### Off

#### Their ascription of greater structural meaning to the insufferable pain of others are the attempts of bad conscience to internalize and disavow the tragic pain of existence-this turns the case

Deleuze ’83 (Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche & Philosophy, 2nd ed., 1983, p. 129-130)

Such, at least, is the definition of the first aspect of bad conscience, of the topological aspect, its raw or material state. Interiority is a complex notion. What is interiorised is primarily active force; but interiorised force becomes manufacturer of pain; and as pain is produced more abundantly, interiority gains "in depth, width and height", an ever more voracious abyss. This means, secondly, that pain in its turn is interiorised, sensualised, spiritualised. What do these expressions mean? A new sense is invented for pain, an internal sense, an inward sense: pain is made the consequence of a sin, a fault. You have produced your pain because you have sinned, you will save yourself by manufacturing your pain. Pain conceived as the consequence of an inward fault and the interior mechanism of salvation, pain being interiorised as fast as it is produced, "pain transformed into feelings of guilt, fear and punishment": (GM III 20) this is the second aspect of bad conscience, its typological moment, bad conscience as feeling of guilt. In order to understand the nature of this invention we must assess the importance of a more general problem: what is the meaning of pain? The meaning of existence is completely dependent on it: existence is meaningful only to the extent that the pain of existence has a meaning (UM III, 5). Now, pain is a reaction. Thus it appears that its only meaning consists in the possibility of acting this reaction or at least of localising it, isolating its trace, in order to avoid all propagation until one can re-act once more. The active meaning of pain therefore appears as an external meaning. In order for pain to be judged from an active point of view it must be kept in the element of its exteriority. There is a whole art in this, an art which is that of the masters. The masters have a secret. They know that pain has only one meaning: giving pleasure to someone, giving pleasure to someone who inflicts or contemplates pain. If the active man is able not to take his own pain seriously it is because he always imagines someone to whom it gives pleasure. It is not for nothing that such an imagination is found in the belief in the active gods which peopled the Greek world: " 'Every evil the sight of which edifies a god is justified' ... what was at bottom the ultimate meaning of Trojan Wars and other such tragic terrors? There can be no doubt whatever: they were intended as festival plays for the gods" (GM II 7 p. 69). There is a tendency to invoke pain as an argument against existence; this way of arguing testifies to a way of thinking which is dear to us, a reactive way. We not only put ourselves in the position of the one who suffers, but in the position of the man of ressentiment who no longer acts his reactions. It must be understood that the active meaning of pain appears in other perspectives: pain is not an argument against life, but, on the contrary, a stimulant to life, "a bait for life", an argument in its favour. Seeing or even inflicting suffering is a structure of life as active life, an active manifestation of life. Pain has an immediate meaning in favour of life: its external meaning. "Our delicacy and even more our tartuffery . . . resist a really vivid comprehension of the degree to which cruelty constituted the great festival pleasure of more primitive men and was indeed an ingredient of almost every one of their pleasures . . . Without cruelty there is no festival: thus the longest and most ancient part of human history teaches — and in punishment there is so much that is festive!" (GM II 6 p. 66 and p. 67\*). This is Nietzsche's contribution to a peculiarly spiritual problem: what is the meaning of pain and suffering? We must admire the astonishing invention of the bad conscience all the more: a new meaning for suffering, an internal meaning. It is no longer a question of acting one's pain, nor of judging it from an active standpoint. On the contrary, one is numbed against pain by passion. "The passion of the most savage": pain is made the consequence of a fault and the means of a salvation; pain is healed by manufacturing yet more pain, by internalising it still further; one tries to forget, that is to say, one cures oneself of pain by infecting the wound (GM III 15). Nietzsche had already pointed out an essential thesis in the Birth of Tragedy: tragedy dies at the same time as drama becomes an inward conflict and suffering is internalised. But who invents and wills the internal meaning of pain?

#### Vote negative to embrace eternal recurrence of the same

#### Eternal recurrence affirms that we should not try to change any part of our life, and should embrace the entirety of it, even those parts that lead to pain and suffering. An acceptance that no change can happen allows us to master our pain.

Kain 7 (Philip J., Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 33, Spring 2007, pp. 49-63, pmuse aks)

Eternal recurrence, I think we can say, shows us the horror of existence. No matter what you say about your life, no matter how happy you claim to have been, no matter how bright a face you put on it, the threat of eternal recurrence brings out the basic horror in every life. Live it over again with nothing new? It is the “nothing new” that does it. That is how we make it through our existing life. We hope for, we expect, something new, something different, some improvement, some progress, or at least some distraction, some hope. If that is ruled out, if everything will be exactly the same in our next life, well that is a different story. If you think you are supremely happy with your life, just see what happens if you start to think that you will have to live it again. Suppose that you can, as Aristotle suggested, look back over your life as a whole and feel that it was a good one—a happy one. Would that make you want to live it again? Would you at the moment in which you feel that your life was a happy one also crave nothing more fervently than to live it again? What if your life was a joyous life or a proud life? It is quite clear that you could have a very positive attitude toward your life and not at all want to live it again. In fact, wouldn’t the prospect of eternal repetition, if the idea grew on you and gained possession of you, begin to sap even the best life of its attractiveness? Wouldn’t the expectation of eternal repetition make anything less appealing? Wouldn’t it empty your life of its significance and meaning? Most commentators seem to assume that the only life we could expect anyone to want to live again would be a good life. That makes no sense to me. On the other hand, most people would assume that a life of intense pain and suffering is not at all the sort of life it makes any sense to want to live again. I think Nietzsche was able to see that a life of intense pain and suffering is perhaps the only life it really makes sense to want to live again. Let me try to explain. For years Nietzsche was ill, suffering intense migraines, nausea, and vomiting. Often he was unable to work and confined to bed. He fought this. He tried everything. He sought a better climate. He watched his diet fanatically. He experimented with medicines. Nothing worked. He could not improve his condition. His suffering was out of his control. It dominated his life and determined his every activity. He was overpowered by it. There was no freedom or dignity here. He became a slave to his illness. He was subjugated by it. What was he to do? At the beginning of the essay “On the Sublime,” Schiller writes: [N]othing is so unworthy of man than to suffer violence. . . . [W]hoever suffers this cravenly throws his humanity away. . . . This is the position in which man finds himself. Surrounded by countless forces, all of which are superior to his own and wield mastery over him. . . . If he is no longer able to oppose physical force by his relatively weaker physical force, then the only thing that remains to him, if he is not to suffer violence, is to eliminate utterly and completely a relationship that is so disadvantageous to him, and to destroy the very concept of a force to which he must in fact succumb. To destroy the very concept of a force means simply to submit to it voluntarily. Although Nietzsche did not go about it in the way Schiller had in mind, nevertheless, this is exactly what Nietzsche did. What was he to do about his suffering? What was he to do about the fact that it came to dominate every moment of his life? What was he to do about the fact that it was robbing him of all freedom and dignity? What was he to do about this subjugation and slavery? He decided to submit to it voluntarily. He decided to accept it fully. He decided that he would not change one single detail of his life, not one moment of pain. He decided to love his fate. At the prospect of living his life over again, over again an infinite number of times, without the slightest change, with every detail of suffering and pain the same, he was ready to say, “Well then! Once more!” (Z IV: “The Drunken Song” 1). He could not change his life anyway. But this way he broke the psychological stranglehold it had over him. He ended his subjugation. He put himself in charge. He turned all “it was” into a “thus I willed it.” Everything that was going to happen in his life, he accepted, he chose, he willed. He became sovereign over his life. There was no way to overcome his illness except by embracing it. I think we are now in a position to see that for eternal recurrence to work, for it to have the effect that it must have for Nietzsche, we must accept without qualification, we must love, every single moment of our lives, every single moment of suffering. We cannot allow ourselves to be tempted by what might at first sight seem to be a much more appealing version of eternal recurrence, that is, a recurring life that would include the desirable aspects of our present life while leaving out the undesirable ones. To give in to such temptation would be to risk losing everything that has been gained. To give in to such temptation, I suggest, would allow the suffering in our present life to begin to reassert its psychological stranglehold. We would start to slip back into subjugation. We would again come to be dominated by our suffering. We would spend our time trying to minimize it, or avoid it, or ameliorate it, or cure it. We would again become slaves to it. For the same reason, I do not think it will work for us to accept eternal recurrence merely because of one or a few grand moments—for the sake of which we are willing to tolerate the rest of our lives. Magnus holds that all we need desire is the return of one peak experience. This suggests that our attitude toward much of our life, even most of it, could be one of toleration, acceptance, or indifference—it could even be negative. All we need do is love one great moment and, because all moments are interconnected (Z IV: “The Drunken Song” 10; WP1032), that then will require us to accept all moments. This would be much easier than actually loving all moments of one’s life—every single detail. The latter is what is demanded in Ecce Homo, which says that amor fati means that one “wants nothing to be different” and that we “[n]ot merely bear what is necessary . . . but love it” (EH “Clever” 10, emphasis added [except to love]). We want “a Yes-saying without reservation, even to suffering. . . . Nothing in existence may be subtracted, nothing is dispensable . . .” (EH “BT” 2). If we do not love every moment of our present life for its own sake, those moments we do not love, those moments we accept for the sake of one grand moment, I suggest, will begin to wear on us. We will begin to wish we did not have to suffer through so many of them, we will try to develop strategies for coping with them, we will worry about them, they will start to reassert themselves, they will slowly begin to dominate us, and pretty soon we will again be enslaved by them. Our attitude toward any moment cannot be a desire to avoid it, change it, or reduce it—or it will again begin to dominate us. Indeed, in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche says that he had to display a “Russian fatalism.” He did so by tenaciously clinging for years to all but intolerable situations, places, apartments, and society, merely because they happened to be given by accident: it was better than changing them, than feeling that they could be changed—than rebelling against them. Any attempt to disturb me in this fatalism, to awaken me by force, used to annoy me mortally—and it actually was mortally dangerous every time. Accepting oneself as if fated, not wishing oneself “different”—that is in such cases great reason itself. (EH “Wise” 6) Eternal recurrence is an attempt to deal with meaningless suffering. It is an attempt to do so that completely rejects an approach to suffering that says, Let’s improve the world, let’s change things, let’s work step by step to remove suffering— the view of liberals and socialists whom Nietzsche so often rails against. If it is impossible to significantly reduce suffering in the world, as Nietzsche thinks it is, then to make it your goal to try to do so is to enslave yourself to that suffering.

### Off

#### Text: We’ll advocate the entirety of the plan sans the framing arguments in the 1AC

#### You should reject preemption; it justifies war and creates the conflict it attempts to stop

Massumi 07 (Brian, Communication Department of the Université de Montréal , “Potential Politics and the Primacy of Preemption”) \*ableist language modified

Fear is always a good reason to go politically conditional. Fear is the palpable action in the present of a threatening future cause. It acts just as palpably whether the threat is determinate or not. It weakens your resolve, creates stress, lowers consumer confidence, and may ultimately lead to individual and/or economic serial policy failure. To avoid serial policy failure, which would make yourself even more of a target and carry the fear to even higher level, you must simply act. In Bush administration parlance, you "go kinetic."6 You leap into action on a level with the potential that frightens you. You do that, once again, by inciting the potential to take an actual shape you can respond to. You trigger a production of what you fear. You turn the objectively indeterminate cause into an actual effect so you can actually deal with it in some way. Any time you feel the need to act, then all you have to do is actuate a fear. The production of the effect follows as smoothly as a reflex. This affective dynamic is still very much in place, independent of Rumsfeld's individual fate. It will remain in place as long as fear and remains politically actuatable. The logic of preemption operates on this affective plane, in this proliferative or ontogenetic way: in a way that contributes to the reflex production of the specific being of the threat. You're afraid Iraq is a breeding ground for terrorists? It could have been. If it could have been, it would have been. So go ahead, make it one. "Bring 'em on," the President said, following Hollywood-trained reflex. He knew it in his "guts." He couldn't have gone wrong. His reflex was right. Because "now we can all agree" that Iraq is in actual fact a breeding ground for "terrrorists". That just goes to prove that the potential was always there. Before, there was doubt in some quarters that Saddam had to be removed from power. Some agreed he had to go, some didn't. Now we can all agree. It was right to remove him because doing so made Iraq become what it always could have been. And that's the truth. Truth, in this new world order, is by nature retroactive. Fact grows conditionally in the affective soil of an indeterminately present futurity. It becomes objective as that present reflexively plays out, as a effect of the preemptive action taken. The reality-based community wastes time studying empirical reality, the Bushites said: "we create it." And because of that, "we" the preemptors will always be right. We always will have been right to preempt, because we have objectively produced a recursive truth-effect for your judicious study. And while you are looking back studying the truth of it, we will have acted with reflex speed again, effecting a new reality. 7 We will always have had no choice but to prosecute the "war on terror," ever more vigilantly and ever more intensely on every potential front. We, preemptors, are the producers of your world. Get used to it. The War in Iraq is a success to the extent that it made the productivity of the preemptive "war on terror" a self-perpetuating movement. Even if the US were to withdraw from Iraq tomorrow, the war would have to continue on other fronts no matter who controls Congress or who is in the White House. It would have to continue in Afghanistan, for example, where the assymetrical tactics perfected in Iraq are now being applied to renew the conflict there. Or in Iran, which also always could have/would have been a terrorist breeding ground. Or it could morph and move to the Mexican-US border, itself morphed into a distributed frontline proliferating throughout the territory in the moving form of "illegal immigration". On the indefinite Homeland Security front of a protieform war, who knows what threats may be spinelessly incubating where, abetted by those who lack the "backbone" to go kinetic. Preemption is like deterrence in that it combines a proprietary epistemology with a unique ontology in such a way as to make present a future cause that sets a self-perpetuating movement into operation. Its differences from deterrence hinge on its taking objectively indeterminate or potential threat as its self-constitutive cause rather than fully formed and specified threat. It situates itself on the ground of ontogenetic potential. There, rather than deterring the feared effect, it actualizes the potential in a shape to which it hopes it can respond. It assumes a proliferation of potential threats, and mirrors that capacity in its own operation. It becomes proliferative. It assumes the objective imbalance of a far-from-equilibrium state as a permanent condition. Rather than trying to right the imbalance, it seizes it as an opportunity for itself. Preemption also sets a race in motion. But this is a race run on the edge of chaos. It is a race of movement-flushing, detection, perception, and affective actuation, run in irreparably chaotic or quasi-chaotic conditions. The race of preemption has any number of laps, each ending in the actual effecting of a threat. Each actualization of a threat triggers the next lap, as a continuation of the first in the same direction, or in another way in a different field. Deterrence revolved around an objective cause. Preemption revolves around a proliferative effect. Both are operative logics. The operative logic of deterrence, however, remained causal even as it displaced its cause's effect. Preemption is an effective operative logic rather than a causal operative logic. Since its ground is potential, there is no actual cause for it to organize itself around. It compensates for the absence of an actual cause by producing an actual effect in its place. This it makes the motor of its movement: it converts an absent or virtual cause really, directly into a taking-actual-effect. It does this affectively. It uses affect to effectively trigger a virtual causality.8 Preemption is when the futurity of unspecified threat is affectively held in the present in a perpetual state of potential emergence(y) so that a movement of actualization may be triggered that is not only self-propelling but also effectively, indefinitely, ontologically productive, because it works from a virtual cause whose potential no single actualization exhausts. Preemption's operational parameters mean that is never univocal. It operates in the element of vagueness and objective uncertainty. Due to its proliferative nature, it cannot be monolithic. Its logic cannot close in around its self-causing as the logic deterrence does. It includes an essential openness in its productive logic.9 It incites its adversary to take emergent form. It then strives to become as proteiform as its ever-emergent adversary can be. It is as shape-shifting as it is self-driving. It infiltrates across boundaries, sweeping up existing formations in its own transversal movement. Faced with gravity-bound formations too inertial for it to sweep up and carry off with its own operative logic, it contents itself with opening windows of opportunity to pass through. This is the case with the domestic legal and juridical structure in the US. It can't sweep that away. But it can build into that structure escape holes for itself. These take the form of formal provisions vastly expanding the power of the executive, in the person of the president in his role as commander-in-chief, to declare states of exception which suspend the normal legal course in order to enable a continued flow of preemptive action.10 Preemption stands for conflict unlimited: the potential for peace amended to become a perpetual state of undeclared war. This is the "permanent state of emergency" so presciently described by Walter Benjamin. In current Bush administration parlance, it has come to be called "Long War" replacing the Cold War: a preemptive war with an in-built tendency to be never-ending. Deterrence produced asymmetrical conflict as a by-product. The MADly balanced East-West bipolarity spun off a North-South sub-polarity. This was less a polarity than an axis of imbalance. The "South" was neither a second Western First nor another Eastern Second. It was an anomalous Third. In this chaotic " Third World ," local conflicts prefiguring the present "imbalance of terror" proliferated. The phrase "the war on terror" was in fact first popularized by Richard Nixon in 1972 in response to the attack at the Munich Olympics when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict spectacularly overspilled northward. Asymmetrical conflicts, however, were perceivable by the reigning logic of deterrence only as a reflection of itself. The dynamic of deterrence were overlaid upon them. Their heterogeneity was overcoded by the familiar US-Soviet duality. Globally such conflicts figured only as opportunities to reproduce the worldwide balance of terror on a reduced scale. The strategy of "containment" adopted toward them was for the two sides in the dominant dyad to operate in each local theater through proxies in such a way that their influence, on the whole, balanced out. "I decided," Nixon said after Munich , "that we must maintain a balance."11 He did not, as Bush did after 9-11, decide to skew things by going unilaterally "kinetic." The rhetoric of the "war on terror" fell into abeyance during the remainder of the 1970s, as Southern asymmetries tended to be overcoded as global rebalancings, and going kinetic was "contained" to the status of local anomaly.

### Off

#### Interpretation: Economic engagement requires the promotion of trade

Celik, 11 **–** master’s student at Uppsala University (Department of Peace and Conflict Research) (Arda, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies <http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagement-policies>)

Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to change the political behaviour of target state. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows, “It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations”.(p523-abstact).It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that “the direct and positive linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.”

#### Violation: The plan is a non-trade promoting form of engagement that results in trade and an economic outcome. This only indirectly engages the country.

#### Voters-

#### Fairness: trade promotion is key to fair debates and neg strategy- affs that aren’t in the context of trade are unfair

#### Education: our interp is best for education- ensures debates that are about economic engagement. Our interpretation is grounded in lit.

#### Effects: even if they win the effect of the plan is increased trade that’s bad- it unlimits the resolution, undercuts neg ground, and makes topicality and solvency unnecessary

### Case

#### Presumptions that alterity is ontologically prior imposes a violent universalism which reduces the other to the same through assimilative violence. Only agonistic relations emphasize the radical alterity of the other as a moment of pluralistic equality.

Ojakangas ‘7 Mika Ojakangas, Doctorate of political science and Academy Research Fellow at Academy of Finland, The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt, 2007, p.233-235

The third step in the elaboration of a Schmittian ethics concerns ethical work, those practices in which the subject engages in order to constitute herself and which Foucault unites under the name ‘askesis’ (Foucault 1984a: 355). For our purposes, the ethical work prescribed by Schmitt’s existential decisionism consists in the friend–enemy distinction as a practice, the ‘art of making enemies’ as a means to actively fashion the self. The antagonistic relationship with the Other is contained in the very definition of ethics as a technique of the self. The significance of ethics as a transgressive practice lies in the possibility of ‘self- formation in the face of all the other forces that fashion us’ (Simons 1995: 76). The art of making enemies thus consists in actively pluralising differences, nurturing an antagonistic field, which alone verifies the reality of one’s subjectivity. Difference and, more precisely, making differences rather than resolving them, become both the condition and the content of the existence of the Schmittian subject. One is reminded at this stage of the very specific function that Schmitt’s political ontology assigns to the figure of the enemy: the political relationship of enmity proceeds from the strictly equal (in)validity of opponents’ claims, in which neither the Self nor the Other may legitimately resort to the language of epistemic and moral certitude (Schmitt 1976, 2003). In this setting of antagonistic symmetry that resembles a well-regulated duel, the Schmittian enemy loses all ethical privileges of the Levinasian Other but is also spared the unfortunate destiny of the a priori denigrated enemy of liberalism, reduced to the status of a despicable monster to be humiliated and annihilated, rather than merely defeated (see Schmitt 1976: 27–29, 53–54). Nonetheless, one should not exaggerate the ‘friendliness’ of the relationship with the enemy. While both presupposing and effecting a fundamental onto-axi- ological symmetry between the adversaries, the friend–enemy distinction utterly devalues a principle central to the liberal ethos in Schmitt’s interpretation: the principle of discussion. To fully appreciate the irrelevance of discussion to the decisionist ethics we need to specify its relationship with alterity. As opposed to the well-known critiques of realist practices of security as stabilising the identity of the self via its authoritative demarcation from the other, the friend–enemy distinction, in our reading, operates in two steps and with two notions of alterity. Simultaneously with any exclusion or authoritative nomination of a positive other (the enemy as something existentially alien to the self), the decision on the friend–enemy distinction traverses a space of negative alterity, the void of undecidability, where neither the self nor the other yet exists (cf. Zizek 1999a: 19–20). It is this radical alterity that is indeed ontologically prior to the self, but it must logically also be prior to any positive figure of the other. That which precedes and exceeds the identities of both self and the other is quite literally the void, the ‘background of emptiness’, whose only characteristic is its radical difference from any positivity. This assumption of negative alterity that must be traversed in a friend–enemy distinction reconfigures the relationship with any positive other into that of existential equality. The existence of the self is no longer owing to the existence of the positive other, since both emerge simultaneously as the twin offspring of the friend–enemy distinction. Yet this mutual constitution of oneself and one’s enemy also marks an irreducible caesura between them that functions as the very opposite of the ‘radical interdependence’ emphasised by Levinasian-Derridean ethics. While certainly interdependent in the ontological sense, the self and the other only emerge as subjects through the resolution of this interdependence through the act of distinction. In a Schmittian ethics, the Levinasian openness to the advent of alterity is concretised in terms of a vigilant receptivity, which calls for the perpetual activity of differentiating between friends and enemies that defines the social field in terms of intensities of association and dissociation. In this logic, an antagonistic relation with a positive other is a marker that verifies one’s subjectivity that must not be erased in a search for reconciliation or consensus. Thus, the ethos of discussion appears wholly irrelevant to a Schmittian ethics since it replaces the ontogenetic situation of self-creation with an ontological reflection on the questions of truth or morality, presupposing either a teleology of rational consensus or a neutralised conception of truth as an emergent equilibrium (see Schmitt 1985b: 35–51). Schmitt’s criticism of the Enlightenment ideal of the ‘discussing public’, coupled with a Foucauldian reintroduction of the political into the domain of the epistemic, entails an obvious consequence: nothing is to be gained in discussion. If all that precedes the difference between the self and the other is the brute ‘being-there’ of the indifferent void, then there is little point in attempting to efface this difference to arrive at a more fundamental identity of the Same. If we are verified as subjects not through identification but through dissociation, then any discussion that seeks to resolve differences does little more than subsume one’s existential singularity under its own teleological or procedural normativity. If truth is a thing of this world, then any consensus that emerges in discussion will be always already permeated by power relations; that is, it will always emerge as a result of an unfounded decision, however much the event of the latter is disavowed: [e]very consensus, even a ‘free’ one, is somehow motivated and brought into existence. Power produces consensus and often, to be sure, a rational and ethically justified consensus. Conversely, consensus produces power, and then often an irrational and – despite the consensus – an ethically repugnant one. (Schmitt 1999: 202) Aware of the eradication of difference inherent in the drive for consensus, a decisionist ethics values difference without a liberal ‘safety mechanism’ of postulating the underlying identity of ‘humanity’, which in Schmitt’s astute observation merely serves to deny the enemy the existential status of being human, reducing him to a ‘total non-value’ (Freund 1995: 19), and has ‘incalculable effects [since] a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity’ (Schmitt 1976: 54). Just as Schmitt’s political realism on the level of interstate relations affirms pluralism in the domain of the international, while privileging a minimal degree of domestic homogeneity, a decisionist ethics emphasises the maintenance of difference in intersubjective relations while simultaneously priv- ileging a resolution of interdependence with the positive other via a clear act of self-distinction and self-delimitation. In this manner, a decisionist ethics posits a telos of sovereign subjectivity.

#### Unconditional hospitality is politically impossible – it inevitably totalizes the Other and denies the choice to Others who don’t want to be interacted with.

Leung and Stone ’09 Gilbert Leung1 and Matthew Stone2, 4-1-2009, Birkbeck, University of London1, London Metropolitan University2, “Otherwise than Hospitality: A Disputation on the Relation of Ethics to Law and Politics,” http://repository.essex.ac.uk/4465/1/Otherwise\_than\_Hospitality.pdf

Although ethically it is unconditional, one cannot say that at the political level hospitality is always the right choice, because one cannot be hospitable to all. Indeed, Levinas was acutely aware of the harsh reality of politics. In a notorious radio interview, when asked whether the Palestinian is, for the Israeli, the deserving other par excellence, he said the following: [I]f your neighbour attacks another neighbour or treats him unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity takes on another character, in alterity we can find an enemy, or at least then we are faced with the problem of knowing who is right and who is wrong, who is just and who is unjust. There are people who are wrong. (Levinas 1989, 294). Whilst at the heart of humanity is an originary ethics, a subjective welcoming of the other person, this does not negate the necessity of politics in all its coldness and brutality. The issue, then, at the core of this critique, is Derrida’s pursuance of hospitality at this political level. Does this not over-simplify the political problematic, revealing a questionable assumption that all people desire (political) hospitality, and that the latter is the most appropriate political strategy? Is there a situation in which the ethical demand requires a non-hospitable response at the level of politics? The decline of the nation state and the contemporary prevalence of ‘refugees of every kind, immigrants with or without citizenship, exiled or forced from their homes, whether with or without papers’ heighten Derrida’s interest in hospitality, and helps to justify his preoccupation (Derrida 1999, 71). But this is to characterise the other in a particular way: migratory; stateless and, crucially, seeking a home. Within the context of refugee politics, this is clearly appropriate. But against a generalisation of the category of the other, we pose an alternative exemplar: the other that does not desire hospitality. This alterity is embodied by the person who wants to resist political inclusion. Whilst such an other would necessarily still provoke the unconditional hospitality of originary ethics, it is clear that it is no longer appropriate in their case to promote hospitality at the political level. As David Gauthier has emphasised, a politics of hospitality would presume a universal fraternity, a kinship and co-belonging. And, as he notes, surely the absolute other would be beyond fraternity itself. In this case, then, there can be only two alternatives when hospitality becomes the dominant political imperative: Either one can remain outside the community, or one can seek to become assimilated into it. In the former instance, the Other remains outside the community’s warm embrace. In the latter, the Other is absorbed into the community, and its otherness is eliminated. In both cases, the Other is totalized. (Gauthier 2007, 178). In other words, the other is either given hospitality that it does not desire, and is therefore assimilated into a fraternity to which it does not belong, or it is left out, which presumably undermines hospitality as a locus for politics. In either case, hospitality reveals its own violence (and we must stress again that by violence we mean ontological violence: the failure of ethics as the reduction of absolute otherness to the language of the same, to whatever extent). The critique being made of Derrida here is perhaps one of emphasis. He was undoubtedly aware, as the last section has observed, of the inherent hostility of hospitality. But with this in mind, we ask why he championed it as a political strategy, as well as a mere descriptive account of an originary ethics. When one shifts attention away from the refugee and toward the other who does not desire inclusion, the violence of hospitality is rendered inescapably visible. And to welcome, in this scene, demonstrates a different type of violence, for the failure of hospitality is not that one is not hospitable enough but, paradoxically, that one has been hospitable at all. To welcome, and indeed to say anything, to engage the other in dialogue, is to say too much, to reduce alterity to the sameness of language. This is a violence that cannot be answered fully with the idea of forgiveness, because here forgiveness itself reveals a similar violence: the aspiration to dialogue, and a demand for interaction with an other that prefers to be left alone. Whilst we are told that it is necessary to impose limits, would Derrida go so far to say that conditional hospitality is not merely a requirement to maintain limits and order, but also offers the possibility of judging whether the other wants hospitality in the first place? Whilst he was clearly aware that the scene of forgiveness and hospitality contains its own violence and impossibility, it could be suggested that, in some cases, these are the wrong goals, even as aporias. Forgiveness seeks a bond, a touch, a linguistic recognition and, ultimately, the redemption of the wrong-doer. Might we suggest that in certain situations, such as the quiet provocation of the other that resists inclusion, one cannot honestly seek redemption, but must simply aspire to an impossible and guilty silence?

#### Yesterday’s rhetorical demands for a new ethic are today’s justifications for violent interventionism. The use of an ethic of infinite or universal justice works to obscure our moral culpability the moment it reaches politics following the logic of “but this is all we can do.” Inevitably, this short falling provides the basis for ethical interventions that unify states, peoples, and communities towards violent nationalist ends.

Chandler ‘3 David Chandler, professor of international relations at csd, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, V. 5 N. 3. August, 2003, pg. 300-303

Perhaps the most important example of the British and US governments attempting to create an ‘ethical’ interventionist agenda is the case of Iraq. For the last 10 years US and British political leaders have used Iraq as an international cause which they can use to raise their status at home and emphasise their commitment to a moral mission abroad. The British and US publics have never been as enthusiastic as their governments in pursuing conflict with Saddam Hussein and the emphasis on Iraq in foreign policy initiatives has little to do with shifts in public opinion. For example, in July 2002 when George W. Bush and Tony Blair prepared the public for a possible military conquest of Iraq, polls showed that only a small, and declining, majority of American people were in favour (Tyson 2002). Opinion polls consistently demonstrate that the western public tends to share a more traditional view of foreign policy priorities, based on national interests, rather than the liberal ‘crusading’ perspective often pushed by their government leaders (Schwarz 2000). This gap is explained by the fact that the drive to pursue ethical adventures abroad is not directly related to winning votes, but to an even more basic political instinct of the political establishment—the need for governing administrations to have a sense of self-identity, purpose and self-belief. Governments without a sense of ‘mission’ and collective purpose would lose their internal cohesion and soon dissolve into faction fighting and petty squabbles. When there are few domestic issues upon which policy can be defined, the international sphere provides an arena in which policy can be expressed in clear, direct and authoritative terms. The Labour government’s Strategic Defence Review in 1998 made clear that the resources being put into foreign policy initiatives bore little relationship to any strategic threat faced by the UK (UKSCD 1998, para. 87). This new flexibility, in terms of freedom from cold war threats, has allowed foreign policy to be driven more directly by a search for policy initiatives seen to symbolise a clear projection of values. This process was apparent in the government’s decision to take a high-profile stand over Kosovo, despite the lack of any ‘direct and immediate threat to Britain’s own national security from the situation’ (UKSCD 1998, para. 95). Intervention in Kosovo was not determined by British geo-strategic concerns of international instability, nor by the alleged depth of public support for Kosovo Albanians, who received little sympathy once they tried to take refuge in Britain as asylum seekers (Hume 1999). An important motivation for British high-profile involvement in Kosovo lay in the unsullied cause of the victims of Milosevic’s Serb regime. As Tony Blair declared, the Kosovo Albanian refugees had ‘become symbols of hope, humanity and peace’. To intervene on their behalf would therefore be to fight ‘a battle for humanity’ because their cause ‘is a just cause, it is a rightful cause’ (Blair 1999). The attention to the articulation of a political mission, beyond the petty partisanship of left and right, through foreign policy activism abroad has been an important resource of authority and credibility for western political leaders. The ability to project or symbolise unifying ‘values’ has become a core leadership attribute. George W. Bush’s shaky start to the US presidency was transformed by his speech to Congress in the wake of the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks, in which he staked out his claim to represent and protect America’s ethical values against the terrorist ‘heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century’ (Bush 2001). Similarly, Tony Blair was at his most presidential in the wake of the attacks, arguing that values were what distinguished the two sides of the coming conflict: ‘We are democratic. They are not. We have respect for human life. They do not. We hold essentially liberal values. They do not’ (The Guardian, 27 March 1999). Peter Hain, minister of state at the UK Foreign Office, also focused on the ‘values that the terrorists attacked’ in his call for political unity around ‘tough action’ (The Guardian, 24 September 2001). By association with the cause of the victims of international conflicts, western governments can easily gain a moral authority that cannot be secured through the domestic political process. Even general election victories, the defining point of the domestic political process, no longer bring authority or legitimacy. This was clear in the contested victory of George W. Bush in the 2000 elections, which turned on the problem of the ‘hanging’ chad in Florida. However, the problem of deriving legitimacy from elections is a much broader one, with declining voter turnouts. In the British elections in 2001 Tony Blair achieved a landslide second term mandate, but there was little sense of euphoria—this was a hollow victory on a 50 per cent turnout which meant only one in four of the electorate voted for New Labour. The demise of the framework of traditional party politics, the source of western governments’ domestic malaise, is directly associated with the search for an external source of legitimacy. This process is illustrated in Michael Ignatieff’s quote from the writings of British war reporter Don McCullin: But what are my politics? I certainly take the side of the underprivileged. I could never say I was politically neutral. But whether I’m of the right or the left—I can’t say ... I feel, in my guts, at one with the victims. And I find there’s integrity in that stance (Ignatieff 1998, 22–23). Ignatieff suggests that the external projection of legitimacy or moral mission stems from the collapse of the left/right political framework, stating that ‘there are no good causes left—only victims of bad causes’ (ibid., 23). Governments, like many gap-year students, seek to define and find themselves through their engagement with the problems experienced by those in far-off countries. This search for a moral grounding through solidarity with the ‘victims of bad causes’ has led to an increasingly moralised ‘black and white’ or ‘good versus evil’ view of crisis situations in the non-western world.10 The jet-setting UK prime minister, Tony Blair, has been much criticised for appearing to deprioritise the domestic agenda in the wake of September 11, yet even his critics admit that his ‘moral mission’ in the international sphere has been crucial to enhancing his domestic standing. The search for ethical or moral approaches emphasising the government’s moral authority has inexorably led to a domestic shift in priorities making international policy-making increasingly high profile in relation to other policy areas. The emphasis on ethical foreign policy commitments enables western governments to declare an unequivocal moral stance, which helps to mitigate awkward questions of government mission and political coherence in the domestic sphere. The contrast between the moral certainty possible in selected areas of foreign policy and the uncertainties of domestic policy-making was unintentionally highlighted when President George Bush congratulated Tony Blair on his willingness to take a stand over Afghanistan and Iraq: ‘The thing I admire about this prime minister s that he doesn’t need a poll or a focus group to convince him of the difference between right and wrong’ (UKGovernment 2002). Tony Blair, like Bush himself, of course relies heavily on polls and focus groups for every domestic initiative. It is only in the sphere of foreign policy that it appears there are opportunities for western leaders to project a self-image of purpose, mission and political clarity. This is because it is easier to promote a position which can be claimed to be based on clear ethical values, rather than the vagaries of compromise and political pragmatism, in foreign policy than it is in domestic policy. There are three big advantages: first, the object of policy activism, and criticism, is a foreign government; second, the British or American government is not so accountable for matching rhetoric to international actions; and third, credit can be claimed for any positive outcome of international policy, while any negative outcome can be blamed on the actions or inaction of the government or population of the country concerned. The following sections highlight that the lack of connection between rhetorical demands and accountability for policy-making or policy outcomes has made selected high-profile examples of ethical foreign policy-making a strong card for western governments, under pressure to consolidate their standing and authority at home.

#### The violent biopolitics of a global state of exception collapses into global civil war- turns the case

Agamben ‘5 (Giorgio Agamben, Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School, State of Exception, pg 85-87) aln

It is perhaps possible at this point to look back upon the path traveled thus far and draw some provisional conclusions from our investigation of the state of exception. The juridical system of the West appears as a double structure, formed by two heterogeneous yet coordinated elements: one that is normative and juridical in the strict sense (which we can for convenience inscribe under the rubric potestas) and one that is anomic and metajuridical (which we can call by the name auctoritas). The normative element needs the anomic element in order to be applied, but, on the other hand, auctoritas can assert itself only in the validation or suspension of potestas. Because it results from the dialectic between these two somewhat antagonistic yet functionally connected elements, the ancient dwelling of law is fragile and, in straining to maintain its own order, is always already in the process of ruin and decay. The state of exception is the device that must ultimately articulate and hold together the two aspects of the juridico-political machine by instituting a threshold of undecidability between anomie and nomos, between life and law, between auctoritas and potestas. It is founded on the essential fiction according to which anomie (in the form of auctoritas, living law, or the force of law) is still related to the juridical order and the power to suspend the norm has an immediate hold on life. As long as the two elements remain correlated yet conceptually, temporally, and subjectively distinct (as in republican Rome’s contrast between the Senate and the people, or in medieval Europe’s contrast between spiritual and temporal powers) their dialectic—though founded on a fiction—can nevertheless function in some way. But when they tend to coincide in a single person, when the state of exception, in which they are bound and blurred together, becomes the rule, then the juridico-political system transforms itself into a killing machine. 6.10 The aim of this investigation—in the urgency of the state of exception “in which we live”—was to bring to light the fiction that governs this arcanum imperii [secret of power] par excellence of our time. What the “ark” of power contains at its center is the state of exception—but this is essentially an empty space, in which a human action with no relation to law stands before a norm with no relation to life. This does not mean that the machine, with its empty center, is not effective; on the contrary, what we have sought to show is precisely that it has continued to function almost without interruption from World War One, through fascism and National Socialism, and up to our own time. Indeed, the state of exception has today reached its maximum worldwide deployment. The normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a governmental violence that— while ignoring international law externally and producing a permanent state of exception internally—nevertheless still claims to be applying the law. Of course, the task at hand is not to bring the state of exception back within its spatially and temporally defined boundaries in order to then reaffirm the primacy of a norm and of rights that are themselves ultimately grounded in it. From the real state of exception in which we live, it is not possible to return to the state of law [stato di diritto], for at issue now are the very concepts of “state” and “law.” But if it is possible to attempt to halt the machine, to show its central fiction, this is because between violence and law, between life and norm, there is no substantial articulation. Alongside the movement that seeks to keep them in relation at all costs, there is a countermovement that, working in an inverse direction in law and in life, always seeks to loosen what has been artificially and violently linked. That is to say, in the field of tension of our culture, two opposite forces act, one that institutes and makes, and one that deactivates and deposes. The state of exception is both the point of their maximum tension and—as it coincides with the rule—that which threatens today to render them indiscernible. To live in the state of exception means to experience both of these possibilities and yet, by always separating the two forces, ceaselessly to try to interrupt the working of the machine that is leading the West toward global civil war.

#### The demand for engagement with the "faceless Other" prevents recognition of how encounters with the Other are implicated in broader power relations and structures – understanding of social location is necessary.

Sara Ahmed, 2-01-2013, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies @ Goldsmiths, “Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality,” http://books.google.com/books?id=Af0mtGfAv\_gC&pg=PT177&lpg=PT177&dq=sara+ahmed+hospitality+forgetting+of+name&source=bl&ots=FGIcDZTbE8&sig=UcyVCC3PRI35meWFjzYkQhcoktQ&hl=en&sa=X&ei=NMztUcuWAsXCyAG7gIHICg&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=sara%20ahmed%20hospitality%20forgetting%20of%20name&f=false

However, while Derrida is providing us with a model of hospitality which is an opening to that which is yet to be assimilated (as either a friend or stranger), there is still a failure to acknowledge the relationship between this opening the forms of assimilation that already function to differentiate others. Such a hospitality is based on the forgetting of the names that are used, however inadequately, to locate subjects in a topography of time and place. In contrast, what is required is a hospitality that remembers the encounters that are already Implicated in such names (including the name of ‘the stranger’), and how they affect the movement and ‘arrival’ of others, in a way which opens out the possibility of these names being moved/from. This hospitality, premised on the surprise ut an opening or gift, would begin by admitting to how the assimilation of others, and the differentiation between others, might already affect who or what may arrive, then or now, here or there. In his analysis of the politics of friendship, Derrida explicitly defines the importance of the particularity of an other whom I might encounter. He writes that the desire for friendship, ‘engages me with a particular him or her rather than with anybody… This desire of the call to bridge the distance (necessarily unbridgeable) is (perhaps) no longer of the order of the common or community, the share taken up or given, participation or sharing’ (Derrida 1995: 298). Friendship is both a friendship with a particular him or her, as it is a form of sharing that is not premised on community or commonality. One is hence surprised by, and open to, that which is particular, in some sense, one is surprised by who is already assimilated into ‘my life.’ Perhaps it is here that we can begin to think of hospitality differently. Being hospitable, or generous, is being open to the particularity of the ‘who’ I might encounter, but in such a way, that this particularity does not hold this ‘you’ in place. However, as I argued in the previous section, we must be careful not to locate the particular in the present of a given ‘who’ we might encounter: rather, what is at stake, is the different modes of encounter that allow us to face (up to) others. A generous encounter may be one which would recognise how the encounter itself is implicated in broader relations and circuits of production and exchange (how did we get here? how did you arrive?), but in such a way that the one who is already assimilated can still surprise, can still move beyond the encounter which names her, and holds her in place. Is it here that an ethics of welcoming that which is other than the Stranger might begin?

### Framing

#### Calculation is inevitable, it’s only a question of whether we calculate for or against the Other – their attempts to be free of calculation ensures that their ethic is co-opted

Jacques Derrida, Directeur d’Etudes at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, and Professor of Philosophy, French and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Irvine, 2002, Acts of Religion, p. 255-57

This excess of justice over law and calculation, this overflowing of the unpre­sentable over the determinable, cannot and should not [ne peut pas et ne doit pas] serve as an alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, between institutions or states. Abandoned to itself, the incalculable and giv­ing [donatrice] idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation. It is always possible, and this is part of the madness of which we were speaking. An absolute assurance against this risk can only saturate or suture the opening of the call to justice, a call that is always wounded. But incalculable justice commands calculation. And first of all, closest to what one associates with justice, namely, law, the juridical field that one cannot isolate within sure frontiers, but also in all the fields from which one cannot separate it, which intervene in it and are no longer simply fields: the ethical, the political, the economical, the psycho-sociological, the philosophical, the liter­ary, etc. Not only must one [il faut] calculate, negotiate the relation between the calculable and the incalculable, and negotiate without a rule that would not have to be reinvented there where we are “thrown’ there where we find ourselves; but one must [il faut] do so and take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find our­selves and beyond the already identifiable zones of morality, politics, or law, beyond the distinctions between national and international, public and private, and so on. The order of this il faut does not properly belong either to justice or to law. It only belongs to either realm by exceeding each one in the direction of the other—which means that, in their very heterogeneity, these two orders are undis­sociable: de facto and de jure [en fait et en droit]. Politicization, for example, is interminable even if it cannot and should not ever be total. To keep this from being a truism, or a triviality, one must recognize in it the following consequence: each advance in politicization obliges one to reconsider, and so to reinterpret the very foundations of law such as they had previously been calculated or delimited. This was true for example in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, in the abolition of slavery, in all the emancipatory battles that remain and will have to remain in progress, everywhere in the world, for men and for women. Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. One cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or with sophistication, without at least some thoughtlessness and without forming the worst complicities. It is true that it is also necessary to re-elaborate, without renouncing, the concept of eman­cipation, enfranchisement, or liberation while taking into account the strange structures we have been describing. But beyond these identified territories of juridico-politicization on the grand geo-political scale, beyond all self-serving misappropriations and hijackings, beyond all determined and particular reappropria­tions of international law, other areas must constantly open up that can at first resemble secondary or marginal areas. This marginality also signifies that a vio­lence, even a terrorism and other forms of hostage taking are at work. The exam­ples closest to us would be found in the area of laws [lois] on the teaching and practice of languages, the legitimization of canons, the military use of scientific research, abortion, euthanasia, problems of organ transplant, extra-uterine con­ception, bio-engineering, medical experimentation, the “social treatment” of AIDS, the macro- or micro-politics of drugs, homelessness, and so on, without forgetting; of course, the treatment of what one calls animal life, the immense question of so-called animality. On this last problem, the Benjamin text that I am coming to now shows that its author was not deaf or insensitive to it, even if his propositions on this subject remain quite obscure or traditional.

#### Calculation is inevitable – but withdrawing from the state cedes it to conservatives and coopts justice

Campbell '99 David Campbell, professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle, Moral Spaces, 1999, pp. 46-47

That undecidability resides within the decision, Derrida argues, "that justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable cannot and should not serve as alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, or between institutions or states and others."9' Indeed, "incalculable justice requires us to calculate." From where does this insistence come? What is behind, what is animating, these imperatives? It is both the character of infinite justice as a heteronomic relationship to the other, a relationship that because of its undecidability multiplies responsibility, and the fact that "left to itself, the incalculable and giving (donatrice) idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst, for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation."92 The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty, a duty that inhabits the instant of madness and compels the decision to avoid "the bad," the "perverse calculation," even "the worst." This is the duty that also dwells with deconstruction and makes it the starting point, the "at least necessary condition," for the organization of resistance to totalitarianism in all its forms. And it is a duty that responds to practical political concerns when we recognize that Derrida names the bad, the perverse, and the worst as those violences "we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism." Furthermore, the duty within the decision, the obligation that recognizes the necessity of negotiating the possibilities provided by the impossibilities of justice, is not content with simply avoiding, containing, combating, or negating the worst violence-though it could certainly begin with those strategies. Instead, this responsibility, which is the responsibility of responsibility, commissions a "utopian" strategy. Not a strategy that is beyond all bounds of possibility so as to be considered "unrealistic," but one which in respecting the necessity of calculation, takes the possibility summoned by the calculation as far as possible, "must take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find ourselves and beyond the already identifiable zones of morality or politics or law, beyond the distinction between national and international, public and private, and so on."94 As Derrida declares, "The condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible: the testing of the aporia from which one may invent the only possible invention, the impossible invention."95 This leads Derrida to enunciate a proposition that many, not the least of whom are his Habermasian critics, could hardly have expected: "Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. We cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or with sophistication, at least not without treating it too lightly and forming the worst complicities." 6

#### Consequentialism is key – their absolutism destroys political responsibility

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As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness. WHAT WOULD IT mean for the American left right now to take seriously the centrality of means in politics? First, it would mean taking seriously the specific means employed by the September 11 attackers--terrorism. There is a tendency in some quarters of the left to assimilate the death and destruction of September 11 to more ordinary (and still deplorable) injustices of the world system--the starvation of children in Africa, or the repression of peasants in Mexico, or the continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. But this assimilation is only possible by ignoring the specific modalities of September 11. It is true that in Mexico, Palestine, and elsewhere, too many innocent people suffer, and that is wrong. It may even be true that the experience of suffering is equally terrible in each case. But neither the Mexican nor the Israeli government has ever hijacked civilian airliners and deliberately flown them into crowded office buildings in the middle of cities where innocent civilians work and live, with the intention of killing thousands of people. Al-Qaeda did precisely this. That does not make the other injustices unimportant. It simply makes them different. It makes the September 11 hijackings distinctive, in their defining and malevolent purpose--to kill people and to create terror and havoc. This was not an ordinary injustice. It was an extraordinary injustice. The premise of terrorism is the sheer superfluousness of human life. This premise is inconsistent with civilized living anywhere. It threatens people of every race and class, every ethnicity and religion. Because it threatens everyone, and threatens values central to any decent conception of a good society, it must be fought. And it must be fought in a way commensurate with its malevolence. Ordinary injustice can be remedied. Terrorism can only be stopped. Second, it would mean frankly acknowledging something well understood, often too eagerly embraced, by the twentieth century Marxist left--that it is often politically necessary to employ morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends. A just or even a better society can only be realized in and through political practice; in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won't work. In such situations our choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is between the wrong that confronts us and the means--perhaps the dangerous means--we have to employ in order to oppose it. In such situations there is a danger that "realism" can become a rationale for the Machiavellian worship of power. But equally great is the danger of a righteousness that translates, in effect, into a refusal to act in the face of wrong. What is one to do? Proceed with caution. Avoid casting oneself as the incarnation of pure goodness locked in a Manichean struggle with evil. Be wary of violence. Look for alternative means when they are available, and support the development of such means when they are not. And never sacrifice democratic freedoms and open debate. Above all, ask the hard questions about the situation at hand, the means available, and the likely effectiveness of different strategies. Most striking about the campus left's response to September 11 was its refusal to ask these questions. Its appeals to "international law" were naive. It exaggerated the likely negative consequences of a military response, but failed to consider the consequences of failing to act decisively against terrorism. In the best of all imaginable worlds, it might be possible to defeat al-Qaeda without using force and without dealing with corrupt regimes and political forces like the Northern Alliance. But in this world it is not possible. And this, alas, is the only world that exists. To be politically responsible is to engage this world and to consider the choices that it presents. To refuse to do this is to evade responsibility. Such a stance may indicate a sincere refusal of unsavory choices. But it should never be mistaken for a serious political commitment.

#### Even if we obscure the incalculable, we have an ethical responsibility to calculate death because it is our only mean of fighting injustice

Santilli 2003

[Paul C., Siena College, “Radical Evil, Subjection, and Alain Badiou’s Ethic of the Truth Event,” World Congress of the International Society for Universal Dialogue. May 18-22. http://web.archive.org/web/20041017224843/http://www.isud.org/papers/pdfs/Santilli.pdf. acc 9/6/11. //Jamie]

From the standpoint of an ethics of subjection there is even something unnecessary or superfluous about the void of suffering in the subject bearers of evil. For Levinas, the return to being from the ethical encounter with the face and its infinite depths is fraught with the danger the subject will reduce the other to a "like-me," totalizing and violating the space of absolute alterity. As Chalier puts it, "Levinas conceives of the moral subject's awakening, or the emergence of the human in being, as a response to that pre-originary subjection which is not a happenstance of being." But if there really is something inaccessible about suffering itself, about the 'other' side of what is manifestly finite, subjected, and damaged, then to a certain extent it is irrelevant to ethics, as irrelevant as the judgment of moral progress in the subject-agent. Let me take the parent-child relation again as an example. Suppose the child to exhibit the symptoms of an illness. Are not the proper "ethical" questions for the parent to ask questions of measure and mathematical multiples: How high is the fever? How long has it lasted? How far is the hospital? Can she get out of bed? Has this happened before? These are the questions of the doctor, the rescue squads and the police. They are questions about being, about detail, causes and effects. Ethically our response to the needs of must be reduced to a positivity simply because we have access to nothing but the symptoms, which are like mine. Our primary moral responsibility is to treat the symptoms that show up in being, not the radically other with whom I cannot identify. Say we observe someone whose hands have been chopped off with a machete. How would we characterize this? Would it not be slightly absurd to say, "He had his limbs severed and he suffered," as though the cruel amputation were not horror enough. Think of the idiocy in the common platitude: "She died of cancer, but thank God, she did not suffer", as though the devastating annihilation of the human by a tumor were not evil itself. For ethics, then, the only suffering that matters are the visible effects of the onslaught of the world. All other suffering is excessive and inaccessible. Therefore, it is in being, indeed in the midst of the most elemental facts about ourselves and other people, that we ethically encounter others by responding to their needs and helping them as best we can It is precisely by identifying being and not pretending that we know any thing about suffering, other than it is a hollow in the midst of being, that we can act responsibly. What worries me about Levinas is that by going beyond being to what he regards as the ethics of absolute alterity, he risks allowing the sheer, almost banal facticity of suffering to be swallowed in the infinite depths of transcendence. Indeed, it seems to me that Levinas too often over emphasizes the importance of the emergence of the subject and the inner good in the ethical encounter, as though the point of meeting the suffering human being was to come to an awareness of the good within oneself and not to heal and repair. I agree with Chalier's observation that Levinas's "analyses adopt the point of view of the moral subject, not that of a person who might be the object of its solicitude." Ethics has limits; there are situations like the Holocaust where to speak of a moral responsibility to heal and repair seems pathetic. But an ethics that would be oriented to the vulnerabilities of the subjected (which are others, of course, but also myself) needs to address the mutilation, dismemberment, the chronology of torture, the numbers incarcerated, the look of the bodies, the narratives, the blood counts, the mines knives, machetes, and poisons. Evil really is all that. When the mind does its work, it plunges into being, into mathematical multiples and starts counting the cells, the graveyards, and bullet wounds. Rational practical deliberation is always about the facts that encircle the void inaccessible to deliberation and practical reason.

#### Great power war is still possible–competition, security concerns, nationalism, and mindsets of policymakers

Mearsheimer ’99 John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of political science at the University of Chicago and co-director of the Program on International Security Policy, “Is Major War Obsolete?” Great Debate Series, 25 February 1999, CIAO

Now I think the central claim that’s on the table is wrong-headed, and let me tell you why. First of all, there are a number of good reasons why great powers in the system will think seriously about going to war in the future, and I’ll give you three of them and try and illustrate some cases. First, states oftentimes compete for economic resources. Is it hard to imagine a situation where a reconstituted Russia gets into a war with the United States and the Persian Gulf over Gulf oil? I don’t think that’s implausible. Is it hard to imagine Japan and China getting into a war in the South China Sea over economic resources? I don’t find that hard to imagine. A second reason that states go to war which, of course, is dear to the heart of realists like me, and that’s to enhance their security. Take the United States out of Europe, put the Germans on their own; you got the Germans on one side and the Russians on the other, and in between a huge buffer zone called eastern or central Europe. Call it what you want. Is it impossible to imagine the Russians and the Germans getting into a fight over control of that vacuum? Highly likely, no, but feasible, for sure. Is it hard to imagine Japan and China getting into a war over the South China Sea, not for resource reasons but because Japanese sea-lines of communication run through there and a huge Chinese navy may threaten it? I don’t think it’s impossible to imagine that. What about nationalism, a third reason? China, fighting in the United States over Taiwan? You think that’s impossible? I don’t think that’s impossible. That’s a scenario that makes me very nervous. I can figure out all sorts of ways, none of which are highly likely, that the Chinese and the Americans end up shooting at each other. It doesn’t necessarily have to be World War III, but it is great-power war. Chinese and Russians fighting each other over Siberia? As many of you know, there are huge numbers of Chinese going into Siberia. You start mixing ethnic populations in most areas of the world outside the United States and it’s usually a prescription for big trouble. Again, not highly likely, but possible. I could go on and on, positing a lot of scenarios where great powers have good reasons to go to war against other great powers. Second reason: There is no question that in the twentieth century, certainly with nuclear weapons but even before nuclear weapons, the costs of going to war are very high. But that doesn’t mean that war is ruled out. The presence of nuclear weapons alone does not make war obsolescent. I will remind you that from 1945 to 1990, we lived in a world where there were thousands of nuclear weapons on both sides, and there was nobody running around saying, “ War is obsolescent.” So you can’t make the argument that the mere presence of nuclear weapons creates peace. India and Pakistan are both going down the nuclear road. You don’t hear many people running around saying, “ That’s going to produce peace.” And, furthermore, if you believe nuclear weapons were a great cause of peace, you ought to be in favor of nuclear proliferation. What we need is everybody to have a nuclear weapon in their back pocket. You don’t hear many people saying that’s going to produce peace, do you? Conventional war? Michael’s right; conventional war was very deadly before nuclear weapons came along, but we still had wars. And the reason we did is because states come up with clever strategies. States are always looking for clever strategies to avoid fighting lengthy and bloody and costly wars of attrition. And they sometimes find them, and they sometimes go to war for those reasons. So there’s no question in my mind that the costs of war are very high, and deterrence is not that difficult to achieve in lots of great-power security situations. But on the other hand, to argue that war is obsolescent-I wouldn’t make that argument. My third and final point here is, the fact of the matter is, that there’s hardly anybody in the national security establishment-and I bet this is true of Michael-who believes that war is obsolescent. I’m going to tell you why I think this is the case. Consider the fact that the United States stations roughly 100,000 troops in Europe and 100,000 troops in Asia. We spend an enormous amount of money on defense. We’re spending almost as much money as we were spending during the Cold War on defense. We spend more money than the next six countries in the world spend on defense. The questions is, why are we spending all this money? Why are we stationing troops in Europe? Why are we stationing troops in Asia? Why are we concentrating on keeping NATO intact and spreading it eastward? I’ll tell you why, because we believe that if we don’t stay there and we pull out, trouble is going to break out, and not trouble between minor powers, but trouble between major powers. That’s why we’re there. We know very well that if we leave Europe, the Germans are going to seriously countenance, if not automatically go, and get nuclear weapons. Certainly the case with the Japanese. Do you think the Germans and the Japanese are going to stand for long not to have nuclear weapons? I don’t think that’s the case. Again, that security zone between the Germans and the Russians-there’ll be a real competition to fill that.

#### Even limited nuclear volleys risk extinction—newest studies

Starr and King ‘9 Steven Starr, published work in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and Moscow Inst. of Physics, director of Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri-Columbia, has addressed the UN General Assembly on environmental consequences of nuclear war, and Peter King, “Nuclear suicide,” Science Alert, 8/2/2009, http://www.sciencealert.com.au/opinions/20090208-19496.html

But there is little evidence yet that either the government or the Commission is fully alert to the most momentous truth of the present era: Our best science now predicts that nuclear arsenals are fundamentally incompatible with continued human existence. It is imperative that the message coming from scientists in the US, Russia and elsewhere about the environmental consequences of nuclear war be included in the general debate about the control and abolition of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the nuclear weapon states apparently remain oblivious to the climatic, ecological and biological consequences of nuclear war. No "environmental impact statement" has ever been created for the US or Russian nuclear weaponry, which is one of the reasons why there still are 22,000 intact nuclear weapons in their deployed and reserve arsenals. However, new peer-reviewed studies done at several US universities predict the detonation of even a tiny fraction of the global nuclear arsenal will result in major changes in the global climate and massive destruction of the stratospheric ozone layer (which protects the Earth from deadly UV light). Even a "regional" nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan, fought with 100 Hiroshima-size weapons, is predicted to loft five million tons of smoke above cloud level; there it would block about 10 per cent of warming sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere. This would produce average surface temperatures colder than any experienced for the last 1000 years. The smoke would remain in the stratosphere for more than a decade and seriously impact global climate. It would probably be too cold to grow wheat in Canada for several years; grain exports would likely cease from grain-exporting nations and global nuclear famine would result. Within a few years, most of the already-hungry human populations could perish, and the populations of any nation dependent upon grain imports would be at risk. One hundred Hiroshima-sized bombs contain about one half of one percent (0.05 per cent) of the explosive power of the deployed and operational nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia. The new studies predict that a war fought with any significant fraction of these arsenals would cause catastrophic changes in the global climate that would virtually eliminate growing seasons for a decade or more. The US and Russia now have 900 missiles armed with 2200 strategic nuclear warheads on high-alert which can be launched with only a few minutes warning, and another 5330 deployed warheads available for use within an hour or less. According to a December, 2008, article in Physics Today, the detonation of 4400 of these warheads in urban areas would cause up to 180 million tons of soot from burning cities to rise into the stratosphere. The smoke would block about 70 per cent of sunlight in the Northern Hemisphere and 35 per cent of sunlight in the Southern Hemisphere from reaching the surface of the Earth. The resulting nuclear darkness would cause global Ice Age weather conditions virtually overnight. Minimum daily temperatures in the large agricultural regions of the Northern Hemisphere would drop below freezing for at least one to three years. It would become colder than it was 18,000 years ago at the height of the last Ice Age. Most humans and large animals would starve to death.