realism. It is in this way that exploitation and oppression proceeds apace. The animal becomes entirely invisible, or rather reduced to a code that’s already managed by the regime of the oligarch… It is reduced to a voice that has always already spoken and been understood; which is to say that it has been reduced to what the oligarch believes the animal to be saying. As such, it is inapparent.¶ Yet the “animal” must still be convinced. This is the most despicable gesture of the political realist. The political realist naturalizes the contingent organization of the social order, perpetually arguing that this the only that can and does exist. By virtue of this effacement of the contingency of this order, by virtue of the naturalization of this order and the identities that populate it, the “animal” must accept austerity foisted on its back because the alternative is “worse”, the animal must accept second class status as a woman, a latino, a black person, a queer, a worker, etc., because the alternative is “worse”. The mechanism always consists in creating a false dilemma between catastrophe and exploitation and oppression. To avoid the former, the political realist hopes to persuade the animal to accept the latter. Of course, this deadlock only proceeds through the denial of voice to the animal, a voice which opens the possibility of different distributions of the social than those that currently reign. ¶

#### Any praxis that disregards anthropocentrism is doomed to failure

LEE, ‘06 (Wendy Lynne, “On Ecology and Aesthetic Experience: A Feminist Theory of Value and Praxis”, *Ethics & the Environment* 11.1 (2006) 21-41, accessed through Project MUSE, September 19, 2011, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ethics\_and\_the\_environment/v011/11.1lee.html)

**In light of what we now know about the intimacy of the relationships between human beings, nonhuman animals, and ecological systems, any praxis—feminist or otherwise—that does not take this intimacy seriously is destined to fail in its emancipatory quest**. **Freedom has no meaning outside the endeavour to free those others who, in virtue of their capacity for labor, their vulnerability, and/or their consumability, have sustained much of Western culture, including Western feminism. This is not to say that freedom comes packaged in some universally accessible form; it does not**. Indeed, one of our tasks is to reevaluate just what this family resemblance term means for a new century whose own distinct characteristics cannot fail to influence our pursuit of happiness. Among these distinct characteristics, however, is a far greater and more globally accessible knowledge about how this pursuit affects the welfare of nonhuman animals and ecological systems; hence **whatever luxury we may have had with respect to defining freedom solely in terms of human welfare is clearly vanquished**

**in the recognition that an emancipation whose**

#### Only our approach to the topic is good – all other approaches beg the question of anthropocentrism

Schlosberg 13 (David Schlosberg; Environmental Politics Volume 22, Issue 1, 2013 Special Issue: Coming of Age? Environmental Politics at 21; “Theorising environmental justice: the expanding sphere of a discourse”; pages 37-55; KDUB)

Horizontal and vertical expansion If there has been a single major development in the framing of environmental justice in the past decade, it has been the way the use of the concept, as an organising theme or value by a range of movements, has expanded spatially (Sze and London 2008, Walker 2009). While there has been a continued focus on the original core of environmental justice issues in the distribution of toxins – or environmental bads more generally – in the United States, environmental justice discourse and literature has been extended in both topical and geographic scope. As Sze and London (2008) note in their important overview, environmental justice has seen the expansion into new issues and constituencies on the one hand, and new places and spatial analyses from the local to the global on the other. They celebrate this expansion, arguing that this attention to the expanding spatial realm of environmental justice has been the focus of many crucial researchers in the field, from politics to sociology to geography.5 This expansion has been more than simply an exercise in academic interdisciplinarity – it has led to a broad extension of the foci of environmental justice scholarship. Environmental justice may have been originally focused on the inequity of the distribution of toxics and hazardous waste in the United States, but it has moved far beyond this. Perhaps, however, such a broadening is not new, but a longstanding characteristic of the movement. Cole and Foster’s (2001) now classic study of the movement discussed the various ‘tributaries’ that make up the environmental justice movement. They included the civil rights and antitoxics movements, but also indigenous rights movements, the labour movement (including farm labour, occupational health and safety, and some industrial unions), and traditional environmentalists. Faber and McCarthy (2003) added the solidarity movement and the more general social and economic justice movements. We could easily add immigrant rights groups and urban environmental and smart growth movements, as well as local foods and food justice movements, to the list. Environmental justice as an organising frame has been applied not only to the initial issues of toxins and dumps, but also analyses of transportation, access to countryside and green space, land use and smart growth policy, water quality and distribution, energy development and jobs, brownfields refurbishment, and food justice.6 Questions of the role of scientific expertise, and the relationship between science and environmental justice communities, have also been examined.7 There has also been more thorough examination of the roles of under-examined groups in the environmental justice movement, or exposed to environmental hazards – indigenous peoples, Asian and Latino workers, women and youth,8 illustrating the broadening range of foci of environmental justice scholarship in the United States. I do not mean to imply that all of these studies offer similar or unproblematic analyses of the issues, but simply to note the longstanding and continuing trend of the expanding topical space of the environmental justice frame. In addition to the expansion of issues, there has been a push to globalise environmental justice as an explanatory discourse. There are two distinct moments to this expansion: the application of the frame to movements in a variety of countries, and the examination of the globalised and transnational nature of environmental justice movements and discourse. Walker (2009) sees this development as both a horizontal diffusion of environmental justice ideas, meanings, and framings, along with the vertical extension of an environmental justice frame beyond borders, and into relations between countries and truly global issues. As for the first, the applications of my own theoretical framework of environmental justice have been more broad than I would have imagined, including cases of postcolonial environmental justice in India, waste management in the United Kingdom, agrarian change in Sumatra, nuclear waste in Taiwan, salmon farming and First Nations in Canada, gold mining in Ghana, oil politics in Ecuador, indigenous water rights in Australia, wind farm development in Wales, pesticide drift in California, energy politics in Mexico, and many more.9 In addition, there have been collections on environmental justice focused on issues and movements in Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and the exSoviet Union.10 Walker (2009, p. 361) lists no fewer than 37 countries in which the environmental justice frame has been applied. Clearly, the discourse of environmental justice has expanded horizontally, and been engaged by both activists and academics involved § Marked 21:09 § in issues across the globe. The vertical extension of an environmental justice framework is evidently illustrated by the use of environmental justice as an organising theme by a number of global movements, such as food security, indigenous rights, and anti-neoliberalism (Schlosberg 2004). This global approach has been thoroughly analysed in Pellow’s (2007, 2011) enlightening work on the global toxics trade and both local community and global non-governmental organisation (NGO) resistance to it. Offering both a thorough analysis of the international production of waste, and keen observation of the transnational movement(s) that have risen in response, Pellow’s work brings attention to the global potential of environmental justice analysis. The essence of transnational networks, he argues, is found in their critique of environmental inequities, the disruption of social relations that produce such inequities, and the articulation of ecologically sustainable and socially just institutions and practices (Pellow 2011, p. 248). Such an analysis focuses on both the nature of the injustice and the creative and crucially networked response on the part of movements. Mohai et al. (2009) note a number of additional transnational issue networks that have environmental justice as an organising theme, from those concerned with e-waste to the movement for climate justice. Carmin and Agyeman (2011) bring both of these elements of expansion together in a recent collection that focuses both on specific issues and movements and a larger global framework of analysis. Clearly, environmental justice analysis continues to expand in scope and scale.

### Violence

**No tradeoff**

**Kaldor, 99** [\* Mary H. Kaldor, London School of Economics, **same symposium as the nayar article**, SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: The Ideas of 1989: The Origins of the Concept of Global Civil Society, p. lexis]

The dialogue between the peace movement and the East European groups was important in several respects. First of all, the East/West strategy was by no means widely accepted. On the contrary, it was bitterly contested within the peace movement, among the Central European groups and in the dialogue between them. The decade of the 1980s was a period of intense debate about how to achieve democracy and human rights in Eastern Europe. Which came first, peace or democracy? What was the appropriate strategy for ending the Cold War? There were those in the peace movement who argued that human rights would follow disarmament and that the worst evil was nuclear weapons; by taking up the human rights issue, groups like END were [\*482] endorsing the Western leaders' Cold War rhetoric and thus reducing the chances of disarmament. In addition, there were those in the East who argued that the Soviet Union only understands force and the West, therefore, needed to be strong; unilateralism was appeasement and disarmament would only be possible after the fall of communism. By the end of the decade there was a growing consensus, at least among those who took part in the dialogue, that democracy in Eastern Europe was the best strategy for ending the Cold War but, at the same time, democracy could be best achieved within the framework of a detente process and a wind down of the arms race. There was also intense debate about how to relate to dictators and oppressors. At one end of the scale, there were primarily those in Communist Parties, but also the German Social Democrats who considered that the priority was a dialogue with officials, particularly the peace committees, and that dialogue with the opposition should not publicly disturb this official dialogue. There were those, primarily in the opposition in the East, who felt there should be no communication with officials, that any communication was a form of collaboration. In between the two extremes, there were a range of positions which varied according to particular situations. These debates were a form of education, a learning process. The thinking of many individuals was profoundly influenced by these discussions and many of those individuals are in power today in both the East and West. Secondly, through the dialogue, the peace movement was able to expand the space in which the East European groups operated and to assist communication between them. In part, the peace movement represented an inspiration to young people who wanted to be able to demonstrate as in the West. As one young pastor put it at the Dresden Peace Forum in 1982: In our television news we see lengthy reports of West European peace movements; and there are many young people who ask why it is so difficult to do such things here. People want to know why, in this country, where there is after all so much talk of peace, wearing the "Swords into Ploughshares" badge, for instance, can lead to so many difficulties. n20 For many young people, a direct connection was made between the Cold War and their own situation. "We have got used to a divided Europe," one of the founders of the Hungarian group Dialogue wrote in 1983: It has become too much part of our consciousness, it does not even occur to us that it can be changed. I am afraid that this already absurd situation could deteriorate further. It would be unbearable to have closed borders, the halt of mutual commerce, [\*483] hatred, preparations of one side against the other, and a national paranoia behind every critical voice. The fight to avoid and prevent this gives me a tangible purpose. Our first documents which came out after long discussion, indicate that we think of the Cold War as our prime enemy, and the struggle and its style are indicated by one of the meanings of our name: Dialogue. n21 But the peace movement also provided support and visibility to the groups in Central Europe and, in effect, acted as a kind of umbrella, especially in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In the GDR and Poland, the churches were able to offer some shelter to the new groups; this was not possible in the other countries. In the end, the issue of how to relate to officials became a matter of necessity. Since the official peace committees had the job of liaising with Western peace groups, peace activists were able to make use of this privileged access and to put pressure on them to tolerate the existence of the East European groups. In the case of Hungary, for example, the Dialogue group was allowed to exist for a few months until the deployment of cruise missiles because of the argument made by Western peace activists that the existence of a genuine independent peace group in Hungary helped the campaign against cruise missiles and provided the beginnings of an answer to the question frequently raised: "Why not demonstrate in Moscow?" Finally, the endless negotiation and pressure on officials, about travel or holding meetings or the release of individual activists, did eventually begin to influence insiders who contributed to the non-violent nature of the 1989 revolutions.

"It is like water dripping on a stone" one official told me privately. It helped the regimes. Above all, it helped to influence the new thinking of the Gorbachev regime. n22 What the peace movement added to the ideas of the Central European intellectuals was transnationalism--the idea of networks of citizens, which could cross borders and bore holes into closed societies. It must be noted that it was not just East-West networks that were facilitated. By the end of the decade, the peace movement was able to facilitate East-East networking as well. It was the many small holes that penetrated the Cold War structures, Jan Kavan, the Czech Foreign Minister, said in a recent BBC2 program that helped to undermine the whole edifice. The new ideas were thus a combination of transnationalism or globalization and, at the same time, a new understanding and extension of democracy focusing on concepts like empowerment, participation, and deliberation, which have become so important in the 1990s. [\*484] Social scientists will never agree about the relative importance of the different factors that led to the end of the Cold War. The significance of the 1989 revolutions will be perceived differently depending on underlying theoretical perspectives. One test of a good explanation is its predictive power. Those who studied Eastern Europe "from above," by studying economic trends or the composition of politburos, failed to predict the 1989 revolutions. In the aftermath of the revolutions, there was much soul searching in think tanks across the United States in particular. Those who were engaged in the dialogue knew that change was under way; they did not predict the form of the 1989 revolutions, but they did expect something to happen. Perhaps the most prescient person was E.P. Thompson. In 1982, he wrote: What we can glimpse now . . . is a detente of peoples rather than states--a movement of peoples which sometimes dislodges states from their blocs and brings them into a new diplomacy of conciliation, which sometimes runs beneath state structures, and which sometimes defies the ideological and security structures of particular states . . . The Cold War road show, which each year enlarges, is now lurching towards its terminus. But in this moment changes have arisen in our continent, of scarcely more than one year's growth, which signify a challenge to the Cold War itself. These are not "political" changes in the usual sense. They cut through the flesh of politics down to the human bone . . . . . . . What I have proposed is improbable. But, if it commenced, it might gather pace with astonishing speed. There would not be decades of detente as the glaciers slowly melt. There would be rapid and unpredictable changes; nations would become unglued from their alliances; there would be sharp conflicts within nations; there would be successive risks. We could roll up the map of the Cold War and travel without maps for a while. n23 CONCEPTUAL IMPLICATIONS The concepts of peace and human rights are associated with the rise of the nation-state. Sir Michael Howard has written about the emergence of the concept of peace after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) as periods of peace began to alternate with periods of war. n24 The idea of natural rights, or later the rights of man, which were the forerunners of human rights, developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, linked to the notion of a social [\*485] contract through which states are established. Natural rights, the rights possessed by man in a state of nature, were voluntarily abrogated in exchange for rights guaranteed by the state, in particular security or the right to life (Hobbes) and liberty (Locke). Peace was about the absence of war, the relation between states. Human rights were about the relation between the state and its citizens. Peace referred to the external arena, an area outside the social contract, characterized by anarchy; human rights were about domestic or internal peace. The notion of rights was linked to the idea of civil society and a domestic rule of law, in contrast to the state of nature that prevailed in the international arena. The external was the world of realpolitik, of blood and iron; the internal was the world of politics and law. Violence was, as it were, pushed outwards beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. According to Rousseau: Should we have been slow to see that . . . . Each one of us being in the civil state as regards our fellow citizens, but in the state of nature as regards the rest of the world, we have taken all kinds of precautions against private wars only to kindle national wars a thousand times more terrible? n25 In fact, of course, wars did take place on somebody's territory and appalling tragedies were inflicted on ordinary people during wars. For people in Britain, the internal/external distinction seems applicable because, in practice, wars did take place abroad. Elsewhere in Europe, the distinction about the character of violence was conceptual. In a sense, one could argue that the implicit contract through which states were established guaranteed individual rights or domestic peace in exchange for an abrogation of those rights in wartime. In peacetime, the citizen was an individual; in wartime, he (and it usually was "he") became part of the collectivity, the state. Effectively, the citizen gained individual rights in exchange for unlimited liability in time of war--hence the importance of being prepared to die for one's country. Of course, reality was much more complicated. Modern war, war between nation-states, was hedged in by all kinds of constraints and justified by secular rationality. The rights of man were envisaged by liberal thinkers, from the beginning, as universal, even if the social contract applied only partially. Hence, nearly all liberal thinkers developed models of perpetual peace, which applied to the relations between states. The most famous was probably the model of Immanuel Kant, published in 1795, which explicitly envisaged a notion of cosmopolitan rights overriding state sovereignty. n26 The nation-state was an imperfect institution and, it can be argued, by 1914, it had already begun to crack. One tension was that of the increasing [\*486] interconnectedness of economies and societies and the difficulties of sustaining clear boundaries. Another tension was the growing demand for emancipation and for further extensions of rights. It took two unbelievably barbaric wars before a temporary solution was found. That solution was the blocs. The blocs involved an extension of civil society or domestic peace across groups of nations. Violence was, as it were, pushed further outwards. It could be argued that a renewed contract was established in which huge emancipatory gains were made primarily in economic and social domains, in exchange for readiness to be part of a bloc-wide collectivity and participate in a war of unimaginable proportions. It was a war sustained in our imaginations through the reproduction of an ever more fearsome military confrontation, through spying games and hostile rhetoric. I have used the term "imaginary war" to describe the Cold War. n27 We lived as though we were at war and the war shaped our membership in collectivities just as earlier wars had shaped the "imagined communities" of the nation. For the West, the threat of nuclear war was justified by the absence of human rights in the East and the risk that totalitarianism might spread, and for the East, the absence of human rights was justified by the permanent threat of war. Whereas in the West, the war system (or the military industrial complex as it became known) was only one element of society, albeit with profound implications, in the East, the war system encompassed society so that individual identity was permanently eclipsed. Indeed, the Soviet system can perhaps be best understood not as socialism but as a war system. The centralization, discipline, mobilization, and paranoia were typical of societies at war. Moreover, the system functioned most effectively in wartime. This idea was first formulated by the Polish reform economist Oskar Lange in a lecture given in Belgrade in 1957. n28 But it was anticipated by George Orwell in the book 1984, which was widely read by East European dissidents. When, the hero, Winston Smith, reads the book which describes the system under which he lives, he discovers that: War, it will be seen, is now a purely internal affair. In the past, the ruling groups of all countries, although they might recognize their common interest and limit the destructiveness of war, did fight against one another, and the victor always plundered the vanquished. In our own day, they are not fighting against one another at all. The war is waged by each ruling group against its [\*487] subjects, and the object of war is not to make or prevent conquests of territory but to keep the structure of society intact. n29 What the dialogue of the 1980s achieved was to undermine this logic. By the end of the 1980s, there was an increasingly shared consensus that detente from above and from below provided a framework for opening up Eastern Europe, for creating autonomous spaces and laying the basis for democratization; that weakening of the war system was a precondition for independent political claims. In addition, by the same token, the widening of the spaces--the beginnings of the process of democratization--was clearly the most effective strategy for dismantling the structures of the Cold War. In the aftermath of the collapse of the blocs, the distinction between internal and external, between peace and human rights, is rapidly eroding. The new wars, taking place in the Balkans or Central Africa, are, at one and the same time, massive violations of human rights. n30 They are wars of the state or of private groups against citizens, not wars between states. However, it is wrong to characterize them as internal wars. They spill over borders through refugees, Diaspora groups, and criminal networks and have a tendency to spread. At the same time, new global instruments are being developed to cope with this kind of violence. Many of these instruments were fashioned beneath the structures of the Cold War--the various human rights conventions, treaties, and bodies, international economic institutions, not to mention the kind of citizen networking that took place in the 1980s. Such instruments have come into their own and indeed have been immeasurably strengthened in the context of an accelerated process of globalization that followed the breaching of the last bastion of what Megnad Desai calls deglobalization and the rapid spread of electronic technologies, especially the Internet. n31 It can be argued that, today, we face a stark choice--between a global civil society, by which I do not mean world government but rather a global peace and a global rule of law, underpinned by an active and alert transnational citizenry, and between a reversion to some kind of pre-modern patterns of violence even more pervasive than in the pre-modern period. Of course, the legacies of the Cold War are still with us--the continued persistence of the military lobby, the belief in virtual or costless war, the way in which "solutions" to human rights problems are conceived in terms of missiles. The bombing of Yugoslavia, in a way, can be understood as a kind of compromise between the new globalist approach towards peace and human [\*488] rights that has its roots in the ideas of 1989 and the legacies of Cold War thinking. CONCLUSION To conclude, my argument is that there were indeed new ideas and they can be summed up in the concept of global civil society. 1989 did represent a profound rupture with the past that is difficult for us to comprehend. In the stirrings of thought that developed beneath the structures of the Cold War were the beginnings of some new concepts and practices that can help us to analyze our immensely complex contemporary world. One of the reasons it was so difficult to identify the new ideas of 1989 was because we had not come to terms with the radical changes currently taking place. We only had old situations, earlier revolutions, the simplicities of the past, by which to describe what was happening. Perhaps in ten years time, the ideas will have crystallized further and it will be easier to make judgments.

### AT: thought exp = violent

IT DOESNT CAUSE VIOLENCE

Lucas-Rose 06 (Rebecca Garcia Lucas-Rose – Trinity College, University of Melbourne, 2006, “Human Rights: ¶ An Earth-based Ethics”, <http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/colloquy/download/colloquy_issue_12_november_2006/rose.pdf>) //MD

There exists the misconception that rejecting strong anthropocentrism ¶ or human-centeredness equates with denying or rejecting the special nature of human-human relationship. Drawing attention to and calling for care ¶ towards nonhumans does not disadvantage humans. An ecocentric ethics ¶ promotes an ethics of care that is inclusive of all life, human and nonhuman, whereby the kinship and welfare of humans are neither diminished ¶ nor neglected. All life benefits from an ecocentric approach. An ecophilosophical perspective needs to be a foundational element for the theory and ¶ practice of human rights. Although I will be discussing human rights specifically, we should keep in mind that the ecophilosophical basis to human ¶ rights that will be introduced advocates for the rights of all life, not only human life. Indeed, the subject of nonhuman rights will be understood as integral to human rights, and a necessary consideration within any honesteffort to understand and help resolve situations characterized by extreme violations of human rights, in particular military conflict and terrorism.

### 2ac slavery best

Relies on the construction of the human in relationship to other

Moral obligation – equivalent to slavery

Best 6(Steven, Intl Journal of Inclusive Democracy, http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/vol2/vol2\_no3\_Best\_rethinking\_revolution\_PRINTABLE.htm)

The next great step in moral evolution is to abolish the last acceptable form of slavery that subjugates the vast majority of species on this planet to the violent whim of one. Moral advance today involves sending human supremacy to the same refuse bin that society earlier discarded much male supremacy and white supremacy. Animal liberation requires that people transcend the complacent boundaries of humanism in order to make a qualitative leap in ethical consideration, thereby moving the moral bar from reason and language to sentience and subjectivity. Animal liberation is the culmination of a vast historical learning process whereby human beings gradually realize that arguments justifying hierarchy, inequality, and discrimination of any kind are arbitrary, baseless, and fallacious. Moral progress occurs in the process of demystifying and deconstructing all myths ―from ancient patriarchy and the divine right of kings to Social Darwinism and speciesism― that attempt to legitimate the domination of one group over another. Moral progress advances through the dynamic of replacing hierarchical visions with egalitarian visions and developing a broader and more inclusive ethical community. Having recognized the illogical and unjustifiable rationales used to oppress blacks, women, and other disadvantaged groups, society is beginning to grasp that speciesism is another unsubstantiated form of oppression and discrimination. The gross inconsistency of Leftists who champion democracy and rights while supporting a system that enslaves billions of other sentient and intelligent life forms is on par with the hypocrisy of American colonists protesting British tyranny while enslaving millions of blacks. The commonalities of oppression help us to narrativize the history of human moral consciousness, and to map the emergence of moral progress in our culture. This trajectory can be traced through the gradual universalization of rights. By grasping the similarities of experience and oppression, we gain insight into the nature of power, we discern the expansive boundaries of the moral community, and we acquire a new vision of progress and civilization, one based upon ecological and non-speciesist principles and universal justice.

### Wilderson

**Solvency**

Roffe 05 Jon philosopher http://www.iep.utm.edu/deleuze/

Gilles Deleuze began his career with a number of idiosyncratic yet rigorous historical studies of figures outside of the Continental tradition in vogue at the time. His first book, Empirisism and Subjectivity, isa study of Hume, interpreted by Deleuze to be a radical subjectivist. Deleuze became known for writing about other philosophers with new insights and different readings, interested as he was in liberating philosophical history from the hegemony of one perspective. He wrote on Spinoza, Nietzche, Kant, Leibniz and others, including literary authors and works, cinema, and art. Deleuze claimed that he did not write “about” art, literature, or cinema, but, rather, undertook philosophical “encounters” that led him to new concepts. As a constructivist, he was adamant that philosophers are creators, and that each reading of philosophy, or each philosophical encounter, ought to inspire new concepts. Additionally, according to Deleuze and his concepts of difference, there is no identity, and in repetition, nothing is ever the same. Rather, there is only difference: copies are something new, everything is constantly changing, and reality is a becoming, not a being.

#### Wilderson presents a naïve and undifferentiated view of racial relations in the US. The neg’s understanding of structural antagonism destroys the possibility for engaging the complexities necessary to tackle whiteness.

**Janani 2013**

“What's Wrong With the Term 'Person of Color',” <http://blackgirldangerous.org/new-blog/2013/3/21/whats-wrong-with-the-term-person-of-color/>

Black cultural theorist Frank Wilderson's Red, White, and Black argues that early US America was constructed in a racial triangle of Settler/Savage/Slave. White people, White men really, claimed this land and because they were able to use Black bodies for slave labor, they were able to launch a genocide on Indigenous peoples. That is, the dehumanization and exploitation of Black people scaffolded the erasure of Native peoples. This was the racial order set in place in the early formation of the US as a White supremacist state. This model leaves a whole lot of us out, of course. API folks, Latinos, Middle Eastern folks, and many more of us don't fit into that racial triangle. We're not White, and we bring our own histories of colonization. Many of us were colonized by the US itself, and White people have supremacy over all of us in various and different ways. But the fact is our land and resources were not stolen from us in this space and our ancestors were not brought here as slaves (with some important exceptions). That place-based specificity is what the term 'person of color' doesn't deal with adequately. As an identifier, 'person of color' can be slippery for a lot of politicized, non-Black, non-indigenous, non-White people in the US, for 2 reasons: 1) US/Western imperialism is so widespread that it even imposes its ways of doing racism on the rest of the world, and on people of color. For example, my family is upper caste, and that caste position is partly what enabled our immigration to the US. It also means that we're lighter-skinned South Asians (read: closer to Aryan British colonizers). Using the term 'POC' as my identifier rather than 'South Asian' or 'Desi' means I never unpack these non-Western racial systems that are also at play. 2) Many of our communities have benefited variously from racism. South Asian communities I've been involved in use antiblack racism as one strategy of assimilation. Because as White people have established, the easiest way to shore up your racial supremacy is to be antiblack, displayed in everything from microaggressions to employment discrimination to violence. We know that people of color can be racist towards each other. What I'm saying is that many of us also reap systematic advantages from the racist attitudes and structures that are held by our entire communities. How do we, as politicized people of color, acknowledge the very limits of the term 'people of color' and the way it can mask our actual racial situations? For example, why do we keep using the phrase 'communities of color' as targets of police and state violence when we primarily mean Black and Latino folks? What races are we trying to contain in the word 'brown'? Why are we afraid to point to the specificities of racism? Do we think it will divide us? Do we think we are really not capable of understanding and working from the different ways we experience racism? As long as the vocabularies of our struggle derive from the homogenizing actions of White supremacy, we will be that much farther from racial liberation.

#### Anti-blackness cannot explain orientalist violence against Islam which preceded the Enlightenment

Charoenying (citing Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Prof of Ethnic Studies, UC Berkeley) 8

(Timothy, Islamophobia & Anti-Blackness: A Genealogical Approach, http://crg.berkeley.edu/content/islamophobia-anti-blackness-genealogical-approach)

The year 1492 marked a major  turning point in the trajectory of Western Civilization. Elementary age children are taught this as the year Columbus famously crossed the Atlantic. An equally significant event that year, was the Spanish conquest of al-Andalus–a Moorish province on the southern Iberian peninsula established eight centuries earlier–and more importantly, the last major Muslim stronghold on the European continent. Critical race scholars have argued that these two events would not only shift the geopolitical balance of power from the Orient to the Occident, but fundamentally alter conceptions about religious and racial identity. According to Nelson Maldonado-Torres, of the University of California, Berkeley, **the expulsion of the Moors from continental Europe marked a transition from an age of imperial relations between Christian and Muslim empires, to an age of European colonial expansion throughout the known world.** The “discovery” of “godless” natives in the Americas would also inspire the great debates between Las Casas and Sepúlveda in 1550 on the nature of the human soul. Such a geopolitical and philosophical shift, Maldonado-Torres argues, would lead to a Eurocentric, re-categorization of humanity based upon religous—and ultimately racial—differences. Maldonado-Torres has proposed that anti-black racism is not simply an extension of some historical bias against blacks, but rather, is an amalgam of old-world Islamophobia linked to the history of the Iberian Peninsula, and to the notion of soulless beings embodied in popular conceptions about the indigenous natives of the Americas. These beliefs would contribute to an ideological basis for, and justification of, colonial conquests in the name of cultural and religious conversion, as well as pave the way for the enslavement and human trafficking of sub-Saharan Africans.

#### Orientalist Otherization creates a dyad between faiths, making genocidal violence inevitable

Batur, 2k7 (Pinar Batur, Professor of Sociology and Director of Environmental Studies at Vassar College; “Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide,” 2007, “Handbook of the Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations,” “Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide”)

Albert Memmi argued that “We have no idea what the colonized would have been without colonization, but we certainly see what happened as a result of it”(Memmi, 1965: 114). Events surrounding Iraq and Katrina provide three critical points regarding global racism. The first one is that segregation, exclusion, and genocide are closely related and facilitated by institutions employing the white racial frame to legitimize their ideologies and actions. The second one is the continuation of violence, either sporadically or systematically, with single- minded determination from segregation, to exclusion, to genocide. The third point is that legitimization and justification of violence is embedded in the resignation that global racism will not alter its course, and there is no way to challenge global racism. Together these three points facilitate the base for war and genocide In 1993, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Samuel P. Huntington racialized the future of global conflict by declaring that “the clash of civilizations will dominate global politics” (Huntington 1993: 22). He declared that the fault line will be drawn by crisis and bloodshed. Huntington’s end of ideology meant the West is now expected to confront the Confucian-Islamic “other.” Huntington intoned “Islam has bloody borders,” and he expected the West to develop cooperation among Christian brethren, while limiting the military strength of the “Confucian-Islamic” civilizations, by exploiting the conflicts within them. When the walls of communism fell, a new enemy was found in Islam, and loathing and fear of Islam exploded with September 11. The new color line means “we hate them not because of what they do, but because of who they are and what they believe in.”

Wilderson’s ontology makes fatalism inevitable and offers no alt

Bâ, 11 (teaches film at Portsmouth University (UK). He researches ‘race’, the ‘postcolonial’, diaspora, the transnational and film ‘genre’, African and Caribbean cinemas and film festivals)

(Saër Maty, The US Decentred, Cultural Studies Review, volume 17 number 2 September 2011)

In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, he writes: The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7 Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279) Not only does Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below), I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians’ and sociologists’ works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazz‐studies books on cross‐cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225) there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti‐ Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340)

#### Turns the K – greatest comparative threat

Miah quoting West in 94

(Malik Miah, Cornel West's Race Matters, May-June, http://www.solidarity-us.org/node/3079)

In the chapter, “Nihilism in Black America,” West observes “The liberal/conservative discussion conceals the most basic issue now facing Black America: the nihilistic threat to its very existence. This threat is not simply a matter of relative economic deprivation and political powerlessness -- though economic well-being and political clout are requisites for meaningful Black progress. It is primarily a question of speaking to the profound sense of psychological depression, personal worthlessness, and social despair so widespread in Black America.” (12-13) “Nihilism,” he continues, “is to be understood here not as a philosophic doctrine ... it is, far more, the lived experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaningless, hopelessness, and (most important) lovelessness.” (14) “Nihilism is not new in Black America. . . . In fact,” West explains,” the major enemy of Black survival in America has been and is neither oppression nor exploitation but rather the nihilistic Threat -- that is, loss of hope and absence of meaning. For as long as hope remains and meaning is preserved, the possibility of overcoming oppression stays alive. The self-fulfilling prophecy of the nihilistic threat is that without hope there can be no future, that without meaning there can be no struggle.” (14-15)

#### The pervasiveness of anti-blackness arguments in the debate space is creating a new norm for critical argumentaion; even white kids are reading Wilderson now. Sexton says this puts the very radicalism of the critical activity into question. Only when Wilderson arguments start losing more ballots can the true radicalism of the argument be actualized. Wilderson has been commodified within the debate space.

ANTE-ANTI-BLACKNESS: AFTERTHOUGHTS

Jared Sexton - African American Studies - University of California, (A slightly different and more extended version of this argument can be found in "The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism," forthcoming in the peer-reviewed electronic journal InTensions, based at York University.) Irvinehttp://lateral.culturalstudiesassociation.org/issue1/content/sexton.html

In "The Case of Blackness," Moten is concerned with a strife internal to the field formation of black studies, internal, moreover, to the black (radical) tradition [10] that black studies is or seeks out as institutional inscription, a "strife between normativity and the deconstruction of norms" that he argues, persuasively, "is essential not only to contemporary black academic discourse but also to the discourses of the barbershop, the beauty shop, and the bookstore" (Moten 2008: 178). Put slightly differently, there is a strife within the black (radical) tradition between "radicalism (here understood as the performance of a general critique of the proper)" and a "normative striving against the grain of the very radicalism from which the desire for norms is derived" (Moten 2008: 177). [11] If radicalism gives rise to the desire for norms, like a river from source water or a tree from roots, if the general critique of the proper gives rise to the desire for propriety (in the fullest sense of the term) and not vice versa, then our prevailing notion of critique – and the forms and sources of our critical activity – is put profoundly into question, and, I think, rightly so. It would mean, at the very least, that we could not, as Nahum Chandler ably demonstrates, analytically presuppose "the system in which the subordination takes place," in this case the system of racial slavery, and then insert the subjects or objects of that system "into this pre-established matrix to engage in their functional articulation of the permutations prescribed therein" (Chandler 2000: 261). Instead, we would have to account for "the constitution of general system or structure" and not just its operational dynamics (ibid, emphasis added). [12] Moten finds examples of this prevailing notion of critique in a certain moment of Fanon and, consequently, in a citation and elaboration or resonance of Fanon in a 2003 article, "Raw Life," that I co-authored with Huey Copeland for the journal Qui Parle (Sexton & Copeland 2003). There are other references in Moten's piece, less perceptible, to an interview with Saidiya Hartman conducted by Frank B. Wilderson, III for the same issue under the title, "The Position of the Unthought" (Hartman 2003). There are references, by extension, to Hartman's Scenes of Subjection (1997) and Lose Your Mother (2007) and to Wilderson'sRed, White and Black (2008), as well as to some of the sources that the latter draws upon in his own formulation: Kara Keeling's The Witch's Flight (2007), David Marriott'sOn Black Men (2000), Achille Mbembe's On the Postcolony (2001). All of these works are addressed to the extent that they are said to share "an epistemological consensus broad enough to include Fanon, on the one hand, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, on the other – encompassing formulations that might be said not only to characterize but also to initiate and continually re-initialize the philosophy of the human sciences." (Moten 2008: 188).[13] That's curious company, of course, but that's precisely the point.

### 1ar material

#### Sexton concludes that exclusively dealing with anti-blackness without also interrogating other forms of oppression is key to achieving actual political action. Sexton 12

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For Wilderson, afro-pessimism takes seriously the longue durée of social death in Atlantic history and thereby pursues an investigation of "the meaning of Blackness not – in the first instance – as a variously and unconsciously interpellated identity or as a conscious social actor [animated by legible political interests], but as a structuralposition of non-communicability in the face of all other positions" (Wilderson 2010: 58, emphasis added). Wilderson's procedure here is something like the abstraction of a conceptual framework (regarding structural positionality), a methodology (regarding paradigmatic analysis) and a structure of feeling (regarding the politics of antagonism) that, taken together, remain implicit in the work of various luminaries of black studies but whose full implications only become available when they are rendered explicit and raised to another level of theorization. [5] Moten, in his turn, forwards a notion of black optimism drawn from his longstanding meditation on the relation between black politics and black musical performance and this notion is meant, in part, to counter or reposition the premises of afro-pessimism by holding the force of black agency to be logically and ontologically prior to the construction of a social order characterized by anti-blackness – "the resistance that constitutes constraint," as he phrases it elsewhere. [6] I think it important that the shifting line of distinction progressively marked out between the theoretical tendencies I have just sketched turns in crucial ways on their real or imagined ability to think about what Wilderson calls "the political ontology of race" not only alongside and through a history of capitalism and the emergence of the modern nation-state, [7] but also with respect to formations of gender and sexuality as mutually constituting categories of differentiation. [8] We are dealing here with both the challenges of analytical description and the desire for political prescription.

#### Black social death theory ignores the plurality of life affirming possibilities available even to the fungible body and fails to explain the oppression of other groups

**Bales, 5** (Kevin Bales, co-founder of Free the Slaves, PhD in economics at the London School of Economics, MA in sociology from the University of Mississippi, “Understanding Global Slavery: A Reader,” p56-7)

The concept of social death highlights the essentialism and totality of enslavement, but it begs certain questions. The effect of enslavement on the life of the slave shares certain characteristics with the effect of immersion on the lives of inmates in total institutions, such as concentration camps. Elie Wiesel, for example, discussed the resocialization of inmates of Nazi concentration camps: the dissolution of their personalities, the fading from memory of their previous lives, the invention of a new being tailored to the demands and context of the camp.47 Like slavery, life in a concentration camp was a state marked by the loss of autonomy, a lack of free will, and subjugation to extreme and violent control. But could inmates in such camps be said to be socially dead? Slavery is, after all, a social and economic relationship between (at least) two people. It may be marked by an extreme imbalance of power, by ongoing exploitation, and by the potential for violence, but it remains a relationship understood and recognized (if not agreed to) by both parties. From historical slavery comes extensive accounts of the interdependence of slaves and masters and of the sometimes rich and caring relationships that grew between them.48 In Mauritania in 1997, David Hecht found an Afro-Mauritanian walking hand in hand with a White Moor dressed in matching robes. They told him that they were master and slave as well as best friends.49 It may be that the concept of social death works best when social life is defined as existing in a state of autonomy and free will, but autonomy varies enormously in human relationships. Slavery may occupy one end of the continuum, a relationship marked by the least amount of autonomy, but it remains a social relationship. Two other factors prompt questions about the concept of social death. The first is the difference in psychological and social adjustments to enslavement by people of different ages. Having interviewed a number of slaves, I find it worth noting that those who have been enslaved from a very early age often show an acceptance of slavery and a willingness to define themselves in relation to their masters. They tend to have a clear idea of their location in the social universe, as “belonging” to a certain family or individual slaveholder. Yet the state holds within itself a social and personal history, one that the slaves will easily recount when asked. For example, recall the reply given in chapter 2 by the bonded laborer in India who said, “We have always lived here. I do not know about before my grandfather, but he said we have always lived here.” People who are enslaved as adults, on the other hand, carry with them the memory of their former state. This memory often becomes the emblem of their desire for freedom. Having known some form of freedom, they are unlikely to accept a view of themselves as socially dead, but instead see themselves as abused, coerced, or controlled against their will. Given these self definitions, we can assert that neither those enslaved as children

#### Wilderson’s logic of social death replicates the violence of the middle passage – rejection is necessary to honor the dead

Brown, 9 (Vincent Brown, professor of history and of African and African American Studies specializing in Atlantic Slavery; “Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery,” http://history.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/documents/brown-socialdeath.pdf)

But this was not the emphasis of Patterson’s argument. As a result, those he has inspired have often conflated his exposition of slaveholding ideology with a description of the actual condition of the enslaved. Seen as a state of being, the concept of social death is ultimately out of place in the political history of slavery. If studies of slavery would account for the outlooks and maneuvers of the enslaved as an important part of that history, scholars would do better to keep in view the struggle against alienation rather than alienation itself. To see social death as a productive peril entails a subtle but significant shift in perspective, from seeing slavery as a condition to viewing enslavement as a predicament, in which enslaved Africans and their descendants never ceased to pursue a politics of belonging, mourning, accounting, and regeneration. In part, the usefulness of social death as a concept depends on what scholars of slavery seek to explain—black pathology or black politics, resistance or attempts to remake social life? For too long, debates about whether there were black families took precedence over discussions of how such families were formed; disputes about whether African culture had “survived” in the Americas overwhelmed discussions of how particular practices mediated slaves’ attempts to survive; and scholars felt compelled to prioritize the documentation of resistance over the examination of political strife in its myriad forms. But of course, because slaves’ social and political life grew directly out of the violence and dislocation of Atlantic slavery, these are false choices. And we may not even have to choose between tragic and romantic modes of storytelling, for history tinged with romance may offer the truest acknowledgment of the tragedy confronted by the enslaved: it took heroic effort for them to make social lives. There is romance, too, in the tragic fact that although scholars may never be able to give a satisfactory account of the human experience in slavery, they nevertheless continue to try. If scholars were to emphasize the efforts of the enslaved more than the condition of slavery, we might at least tell richer stories about how the endeavors of the weakest and most abject have at times reshaped the world. The history of their social and political lives lies between resistance and oblivion, not in the nature of their condition but in their continuous struggles to remake it. Those struggles are slavery’s bequest to us.