### 1ac

#### We begin with the story of the Selfish Giant by Oscar Wilde:

(Oscar Wilde, Irish writer and poet, studied at Oxford College and Trinity College, The Selfish Giant, 1888, anuss)

Every afternoon, as they were coming from school, the children used to go and play in the Giant's garden. It was a large and lovely garden, with soft green grass. Here and there over the grass stood beautiful flowers like stars, and there were twelve peach-trees that in the spring-time broke out into delicate blossoms of pink and pearl, and in the autumn bore rich fruit. The birds sat on the trees and sang so sweetly that the children used to stop their games in order to listen to them. "How happy we are here!" they cried to each other. One day the Giant came back. He had been to visit his friend the Cornish ogre, and had stayed with him for seven years. After the seven years were over he had said all that he had to say, for his conversation was limited, and he determined to return to his own castle. When he arrived he saw the children playing in the garden. "What are you doing here?" he cried in a very gruff voice, and the children ran away. "My own garden is my own garden," said the Giant; "anyone can understand that, and I will allow nobody to play in it but myself." So he built a high wall all around it, and put up a notice-board. TRESPASSERS WILL BE PROSECUTED The poor children had now nowhere to play. They tried to play on the road, but the road was very dusty and full of hard stones, and they did not like it. They used to wander round the high wall when their lessons were over, and talk about the beautiful garden inside. 'How happy we were there,' they said to each other. Then the Spring came, and all over the country there were little blossoms and little birds. Only in the garden of the Selfish Giant it was still winter. The birds did not care to sing in it as there were no children and the trees forgot to blossom. Once a beautiful flower put its head out from the grass, but when it saw the notice-board it was so sorry for the children that it slipped back into the ground again, and went off to sleep. The only people who were pleased were the Snow and the Frost. One morning the Giant was lying awake in bed when he heard some lovely music. It sounded so sweet to his ears that he thought it must be the King's musicians passing by. It was really only a little linnet singing outside his window, but it was so long since he had heard a bird sing in his garden that it seemed to him to be the most beautiful music in the world. Then the Hail stopped dancing over his head, and the North Wind ceased roaring, and a delicious perfume came to him through the open casement. "I believe the Spring has come at last," said the Giant; and he jumped out of bed and looked out. What did he see? He saw a most wonderful sight. Through a little hole in the wall the children had crept in, and they were sitting in the branches of the trees. In every tree that he could see there was a little child. And the trees were so glad to have the children back again that they had covered themselves with blossoms, and were waving their arms gently above the children's heads. The birds were flying about and twittering with delight, and the flowers were looking up through the green grass and laughing. It was a lovely scene, only in one corner it was still Winter. It was the farthest corner of the garden, and in it was standing a little boy. He was so small that he could not reach up to the branches of the tree, and he was wandering all round it, crying bitterly. The poor tree was still quite covered with frost and snow, and the North Wind was blowing and roaring above it. "Climb up! little boy," said the Tree, and it bent its branches down as low as it could; but the little boy was too tiny. And the Giant's heart melted as he looked out. "How selfish I have been!" he said; "now I know why the Spring would not come here. I will put that poor little boy on the top of the tree, and then I will knock down the wall, and my garden shall be the children's playground for ever and ever." He was really very sorry for what he had done. So he crept downstairs and opened the front door quite softly, and went out into the garden. But when the children saw him they were so frightened that they all ran away, and the garden became Winter again. Only the little boy did not run, for his eyes were so full of tears that he died not see the Giant coming. And the Giant stole up behind him and took him gently in his hand, and put him up into the tree. And the tree broke at once into blossom, and the birds came and sang on it, and the little boy stretched out his two arms and flung them round the Giant's neck, and kissed him. And the other children, when they saw that the Giant was not wicked any longer, came running back, and with them came the Spring. "It is your garden now, little children," said the Giant, and he took a great axe and knocked down the wall. And when the people were going to market at twelve o'clock they found the Giant playing with the children in the most beautiful garden they had ever seen.

#### The topic of economic engagement is constrained by the conception of a restricted economy, the resolution itself defends an economic rationality that presupposes a utilitarian calculus. Economic engagement shouldn’t be a question of whether there is a benefit to lifting the embargo with Cuba, or trading with Mexico, or investing in Venezuela’s oil industry; economic engagement shouldn’t be conditioned on the necessity of a utility behind each and every action that precedes it. Thus the ballot is a choice- between the restricted and rational economics ensured by a normative affirmation of the resolution, or an embrace of general economics through our affirmation.

Human and Cilliers ‘13 (Oliver Human, Professor of Philosophy at University of Stellenbosch, Paul Cilliers, Professor of Complexity and Philoshophy at the University of Stellenbosch and PhD in philosophy at Cambridge, Towards an Economy of Complexity: Derrida, Morin and Bataille, pgs 34-35, 8-1-13, aln)

Bataille (1989) argues that traditional political economy restricts its analysis of a system to the production and consumption of resources, limited to the immediate ends they serve. According to restricted economics, ‘on the whole, any general judgement of social activity implies the principle that all individual effort, in order to be valid, must be reducible to the fundamental necessities of production and conservation’ (1989: 117). Restricted economics is therefore utilitarian, only interested in the use value any object or activity may have. The problem with this model, for Bataille, is that it does not take into consideration the ‘excesses’ and so called ‘waste’ produced by a system. In contrast to the notion of restricted economy, Bataille argued for the notion of ‘general economy’ which aimed to include within its analysis the excesses and waste not considered by a restricted worldview. The ‘law of general economy’ states: On the whole a society always produces more than is necessary for its survival; it has a surplus at its disposal. It is precisely the use it makes of this surplus that determines it: the surplus is the cause of the agitation, of the structural changes and of the entire history of society. But the surplus has more than one outlet, the most common of which is growth. (Bataille, 1991: 106) For Bataille, the impact which a surplus has on the nature of a system is not reflected upon by restricted economies of analysis which limit their analysis to notions such as utility and thereby exclude, and are unable to explain, other forces which act upon the system. It is for this reason that Bataille (1989) argues that restricted economic worldviews struggle to explain the occurrence of such phenomena as war, sacrifice or eroticism. These aspects of human life and history remain sidelined and are seen as marginal to the ‘more important’ aspects of survival. Yet it is precisely these marginalized forms which give shape to the societies we live in (Bataille, 1991). General economics tries to incorporate these aspects of life which are considered pure expenditure, or ‘excess’, into its frame of analysis. However, as we have already argued, we always operate from a limited, context dependent position. Bataille in this sense tries to ‘reeconomize’ our thinking by attempting to take into consideration the excess of the frames we use when describing economies purely in utilitarian terms. In other words, Bataille tries to include all social activity in his analysis; he aims to overcome the limits of the economies we create due to our situated perspectives. However, as Bennington (1995) illustrates, by focusing on the waste or excess produced by a system, Bataille is structuring his analysis around a single concept (that of excess) in the same vein as the restricted economies he is critiquing: In its most abstract form, this suggestion would say that ‘general economy’ is not the other of ‘restricted economy,’ but is no other than restricted economy; that there is no general economy except as the economy of restricted economy; that general economy is the economy of its own restriction. (Bataille, 1991: 47–8, emphasis in original) The argument here is simple enough: in order to be an economy, it must by definition operate as if it is restricted; an economy cannot contain everything. We argued above that when we model a complex system our analysis will always be restricted, due not only to our limited perspectives but also due to the fact that our models need to deal with the inevitable uncertainty of our existence and still be coherent and logical. We deal with this uncertainty through the use of reason, which Derrida (2005: 151) defined as a wager between the calculable and the incalculable. As such there will always be an excess. Excess, by definition, exceeds reason (Derrida, 1978: 255, quoting Bataille). This excess we have labelled heterogeneity.7 What the notion of general economy does is to establish a relationship to this excess (Derrida, 1978: 270). In Derrida’s exploration of Bataille we can note the double handed movement of the deconstructive process which aims to maintain the radical nature of Bataille’s critique whilst at the same time illustrating the impossibility of a ‘pure excess’ without an economy to which it corresponds (or ‘sovereignty’ as Bataille labels it). Derrida argues that we need to remember that we can only speak of one economy (of one discourse); it is senseless in this regard to postulate two different kinds of economy, one restricted and the other excessive or general. That is, we cannot postulate an economy of excess which runs parallel to the restricted economy or a general economy in which there is only excess. When we speak of a general economy it is not an economy separate from a restricted economy; rather, it is a single economy which is not closed but is both open to random chance events as well as predictability, open to the possibility of destruction and yet robust, whether it comes from the play of forces inside the system or from its relationship to its environment (Derrida, 1978: 272). The models we construct of such systems must keep in mind that a system does not run on an entirely rational, utilitarian basis, but is open to the possibility of paradox and inconsistency yet still displays enough stability in order to be comprehended. The notion of general economy describes an economy with open boundaries and also a play of forces inside the system. Such an economy is neither the strictly restricted economy of traditional political economy or of classical science which denies the partiality of any perspective, nor is it an economy of excess (whatever that may look like). The double handed logic of Derrida allows us to conceive of this economy as being limited, constrained and restricted and, at the same time, as being open and excessive. What makes this possible? The notion of ‘play’ is crucial to this understanding.

#### Survival under restricted economy is reduced to a tautological circle of violence in which we defend our lives through military adventurism and arms buildup, only for the sake of sustaining this circle as long as we can

Stoekl ‘7 (Allan Stoekl, Professor at Penn State, Bataille’s Peak: Energy, Religion, Postsustainability, p. 43-46, 2007, Indiana University Press) aln

And yet, if we think a bit more deeply about these two approaches to human expenditure (both LeBlanc and Bataille are, ultimately, theorists of BATAILLE’S ETHICS 43 human violence), we start to see notable points in common. Despite appearing to be a theorist of human and ecological scarcity, LeBlanc nevertheless presupposes one basic fact: there is always a tendency for there to be too many humans in a given population. Certainly populations grow at different rates for different reasons, but they always seem to outstrip their environments: there is, in essence, always an excess of humans that has to be burned off. Conversely, Bataille is a thinker of limits to growth, precisely because he always presupposes a limit: if there were no limit, after all, there could be no excess of anything (yet the limit would be meaningless if there were not always already an excess: the excess opens the possibility of the limit). As we know, for Bataille too there is never a steady state: energy (wealth) can be reinvested, which results in growth; when growth is no longer possible, when the limits to growth have been reached, the excess must be destroyed. If it is not, it will only return to cause us to destroy ourselves: war. For if we aren’t strong enough to destroy, on our own, excessive energy, it cannot be used; and, like a healthy animal that cannot be trained, it will come back to destroy us, and we will be the ones who pay the costs of the inevitable explosion. (OC, 7: 31; AS, 24) In fact, Bataille sounds a lot like LeBlanc when he notes, in The Accursed Share, that the peoples of the “barbarian plateaus” of central Asia, mired in poverty and technologically inferior, could no longer move outward and conquer other adjacent, richer areas. They were, in effect, trapped; their only solution was the one that LeBlanc notes in similar cases: radical infertility. This, as noted by Bataille, was the solution of the Tibetans, who supported an enormous population of infertile and unproductive monks (OC, 7: 106; AS, 108). Bataille does, then, implicitly face the question of carrying capacity. Perhaps the ultimate example of this is nuclear war. The modern economy, according to Bataille, does not recognize the possibility of excess and therefore limits; the Protestant, and then the Marxist, ideal is to reinvest all excess back into the productive process, always augmenting output in this way. “Utility” in this model ends up being perfectly impractical: only so much output can be reabsorbed into the ever -more -efficient productive process. As in the case with Tibet, ultimately the excess will have to be burned off. This can happen either peacefully, through various postcapitalist 44 BATAILLE’S ETHICS mechanisms that Bataille recommends, such as the Marshall Plan, which will shift growth to other parts of the world, or violently and apocalyptically through the ultimate in war: nuclear holocaust. One can see that, in the end, the world itself will be en vase clos, fully developed, with no place for the excess to go. The bad alternative—nuclear holocaust—will result in the ultimate reduction in carrying capacity: a burned -out, depopulated earth. Humanity is, at the same time, through industry, which uses energy for the development of the forces of production, both a multiple opening of the possibilities of growth, and the infinite faculty for burnoff in pure loss [facilité infinie de consumation en pure perte]. (OC, 7: 170; AS, 181) Modern war is first of all a renunciation: one produces and amasses wealth in order to overcome a foe. War is an adjunct to economic expansion; it is a practical use of excessive forces. And this perhaps is the ultimate danger of the present -day (1949) buildup of nuclear arms: armament, seemingly a practical way of defending one’s own country or spreading one’s own values, in other words, of growing, ultimately leads to the risk of a “pure destruction” of excess—and even of carrying capacity. In the case of warfare, destructiveness is masked, made unrecognizable, by the appearance of an ultimate utility: in this case the spread of the American economy and the American way of life around the globe. Paradoxically, there is a kind of self -consciousness concerning excess, in the “naïve” society— which recognizes expenditure for what it is (in the form of un - productive glory in primitive warfare)—and a thorough ignorance of it in the modern one, which would always attempt to put waste to work (“useful” armaments) even at the cost of wholesale destruction. Bataille, then, like Le Blanc, can be characterized as a thinker of society who situates his theory in the context of ecological limits. From Bataille’s perspective, however, there is always too much rather than too little, given the existence of ecological (“natural”) and social (“cultural”) limits. The “end” of humankind, its ultimate goal, is thus the destruction of this surplus. While Le Blanc stresses war and sacrifice as a means of obtaining or maintaining what is essential to bare human (personal, social) survival, Bataille emphasizes the maintenance of limits and survival as mere preconditions for engaging in the glorious destruction of excess. The meaning of the limit and its affirmation is inseparable from the senselessness of its transgression in expenditure (la dépense). By seeing warfare as a mere BATAILLE’S ETHICS 45 (group) survival mechanism, Le Blanc makes the same mistake as that made by the supporters of a nuclear buildup; he, like they, sees warfare as practical, serving a purpose, and not as the sheer burn -off it really is. If, however, our most fundamental gesture is the destruction of a surplus, the production of that surplus must be seen as subsidiary. Once we recognize that everything cannot be saved and reinvested, the ultimate end (and most crucial problem) of our existence becomes the disposal of excess wealth (concentrated, nonusable energy). All other activity leads to something else, is a means to some other end; the only end that leads nowhere is the act of destruction by which we may—or may not—assure our (personal) survival (there is nothing to guarantee that radical destruction— consumation—does not turn on its author). We work in order to spend. We strive to produce sacred (charged) things, not practical things. Survival and reproduction alone are not the ultimate ends of human existence. We could characterize Bataille for this reason as a thinker of ecology who nevertheless emphasizes the primacy of an ecstatic social act (destruction). By characterizing survival as a means not an end (the most fundamental idea in “general economy”), expenditure for Bataille becomes a limitless, insubordinate act—a real end (that which does not lead outside itself ). I follow Bataille in this primacy of the delirium of expenditure over the simple exigency of personal or even social survival (Le Blanc). This does not preclude, however, a kind of ethical aftereffect of Bataille’s expenditure: survival for this reason can be read as the fundamentally unintentional consequence of expenditure rather than its purpose. Seeing a nuclear buildup as the wrong kind of expenditure—because it is seen as a means not an end—can lead, in Bataille’s view, to a rethinking of the role of expenditure in the modern world and hence, perhaps, the world’s (but not modernity’s) survival.

#### The military adventurism of a restricted economy entails the reduction of individual’s to a wax-museum of dead objects to be catastrophically expended- the reduction of human life to a standing reserve enables nuclear devastation and destruction of the ecosystem

Stoekl ‘7 (Allan Stoekl, Professor at Penn State, Bataille’s Peak: Energy, Religion, Postsustainability, p. 57-58, 2007, Indiana University Press) aln

War, too, reflects this nonintimacy of the thing: fossil fuel and nuclear - powered explosives and delivery systems make possible the impersonal destruction of lives in great numbers and at a great distance. Human beings are now simply quantities of material to be processed and destroyed in wars (whose purpose is to assure the continued availability of fossil fuel resources). Killing in modern warfare is different in kind from that carried out by the Aztecs. All the sacrificial elements, the elements by which the person has been transformed in and through death, have disappeared. Bataille, then, should have distinguished more clearly between intimate and impersonal varieties of useless squandries when it came to his discussion of the Marshall Plan.29 (In the same way, he should have distinguished between energy that is stockpiled and put to use and energy that is fundamentally “cursed” not only in and through bodily excess but in its ability to do “work.”)30 It is not merely a question of our attitude toward expenditure, our “self -consciousness”: also fundamental is how it is carried out. Waste based on the consumption of fossil or inanimate (nuclear) fuels cannot entail intimacy because it is dependent on the thing as thing, it is dependent on the energy reserve, on the stockpiled, planned, and protected self: “[This is] what we know from the outside, which is given to us as physical reality (at the limit of the commodity, available without reserve). We cannot penetrate the thing and its only meaning is its material qualities, appropriated or not for some use [utilité], understood in the productive sense of the term. (OC, 7: 126; AS, 132; italics Bataille’s) The origin of this destruction is therefore to be found in the maximizing of the efficiency of production; modern, industrialized waste is fundamentally only the most efficient way to eliminate what has been over - produced. Hence the Marshall Plan, proposing a gift -giving on a vast, mechanized scale, is different in kind from, say, a Tlingit potlatch ceremony. “Growth” is the ever -increasing rhythm and quantity of the treatment of matter for some unknown and unknowable human purpose and that matter’s subsequent disposal/ destruction. One could never “self -consciously” reconnect with intimacy through the affirmation of some form of industrial production -destruction. To see consumer culture as in some way the fulfillment of Bataille’s dream of a modern -day potlatch is for this reason a fundamental misreading of The Accursed Share.31 Bataille’s critique is always an ethics; it entails the affirmation of a “general economy” in which the particular claims of the closed subjectivity are left behind. The stockpiled self is countered, in Bataille, by the generous and death -bound movement of an Amélie, of a Sadean heroine whose sacrifice puts at risk not only an object, a commodity, but the stability of the “me.” To affirm a consumption that, in spite of its seeming delirium of waste, is simply a treatment of matter and wastage of fossil energy in immense quantities, lacking any sense of internal limits (angoisse), and always with a particular and efficacious end in view (“growth,” “comfort,” “personal satisfaction,” “consumer freedom”) is to misrepresent the main thrust of Bataille’s work. The point, after all, is to enable us to attain a greater “self -consciousness,” based on the ability to choose between modes of expenditure. Which entails the greatest intimacy? Certainly not nuclear devastation (1949) or the simple universal depletion of the earth’s resources and the wholesale destruction of ecosystems (today). We face a situation through Bataille, then, in which, to paraphrase the Bible, “the left hand does not know what the right is doing.”32 By affirming the generosity of the self that risks itself, the irony is that, as in 1949, an economy of expenditure—one that affirms the bodily expenditure of sacrifice, of the orgy, of the celebration of cursed matter—will “save the world.”33 Instead of facing—and choosing an alternative to—nuclear war, as Bataille in his day did, today we effectively, and perhaps inadvertently, choose an alternative to ecological disaster brought about by unwise modes of consumption (consommation). Expenditure is double, and just as the affirmation of giving, according to Bataille, could head off nuclear apocalypse, so too today we can envisage a model of expenditure that, involving not the expenditure of a standing reserve of eighty million barrels a day of oil, but the wastage of human effort and time, will transform the cities of the world, already facing imminent fossil fuel depletion (what I call postsustain - ability). What indeed would a city be like whose chief mode of expenditure entailed not the burning of fossil fuel but the movement of bodies in transport, in ecstasy, in despair?

#### We believe the topic should be shared and that our speech, as our own personal expenditure, is a performance of equality that transcends hierarchy- our affirmation is not “theft” of the resolution, it escapes the normativity of a fixed economic system that is continued through the violence of limitation and reservation.

Sutzl ‘13 (Wolfgang Sutzl, transdisciplinary researcher, writer and educator chiefly concerned with a critique of violence , Ph.D. in Philosophy from the Universitat Jaume I de Castellón, Subjectivities of Sharing The Emergence of an Anti-economy, <http://web.mit.edu/comm-forum/mit8/papers/SUTZL_paper_mit8_v1%201.pdf>, pg 16-17, we do not defend the ableist word “disables”, aln)

The point of this essay was to put forward several propositions about the nature of sharing. One, that sharing is essentially different from the forms of the gift and economic exchange, that it cannot be adequately described in their terms and that it therefore constitutes its own social sphere. While sharing is often understood as an economic model that offers a solution to many of the impasses of the capitalist market economy and its structure of economic exchange, and leads to better results as argued by Benkler (2004), the view I have tried to account for here suggest a more radical understanding of sharing as an activity that fundamentally disturbs the very idea of economic exchange such as it underlies standard economic theory. Classical economics is largely limited to seeing sharing as an aberrant activity to be economized and subjected to the principles of economic exchange, as 'theft,' or as violation of intellectual property rights. I have also suggested that sharing disturbs the economy of the gift by unhinging the social hierarchization upon which the gift inevitably relies, and which are reinforced in one way or another through gift-giving. Drawing on Derrida and Bourdieu, I have argued that both economic exchange and gift-giving (or symbolic exchange) are different ways of legitimizing and managing scarcity, in the former case through a formal equality that is inseparable from competition, and in the latter case through an essentially anti-liberal social hierarchization. I have agreed with Baudrillard that economic exchange is inevitably haunted by symbolic exchange. On the other hand, I have described sharing as a performance of equality among the sharers that disables both competition and hierarchy. It can do that because it is does not have to subscribe to a metaphysical assumption of scarcity. Such a negation of scarcity is at the basis of George Bataille's idea of the general economy which looks at economics from the perspective of excess, from that which is expended without return, a perspective that might seem frivolous to many at a first glance. However, it would be difficult to argue that the problems resulting from the global pressures for productivity at all costs do not exist: not only have we begun to see what happens when our natural resources are put at the service of this drive for growth, cognitive (or immaterial) capitalism has taken this drive into the very core of our everyday lives, where production is the production of subjectivity, exploiting those areas of life the once were leisure, or where affects, emotions, and general knowledge are located that did not serve a productive purpose. Indeed, if we measure wealth on the basis of what we make available to be expended without a return, then we might see ourselves the midst of a massive drive for poverty, of situations of extreme austerity in the midst of abundance. This is only seemingly a paradox, given that growth itself relies on using up as little as possible from what has been produced, and reinvesting as much as possible. I have argued that sharing may create wealth by expending what Bataille calls the “accursed share,” and not by providing a fix for an economic system that can be continued only at the price of much violence. To think of sharing as a fix can only lead to sharing being considered another growth area, which would explain the excitement about the shareconomy at the Cebit fair, and certainly use 'sharing' as a euphemism for exploiting a hitherto unexploited area.

#### Gifting without return cuts the head off of humanist arrogance in favor of an a-teleological economy of generosity

Stoekl ’90 (Allan Stoekl, Professor at Penn State, Truman’s Apotheosis: Bataille, “Planisme”, and Headlessness, p. 180-250, Yale University Press, 1990, Yale French Studies 78, jstor) aln

This last point is an important one: the decision, the plan, to give away wealth means nothing less than the destruction of the old profit system, centered as it is in "isolated calculations" (AS, 176). Bataille thus confronts a problem of the so-called "American cancer": the purely arithmetic calculation of debt, while larger concerns are ignored. As in Dandieu and Aron, a plan will solve the problem; but here the "end" is nothing less than potlatch, the "spending without return" championed in "The Notion of Expenditure." Bataille has discarded his earlier fetishes, such as the proletariat in the street ("The solving of social problems no longer depends on street uprisings" [AS, 186]) and "'visions,' divinities and myths" (AS, 189). Now lucidity will guarantee both economic development, peace, and the end of economic selfishness. Finally, the very necessity of central planning will make America look like the Soviet Union in that the former will accord more importance to state-planned and financed production. "It [the US] defends free enterprise, but it thereby in- creases the importance of the state. It is only advancing, as slowly as it can, toward a point where the USSR rushed headlong" (AS, 186). Some form of socialism will be developed in the US, then, as the opposing parties come to resemble each other. But, implicitly at least, Bataille is arguing that an American Stalinism will not arise from this situation, because this state control is devoted not to accumulation (as in Russia) but to expenditure. If the Marshall Plan, and the similar plans that will follow, necessarily negate purely individual concerns and enterprises, then socialist state planning will be inseparable from the giving away of massive amounts of wealth, from potlatch. Even though law and directives will determine activity, the Stalinist "head" will be replaced by a "headlessness." Or we can say, following Bataille's logic, that this nonauthoritarian direction, this "acephalite," is already in place in America, since the Marshall Plan has been set in motion not by a "head," an oppressive command, but by Roose- velt's successor, who is precisely unaware of what he is doing: "Today Truman would appear to be blindly preparing for the final-and se- cret-apotheosis" (AS, 190). Confrontation will continue between the superpowers-it is integral to the model of potlatch, which is now being elaborated on an international scale-but coercive con- trol, at least in America, seems a thing of the past. This is "planning without a head" in another sense as well: the ALLAN STOEKL 203 "end" of planning is planlessness, the "self-consciousness" that has "nothing as its object," that is the "nothing of pure expenditure" (AS, 190). Bataille here, at the end of the chapter, reiterates the argument from "The Psychological Structure of Fascism": accumulation is sub- ordination to some future goal. (It is, in the terms of that essay, homo- geneous.) But Bataillean self-consciousness is a "becoming conscious of the decisive meaning of an instant in which increase (the acquisition of something) will resolve into expenditure" (AS, 190). Just as the most elaborately conceived planning is inseparable from potlatch, so too the most integrated, nonindividuated consciousness (the consciousness that arises at the end of history, through an impossible "awareness" of the [non] "object" of the Marshall Plan) is indissociable from the nothingness it "knows." At this point one can see how Bataille's economic project folds back into the secular mystical expe- rience of the Somme Atheologique. We can see also how different this model is from Dandieu and Aron's. Their authoritarian direction may have been meant to lead to a death of hierarchy, but only through a psychic "individuality" and "spirituality." True, their model was based on potlatch, but the inner motivation of potlatch for them was not the "nothing of pure expen- diture," but rather the energy of the isolated "person." So even while their planning too may be conceived as a "planning to end planning," it is applied from outside-through an authoritarian state-and its end is self-glorification under the protection of that same state. Confrontation, so integral to potlatch, is completely denied (indeed the abolition of the proletariat is presented as the elimination of class conflict), and we realize that for Dandieu and Aron the affirmation of "primitive" expenditure was nothing more than a justification of a Nietzschean "personal" force. For Bataille, on the other hand, the end of planning-in both senses of the word "end," both goal and death- lies in the "lucidity" of the mystical state, a lucidity that opens onto the extinction of society, the individual, and the state

#### Thus Alex and I affirm an intimate expenditure of sharing within the resolution.

#### Our intimate expenditure is a utility of non-utility that ruptures and destroys the restricted economy that lashes out in exclusionary and violent ways to establish a true moment of communal unity

Biles ‘11 (Jeremy Biles, teaches philosophy at the Illionois Institute of Art, super cool guy, <3’s Bataille, The Remains of God: Bataille/Sacrifice/ Community, 11-24-11, 132-144, Culture Theory and Critique, Taylor and Francis) aln

In this sense, then, a sacrifice is always a sacrifice of God, of work hypostatised, for sacrifice is anti-utilitarian, wasteful, amode of glorious consumption. That which is genuinely sacred is revealed in sacrifice to be insubstantial – not eternal, but only a ‘privileged instant’, a ‘moment of communal unity, a moment of the convulsive communication of what is ordinarily stifled’: the range of human passions and intoxications at their extremes (Bataille 1992a: 242, 241). To live out the full meaning of Nietzsche’s declaration of God’s death is thus to attain a kind of madness in which rational thought is suspended in a momentary experience of rupture with the profane world and a fusion among previously distinct beings. If God ‘represent[s] the only obstacle to the human will’, then to sacrifice God means to ‘[surrender], nude, to the passion of giving the world an intoxicating meaning’ (Bataille 1992a: 245). And yet, the sacred, by its very nature, is fleeting; the passional effluxes of sacrifice inevitably wane, and the aims of instrumental reason invariably reassert themselves, giving rise again to the fear of the loss of self, and with it, the tendency to hypostasise work in the form of God. The remains of God, like the profane self that always returns, are never finally eradicated; prohibitions are re-installed, and the world of rational utility endures. Individuals are again themselves, discontinuous and isolated by the profane concerns of the workaday world and traditional social structures, deprived of the deep sense of continuity, or intimacy, that is afforded in transitory experiences of sacred community. Bataille’s aim in thinking community beyond communism, and ultimately beyond any ‘communitarian enterprises’ (Nancy 1991a: 17), is to accede to a point of sovereignty, an experience of excess that transgresses the boundaries of the profane world, and the system of taboos that uphold the work of instrumental reason. Taboos protect against the excesses – in particular violence and perverse, non-procreative sexuality – that threaten to destroy those who elicit and engage them. But far from a quest for masterful control, sovereignty, for Bataille, is ecstatic abandonment – the rupture of the closed, individual self as formed through social prohibitions and work.

#### Economic systems operate not according to efficiency, but wasteful expenditure—linear progress is a lie, development is truly frenzied and sacred, not rational and restricted

Rehn and Lindahl ’11 Alf Rehn, and Marcus Lindahl, “George Bataille—On His Shoulders (And Other Parts of the Body of Knowledge,” in On the Shoulders of Giants, ed. Jensen, T. & Wilson, T., Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2011, p. 32-34

The key argument of this first volume is that all dynamic, developing systems have two aspects to them, one limited and one general. Even though Bataille was primarily interested in systems of human action, here he ventures much further and includes both cosmological and biological systems in his sweeping analysis of the logic of systems. Discussing economy (broadly understood), he begins by pointing out that most studies have completely misunderstood the foundational aspect of this system. Most theorists of economy start from the assumption that its key logic is one of efficiency. One thus assumes that things such as the conservation of energy, the parsimonious use of resources and savings – things we often state as positive and “economic” things to do – are natural and basic for economic functioning. Bataille disagrees in the most violent manner possible. Presaging modern economic anthropology, he instead turns the entire question on its head. If we look back to the very birth of the economy, the moment in which society started forming around productive functions, what actually occurred? As Marshall Sahlins later showed to great effect in his Stone Age Economics (1972), the state of primitive man was not one of dearth. Instead it seems that our ancestors lived fairly pleasant lives, with limited time spent on anything like work due to their very limited needs. With few people in the world, and food thus being plentiful and relatively easy to gather or hunt, work and means were minimized as there were no real ends to pursue. It is here that Bataille enters the picture. How did we develop culture and economy? Not because we had to, as we might well have opted to live in a pre-historical bliss. No, we developed because we desired something more – something that Bataille calls the accursed share. We desired feasts, fetish-objects, larger huts, bigger prey, rituals and merrymaking. For some this seems normal, as we’re programmed to understand progress and development as something natural and necessary. But Bataille points out that this is a very peculiar assumption, and that all these things can in fact be understood more analytically as “waste”. Looking to a wide range of anthropological evidence, Bataille argues that progress isn’t driven by some natural necessity, but rather by the tendency of all systems to create great eruptions of energy, magnificent waste and sacred excess. I will simply state, without waiting further, that the extension of economic growth itself requires the overturning of economic principles–the overturning of the ethics that ground them. Changing from the perspectives of restrictive economy to those of general economy actually accomplishes a Copernican transformation: a reversal of thinking–and of ethics. From The Accursed Share, Vol. 1 (1949/1988, p. 25) We didn’t need to start storing grain, but did so because we wanted to organize huge drunken feasts in which our saved surplus could be gloriously wasted (and during which we ourselves could get wasted – as archaeological research has convincingly shown that the first instances of farming were not for the production of necessities but for producing beer and thus drunkenness). We developed complex logistics in order to lay our hands on trinkets and frivolities such as gold and spices. We built societies in order to arrange huge events – such as wars, huge art galleries or the Olympics – without apparent purpose. Waste, nothing but glorious waste! The problem, maintains Bataille, is that we’ve assumed that the limited system of economy, the part of it that strives for efficiency and order, is the whole story. No, he continues, the general economy is the correct unit of analysis, and here efficiency and parsimony only exist in order to enable waste and expenditure. Bataille continues this vision throughout the three volumes of The Accursed Share and ends up by presenting a sweeping understanding of human systems in which all calls for rationality or closedness are turned inside-out by the pressure that general systems brings. For Bataille, all systems are attempts to transcend themselves, to waste themselves, to enact excess. To be economic, then, is to enable waste or to make waste possible. This can obviously be enacted in numerous ways. In the sphere of eroticism, Bataille notes how it is in the realm of desire, transgression, limitations and prohibitions that the true nature of the erotic come into being, namely eroticism as a grand frivolity, escaping the repressive notion of humans as procreation machines: Life has always taken place in a tumult without apparent cohesion, but it only 4nds its grandeur and its reality in ecstasy and in ecstatic love. From !e Sacred (1985, p. 179)

#### Scholarship is a waste of time. Education is a waste of time. The 1ac was a waste of time- all that matters is that we accept this waste of time, that we accept that not everything can be utopic- only then can we truly achieve value, or ethics.

Mellors ‘13 (Anthony Mellors, Professor in English departments of Oxford and Durham Universities, and at The Manchester Metropolitan University, Refusing Impact: Aesthetic Economy and Given Time, pgs 40-61 of SubStance Volume 42, Number 1 published in 2013, aln)

Perhaps this further indeterminacy is dissemination "itself"? If so, it highlights the problem of risk in relation to temporality in that those activities which struggle to comply with demands for quickly deliverable outcomes—e.g., scholarship, scientific experiment, art—can only create value by running the risk of being a waste of time. Much the same could be said of entrepreneurship, even though its stated object is making money, and one of the ironies of advanced capital is that it seeks to eliminate the risk that allows it to innovate in the first place. What remains intolerable to business, and certainly to its bureaucratic state arm, which destroys the unaccountably innovative by insisting on its accountability, are activities that not only delay outcomes but do not start out with the goal of self-interested outcomes. Connor confesses that his valuing of "the rhythm of delay, the delay of rhythm," looks like "a simple return to aestheticist or liberal claims for the autonomy and non-utility of art," but argues that this [End Page 55] has new significance in the context of a global market, for which "nothing that does not produce or can be registered on a scale of value can be recognized" (98-99). Beyond art, the principle is ascetic and ethical and points Connor towards the deconstructive "value of suspending every value...the permanent ethico-political necessity for ethics and politics to be thought through and with the other-directed saying, responding and responsibility of other discourses such as the literary" (227) while guarding against utopian accounts of value, such as those of Fredric Jameson and Terry Eagleton, which wish "value away into a strictly unattainable future" based on the return to a myth of pure use-value (156). Socialism, he argues, needs to "begin the long work" of abandoning the humanist ideal of an organic society before or beyond exchange (the gift again) and move "beyond reification and fixation into the productive possibilities of the unconstrained evaluation of value" (157). The problem here is that socialism is given as a value that must be upheld and revised; but how do we arrive at socialism prior to the process of transvaluation? A similar issue takes place in Drucilla Cornell's The Philosophy of the Limit , which argues for a deconstructive ethics of the Other as the basis for an "ideological critique" of law. Where, for example, the myth of legal precedents discriminates against women and homosexuals, Cornell suggests that Derrida's "critique" shows that the gender hierarchy, and with it, imposed heterosexuality, is "ideology" in that it is not and cannot be made "true" to lived, individual sexuality. In turn he shows that the gender hierarchy violates the moment of universality that inheres in the recognition of the phenomenological symmetry of the Other. (175) The scare quotes around "true" make the lived nature of sexuality disingenuous. A paragraph later, Cornell notes that "even if gender identity is just a role into which we are cast by the rigid structures of culture, we still play it, like automatons, as we take up our positions in the gender hierarchy" (ibid.) All identity is constructed, and human desire is the puppet of culture, yet a special case can be made for the living value of the sexualities Cornell wants to rescue from injustice. Caught between phusis and nomos , her ethics is subject to the deconstruction she claims as the ground of ideological critique. Since she has always already established the right of women and gays not to be discriminated against in law, deconstruction becomes a kind of supplementary justification after the fact, and one that exposes the indeterminate (and in law irresolvable) ground on which her theory sits. And this remains the problem for Left critique, which tends to regard theory both as a way of shaking the ground on which "natural" (= reified ideology = the right) values rest and as the ground of culturally provisional [End Page 56] values opening and justifying intervention. But if the emancipatory values broadly identified with the Left were not already in place, there would be no "Left" critique, merely critique. But critique, however altruistic, would be critique of nothing if it were not motivated by values. Therefore, it must identify and acknowledge those originary values in a way that both recognizes (insofar as it is possible to recognize one's motivations) their contingency and their political necessity. In effect, this means preserving something of the notion of disinterestedness as a constituent part of interestedness. By labelling disinterest a "bourgeois" misrecognition of interest, Bourdieu forfeits critique altogether. But this does not mean that his attack on the asceticism of reflection is without critical value, for even as it discloses the impasse of his own theory it guards against the complacency of claustral formalism. When Connor begins his work on cultural value by asserting that "[I]t will be necessary to be suspicious of every attempt to project oneself outside or beyond the field of socially constituted value through the various theories of the aesthetic, from the fraudulent disinterestedness of the aesthetic in Kant" and "refusing...any kind of aesthetic experience or form that does not implicitly begin the work of subjecting the ideal and identity of the aesthetic to self-reflexive critique" (6), he continues to invest in the value of self-reflexive critique and goes on to affirm the disinterested aesthetic he calls "fraudulent," albeit as a strategic response to the "general positivity of outcomes" (98) demanded by the global market. You cannot refuse or waste what you hold on to as a positivity, and Connor runs the risk of deconstructing his own reflexivity. Yet that "risk" may be the unavoidable and productive point of critique, the point at which even Barbara Herrnstein Smith's insistence that "no valorization of anything, even of 'loss' itself, can escape the idea of some sort of positivity—that is, gain, benefit, or advantage—in relation to some economy" must open itself to a critique of its conservative determination of positivity as utility (qtd. in Connor, 74).