## Off Case

### 1

#### Interpretation: Economic engagement requires the promotion of trade

Celik, 11 **–** master’s student at Uppsala University (Department of Peace and Conflict Research) (Arda, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies <http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagement-policies>)

Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to change the political behaviour of target state. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows, “It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations”.(p523-abstact).It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that “the direct and positive linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.”

#### Violation: The plan is a non-trade promoting form of engagement that results in trade and an economic outcome. This only indirectly engages the country.

#### Voters-

#### Fairness: trade promotion is key to fair debates and neg strategy- affs that aren’t in the context of trade are unfair

#### Education: our interp is best for education- ensures debates that are about economic engagement. Our interpretation is grounded in lit.

#### Effects: even if they win the effect of the plan is increased trade that’s bad- it unlimits the resolution, undercuts neg ground, and makes topicality and solvency unnecessary

### 2

#### Anthropocentric enframing is the root cause of human violence—sovereign exclusions permit the reduction of beings to objects of manipulation, enslavement, and extermination

Smith ’11 Mick Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 2011, p. 103-106

We should bear in mind, then, that, like realpolitik, fate too pro- vides a (historicist) rubric that falsely naturalizes worldly apathy. Both terms imply that ethicopolitical action is irretrievably subservient to sovereign powers (whether such powers are envisaged as progress or the invisible hand of the market), which we must simply accept because they cannot be resisted. But neither term has a place in a politics for the real (natural) world precisely because, at least from the perspective of radical ecology, this naturalization is false. Nature is not the source of the short-term, calculating, self-interested individualism that constitutes the (a)social world envisaged by contemporary advocates of realpolitik, nor should it be made subject to it. Nor is nature a synonym for, or ruled by, fate’s decree; it is not governed by powers that impose a predetermined order on the world’s unfolding. The radical ecologist does not want to save whales from realpolitik only to make them subject to some other predetermined fate (as those who reject all interference in natural processes might do), nor do they want to preserve them in timeless aspic in a museum or a dolphinarium. To save the whales is to free them from all claims of human sovereignty, to release them into their singularity, their being such as it is—whatever it is-quodlibet ens, and into flows of evolutionary time, of natural history, just as they release themselves into the flows of the world’s oceans. This “saving” is an ethicopolitical action. Of course, there is much more to say about this saving, but a politics for the real (natural) world must then recognize that the technological enframing of the world, its ordering as standing reserve, its being conceived as merely an instrumental means to human ends, is not fated either. Heidegger (1993a, 330) warns against “the talk we hear more fre- quently, to the effect that technology is the fate of our age, where ‘fate’ means the inevitableness of an unalterable course." Nevertheless, while not irresistible, this enframing is, in fact, the “supreme danger” from which a politics of natural reality must strive to save us all: whales, humans, indeed the whole world. For, at this very moment, when hu- manity "postures as lord of the earth” (332), it too risks being reduced to standing reserve, to a material resource open to manipulation and transformation. How could this be? The systematic ordering of the world accord- ing to this technological enframing is usually taken as a sign both of humanity’s successful dominion over the external world and of the in- superable difference between human subjectivity and an objectively understood natural world. But Evernden (1999), following Heidegger, argues this view entirely misconstrues the nature of the world and of human existence. Such objectification entails the rejection of our actual phenomenal experiences of concerned involvement in the world, such as the feelings of elation or freedom on a windswept mountaintop, or despair and anger at the destruction of a well-loved place. We have to be trained to regard nature objectively and dispassionately: seeing a tree as protopulp for paper manufacturing is an “accomplishment,” one that requires us to overcome the childish notion that the natural world is “alive to us.” In other words, an understanding of the world as stand- ing reserve has to overcome, to conquer, our phenomenological naivety. This feeling oneself part of (which is not the same as feeling at one with) a living (wild) world is not just the ground of radical ecology but is expressed and made manifest in the phenomenal ground and flow of every human existence. It is certainly a sign of the successful domi- nance of the technological Gestell that many “sophisticated” adults claim to no longer feel this (or that they have managed to repress such feelings) and that an entire polity is ordered on the basis that such feel- ings are unimportant. (The fact that this enframing has resulted in the successful eradication of nonhuman natural beings from an increasing proportion of so many human lives doubtless fosters this.) But this Gestell should be seen for what it is: a bizarre historical aberration, and one that, radical ecologists would argue, is closely connected to our current ecological problems. When the world is challenged to appear in this technological Gestell, when nature is set upon and set in order as a resource, then, for Heidegger, humanity too “stands within the essential realm of en- framing” (1993a, 329), And again, this is not at all to say, as we might be tempted to do, that the fate of humanity and the world are in- extricably entwined, because as already argued, this is not a matter Of fate. Heidegger’s ontology is, in any case, much more intimate and this-worldly, and much less determinate, than this. The enframing of the world encompasses human being (Dasein) because our existence is always already that of a being-in-the-world. The world only appears as it does through our being-there, our emplacement within it. Its appearance as standing reserve is the expression of a particularly limited kind of human involvement within the world. To say that nature is a resource is to express something of that limited and limiting mode of existence. What it expresses is that we have forgotten the "nature" of our being and, we might add, our being in nature, forgotten that we can inhabit a living world of ends. What it now threatens is the end of the world as anything other than an ethical- and political-free trade zone, a profit—driven system of circulating resources. If we regard the natural world as nothing but a resource, then humanity is loft, at best, with nothing to become other than the orderer of that resource. At worst, human lives come to be entirely dictated by this projection, by our being caught up in endless cycles of resource mobi- lization. This is close to the reality of much of contemporary existence, where, to use Heidegger’s example, the forester “is made subordinate to the orderability of cellulose” (1993a, 323), To view the world as standing reserve, as a resource, then, is a dangerous self-fulfilling prophecy that is ultimately self-negating: it denies the natality and ethicopolitical autonomy of human being (of the self’s existence). Paradoxically, the presentation of the world as just a means to suit human ends risks eroding the freedom to determine one’s own destiny, to have one’s own life unfold as an ethicopolitical end in itself in the company of others. Perhaps, ironically, it is only the fact that humans have the possibility of being-alive-to-the-world that offers any possibility of salvation here from the spiraling self-referentiality of economically driven “realities." Humanity’s posturing as sovereign lord of the Earth fosters an illusion that everything we “encounter exists only insofar as it is [humanity’s] construct" (1993a, 332) and an accompanying delusion that we "al- ways and everywhere encounter only ourselves (an illusion/delusion sometimes all too present in those writing about the social construction production of nature). The world-creating activities of nature are covered over, hidden from us as we come to consider everything of worldly significance a product of our own doing. We come to regard humanity as a world apart, somehow existing outside of the natural world, returning to it only to satisfy our socially determined needs. But we are not a world apart. Human existence is not, in any sense, ultimately separable from its existence in the world. We are beings that can only exist insofar as we stand out (ek-sist) into this world so that, as Heidegger emphasizes (332), we "can never" encounter only ourselves. In a world where a technological enframing predominates, the place for ethics and politics (and also, art, love, play, etc. etc.) is correspondingly diminished, for they are ways of envisioning and creating a good life with those others we come to regard as being (to adopt the Kantian idiom) ends in themselves, those singular, indefinable, beings such as they are. Radical ecology, then, is contrary to its misanthropic portrayal by its many detractors: not just interested in saving the natural world, it is also a movement that strives to save a place for politics and ethics. For, one might say, it is the reduction of the world to a standing reserve that threatens to reduce humans to the status of "bare life.” This threat is not just a dystopic possibility but, according to Agamban (2000, 36), already constitutes the “hidden matrix” of contemporary (bio)politics (see chapter 1). If Agamben emphasizes the human impact of the loss of political possibilities (of a political “negativity with no use”), a reading of Heidegger might suggest something more than this: that such reductive forms of biopolitical "inhumanity" become more likely when the world itself comes to be enframed as nothing more than a standing reserve. Unless we can think the roots of this technologi- cal Gestell (and then employ this thinking as a basis for political and ethical action), such biopolitical dangers will remain with us. (Though given Heidegger’s association with, and failure to publicly repudiate, National Socialism [Farias 1989; Ott 1993], one might justly consider whether he rejected on his own role in this antipolitical and unethical enframing and its appalling consequences, a fact not lost on his own students, like Levinas, Arendt, Marcuse, and Lowith.)2

#### The ethical irresponsibility of speciesism produces constant, unspeakable violence

Kochi and Ordan ‘8 Tarik Kochi & Noam Ordan, “An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity,” borderlands, vol. 7 no. 3, 2008, http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol7no3\_2008/kochiordan\_argument.pdf

Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of ‘evil’, a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of ‘evil’ given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity might comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was ‘evil’, then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if we are to think of the content of the ‘human heritage’, then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the ‘West’ generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples’ land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of colonialism highlights the central function of ‘race war’ that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity. After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially ‘inferior’ and in some instances that they were closer to ‘apes’ than to humans (Diamond, 2006). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of ‘race’ is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans. Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human ‘races’) and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s comment that whereas humans consider themselves “the crown of creation”, for animals “all people are Nazis” and animal life is “an eternal Treblinka” (Singer, 1968, p.750). Certainly many organisms use ‘force’ to survive and thrive at the expense of their others. Humans are not special in this regard. However humans, due a particular form of self-awareness and ability to plan for the future, have the capacity to carry out highly organised forms of violence and destruction (i.e. the Holocaust; the massacre and enslavement of indigenous peoples by Europeans) and the capacity to develop forms of social organisation and communal life in which harm and violence are organised and regulated. It is perhaps this capacity for reflection upon the merits of harm and violence (the moral reflection upon the good and bad of violence) which gives humans a ‘special’ place within the food chain. Nonetheless, with these capacities come responsibility and our proposal of global suicide is directed at bringing into full view the issue of human moral responsibility. When taking a wider view of history, one which focuses on the relationship of humans towards other species, it becomes clear that the human heritage – and the propagation of itself as a thing of value – has occurred on the back of seemingly endless acts of violence, destruction, killing and genocide. While this cannot be verified, perhaps ‘human’ history and progress begins with the genocide of the Neanderthals and never loses a step thereafter. It only takes a short glimpse at the list of all the sufferings caused by humanity for one to begin to question whether this species deserves to continue into the future. The list of human-made disasters is ever-growing after all: suffering caused to animals in the name of science or human health, not to mention the cosmetic, food and textile industries; damage to the environment by polluting the earth and its stratosphere; deforesting and overuse of natural resources; and of course, inflicting suffering on fellow human beings all over the globe, from killing to economic exploitation to abusing minorities, individually and collectively. In light of such a list it becomes difficult to hold onto any assumption that the human species possesses any special or higher value over other species. Indeed, if humans at any point did possess such a value, because of higher cognitive powers, or even because of a special status granted by God, then humanity has surely devalued itself through its actions and has forfeited its claim to any special place within the cosmos. In our development from higher predator to semi-conscious destroyer we have perhaps undermined all that is good in ourselves and have left behind a heritage best exemplified by the images of the gas chamber and the incinerator. We draw attention to this darker and pessimistic view of the human heritage not for dramatic reasons but to throw into question the stability of a modern humanism which sees itself as inherently ‘good’ and which presents the action of cosmic colonisation as a solution to environmental catastrophe. Rather than presenting a solution it would seem that an ideology of modern humanism is itself a greater part of the problem, and as part of the problem it cannot overcome itself purely with itself. If this is so, what perhaps needs to occur is the attempt to let go of any one-sided and privileged value of the ‘human’ as it relates to moral activity. That is, perhaps it is modern humanism itself that must be negated and supplemented by a utopian anti-humanism and moral action re-conceived through this relational or dialectical standpoint in thought.

#### Text: Vote negative to refuse the speciesist ethic of the 1AC.

#### The aff’s ethical insufficiency is prior to its consequential benefits. Rejecting speciesism is essential to opening better ways of relating to other beings

Smith ’11 Mick Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 2011, p. 44-45

Leaving aside for the moment the question of how far Murdoch’s and Levinas’s understandings might be compatible, or at odds, with claims about the ethicopolitical stewardship of nature (questions that, as the next section illustrates, are closely connected with the manner in which their metaphysics is thought of as providing a "guide for mor- als”), it is still necessary to ask what it means to “join the world as it really is" and how this might relate to a potential ecological ethics. In other words, how far might such approaches be capable of recognizing the ethical import of nonhuman others given that both Murdoch and Levinas speak of the other as a human being? In Levinas’s terms, the Other (Autrui often, but not always consistently, capitalized) is exclu- sively and explicitly so, as, for example, with regard to the face-to-face encounter. Certainly, if such an ethics can be understood as being relevant to the more—than-human world, it offers the possibility of paying concerned attention to patterns of difference in nature without reducing these differences to representational codes (taxonomies) and systems (axiologies) that might claim to, but cannot, capture essential moral distinctions between categories of beings (Smith 2001a). Such an ethics would be a much more suitable response to a natural world that is alien, purposeless, and independent of human interests. Animals, birds, stones, trees really are alien in the sense that they are other than human, that they exhibit radically different and sometimes extraor- dinarily strange ways of being-in-the-world. Humanistic approaches, indebted to the anthropological machine, tend to emphasize and use these differences as reasons for excluding such things from moral con- sideration. They are not like our-human-selves, and so, they argue, in their anthropocentric self-obsessed ways, can consequently be of no ethical (as opposed to instrumental) interest to us. The unfortunate response of environmental ethics to such claims has often been to try to minimize differences and find essential similarities or common purpose or to establish mutual dependencies by extending these same self-centered patterns (Taylor 1986; Attfield 1991). Certain aspects of the environment are deemed morally considerable because they share some supposedly key aspect of human selfhood that makes them as "intrinsically" valuable as ourselves, for example, as subjects- of-a-life. Our self-concern becomes the basis for a (supposedly) ethical concern for those others deemed sufficiently like us. An alternative, more expansive strategy, which still retains this same self-centered form, is to suggest that the whole of nature might be deemed valuable insofar as it is reconceptualized (via, for example, ecology, quantum physics, or non-Western metaphysics) as part of our extended selves (see, for example, Callicott’s [1985] early work). Some even combine both strategies, for example, by espousing a form of “contemporary panpsychism” whereby the universe is reenvisaged as a "self-realizing system," which “possesses reflexivity and to this extent . . . is imbued with a subjectival dimension" (Mathews 2003, 74).14 However, in adopting these strategies, these purportedly biocentric approaches change the content but retain the form, the same anthro- pocentrically self-obsessed locus, of the dominant ethical held (Smith 2001a). These forms of axiological extensionism, while often well in- tentioned, are not only philosophically artificial (constructed largely in order to justify certain already predetermined ends) and ecologically impractical but also tend to replicate, rather than fundamentally challenge, the presuppositions of the anthropological machine. For all their egalitarian rhetoric, they tend to ethically favor those things most like, or closest to, that defined as properly human. The real differences that an alien nature presents are overlooked and human alienation fantasized away.15 By contrast, Murdoch and Levinas can be understood as arguing that ethics exists as a non-self-centered response to the recog- nition of such alienation from the world and from others. Indeed, there is no real ethics without recognizing such differences, An ecological difference ethics thus potentially offers a radical alternative to all attempts to enclose the nonhuman in an economy of the Same.

### 3

#### The President of the United States of America ought to issue an executive order with a signing statement, via appropriate administrative agencies, to end sanctions on Cuba.

#### Obama can lift the embargo-travel ban proves

Heuvel ‘13 (Katrina Vanden, is the editor, publisher, and part-owner of the magazine The Nation6/2/13, The Washington Post, “The US Should End the Cuban Embargo,” <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-02/opinions/40316090_1_embargo-limited-private-enterprise-odebrecht>, Accessed: 7/5/13, LPS.)

This month, 100 state-run produce markets and 26 other establishments are scheduled to become private cooperatives. The government says many more establishments will follow, beginning in 2014, as an alternative to small and medium-size state businesses in retail and food services, transportation, light manufacturing and construction, among other sectors.¶ Despite the embargo, José Martí International Airport displays the new vitality. Hundreds of Cuban Americans fly into see relatives, bringing everything from flat-screen TVs to consumer basics. Since President Obama lifted restrictions on family visits in 2009, remittances and material support from Cuban Americans play a growing role in the microeconomy of the island.¶ Whereas in the 1990s, Havana was willing to permit only limited private enterprise as an emergency measure, government officials now speculate openly about aiming toward 50 percent of Cuba’s GDP in private hands within five years. Of course, an expanding small business sector won’t resolve some central issues facing the island: access to large-scale credit and investment and the need to boost exports and address anemic productivity, not to mention the demands of an aging population.¶ In Havana, there is more talk about Brazil’s investment in renovating Mariel Harbor than about Edward Snowden. Brazilian conglomerate Odebrecht had to resist threats by Florida’s state government to cut off any state contracts if it invested in Cuba. This enormous deep-water port is designed to handle trade with the United States and beyond in a post-embargo world, if the embargo is ever ended.¶ Cuba’s official media remains sclerotic, though there are spirited debates in a few online outlets. But the government appears to understand that the explosion of social media will transform communications and politics, and however tentatively, realizes it has little choice but to change if it is to engage a younger generation.

#### Unilateral action avoids the politics DA – doesn’t spend political capital.

Howell ‘5 (William G., Associate Professor of Government @ Harvard University, “Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 35, no. 3, September, p. 421)

The actions that Bush and his modern predecessors have taken by fiat do not fit¶ easily within a theoretical framework of executive power that emphasizes weakness and¶ dependence, and offers as recourse only persuasion. For at least two reasons, the ability¶ to act unilaterally is conceptually distinct from the array of powers presidents rely upon¶ within a bargaining framework. First, when presidents act unilaterally, they move policy first and thereby place upon Congress and the courts the burden of revising a new political landscape. If they choose not to retaliate, either by passing a law or ruling against¶ the president, then the president’s order stands. Only by taking (or credibly threatening¶ to take) positive action can either adjoining institution limit the president’s unilateral powers. Second, when the president acts unilaterally, he acts alone. Now of course, he¶ relies upon numerous advisers to formulate the policy, to devise ways of protecting it¶ against congressional or judicial encroachment, and to oversee its implementation (more¶ on this below). But in order to issue the actual policy, the president need not rally majorities,¶ compromise with adversaries, or wait for some interest group to bring a case to¶ court. The president, instead, can strike out on his own. Doing so, the modern president is in a unique position to lead, to break through the stasis that pervades the federal government, and to impose his will in new areas of governance.¶ The ability to move first and act alone, then, distinguishes unilateral actions from other sources of influence. Indeed, the central precepts of Neustadt’s argument are turned¶ upside down, for unilateral action is the virtual antithesis of persuasion. Here, presidents just act; their power does not hinge upon their capacity to “convince [political actors]¶ that what the White House wants of them is what they ought to do for their sake and¶ for their authority” (Neustadt 1990, 30). To make policy, presidents need not secure the formal consent of Congress. Instead, presidents simply set public policy and dare others to counter. And as long as Congress lacks the votes (usually two thirds of both chambers)¶ to overturn him, the president can be confident that his policy will stand.

### 4

#### Congressional maneuvering can force a vote, even if that fails it strongly pressures GOP action on reform

UPI 2-14 (Obama predicts immigration reform no later than 2017, <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2014/02/14/Obama-predicts-immigration-reform-no-later-than-2017/UPI-83101392360045/#ixzz2tNcqgRmN>)

Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., said Thursday a procedural maneuver to circumvent the House Republican majority could revive stalled efforts on immigration.¶ He told the New York Times he was considering a legislative tactic known as a discharge petition to bring sweeping immigration legislation out of committee to the floor for consideration. The tactic, which has succeeded only twice since 1985, is done by bringing the measure directly to the House floor, bypassing the regular committee process, and usually without the cooperation of House leadership.¶ A successful petition "discharges" the committee from further consideration of a bill and brings it directly to the floor.¶ The petition would require the support of an absolute majority of House members, meaning if all Democrats supported the measure, it would still need more than a dozen Republican signatures, the Times said.¶ Schumer, one of the architects of a comprehensive immigration reform measure that passed the Senate in June, told the newspaper GOP House members were trying to "sweep this issue under the rug."¶ "In the next few months you're going to see increased pressure, and the discharge petition is one such way," he said.¶ Some Democratic lawmakers said the scheme would, at best, simply keep alive an election-year issue GOP lawmakers aligned with the Tea Party movement strongly oppose.¶ Michael Steel, a spokesman for House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, told the Times Schumer's "scheme has zero chance of success."¶ "A clear majority in the House understands that the massive Senate-passed bill is deeply flawed," Steel said. "That's why we will continue to work on step-by-step, common-sense reform."¶ The Senate bill included a path to citizenship for the 11 million immigrants living in the country without legal permission.¶ House Republicans largely reject the measure as "amnesty." They have called for a piecemeal approach, with smaller bills.¶ Boehner, who tried to advance immigration reform at a recent GOP retreat, told reporters Feb. 6 the idea was all but dead this year.¶ His comments came two days after Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., who faces a primary challenge, predicted the immigration push would stall, saying the dissimilar approaches between the House and Senate presented "sort of an irresolvable conflict."¶ Rep. Paul Ryan, R-Wis., said Feb. 2 comprehensive immigration reform was "clearly in doubt" this year.¶ Rep. Raul Labrador, R-Idaho, told Roll Call Feb. 4 Boehner should lose his speakership if he pursues the bill, which could be seen as giving Obama a legislative victory in a midterm election year.¶ "Discharge petitions are difficult, but when they work, it's because there's a clear majority of the body that supports a specific proposal, and in this case, that is true," Schumer told the Times. "But I have no illusions that this will be easy in any way."¶ Some Democratic lawmakers told the newspaper even if the maneuver fails, it would pressure Boehner and other Republicans to act on some form of immigration overhaul this year -- and could help Democrats looking toward the 2016 presidential elections.

#### Political capital is key- Obama already pushing, but he needs focus to overcome Republican bias

LAHT 2-15 (Latin America Herald Tribune, February 15, 2014, Obama Ready to Spend Political Capital on Immigration, <http://www.laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=12395&ArticleId=329931> aks)

President Barack Obama told Hispanic Democratic legislators on Wednesday that he will invest his political capital in an immigration reform package whose principles will be revealed during a forum in the next two months. That is what members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus reported after their first meeting with Obama on the subject of immigration. In remarks to reporters, the lawmakers expressed confidence that, with the president’s support, this year the dialogue on comprehensive immigration reform will be resumed, opening a path to legalization for the country’s estimated 12 million undocumented immigrants. The chairwoman of the Hispanic Caucus, New York Democratic Rep. Nydia Velazquez said that the president assured the group “he is a man of his word” and would fulfill his campaign promises to push for immigration reform. Meanwhile, Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) said that during the meeting Obama assured lawmakers that he will invest part of his political capital in moving forward on immigration reform that includes strong measures for border security and a path to legalization for undocumented immigrants. Menendez said that the lawmakers will work with Obama on the “principles” of that reform package, which will be presented at a public forum in the next two months with the aim of starting the dialogue about how to fix the country’s problematic immigration system. “He understands that this is a matter of civil rights,” the senator said of Obama. Gaining approval of a reform plan, Menendez acknowledged, will be “a struggle,” taking into account the opposition of many Republicans and other conservative groups. Immigration reform was shelved after much partisan battling in 2007 and, given the current economic crisis, many Republicans are insisting on law enforcement measures to put an end to illegal immigration.

#### Reforming US-Cuba trade laws cause fierce political fights

NY Times 12 (“Easing of Restraints in Cuba Renews Debate on U.S. Embargo”, November 19th, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/changes-in-cuba-create-support-for-easing-embargo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>)

And Cuba has a long history of tossing ice on warming relations. The latest example is the jailing of Alan Gross, a State Department contractor who has spent nearly three years behind bars for distributing satellite telephone equipment to Jewish groups in Havana. In Washington, Mr. Gross is seen as the main impediment to an easing of the embargo, but there are also limits to what the president could do without Congressional action. The 1992 Cuban Democracy Act conditioned the waiving of sanctions on the introduction of democratic changes inside Cuba. The 1996 Helms-Burton Act also requires that the embargo remain until Cuba has a transitional or democratically elected government. Obama administration officials say they have not given up, and could move if the president decides to act on his own. Officials say that under the Treasury Department’s licensing and regulation-writing authority, there is room for significant modification. Following the legal logic of Mr. Obama’s changes in 2009, further expansions in travel are possible along with new allowances for investment or imports and exports, especially if narrowly applied to Cuban businesses. Even these adjustments — which could also include travel for all Americans and looser rules for ships engaged in trade with Cuba, according to a legal analysis commissioned by the Cuba Study Group — would probably mean a fierce political fight. The handful of Cuban-Americans in Congress for whom the embargo is sacred oppose looser rules. When asked about Cuban entrepreneurs who are seeking more American support, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the Florida Republican who is chairwoman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, proposed an even tighter embargo. “The sanctions on the regime must remain in place and, in fact, should be strengthened, and not be altered,” she wrote in an e-mail. “Responsible nations must not buy into the facade the dictatorship is trying to create by announcing ‘reforms’ while, in reality, it’s tightening its grip on its people.”

#### CIR’s key to future economic competitiveness

Kramer ‘14 (Hilary Kramer, top investment manager, MBA, University of Pennsylvania, 2/11/2014, How Immigration Reform - Or Lack Thereof - Is Hurting Our Economic Competitiveness, http://www.forbes.com/sites/hilarykramer/2014/02/11/how-immigration-reform-or-lack-thereof-is-hurting-our-economic-competitiveness/

With Washington often appearing hopelessly gridlocked, there’s one issue critical to the nation’s economic health that both parties seem to agree on: the need to fix the nation’s broken immigration system. In particular, the US needs to take advantage of the global high-skilled labor supply to meet demand as our global competitors step up their game to attract the best and brightest talent.¶ There’s agreement among government officials and industry leaders that America should be the world’s number one destination for highly-skilled workers. The H-1B visa program was created to connect those individuals with U.S. employers who can’t find domestic workers with the right skill sets. Without the H-1B program, many companies would be unable to find workers with the science, technology, engineering and mathematics skills (STEM) they need to innovate and grow.¶ The federal government only makes 65,000 of these highly coveted visas available each year. Applications become available on April 1st, and like a hot concert ticket are gone within days. According to the US Citizenship and Immigration Services, they received 124,000 H-1B petitions during the last filing period, including those filed for a special advanced degree exemption. Clearly, demand for these workers is staggering and continues to grow every year. The U.S. Senate and House both rightly recognize that the current arbitrary visa cap must be raised.¶ But there are critical differences between the House and Senate when it comes to highly-skilled worker visas that are not well-known.¶ Last summer, the House Judiciary Committee passed the “Skills Visa Act,” which would increase the number of H-1B visas and make the visa selection process fairer. Most importantly, the bill drops the discriminatory “outplacement” language present in the Senate bill that would bar IT services firms from sending specialists to work on-site at client facilities if more than 15% of the IT firm’s U.S. workforce consists of visa workers.¶ This is an arbitrary, protectionist (most of the IT services firms meeting the criteria are based in India) labor-backed amendment that has nothing to do with safeguarding American jobs. The temporary visa allocations will simply shift to other, larger corporations that manage to skate under the 15% cap due to their legacy U.S. labor force. In fact, so-called “H-1B dependent” firms targeted by the Senate bill would be forced to pay higher wages to their existing visa workers than they would have to pay to U.S.-born workers. Do the unions truly believe that it makes sense for the government to require businesses to pay foreign workers more than Americans?¶ What’s more, these “H-1B dependent” companies would be hit with new restrictions on the number of visa workers and filing fees that are in some cases nearly quintuple what other companies would pay. If these onerous provisions were to become law, U.S. jobs would most likely be outsourced or eliminated all together. And this is to say nothing of the impact on U.S. businesses that have established long-standing relationships with their IT services providers, particularly in the financial sector, if they are forced to disrupt these relationships by government fiat.¶ In general, those who claim increasing the number of skilled foreign workers costs American jobs are simply wrong on the facts. Economist Giovanni Peri of the University of California, Davis wrote in a report published by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco: “Data show that, on net, immigrants expand the U.S. economy’s productive capacity, stimulate investment, and promote specialization that in the long run boosts productivity…there is no evidence that these effects take place at the expense of jobs for workers born in the United States.”¶ In a study published last year, Peri and his fellow researchers found that foreign scientists and engineers with H-1B visas contributed to 10%-20% of the annual productivity growth in the US from 1990 to 2010.This immigrant-driven growth boosted GDP per capita by 4%, and increased the size of the economy by $615 billion in 2010. Peri and his colleagues also reported that H-1B holders had no negative impact on U.S.- born workers with similar skills and actually increased the compensation and overall employment of American-born scientists and engineers. Clearly, allowing more talented and entrepreneurial individuals into the country will lead to more jobs for all Americans, greater productivity growth and increased economic benefits.¶ Sustaining a robust pipeline for highly-skilled workers and keeping America competitive are two sides of the same coin. Consider the alternative: if these highly trained engineers, scientists, mathematicians and programmers are not allowed to stay and work in the U.S., they’ll simply end up helping one of our global competitors grow their own economy.¶ Similarly, college graduates with STEM degrees that are not allowed to stay and work in the U.S. will leave.¶ This undermines U.S. competitiveness and the ability of businesses to hire the talented workers they need. As President Obama said last year, “There are brilliant students from all over the world sitting in classrooms at our top universities. We’re giving them all the skills they need to figure that out. But then we’re going to turn around and tell them to start that business and create those jobs in China or India or Mexico…That’s not how you grow new industries in America.”¶ Another way to look at foreign born entrepreneurs’ impact on economic growth is in startup formation. A study conducted by Duke professor Vivek Wadhwa, who was cited last year by Time Magazine as one of the Top 40 Most Influential Minds in Tech, showed that a quarter of technology-based companies started between 1995 and 2005 had a foreign-born CEO or chief technologist. These new companies posted revenue of $52 billion and employed a staggering 450,000 people.¶ Furthermore, a report by the Kauffman Foundation held that “…immigrants were more than twice as likely to start businesses each month than were the native-born in 2010.” According to the Brookings Institution, “…among people with advanced degrees, immigrants are three times more likely to file patents than US-born citizens. Such investments in new businesses and in research may provide spillover benefits to US-born workers by enhancing job creation and by increasing innovation among their US-born peers.”¶ Simply put, the current limits for highly-skilled individuals to work in this country put the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace. These limits must be lifted while maintaining a level playing field for all those who need to tap that global talent pool to succeed – and without discriminatory carve-outs for special interests that will simply drive jobs offshore.¶ Fixing our immigration system is crucial as our country faces increasingly competitive challenges in the years ahead. Washington needs to take “yes” as an answer for once and take action on an issue that members of both parties say is long past due.¶

#### Competitiveness key to primacy and averting great power war

Baru ‘9 Sanjaya Baru, professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School in Singapore, “Geopolitical Implications of the Current Global Financial Crisis,” Strategic Analysis 33:2, March 2009, pp. 163-168

Hence, **economic policies and performance do** have strategic consequences.2 In the modern era, the idea that **strong economic** performance is the foundation of power was argued most persuasively by historian Paul Kennedy. **'Victory** (in war)', Kennedy claimed, **'has repeatedly gone to the side with more flourishing productive base**'.3 **Drawing attention to the interrelationships between** economic wealth, technological innovation, and the ability of states to efficiently mobilize economic and technological resources for power projection and national defence, Kennedy argued that **nations that were able to better combine military and economic strength scored over others**. 'The fact remains', Kennedy argued, **'that all of the major shifts in the world's military-power balance have followed alterations in the productive balances**; and further, that the **rising and falling** of the various empires and states in the international system **has been confirmed by the outcomes of the** major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources'.4 In Kennedy's view, **the geopolitical consequences of an economic crisis, or even decline, would be transmitted through a nation's inability to find adequate financial resources to simultaneously sustain economic growth and** military power. The classic 'guns versus butter' dilemma. Apart from such fiscal disempowerment of the State, **economic under-performance would also reduce a nation's attraction as a market, as a source of capital and technology, and as a 'knowledge power'**. As power shifted from Europe to America, so did the knowledge base of the global economy. **As China's power rises, so does its profile as a 'knowledge economy'**. Impressed by such arguments, the **China** Academy of Social Sciences **developed the concept of** Comprehensive National Power (**CNP) to get China's political and military leadership to focus more clearly on economic and technological performance** than on military power alone **in its quest for Great Power status**.5 **While China's impressive economic performance, and the consequent rise in China's global profile, has forced strategic analysts to acknowledge this link**, the recovery of the US economy in the 1990s had reduced the appeal of the Kennedy thesis in Washington, DC. We must expect a revival of interest in Kennedy's arguments in the current context. A historian of power who took Kennedy seriously, Niall Ferguson, has helped keep the focus on the geopolitical implications of economic performance. In his masterly survey of the role of finance in the projection of state power, Ferguson defines the 'square of power' as the tax bureaucracy, the parliament, the national debt, and the central bank. These four institutions of 'fiscal empowerment' of the state enable nations to project power by mobilizing and deploying financial resources to that end.6 **Ferguson shows how vital sound** economic management is to strategic policy and national power. More recently, Ferguson has been drawing a parallel between the role of debt and financial crises in the decline of the Ottoman and Soviet Empires and that of the United States. In an early comment on the present financial crisis, Ferguson wrote: We are indeed living through a global shift in the balance of power very similar to that which occurred in the 1870s. This is the story of how an over-extended empire sought to cope with an external debt crisis by selling off revenue streams to foreign investors. **The empire that suffered these setbacks in the 1870s was the Ottoman empire. Today it is the US. … It remains to** be seen how quickly today's financial shift will be followed by a comparable geopolitical shift in favour of the new export and energy empires of the east. Suffice to say that the historical analogy does not bode well for America's quasi-imperial network of bases and allies across the Middle East and Asia. Debtor empires sooner or later have to do more than just sell shares to satisfy their creditors. … as in the 1870s the balance of financial power is shifting. Then, the move was from the ancient oriental empires (not only the Ottoman but also the Persian and Chinese) to western Europe. Today the shift is from the US - and other western financial centres - to the autocracies of the Middle East and East Asia. …7 An economic or financial crisis may not trigger the decline of an empire. It can certainly speed up a process already underway. In the case of the Soviet Union, the financial crunch caused by the Afghan War came on top of years of economic under-performance and the loss of political legitimacy of the Soviet State. In a democratic society like the United States, the political legitimacy of the state is constantly renewed through periodic elections. Thus, the election of Barack Obama may serve to renew the legitimacy of the state and by doing so enable the state to undertake measures that restore health to the economy. This the Soviet State was unable to do under Gorbachev even though he repudiated the Brezhnev legacy and distanced himself from it. Hence, **one must not become an economic determinist, and historic parallels need not always be relevant.** Politics can intervene and offer solutions**. Political economy and politics, in the form of Keynesian economics and the 'New Deal' did intervene to influence the geopolitical implications of the Great Depression. Whether they will do so once again in today's America remains to be seen**.

## Case

### Medicine

#### Human Rights create a world where all are to conform to a universal ideal of ethics where those who disagree are expelled or eliminated

Rasch 3 (William, Associate Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University, Human Rights as Geopolitics, pages 138-141 aks)

In the past, we/they, neighbor/foreigner, friend/enemy polarities were inside/outside distinctions that produced a plurality of worlds, separated by physical and cultural borders. When these worlds collided, it was not always a pretty picture, but it was often possible to [End Page 138] maintain the integrity of the we/they distinction, even to regulate it by distinguishing between domestic and foreign affairs. If "they" differed, "we" did not always feel ourselves obliged to make "them" into miniature versions of "us," to Christianize them, to civilize them, to make of them good liberals. Things have changed. With a single-power global hegemony that is guided by a universalist ideology, all relations have become, or threaten to become, domestic. The inner/outer distinction has been transformed into a morally and legally determined acceptable/unacceptable one, and the power exists (or is thought to exist), both spiritually and physically, to eliminate the unacceptable once and for all and make believers of everyone. The new imperative states: the other shall be included. Delivered as a promise, it can only be received, by some, as an ominous threat. In his The Conquest of America, Tzvetan Todorov approaches our relationship to the "other" by way of three interlocking distinctions, namely, self/other, same/different, and equal/unequal. A simple superposition of all three distinctions makes of the other someone who is different and therefore unequal. The problem we have been discussing, however, comes to light when we make of the other someone who is equal because he is essentially the same. This form of the universalist ideology is assimilationist. It denies the other by embracing him. Of the famous sixteenth-century defender of the Indians, Bartolomé de Las Casas, Todorov writes, [his] declaration of the equality of men is made in the name of a specific religion, Christianity.... Hence, there is a potential danger of seeing not only the Indians' human nature asserted but also their Christian "nature." "The natural laws and rules and rights of men," Las Casas said; but who decides what is natural with regard to laws and rights? Is it not specifically the Christian religion? Since Christianity is universalist, it implies an essential non-difference on the part of all men. We see the danger of the identification in this text of Saint John Chrysostrom, quoted and defended at Valladolid: "Just as there is no natural difference in the creation of man, so there is no difference in the call to salvation of all men, barbarous or wise, since God's grace can correct the minds of barbarians, so that they have a reasonable understanding."12 Once again we see that the term "human" is not descriptive, but evaluative. To be truly human, one needs to be corrected. Regarding the relationship of difference and equality, Todorov concludes, "If it is [End Page 139] incontestable that the prejudice of superiority is an obstacle in the road to knowledge, we must also admit that the prejudice of equality is a still greater one, for it consists in identifying the other purely and simply with one's own 'ego ideal' (or with oneself)" (1984, 165). Such identification is not only the essence of Christianity, but also of the doctrine of human rights preached by enthusiasts like Habermas and Rawls. And such identification means that the other is stripped of his otherness and made to conform to the universal ideal of what it means to be human. And yet, despite—indeed, because of—the all-encompassing embrace, the detested other is never allowed to leave the stage altogether. Even as we seem on the verge of actualizing Kant's dream, as Habermas puts it, of "a cosmopolitan order" that unites all peoples and abolishes war under the auspices of "the states of the First World" who "can afford to harmonize their national interests to a certain extent with the norms that define the halfhearted cosmopolitan aspirations of the UN" (1998, 165, 184), it is still fascinating to see how the barbarians make their functionally necessary presence felt. John Rawls, in his The Law of Peoples (1999), conveniently divides the world into well-ordered peoples and those who are not well ordered. Among the former are the "reasonable liberal peoples" and the "decent hierarchical peoples" (4). Opposed to them are the "outlaw states" and other "burdened" peoples who are not worthy of respect. Liberal peoples, who, by virtue of their history, possess superior institutions, culture, and moral character (23-25), have not only the right to deny non-well-ordered peoples respect, but the duty to extend what Vitoria called "brotherly correction" and Habermas "gentle compulsion" (Habermas 1997, 133). 13 That is, Rawls believes that the "refusal to tolerate" those states deemed to be outlaw states "is a consequence of liberalism and decency." Why? Because outlaw states violate human rights. What are human rights? "What I call human rights," Rawls states, "are ... a proper subset of the rights possessed by citizens in a liberal constitutional democratic regime, or of the rights of the members of a decent hierarchical society" (Rawls 1999, 81). Because of their violation of these liberal rights, nonliberal, nondecent societies do not even have the right "to protest their condemnation by the world society" (38), and decent peoples have the right, if necessary, to wage just wars against them. Thus, [End Page 140] liberal societies are not merely contingently established and historically conditioned forms of organization; they become the universal standard against which other societies are judged. Those found wanting are banished, as outlaws, from the civilized world. Ironically, one of the signs of their outlaw status is their insistence on autonomy, on sovereignty. As Rawls states, "Human rights are a class of rights that play a special role in a reasonable Law of Peoples: they restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and they specify limits to a regime's internal autonomy. In this way they reflect the two basic and historically profound changes in how the powers of sovereignty have been conceived since World War II" (79). Yet, what Rawls sees as a postwar development in the notion of sovereignty—that is, its restriction—could not, in fact, have occurred had it not been for the unrestricted sovereign powers of the victors of that war, especially, of course, the supreme power of the United States. The limitation of (others') sovereignty is an imposed limitation, imposed by a sovereign state that has never relinquished its own sovereign power. What for Vitoria was the sovereignty of Christendom and for Scott the sovereignty of humanity becomes for Rawls the simple but uncontested sovereignty of liberalism itself.

#### Their “anti-Western” guilt negates ethics – legitimates non-Western violence and reduces morality to questions of apparent geographic space

Bruckner 1986

(Pascal, maître de conférences at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, and collaborator at the Nouvel Observateur, “Tears of the White Man – Compassion as Contempt”, Ch.1 Page 21)

This political viewpoint makes all morality temporary and even irrelevant in the face of the Promethean confrontation that is tearing the earth into two factions. Being non-European is enough to put one on the side of right. Being European or being supported by a European power is enough to make one suspect. v The bloody messes in banana republics, and butchery of political opposition and the dictatorial lunacy by their petty chieftains are all brushed aside. Such trifles will not restrain the progress of these peoples toward socialism. What seems criminal in Cuba, Angola, and Guinea has the real purpose of washing away the far greater crime of colonialism. Against every kind of moral reservation, then, there is a guilty conscience that can paralyze any thought of criticism. For this generation, which saw colonialism in its worst moments and for which it has a deep disgust, guilt lives on long after the circumstances that gave rise to it. And the severity of the judge is in inverse proportion to the distance of the country in question. The farther away the country is from European shores, the greater is its claim to total freedom from condemnation.

#### Specifically, this guilt makes hatred for the west a moral necessity – America is the perfect scapegoat and the rest of the world gains purity – this justifies infinite violence.

Bruckner 1986

(Pascal, maître de conférences at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, and collaborator at the Nouvel Observateur, “Tears of the White Man – Compassion as Contempt”, Ch.1 Page 17)

Parasitical, murderous, and sick, America was the ideal scapegoat. Every bombardment, torture, and cruelty performed by her boys fed our resentment, which no gesture of appeasement could have disarmed. We stood to lose too much to even think of forgiving her.16 The existence of a total, absolute, perfect enemy bestowed on us a free hand for hating with serenity, hating with legitimacy, and even hating with a high moral purpose.17 In sum, in expansionist America, the Western world believed it had found its own disgraceful quintessence. Four hundred years of conquest, pillage, and massacre achieved their supreme expression and converged under the roof of the White House. All the loathing for a particular culture could be concentrated in a single place, in a single people, in a single system. Because the American Devil could serve as a fixed abscess, evil ceased to be free-floating, and the Old World, soiled by age-old faults and born on the back of its transatlantic relative, could finally regain some measure of the purity it had lost during the long centuries that followed the Renaissance.

#### Critiquing American imperialism decreases hegemony

Kagan, adjunct history professor at Georgetown, 98

(Robert, PhD, graduate of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Foreign Policy, “The benevolent empire”, http://people.cas.sc.edu/rosati/a.kaplan.benevolentempire.fp.sum98.pdf)

Those contributing to the growing chorus of antihegemony and multipolarity may know they are playing a dangerous game, one that needs to be conducted with the utmost care, as French leaders did during the Cold War, lest the entire international system come crashing down around them. What they may not have adequately calculated, however, is the possibility that Americans will not respond as wisely as they generally did during the Cold War. Americans and their leaders should not take all this sophisticated whining about U.S. hegemony too seriously. They certainly should not take it more seriously than the whiners themselves do. But, of course, Americans are taking it seriously. In the United States these days, the lugubrious guilt trip of post-Vietnam liberalism is echoed even by conservatives, with William Buckley, Samuel Huntington, and James Schlesinger all decrying American "hubris," "arrogance," and "imperialism." Clinton administration officials, in between speeches exalting America as the "indispensable" nation, increasingly behave as if what is truly indispensable is the prior approval of China, France, and Russia for every military action. Moreover, at another level, there is a stirring of neo-isolationism in America today, a mood that nicely complements the view among many Europeans that America is meddling too much in everyone else's business and taking too little time to mind its own. The existence of the Soviet Union disciplined Americans and made them see that their enlightened self-interest lay in a relatively generous foreign policy. Today, that discipline is no longer present. In other words, foreign grumbling about American hegemony would be merely amusing, were it not for the very real possibility that too many Americans will forget — even if most of the rest of the world does not — just how important continued American dominance is to the preservation of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity. World leaders may want to keep this in mind when they pop the champagne corks in celebration of the next American humbling.

#### Heg solves global conflicts—impact is nuclear war

Brooks et al ’13 Stephen G. Brooks, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University, and William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, “Lean Forward,” Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2013, Vol. 92, Issue 1

Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world’s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing.

#### Multipolarity will fail – rising powers will have no influence

Xuetong 11 Yan, writer for the Global Times, Published by the Carnegie Endowment, “From a Unipolar to a Bipolar Superpower System: The Future of the Global Power Dynamic” 12/20/11. http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/30/from-unipolar-to-bipolar-superpower-system-future-of-global-power-dynamic/a6vl

Empty Talk from International Organizations Is Becoming a Trend The ability of international organizations to steer world affairs is waning. International organizations are designed to be diverse, and after World War II, they have essentially complied with the principles of the nations that were most powerful when they were formed. As a result, even as these nations’ respective powers diminish, they remain the primary decision makers and determine the foundational principles of these organizations. For example, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council have not changed. Similarly, traditionally, only a U.S. citizen can be the president of the World Bank and only a European Union citizen can be managing director of the International Monetary Fund. As the global power dynamic shifts toward a bipolar superpower system, these international organizations will be rendered ineffective if leadership positions remain only in the hands of former powers and thus will fail to maintain international order and promote international cooperation. During the Cold War, the permanent members of the Security Council exercised their vetoes more frequently than not. The power transition from unipolarity to bipolarity could generate an even-greater number of vetoes than before. When faced with a crisis, international organizations can only gather to discuss the issue and often fail to meet the expectations of their member states. There is a growing demand for the establishment of new international institutions that can produce practical solutions to resolve these global crises. For example, when the G8 failed to resolve global economic issues, the G20 was founded. Faced with difficulties in establishing an East Asian economic sphere of cooperation, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was established, followed by APEC 10+1, 10+3, and 10+8. With the phenomenal expansion of international institutions, the number of international summits has increased. The declarations agreed at these summit conferences are only becoming longer and more convoluted. However, after a consensus is reached, no further action is taken to implement the consensus or to promote cooperation. International organizations are thus progressing toward divergent views rather than solving practical problems.

### Exceptionalism

#### Alt fails – ignores oppression, lacks political strategy, and no one cares

O’Callaghan ‘2 Terry O'Callaghan, lecturer in the school of International Relations at the University of South Australia, International Relations and the third debate, ed: Jarvis, 2002, p. 80-82

There are also a host of technological and logistical questions that plague George's scheme and make problematic his recommendations. For example, through what medium are those on the fringes of the international system going to speak to the world? Although it may be true that the third world has now been integrated into the global polity via the advent of technological innovations in communications, allowing for remote access to information sources and the Internet, it also remains true that the majority of those on the fringes continue to be disenfranchised from such mediums, whether as a result of a lack of economic resources, the prevalence of illiteracy, or social, cultural and political circumstances that systemically exclude, women (among others) from economic resources and certain political and social freedoms. Need we remind George that social, political, and individual autonomy is at a minimum in these parts of the world, and an intellectual approach as controversial as postmodernism is not likely to achieve the sorts of goals that George optimistically foreshadows. Indeed, on practical questions such as these, matters otherwise central to the success of postmodern visions, George prefers to be vague, suggesting instead that the intricacies of such details will somehow work themselves out in a manner satisfactory to all. Such a position reveals George's latent idealism and underscores how George's schema is an intellectual one: a theory of international politics written for other theorists of international politics. George's audience is thus a very limited and elite audience and begs the question of whether a senior, middle-class scholar in the intellectual heartland of Australia can do anything of real substance to aid the truly marginalized and oppressed. How is it possible to put oneself in the shoes of the "other," to advocate on his or her behalf, when such is done from a position of affluence, unrelated to and far removed from the experiences of those whom George otherwise champions? Ideals are all good and well, but it is hard to imagine that the computer keyboard is mightier than the sword, and hard to see how a small, elite, affluent assortment of intellectuals is going to generate the type of political momentum necessary to allow those on the fringes to speak and be heard! 1 . Moreover, why should we assume that states and individuals want to listen and will listen to what the marginalized and the oppressed have to say? There is precious little evidence to suggest that "listening" is something the advanced capitalist countries do very well at all. Indeed, one of the allegations so forcefully alleged by Muslim fundamentalists as justification for the terrorist attacks of September I I is precisely that the West, and America in particular, are deaf to the disenfranchised and impoverished in the world. Certainly, there are agencies and individuals who are sensitive to the needs of the "marginalized" and who champion institutional forums where indigenous voices can be heard. But on even the most optimistic reckoning, such forums and institutions represent the exception, not the rule, and remain in the minority if not dwarfed by those institutions that represent Western, first world interests. To be sure, this is a realist power-political image of the current configuration of the global polity, but one apparently, and ironically, endorsed by George if only because it speaks to the realities of the marginalized, the imposed silences, and the multitude of oppressions on which George founds his call for a postmodern ethic. Recognizing such realities, however, does not explain George's penchant for ignoring them entirely, especially in terms of the structural rigidities they pose for meaningful reform. Indeed, George's desire to move to a new "space beyond International Relations" smacks of wishful idealism, ignoring the current configuration of global political relations and power distribution; of the incessant ideological power of hyperindividualism, consumerism, advertising, Hollywood images, and fashion icons; and of the innate power bestowed on the (institutional) barons of global finance, trade, and transnational production. George seems to have little appreciation of the structural impediments such institutions pose for radical change of the type he so fiercely advocates. Revolutionary change of the kind desired by George ignores that fact that many individuals are not disposed to concerns beyond their family, friends, and daily work lives. And institutional, structural transformation requires organized effort, mass popular support, and dogged single-mindedness if societal norms are to be challenged, institutional reform enacted, consumer tastes altered, and political sensibilities reformed. Convincing Nike that there is something intrinsically wrong with paying Indonesian workers a few dollars a week to manufacture shoes for the global market requires considerably more effort than postmodern platitudes and/or moral indignation. The cycle of wealth creation and distribution that sees Michael Jordan receive multimillion dollar contracts to inspire demand for Nike products, while the foot soldiers in the factory eke out a meager existence producing these same products is not easily, or realistically, challenged by pronouncements of moving beyond International Relations to a new, nicer, gentler nirvana. More generally, of course, what George fails to consider is the problem of apathy and of how we get people to care about the plight of others. What do we with the CEOs of multinational corporations, stockbrokers, accountants, factory workers, and the unemployed, who, by and large, fail to consider the homeless and destitute in their own countries, let alone in places they have never isited and are never likely to visit? Moral indignation rarely translates into action, and apathy about the plight of others is a structural impediment as strong any idea, theory, or writing. What George's treatise thus fails to consider is how we overcome this, and how we get others to listen. He needs to explain how the social, political, psychological, and moral structures that define the parameters of existence for the many millions of ordinary citizens in the first world, and that deflects attention from the marginalized and the oppressed can be broken down. Unfortunately, there is little to indicate that George has thought much about this, suggesting that his commitment to postmodern theory is not likely to make much difference. In fact, in the academy the postmodern light is already beginning to dim in certain quarters, having registered scarcely a glimmer in the broader polity, where, if change was to ensue, it needed to burn brightly. Even among those versed in the nomenclature of scholarly debate, theorists of international politics remain skeptical of the value of postmodern discourse, by and large rejecting it. This does not portend well for postmodern visionaries and the future of postmodern discourse. But can George really be surprised by this? After all, his discourse indicts the "backward discipline" for complicity in crimes against humanity, calling for a repudiation of realism and with it a repudiation of the lifelong beliefs and writings of eminent theorists like Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and Stephen Krasner who have otherwise defined the parameters of the discipline, its projects, and research agendas. Can George really expect discipline-wide capitulation to an intellectual diaspora that would see theorists repudiate their beliefs and works in order to take up the creed of postmodernism, as vague, open-ended, and indeterminate as it is? Without a clear and credible plan of how to get from "incarceration and closure" to intellectual freedom, creativity, and openness, George's postmodern musings have understandably attracted few disciples.

#### Consequentialism comes first, you should evaluate this debate in terms of lives saved– their absolutism is politically irresponsible

Isaac ‘2 Jeffrey Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University-Bloomington, Dissent, Vol. 49 No. 2, Spring 2002

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness. WHAT WOULD IT mean for the American left right now to take seriously the centrality of means in politics? First, it would mean taking seriously the specific means employed by the September 11 attackers--terrorism. There is a tendency in some quarters of the left to assimilate the death and destruction of September 11 to more ordinary (and still deplorable) injustices of the world system--the starvation of children in Africa, or the repression of peasants in Mexico, or the continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. But this assimilation is only possible by ignoring the specific modalities of September 11. It is true that in Mexico, Palestine, and elsewhere, too many innocent people suffer, and that is wrong. It may even be true that the experience of suffering is equally terrible in each case. But neither the Mexican nor the Israeli government has ever hijacked civilian airliners and deliberately flown them into crowded office buildings in the middle of cities where innocent civilians work and live, with the intention of killing thousands of people. Al-Qaeda did precisely this. That does not make the other injustices unimportant. It simply makes them different. It makes the September 11 hijackings distinctive, in their defining and malevolent purpose--to kill people and to create terror and havoc. This was not an ordinary injustice. It was an extraordinary injustice. The premise of terrorism is the sheer superfluousness of human life. This premise is inconsistent with civilized living anywhere. It threatens people of every race and class, every ethnicity and religion. Because it threatens everyone, and threatens values central to any decent conception of a good society, it must be fought. And it must be fought in a way commensurate with its malevolence. Ordinary injustice can be remedied. Terrorism can only be stopped. Second, it would mean frankly acknowledging something well understood, often too eagerly embraced, by the twentieth century Marxist left--that it is often politically necessary to employ morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends. A just or even a better society can only be realized in and through political practice; in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won't work. In such situations our choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is between the wrong that confronts us and the means--perhaps the dangerous means--we have to employ in order to oppose it. In such situations there is a danger that "realism" can become a rationale for the Machiavellian worship of power. But equally great is the danger of a righteousness that translates, in effect, into a refusal to act in the face of wrong. What is one to do? Proceed with caution. Avoid casting oneself as the incarnation of pure goodness locked in a Manichean struggle with evil. Be wary of violence. Look for alternative means when they are available, and support the development of such means when they are not. And never sacrifice democratic freedoms and open debate. Above all, ask the hard questions about the situation at hand, the means available, and the likely effectiveness of different strategies. Most striking about the campus left's response to September 11 was its refusal to ask these questions. Its appeals to "international law" were naive. It exaggerated the likely negative consequences of a military response, but failed to consider the consequences of failing to act decisively against terrorism. In the best of all imaginable worlds, it might be possible to defeat al-Qaeda without using force and without dealing with corrupt regimes and political forces like the Northern Alliance. But in this world it is not possible. And this, alas, is the only world that exists. To be politically responsible is to engage this world and to consider the choices that it presents. To refuse to do this is to evade responsibility. Such a stance may indicate a sincere refusal of unsavory choices. But it should never be mistaken for a serious political commitment.

#### Strategic securitization is essential for democratic politics—the alt’s withdrawal into idealism magnifies social violence

Loader and Walker ‘7 Ian Loader, University of Oxford, and Neil Walker, European University Institute, Civilizing Security, 2007, p. 5-7

Faced with such inhospitable conditions, one can easily lapse into fatalistic despair, letting events simply come as they will, or else seek refuge in the consolations offered by the total critique of securitization practices – a path that some critical scholars in criminology and security studies have found all too seductive (e.g. Bigo 2002, 2006; Walters 2003). Or one can, as we have done, supplement social criticism with the hard, uphill, necessarily painstaking work of seeking to specify what it may mean for citizens to live together securely with risk; to think about the social and political arrangements capable of making this possibility more rather than less likely, and to do what one can to nurture practices of collective security shaped not by fugitive market power or by the unfettered actors of (un)civil society, but by an inclusive, democratic politics. Social analysts of crime and security have become highly attuned to, and warned repeatedly of, the illiberal, exclusionary effects of the association between security and political community (Dillon 1996; Hughes 2007). They have not, it should be said, done so without cause, for reasons we set out at some length as the book unfolds. But this sharp sensitivity to the risks of thinking about security through a communitarian lens has itself come at a price, namely, that of failing to address and theorize fully the virtues and social benefits that can flow from members of a political community being able to put and pursue security in common. This, it seems to us, is a failure to heed the implications of the stake that all citizens have in security; to appreciate the closer alignment of self-interest and altruism that can attend the acknowledgement that we are forced to live, as Kant put it, inescapably side-by-side and that individuals simultaneously constitute and threaten one another’s security; and to register the security-enhancing significance and value of the affective bonds of trust and abstract solidarity that political communities depend upon, express and sustain. All this, we think, offers reasons to believe that security offers a conduit, perhaps the best conduit there is, for giving practical meaning to the idea of the public good, for reinventing social democratic politics, even for renewing the activity of politics at all.

#### Threats can refer to real phenomenon - rejecting all threats as constructed prevents us from minimizing potential dangers

Olav Knudsen, Professor of Political Science at Sodertorn, "Post-Copenhagen Security Studies," Security Dialogue 32:3, 2001

Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states 'really' face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors' own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for what- ever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War, threats - in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger - referred to 'real' phenomena, and they refer to 'real' phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both ín terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening. The point of Waever’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ’One can View “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real - it is the utterance itself that is the act.’24 The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & WaeVer’s joint article of the same year.” As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics.” It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Waever himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article." This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made 'threats' and ’threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Waever first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of 'security' and the consequent ’politics of panic', as Waever aptly calls it.” Now, here - in the case of urgency - another baby is thrown out with the Waeverian bathwater. When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Waever’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of 'abolishing' threatening phenomena ’out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Waever does, we should continue paying attention to them, because situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.

#### States will always act to preserve security

John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of political science at the University of Chicago and co-director of the Program on International Security Policy, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001, p. 30-32

The first assumption is that the international system is anarchic, which does not mean that it is chaotic or riven by disorder. It is easy to draw that conclusion, since realism depicts a world characterized by security competition and war. By itself, however, the realist notion of anarchy has nothing to do with conflict; it is an ordering principle, which says that the system comprises independent states that have no central authority above them.4 Sovereignty, in other words, inheres in states because there is no higher ruling body in the international system.5 There is no “government over governments.”6 The second assumption is that great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other. States are potentially dangerous to each other, although some states have more military might than others and are therefore more dangerous. A state’s military power is usually identified with the particular weaponry at its disposal, although even if there were no weapons, the individuals in those states could still use their feet and hands to attack the population of another state. After all, for every neck, there are two hands to choke it. The third assumption is that states can never be certain about other states’ intentions. Specifically, no state can be sure that another state will not use its offensive military capability to attack the first state. This is not to say that states necessarily have hostile intentions. Indeed, all of the states in the system may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be sure of that judgment because intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty.7 There are many possible causes of aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by one of them.8 Furthermore, intentions can change quickly, so a state’s intentions can be benign one day and hostile the next. Uncertainty about intentions is unavoidable, which means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go along with their offensive capabilities. The fourth assumption is that survival is the primary goal of great powers. Specifically, states seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. Survival dominates other motives because, once a state is conquered, it is unlikely to be in a position to pursue other aims. Soviet leader Josef Stalin put the point well during a war scare in 1927: “We can and must build socialism in the [Soviet Union]. But in order to do so we first of all have to exist.”9 States can and do pursue other goals, of course, but security is their most important objective. The fifth assumption is that great powers are rational actors. They are aware of their external environment and they think strategically about how to survive in it. In particular, they consider the preferences of other states and how their own behavior is likely to affect the behavior of those other states, and how the behavior of those other states is likely to affect their own strategy for survival. Moreover, states pay attention to the long term as well as the immediate consequences of their actions. As emphasized, none of these assumptions alone dictates that great powers as a general rule *should* behave aggressively toward each other. There is surely the possibility that some state might have hostile intentions, but the only assumption dealing with a specific motive that is common to all states says that their principal objective is to survive, which by itself is a rather harmless goal. Nevertheless, when the five assumptions are married together, they create powerful incentives for great powers to think and act offensively with regard to each other. In particular, three general patterns of behavior result: fear, self-help, and power maximization.