### 2ac short – rc & ontology

Squo conceptualizes Mexico’s ecosystem as devoid of intrinsic value this results in arbitrary hierarchies between forms of life ie: humans and animals; this underscores all other modes of oppression and precedes their root cause arguments because the human animal distinction occurred structurally prior to distinctions within the species

Separating the environment from humanity also precludes ones ability to feel that they belong in the universe, a lack of belonging results in a constant horror of isolation precluding ones ability to embrace subjectivity

### ---agamben

#### Agamben votes aff

Wadiwel 4 (Dinesh Joesph, completing a doctorate at the University of Western Sydney “Animal by Any Other Name? Patterson and Agamben Discuss Animal (and Human) Life” Borderlands E-Journal Vol 3 No. 1; Kristof)

Both of these ‘brushes’ with the animal point to the same thing: **for Agamben** the political is caught between a ceaseless constitution of the human and the in-human, the human and the animal. Homo sacer or **‘bare life’ is the meeting point of this threshold, where** the pre-eminent political question, above all other forms of inquiry, is life and how it is defined. It is no coincidence therefore that **Agamben continues this theme** in The Open, **when he remarks that "**it is more urgent to work on these divisions, to ask in what way − within man − has man been separated from non-man, and the animal from the human, than it is to take positions on the great issues, on so called human rights and values."

### at bare life

**No impact – people can assert agency in the face of state control – ignoring this disempowers the alt**

Cesare **Casarino**, professor of cultural studies and comparative literature at the University of Minnesota AND Antonio Negri, author of numerous volumes of philosophy and political theory. “It’s a Powerful Life: A Conversation on Contemporary Philosophy” Cultural Critique 57. **2004**

AN: I believe Giorgio is writing a sequel to Homo Sacer, and I feel that this new work will be resolutive for his thought—in the sense that he will be forced in it to resolve and find a way out of the ambiguity that has qualified his understanding of naked life so far. He already attempted something of the sort in his recent book on Saint Paul, but I think this attempt largely failed: as usual, **this book** is extremely learned and elegant; it **remains**, however, somewhat **trapped within** Pauline **exegesis, rather than constituting a full-fledged attempt to reconstruct naked life as a potentiality for exodus,** to rethink naked life fundamentally in terms of exodus. **I believe that the concept of naked life is not an impossible**, unfeasible **one**. I believe it is possible to push the image of power to the point at which a defenseless human being [un povero Cristo] is crushed, to conceive of that extreme point at which power tries to [End Page 173] eliminate that ultimate resistance that is the sheer attempt to keep oneself alive. From a logical standpoint, it is possible to think all this: the naked bodies of the people in the camps, for example, can lead one precisely in this direction. **But this is** also **the point at which this concept turns into ideology: to conceive of the relation between power and life in such a way** actually **ends up bolstering and reinforcing ideology**. **Agamben**, in effect, **is saying that such is the nature of power: in the final instance, power reduces each and every human being to such a state of powerlessness. But this is absolutely not true!** On the contrary: **the historical process takes place and is produced thanks to a continuous constitution and construction, which** undoubtedly **confronts the limit over and over** again—**but this is an extraordinarily rich limit, in which desires expand, and** in which **life becomes** increasingly **fuller**. Of course it is possible to conceive of the limit as absolute powerlessness, especially when it has been actually enacted and enforced in such a way so many times. And yet, isn't such a conception of the limit precisely what the limit looks like from the standpoint of constituted power as well as from the standpoint of those who have already been totally annihilated by such a power—which is, of course, one and the same standpoint? Isn't this the story about power that power itself would like us to believe in and reiterate? **Isn't it far more politically useful to conceive of this limit from the standpoint of those who are not yet or not completely crushed by power§ Marked 14:11 § , from the standpoint of those still struggling to overcome such a limit, from the standpoint of the process of constitution**, from the standpoint of power [potenza]? I am worried about the fact that **the concept of naked life as it is conceived by Agamben might be taken up by political movements and in political debates**: I find this prospect quite troubling, which is why I felt the need to attack this concept in my recent essay. Ultimately, I feel that nowadays **the logic of traditional eugenics is attempting to saturate and capture the whole of human reality**—even at the level of its materiality, that is, through genetic engineering—and **the** ultimate **result of such a process of saturation and capture is a capsized production of subjectivity within which ideological undercurrents continuously try to subtract or neutralize our resistance**. [End Page 174]

### 2ac a2 luke

#### Luke concludes that institutional change is necessary to stop extinction – their alternative fails

Luke, 97 – professor of political science at Virginia polytechnic

Timothy, “Ecocritique: Contesting the Politics of Nature, Economy, and Culture”, pg 126-127

It may be true that “the actions of those now living will determine the future and possibly the very survival of the species”, but it is, in fact, mostly a mystification. Only the actions of a very small handful of the humans who are now living, namely, those in significant positions of decisive managerial power in business or central executive authority in government, can truly do something to determine the future. Hollander’s belief that thousands of his readers, who will replace their light bulbs, water heaters, automobiles, or toilets with ecologically improved alternatives, can decisively affect the survival of the species is pure ideology. It may sell new kinds of toilets, cars, appliances, and light bulbs, but it does not guarantee planetary survival. Hollander does not stop here. He even asserts that everyone on the planet, not merely the average consumers in affluent societies, is to blame for the ecological crisis. Therefore, he maintains, rightly and wrongly, that “no attempt to protect the environment will be successful in the long run unless ordinary people—the California executive, the Mexican peasant, the Soviet [*sic*] factory worker, the Chinese farmer—are willing to adjust their life-styles and values. Our wasteful, careless ways must become a thing of the past.” The wasteful, careless ways of the California executive plainly must be ecologically reconstituted, but the impoverished practices of Mexican peasants and Chinese farmers, short of what many others would see as their presumed contributions to “overpopulation,” are probably already at levels of consumption that Hollander happily would ratify as ecologically sustainable if the California executive could only attain and abide by them. As Hollander asserts, “every aspect of our lives has some environmental impact,” and, in some sense, everyone he claims, “must acknowledge the responsibility we were all given as citizens of the planet and act on the hundreds of opportunities to save our planet that present themselves every day.” Nevertheless, the typical consumer does not control the critical aspects of his or her existence in ways that have any major environmental impact. Nor do we all encounter hundreds of opportunities every day to do much to save the planet. The absurd claim that average consumers only need to shop, bicycle, or garden their way to an ecological failure merely moves most of the responsibility and much of the blame away from the institutional center of power whose decisions actually maintain the wasteful, careless ways of material exchange that Hollander would end by having everyone recycle all their soda cans.

#### Rejection of managerialism is just as dangerous – their author

Luke, 97 – professor of political science at Virginia polytechnic

Timothy, “Ecocritique: Contesting the Politics of Nature, Economy, and Culture”, pg. 80

Although resource managerialism can be criticized on many levels, it has provisionally guaranteed some measure of limited protection to wilderness areas, animal species, and watercourses in the United States. And, whatever its flaws, the attempt to extend the scope of its oversight to other regions of the world probably could have a similar impact. Resource managerialism directly confronts the existing cultural, economic, and social regime of transnational corporate capitalism with the fact that millions of Americans, as well as billions of other human beings, must be provisioned from the living things populating Earth’s biosphere (the situation of all these other living things, of course, is usually ignored or reduced to an aesthetic question). And, if they are left unregulated, as history as shown, the existing corporate circuits of commodity production will degrade the biosphere to the point that all living things will not be able to renew themselves. Other ecological activists can fault resource managerialism, but few, if any, of them face these present-day realities as forthrightly in actual practice, largely because the prevailing regimes of state and corporate power, now assuming the forms of the “wise-use” movement often regard even this limited challenge as far too radical. Still, this record of “success” is not a license to ignore the flawed working of resource managerialism. In fact, this forthright engagement with resource realities raises very serious questions, as the global tactics of such agencies as the Worldwatch Institute reveal.

### T

Wm – implication is connotative they can’t determine that - prefer reasonability

#### Should is permissive—it’s a persuasive recommendation

Words and Phrases, 2002 (“Words and Phrases: Permanent Edition” Vol. 39 Set to Signed. Pub. By Thomson West. P. 370)

Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1976. Term “should,” as used in statutory provision that motion to suppress search warrant should first be heard by magistrate who issued warrant, is used in regular, persuasive sense, as recommendation, and is thus not mandatory but permissive. West’s Ann.Pen Code, § 1538.5(b).---Cuevas v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 238, 58 Cal.App.3d 406 ----Searches 191.

-neg ground, they still get the status quo, alternate methodologies, a critique of ecopragmatism, disads to our method etc

-topic literature, our evidence is in the context of US economic engagement policies towards Mexico

-Schlossberg indicates that in the status quo academia does NOT engage environmental praxis, our framework is key to that because debate is fundamentally an academic game

-They arbitrarily exclude the affirmative, that’s a voting issue because the neg will always win, terminally impacted by the Bryant evidence this empirically leads to silencing the voice of marginalized groups ensuring oppression

Reasonability -avoids infinite regress

Counterinterp the aff can have a discussion about the topic rather than a topical discussion solves their offense because the debates they want to occur still happen

Our advocacy is a precondition to education

-Castellano indicates that interrogating how people institutions and ecosystems interact is a prerequisite to good policy

-Reitan indicates that problem solving requires a change in worldview and that pragmatism is key to identify which debates really matter and how to mediate those debates

### 2ac kappeller

Perm do both

CP doesn’t access role of the ballot Castellano is very specific insofar as only applied ecology can facilitate the interdisciplinary context necessary for a relationship to Mexico’s ecosystem

Perm do the counterplan – cross ex checks we don’t have to defend the state not a single piece of 1ac evidence talks about state action

Governments enforce and create environmental protection laws the state is key whether they like it or not

#### Detaching theory and practice mean they don’t solve

Schlosberg 13 (David Schlosberg; Environmental Politics Volume 22, Issue 1, 2013 Special Issue: Coming of Age? Environmental Politics at 21; “Theorising environmental justice: the expanding sphere of a discourse”; pages 37-55; KDUB)

This focus on the relationship between practice and theory has also been central to my attempts to understand the ‘justice’ of environmental justice (Schlosberg 2004, 2007). Many attempts to define environmental or climate justice have been too detached from the actual demands of social movements that use the idea as an organising theme or identity. This does assume that there is a value to movement practice – that theory can, and should, actually learn from the language, demands, and action of movements. Why, the more purist academic or sceptic might ask, should we prioritise what activists believe or do? But the question should not be about who is the best judge of a conception of justice – activists or theorists. The point is that different discourses of justice, and the various experiences and articulations of injustice, inform how the concept is used, understood, articulated, and demanded in practice; the engagement with what is articulated on the ground is of crucial value to our understanding and development of the concepts we study. It continues to be unfortunate that there are those in the study of environmentalism, or in the theoretical realm, who simply cannot see the importance, and range, of these articulations at the intersection of theory and practice – especially when movement innovation is as broad and informative as it is in environmental justice.

Hirokawa is a solvency deficit they don’t have an answer to – incremental changes produce new contexts that open up the space for alternative paradigms to emerge

-Reitan indicates that problem solving requires a change in worldview and that pragmatism is key to identify which debates really matter and how to mediate those debates

Their framing is bad and results in political apathy because instead of fixing a problem we constantly shift the blame for failure on an external entity – in this case the state - Lichatovich

The counterplan is not competitive – the exact proposed plan of action is irrelevant in a world we don’t need to defend fiat to gain access to our advantage

#### Working through the system is a lot more successful than radical demands

Zizek, 98– Professor of Philosophy at Institute of Social Sciences at University of Ljubljana (Slavoj, Law and the Postmodern Mind, “Why Does the Law need an Obscene Supplement?” Pg 91-94)

Finally, **the point** about inherent transgression **is not that every opposition**, every attempt at subversion**, is automatically "coopted.**" On the contrary, **the very fear of being coopted that makes us search for more and more "radical," "pure" attitudes, is the** supreme **strategy of** suspension or **marginalization.** The point is rather that true subversion is not always where it seems to be. **Sometimes, a small distance is much more explosive for the system than an ineffective radical rejection**. In religion**, a small heresy can be more threatening** than an outright atheism or passage to another religion; for a hard-line Stalinist, a Trotskyite is infinitely more threatening than a bourgeois liberal or social democrat. As le Carre put it, one true revisionist in the Central Committee is worth more than thousand dissidents outside it. It was easy to dismiss Gorbachev for aiming only at improving the system, making it more efficient-he nonetheless set in motion its disintegration. So one should also bear in mind the obverse of the inherent transgression: one is tempted to paraphrase Freud's claim from The Ego and the Id that man is not only much more immoral than he believes, but also much more moral than he knows-the System is not only infinitely more resistant and invulnerable than it may appear (it can coopt apparently subversive strategies, they can serve as its support), it is also infinitely more vulnerable (a small revision etc, can have large unforeseen catastrophic consequences). Or, to put it in another way: the paradoxical role of the unwritten superego injunction is that, with regard to the explicit, public Law, it is simultaneously transgressive (superego suspends, violates, the explicit social rules) and more coercive (superego consists of additional rules that restrain the field of choice by way of prohibiting the possibilities allowed for, guaranteed even, by the public Law). From my personal history, I recall the moment of the referendum for the independence of Slovenia as the exemplary case of such a forced choice: the whole point, of course, was to have a truly free choice-but nonetheless, in the pro-independence euphoria, every argumentation for remaining within Yugoslavia was immediately denounced as treacherous and disloyal. This example is especially suitable since Slovenes were deciding about a matter that was literally "transgressive" (to break from Yugoslavia with its constitutional order), which is why the Belgrade authorities denounced Slovene referendum as unconstitutional-one was thus ordered to transgress theLaw ... **The obverse of the omnipotence of the unwritten is thus that, if one ignores them, they simply cease to exist, in contrast to the written law that exists (functions) whether one is aware of it or not-**or, as the priest in Kafka's The Trial put it, **law does not want anything from you, it only bothers you if you yourself acknowledge it and address yourself to it with a demand** ... § Marked 14:14 § When, in the late eighteenth century, universal human rights were proclaimed, this universality, ofcourse, concealed the fact that they privilege white, men of property; however, this limitation was not openly admitted, it was coded in apparently tautological supplementary qualifications like "all humans have rights, insofar as they truly are. rational and free," " which then implicitly excludes the mentally ill, "savages," criminals, children, women.'. . So, if, in this situation, a poor black woman disregards this unwritten, implicit, qualification and demands human rights, also for herself, she just takes the letter ofthe discourse of rights "more literally than it was meant" (and thereby redefines its universality, inscribing it into a different hegemonic chain). "Fantasy" designates precisely this unwritten framework that tells us how are we to understand the letter of Law. The lesson of this is that-sometimes, at least-the truly subversive thing is not to disregard the explicit letter of Law on behalf of the underlying fantasies, but to stick to this letter against the fantasy that sustains it. Is-at a certain level, at least-this not the outcome of the long conversation between Josepf K. and the priest that follows the priest's narrative on the Door of the Law in The Trial?-the uncanny effect of this conversation does not reside in the fact that the reader is at a loss insofar as he lacks the unwritten interpretive code or frame ofreference that would enable him to discern the hidden Meaning, but, on the contrary, in that thepriest's interpretation of the parable on the Door of the Law disregards all standard frames of unwritten rules and reads the text in an "absolutely literal" way. One could also approach this deadlock via. Lacan's notion of the specifically symbolic mode of deception: ideology "cheats precisely by letting us know that its propositions (say, on universal human rights)' are not to be read a la lettre, but against thebackground of a set of unwritten rules. Sometimes, at least, the most effective anti-ideological subversion of the official discourse of human rights consists in reading it in an excessively "literal" way, disregarding the set of underlying unwritten rules. The need for unwritten rules thus bears witness to, confirms, this vulnerability: **the system is compelled to allow for possibilities of choices that must never actually take place since they would disintegrate thesystem, and the function of the unwritten rules is precisely to prevent the actualization of these choices formally allowed by the system.** One can see how unwritten rules are correlative to, the obverseof, the empty symbolic gesture and/or the forced choice: unwritten rules prevent the subject from effectively accepting what is offered in the empty gesture, from taking the choice literally and choosing the impossible, that the choice of which destroys the system. In the Soviet Union of the 1930s and 1940s, to take the most extreme example, it was not only prohibited to criticize Stalin, it was perhaps even more prohibited to enounce publicly this prohibition, i.e., too state that one is prohibited to criticize Stalin-the system needed to maintain the appearance that one is allowed to criticize Stalin, i.e., thatthe absence of this criticism (and the fact that there is no opposition party or movement, that theParty got 99.99% of the votes at elections) simply demonstrates that Stalin is effectively the best and (almost) always right. In Hegelese, this appearance qua appearance was essential.  
This dialectical tension between the vulnerability and invulnerability of the System also enables us to denounce the ultimate racist and/or sexist trick, that of "two birds in the bush instead of a bird in hand": when women demand' simple equality, quasi-"feminists" often pretend to offer them "much more" (the role of the warm and wise "conscience of society," elevated above the vulgar everyday competition and struggle for domination ...)-the only proper answer to this offer, of course, is "No, thanks! Better is the enemy of the Good! We do not want more, just equality!" Here, at least, the last lines in Now Voyager ("Why reach for the moon, when we can have the stars?") are wrong. It is homologous with the native American who wants to become integrated into the predominant "white" society, and a politically correct progressive liberal endeavors to convince him that, he is thereby renouncing his very unique prerogative, the authentic native culture and tradition-no thanks, simple equality is enough, I also wouldn't mind my part of consumerist alienation! ... **A modest demand of theexcluded group for the full participation at the society's universal rights is much more threatening forthe system than the apparently much more "radical" rejection of the predominant "social values" andthe assertion of the superiority of one's own culture**. For a true feminist, Otto Weininger's assertion that, although women are "ontologically false," lacking the proper ethical stature, they should be acknowledged the same rights as men in public life, is infinitely more acceptable than the false elevationof women that makes them "too good" for the banality of men's rights.

#### Kappler is wrong – key to democracy and engagement

**Rawls 99** (John, Professor Emeritus – Harvard University, The Law of Peoples, p. 54-7)

Developing the Law of Peoples within a liberal conception of justice, we work out the ideals and principles of the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people. I distinguish between the public reason of liberal peoples and the public reason of the Society of Peoples. The first is the public reason of equal citizens of domestic society debating the constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice concerning their own government; the second is the public reason of free and equal liberal peoples debating their mutual relations as peoples. The Law of Peoples with its political concepts and principles, ideals and criteria, is the content of this latter public reason. Although these two public reasons do not have the same content, the role of public reason among free and equal peoples is analogous to its role in a constitutional democratic regime among free and equal citizens. Political liberalism proposes that, in a constitutional democratic regime, comprehensive doctrines of truth or of right are to be replaced in public reason by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens. Here note the parallel: public reason is invoked by members of the Society of Peoples, and its principles are addressed to peoples as peoples. They are not expressed in terms of comprehensive doctrines of truth or of right, which may hold sway in this or that society, but in terms that can be shared by different peoples. 6.2. Ideal of Public Reason. Distinct from the idea of public reason is the ideal of public reason. In domestic society this ideal is realized, or satisfied, whenever judges, legislators, chief executives, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the idea of public reason and explain to other citizens their reasons for supporting fundamental political questions in terms of the political conception of justice that they regard as the most reasonable. In this way they fulfill what I shall call their duty of civility to one another and to other citizens. Hence whether judges, legislators, and chief executives act from and follow public reason is continually shown in their speech and conduct. How is the ideal of public reason realized by citizens who are not government officials? In a representative government, citizens vote for representatives-chief executives, legislators, and the like-not for particular laws (except at a state or local level where they may vote di­rectly on referenda questions, which are not usually fundamental ques­tions). To answer this question, we say that, ideally, citizens are to **think of themselves as** if they were **legislators** and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact.7l When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason, forms part of the **political and social basis of liberal democracy** and is **vital** for its enduring strength and vigor. Thus in domestic society citizens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason, while doing what they can to hold government officials to it. This duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. I emphasize that it is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech.

#### Also that turn outweighs – key to change

**Milbrath ’96** (Lester W., Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Sociology – SUNY Buffalo, Building Sustainable Societies, Ed. Pirages, p. 289)

In some respects personal change cannot be separated from societal change. Societal transformation will not be successful without change at the personal level; such change is a necessary but not sufficient step on the route to sustainability. People hoping to live sustainably must adopt new beliefs, new values, new lifestyles, and new worldview. But lasting personal change is unlikely without simultaneous transformation of the socioeconomic/political system in which people function. Persons may solemnly resolve to change, but that resolve is likely to weaken as they perform day-today within a system reinforcing different beliefs and values. Change agents typically are met with denial and great resistance. Reluctance to challenge mainstream society is the major reason most efforts emphasizing education to bring about change are ineffective. If societal transformation must be speedy, and most of us believe it must, pleading with individuals to change is not likely to be effective.

#### Not passive

**Kulynych 97** – Jessica, Asst Professor of Political Science at Winthrop University, Polity, Winter, n2 p315(32)

When we look at the success of citizen initiatives from a performative perspective, we look precisely at those moments of defiance and disruption that bring the invisible and unimaginable into view. Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the policy debate and experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate within the energy commissions could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics. The existence of a goal-oriented debate within a technically dominated arena defied the normalizing separation between expert policymakers and consuming citizens. Citizens momentarily recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients.

#### Integrating ethical obligations to the other into politics is the only way to prevent totalitarianism

Simmons 99 William Paul, current Associate Professor of Political Science at ASU, formerly at Bethany College in the Department of History and Political Science, “The Third: Levinas' theoretical move from an-archical ethics to the realm of justice and politics,” Philosophy & Social Criticism November 1, 1999 vol. 25 no. 6

Levinas argues for a place for both ethics and politics, or, to employ his metaphor, a place for both the Jewish tradition of ethics and responsibility and, along with it, the Greek tradition of language, justice and politics. This section will analyze the mutual necessity of both ethics and politics. According to Levinas, ethics and politics can both be needed only if there is separation, that is, if each has its own justiﬁcation. Neither ethics nor politics should be taken to their extremes; each must be moderated by the other. ‘I think there’s a direct contradiction between ethics and politics, if both these demands are taken to the extreme.’ 56 **Ethics must temper the political because politics unbounded leads to tyranny, absolute power** of the strongest. Politics ignores the individuality of each citizen, treating each as a cipher, a member of a species. Further, without a norm outside of the scope of the said, there is no standard to judge political regimes. The call for a standard by which to judge regimes is what Levinas means by a return to Platonism. Plato, in the Republic, had used the good beyond being as his standard. A return to Platonism would be necessary to restore ‘the independence of ethics in relation to history’ and trace ‘a limit to the comprehension of the real by history’. 57 Levinas ﬁnds a standard in the ethical relationship with the Other. The norm that must continue to inspire and direct the moral order is the ethical norm of the interhuman. If the moral-political order totally relinquishes its ethical foundation, it must accept all forms of society, including the fascist or totalitarian, for it can no longer evaluate or discriminate between them. The state is usually better than anarchy – but not always. In some instances, – fascism or totalitarianism, for example – **the political order of the state may have to be challenged in the name of our ethical responsibility** to the other. This is why **ethical philosophy must remain the ﬁrst** philosophy. 58 At the same time, ethics needs politics. To reach those others who are far away, **ethics must be transﬁxed into language, justice and politics**. ‘As prima philosophia, **ethics cannot itself legislate for society or produce rules** of conduct whereby society might be revolutionized or transformed.’ 59 Although this universalization distances the ego from the Other, it must be done to reach the others. We must, out of respect for the categorical imperative or the other’s right as expressed by his face, un-face human beings, sternly reducing each one’s uniqueness to his individuality in the unity of the genre, and let universality rule. Thus we need laws, and – yes – courts of law, institutions and the state to render justice. 60 Further, **politics is necessary because there are those who will refuse to heed** the new law, ‘Thou shall not kill.’ Levinas is well aware that this commandment is not an ontological impossibility. Many will take Cain’s position and shun the responsibility for the Other. Thus, **politics is necessary to prohibit murder**, in all its forms. ‘A place had to be foreseen and kept warm for all eternity for Hitler and his followers.’ 61 **Both ethics and politics have their** own **justiﬁcation. The justiﬁcation for ethics is found in the face-to-face relationship with the Other**. The justiﬁcation for politics is to restrain those who follow Cain’s position and ignore the responsibility for the Other. **Politics does not subsume ethics, but rather it serves ethics**. Politics is necessary but it must be continually checked by ethics. Levinas calls for a state that is as ethical as possible, one which is perpetually becoming more just. Levinas calls for the liberal state.

#### The state is inevitable – our obligation is to make it as ethical as possible

Simmons 99 William Paul, current Associate Professor of Political Science at ASU, formerly at Bethany College in the Department of History and Political Science, “The Third: Levinas' theoretical move from an-archical ethics to the realm of justice and politics,” Philosophy & Social Criticism November 1, 1999 vol. 25 no. 6

**Since ‘it is impossible to escape the State’**, 70 Levinas **insists that the state be made as ethical as possible.** The world of institutions and justice must be held in check by the an-archical responsibility for the Other. Levinas calls for both an-archy and justice. Alongside the an-archical responsibility for the Other there is a place for the realm of the said, which includes ontology, justice and politics. Levinas’ thought is not apolitical as many have charged. His harsh critiques of the political realm refer to a politics unchecked by ethics. For example, in Totality and Inﬁnity, Levinas sees politics as antithetical to an ethics based on the Other. ‘The art of foreseeing war and winning it by every means – politics – is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naïveté.’ 71 **Politics unrestrained**, by necessity, **totalizes the Other by reducing** him or her **to abstract categories.** Levinas will call for a politics that is founded on ethics and not on ontology. **The state must be answerable to the** an-archical **relationship** with the Other, it must strive to maintain the exteriority of the Other. Levinasian heteronomic political thought oscillates between the saying and the said, an-archy and justice, ethics and politics. The liberal state is the concrete manifestation of this oscillation. Levinas calls for a balance between the Greek and the Judaic traditions. Neither tradition should dominate. The fundamental contradiction of our situation (and perhaps of our condition) . . . that both the hierarchy taught by Athens and the abstract and slightly anarchical ethical individualism taught by Jerusalem are simultaneously necessary in order to suppress the violence.0020Each of these principles, left to itself, only hastens the contrary of what it wants to secure.

### k

The role of the ballot is who has a better methodology to develop a relationship to Mexico’s ecosystem the academic reward system must be changed to facilitate discussions about competing ecological praxis (Castello)

The discourses of competing environmental practices inform how concepts are used understood articulated and demanded from institutions such as the state means only competing environmental practices should be evaluated any other evaluation links to all our offense

Our method is superior

-solution rather than problem oriented (Castello)

-identifies debates that really matter (Reitan)

-opens up new contingencies for problem solving (hirokawa)

-takes responsibility for environmental destruction (lichatovich)

-ruptures epistemic construction of nature in the border region (orihuela)

-problematizes the narratives the legitimize violence against nature (bell and russel)

#### Ethical egalitarianism is complicit with ableism and genocide

Callicott 2 (J. BAIRD CALLICOTT; Environmental Values, Vol. 11, No. 1 (February 2002), pp. 3-25; “The Pragmatic Power and Promise of Theoretical Environmental Ethics: Forging a New¶ Discourse”; KDUB)

¶ EXTENDING THE KANTIAN CONCEPT OF INTRINSIC VALUE TO (SOME) ANIMALS But look again. In the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant himself is quite careful to avoid speciesism - analogous to racism and sexism - the unjustified or ungroundedmordl entitlement of one' s own kind and the exclusion of other kinds. Not being human, but being rational is that in virtue of which a human being has intrinsic value. Kant consistently holds open the possibility that there may be other-than-human rational beings. He never more specifically identifies who such non-human rational beings may be. Some passages suggest Kant might be thinking of God and the heavenly host; others that he might be thinking of rational beings on other planets that inhabit very different bodies and therefore have very different desires and inclinations than do human beings. In the passage just quoted, he seems to hold open the possibility that there may be non-human rational beings found in terrestrial nature. It is in this orthodox Kantian moral climate that so much ethical significance was recently attached to proving that chimpanzees and gorillas could master rudimentary language skills, and could, via American Sign Language or some other surrogate for spoken language, express themselves creatively (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1998). For Descartes (1950 [1637]) had insisted that the ability to use language creatively - not merely rotely as he believed parrots to do - was an indication of rationality. Proving that chimpanzees and gorillas are minimally rational does under- mine anthropocentrism, but only a little. It certainly does not take us very far in the direction of an expansive environmental ethic - however much it may help ethically rehabilitate our primate relatives and spare them the indignities and outrages of the zoo trade and biomedical research. Kant' s conceptual distinction between humanity and rationality was, however, also exploited theoreticallyanother way, which proved to be more powerful and transformative. Not all human beings are minimally rational. The so-called 'marginal cases' are not (Regan 1979). Infants, the severely mentally handicapped, and the abjectly senile are the usual suspects. They are thus in the same boat with all the other '[b]eings whose existence ... depend[s] on nature ... i.e., things which may be used merely as a means', to quote Kant once more. Let's get specific: if we equitably applied Kant's ethical theory, we could justifiably perform the same painful and destructive biomedical experiments on unwanted non-rational infants that we inflict on non-rational nonhuman animals; we could open a hunting season on the severely mentally handicapped; and we could make pet food out of the abjectly senile.

#### A non-anthropocentric value system is IMPOSSIBLE and PROBLEMATIC – ontology comes before ethics, ontological commitment will always be rooted in humanity, not only does the alt not solve it discredits ecological academia

Avery 4 (STEPHEN AVERY; “The Misbegotten Child of Deep Ecology”; Environmental Values, Vol. 13, No. 1 (February 2004), pp. 31-50; KDUB)

Hand-in-hand with this ontological commitment, however, is the belief that this holistic ontology entails a non-anthropocentric ethic. Within the literature this entailment is almost universally accepted, so much so that deep ecology is often characterised by its non-anthropocentric stance. It is my contention, however, that such an entailment is misbegotten. The development of a non- anthropocentric ethic is a problematic task that must be aborted. The debate between those advocating and those opposing a non-anthropocentric ethic has been one of the most prominent and long-running debates within environmental philosophical circles. Supporters of a non-anthropocentric or ecocentric ethic seek to locate intrinsic value in the non-human world, thus providing all creatures an equal right to 'live and blossom' . However, in this endeavour, such ethicists fail to recognise the essentially practical nature of ethics and the consequent impossibility of separating human concern and value from any environmental ethical consideration. Invariably, non-anthropocentrists, at least those who wish to avoid the inherent misanthropic consequences of a consistent application of non-anthropocentric ethics, develop a hierarchy of needs to solve this problematic practical application. These hierarchies, however, lead ulti- mately to a question-begging ethical preference for the human species. Despite the rejection of non-anthropocentric ethics, I believe that the deep ecological ontological commitment does have merit. However, intrinsic in deep ecologists' failure to develop a viable environmental ethic, I believe, is a lack of understanding of the derivation of ethics from ontology. As Heidegger claims, 'Before we attempt to determine more precisely the relationship between "ontology" and "ethics" we must ask what "ontology" and "ethics" themselves are'.2 In pursuing this question it becomes apparent that ontology itself is derivative of what Heidegger calls fundamental ontology. Fundamental ontol- ogy offers the recognition that we, as humans, have no ontological access except through our own understanding of what it is to 'be' . For this reason I believe that, to meet deep ecology's ontological conception, a distinction needs to be made between shallow and deep anthropocentrism. Like its namesake, deep anthropocentrism is suggestive of a deeper connection between humans and the world, a connection that has its roots in the human condition. Such a connection can be contrasted with 'shallow' or 'formal' anthropocentrism, the idea that we necessarily view the world from a human perspective. The need for a deep anthropocentric distinction follows the conception that ontology itself is not possible outside a fundamental human standpoint.

#### Perm solves - Pragmatic action in the face of critique is the only way to break out of recurrent environmental harms

Reitan ’98- Professor of Philosophy at Oklahoma State University (Eric, “Pragmatism, Environmental World Views, and Sustainability”, 1998, <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0th496m4>) //CW

What I would like to do here is demonstrate, by way of an example, **the value of pragmatic principles not only for the critique of the modern worldview, but also for guiding the on-going process of developing new, environmentally friendly alternatives**. Perhaps the most useful role of pragmatism for current environmental philosophy lies in its capacity to identify which theoretic debates really matter, and to mediate these debates in terms of shared pragmatic goals--in particular, the goal of cultivating sustainable human-natural systems. With the urgency of the current environmental crisis, **we cannot afford to get bogged down in theoretic disputes that mask a common mission and get in the way of making the practical changes that are so pressing.**

#### Juxtaposition solves – environmental criticism is pluralistic

Reitan ’98- Professor of Philosophy at Oklahoma State University (Eric, “Pragmatism, Environmental World Views, and Sustainability”, 1998, <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0th496m4>) //CW

Second, **it is worth noting that there is almost certainly more than one human social arrangement that harmonizes sustainable with the natural environment.** Put another way, **there is more than one set of human practices that works in terms of promoting a healthy** human-natural **system**. And it follows from this observation that more than one¶ worldview can be pragmatically true: while two worldviews may imply environmental behaviors that are different, and hence have a different pragmatic meaning, insofar as they both promote sustainable behaviors they are both true from a pragmatic standpoint. **Pragmatic truth is not monistic, but pluralistic. Given the urgent pragmatic goals of environmental philosophy, sustained theoretic debates about meaning differences of this sort appear to be unwarranted, and should be put aside in favor of the task of finding practical ways of integrating and accommodating those alternative social arrangements** which serve the common goal of sustainable human-natural systems.

### ecoprag good

#### Eco-pragmatism avoids totalizing theory and allows solutions to the environmental issues of the squo

Hirokawa 2 (Keith Hirokawa, J.D. from the UConn and LL.M. from the Northwestern School of Law, 2002, "Some Pragmatic Observations About Radical Critique In Environmental Law," Stanford Environmental Law Journal, Volume 21, June; lexis; Kristof)

By rejecting commitments to theory, pragmatists are denied the benefit of having a justifying principle (such as free will, equality, utility, ecocentrism, etc.) under which they can rally support. However, what pragmatists lose by rejecting meta-theory they replace by widening the field of potential solutions. **Avoiding commitment to** a **substantive meta-theory frees the environmental thinker from worry about whether the solutions proposed for a given problem are consistent with an ultimate theoretical grounding**; that is, the pragmatist is not bound by deductive reasoning within the confines of any particular analytic scheme. Visionary reasoning becomes an eclectic array of possibilities, limited only by those contextual needs that make the inquiry important in the first place. The turn to pragmatism thus symbolizes a rejection of the alleged [\*251] relationship between theory and answers to practical questions. To the pragmatist, this rejection comes for very good reason. Competing conclusions can often be derived from the same incomplete set of premises, and divergent theories can often produce the same conclusions. Pragmatists redirect human inquiry to avoid the indeterminacy of theory, since the "knowledge of obstacles is not itself an obstacle unless it leads to defeatism; for pragmatists it serves as a spur to seek a way to overcome those obstacles." n118 In the final analysis, although theories are important, the pragmatist warns against theory commitments, because theories provide "no more than commentary on practice, based on premises drawn from that practice itself." n119 Accordingly, the pragmatic position against theory is not a broad, sweeping dismissal of every idea derived from a theoretical framework. n120 Rather, **the pragmatist is free to consider a variety of ideas, approaches and solutions without committing to particular theoretical foundations**. The method and strength of problem solving, n121 if not the purpose, is to ensure conversation participants [\*252] that their theories are duly considered. n122 **The resulting formation of policy is "inclusive, treating current theories as perspectives, each of which can add to the understanding of law**." n123 **Pragmatism**, then, **is a helpful tool** (especially **to environmental debate**) **because of its freedom from any particular method of inquiry and any particular metaphysical "good"** of society. For the pragmatist, **theories** "**are not** Euclidean axioms or Kantian categorical **imperatives, but** graffiti, **practical guidelines to be noticed** by the alertly street-wise **when context makes them applicable**." n124 **When unbounded by consistency** with or loyalty to any particular theory, **all relevant ideas become useful to the resolution** of a dilemma. The lesson from pragmatism is that to see the law as something more than a refined, yet interminably eclectic conglomerate of ideas, taken from all forms of social and cultural practices, would be to give too much credit to our insight into the nature of justice. The resulting amalgam - the plurality of perspectives arranged for inclusive discourse - is not mandated by pragmatism. n125 Nonetheless, since pragmatism is in its most useful capacity when put to the task of dispute resolution, pragmatism inevitably finds itself confronted with opposing and incompatible perspectives. A pragmatic conclusion is one in which those opposing and incompatible perspectives are represented. To this end, some pragmatists have tried to surmount the foundationalists' problem of theory-hope (that the right theory will supply the right solutions) by proposing pluralist perspectives to bridge the gaps between competing paradigms. Pluralism serves as a helpful model for pragmatism's [\*253] application. n126 In summary, pragmatic inquiry illustrates three main themes. First, **pragmatism embodies "anti-foundationalism" in that it** is not loyal to any particular substantive theory. Second, pragmatism **allows negotiation between** purportedly **uncompromising positions for the purpose of solving real problems, due** in large part **to its lack of dependency on any "truths" claimed** in these positions. Finally, particular theory determines the right answers to difficult questions. The **pragmatist uses these tools to transcend barriers between alternative perceptions by critically examining such perspectives to determine how each of them can be applied in a helpful, non-exclusive manner**. **These tools can be applied to debates over environmental protection, which were** above portrayed as **deadlocked dialogues between deeply held beliefs**. Below, the problems of frustrated belief are contrasted to examples of pragmatic environmentalism, verifying the potential benefits of legal pragmatism for advocates and judges engaged in environmental disputes.

#### Even if their ideas are good, their presentation fails. The perm frames the alt in a persuasive manner

Hirokawa 2 (Keith Hirokawa, J.D. from the UConn and LL.M. from the Northwestern School of Law, 2002, "Some Pragmatic Observations About Radical Critique In Environmental Law," Stanford Environmental Law Journal, Volume 21, June; lexis; Kristof)

**Pragmatism's success in** the **environmental debate is owed to its** [\*257] **understanding of the operation of context as a constraint on persuasion and discourse**. **Persuasion** between foundational theories **may result from the attempt to reconcile differing approaches**. **Pragmatists rely on a reconciliation-based description of how paradigms** and belief systems **transform in the face of competing paradigmatic structures**, n147 **in which new** problems, predictions and **solutions can be translated into an existing structure** of beliefs **by displacing the fewest other beliefs**. **Effective dialogue** on solutions espoused from otherwise incommensurable positions simply **requires** a touch of **flexibility toward traditional philosophical questions**. n148 **In applying this** maxim **to legal change, the lesson** to be learned from the pragmatist's understanding of paradigm shifts **is that revolutionary ideals can be presented in light of dominant beliefs,** rather than in spite of them.

#### Pragmatism can situate anthropocentrism within a dialogic forum. Totalizing critique cuts off any possibility of transcending cultural norms.

Hirokawa 2 (Keith Hirokawa, J.D. from the UConn and LL.M. from the Northwestern School of Law, 2002, "Some Pragmatic Observations About Radical Critique In Environmental Law," Stanford Environmental Law Journal, Volume 21, June; lexis; Kristof)

Recent decades have witnessed a resurgence of experiments in testing these limits of anthropocentrism. **The pragmatists**, in particular, **have set out to defend a human perspective that is not limited by anthropocentric interests**. n205 **They have found that human insights create a context in which environmentally protective doctrines come to light** in common terms and concepts. **Besides avoiding** some of the more **agitating epistemological debates, the** [\*272] **human perspective limits dialogue only to the extent of our ability to empathize and theorize**. **It is because humans are able to seek** both economic and **non-use values, while reconciling** the competing **ends, that the human perspective** is **demands attention.** Our **philosophical underpinnings may** in fact **be confined by our distinctively human perspective, but they are concurrently liberated by our sense of selves**, "**characterized** not so much **by** [**our**] ability to produce a culture but by [our] **ability to transcend** old **cultural forms**." n206

#### Alt fails – absent pragmatic action, environmental theorizing continues the destruction of the environment

Reitan ’98- Professor of Philosophy at Oklahoma State University (Eric, “Pragmatism, Environmental World Views, and Sustainability”, 1998, <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0th496m4>) //CW

The emerging environmental crisis creates an urgency to make changes in how we live, and there is considerable merit to the claim that we cannot make the changes that are required if we do not alter how we think about the human-natural relationship. **But the urgency for change does not afford us the luxury of pursuing academic debates that lack a clear pragmatic significance.** Because § Marked 14:18 § the incentive driving the development of new environmental worldviews is a pragmatic one, it is important for the theoreticians who construct these new worldviews not to lose sight of the pragmatic meanings of what they build. When two worldviews have pragmatic environmental meanings as close as what we find between Christian stewardship and deep ecology, the appropriate response is mutual support and collaboration, and the discussion should concern how best to integrate the efforts of adherents to either view**. To the extent that environmental theorists can keep these pragmatic meanings in mind, we will see increased cooperation among theorists who emerge from alternative perspectives**, and we will see a greater real-world impact of the work they do.

### narcissism <3

#### The K cannot be divorced from the narcissism of man – causes us to repeat the tragedy of narcissus

Becker 73 (Earnest, The Denial of Death, pg 14, Ph.D ins Cultural Anthropology, was a professor the University of California at Berkely, San Franciso State College, and Simon Fraser University, and founder of The Ernest Becker Foundation; Kristof)

One such vital truth that has long been known is the idea of heroism; but in “normal” scholarly times we never thought of making much out of it, of parading it, or of using it as a central concept. Yet the popular mind always knew how important it was: as William James—who covered just about everything— remarked at the turn of the century: “mankind’s common instinct for reality … has always held the world to be essentially a theatre for heroism.”1 Not only the popular mind knew, but philosophers of all ages, and in our culture especially Emerson and Nietzsche—which is why we still thrill to them: we like to be reminded that our central calling, our main task on this planet, is the heroic.\* One way of looking at the whole development of social science since Marx and of psychology since Freud is that it represents a massive detailing and clarification of the problem of human heroism. This perspective sets the tone for the seriousness of our discussion: we now have the scientific underpinning for a true understanding of the nature of heroism and its place in human life. If “mankind’s common instinct for reality” is right, we have achieved the remarkable feat of exposing that reality in a scientific way. One of the key concepts for understanding man’s urge to heroism is the idea of “narcissism.” As Erich Fromm has so well reminded us, this idea is one of Freud’s great and lasting contributions. Freud discovered that each of us repeats the tragedy of the mythical Greek Narcissus: we are hopelessly absorbed with ourselves. If we care about anyone it is usually ourselves first of all. As Aristotle somewhere put it: luck is when the guy next to you gets hit with the arrow. Twenty-five hundred years of history have not changed man’s basic narcissism; most of the time, for most of us, this is still a workable definition of luck. It is one of the meaner aspects of narcissism that we feel that practically everyone is expendable except ourselves. We should feel prepared, as Emerson once put it, to recreate the whole world out of ourselves even if no one else existed. The thought frightens us; we don’t know how we could do it without others—yet at bottom the basic resource is there: we could suffice alone if need be, if we could trust ourselves as Emerson wanted. And if we don’t feel this trust emotionally, still most of us would struggle to survive with all our powers, no matter how many around us died. Our organism is ready to fill the world all alone, even if our mind shrinks at the thought. This narcissism is what keeps men marching into point-blank fire in wars: at heart one doesn’t feel that he will die, he only feels sorry for the man next to him. Freud’s explanation for this was that the unconscious does not know death or time: in man’s physiochemical, inner organic recesses he feels immortal. None of these observations implies human guile. Man does not seem able to “help” his selfishness; it seems to come from his animal nature. Through countless ages of evolution the organism has had to protect its own integrity; it had its own physiochemical identity and was dedicated to preserving it. This is one of the main problems in organ transplants: the organism protects itself against foreign matter, even if it is a new heart that would keep it alive. The protoplasm itself harbors its own, nurtures itself against the world, against invasions of its integrity. It seems to enjoy its own pulsations, expanding into the world and ingesting pieces of it. If you took a blind and dumb organism and gave it self-consciousness and a name, if you made it stand out of nature and know consciously that it was unique, then you would have narcissism. In man, physiochemical identity and the sense of power and activity have become conscious. In man a working level of narcissism is inseparable from self-esteem, from a basic sense of self-worth. We have learned, mostly from Alfred Adler, that what man needs most is to feel secure in his self-esteem. But man is not just a blind glob of idling protoplasm, but a creature with a name who lives in a world of symbols and dreams and not merely matter. His sense of self-worth is constituted symbolically, his cherished narcissism feeds on symbols, on an abstract idea of his own worth, an idea composed of sounds, words, and images, in the air, in the mind, on paper. And this means that man’s natural yearning for organismic activity, the pleasures of incorporation and expansion, can be fed limitlessly in the domain of symbols and so into immortality. The single organism can expand into dimensions of worlds and times without moving a physical limb; it can take eternity into itself even as it gaspingly dies.

#### This narcissism leads to oppressive systems such as Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia and contemporary capitalism

Becker 73 (Earnest, The Denial of Death, pg 15, Ph.D ins Cultural Anthropology, was a professor the University of California at Berkely, San Franciso State College, and Simon Fraser University, and founder of The Ernest Becker Foundation; Kristof)

If we were to peel away this massive disguise, the blocks of repression over human techniques for earning glory, we would arrive at the potentially most liberating question of all, the main problem of human life: How empirically true is the cultural hero system that sustains and drives men? We mentioned the meaner side of man’s urge to cosmic heroism, but there is obviously the noble side as well. Man will lay down his life for his country, his society, his family. He will choose to throw himself on a grenade to save his comrades; he is capable of the highest generosity and self-sacrifice. But he has to feel and believe that what he is doing is truly heroic, timeless, and supremely meaningful. The crisis of modern society is precisely that the youth no longer feel heroic in the plan for action that their culture has set up. They don’t believe it is empirically true to the problems of their lives and times. We are living a crisis of heroism that reaches into every aspect of our social life: the dropouts of university heroism, of business and career heroism, of political-action heroism; the rise of anti-heroes, those who would be heroic each in his own way or like Charles Manson with his special “family”, those whose tormented heroics lash out at the system that itself has ceased to represent agreed heroism. The great perplexity of our time, the churning of our age, is that the youth have sensed—for better or for worse—a great social-historical truth: that just as there are useless self-sacrifices in unjust wars, so too is there an ignoble heroics of whole societies: it can be the viciously destructive heroics of Hitler’s Germany or the plain debasing and silly heroics of the acquisition and display of consumer goods, the piling up of money and privileges that now characterizes whole ways of life, capitalist and Soviet.

### 1ar externalization

#### Turn – the K prevents us from solving institutional environment destruction

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(Michael F., “Individualization: Plant a Tree, Buy a Bike, Save the World?”, Global Environmental Politics, August 1, EBSCO, p. 33-34)

For the lack of a better term, call this response the individualization of responsibility. When responsibility for environmental problems is individualized, there is little room to ponder institutions, the nature and exercise of political power, or ways of collectively changing the distribution of power and influence in society—to, in other words, “think institutionally.”4 Instead, the serious work of confronting the threatening socio-environmental processes that The Lorax so ably illuminates falls to individuals, acting alone, usually as consumers. We are individualizing responsibility when we agonize over the “paper or plastic” choice at the checkout counter, knowing somehow that neither is right given larger institutions and social structures. We think aloud with the neighbor over the back fence about whether we should buy the new Honda or Toyota hybrid engine automobile now or wait a few years until they work the kinks out, when really what we wish for is clean, efficient, and effective public transportation of the sort we read about in science fiction novels when we were young—but which we can’t vote for with our consumer dollars since, for reasons rooted in power and politics, it’s not for sale. So we ponder the “energy stickers” on the ultra-efficient appliances at Sears, we diligently compost our kitchen waste, we try to ignore the high initial cost and buy a few compact-fluorescent lightbulbs. We read spirited reports in the New York Times Magazine on the pros and cons of recycling while sipping our coffee,5 study carefully the merits of this and that environmental group so as to properly decide upon the destination of our small annual donation, and meticulously sort our recyclables. And now an increasing number of us are confronted by opportunistic green-power providers who urge us to “save the planet” by buying their “green electricity”—while doing little to actually increase the quantity of electricity generated from renewable resources. The Lorax is not why the individualization of responsibility dominates the contours of contemporary American environmentalism. Several forces, described later in this article, are to blame. They include the historical baggage of mainstream environmentalism, the core tenets of liberalism, the dynamic ability of capitalism to commodify dissent, and the relatively recent rise of global environmental threats to human prosperity. Seuss’s book simply has been swept up by these forces and adopted by them. Seuss himself would probably be sur-prised by the near deidication of his little book; and his central character, a Lorax who politely sought to hold a corporate CEO accountable, surely would be appalled that his story is being used to justify individual acts of planting trees as the primary response to the threat of global climate change.6 Mark Dowie, a journalist and sometimes historian of the American environmental movement, writes about our “environmental imagination,” by which he means our collective ability to imagine and pursue a variety of productive responses (from individual action to community organization to whole-scale institutional change) to the environmental problems before us.7 My claim in this is that an accelerating individualization of responsibility in the United States is narrowing, in dangerous ways, our “environmental imagination” and undermining our capacity to react effectively to environmental threats to human well-being. Those troubled by overconsumption, consumerism and commodification should not and cannot ignore this narrowing. Confronting the consumption problem demands, after all, the sort of institutional thinking that the individualization of responsibility patently undermines. It calls too for individuals to understand themselves as citizens in a participatory democracy first, working together to change broader policy and larger social institutions, and as consumers second. By contrast, the individualization of responsibility, because it characterizes environmental problems as the consequence of destructive consumer choice, asks that individuals imagine themselves as consumers first and citizens second. Grappling with the consumption problem, moreover, means engaging in conversation both broad and deep about consumerism and frugality and ways of fostering the capacity for restraint. But when responsibility for environmental ills is individualized, space for such conversation disappears: the individually responsible consumer is encouraged to purchase a vast array of “green” or “eco-friendly” products on the promise that the more such products are purchased and consumed, the healthier the planet’s ecological processes will become. “Living lightly on the planet” and “reducing your environmental impact” becomes, paradoxically, a consumer-product growth industry.

#### Turn – the government makes it easier for individuals to change

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(Jessica Nihle´n Fahlquist, November 22, 2008, J Agric Environ Ethics, “Moral Responsibility for Environmental Problems—Individual or Institutional?,” <http://www.ethicsandtechnology.eu/images/uploads/jes.pdf> , Springer, pg 14,15 EP)

Although it is questionable to hold individuals responsible in the backward-looking sense, it is reasonable to hold individuals responsible in a forward-looking sense. Again, the different contexts and the different extent to which individuals have the capacity and resources to assume such responsibility should be taken into account. The most important conclusion is that governments and corporations have a great forward-looking responsibility to create opportunities for individuals to behave responsibly and act in environmentally friendly ways. Although acknowledging individual responsibility is beneﬁcial, we should make sure that institutional responsibility is not overlooked or ignored as a consequence. There are good reasons to argue that responsibility ascriptions and distributions should be both i) fair and ii) efﬁcient. They should be fair for reasons of social cooperation and humanity. Cooperation is easier to achieve in a society where the norm is to hold someone responsible only when it is fair to do so and such a society is arguably more humane. Of course there is no simple answer to the question when it is fair to hold someone responsible. However, it is common both in social practice and philosophical discussions to apply a number of conditions when ascribing responsibility. For instance, an agent should only be held responsible if she is eligible for normative assessment, meaning she is a mentally well grown-up, she contributed causally to the event, she knew what she was doing, she did it voluntarily, and what she did was wrong according to some set of norms.30 Of course, there is disagreement on the content of these conditions as well as how important each one of them is. The point is that we commonly use some set of conditions when ascribing responsibility and this can be seen as a way to make sure that responsibility is ascribed and distributed fairly. The efﬁciency aim is about the way in which ascriptions and distributions of responsibility contribute to solving societal problems. Whether it be public health, poverty, education, or the environment—when discussing to whom we should ascribe responsibility and the question how responsibility should be distributed between different actors (individuals, governments, corporations, teachers, parents, and so forth) we do not merely care about what is fair, but also who is best

apt at solving the problem. To use this notion, my conclusion can be stated as follows. It is not fair to ascribe responsibility in the backward-looking sense, i.e., to blame individuals, for environmentally destructive actions unless they have reasonable alternatives and resources to act in environmentally friendly ways. However, it is fair to ascribe forward-looking responsibility to individuals, based on their capacity to contribute to solutions to environmental problems. Furthermore, a considerable share of forward-looking responsibility should be ascribed to governments and corporations because they can make the group of capable, hence responsible, individuals larger. The urge to ascribe forward-looking responsibility to institutional agents is motivated by the efﬁciency aim of responsibility distributions. Simply put, if we ascribe responsibility to governments and corporations we have a better chance of creating a society in which the opportunities to act in an environmentally friendly way increase.