### Plan

#### plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic engagement towards Mexico by offering open licensing of Remotely Piloted Aerial Vehicle technology to the assembly-for-exports industry.

### Terrorism

#### **Drones bolster intelligence gathering on the border—efficiency is key**

Rozemberg ‘12 (Hernan, served as a Bureau Chief and senior correspondent for NPR's "Fronteras: The Changing America Desk," where he covered issues of immigration and border security, "Mixed Feelings On Border Drones: Boon To National Security, Threat To Privacy", July 5 2012, www.fronterasdesk.org/content/mixed-feelings-border-drones-boon-national-security-threat-privacy)

¶ The [Department of Homeland Security](http://www.dhs.gov/) just launched its tenth Predator B Unmanned Aerial System, commonly known as a **drone**, and now both northern and southern borders are covered.¶ Even though they cost $18 million apiece, many **experts say they’re worth every penny**.¶ "Homeland Security’s behind the times. It should have been doing this a decade ago," said [Dan Gouré](http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/dr-daniel-goure), a former high-ranking Defense Department official and current vice president of The Lexington Institute, a military think tank in Virginia.¶ "**We’ve done as much as we can do on the surface and so you have to go into the air**. And we’re going to have to increasingly have to go into the air **in order to be effective**," Gouré said.¶ [Doug Davis](http://www.linkedin.com/in/kdougdavis) has been working with drones for over two decades. He’s currently second in charge of the country’s largest drone development and testing center, at [New Mexico State University](http://www.psl.nmsu.edu/). And he started the drone office at the [Federal Aviation Administration](http://www.faa.gov/).¶ "I don’t think there’s a whole lot of need to do this over Kansas, but **for border surveillance, I believe we absolutely need that as a nation right now**," Davis said. "What **you have to balance** is **the safety of the airspace users and the people on the ground with the national security of the country**."¶ Striking that balance is a thorny matter. Opponents of the drone program say the government can now spy into anyone’s backyard without their consent. That’s a scary thought, said [Jay Stanley](http://www.aclu.org/blog/author/jay-stanley), who specializes in privacy issues at the [American Civil Liberties Union](http://www.aclu.org/).¶ "**The government does have the right to protect its borders, but we haven’t sat down and gotten our policies straight about how we want to allow these technologies to be used, what kind of limits need to be placed on them in order to protect our privacy**," Stanley said.¶ And **then there’s** also **the question of the effectiveness of border drones**. The Homeland Security Department's Office of Inspector General issued a scathing report in May on this issue. It questioned why drones are being put to use for fewer than 4,000 flight hours per year when they could be up in the air for more than 13,000 hours.¶ **They’re just not being used efficiently**, said [Tom Barry](http://www.ciponline.org/about-us/experts-staff/tom_barry), who researches drone issues at the Center for International Policy, a foreign policy think tank in Washington, D.C.

#### High risk of cross-border WMD terror

McCaul ’12 REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL T. McCAUL, CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT, “Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border,” ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION, November 2012, http://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=725796&advanced=advanced

Terrorism remains a serious threat to the security of the United States. The Congressional Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. Of growing concern and potentially a more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected. This second edition emphasizes America’s ever-present threat from Middle East terrorist networks, their increasing presence in Latin America, and the growing relationship with Mexican DTOs [Drug Trafficking Organizations] to exploit paths into the United States. During the period of May 2009 through July 2011, federal law enforcement made 29 arrests for violent terrorist plots against the United States, most with ties to terror networks or Muslim extremist groups in the Middle East. The vast majority of the suspects had either connections to special interest countries, including those deemed as state sponsors of terrorism or were radicalized by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. American-born al Qaeda Imam Anwar al Awlaki, killed in 2011, was personally responsible for radicalizing scores of Muslim extremists around the world. The list includes American-born U.S. Army Major Nidal Hassan, the accused Fort Hood gunman; “underwear bomber” Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab; and Barry Bujol of Hempstead, TX, convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In several documented cases, al Awlaki moved his followers to commit “jihad” against the United States. These instances, combined with recent events involving the Qods Forces, the terrorist arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Hezbollah, serve as a stark reminder the United States remains in the crosshairs of terrorist organizations and their associates. In May of 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported that intelligence gleaned from the 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound indicated the world’s most wanted terrorist sought to use operatives with valid Mexican passports who could illegally cross into the United States to conduct terror operations.3 The story elaborated that bin Laden recognized the importance of al Qaeda operatives blending in with American society but felt that those with U.S. citizenship who then attacked the United States would be violating Islamic law. Of equal concern is the possibility to smuggle materials, including uranium, which can be safely assembled on U.S. soil into a weapon of mass destruction.

#### The plan facilitates the perception of a strong border and bolsters intelligence networks- that augments counterterror operations and has a deterrent effect on terror groups

Willis et al ’10 (Henry H. Willis, Director of the RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center, and professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, Ph.D. in engineering and public policy at Carnegie Mellon Unviersity, Joel B. Predd, engineer at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in electrical engineering at Princeton University, Paul K. Davis, senior principal researcher at the RAND Corporation and a professor of policy analysis in the Pardee Rand Graduate School, Ph.D. in chemical physics at MIT, Measuring the Effectiveness of Border Security Between Ports-ofEntry, Sponsored by the DHS, Technical Report, RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR837.pdf>, 2010) aln

The complexity of the counterterrorism mission is well recognized, as is the range of capabilities that can be brought to bear on the problem. The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSC, 2006) illustrates the variety of short-term and long-term objectives involved in combating terrorism (see Table 4.1). Short-term objectives are directed at disrupting terrorist planning and operations as well as hindering the ability of terrorist groups to achieve strategic goals of controlling national governments (see Table 4.1). Long-term objectives are directed at combating the roots and ideologies of terrorism and building capabilities within international coalitions to combat terrorism. These national objectives involve influencing why people become terrorists (Helmus, 2009), how terrorist groups generate and maintain support (Paul, 2009), and how terrorist groups learn and plan (Cragin, 2007; Bonomo et al., 2007; Jackson et al., 2005, 2009). In the short term, success is defined by successfully disrupting terrorism (Jackson et al., 2009). In the long term, success involves ending a terrorist group’s ability to sustain itself (Gvineria, 2009; Jones and Libicki, 2008).3 Achieving these goals requires a concerted effort focusing on domestic security, military capabilities, economics, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomacy. With this broad set of required capabilities, DHS and its border-security agencies are but one constituency in a truly interagency mission. Measuring these national objectives could be quite difficult. Possible measures could be the number of terrorist attacks or consequences of terrorist attacks. These measures are not perfectly reliable, because, even if a terrorist group was not attacking, it could be successfully recruiting members with knowledge of weapons of mass destruction or obtaining weapon-of-mass- destruction technologies. Other subsidiary measures might better reflect the broader success of national policies on combating terrorism. For example, estimates of the membership of terrorist organizations or qualitative estimates of the capabilities of terrorists to conduct attack scenarios could provide indications of how counterterrorism efforts are influencing risks from terrorism. Although these measures may be more reliable measures of national counterterrorism policies, they are not reliable measures of the contributions made by border security. Because terrorist groups can recruit and train members inside or outside the United States without necessarily crossing a border, the effectiveness of border-security efforts could have little relationship with measures like terrorist groups’ membership or technical capability. Instead, to develop sound and reliable measures of the contributions of border security to counter terrorism, it is necessary to look to the fundamental capabilities of interdiction, deterrence, and networked intelligence that are part of the conceptual model in Chapter Three. The principal contributions that border security makes to counterterrorism relate to preventing certain kinds of terrorist attacks dependent on flows into the country of people or materials. These contributions can be illustrated by considering what opportunities exist to disrupt terrorist attacks while they are being planned and orchestrated. Through a number of planning efforts, DHS and its components have developed detailed planning scenarios of terrorist events (DHS, 2006). Each of these scenarios has been deconstructed into attack trees that are useful for considering how DHS border-security programs contribute to terrorism security efforts. In their most generic form, these attack trees specify dimensions of attack scenarios with respect to building the terrorist team, identifying a target, and acquiring a weapon (see Figure 4.1). This decomposition of attack planning provides a structure around which to consider how interdiction, deterrence, and networked intelligence contribute to preventing terrorist attacks and, thus, why it is relevant to measure these functions. DHS border-security efforts focus on interdiction of terrorist team members and weapons or weapon components when they cross U.S. borders. Examples of initiatives that are intended to enhance these capabilities include the Secure Border Initiative, the acquisition of Advanced Spectroscopic Portals for nuclear detection, the Secure Communities Initiative, and US-VISIT. 3 A number of these references appear as chapters in a single book (Davis and Cragin, 2009), a RAND critical review of the scholarly social science bearing on counterterrorism. Contributions of Border Security to Drug Control, Counterterrorism, and Illegal Migration 19 In addition, it is often pointed out that, when border-security measures are perceived to be effective, terrorists groups may be deterred from attacking in particular ways, or possibly from attacking at all. This could result from awareness of what type of surveillance is occurring or the capability of interdiction systems. In either case, deterrence refers to the judgment of terrorists that they will not be successful, leading them to choose another course of action. Finally, many border-security initiatives also contribute information to the national networked-intelligence picture. For example, the Secure Communities Initiative has implemented new capabilities to allow a single submission of fingerprints as part of the normal criminal arrest and booking process to be queried against both the FBI and DHS immigration and terrorism databases. This effort makes it easier for federal and local law enforcement to share actionable intelligence and makes it more difficult for terrorists to evade border-security efforts. 4.2.3 Non-DHS Factors on Which Border-Security Outcomes Depend The terrorist threat that border-security efforts must counter will be significantly influenced by the effectiveness of security, economic policy, military, diplomatic, and intelligence efforts targeting other aspects of terrorism. If terrorists overseas are able to acquire significant quantities of weapon material or establish advanced counterintelligence capabilities, attack plans may easily overwhelm border-security efforts. If terrorists are successful at recruiting and building networks within the United States, border-security efforts may never get the chance to interdict attacks. Similarly, the perceptions that terrorists have about the difficulty of entering the country could influence decisions of how to organize and plan attacks. If borders are viewed as porous and open, terrorist groups can be expected to take advantage of this vulnerability. To the extent that border security is seen as presenting barriers to terrorist planning (especially barriers that include substantial operational uncertainty), efforts will create a deterrent effect that could lead terrorists to shift to attacking interests outside the United States or attacking in different ways. The extent to which border security will be effective at both interdicting and deterring terrorists will itself depend on a number of contextual factors, including the following: • material being smuggled: Is it possible to detect the material using noninvasive means (e.g., with nuclear detectors)? • mode of travel: Will crossings be via air, land, or sea? • environment and terrain: Will crossings occur during times when and at places where border security benefits from good visibility or poor visibility? • U.S. intelligence capabilities: Do expenditures on intelligence collection and analysis afford border security the ability to anticipate terrorist incursion attempts? • terrorist counterintelligence capabilities: Do terrorists have enough understanding of border-security tactics and techniques to be able to avoid them and to do so with considerable confidence? The answer to this, of course, will depend on the visibility and predictability of border-security systems and procedures. The measures used for evaluation of border-security efforts must be able to reflect some of these dependencies and factors that moderate the effectiveness of border security.

#### Drones better than all alternative methods of targeted killing

Zenko ’13 Micah Zenko, Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 65, January 2013 jss

The U.S. use of armed drones has two unique advantages over manned aircraft, distant missile strikes, and special operations raids when it comes to destroying targets. First, drones allow for sustained persistence over potential targets. The existing U.S. arsenal of armed drones—primarily the Predator and Reaper—can remain aloft, fully loaded with munitions, for over fourteen hours, compared to four hours or less for F-16 fighter jets and A-10 ground attack aircraft.5 And unlike manned aircraft or raids, drones fly directly over hostile territory without placing pilots or ground troops at risk of injury, capture, or death. Second, drones provide a near-instantaneous responsiveness— dramatically shrinking what U.S. military targeting experts call the “find-fix-finish” loop—that most other platforms lack. For example, a drone-fired missile travels faster than the speed of sound, striking a target within seconds—often before it is heard by people on the ground. This ability stands in stark contrast to the August 1998 cruise missile salvo targeting Osama bin Laden, which had to be programmed based on projections of where he would be in four to six hours, to allow time to analyze the intelligence, obtain presidential authorization, program the missiles, and fly them to the target.6 Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) loaded with conventional munitions can reach distant targets much faster than cruise missiles, but they carry the dire risk of misattribution as a U.S. nuclear first strike against Russia or China, for instance. Finally, drone-fired missiles can be—and have been—diverted at the last moment if noncombatants enter the likely blast radius.7

#### High probability of terrorism- Major international consensus, materials and motivation exist now, rigorous global studies agree

Bunn et al. ‘13 ("Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism," Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2, 2013, Matthew Bunn. Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School and Co-Principal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Military Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. • Martin Malin. Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. • Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security expert and writer from 1993 to 2008. • William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration from 2006 to 2009. • Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces). Leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces from 1994 to 1996. • Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to 1997, section head - deputy chief of staff of the Defense Council of Russia from 1997 to 1998,<http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html>)

I. Introduction In 2011, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies published “The U.S. – Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism.” The assessment analyzed the means, motives, and access of would-be nuclear terrorists, and concluded that the threat of nuclear terrorism is urgent and real. The Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits in 2010 and 2012 established and demonstrated a consensus among political leaders from around the world that nuclear terrorism poses a serious threat to the peace, security, and prosperity of our planet. For any country, a terrorist attack with a nuclear device would be an immediate and catastrophic disaster, and the negative effects would reverberate around the world far beyond the location and moment of the detonation. Preventing a nuclear terrorist attack requires international cooperation to secure nuclear materials, especially among those states producing nuclear materials and weapons. As the world’s two greatest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia have the greatest experience and capabilities in securing nuclear materials and plants and, therefore, share a special responsibility to lead international efforts to prevent terrorists from seizing such materials and plants. The depth of convergence between U.S. and Russian vital national interests on the issue of nuclear security is best illustrated by the fact that bilateral cooperation on this issue has continued uninterrupted for more than two decades, even when relations between the two countries occasionally became frosty, as in the aftermath of the August 2008 war in Georgia. Russia and the United States have strong incentives to forge a close and trusting partnership to prevent nuclear terrorism and have made enormous progress in securing fissile material both at home and in partnership with other countries. However, to meet the evolving threat posed by those individuals intent upon using nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes, the United States and Russia need to deepen and broaden their cooperation. The 2011 “U.S. - Russia Joint Threat Assessment” offered both specific conclusions about the nature of the threat and general observations about how it might be addressed. This report builds on that foundation and analyzes the existing framework for action, cites gaps and deficiencies, and makes specific recommendations for improvement. “The U.S. – Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism” (The 2011 report executive summary): • Nuclear terrorism is a real and urgent threat. Urgent actions are required to reduce the risk. The risk is driven by the rise of terrorists who seek to inflict unlimited damage, many of whom have sought justification for their plans in radical interpretations of Islam**;** by the spread of information about the decades-old technology of nuclear weapons; by the increased availability of weapons-usable nuclear materials; and by globalization, which makes it easier to move people, technologies, and materials across the world. • Making a crude nuclear bomb would not be easy, but is potentially within the capabilities of a technically sophisticated terrorist group, as numerous government studies have confirmed. Detonating a stolen nuclear weapon would likely be difficult for terrorists to accomplish, if the weapon was equipped with modern technical safeguards (such as the electronic locks known as Permissive Action Links, or PALs). Terrorists could, however, cut open a stolen nuclear weapon and make use of its nuclear material for a bomb of their own. • The nuclear material for a bomb is small and difficult to detect, making it a major challenge to stop nuclear smuggling or to recover nuclear material after it has been stolen. Hence, a primary focus in reducing the risk must be to keep nuclear material and nuclear weapons from being stolen by continually improving their security, as agreed at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010. • Al-Qaeda has sought nuclear weapons for almost two decades. The group has repeatedly attempted to purchase stolen nuclear material or nuclear weapons, and has repeatedly attempted to recruit nuclear expertise. Al-Qaeda reportedly conducted tests of conventional explosives for its nuclear program in the desert in Afghanistan. The group’s nuclear ambitions continued after its dispersal following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Recent writings from top al-Qaeda leadership are focused on justifying the mass slaughter of civilians, including the use of weapons of mass destruction, and are in all likelihood intended to provide a formal religious justification for nuclear use. While there are significant gaps in coverage of the group’s activities, al-Qaeda appears to have been frustrated thus far in acquiring a nuclear capability; it is unclear whether the the group has acquired weapons-usable nuclear material or the expertise needed to make such material into a bomb. Furthermore, pressure from a broad range of counter-terrorist actions probably has reduced the group’s ability to manage large, complex projects, but has not eliminated the danger. However, there is no sign the group has abandoned its nuclear ambitions. On the contrary, leadership statements as recently as 2008 indicate that the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.

#### A terrorist attack goes nuclear- highest risk of escalation

Ayson ‘10 (Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington (Robert, July. “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7. InformaWorld.)

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular**,** if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tensionin Washington’s relationswith Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions mightgrow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

#### Independently, nuclear terrorism causes US-Russia miscalc- largest existential risk

Barrett et al 6-24 (Anthony Barrett, Seth Baum, Kelly Hostetler, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia, 6/24/13, pgs 1-2, anuss)

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide, and even the extinction of humanity. 2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side's forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 6 However, it also has been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. 7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 9 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, 10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. 13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.–Russian crisis conditions, 15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.–Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16

#### Drones solve Pakistani militancy and stability—decimate militant group’s effectiveness

**Nadim ‘12** (Hussain Nadim, visiting scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center, August 8, 2012, "How Drones Changed the Game in Pakistan," National Interest, nationalinterest.org/how-drones-changed-the-game-pakistan-7290)

Regardless of what the news agencies in Pakistan claim about the negative effects of drone strikes, the weapon is proving to be a game changer for the U.S. war on terrorism. And surprisingly, the Pakistani Army quietly admits to this fact. Just the way Stinger missiles shifted the balance of power in favor of the United States in the 1980s, drones are producing the same results.¶The critics of unmanned strikes, who claim that drones are contributing to growing radicalization in Pakistan, haven’t looked around enough—or they would realize that much of the radicalization already was established by the Taliban in the 1990s. The real tragedy is that it is acceptable for the Taliban to radicalize and kill, but it is considered a breach of sovereignty for the United States, in pursuit of those radicalizing Pakistan’s people, to do the same.¶There is so much protest over the drones because the media reports about them are biased. Although people on ground in war zones contend that the drone strikes have very few civilian casualties and, with time, have become extremely precise, the media presents quite a different story to boost its ratings.¶ Many in Pakistan, especially in the army, understand the positive impact of this weapon. Drones are coming in handy for two reasons: their precision and psychological effect. Many analysts of this subject have been concerned only with the military aspect, such as whether or not drones are precise enough and the casualties they incur. But part of what works in favor of the United States is the psychological impact—the fear that drones have instilled in the militants. The fact that the United States might strike day or night, inside the militant compound or outside while traveling in the convoys, works to deter militants and restrict their operations. This tilts the balance of power in favor of the United States.¶Most of the people in the Pakistani Army whom I interviewed on the subject were positive about the drone strikes and their direct correlation with a decrease in terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The majority focused on the psychological impact of the drones and how they have put militants on the run, forcing them to sleep under trees at night, though it must be said that army officials showed some concern about cases in which the same psychological impact is experienced by civilians.¶Locals I talked to are frustrated over the fear that they might get hit by a drone if the militants are hiding in their neighborhood. But this frustration may have a positive impact as it motivates civilians to flush out and close doors to militants who seek refuge in their areas.¶ Surprisingly, there isn’t as much anti-Americanism as one would suspect in areas where the United States is conducting drone strikes, largely because the locals are fed up with the influx of militants in their areas and have suffered because of terrorism. However, urban centers, which have suffered the least from terrorism, are far more radicalized and anti-American. Hence, we see large anti-drone rallies in the cities of Punjab, where people have little first-hand experience with drones. The anti-American lot in these places will start a rally for any reason at all as long as they get to burn a few American flags.

#### Pakistani instability causes a coup and goes nuclear

Pitt ‘9 - a New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence." (5/8/09, William, “Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,” http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183)

But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21, including several children who were waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in terror as gunfire rings out around them, and government forces have been unable to quell the violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in retaliation for the killing of other militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take place where we have come to expect such terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole new ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave and growing threat to us all.Pakistan is now trembling on the edge of violent chaos, and is doing so with nuclear weaponsin its hip pocket,right in the middle ofone ofthe most dangerous neighborhoods in the world.The situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a blatantly criminal security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic population with deep ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an ongoing standoff with neighboring India that has been the center of political gravity in the region for more than half a century. The fact thatPakistan, andIndia, and Russia, and China all possess nuclear weaponsand share the same space means any ongoing or escalating violence over there hasthe real potential to crack open the very gates of Hellitself. Recently, the Taliban made a military push into the northwest Pakistani region around the Swat Valley. According to a recent Reuters report: The (Pakistani) army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007 and used artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a negotiated settlement. A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that, hundreds — including soldiers, militants and civilians — died in battles. Militants unleashed a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools.About 1,200 people were killed since late 2007 and 250,000 to 500,000 fled, leaving the militants in virtual control. Pakistan offered on February 16 to introduce Islamic law in the Swat valley and neighboring areas in a bid to take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants announced an indefinite cease-fire after the army said it was halting operations in the region. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a regulation imposing sharia in the area last month. But the Taliban refused to give up their guns and pushed into Buner and another district adjacent to Swat, intent on spreading their rule. The United States, already embroiled in a war against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, must now face the possibility that Pakistan could collapse under the mounting threat of Taliban forces there. Military and diplomatic advisers to President Obama, uncertain how best to proceed, now face one of the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant gains in Pakistan," reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so alarmed the White House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described the situation as 'one of the very most serious problems we face.'" "Security was deteriorating rapidly," reported The Washington Post on Monday, "particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor al-Qaeda and the Taliban, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi heartland. The Pakistani government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for dealing with it. Anti-American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. The United States is fighting Pakistan-based extremists by proxy, through an army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence." It is believedPakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons. Because Pakistan's stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population that shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears over what could happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real. "As the insurgency of the Taliban and Al Qaeda spreads in Pakistan," reported the Times last week, "senior American officials say they are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel-production facilities. In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure." "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spinesof those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 — the U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the country and secure as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S. officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say." In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble for everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the worst-case scenario. If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling the government, several very dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armedIndia couldbe galvanized into military actionof some kind,as couldnuclear-armedChina ornuclear-armedRussia. If the Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted for and secured,the specter (or reality) ofloose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations could place the entire world on a collision course with unimaginable disaster.We have all been paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so. The developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious about addressing the situation. So should we all.

### Hegemony

#### Currently restrictions and red tape are driving away investors and decimating drone production

AP ’13 (Associated Press, Looking to break into private market, drone industry worries about backlash, 3-29-13, <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/drone-industry-worries-privacy-backlash-article-1.1302461#ixzz2i8PsIV8C>) aln

It's a good bet that in the not-so-distant future aerial drones will be part of Americans' everyday lives, performing countless useful functions. A far cry from the killing machines whose missiles incinerate terrorists, these generally small, unmanned aircraft will help farmers more precisely apply water and pesticides to crops, saving money and reducing environmental impacts. They'll help police departments find missing people, reconstruct traffic accidents and act as lookouts for SWAT teams. They'll alert authorities to people stranded on rooftops by hurricanes and monitor evacuation flows. Real estate agents will use them to film videos of properties and surrounding neighborhoods. States will use them to inspect bridges, roads and dams. Oil companies will use them to monitor pipelines, while power companies use them to monitor transmission lines. With military budgets shrinking, drone makers have been counting on the civilian market to spur the industry's growth. But there's an ironic threat to that hope: Success on the battlefield may contain the seeds of trouble for the more benign uses of drones at home. The civilian unmanned aircraft industry worries that it will be grounded before it can really take off because of fear among the public that the technology will be misused. Also problematic is a delay in the issuance of government safety regulations that are needed before drones can gain broad access to U.S. skies. Some companies that make drones or supply support equipment and services say the uncertainty has caused them to put U.S. expansion plans on hold, and they are looking overseas for new markets. "Our lack of success in educating the public about unmanned aircraft is coming back to bite us," said Robert Fitzgerald, CEO of The BOSH Group of Newport News, Va., which provides support services to drone users. A far cry from the killing machines whose missiles incinerate terrorists, these generally small unmanned aircraft will help farmers more precisely apply water and pesticides to crops, saving money and reducing environmental impacts. DON RYAN/AP A far cry from the killing machines whose missiles incinerate terrorists, these generally small unmanned aircraft will help farmers more precisely apply water and pesticides to crops, saving money and reducing environmental impacts. "The U.S. has been at the lead of this technology a long time," he said. "If our government holds back this technology, there's the freedom to move elsewhere ... and all of a sudden these things will be flying everywhere else and competing with us."

Drones are key to United States power projection.

Ekmektsioglou ’11 (Eleni “New Operational Concepts, the Future of Power Projection and Drones” 7/02/2011 Institute for Defense and Government Advancement http://www.idga.org/unmanned-systems/articles/new-operational-concepts-the-future-of-power-proje/

Investments in anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry threaten to put a serious hurdle to power projection strategies. Land based systems along with sophisticated mines and quiet Diesel submarines contribute to the creation of a non-go zone that could make any third party reluctant to intervene in the event of crisis. ¶ New Operation Concepts (CONOPs), therefore, such as Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies have degraded the value of short-range systems. Intervening forces in their effort to approach the theater of operations will be called to face the following dilemma: either enter the enemy’s envelop and accept the high cost of doing so or operate from a safe distance. This is exactly the reason why the emphasis needs to be put on long range strike capabilities, which provide the friendly forces with the capacity to strike from over the horizon without offering themselves as targets to the enemy. US identified the aforementioned changes from the early ‘90s when the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessments tried to explore how conflicts would look like in the post-Cold War world. Twenty years later and after two costly counterinsurgencies, anti-access strategies are once again at the center of interest and promise to stay there for long.¶ Hence, the US Defense Department seems to be willing to invest heavily in Research and Development programs related to its long-range strike ‘family of systems’ (land-based bombers, carrier-based strike aircraft, both unmanned and manned, cruise missiles). One of the most attractive options is carrier launched stealth and long-range UAVs for both surveillance and strike purposes.¶ The groundwork for unmanned carrier aviation was laid by the Navy’s UCAS-D (Unmanned Combat Air System-Demonstration) program, which explores the possibilities of a permanent carrier-based fleet of unmanned aircrafts. In the context of the UCAS-D program, Northrop Grumman received a contract in 2007 for the development of two X-47B aircrafts. Very recently, the contractor announced the successful testing of software systems for the X-47B through the use of a ‘surrogate’ F/A 18D Hornet with crew aboard. As the [official website of the US Navy](http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=61420) reported recently, ‘the test, conducted on USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69), means the Navy is one step closer to demonstrating the first carrier-based recoveries and launches of an autonomous, low-observable relevant unmanned aircraft’. The Hornet’s successful launch and recovery confirmed hopes about a pilotless flight once UAVs are finally fully integrated into CSG (Carrier Strike Group) operations. Integration requires the digitization of communications and navigation for the successful recovery of the UAV. However and as [DoD Buzz](http://www.dodbuzz.com/2011/07/06/navy-northrop-announce-ucas-software-carrier-tests/) reported a couple of days ago, the main bet that US Navy and Northrop Grumman need to win is the integration of UAVs ‘with minimal impact to existing hardware, training and procedures’.¶ Navy seems to be very serious about bringing UAVs aboard. Apart from Northrop Grumman, Boeing, this time, received a study contract worth $480,000 related to its [UCLASS](http://www.dodbuzz.com/2011/06/27/navy-orders-study-on-uclass-concepts/) (Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike) aircraft programme, while the Army and Navy are seeking collaboration for a new VTOL (Vertical Take-off and Landing) surveillance drone. UAVs seem promising in a strategic environment where anti-access strategies dominate and the Navy seems determined to have them on the decks by 2018.¶ However, UAVs do not make an attractive choice only for the US. It appears that PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air Force) is planning to bring into service Global Hawk-style drones for spy and data gathering purposes. The striking detail about this development is that the aircraft will be used to provide targeting data to the Chinese DF21-D ASBM (Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile), which reached IOC (Initial Operational Capability) in December last year, taking by surprise a plethora of high ranking military officers. The aircraft is the reply to those who advocated that China lacks the appropriate ISR capabilities for successfully striking targets like an aircraft carrier in long distances. Even though the ASBM hasn’t undergone a full test yet, the prospect of using a drone for collection of targeting data is promising.

#### Drones also ensure steady and efficient forward deployed forces

Rushforth ’12 Elinor June Rushforth 12, J.D. candidate, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law, Class of 2013, Fall 2012, “NOTE: THERE'S AN APP FOR THAT: IMPLICATIONS OF ARMED DRONE ATTACKS AND PERSONALITY STRIKES BY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST NON-CITIZENS, 2004-2012,” Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, 29 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. Law 623, p. lexis

The drone program is a fixture in the Obama administration's fight against terror n163 and the moral and legal defense the administration offers serves as an indication that these attacks will continue. n164 Further, proponents of the drone program argue their use reduces risk to U.S. service members, decreases American weariness at foreign intervention, and minimizes civilian casualties during attacks and missions.¶ First, because asymmetric warfare has increased, the United States has sought out creative ways to fight terrorists, insurgents, and asymmetric wars more generally. n165 Despite controversy surrounding the drone program, it allows surveillance and lethal missions without putting U.S. troops in harm's way. n166 This is an almost incontrovertible positive factor when considering American public support for a new and technologically incredible program. n167 Due to the lingering Overseas Contingency Operations, Americans are eager for some good news, and this program can deliver. Drone operators are on the front lines of a new and more sophisticated type of war and the information their surveillance missions provide can prove invaluable to service members on the ground. n168 This dual benefit weighs heavily in favor of drone proliferation. Drones can be [\*649] deployed to survey and attack where it would otherwise be impractical for troops, and a single pilot, to venture. n169¶ However, the analysis of this benefit must be separated between the two organizations employing drones: the military and the CIA. n170 Drones are used for surveillance and killing by both organizations but usually with different purposes in mind. n171 The military has focused its drones primarily on tactical support of ground forces, n172 either by providing information about enemy tactics or eliminating combatants entrenched in defended positions. n173 The CIA uses drones to eliminate specific targets in remote areas in which conventional U.S. military action would be impossible. n174¶ During Operation Southern Watch, the military used drones to police no-fly zones in Iraq and they were eventually used to target Iraqi radar systems during the second Iraq War. n175 In Operation Enduring Freedom, the military has expanded its use of armed drones to provide air support to ground operations and to act as "killer scouts." n176 By providing immediate battle damage assessment, drones enable commanders to determine if further action is necessary, and provide a new perspective on the field. n177 In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the armed drone retained and expanded its roles targeting anti-aircraft vehicles, performing as a decoy revealing enemy positions, and aiding in a rescue mission. n178 Based on these successes, military leaders maintain the value of drones. n179 The CIA's use [\*650] of drones facilitates U.S. attacks in environments where it is deemed too dangerous for ground troops to have a physical presence. n180 The ability to protect American lives, keep military costs down, and damage terrorist infrastructure and leadership is central to proponents' view of this program.¶ Second, the American public has grown tired of drawn-out conflicts and foreign intervention, and the drone program offers a more palatable form of foreign involvement. n181 President Obama claims that "it is time to focus on nation-building here at home" and, presumably, the drone program allows the government to operate without deployment of ground troops to areas in which intervention is deemed necessary, be it for humanitarian or military purposes. n182 Lethal operations, surveillance for U.S. military operations, and less costly intervention all become possible when robots are the actual tools. With a weary electorate, the Executive can maintain a presence abroad militarily, while remaining able to argue that its full focus is on protecting and growing our nation at home.

#### Steady and recycled forward deployed forces key to global stability and deterrence – ensures heg

Flourney and Davidson ’12 , Co-Founder Center for a New American Security, and Davidson, Professor Public Policy George Mason, ’12 (Michele- Former US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and Janine- Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, July/August, “Obama’s New Global Posture” Foreign Affairs, Vol 91 Issue 4, EbscoHost)

THE LOGIC OF SUSTAINED FORWARD ENGAGEMENT DURING THE Pentagon's last global posture review, in 2004, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's guiding principle was closing overseas bases and bringing home U.S. troops stationed abroad. In contrast, the Obama administration has emphasized making the country's forward posture more efficient and effective. American forces stationed abroad should be aiming to prevent conflict, build the capacity of key partners, maintain core alliances, and ensure the U.S. military's ability to secure American interests in critical regions. Forward engagement, as this approach is called, does not mean policing the world or letting other countries free-ride on U.S. security guarantees. And partnership does not mean relinquishing American sovereignty to regional and international institutions. Rather, forward engagement means leveraging the United States' biggest strength, the ability to lead, while encouraging others to share the burden. The cornerstone of forward engagement will be positioning U.S. troops in vital regions to help deter major conflicts and promote stability, particularly in Asia and the Middle East. As the long-term U.S. deployments in Europe and Asia have demonstrated, the physical presence of military forces sends a powerful message to potential adversaries. Some believe that troops garrisoned at home are just as effective a deterrent, given the global reach and technological superiority of the U.S. armed forces. But that argument, which was the cornerstone of Rumsfeld's posture vision, ignores the realities of time, distance, logistics, and politics. As the United States' experience in the two Iraq wars demonstrated, it takes weeks, if not months, to deploy a force of the size and strength required for some of the most likely and most dangerous scenarios the United States could face around the world. Furthermore, moving troops from the United States to a conflict zone just as tensions begin to rise can exacerbate or escalate a crisis. Forward-postured forces also reassure allies of the United States' commitment to their security. On the Korean Peninsula, for example, the presence of some 28,000 U.S. personnel reminds Seoul that the United States stands ready to defend South Korea against North Korean aggression. Further south, U.S. naval and air forces engaged in Australia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand give allies in Southeast Asia greater confidence that the United States will not abandon the region at a time of great change and uncertainty. Should deterrence fail, forward-stationed military forces are well placed to facilitate a collective response. As the recent NATO operation in Libya showed, responding to threats requires guaranteed access to supply routes and bases, diplomatic support, and, ideally, the help of allies in the field. Quickly assembling a posse to get the bad guys might have worked in old Westerns, but it does not work in complex, high-tech military operations. For those, common-command-and-control protocols, interoperable technologies, doctrines, and planning processes should be developed well in advance. And more than any other forces, forward-stationed forces can spearhead those preparations. They can conduct regular training exercises with allies to identify and correct shortfalls, build trust among U.S. and allied service members, and develop the shared practices that make the militaries work together more effectively in the field. Another good reason for forces to remain engaged abroad, even in peacetime, is to serve as an investment in burden sharing. Training and conducting real-world missions with allies and partners, such as the United States' multilateral antipiracy operations off the Horn of Africa aid its freedom-of-navigation exercises in the Persian Gulf, helps build up their capacities. Such engagement also promotes a shared vision of the world, in which the rule of law dominates, disputes can be resolved without the use of force, and commerce flows freely. In turn, such partners: are more able to address problems at home without the need for U.S. forces. Such relatively small investments in peacetime activities can mean not having to put American men and women in harm's way later. Forward engagement is not only an effective way to safeguard U.S. national security interests; it is also a responsible and efficient way to position U.S. forces in a time of economic constraint. The political scientists Joseph Parent and Paul MacDonald argued in these pages ("The Wisdom of Retrenchment," November/December 2011) that closing U.S. overseas bases and bringing U.S. personnel home would save billions of dollars. Such an argument misunderstands how U.S. armed forces are sustained abroad and underestimates the expense of relocating them. The United States has 1.4 million men and women in uniform. All of them, and their families, must be housed and trained somewhere. It is not necessarily cheaper to do that in the United States, especially since some countries, including Germany, Japan, and South Korea, help foot the bill for U.S. facilities stationed there. Furthermore, it would be a colossal misallocation of resources to abandon significant capital investments--for example, the world-class U.S. Army training center in Hohenfels, Germany--only to build duplicate facilities at home. The United States should position its forces to provide national security in the most efficient and responsible way possible. In the coming years, the U.S. military will likely be operating in a tight budget environment, but Washington can get more for less by positioning a larger percentage of its forces in key regions. Take, for example, the rotation cycles of U.S. naval ships. For every ship out securing sea- lanes or deterring aggression, there are three others in various stages of maintenance or in transit. Porting ships closer to their areas of operation in Europe or Asia would save each vessel three to four weeks in transit time and would require keeping one-third fewer ships in U.S. inventories. That alone would save billions of dollars in acquisition, operations, and maintenance costs. Similarly, the strategic forward stationing of U.S. forces, combined with periodic rotations by U.S. forces to train with allies, makes the best use of American resources, enhances cooperation and burden sharing, and ensures that the military is positioned and ready to respond to emerging threats and crises.

#### Second, the aerospace defense industry is declining now- lack of revenue and war on cost

Fitzpatrick ’13 (David Fitzpatrick, managing director at AlixPartners global business-advisory firm, leader firm’s Aerospace & Defense Practice, 29 year vet of the aerospace industry, The Military Aerospace Market: Sky’s No Longer the Limit, 6-19-13, <http://nation.time.com/2013/06/19/the-military-aerospace-market-skys-no-longer-the-limit/>) aln

As the industry’s all-important Paris Air Show gets underway, the outlook for the defense sector appears like a UFO blip on a radar screen: something’s definitely there, but how much of a threat it poses is uncertain. One thing, however, is clear: while commercial aerospace is booming, investments in aerospace defense in most Western countries is not. In fact, it’s declining. So where is business in the defense sector of the aerospace industry headed? I was recently part of a comprehensive analysis of sector and company financials as well as key industry trends, the AlixPartners Global Aerospace & Defense Industry Outlook. That analysis reveals much about the new world order in aerospace defense as well as the future outlook for the industry. Here’s a brief summary of the report’s high points. – The war on cost is heating up in the defense sector as companies are simultaneously chasing fewer revenue opportunities in Western nations, and facing stiffer competition for a slice of the emerging-market pie. Driven by retrenchment in the U.S. and Europe, global defense spending fell in 2012 for the first time since the 1998 spending drop, to $1.7 trillion in 2012. At the same time, the proportion of global spending by China and Russia is increasing, and by 2016 those two countries will make up almost a third (32%) of global spending by the “top 5” spenders (vs. just 17% in 2011). – Virtually every part of the aerospace and defense business is taking another look at costs, searching for efficiencies and struggling to stay ahead of the changing environments in which they do business. With the huge number of changes happening all at once, identifying and keeping ahead of trends is what will generate long-term success. – With China and Russia being largely inaccessible to Western defense companies, this phenomenon is further squeezing the market for Western companies. This is expected to drive intense competition to capture export business in accessible emerging markets, such as Brazil and India. Furthermore, traditional selling strategies are coming under great pressure and competitions in export markets – particularly for combat aircraft – are increasingly becoming ‘winner-takes-all’ deals. – Those with more balanced portfolios, such as lower-tier suppliers, will more easily be able to tackle the challenges of this new environment than will most OEMs, many of whom today are 80% reliant on defense and 75% of whom are dependent on U.S. and European markets. Moreover, the cyber security market – viewed by many as the “saving grace” of Western defense companies – will likely not grow enough to compensate for declining defense spending. The key to not only compete but thrive in this environment may very well be for defense firms to focus on improving both domestic programs’ affordability and competitiveness in emerging markets. Selling defense solutions in growing emerging markets, however, requires more complex technology and manufacturing partnerships as those countries seek to develop their own A&D industries. Aside from defense growth in emerging markets, the homeland-security market globally, projected by the study to grow to $281 billion by 2022, represents another potential path to profitability. Defense companies that can leverage their program management, integration experience and government-contracting skills will be most able to take advantage of this opportunity.

#### Mexico’s manufacturing and aerospace industry are key to US aerospace

Johnson 12 (Tim, political reporter and writer for McClatchyDC, published 7/18/12, “Mexico takes flight as hub for aerospace industry”, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/07/18/156657/mexico-takes-flight-as-hub-for.html> aks)

In one part of this central Mexico city, technicians overhaul commercial aircraft engines and landing gear. Across town, engineers assemble fuselages for one of the most modern business aircraft on earth, the Learjet 85. Industrializing nations like Brazil and China get a lot of attention for their thriving aerospace sectors. But Mexico’s aerospace industry, too, has gone wheels up and taken flight, with a lot less world notice. More than 260 aerospace companies now operate in Mexico, exporting some $4.3 billion in aircraft and parts last year. The Mexican government has set a target of $12 billion in such exports by 2020, a figure that would surpass aerospace exports from Brazil and Spain. Major clusters of aerospace companies have settled in the Tijuana-Mexicali corridor along the U.S. border, in the city of Chihuahua in northwest Mexico, and surrounding this high desert hub in the geographical center of the country. Smaller clusters have formed in Monterrey in the northeast and in the port city of Guaymas on the Gulf of California in Sonora state. Local officials are hoping that one day Queretaro (pronounced keh-REH-tah-roh) will be uttered in the same breath as aviation centers like Seattle and Wichita in the United States, Montreal in Canada, and Toulouse in France. Unlike other up-and-coming aerospace powers, Mexico neither supplies its own defense needs nor produces its own aircraft. But just about every component imaginable for jetliners and helicopters can be manufactured in Mexico today, including jet turbines and fuselages. It’s only a matter of time before the nation may design its own aircraft, experts here say. Dreams already are taking shape. In an office in the National Aeronautics University of Queretaro, Rector Jorge Gutierrez de Velasco leans back and reflects on Mexico’s aerospace achievements. “History tells us that clusters take decades to take shape. Then as they develop, advancing along with Mexican engineering, development processes, educational and economic capacities and so forth, maybe we can talk about producing an Aztec Uno or a Huitzilopochtli,” Gutierrez said, reaching for possible names for an aircraft from his nation’s history prior to the Spanish conquest. First off, though, he said the nation wants to see a new foreign aircraft, no matter the brand, take off with 50 percent of its components “Made in Mexico.” Big U.S. companies with operations in Mexico include Hawker Beechcraft, Gulfstream Aerospace, General Electric, Textron and Honeywell. France’s Safran Group, Canada’s Bombardier Aerospace, Netherlands-based Fokker and Spain’s Aernnova, a major supplier to Airbus, Bombardier and Brazil’s Embraer, also have set up production in Mexico. Some 30 foreign companies have operations in this city of 1.8 million people. “A great point in Mexico is that it’s really easy to work with authorities. When we suggest something, they listen and they help in any way they can,” said Claude Gobenceaux, director general of Messier Services Americas, a division of Safran, and head of the Queretaro aerospace cluster, an informal industry group. As an example, he said, foreign companies in Queretaro discovered that while local engineers were numerous, technicians who knew how to operate precision machining equipment were not. The National Aeronautics University set up a program. “It’s quite interesting that a university also agreed to train technicians,” Gobenceaux said. Mexico has an edge in human capital. On a per capita basis, it graduates three times more engineers than the United States. Some 30 percent of Mexico’s 745,000 university students are enrolled in engineering and technology fields, and 114,000 of them graduate yearly. Technicians, though, often have to be trained in-house in specialized processes even after receiving training elsewhere. So far, industries with operations in Mexico have focused on assembly of aircraft structures, precision machining, overhauling engines and landing gear, laying out of electrical systems, and assembly of composite components. “There are companies like Zodiac in Baja California that are putting together interiors of aircraft using composites,” said Manuel Sandoval Rios of ProMexico, a trade promotion agency. “We are moving into complex materials such as carbon.” Currently, Mexico’s aerospace sector employs 31,000 workers. The goal is to have 110,000 jobs in aerospace by 2020, Sandoval said. That compares with some 335,000 jobs in auto manufacturing and auto parts.

#### Aerospace competitiveness is most important internal link to overall U.S. leadership

Walker et al ‘02 - Chair of the Commission on the Future of the US Aerospace Industry Commissioners (Robert, Final Report of the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners, November, <http://www.trade.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf>)

Defending our nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the federal govern-ment.2 This translates into two broad missions—Defend America and Project Power—when and where needed. In order to defend America and project power, the nation needs the ability to move manpower, materiel, intelligence information and precision weaponry swiftly to any point around the globe, when needed. This has been, and will continue to be, a mainstay of our national security strategy. The events of September 11, 2001 dramatically demonstrated the extent of our national reliance on aerospace capabilities and related military contribu-tions to homeland security. Combat air patrols swept the skies; satellites supported real-time communica-tions for emergency responders, imagery for recov- ery, and intelligence on terrorist activities; and the security and protection of key government officials was enabled by timely air transport. As recent events in Afghanistan and Kosovo show, the power generated by our nation’s aerospace capa-bilities is an—and perhaps the—essential ingredient in force projection and expeditionary operations. In both places, at the outset of the crisis, satellites and reconnaissance aircraft, some unmanned, provided critical strategic and tactical intelligence to our national leadership. Space-borne intelligence, com-mand, control and communications assets permitted the rapid targeting of key enemy positions and facil-ities. Airlifters and tankers brought personnel, materiel, and aircraft to critical locations. And aerial bombardment, with precision weapons and cruise missiles, often aided by the Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Predator unmanned vehicle, destroyed enemy forces. Aircraft carriers and their aircraft also played key roles in both conflicts. Today’s military aerospace capabilities are indeed robust, but at significant risk. They rely on platforms and an industrial base—measured in both human capital and physical facilities—that are aging and increasingly inadequate. Consider just a few of the issues: • Much of our capability to defend America and project power depends on satellites. Assured reli-able access to space is a critical enabler of this capa-bility. As recently as 1998, the key to near- and mid-term space access was the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), a development project of Boeing, Lockheed Martin and the U. S. Air Force. EELV drew primarily on commercial demand to close the business case for two new launchers, with the U.S. government essentially buying launches at the margin. In this model, each company partner made significant investments of corporate funds in vehicle development and infrastructure, reducing the overall need for government investment. Today, however, worldwide demand for commer-cial satellite launch has dropped essentially to nothing—and is not expected to rise for a decade or more—while the number of available launch platforms worldwide has proliferated. Today, therefore, the business case for EELV simply does not close, and reliance on the economics of a com-mercially-driven market is unsustainable. A new strategy for assured access to space must be found. • The U.S. needs unrestricted access to space for civil, commercial, and military applications. Our satellite systems will become increasingly impor- tant to military operations as today’s information revolution, the so-called “revolution in military affairs,” continues, while at the same time satellites will become increasingly vulnerable to attack as the century proceeds. To preserve critical satellite net-works, the nation will almost certainly need the capability to launch replacement satellites quickly after an attack. One of the key enablers for “launch on demand” is reusable space launch, and yet within the last year all work has been stopped on the X-33 and X-34 reusable launch programs • The challenge for the defense industrial base is to have the capability to build the base force struc-ture, support contingency-related surges, provide production capacity that can increase faster than any new emerging global threat can build up its capacity, and provide an “appropriate” return to shareholders. But the motivation of government and industry are different. This is a prime detrac-tion for wanting to form government-industry partnerships. Industry prioritizes investments toward near-term, high-return, and high-dollar programs that make for a sound business case for them. Government, on the other hand, wants to prioritize investment to ensure a continuing capa-bility to meet any new threat to the nation. This need is cyclical and difficult for businesses to sus-tain during periods of government inactiv-ity. Based on the cyclic nature of demand, the increasing cost/complexity of new systems, and the slow pace of defense modernization, aerospace companies are losing market advantages and the sector is contracting. Twenty-two years ago, today’s “Big 5” in aerospace were 75 separate companies, as depicted by the historical chart of industry con-solidation shown in Chapter 7. • Tactical combat aircraft have been a key compo-nent of America’s air forces. Today, three tactical aircraft programs continue: the F/A-18E/F (in production), the F/A-22 (in a late stage of test and evaluation), and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (just moving into system design and development). Because of the recentness of these programs, there are robust design teams in existence. But all of the initial design work on all three programs will be completed by 2008. If the nation were to con- clude, as it very well may, that a new manned tac- tical aircraft needs to be fielded in the middle of this century, where will we find the experienced design teams required to design and build it, if the design process is in fact gapped for 20 years or more? • More than half of the aerospace workforce is over the age of 404, and the average age of aerospace defense workers is over 50.5Inside the Department of Defense (DoD), a large percent of all scientists and engineers will be retirement eligible by 2005. Given these demographics, there will be an exodus of “corporate knowledge” in the next decade that will be difficult and costly to rebuild once it is lost. There will be a critical need for new engineers, but little new work to mature their practical skill over the next several decades. Further, enrollment in aerospace engineering programs has dropped by 47 percent in the past nine years6, and the interest and national skills in mathematics and science are down. Defense spending on cutting-edge work is at best stable, and commercial aircraft programs are struggling and laying workers off. As the DoD’s recent Space Research and Development (R&D) Industrial Base Study7 concluded, “[s]ustaining a talented workforce of sufficient size and experience remains a long-term issue and is likely to get worse.” In short, the nation needs a plan to attract, train and maintain a skilled, world-class aerospace workforce, but none currently exists. • The current U.S. research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) infrastructure has a legacy dating back to either World War II or the expan- sion during the Space Age in the 1960s. It is now suffering significantly from a lack of resources required for modernization. In some cases, our nation’s capabilities have atrophied and we have lost the lead, as with our outdated wind tunnels, where European facilities are now more modern and efficient. In the current climate, there is inad- equate funding to modernize aging government infrastructure or build facilities that would support the development of new transformational capabil- ities, such as wind tunnels needed to design and test new hypersonic vehicles. The aerospace indus-try must have access to appropriate, modern facil- ities to develop, test and evaluate new systems. Throughout this dynamic and challenging environ-ment, one message remains clear: a healthy U.S. aerospace industry is more than a hedge against an uncertain future. It is one of the primary national instruments through which DoD will develop and obtain the superior technologies and capabilities essential to the on-going transformation of the armed forces, thus maintaining our position as the world’s preeminent military power.

#### Heg solves global conflicts—impact is nuclear war

Brooks et al ’13 Stephen G. Brooks, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University, and William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, “Lean Forward,” Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2013, Vol. 92, Issue 1

Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world’s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing.

#### Pursuit of heg inevitable—only a question of effectiveness

Tellis ‘9 Ashley J. Tellis, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, Research Director of the Strategic Asia program at the National Bureau of Asian Research, “Preserving Hegemony: The Strategic Tasks Facing the United States,” Global Asia, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 2009, <http://globalasia.org/pdf/issue9/Ashley_J._Tellis.pdf>

This hegemony is by no means fated to end any time soon, however, given that the United States remains predominant by most conventional indicators of national power. The character of the United States’ hegemonic behavior in the future will thus remain an issue of concern both within the domestic polity and internationally. Yet the juvenescence of the United States’ “unipolar moment,” combined with the disorientation produced by the September 11 attacks, ought to restrain any premature generalization that the imperial activism begun by the Clinton administration, and which the Bush administration took to its most spirited apotheosis, would in some way come to define the permanent norm of US behavior in the global system. In all probability, it is much more likely that the limitations on US power witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq will produce a more phlegmatic and accommodating United States over the longer term, despite the fact that the traditional US pursuit of dominance — understood as the quest to maintain a preponderance of power, neutralize threatening challengers, and protect freedom of action, goals that go back to the foundations of the republic — is unlikely to be extinguished any time soon. Precisely because the desire for dominance is likely to remain a permanent feature of US geopolitical ambitions — even though how it is exercised will certainly change in comparison to the Bush years — the central task facing the next administration will still pertain fundamentally to the issue of US power. This concern manifests itself through the triune challenges of: redefining the United States’ role in the world, renewing the foundations of US strength, and recovering the legitimacy of US actions. In other words, the next administration faces the central task of clarifying the character of US hegemony, reinvigorating the material foundations of its power, and securing international support for its policies.

#### Any transition will be violent absent credible leadership now

Barnett ’11 Thomas P. M. Barnett, Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” World Politics Review, 3/7/2011, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads

It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding. As a result, the vector of structure-building connectivity shifted from trans-Atlantic to trans-Pacific. But if the connectivity push of the past several decades has been from West to East, with little connectivity extended to the South outside of the narrow trade of energy and raw materials, the current connectivity dynamic is dramatically different. Now, the dominant trends are: first, the East cross-connecting back to the West via financial and investment flows as well as Asian companies "going global"; and second, the East creating vast new connectivity networks with the South through South-South trade and investment. The challenge here is how to adjust great-power politics to these profound forces of structural change. Because of the West's connectivity to the East, we are by extension becoming more deeply connected to the unstable South, with China as the primary conduit. Meanwhile, America's self-exhausting post-Sept. 11 unilateralist bender triggered the illusion -- all the rage these days -- of a G-Zero, post-American world. The result, predictably enough for manic-depressive America, is that we've sworn off any overall responsibility for the South, even as we retain the right to go anywhere and kill any individuals -- preferably with flying robots -- that we deem immediately threatening to our narrowly defined national security interests. The problem with this approach is that China has neither the intention nor the ability to step up and play anything resembling a responsible Leviathan over the restive South, where globalization's advance -- again, with a Chinese face -- produces a lot of near-term instability even as it builds the basis for longer-term stability. Libya is a perfect example of where the world is now stuck: America is very reticent to get involved militarily, while China, for the first time in its history, engages in long-range military operations to evacuate its workforce there. Meanwhile, the expanding civil war rages on, to everyone's moral and economic distress. The point is not that America must invade Libya pronto to keep the world as we know it from coming to an end. But if the United States and the West sit by while the Rest, risers that they are, manage nothing more than pious warnings about needlessly butting in, then we all run the risk of collectively making the post-American, G-Zero, do-nothing storyline a self-fulfilling prophecy. While that alone won't stop the world from spinning, if it persists as a pattern, globalization will slide down another path: one of regionalism, spheres of influence and neocolonial burdens that are intuitively hoarded by great powers grown increasingly suspicious of one another. And if you know your history, that should make you nervous.

#### Multipolarity will fail – rising powers will have no influence

Xuetong ‘11 Yan, writer for the Global Times, Published by the Carnegie Endowment, “From a Unipolar to a Bipolar Superpower System: The Future of the Global Power Dynamic” 12/20/11. http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/30/from-unipolar-to-bipolar-superpower-system-future-of-global-power-dynamic/a6vl

Empty Talk from International Organizations Is Becoming a Trend The ability of international organizations to steer world affairs is waning. International organizations are designed to be diverse, and after World War II, they have essentially complied with the principles of the nations that were most powerful when they were formed. As a result, even as these nations’ respective powers diminish, they remain the primary decision makers and determine the foundational principles of these organizations. For example, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council have not changed. Similarly, traditionally, only a U.S. citizen can be the president of the World Bank and only a European Union citizen can be managing director of the International Monetary Fund. As the global power dynamic shifts toward a bipolar superpower system, these international organizations will be rendered ineffective if leadership positions remain only in the hands of former powers and thus will fail to maintain international order and promote international cooperation. During the Cold War, the permanent members of the Security Council exercised their vetoes more frequently than not. The power transition from unipolarity to bipolarity could generate an even-greater number of vetoes than before. When faced with a crisis, international organizations can only gather to discuss the issue and often fail to meet the expectations of their member states. There is a growing demand for the establishment of new international institutions that can produce practical solutions to resolve these global crises. For example, when the G8 failed to resolve global economic issues, the G20 was founded. Faced with difficulties in establishing an East Asian economic sphere of cooperation, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was established, followed by APEC 10+1, 10+3, and 10+8. With the phenomenal expansion of international institutions, the number of international summits has increased. The declarations agreed at these summit conferences are only becoming longer and more convoluted. However, after a consensus is reached, no further action is taken to implement the consensus or to promote cooperation. International organizations are thus progressing toward divergent views rather than solving practical problems.

#### Heg solves blowback

Brooks et al. 12 Stephen G. Brooks, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University, and William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, “Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment,” International Security, vol. 37, no. 3, Winter 2012, muse

It is now generally understood that the current grand strategy of deep engagement runs no risk of generating "hard" counterbalancing. When properly specified, realist balance of power theory does not predict counterhegemonic balancing against the United States: the conditions that sparked internal and external counterbalancing against past leading states—notably the existence of contiguous peer rival great powers—do not apply.30 Moreover, recent scholarship [End Page 20] strongly supports the proposition that the deep engagement strategy—and the maintenance of the formidable military power that underwrites it—slows rather than hastens the speed at which capabilities might diffuse to a more balanced distribution. As we argue below, securing partners and allies in key regions reduces their incentives to generate military capabilities.31 Less often noted is that these same security guarantees provide leverage to prevent U.S. allies—which comprise the majority of the most modern and effective militaries in the world—from transferring military technologies and production techniques to potential rivals. The U.S. dominance of the high-end defense industry also allows Washington to trade access to its defense market for compliance on key security issues, such as technology transfers to potential geopolitical opponents.32 The embargo on military sales to China—in place since 1989—is a case in point. More generally, recent years have witnessed an outpouring of scholarship directly refuting the proposition forwarded by many retrenchment proponents that U.S. military preeminence sparks a diffusion of military power. On the contrary, there are many settings in which the first mover's military innovations are unlikely to be adopted successfully by potential rivals.33 Path dependence, scale economies, learning effects regarding production techniques, and barriers to entry in the production of high-end military power make the maintenance of unmatched capabilities far easier than many retrenchment advocates suggest—particularly in today's environment in which modern weaponry is so much more complex both to produce and to use than in past eras.34 A United States less committed to global leadership with a less [End Page 21] dominant military posture would have far less capacity to control the diffusion of military power. Concerning balance of threat theory, its author, Stephen Walt, concludes that because of the numerous systemic factors that mitigate other powers' perceptions of U.S. threats to their security, the United States would have to "have the same expansionist ambitions [as] Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany, or the Soviet Union" to spark a hard balancing coalition.35 Expanding the theoretical lens to encompass domestic and international institutions only strengthens the case. Deep engagement allows the United States to institutionalize its alliances and wrap its hegemonic rule in a rules-based order. The result is to make the U.S. alliance system—especially among its core liberal members—far more robust and harder to challenge than if the United States were to disengage.36 Needless to say, the evidence is perfectly consistent with this near consensus regarding the nature of balancing in today's system. The United States has pursued a grand strategy of deep engagement in a unipolar setting for twenty years. For at least a portion of his eight-year administration, George W. Bush followed a more "unilateral" foreign policy that many scholars (critics and defenders of deep engagement alike) saw as being far more threatening to other states.37 Yet multiple, comprehensive analyses find no evidence of external or internal balancing by major powers.38

#### \*Independently, Heg prevents China from Taiwan aggression

Brzezinski 12 (Zbigniew, US National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter, Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, scholar at CSIS, Jan/Feb 2012, "8 Geopolitically Endangered Species," www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/8\_geopolitically\_endangered\_species?page=0,7 SL)

2. TAIWAN Since 1972, the United States has formally accepted the mainland's "one China" formula while maintaining that neither side shall alter the status quo by force. Beijing, however, reserves the right to use force, which allows Washington to justify its continued arms sales to Taiwan. In recent years, Taiwan and China have been improving their relationship. America's decline, however, would increase Taiwan's vulnerability, leaving decision-makers in Taipei more susceptible to direct Chinese pressure and the sheer attraction of an economically successful China. That, at the least, could speed up the timetable for cross-strait reunification, but on unequal terms favoring the mainland. At stake: Risk of a serious collision with China.

#### \*Perception of rationality ensures unchecked nuclear escalation

Glaser ’11 (Charles, Political Science Professor at George Washington, March/April, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90 Issue 2, Ebsco Host)

ACCOMMODATION ON TAIWAN? THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

### Solvency

#### Mexico’s manufacturing key to aerospace

Guidi 11 (Ruxandra, Writer for Fronteras, September 28th, 2011, Border Business: Aerospace As A Binational Industry, <http://www.fronterasdesk.org/news/2011/sep/28/business-mexico-aerospace-industry-maquiladora> aks)

Hundreds of buyers and suppliers from the United States, Mexico and Europe gathered in August inside an old airplane hangar in Tijuana. They shuffled around the vast space — filled with samples of advanced electronic equipment — wearing dark suits and with briefcases in hand. With its high-profile speakers and 3D simulation stations, the second annual Baja Aero Space Show did a pretty good job of putting the Mexican state of Baja California on the map — at least when it comes to aerospace manufacturing. “People’s perceptions about what cross-border manufacturing, what maquiladoras are like, is still based upon what was happening in the 70s and maybe the 80s,” said Kenn Morris, president of Crossborder Group, a San Diego-based market research firm. “The fact is that a lot of the factories, whether they produce medical devices, aerospace, or electronics; they are built in such a way these days, and they’re managed in such a way, that they can be put anywhere on the planet,” Morris said. “But they’re coming to Mexico.” According to Mexico’s Trade Ministry, more than 50 aerospace and defense companies have started operations in Baja in the last five to 10 years. Most of them are American and manufacture parts for companies like Honeywell, Goodrich and Gulfstream. They produce a wide variety of items, from electronic components, air conditioning systems, and cable harnesses, to steel bolts for commercial and military aircraft. Their advantage is the proximity to the United States and to Western ports that ship to the Asian markets. They have access to a large, high-tech workforce in Tijuana, made up of engineers, technicians and software developers. But the main reason the companies come to Baja is simple: The cost of that highly skilled labor is low — about one-third of what it is in the U.S. Currently, the Baja aerospace industry employs more than 10,000 machine operators and technicians. And that number has been growing steadily since 2007, when Mexico dropped import duties on aeronautics components. According to Mexico’s Trade Ministry, between 2007 and 2008, the amount of aerospace companies with operations in the Mexican border state grew by 50 percent. COBHAM, a global company producing advance defense systems with some operations in San Diego, made the move to Tijuana in 1997. On a recent day, about 50 workers dressed in royal blue overalls sat in groups of five. They were looking into microscopes and holding tiny tweezers as they assembled parts. Their building, a nondescript brick structure, is just 15 miles south of the U.S.-Mexico border. "Over here we do the tuning and testing of the product," said plant manager Javier Urquizo, as he gave a brief tour of the plant. "After we finalize the assembly, we need to tweak around some components to get the electrical responses required on the different frequencies.” Urquizo said he could not say exactly what those parts were made for. "That is classified information," he said. The manager did explain that the company must regularly apply for a special license from the U.S. Department of State in order to build those parts in Mexico. It is to ensure the raw materials, parts and technology do not end up in the wrong hands. Once they receive those licenses, COBHAM is authorized to ship materials from the U.S. to Mexico and then back again to the U.S. as a final product. Teresa Jesus Rio Ramos is a production supervisor at COBHAM and has worked at the factory for 15 years. The aerospace and defense industry in Tijuana offers the most stable and best paying jobs in this city, she said. Her salary is about $1,800 U.S. a month. "I think our company is pretty financially stable," said Rio Ramos. "I don’t have to worry from month-to-month whether I will have a job or not. But that is not true for all maquilas in Tijuana. People get fired and rehired elsewhere all the time.” t as more American aerospace and defense companies shift manufacturing to Baja California, are Americans losing jobs? Not really, said 30-year industry veteran John Riley. There are still 130,000 people across California employed by aerospace suppliers, which is down some 40 percent since the mid-1990s. Since then, it has remained static. On the other hand, Mexico’s aerospace industry has been adding many new jobs in recent years. "The private sector has to tell government and academia what our needs are and how they can help," said Riley, pointing out that the real challenge will be finding enough people to fill future jobs as the industry continues to grow. "We need to get involved, especially in aerospace, because some of these things take five, 10, 15 years for people and industry to really get good at it,” he said. As a long-time champion of a cross-border aerospace industry, Riley has always argued that people should start looking at Baja’s success in manufacturing as a benefit to San Diego. A lot of those same workers who are earning money in Tijuana are bringing products into the U.S. for packaging and for sale, he said. They are also spending money on products and services on the U.S. side of border.

#### Cooperation in the aerospace sector with open licensing is key to drone production and innovation

Godoy ’13 (Emilio Godoy, Mexico-based correspondent who covers the environment, human rights and sustainable development, Mexicans Develop Drones for Peace, 4-11-13, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/mexicans-develop-drones-for-peace/>) aln

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), better known as drones, have earned a bad reputation due to their controversial use by the United States in its “war on terrorism”, yet they have almost unlimited potential as tools for scientific research. The word “drone” is most commonly associated with the remotely piloted and heavily armed aircraft that are used by the United States to strike down suspected terrorists, but have also caused a great many civilian deaths in countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. However, more than 40 countries around the world either deploy or manufacture drones, according to reports consulted for an article published by IPS. These unmanned airplanes and helicopters are used for such diverse purposes as drawing maps, exploring the ocean floor, measuring temperature or pollution levels, monitoring weather phenomena, and the surveillance of high-risk areas or archaeological sites. Last month, the U.S. space agency NASA sent drones into the plume of the Turrialba volcano in Costa Rica to study its chemical composition. “The technology is emerging, the first applications have just barely begun. Society itself has learned to accept drones beyond their military uses, because they have seen the different ways they can be used. It’s just a matter of time” until they become more widely developed and used, said young Mexican entrepreneur Jordi Muñoz, co-founder of 3D Robotics, a pioneer in the manufacture of drones in Mexico. His story mirrors the evolution of drones, which he began to build in 2007 with the help of 500 dollars provided by U.S. physicist Chris Anderson. “He gave me the money purely on trust. It was the best 500 dollars I ever invested. I decided to build a drone. I was developing the automatic pilot and I went on Google to look for information when I came across a forum. I went in, registered, and saw that they were posting things about homemade drones,” recalled Muñoz, who is currently finishing a degree in computer engineering at the University of California, Berkeley in the United States. The forum was DIY (“Do It Yourself”) Drones, an online community created by Anderson in 2007 as a space for hobbyists who build their own UAVs to share experiences, electronic codes and component maps. “I started to post videos, write code, and document and publish what I was doing,” Muñoz told Tierramérica\*. His work caught the attention of Anderson, the editor-in-chief of Wired magazine until this past January and now the young Mexican’s partner in 3D Robotics. The company does not sell UAVs for military use. The vehicles are designed in the southwest U.S. city of San Diego and assembled across the border in Tijuana, Mexico. They receive between 100 and 150 orders daily from clients in the United States, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Israel and Japan. 3D Robotics currently employs 60 people and hopes to expand its staff to 100 by the end of the year. Since its founding in 2009, the company has earned around 10 million dollars through sales and received another five million from three U.S. funds that provide financing for tech firms. “In 2013 we want to professionalise all of our products. There have been huge advances, everything has now been greatly simplified, and we want to make drones easy to use. But we need engineers to write code, for manufacturing,” said Muñoz. Working on the basis of open licensing, a network of engineers around the world work together to improve codes and develop more advanced products.

#### No DA’s- Obama already committed to engagement with Mexico

UPI 2-20 “U.S. Mexican, Canadian leaders commit to region's competitiveness”, 2-20-14, <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2014/02/20/US-Mexican-Canadian-leaders-commit-to-regions-competitiveness/UPI-29691392910531/>, aln

Mexico, Canada and the United States vow to position the region as a global competitor, Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto told business and academic leaders. The principals of the seventh summit of North American leaders are clear, Pena Nieto told the group Wednesday in Toluca, Mexico. "First, inclusive and shared prosperity. Number two, new opportunity areas. Number three, citizen security. And fourth, regional and global topics," he said through an interpreter. "It is upon these four topics [that] we will work together to boost the economic growth of our countries and a generation of quality jobs, and by this, increase the well-being of our societies." Canada, the United States and Mexico share strengths that will move the region forward, Pena Nieto said, noting trade exchanges from the three countries exceed $1 trillion. "We are a community of more than 450 million inhabitants where talent and creativity of our peoples excel," he said. We have the support and drive of "our entrepreneurs and the capabilities of technological innovation coming from our universities and large companies." President Obama said he, Pena Nieto and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper were focused on "how we can deepen what are already incredible ties between our three nations. ... The strength of the relationship between Canada, Mexico and the United States is not just a matter of government policy; it's not just a matter of legislation." "There is an incredible richness to the relationship that comes from our people, from our businesses, from our commercial ties, from the students who are traveling back and forth, from the cultures that are shared between us," Obama said. The relationship between the United States, Canada and Mexico is a "precious gift," the U.S. president added. "If you think about North America, to have three borders this long in which we share a common set of values, a common set of principles, a commitment to democracy, a commitment to free markets, a commitment to trade where we are allies and interact peacefully, that is a precious gift," he said. "And it's one that I think all three of us are committed to building and nurturing for future generations." Harper said Canadian, American and Mexican companies "do much more than sell things to each other" because items are manufactured through integrated supply chains. This integration "is why we want to tighten our relationships and increase the competitiveness in the region. And we call on the entrepreneurs ... throughout the continent to create employment seedbeds." "Today we have this opportunity to make this North American market more competitive," Harper said. "You are entrepreneurs, you are job creators, employment creators all over this continent."

### 2AC- OOO

#### Drone technology acts as a melding of the corporeal and incorporeal, oscillating indefinitely between human action and the autonomous agency of the drone- this ontological interrogation becomes the base point for any form of ethics

Holmqvist ’13 Caroline Holmqvist, Senior Lecturer, War Studies at the National Defence College, London School of Economics, Centre of International Studies, “Undoing War: War Ontologies and the Materiality of Drone Warfare”, May 2013, Millenium- Journal of International Studies 41:535, sagepub, aln

What we need to do then, it seems, is to integrate accounts of the human, both a material, fleshy body and a sentient being in ethical and political relation with others, with accounts of matter in ways that do not reify or essentialise materialities of war, but recognise matter’s ‘human’ qualities – its agentic capacities or its otherwise ‘unbearable humanness’. The question becomes one of how to integrate accounts of the real/material – of the actual injury sustained by actual people in contexts of war – with accounts of how we come to see what we see, know what we know and think what we think about war: accounts of the epistemologies of war. Perhaps counter-intuitively, my proposition here is that the advent of new technologies derided as ‘non-human’ beckons us to rethink the human in war. It is not simply that the human is written out of war by military robotics – rather, robotic technologies produce a number of paradoxical consequences precisely for how we think the human in war. Part of it relates to how we think ‘bodies’ in war: visceral, bodily experience is clearly an important part of power relations, and war is no exception. The implications of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology are thus decidedly political: it affects the way in which we think about ourselves as human and compels us to rethink agency. Furthermore, as has been argued, there are a number of important ways in which drone technologies challenge conventional understandings of the corporeal – of both the fleshy and the steely kinds. The materialist turn, I have suggested, has significant intellectual purchase on the study of the advent of robotic warfare. Yet critical materialist inquiry and insight hold promise also for the study of war per se, irrespective of time and circumstance. I opened this article by drawing attention to recent initiatives regarding the study of war, in particular, calls for studying war in ontological terms (Barkawi and Brighton) and for studying war as experience (Sylvester). The section to follow suggests that if we think of these two impetuses in conjuction, that they are mutually enhancing and illuminating. Central to a critical inquiry into war, I argue, is the human being. The human experience is continually altered by human beings’ encounters with technology, as this article has argued, and to understand the human being in war we need to consider the way in which fleshy and steely bodies associate, interact, merge – the dissolution between the corporeal and the incorporeal. This pushes us towards engagement with the ontology of the human. This, I suggest, also allows for renewed ethico-political engagement with war: at the base of any ethics is an ontological assumption about what it means to be human.

#### The humanist denial of nonhuman ontologies provides the grounds for all forms of violence

Bryant ’12 Levi Bryant, Professor at Collins College, also is the OOO guy, “The Stakes of SR/NFM/OOO/Onticology: Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolves?”, 6-5-12, <http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/06/05/the-stakes-of-srnfmoooonticology-whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-wolves/>, aln

No, I think the point has always been to show that humans are not little sovereigns that produce all of being– though clearly we make our contributions –but that we ourselves are partially products of other beings and are incredibly dependent on all sorts of nonhuman beings in order to sustain ourselves at all. The point has been to show that we could not be what we are without things like forests, coral reefs, algae, cows, sheep, grass, microbes, electro-magnetic fields, moons, etc, etc., etc., etc., etc., and that we impact the greater world as well. The point was to show that there’s not a strict boundary between “nature and culture”, but that we are both affected and enabled by the nonhuman world and that we affect that world. The point was to show that these lawns can’t be drawn but artificially. The point was to show that nonhumans matter, that we aren’t gods, and that we’re bound up in these things. The point was ecology. People sometimes suggest that claiming that beings like sharks and tardigrades are real is somehow the foundation of capitalistic violence and exploitation. To me the truth seems to be exactly the reverse. If I treat other beings as nothing but the product or effect of signifiers, lived intentionality, social constructs, concepts, perceptions, etc., I have reduced these other things to me, because I have said that they are nothing more than my constructs. If, by contrast, I recognize that these other things are real, I recognize that they are not just my reflections, then I also recognize that they are autonomous entities in their own right, that they aren’t just “passive matters awaiting inscription”, that they are characterized by alterity, then I also recognize that they have claims of their own, that they are not just stuff of my own for use, that they make claims– even if they don’t make claims like us –and that we must attend to these claims. It is humanism (human exceptionalism, phenomenology, structuralism, post-structuralism, semiological idealism, linguistic idealism, etc.) that provides the grounds for violence and exploitation by seeing all beings as a reflection of human being and by seeing all being as passive matter for our exploitation, not posthumanism that recognizes the reality of other beings, their independence, and what they contribute to us in terms of our formation and agency.