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## Plan

Plan: The United States Federal Government should implement the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement between the United States and the United Mexican States.

## Contention 1 is Dodd-Frank

Passage of the TBA now is key – it expires on January 17th – kills future hopes of drilling

**Fox News, 3/10 –** (Associated Press Staff Writer for Fox News. October 3, 2010. “Joint U.S.-Mexico Gulf Oil Drilling Deal Held Up Over Disagreements In Congress,” <http://www.reefrelieffounders.com/drilling/2013/10/04/fox-news-joint-u-s-mexico-gulf-oil-drilling-deal-held-up-over-disagreements-in-congress/)//SDL>

¶ Along with the budget and immigration, one more thing that the Senate and House can’t mutually agree upon is the proposed joint U.S.-Mexico effort to develop offshore oil and gas fields along the two countries’ maritime border in the Gulf of Mexico.¶ Both the Mexican government and many in Washington want to nail down the agreement soon, but its ratification by the U.S. Congress has been delayed by a dispute between the House and Senate over whether oil and gas producers should be required to publicly disclose their payments to foreign governments.¶ Mexico almost immediately ratified the treaty but the agreement has stalled on Capitol Hill as the House-passed version exempts oil and gas companies from disclosing their payments.¶ SUMMARY¶ The U.S. and Mexico have tried for decades to figure out a plan for divvying up the oil and gas resources in the Gulf, but a 2000 moratorium was placed on drilling in the region to allow time for the development of a joint plan. From that point on, the U.S. began expanding its drilling operations closer and closer to the maritime border in the Gulf, as Mexico grew increasingly concerned that the U.S. could be siphoning from deposits located on their side of the border.¶ “It is the hope that, through this Agreement and the proposed energy reforms in Mexico, the energy revolution the U.S. is currently experiencing can extend throughout the Western Hemisphere,” Democratic Sen. Ron Wyden of Oregon said in a statement Tuesday during a meeting of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. “This would make our region more competitive and less reliant on politically tumultuous states for obtaining energy.”¶ The U.S. and Mexico have tried for decades to figure out a plan for divvying up the oil and gas resources in the Gulf, but a 2000 moratorium was placed on drilling in the region to allow time for the development of a joint plan. From that point on the U.S. began expanding its drilling operations closer and closer to the maritime border in the Gulf, as Mexico grew increasingly concerned that the U.S. could be siphoning from deposits located on their side of the border.¶ The joint agreement is meant to set explicit guidelines for where each country can drill and provide the United States “substantial geopolitical, energy security and environmental benefits, while potentially helping the U.S. oil and gas industry gain access to a huge market that may offer jobs and gains across a long value chain,” the Brookings Institution stated earlier this year.¶ For Mexico, a ratified agreement would provide Latin America’s second-largest economy with new technology and investment needed to develop hard-to-reach regions along with giving a major boost to President Enrique Peña Nieto’s push for energy reform that includes opening the country’s state-run oil company -Pemex – to foreign investment.¶ “The motive for the U.S. is ‘We’re ready to drill, but we don’t want to drill ourselves into a legal nightmare,’” said George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence, an industry newsletter based in Houston, according to the Christian Science Monitor. “For Mexico, it’s ‘We want to make certain our oil rights are protected so that if they start drilling on the U.S. side – and discover crossborder oil – we have architecture in place to protect our interests.”¶ Besides the exemptions for oil and gas companies, the specter of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill looms heavy over drilling in the Gulf. Environmental activists argue that the U.S. and oil companies have not learned their lessons from the BP spill that left 11 people dead and dumped around 4.2 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.¶ “[O]ur continued emphasis on expanding offshore drilling is slowing the necessary investment in clean energy projects that will stimulate the economy without the attendant risks, and help to alleviate the worst impacts of climate change,” said Jacqueline Savitz, vice president for U.S. oceans at the conservation organization Oceana during Tuesday’s hearing.¶ If finally approved, the agreement will be the first major test to Peña Nieto’s energy reform plan. The Mexican leader has already taken heat for his proposal to open Pemex up to foreign investment – with opponents claiming the move is tantamount to Mexico losing its sovereignty.¶ If the agreement is not ratified by Congress by Jan. 17, 2014 then the moratorium in place will expire and it is unlikely that either country will drill in the region.

If the TBA does pass, lack of leadership in the status quo means it will be the house version

Goldwyn et al 8/4/13

[David Goldwyn, president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, an international energy advisory consultancy, nonresident senior fellow with the Energy Security Initiative at the Brookings Institution. State Department’s special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs from 2009-2011—conceived and developed the Global Shale Gas Initiative and the Energy Governance and Capacity Initiative, led ministerial-level energy dialogues with Angola, Canada, China, India, Iraq, Mexico, Nigeria and Brazil, and co-chaired a regional biofuels initiative with Brazil, AND Neil R. Brown, Senior Advisor, Goldwyn Global Strategies, AND Cory R. Gill, Associate, Goldwyn Global Strategies, “Time to Implement the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement — Congress: Drop the Poison Pill,” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/08/14-us-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbon-goldwyn-brown-gill]

The United States and Mexico concluded a transboundary hydrocarbons agreement, officially titled the “Agreement between the United States and Mexico Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico,” (TBA) in February 2012. The agreement provides the United States substantial geopolitical, energy security and environmental benefits while potentially helping the U.S. oil and gas industry gain access to a huge market that may offer jobs and gains across a long value chain. The Mexican Senate ratified the agreement in April 2012. However, the U.S. Congress needs to enact implementing legislation to give the Department of Interior the authority to play its role in the agreement.¶ This otherwise uncontroversial agreement is now at risk. After nearly a year of benign neglect from the Obama administration, legislation is now being considered to implement TBA. The TBA is a new type of international agreement, and using proven tools for considering treaties and executive agreements, Congress has an important role to play in its interpretation. Regrettably, without strong leadership and engagement from the administration or Congressional leaders, the U.S. House of Representatives included an unnecessary “poison pill” in its June 27, 2013 version of the authorizing bill. The Senate can do better.

Only the senate version provides transparency over contracts with Mexico

**Boman, 13 –** (Karen Boman, Associated Press Staff Writer for RigZone. October 14, 2013. “Senate Passes US-Mexico Drilling Pact,” http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil\_gas/a/129582/Senate\_Passes\_USMexico\_Drilling\_Pact)//SDL

The U.S. Senate passed a bill Saturday that would implement the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement. The Senate passed the bill by “unanimous consent”, avoiding a roll call vote, The Hill reported on Sunday. Last year, government officials from the two countries signed the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement, which would establish rules for developing oil and gas resources along the United States’ maritime border with Mexico. In June, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements Authorization Act (H.R. 1613), which would enact the terms of the agreement signed by the Obama administration and Mexico to govern how to explore, develop, and share revenue from all oil and gas resources along the Gulf of Mexico’s maritime border. H.R. 1613 would lift the current moratorium on exploration and production along the Western Gap section of the boundary, opening up 1.5 million acres in the Gulf previously off limits due to border issues, and provide a framework for the safe management of oil and gas resources in the boundary area. While the Senate bill has bipartisan support, the Senate bill differs from the version passed by the House in June. The House version grants waivers for companies under the pact from a Dodd-Frank law mandate to disclose payments to foreign governments, the Hill reported, while the Senate version does not offer such waivers, The Hill reported.

Even if Nieto passes reform, domestic legislation alone fails, clear and transparent US engagement on oil via the plan is key to solvency and broader Latin American relations

Abe Collier, Policy Analyst at Praemon, 13 [“The US Stake in Mexican Energy Reform,” Praemon—forecast and analysts from the brightest new minds, September 17,

In 1938, Mexico’s government made one¶ of the world’s most populist and radical¶ moves of the 20th century—nationalizing¶ the oil and gas industry. Foreign companies¶ from the United States and elsewhere¶ were paid as much as the Mexican¶ government could afford, but the companies¶ lost all permanent investments in¶ the country. Lázaro Cárdenas, Mexico’s¶ president at the time, was hailed as a hero¶ by the Mexican people—Mexico, long a¶ servant of foreign investors and governments,¶ was establishing itself as an international¶ force. Nearly eighty years later,¶ Mexico’s current president, Enrique Peña¶ Nieto, has proposed an energy reform¶ plan that would allow foreign companies¶ to take a significant part in the rich proceeds¶ from Mexican oil and gas for the¶ first time since 1938.1¶ The move makes practical sense. Pemex—the public Mexican company that performs all the explora-tion, drilling, and refining of oil within Mexican borders—has long been notorious for its corruption¶ and bureaucratic waste. It is frequently used as a cash source for politicians who sell high positions¶ in the publicly owned company, invest with inside information, or provide consulting services.2 The¶ company is twenty to thirty years behind industry leaders in management structure as well as technology¶ and expertise concerning deep-sea and shale drilling, which are seen by many as the future of the¶ industry.3 And many Mexicans agree that the company needs to be reformed, but less than 20% think¶ it should be done by allowing private investment.4 With such broad, bi-partisan opposition to privatization¶ of the oil and gas industry—along with bad memories from the privatization of the telecommunications¶ industry in the 1990s, when Carlos Slim and a few other business moguls ended up with a de¶ facto private monopoly—private investment in Pemex is an unlikely option for reform. To avoid this,¶ Peña Nieto and his party have proposed that the Mexican legislature allow private companies to form¶ joint ventures and partnerships with Pemex (taking fees but ceding all ownership rights of the oil to¶ the national firm). More liberal politicians, including the left-leaning PRD, have suggested that Mexico¶ continue its isolationist energy policy and attempt a complete overhaul of Pemex without any private¶ involvement.5¶ Peña Nieto’s proposition has several clear advantages for Mexico. The primary advantage for Mexico is¶ that change will come more quickly and efficiently if outside companies are involved; private firms usually¶ have more technical know-how and less time-wasting corruption. In addition, true to the intent of¶ the 1938 nationalization of the country’s oil and gas, the proposition permits reform without allowing¶ permanent private or foreign investment. Indeed, Pemex has already entered into some joint venture¶ projects outside of its national boundaries in order to begin acquiring the experience it needs.6 Additionally,¶ the ties created by work with foreign companies could well lead to increased foreign trade,¶ which has been the lifeblood of Mexico’s economic growth for decades.¶ But the US stands to gain much as well¶ if the centrist PRI plan is adopted. One¶ clear advantage is that large US oil companies—¶ such as ExxonMobil and Chevron—¶ will be afforded significant growth¶ and revenue opportunities as they work¶ with Pemex. Perhaps more important,¶ however, the two nations would likely¶ advance their working relationship a¶ great deal by international cooperative¶ ventures, even among private firms. The¶ troubled history between the two countries,¶ including a good deal of present¶ tension caused by the ongoing war on¶ drugs, could only be helped by friendly¶ business relationships. On a related note,¶ US foreign trade could be boosted by a¶ better relationship with Mexican firms,¶ and not just in Mexico—Central and¶ South American views of the United States are greatly affected by its behavior towards Mexico, and a¶ better US-Mexican relationship could increase trade from the Mexican border to the southern tip of Ar-gentina. Finally, if Pemex recovers fully, the increased revenues would markedly strengthen Mexico—an¶ important US ally—on the international stage and help further US interests in diplomacy and trade.¶ How, then, should the United States encourage Peña Nieto’s energy reform plan? Many Mexicans worry¶ that private and foreign companies, unhindered by labor laws and unions, would generally exploit¶ Mexican workers and care little about the country.7 Accordingly, the United States must first provide assurance¶ that any foreign involvement will be strictly monitored, perhaps by forming a bilateral monitoring¶ team with representatives from both nations to oversee the contracting, planning, and execution of¶ any joint ventures. Once both nations are satisfied that Mexican security and autonomy are not at risk,¶ US diplomats should collaborate with Pemex, representatives of the Mexican government, and private¶ energy companies to outline a long-term plan for growth in Mexico’s energy sector. This should include¶ details of how long domestic and foreign firms will be involved in the energy industry as well as an informational¶ campaign to promote the program among the Mexican public.¶ US politicians and businesspeople can no longer afford to stand by and let Mexico suffer poverty and¶ slow economic growth because it lacks information or options to make wise decisions. Limited intervention,¶ particularly as Mexico’s energy sector is currently striving to reinvent itself, has become both a¶ practical imperative and a humanitarian duty.

Additionally, the house waiver exemption gets modeled globally

Goldwyn et al 8/4/13

[David Goldwyn, president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, an international energy advisory consultancy, nonresident senior fellow with the Energy Security Initiative at the Brookings Institution. State Department’s special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs from 2009-2011—conceived and developed the Global Shale Gas Initiative and the Energy Governance and Capacity Initiative, led ministerial-level energy dialogues with Angola, Canada, China, India, Iraq, Mexico, Nigeria and Brazil, and co-chaired a regional biofuels initiative with Brazil, AND Neil R. Brown, Senior Advisor, Goldwyn Global Strategies, AND Cory R. Gill, Associate, Goldwyn Global Strategies, “Time to Implement the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement — Congress: Drop the Poison Pill,” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/08/14-us-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbon-goldwyn-brown-gill]

The House bill contains language that would introduce secrecy into payments made under the TBA by precluding the revenue transparency provisions of the so-called “Cardin-Lugar Amendment” (Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act) from applying to TBA implementation. The Cardin-Lugar Amendment requires oil, gas, and minerals companies to publicly disclose payments to governments, a U.S. requirement that has sparked similar laws in the European Union and are[r1] now under consideration in Canada and beyond. By targeting those bipartisan, robustly supported pro-openness provisions, opponents of transparency are creating opposition to the TBA where none need be present. In raw political terms, the TBA is important but not at the top of the oil and gas industry’s priority list for Congress whereas the proponents of transparency are well-organized and gaining momentum. Even the White House announced it could not support the House bill. Given that political dynamic, some proponents of the TBA are hurting their cause by encouraging the anti-transparency provision.

Dodd-Frank solves corruption in Afghanistan - the impact is stability

**Clough, 10 -** (Christine, coordinator of the Task Force on Financial Integrity 26 Economic Development. August 3, 2010. Using Transparency to Avoid the Resource Curse in Afghanistan, Financial Transparency Coalition, p. http://www.financialtransparency.org/2010/08/03/using-transparency-to-avoid-the-resource-curse-in-afghanistan/)

¶ Additionally, the disclosure of corporate profits on a country-by-country-basis would aid civil society groups and donors in the fight against corruption and cronyism in Afghanistan. Extractive industry experts will be able to estimate whether the revenue figures disclosed by a corporation are accurate based on their knowledge of the deposits and the industry. Relatively accurate revenue figures will in turn support better estimates of government revenue, which outside parties can then compare to figures released by the government on its receipts and expenditures—as discrepancies between the two sources could suggest corruption. The net result of a country-by-country reporting standard is the potential for more of the wealth generated by Afghanistan’s mineral resources to actually reach and benefit the general population.¶ ¶ Transparent management and reporting of Afghanistan’s natural resources would be a win-win situation for all the parties involved. The central government will have more revenue, which can then be spent on development; infrastructure; and proper, timely payment of government employees (including the military and police). The happier, wealthier populous will generate greater legitimacy for political leaders, which contributes to improved government and social stability. Mining companies will, in turn, benefit from a stable and lawful environment in which to operate eventually improving their bottom line. Allied governments—and their people—would then transition from the role of donor to a desperate country into investors in a dynamic and rapidly developing country.¶ ¶ Significant progress was made towards country-by-country reporting this past month when the United States Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The legislation included the Energy Security Through Transparency (ESTT) provision, which requires all companies working in the extractive industries and registered with the SEC (i.e. 90% of all major international companies working in the extractive industries) to disclose all payments made to host governments on an on-going basis. That’s major progress, and it will significantly help curtail corruption in resource-rich countries like Afghanistan. However, it’s not until we report corporate profits on a country-by-country basis, that we’ll achieve full transparency in this crucial sector.

Afghanistan collapse escalates to global nuclear war

**Morgan, 7** (Stephen J., Political Writer and Former Member of the British Labour Party Executive Committee, "Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan21?", 9-23, http://www.freearticlesarchive .com/article/\_Better\_another\_Taliban\_Afghanistanthan\_a\_Taliban\_NUCLEAR\_Pakistan\_/99961/0/)

However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

Exemptions undermine transparency laws – they create a race to the bottom of non-disclosure – our evidence is Africa Specific

Geman, 11 – (Ben Geman, Associated Press Staff Writer for The Hill. March 1, 2011. “It’s George Soros versus Exxon in fight over oil payment disclosures,” http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/146749-its-george-soros-against-exxon-on-oil-payments-disclosure)//SDL

¶ “I believe it is not an exaggeration to say that in promulgating the U.S. regulations for Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank, the Commission will be setting the rules for much of the world. I urge the Commission to fulfill its responsibility in the strongest and clearest manner possible to fulfill the clear intent of the U.S. Congress to make these important financial flows between companies and governments fully transparent to investors and the general public, country by country and project by project.”¶ ¶ The provision in the Wall Street law is aimed at ending the “resource curse” in which some energy- and mineral-rich nations in Africa and elsewhere **are** plagued by high levels of corruption, conflict and poverty.¶ ¶ A suite of energy companies, in comments to the regulators, say they favor disclosure but warn that prescriptive rules would be burdensome and place them at a competitive disadvantage compared to certain state-backed oil companies from countries such as Russia and China.¶ ¶ In addition, Exxon and other companies are pushing the SEC to allow exemptions in cases where host countries or contracts don’t allow project-specific payment disclosures.¶ ¶ “[I]t is essential for the Commission to provide an exemption for disclosure that is prohibited by foreign governments or existing contracts in order to avoid irreparable harm to investors, efficiency, competition and capital formation,” Exxon wrote in late January comments to the SEC.¶ ¶ But Soros is pushing back against the industry push for such exemptions. The SEC asked for input on the question when floating draft rules last year.¶ ¶ “[The Commission should not allow exemptions where the laws of the host country prohibit disclosure. It is precisely in these countries, which prevent transparency and disclosure of information, where the greatest investment risk lies. Such an exemption would create an incentive for countries to create such laws, thereby undermining the purpose and intent of the statute to provide information to investors and promote international transparency,” Soros writes.

Corruption in Africa causes wars and instability – transparency key

**Diamond, 98**  (Larry Diamond, Senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution. January 1998. “Restoring Democracy in Africa,” http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-20301225/restoring-democracy-in-africa )//SDL

¶ The common root cause of economic decay, state collapse, ethnic violence, civil war, and humanitarian disaster in Africa is bad, abusive governance. Because most states lack any semblance of a rule of law and norms of accountability that bind the conduct of those in government, their societies have fallen prey to massive corruption, nepotism, and the personal whims of a tiny ruling elite.¶ ¶ In such circumstances, every political clique and ethnic group struggles for control of a stagnant or diminishing stock of wealth. There are no trust, institutions to facilitate cooperation, or confidence in the future. Every competing faction tries to grab what it can for the moment while excluding other groups.¶ ¶ The only real antidote to this decay is a constitutional framework that facilitates the limitation, separation, devolution, and sharing of power so that each group can have a stake in the system while checking the ruling elite and one another. In essence, this means a democratic political system, to one degree or another.¶ ¶ Given Africa's authoritarian history, many changes in beliefs and institutions will be necessary for democracy to emerge. A growing segment of African elites and the public realizes that every type of dictatorship on the continent has been a disaster. Thus, there is increasing hunger for economic and political freedom and the predictability of a democratic constitution.¶ ¶ As Hoover Institution senior fellow Barry Weingast pointed out in the American Political Science Review, contending that ethnic groups will not trust and tolerate one another and cooperate for a larger national good unless there are credible limits on the state. Democracy can not be stable unless rulers see that it is in their interest to abide by the rules. What makes it in their interest is the overriding commitment of all major ethnic groups, parties, and interest organizations to a constitution.

African instability goes nuclear.

**Deutsch, 02** (Jeffrey, Founder of the Rabid Tigers Project, Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 9, "The Nuclear Family Has Become Over-Extended," November 18, <http://list.webengr.com/pipermail/picoipo/2002-November/000208.html>)

The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.

And there’s no disads to the senate bill

Goldwyn et al 8/4/13

[David Goldwyn, president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, an international energy advisory consultancy, nonresident senior fellow with the Energy Security Initiative at the Brookings Institution. State Department’s special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs from 2009-2011—conceived and developed the Global Shale Gas Initiative and the Energy Governance and Capacity Initiative, led ministerial-level energy dialogues with Angola, Canada, China, India, Iraq, Mexico, Nigeria and Brazil, and co-chaired a regional biofuels initiative with Brazil, AND Neil R. Brown, Senior Advisor, Goldwyn Global Strategies, AND Cory R. Gill, Associate, Goldwyn Global Strategies, “Time to Implement the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement — Congress: Drop the Poison Pill,” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/08/14-us-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbon-goldwyn-brown-gill]

More importantly, the pro-secrecy exemption is not necessary on the merits. First, it has no relevance for activities on the U.S. side of the Gulf. In the U.S., royalties paid for offshore production are public knowledge. Indeed, as part of its efforts to implement the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (),**EITI** the Obama Administration has offered – and industry and civil society welcomed – to unilaterally disclose 100% of payments received by the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) from industry for development of oil and gas concessions. ONRR receipts make up 95% of all U.S. government extractive revenues, including royalties, rents and bonuses.¶ Second, the claim that an anti-transparency exemption is necessary to protect U.S. competitiveness on the Mexican side of the border is without foundation. Some exemption supporters claim it is necessary because Mexico could create a legal framework prohibiting payment disclosure by foreign firms. Yet the transboundary agreement provides for certain information to be kept confidential unless national laws require disclosure. Thus, the U.S. and Mexico have already reached an understanding that national governments should decide whether payments disclosure should be required. As formal negotiations for the TBA began in September 2011, Mexico acceded to this arrangement more than one year after the Cardin-Lugar Amendment became U.S. law. In other words, the TBA protects companies that will be required to disclose payments under existing U.S. law. ¶ Third, while some proponents of the exemption fear U.S. disclosure laws will render PEMEX or the Mexican Government unwilling to cooperate with U.S. firms, that Mexican leaders took the political risks necessary to pass the TBA suggests otherwise. Only a handful of companies have the technology and capital to partner with PEMEX in the deep water area under jurisdiction of the TBA, the reality of which PEMEX leaders are keenly aware as they work to diversify production sources. Within Mexico’s political leadership, it would be antithetical to President Peña Nieto’s push for more transparency and in combating corruption for him to seek less openness in the oil sector, particularly considering that PEMEX itself is not under jurisdiction of Cardin-Lugar disclosure requirements. If anything, U.S. disclosure requirements will benefit the standing of U.S. companies in Mexico by helping overcome the deep distrust they have inherited. ¶ Fourth, the TBA gives the U.S. government a veto in order to protect U.S. interests, including commercial interests. No “unitization” agreement (essentially, a joint venture between PEMEX and private companies) to develop resources under the TBA can enter into force without the Department of Interior’s approval. Therefore, any discrimination against U.S. companies can be guarded against.

## Contention 2 Hegemony

Hegemony is sustainable – but the US must walk carefully – policy choices that endorse multilateral leadership are key

Beckley 2012, Michael Beckley, PHD Columbia, assistant professor of political science at Tufts University specializing in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy, 2012, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited”, PDF, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDkQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Facademiccommons.columbia.edu%2Fcatalog%2Fac%3A146399&ei=I1mZUaOnMMLk0gH9iICoCw&usg=AFQjCNGKp8jw7t-cvRknlrP0qcv6Z7M41w&sig2=EcwCKI0jGPs3NkMrxYYY5g&bvm=bv.46751780,d.dmQ>

The growing consensus in U.S. academic and policymaking circles is that unipolarity is a temporary aberration that soon will be swept away. The most recent National Intelligence Council report, for example, claims that “the international system...will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers” and “will be a global multipolar one.”6 Among academics, “it is widely perceived that the international political system is in flux and that the post-­‐ Cold War era of American preeminence is winding down.”7 Book stores are filled with titles such as The Post-­‐American World, The End of the American Era, When China Rules the World, and Becoming China’s Bitch. And opinion polls show that pluralities of people in most countries believe that China is already the world’s dominant economic power.8 If this conventional wisdom is correct, then the United States faces an extraordinary challenge. The Argument In the pages that follow, I argue that such declinist beliefs are exaggerated and that the alternative perspective more accurately captures the dynamics of the current unipolar era. First, I show that the United States is not in decline. Across most indicators of national power, the United States has maintained, and in some areas increased, its lead over other countries since 1991. Declinists often characterize the expansion of globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens as sufficient conditions for U.S. relative decline. Yet, over the last two decades American economic and military dominance endured while globalization and U.S. hegemony increased significantly. Second, I find that U.S. hegemony is profitable in certain areas. The United States delegates part of the burden of maintaining international security to others while channeling its own resources, and some of its allies resources, into enhancing its own military dominance. It imposes punitive trade measures against others while deterring such measures against its own industries. And it manipulates global technology flows in ways that enhance the technological and military capabilities of itself and allies. Such a privileged position has not provoked significant opposition from other countries. In fact, balancing against the United States has declined steadily since the end of the Cold War. Third, I conclude that globalization benefits the United States more than other countries. Globalization causes innovative activity to concentrate in areas where it is done most efficiently. Because the United States is already wealthy and innovative, it sucks up capital, technology, and people from the rest of the world. Paradoxically, therefore, the diffusion of technology around the globe helps sustain a concentration of technological and military capabilities in the United States. Taken together, these results suggest that unipolarity will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future. The United States may decline because of some unforeseen disaster, bad policies, or from domestic decay. But the two chief features of the current international system – American hegemony and globalization – both reinforce unipolarity. For scholars, this conclusion implies that the study of unipolarity should become a major research agenda, at least on par with the study of power transitions and hegemonic decline. For policymakers, the results of this study suggest that the United States should not retrench from the world, but rather continue to integrate with the world economy and sustain a significant diplomatic and military presence abroad.

Three Internal Links:

The first internal link is oil dependence:

THA eases Middle Eastern oil dependence

Committee on Natural Resources, 13 – (Senate Committee on Natural Resources. June 27, 2013. “House Votes to Approve Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement with Mexico,” http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=340794)//SDL

The bill would open up nearly 1.5 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico that is estimated to contain as much as 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas. This would expand U.S. energy production, create new American jobs, lower energy prices, and generate tens of millions of dollars in new revenue. ¶ The bill would also put into place an important and transparent framework for future implementation of similar transboundary hydrocarbon agreements with other nations.¶ “By passing this Transboundary Agreement, the House has furthered its commitment to create jobs though energy. This legislation implements a first of its kind agreement with the government of Mexico to develop shared resources located between our two countries in the Gulf. The legislation also opens roughly 1.5 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico for production, and would help create American jobs and grow our economy in the process,” said Rep. Jeff Duncan (SC-03). “According to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and the U.S. State Department, these areas are estimated to contain 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas, a considerable amount that will lessen our dependence on Middle Eastern sources of oil. The agreement also prioritizes safety by requiring that all operations in the region conform to U.S. safety standards, and establishes a framework for possible future arrangements with other neighboring countries like Canada. Simply put, this legislation is a win-win for our country, and I am proud that it received strong bipartisan support.” ¶ “These areas in the Gulf of Mexico are ready to be explored and developed and this bill will give U.S. job creators the certainty they need to move forward. Activity can begin once this agreement is enacted,” said Natural Resources Committee Chairman Doc Hastings. “The Natural Resources Committee and Congressman Duncan have worked hard to advance this bill and get it signed into law. It’s important to American energy, American jobs and American energy security. And it is important to supporting a positive relationship with our neighbor to the south, Mexico.”

Oil dependence draws the US into Middle East conflicts and decimates US Hegemony

Josef Braml, editor-in-chief of the Yearbook on International Relations, 2007, The Washington Quarterly 30.4 (2007) 117-130, “Can the United States Shed Its Oil Addiction?”

If the United States continues its overreliance on fossil fuels, it will become increasingly dependent on producing nations that are unstable and that pose a risk to its interests and could come into conflict with other consumer states. [End Page 118] Although the United States can still count on Canada and Mexico, which are its two most important petroleum providers, its tense relationship with Venezuela illustrates the challenges in securing energy resources even in its own backyard, let alone the Middle East and other volatile areas. Some observers of petropolitics go as far as to describe an "axis of oil" (Russia, China, and eventually Iran) at work that is "acting as a counterweight to American hegemony" and will deprive the United States of its oil supplies and strategic interests.6

**Oil wars cause extinction**

**Lendman 07 –** Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (Stephen Lendman, “Resource Wars - Can We Survive Them?,” rense.com, 6-6-7, pg. http://www.rense.com/general76/resrouce.htm)

With the world's energy supplies finite, the US heavily dependent on imports, and "peak oil" near or approaching, **"security" for America means assuring a** sustainable **supply of what we can't do without**. It includes waging wars to get it, protect it, and defend the maritime trade routes over which it travels. **That means** energy's partnered with predatory New World Order globalization, militarism, **wars, ecological recklessness, and** now **a**n extremist **US** administration **willing to risk Armageddon** for world dominance. Central to its plan is first controlling essential resources everywhere, at any cost, starting with oil and where most of it is located in the Middle East and Central Asia. The New "Great Game" and Perils From It The new "Great Game's" begun, but this time the stakes are greater than ever as explained above. The old one lasted nearly 100 years pitting the British empire against Tsarist Russia when the issue wasn't oil. This time, it's the US with help from Israel, Britain, the West, and satellite states like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan challenging Russia and China with today's weapons and technology on both sides making earlier ones look like toys. ***At stake is more than oil. It's planet earth with survival of all life on it*** issue number one twice over. Resources and wars for them means militarism is increasing, peace declining, and the planet's ability to sustain life front and center, if anyone's paying attention. They'd better be because beyond the point of no return, there's no second chance the way Einstein explained after the atom was split. His famous quote on future wars was : "I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones." Under a worst case scenario, it's more dire than that. There may be **nothing left but resilient beetles and bacteria** in the wake of a nuclear holocaust meaning even a new stone age is way in the future, if at all. **The threat is real** and once nearly happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962. We later learned a miracle saved us at the 40th anniversary October, 2002 summit meeting in Havana attended by the US and Russia along with host country Cuba. For the first time, we were told how close we came to nuclear Armageddon. Devastation was avoided only because Soviet submarine captain Vasily Arkhipov countermanded his order to fire nuclear-tipped torpedos when Russian submarines were attacked by US destroyers near Kennedy's "quarantine" line. Had he done it, only our imagination can speculate what might have followed and whether planet earth, or at least a big part of it, would have survived.

Second internal link is US-Mexico relations:

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**Exemptions destroy multilateralism – it ruins US leadership on international transparency norms**

**PWPC, 13 –** (PWYPC, coalition including Revenue Watch Institute, Global Financial Integrity, OxFam America, Global Witness, and Human Rights Watch. June 26, 2013. <http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/TRANSPARENCY%20HR1613%20PWYP%20LETTER%20TO%20HOUSE_26JUNE2013.pdf)//SDL>

¶ ¶ ¶ Cardin-Lugar disclosures will increase transparency in extractive development, fostering stable investment ¶ ¶ and operating environments for U.S. companies, and providing investors with high-quality, consistent ¶ ¶ information to assess companies’ risk exposure in oil, gas and mineral-rich countries. Transparency will also ¶ ¶ increase government accountability in these countries, which is critical to the U.S. foreign policy objective ¶ ¶ of reducing extreme poverty by combating corruption, fraud and waste in resource-rich developing ¶ ¶ countries, to end the so-called “resource-curse.” For this reason, Cardin-Lugar forms part of U.S. energy ¶ ¶ security and multilateral foreign policy, and has the support of the Administration. ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ The U.S. is not alone in this effort. Cardin-Lugar is the foundation of a global standard of extractives ¶ ¶ transparency being adopted by leading capital markets. In early June, the European Union voted to adopt ¶ ¶ equivalent reporting requirements for its 27 member states, Canada committed to adopt similar reporting ¶ ¶ requirements, and the G8 committed to adopt common standards for extractives transparency. In addition, ¶ ¶ the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a voluntary initiative that operates in more than 35 ¶ ¶ countries and is supported the world’s largest oil, gas and mining companies, including Exxon Mobil, ¶ ¶ Chevron, ConocoPhillips, BP, Shell and others, revised its rules in May to ensure its disclosure requirements ¶ ¶ are consistent with Cardin-Lugar and EU rules. ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ The anti-transparency provision in H.R.1613 would therefore contradict this global effort and the interests ¶ ¶ of U.S. investors, while undermining U.S. energy security and foreign policy objectives. The provision reads ¶ ¶ as follows: ¶ ¶ ‘(d) EXEMPTION FROM RESOURCES EXTRACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Actions taken ¶ ¶ by a public company in accordance with any transboundary hydrocarbon agreement shall not ¶ ¶ constitute the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals for purposes of section ¶ ¶ 13(q) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (157U.S.C. 78m(q)).

**Counterplan turns the case – exemptions kill US international leadership**

**PWPC, 13 –** (PWYPC, coalition including Revenue Watch Institute, Global Financial Integrity, OxFam America, Global Witness, and Human Rights Watch. June 26, 2013. <http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/TRANSPARENCY%20HR1613%20PWYP%20LETTER%20TO%20HOUSE_26JUNE2013.pdf)//SDL>

The exemption provision would weaken U.S. global leadership and influence. As mentioned above, Cardin-Lugar laid the foundations for a new global standard for excratives transparency. The EU disclosure rules and commitments on disclosure by Canada and the G8 are based on the precedent set by Cardin-Lugar. The EU rules match the U.S. law and do not allow for exemptions. Providing exemptions in the U.S. – Mexico THA would signal a retreat from transparency, and send a very poor message to our strongest allies. This could erode the faith of our international partners and undermine U.S. leadership. In conclusion, transparency promotes accountability and stability and improves the global business climate for economic growth and investment, which is good for American business and our national security. For these reasons, we urge Congress to keep America’s commitments and stand up for transparency by opposing HR. 1613 in its current form, and opposing inclusion of any version of the anti-transparency language included in any legislation considered or negotiated with the Senate to codify the U.S.-Mexico THA.

Loss of American power projection capacity causes global war.

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

Statistics prove – Collapse of US leadership causes great power war and extinction

Barnett 11 (Thomas P.M., Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” March 7, CMR)

Events in Libya are a further reminder forAmericans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization**, **the U.S. military has been the** greatest force for peace the world has ever known. **Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century**, the **mass murder never would have ended**. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be** no identifiable human civilization left**, once** nuclear weapons **entered the killing equation.**  But **the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war**. **Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-**perpetual great-power peace. **We introduced the international liberal trade order known as** globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. **What resulted was the collapse of empires,** an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP **and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from** state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these **calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a** 99 percent **relative** drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, **we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms**, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

Multilateral hegemony solves great power wars – the alternative is apolarity

Kempe 2012, Frederick Kempe, president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council, a foreign policy think tank and public policy group, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Atlantic Council since December 1, 2006, and is a Visiting Fellow at Oxford University's Saïd Business School, April 18, 2012, “Does America still want to lead the world?”, <http://blogs.reuters.com/thinking-global/2012/04/18/does-america-still-want-to-lead-the-world/>,)

For all their bitter differences, President Obama and Governor Romney share one overwhelming challenge. Whoever is elected will face the growing reality that the greatest risk to global stability over the next 20 years may be the nature of America itself. Nothing – not Iranian or North Korean nuclear weapons, not violent extremists or Mideast instability, not climate change or economic imbalances – will shape the world as profoundly as the ability of the United States to remain an effective and confident world player advocating its traditional global purpose of individual rights and open societies. That was the conclusion of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, a group of experts that was brought together by the World Economic Forum and that I have chaired. Even more intriguing, our group tested our views on, among others, a set of Chinese officials and experts, who worried that we would face a world overwhelmed by chaos if the U.S. – facing resource restraints, leadership fatigue and domestic political dysfunction – disengaged from its global responsibilities. U.S. leadership, with all its shortcomings and missteps, has been the glue and underwriter of global stability since World War Two – more than any other nation. Even with the world experiencing its greatest shift of economic and political power since the 19th century, no other country is emerging – or looks likely to emerge – that would be as prepared or equipped to exercise leadership on behalf of the global good. Yet many in the world are questioning the role of U.S. leadership, the governance architecture it helped create and even the values for which the U.S. stands. Weary from a decade of war and strained financially, Americans themselves are rethinking whether they can afford global purpose. The election campaign is unlikely to shed much light on these issues, yet both candidates face an inescapable truth: How the U.S. evolves over the next 15 to 20 years will be most important single variable (and the greatest uncertainty) hovering over the global future. And the two most important elements that will shape the U.S. course, in the view of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, will be American intentions and the capability to act on them. In short, will Americans continue to see as part of their identity the championing of values such as individual opportunity and open societies that have contributed so richly to the global commons? Second, can the U.S. sufficiently address its domestic challenges to assure its economic, political and societal strength while the world changes at unprecedented velocity? Consider this: It took Great Britain 155 years to double its gross domestic product per capita in the 18th and 19th centuries, when it was the world’s leading power. It took the U.S. 50 years to do the same by 1950, when its population was 152 million. Both India and China have achieved the same growth on a scale and at a pace never experienced before. Both countries have more than a hundred times the population of Britain during its heyday, yet they are achieving similar outcomes in a tenth of the time. Although China will likely surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy by 2030, Americans retain distinct advantages that could allow them to remain the pivotal power. Think of Uncle Sam as a poker player sitting at a global table of cohorts, holding better cards than anyone else: a free and vibrant society, a history of technological innovation, an ability to attract capital and generate jobs, and a relatively young and regenerating population. However, it doesn’t matter how good your cards are if you’re playing them poorly. Put another way, the candidate who wins in November is going to be faced with the reality summed up by the cartoon character Pogo in 1971 as he was trying to make his way through a prickly primeval forest without proper footwear: “We have met the enemy and he is us.” Imagine two very different scenarios for the world, based on how America rises to its challenges. The positive scenario would require whoever is elected in November to be a unifier, someone who can rise above our current squabbles and galvanize not only the U.S. but also the world around a greater understanding of this historic moment. He would address the larger U.S. issues of failing infrastructure, falling educational standards, widening deficits and spiraling healthcare costs. He would partner more effectively with rising powers, and China in particular. And he would recognize and act upon the strategic stake the U.S. has in a politically confident, economically healthy Europe. The doubling of the global middle class by a billion people by 2030 plays into U.S. political and economic strengths, increasing demand for the products and services of information technology where the U.S. excels. Developments that improve the extraction of shale natural gas and oil provide the U.S. and some of its allies disproportionate benefits. Under this positive scenario, the U.S. could log growth rates of 2.7 percent or more each year, compared with 2.5 percent over the past 20 years. Average living standards could rise by 40 percent through 2030, keeping alive the American dream and restoring the global attractiveness of the U.S. model. The negative scenario results from a U.S. that fails to rise to its current challenges. Great powers decline when they fail to address the problems they recognize. U.S. growth could slow to an average of 1.5 percent per year, if that. The knock-on impact on the world economy could be a half-percent per year. The shift in the perception of the U.S. as a descending power would be more pronounced. This sort of United States would be increasingly incapable of leading and disinclined to try. It is an America that would be more likely to be protectionist and less likely to retool global institutions to make them more effective. One can already see hints of what such a world would look like. Middle Eastern diplomats in Washington say the failure of the U.S. to orchestrate a more coherent and generous transatlantic and international response to their region’s upheavals has resulted in a free-for-all for influence that is favoring some of the least enlightened players. Although the U.S. has responded to the euro zone crisis, as a result of its own economic fears, it hasn’t offered a larger vision for the transatlantic future that recognizes its enormous strategic stake in Europe’s future, given global shifts of influence. The U.S. played a dominant role in reconstructing the post-World War Two international order. The question is whether it will do so again or instead contribute to a dangerous global power vacuum that no one over the next two decades is willing or capable of filling.

AND – American involvement is inevitable – decline causes lash out and great power wars

Brzezinski 12 Zbigniew, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, PHD, JAN/FEB, “After America”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>,)

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

## Contention 3 is Drilling

Deepwater oil accident inevitable in the Gulf of Mexico

**Shields, 12 –** (David, independent energy consultant. “QandA: Is Mexico Prepared for Deepwater Drilling in the Gulf?”, Inter-American Dialogue’s Latin American Energy Advisor, 2/20/2012, <http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/20477/Is%20Mexico%20Prepared%20for%20Deepwater%20Drilling%20in%20the%20Gulf.pdf?sequence=1)//SDL>. EJW.)

"They say that if a country does not defend its borders, then others will not respect those borders. ¶ That is probably how we should understand Pemex's decision to drill the Maximino-1 well in ¶ 3,000 meters of water in the Perdido Fold Belt, right next to the shared maritime boundary with ¶ the United States. It is a decision that does not make sense in terms of competitiveness or ¶ production goals. It is about defending the final frontier of national sovereignty and sticking the ¶ Mexican flag on the floor of the Gulf of Mexico to advise U.S. companies that they have no right ¶ to drill for oil in the ultradeep waters on the Mexican side. The recently signed deepwater ¶ agreement obliges both countries to work together and share the spoils of the development of transboundary reservoirs, if they actually exist. For now, Pemex, in line with constitutional ¶ restrictions, is going alone on the Mexican side. Safety is a major concern as Pemex and its ¶ contractors have no experience in such harsh environments. In fact, Pemex has never produced ¶ oil commercially anywhere in deep water. It does not have an insurance policy for worst-case ¶ scenarios nor does it have emergency measures in place to deal with a major spill. It does not ¶ fully abide by existing Mexican regulation of its deepwater activity, which cannot be enforced. ¶ On the U.S. side, prohibition of ultradeepwater drilling, enacted after the Deepwater Horizon ¶ spill, has come and gone. The next disaster is just waiting to happen."

Gulf’s ecosystems on the brink—plan key to solve another accident

**Craig, 11 –** (Robert Kundis Craig, Attorneys’ Title Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs at Florida State University. “Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Match Made in Hell”, Brigham Young University Law Review, 2011, http://lawreview.byu.edu/articles/1326405133\_03craig.fin.pdf)//SDL

These results suggest that we should be very concerned for the ¶ Gulf ecosystems affected by the Macondo well blowout. First, and as ¶ this Article has emphasized throughout, unlike the Exxon Valdez¶ spill, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred at great depth, and the ¶ oil behaved unusually compared to oil released on the surface. ¶ Second, considerably more toxic dispersants were used in connection ¶ with the Gulf oil spill than the Alaska oil spill.164 Third, humans ¶ could intervene almost immediately to begin cleaning the rocky ¶ substrate in Prince William Sound, but human intervention for many ¶ of the important affected Gulf ecosystems, especially the deepwater ¶ ones (but even for shallower coral reefs**),** remains impossible. ¶ Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Prince William Sound ¶ was and remains a far less stressed ecosystem than the Gulf of ¶ Mexico. In 2008, for example, NOAA stated that “[d]espite the ¶ remaining impacts of the [still then] largest oil spill in U.S. history, ¶ Prince William Sound remains a relatively pristine, productive and ¶ biologically rich ecosystem.”165 To be sure, the Sound was not ¶ completely unstressed, and “[w]hen the Exxon Valdez spill occurred ¶ in March 1989, the Prince William Sound ecosystem was also ¶ responding to at least three notable events in its past: an unusually ¶ cold winter in 1988–89; growing populations of reintroduced sea ¶ otters; and a 1964 earthquake.”166 Nevertheless, the Gulf of Mexico ¶ is besieged by environmental stressors at another order of magnitude ¶ (or two), reducing its resilience to disasters like the Deepwater ¶ Horizon oil spill. As the Deepwater Horizon Commission detailed at ¶ length, the Gulf faces an array of long-term threats, from the loss of ¶ protective and productive wetlands along the coast to hurricanes to a ¶ growing “dead zone” (hypoxic zone) to sediment starvation to sealevel rise to damaging channeling to continual (if smaller) oil releases ¶ from the thousands of drilling operations.167 In the face of this ¶ plethora of stressors, even the Commission championed a kind of ¶ resilience thinking, recognizing that responding to the oil spill alone ¶ was not enough. It equated restoration of the Gulf to “restored ¶ resilience,” arguing that it “represents an effort to sustain these diverse, interdependent activities [fisheries, energy, and tourism] and ¶ the environment on which they depend for future generations.”168¶ A number of commentators have catalogued the failure of the ¶ legal and regulatory systems governing the Deepwater Horizon¶ platform and the Macondo well operations.169 The Deepwater ¶ Horizon Commission similarly noted that the Deepwater Horizon’s ¶ “demise signals the conflicted evolution—and severe shortcomings—¶ of federal regulation of offshore oil drilling in the United States.”170¶ In its opinion, “[t]he Deepwater Horizon blowout, explosion, and oil ¶ spill did not have to happen.”171 The Commission’s overall ¶ conclusion was two-fold. First, “[t]he record shows **that** without ¶ effective government oversight, the offshore oil and gas industry will ¶ not adequately reduce the risk of accidents, nor prepare effectively to ¶ respond in emergencies.”172 Second, “government oversight, alone, ¶ cannot reduce those risks to the full extent possible. Government ¶ oversight . . . must be accompanied by the oil and gas industry’s ¶ internal reinvention: sweeping reforms that accomplish no less than a ¶ fundamental transformation of its safety culture.”173

Plan solves shortfalls in Mexico drilling safety resources—solves through straw effect, lack of experience, and uncoordinated spill plans

Philbin, et all ‘12

(“Q and A: Is Mexico Prepared for Deepwater Drilling in the Gulf.” Inter-American Dialogue’s Latin American Energy Advisor. John P. Philbin, director of crisis management at Regester Larkin Energy. John D. Padilla, managing director at IPD Latin America: Alejandra León, associate director for Latin America-downstream oil at IHS Cera. David Shields, independent energy consultant based in Mexico City George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence. 2/20/12. EJW.)

**Pemex is not prepared for risks such as a spill** or other serious accident **that could happen as it ¶ plans to drill** two wells **in ultradeep waters** of the Gulf of Mexico, **said** Juan Carlos Zepeda, the ¶ **head of Mexico's National Hydrocarbons Commission**, in a Feb. 15 interview with The Wall ¶ Street Journal. According to Zepeda, his agency's resources amount to about 2 percent the size of ¶ its U.S. counterpart's budget. Pemex officials, however, say that the company is capable of ¶ carrying out its plans safely. How prepared is Mexico to deal with a serious accident in the Gulf ¶ of Mexico? Is the company sacrificing safety in its bid to improve competitiveness and meet ¶ production goals? ¶ A: John P. Philbin, director of crisis management at Regester Larkin Energy: ¶ "Among the lessons **learned from** the **Deepwater Horizon** incident, two are **fundamental in ¶ determining response preparedness**. First **is the importance of having a consistent national ¶ doctrine at federal, state and local levels**. Significant gaps surfaced during the Macondo blowout ¶ response because the U.S. Coast Guard operated under the United States' National Contingency ¶ Plan (NCP), which uses a top-down approach to manage the response, while state, local and ¶ elected officials operated under the Stafford Act, which is a bottom-up approach. **The second** ¶ fundamental **concern** **is awareness and knowledge** of the doctrine for those with any role in ¶ preparedness and response. Response plans and procedures developed from national doctrine ¶ must account for the complexity that will ensue, involving many jurisdictions and response ¶ elements. Adequate resources and pre-agreed collaboration mechanisms among resource ¶ providers are equally important. Note that the U.S. Coast Guard deployed some 60 boats and 2 ¶ aircraft to assist in Macondo response efforts, along with over 3,000 other boats and 127 ¶ surveillance aircraft and hundreds of individuals involved in the command and control structure. ¶ Mexico's navy, with some 200 ships total, would be severely taxed to respond to an incident, ¶ despite having some doctrine in place to deal with a spill and despite some simulations. The fact ¶ that **the** United States and Mexico signed an **agreement** this week **to collaborate on safety and ¶ response mechanisms in the Gulf of Mexico is a critical step toward safer Gulf operations—for ¶ both Mexico and the U**nited **S**tates." : John D. Padilla, managing director at IPD Latin America: ¶ "The plan at issue is Pemex's intent to drill in the Perdido Foldbelt area, which abuts the U.S.- ¶ Mexico maritime border. Although the bulk of Pemex's offshore infrastructure is located in the ¶ southern Gulf of Mexico (i.e. near Cantarell and Ku-Maloob-Zaap), Perdido represents the ¶ company's most promising near-term commercial crude oil prospect. The 18 other deepwater ¶ wells Pemex has drilled have either been principally natural gas or heavy oil; those that will be ¶ brought online still await commercialization. Complicating the equation, Pemex is saddled with ¶ four latest- generation semisubmersible rigs that cost $500,000 per day. Because the company ¶ has been unable to drill in Perdido's ultra-deepwater, the rigs have been relegated to drilling in ¶ shallower water—work that less sophisticated technology could accomplish. Ongoing concerns ¶ over deepwater drilling in the wake of the Macondo incident, combined with memories of ¶ Pemex's less-than-aggressive response to its 1979 Ixtoc spill, have given authorities on both ¶ sides of the U.S.– Mexico border pause. An archaic constitutional ban that prevents the company ¶ from providing the proper balance of risk-reward incentives, coupled with declining production, ¶ leave Pemex few large-scale, near-term alternatives—other than forging into Perdido on its own. ¶ The accord signed by U.S. and Mexican authorities on Monday offers an elegant way to calm ¶ fears on both sides of the border. Whether joint ventures materialize or not, the accord would ¶ permit joint inspection teams the right to ensure compliance with safety and environmental ¶ laws.Will Mexico's Senate approve the accord?" ¶ A: Alejandra León, associate director for Latin America-downstream oil at IHS Cera: ¶ "**The lack of Pemex's experience in** deep and **ultradeep water operations creates a valid ¶ uncertainty about its capabilities to efficiently handle any** accident or crude **spill** in those types of ¶ operations. However, safe operations do not just depend on Pemex. Service providers play a ¶ critical role. As long as Pemex contracts highly qualified companies to develop deep and ¶ ultradeep water activities and the contracts are clear regarding environmental requirements and ¶ other responsibilities, the risk will be mitigated. In fact, prevention is the very first step in ¶ creating strategies for potential accidents or crude spills. In this sense, the role of the National ¶ Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH) is critical. As a regulator, the CNH has created clear and ¶ strict rules for deepwater operations, aligning Mexican standards to the strictest international ¶ standards. This is a good first step to prevent any serious accident or crude spill. The next ¶ challenge is to ensure that the regulation will be upheld and here the question remains if the ¶ CNH has the sufficient authority and resources to oversee Pemex's operations and guarantee the ¶ rule of law." ¶ A: David Shields, independent energy consultant based in Mexico City: ¶ "They say that if a country does not defend its borders, then others will not respect those borders. ¶ That is probably how we should understand **Pemex's** **decision to drill** the Maximino-1 well in ¶ 3,000 meters of water **in the Perdido** Fold Belt, right **next to the shared maritime boundary** with ¶ the United States. It is a decision that does not make sense in terms of competitiveness or ¶ production goals. It **is about defending** the final frontier of **national sovereignty and** sticking the ¶ Mexican flag on the floor of the Gulf of Mexico **to advise U.S. companies that they have no right ¶ to drill for oil** in the ultradeep waters **on the Mexican side.** **The** recently signed deepwater ¶ **agreement obliges both countries to work together** and share the spoils of the development of Transboundary reservoirs, if they actually exist. For now, Pemex, in line with constitutional ¶ restrictions, is going alone on the Mexican side. Safety is a major concern as **Pemex** and its ¶ contractors **have no experience in such harsh environments**. In fact, **Pemex has never produced ¶ oil commercially anywhere in deep water**. It does not have an insurance policy for worst-case ¶ scenarios nor does it have emergency measures in place to deal with a major spill. It does not ¶ fully abide by existing Mexican regulation of its deepwater activity, which cannot be enforced. ¶ On the U.S. side, prohibition of ultradeepwater drilling, enacted after the Deepwater Horizon ¶ spill, has come and gone. **The next disaster is just waiting to happen."** ¶ A: George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence: ¶ "The serious issues of corporate governance and regulation in the shadow of the Macondo ¶ incident have not yet been addressed in the many post-accident studies that have been released. ¶ On April 20, 2010, a joint BP-Transocean safety audit team boarded the Deepwater Horizon for ¶ an inspection of the safety practices of the crew and the condition of the facilities. The nominal ¶ objective of the inspection was to identify issues and conditions that could result in damage to ¶ lives, facilities and the environment. Within hours after the safety audit team flew off by ¶ helicopter, the Macondo well blew out. How is it that this team of senior safety auditors missed ¶ all the evidence that a catastrophe was unfolding beneath their feet? This is a question on the ¶ level of seriousness as that of the integrity of the cement that failed. The facile answer to the ¶ question is that safety, as a discipline and a concern, is divided into two parts: occupational ¶ safety, dealing with the slips and falls of employees, and process, or industrial, safety, dealing ¶ with conditions that could put the entire crew and facilities at risk. What happened on the ¶ **Deepwater Horizon** is that members of the safety audit team focused their attention on the feelgood issues of occupational safety, chit-chatting with crew members, while they ignored the fact ¶ that a cement bond log had not been run, and that proof of cement integrity was problematic at ¶ best. One measure **to avoid a repetition of this situation** would be to order, **as a matter of ¶ regulation, safety audits of industrial safety and occupational safety to be carried out separately, ¶ by different teams."**

Gulf ecosystems are critical biodiversity hotspots and have a key effect on the world’s oceans

Brenner ‘8

(Jorge Brenner, “Guarding the Gulf of Mexico’s valuable resources”, SciDevNet, <http://www.scidev.net/en/opinions/guarding-the-gulf-of-mexico-s-valuable-resources.html>. 3-14-2008. Jorge Brenner is postdoctoral research associate at the Harte Research Institute for Gulf of Mexico Studies, Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi.¶ EJW.) \*\*The Gulf of Mexico is rich in biodiversity and unique habitats— only known nesting beach of Kemp’s Ridley most threatened sea-turtles and helps the North Atlantic that helps to regulate the climate of western Europe.\*\*

Scientific collaboration on the common resources of the Gulf of Mexico has been difficult since the United States placed an economic embargo on Cuba in 1962. Research is permitted for US scientists who have a special government licence and Mexican scientists are allowed to travel to Cuba, but the political deadlock means that only a few institutions have managed to develop collaborative projects among the three countries. As a result, efforts to conserve the Gulf's valuable species and resources are being thwarted.¶ The economic embargo is widely considered as the main barrier to international marine research and conservation programmes in the Gulf. But, given that the Gulf is enclosed by three countries, an integrated view of governance of common resources should prevail over the political strategies of the individual countries.¶ This common responsibility is often overlooked. We have abused the region's ecological resources in treating them as a source of wealth while failing to share responsibility for their conservation. In my opinion, this misunderstanding of the concept of the commons — owned by everyone and no one — has probably caused more damage than the economic embargo imposed on almost self-sufficient Cuba.¶ Rich in biodiversity and habitats¶ **The Gulf of Mexico is rich in biodiversity and unique habitats, and hosts the only known** **nesting** beach **of** Kemp's Ridley, the **world's most endangered sea turtle**.¶ **The Gulf's circulation pattern gives it biological and socioeconomic importanc**e: **water** from the Caribbean enters from the south through the Yucatan Channel between Cuba and Mexico and, after warming in the basin, leaves through the northern Florida Strait between the United States and Cuba to **form the Gulf Stream in the North Atlantic that helps to regulate the climate of western Europe.¶**

Ocean biodiversity loss causes extinction

Craig 03

(Robin Kundis Craig, Associate Professor of Law at the Indiana University School of Law, 2003, “Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection? Fishing and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1289250>)

Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. n856 Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. n857 More generally, "ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." n858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." n859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. [\*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that **many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system.** n860 Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with us. The Black Sea is almost dead, n863 its once-complex and productive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, "starving out fish and dolphins, emptying fishermen's nets, and converting the web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs of jelly." n864 More importantly, the Black Sea is not necessarily unique.

# 2AC

## Dodd Frank

## Heg

## Drilling

1. Resilience theory is deadwrong—studies prove

Wall ’11—

(Tim Wall is a contributor to *Discovery News.* “Lack of Spare Species Leave Ecosystems Flat.” *Discovery News.*  <http://news.discovery.com/earth/global-warming/lack-of-spare-species-leaves-ecosystems-flat.htm>. Jessica Whiteside is an Assistant Professor in Geological Sciences at Brown University. She has a BA from Mt. Holyoke College, an MA and a M. Phil in Earth and Environmental Sciences from Columbia University. She has a PhD from Columbia University from the Lamont Doherty Earth Observatory. 1/11/11. EJW.)

Having back-up plans and built-in redundancy features can save lives, whether it’s emergency flares in the trunk of the car or warning lights and alarms in the cockpit of an airplane. **For Earth, failures in redundancy can lead to catastrophe.**¶ In nature, **multiple species compete for the same resources,** something called [**ecological redundancy**](http://www.ecology.info/article.aspx?cid=10&id=68)**.** For example, several species of sharks may feed on the same prey fish. If one species disappeared, the other sharks would take up the slack on chowing down on the extra fish – keeping the system in balance. **But if multiple species** of shark **go extinct**, a situation that is currently playing out, **the system can veer toward collapse.¶** For the first time **researchers** **have made a direct connection between loss of redundancy and ecosystem collapse**. Their work, published recently in the journal Geology, shows that **during extinction events in the** [**Permian**](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Permian_period.aspx) **and** [**Triassic**](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Triassic_period.aspx) **periods, the Earth’s ancient oceans lost critical back-up species.¶ The research holds a dire warning** about humans activitiesin the oceansand points out **the importance of preserving whole ecosystems, not just individual species.¶** “It’s definitely a cautionary tale because we know it’s happened at least twice before,” **said** Jessica **Whiteside of Brown University**, the paper’s lead author in a [**press release**](http://news.brown.edu/pressreleases/2011/01/extinction). “And you have long periods of time before you have **reestablishment of ecological redundancy**.” In these cases, it **took 10 million years for nature to balance itself out again**, the team reported.¶ Many marine biologists worry that fisheries worldwide are in collapse. Overfishing of predatory species, like bluefin tuna, sharks, and swordfish has eliminated, not just competing species, but entire levels of the food chain.¶“It is difficult to evaluate what is going on at present, given that we don’t have the advantage of the long lens of geologic history, where we can see things play out over millions of years,” Whiteside wrote in an email to Discovery News. “But there is evidence that trophic (i.e. food-web) collapse is starting to occur in some marine ecosystems.”¶ One example of ecosystem collapse in the modern world can be seen off the coast of North Carolina, Whiteside said. The disappearance of the [**blacktip shark**](http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sharks/FS_blacktipshark.htm) allowed the [**cownose ray**](http://www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/gallery/descript/cownoseray/cownoseray.html)population to explode. This event, called a trophic cascade, collapsed the area’s century-old [**bay scallop**](http://www.nwrc.usgs.gov/wdb/pub/species_profiles/82_11-012.pdf) industry.¶ Similar situations occurred 250 and 200 million years ago. Predators similar to the modern day[**nautilus**](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/nautilus.aspx), called [**ammonites**](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/ammonite.aspx), were once common and diverse. But many species went extinct after[**massive volcanic eruptions**](http://dsc.discovery.com/convergence/supervolcano/others/others_07.html) in the Permian and Triassic caused devastation and atmospheric disruption. The resulting climate change reduced ammonites to only a few species.¶ **The result was a simplified food chain.** A few hardy species survived the extinctions and became common. Generalist species expanded and filled wide ranges of the food web, as opposed to locally adapted species filling specific niches. Other **research has suggested that homogeneous populations of generalist species** can actually **slow the divergence of new species and subsequently the ecosystem’s recovery**.¶ After the ancient extinctions, biodiversity and robust ecosystems slowly re-emerged. To understand this re-emergence, the ammonite researchers analyzed carbon isotopes in the fossils. The scientists were then able to measure the stability of the carbon cycle in the ancient oceans.¶ Disruptions, like the volcanic events of the Permian and Triassic, caused species numbers to plummet. After disturbances, it took up to 10 million years for fluctuations to settle down and a stable pattern to develop. Highest species diversities of ammonites were found when the carbon isotope values were stable.¶ “The take home message is that **biodiversity matters**,” Whiteside told Discovery News. Not just because it’s nice to look at a bunch of species, she said, but because **ecosystem functioning is reduced by biodiversity loss.**

## Cap K

Cap is inevitable – alt causes transition wars

Aligica ‘03(Paul Aligica, Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and Adjunct Fellow at the Hudson Institute, “The Great Transition and the Social Limits to Growth: Herman Kahn on Social Change and Global Economic Development”, April 21, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication\_details&id=2827)

Stopping things would mean if not to engage in an experiment to change the human nature, at least in an equally difficult experiment in altering powerful cultural forces: "We firmly believe that despite the arguments put forward by people who would like to 'stop the earth and get off,' it is simply impractical to do so. Propensity to change may not be inherent in human nature, but it is firmly embedded in most contemporary cultures. People have almost everywhere become curious, future oriented, and dissatisfied with their conditions. They want more material goods and covet higher status and greater control of nature. Despite much propaganda to the contrary, they believe in progress and future" (Kahn, 1976, 164). As regarding the critics of growth that stressed the issue of the gap between rich and poor countries and the issue of redistribution, Kahn noted that what most people everywhere want was visible, rapid improvement in their economic status and living standards, and not a closing of the gap (Kahn, 1976, 165). The people from poor countries have as a basic goal the transition from poor to middle class. The other implications of social change are secondary for them. Thus a crucial factor to be taken into account is that while the zero-growth advocates and their followers may be satisfied to stop at the present point, most others are not. Any serious attempt to frustrate these expectations or desires of that majority is likely to fail and/or create disastrous counter reactions. Kahn was convinced that "any concerted attempt to stop or even slow 'progress' appreciably (that is, to be satisfied with the moment) is catastrophe-prone". At the minimum, "it would probably require the creation of extraordinarily repressive governments or movements-and probably a repressive international system" (Kahn, 1976, 165; 1979, 140-153). The pressures of overpopulation, national security challenges and poverty as well as the revolution of rising expectations could be solved only in a continuing growth environment. Kahn rejected the idea that continuous growth would generate political repression and absolute poverty. On the contrary, it is the limits-to-growth position "which creates low morale, destroys assurance, undermines the legitimacy of governments everywhere, erodes personal and group commitment to constructive activities and encourages obstructiveness to reasonable policies and hopes". Hence this position "increases enormously the costs of creating the resources needed for expansion, makes more likely misleading debate and misformulation of the issues, and make less likely constructive and creative lives". Ultimately "it is precisely this position the one that increases the potential for the kinds of disasters which most at its advocates are trying to avoid" (Kahn, 1976, 210; 1984).

We win on methodology –– rejection is extinction

Ronald H. Nash, PhD, 2005, "Why the Left is Not Right - The Religious Left -Who they Are and What They Believe", <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352736/posts>

Capitalism is not economic anarchy. When properly defined, it recognizes several necessary conditions for the kinds of voluntary relationships it supports. One of these is the existence of inherent human rights, such as the right to make decisions, the right to be free, the right to hold property, and the right to exchange peacefully what one owns for something else. Capitalism also presupposes a system of morality. Under capitalism, there are definite limits, moral and otherwise, to the ways in which people can exchange. Capitalism should be viewed as a system of voluntary relationships within a framework of laws that protect people’s rights against force, fraud, theft, and violations of contracts. “Thou shalt not steal” and “Thou shalt not lie” are part of the underlying moral constraints of the system. After all, economic exchanges can hardly be voluntary if one participant is coerced, deceived, defrauded, or robbed. Deviations from the market ideal usually occur because of defects in human nature. Human beings naturally crave security and guaranteed success, values not found readily in a free market. Genuine competition always carries with it the possibility of failure and loss. Consequently, the human desire for security leads people to avoid competition whenever possible, encourages them to operate outside the market, and induces them to subvert the market process through behavior that is often questionable and dishonest. This quest for guaranteed success often leads people to seek special favors from powerful members of government through such means as regulations and restrictions on free exchange. One of the more effective ways of mitigating the effects of human sin in society is dispersing and decentralizing power. The combination of a free market economy and limited constitutional government is the most effective means yet devised to impede the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of a small number of people. The Religious Left should be aware that their opposition to amassing wealth and power is far more likely to bear fruit with a conservative understanding of economics and government than with the big-government approach of political liberalism. Every person’s ultimate protection against coercion requires control over some private spheres of life where he or she can be free. Private ownership of property is an important buffer against the exorbitant consolidation of power by government. Liberal critics also contend that capitalism encourages the development of monopolies. The real source of monopolies, however, is not the free market but governmental intervention with the market. The only monopolies that have ever attained lasting immunity from competition did so by governmental fiat, regulation, or support of some other kind. Governments create monopolies by granting one organization the exclusive privilege of doing business or by establishing de facto monopolies through regulatory agencies whose alleged purpose is the enforcement of competition but whose real effect is the limitation of competition. Economic interventionism and socialism are the real sources of monopolies. This is illustrated, for example, in the success of the American robber barons of the nineteenth century. Without government aid such as subsidies, the robber barons would never have succeeded. Liberals blame capitalism for every evil in contemporary society, including its greed, materialism, selfishness, the prevalence of fraudulent behavior, the debasement of society’s tastes, the pollution of the environment, the alienation and despair within society, and vast disparities of wealth. Even racism and sexism are treated as effects of capitalism. Many of the objections to a market system result from a simple but fallacious two-step operation. First, some undesirable feature is noted in a society that is allegedly capitalistic; then it is simply asserted that capitalism is the cause of this problem. Logic texts call this the Fallacy of False Cause. Mere coincidence does not prove causal connection. Moreover, this belief ignores the fact that these same features exist in interventionist and socialist societies. The Issue of Greed Liberal critics of capitalism often attack it for encouraging greed. The truth, however, is that the mechanism of the market actually neutralizes greed as it forces people to find ways of serving the needs of those with whom they wish to exchange. As long as our rights are protected (a basic precondition of market exchanges), the greed of others cannot harm us. As long as greedy people are prohibited from introducing force, fraud, and theft into the exchange process and as long as these persons cannot secure special privileges from the state under interventionist or socialist arrangements, their greed must be channeled into the discovery of products or services for which people are willing to trade. Every person in a market economy has to be other-directed. The market is one area of life where concern for the other person is required. The market, therefore, does not pander to greed. Rather, it is a mechanism that allows natural human desires to be satisfied in nonviolent ways. Does Capitalism Exploit People? Capitalism is also attacked on the ground that it leads to situations in which some people (the “exploiters”) win at the expense of other people (the “losers”). A fancier way to put this is to say that market exchanges are examples of what is called a zero-sum game, namely, an exchange where only one participant can win. If one person (or group) wins, then the other must lose. Baseball and basketball are two examples of zero-sum games. If A wins, then B must lose. The error here consists in thinking that market exchanges are a zero-sum game. On the contrary, market exchanges illustrate what is called a positive-sum game, that is, one in which both players may win. We must reject the myth that economic exchanges necessarily benefit only one party at the expense of the other. In voluntary economic exchanges, both parties may leave the exchange in better economic shape than would otherwise have been the case. To repeat the message of the peaceful means of exchange, “If you do something good for me, then I will do something good for you.” If both parties did not believe they gained through the trade, if each did not see the exchange as beneficial, they would not continue to take part in it. Most religious critics of capitalism focus their attacks on what they take to be its moral shortcomings. In truth, the moral objections to capitalism turn out to be a sorry collection of claims that reflect, more than anything else, serious confusions about the real nature of a market system. When capitalism is put to the moral test, it beats its competition easily. Among all of our economic options, Arthur Shenfield writes: "Only capitalism operates on the basis of respect for free, independent, responsible persons. All other systems in varying degrees treat men as less than this. Socialist systems above all treat men as pawns to be moved about by the authorities, or as children to be given what the rulers decide is good for them, or as serfs or slaves. The rulers begin by boasting about their compassion, which in any case is fraudulent, but after a time they drop this pretense which they find unnecessary for the maintenance of power. In all things they act on the presumption that they know best. Therefore they and their systems are morally stunted. Only the free system, the much assailed capitalism, is morally mature." The alternative to free exchange is coercion and violence. Capitalism is a mechanism that allows natural human desires to be satisfied in a nonviolent way. Little can be done to prevent people from wanting to be rich, Shenfield says. That’s the way things often are in a fallen world. But what capitalism does is channel that desire into peaceful means that benefit many besides those who wish to improve their own situation in life. “The alternative to serving other men’s wants,” Shenfield concludes, “is seizing power of them, as it always has been. Hence it is not surprising that wherever the enemies of capitalism have prevailed, the result has been not only the debasement of consumption standards for the masses but also their reduction to serfdom by the new privileged class of Socialist rulers.” Once people realize that few things in life are free, that most things carry a price tag, and that therefore we have to work for most of the things we want, we are in a position to learn a vital truth about life. Capitalism helps teach this truth. But under socialism, Arthur Shefield warns, “Everything still has a cost, but everyone is tempted, even urged to behave as if there is no cost or as if the cost will be borne by somebody else. This is one of the most corrosive effects of collectivism upon the moral character of people.” And so, we see, capitalism is not merely the more effective economic system; it is also morally superior. When capitalism, the system of free economic exchange, is described fairly, it comes closer to matching the demands of the biblical ethic than does either socialism or interventionism.

**AND we should adopt a util framework – Zizek’s mentality is violent because it makes actors irresponsible for the utilitarian impacts of their actions.**

**Kirsch, 8** – senior editor of The New Republic (Adam, The New Republic, “The Deadly Jester,” http://www.tnr.com/story\_print.html?id=097a31f3-c440-4b10-8894-14197d7a6eef)

This sacerdotal notion of intellectual authority makesboth thinkers essentially hostile to democracy, which holds that the truth is available in principle to everyone, and that every individual must be allowed to speak for himself. Zizek, too, sees the similarity--or, as he says, "the profound solidarity"--between his favorite philosophical traditions. "Their structure," he acknowledges, "is inherently 'authoritarian': since Marx and Freud opened up a new theoretical field which sets the very criteria of veracity, their words cannot be put to the test the same way one is allowed to question the statements of their followers." Note that the term "authoritarian" is not used here pejoratively. For Zizek, it is precisely this authoritarianism that makes these perspectives appealing.Their "engaged notion of truth" makes for "struggling theories, not only theories about struggle**."**

But to know what is worth struggling for, you need theories about struggle**.** Only if you have already accepted the terms of the struggle--in Zizek's case, the class struggle--can you move on to the struggling theory that teaches you how to fight. In this sense, Zizek the dialectician is at bottom entirely undialectical. That liberalismis evil and that communism is good is not his conclusion, it is his premise; and the contortions of his thought, especially in his most political books, result from the need to reconcile that premise with a reality that seems abundantly to indicate the opposite. Hence the necessity of the Matrix, or something like it, for Zizek's worldview. And hence his approval of anything that unplugs us from the Matrix and returns us to the desert of the real--for instance, the horrors of September 11**.** One of the ambiguities of Zizek's recent work lies in his attitude toward the kind of Islamic fundamentalists who perpetrated the attacks. On the one hand, they are clearly reactionary in their religious dogmatism; on the other hand, they have been far more effective than the Zapatistas or the Porto Alegre movement in discomfiting American capitalism. As Zizek observes, "while they pursue what appear to us to be evil goals with evil means, the very form of their activity meets the highest standard of the good." Yes, the good: Mohammed Atta and his comrades exemplified "good as the spirit of and actual readiness for sacrifice in the name of some higher cause." Zizek's dialectic allows him to have it all: the jihadis are not really motivated by religion, as they say they are; they are actually casualties of global capitalism, and thus "objectively" on the left. **"**The only way to conceive of what happened on September 11," he writes, "is to locate it in the context of the antagonisms of global capitalism."

All lives are infinitely valuable, the only ethical option is to maximize the number saved

Cummisky 96 (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)

Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way—this point still does not justify deontologieal constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that 1 may still saw two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hills example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one. Then 1 cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one**. But** Similarly, **the loss of the two is not outweighed by** the **one** that was **not destroyed**. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up. How is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the lass of the one, each is priceless: thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing'letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.\*

No impact—Growth empirically shields the environment – multiple reasons –wealth, democracy, tech development, trade

Norberg 3 Johan Norberg, MA in History Fellow at Timbro, MA with a focus in economics and philosophy, In Defense of Global Capitalism, p. 225-237

All over the world, economic progress and growth are moving hand in hand with intensified environmental protection. Four researchers who studied these connections found “a very strong, positive association between our [environmental] indicators and the level of economic development.” A country that is very poor is too preoccupied with lifting itself out of poverty to bother about the environment at all. Countries usually begin protecting their natural resources when they can afford to do so. When they grow richer, they start to regulate effluent emissions, and when they have still more resources they also begin regulating air quality. 19 A number of factors cause environment protection to increase with wealth and development. Environmental quality is unlikely to be a top priority for people who barely know where their next meal is coming from. Abating misery and subduing the pangs of hunger takes precedence over conservation. When our standard of living rises we start attaching importance to the environment and obtaining resources to improve it. Such was the case earlier in western Europe, and so it is in the developing countries today. Progress of this kind, however, requires that people live in democracies where they are able and allowed to mobilize opinion; otherwise, their preferences will have no impact. Environmental destruction is worst in dictatorships. But it is the fact of prosperity no less than a sense of responsibility that makes environmental protection easier in a wealthy society. A wealthier country can afford to tackle environmental problems; it can develop environmentally friendly technologies—wastewater and exhaust emission control, for example—and begin to rectify past mistakes. Global environmental development resembles not so much a race for the bottom as a race to the top, what we might call a “California effect.” The state of California's Clean Air Acts, first introduced in the 1970s and tightened since, were stringent emissions regulations that made rigorous demands on car manufacturers. Many prophets of doom predicted that firms and factories would move to other states, and California would soon be obliged to repeal its regulations. But instead the opposite happened: other states gradually tightened up their environmental stipulations. Because car companies needed the wealthy California market, manufacturers all over the United States were forced to develop new techniques for reducing emissions. Having done so, they could more easily comply with the exacting requirements of other states, whereupon those states again ratcheted up their requirements. Anti-globalists usually claim that the profit motive and free trade together cause businesses to entrap politicians in a race for the bottom. The California effect implies the opposite: free trade enables politicians to pull profit-hungry corporations along with them in a race to the top. This phenomenon occurs because compliance with environmental rules accounts for a very small proportion of most companies' expenditures. What firms are primarily after is a good business environment—a liberal economy and a skilled workforce— not a bad natural environment. A review of research in this field shows that there are no clear indications of national environmental rules leading to a diminution of exports or to fewer companies locating in the countries that pass the rules. 20 This finding undermines both the arguments put forward by companies against environmental regulations and those advanced by environmentalists maintaining that globalization has to be restrained for environmental reasons. Incipient signs of the California effect's race to the top are present all over the world, because globalization has caused different countries to absorb new techniques more rapidly, and the new techniques are generally far gentler on the environment. Researchers have investigated steel manufacturing in 50 different countries and concluded that countries with more open economies took the lead in introducing cleaner technology. Production in those countries generated almost 20 percent less emissions than the same production in closed countries. This process is being driven by multinational corporations because they have a lot to gain from uniform production with uniform technology. Because they are restructured more rapidly, they have more modern machinery. And they prefer assimilating the latest, most environmentally friendly technology immediately to retrofitting it, at great expense, when environmental regulations are tightened up. Brazil, Mexico, and China—the three biggest recipients of foreign investment—have followed a very clear pattern: the more investments they get, the better control they gain over air pollution. The worst forms of air pollution have diminished in their cities during the period of globalization. When Western companies start up in developing countries, their production is considerably more environment-friendly than the native production, and they are more willing to comply with environmental legislation, not least because they have brand images and reputations to protect. Only 30 percent of Indonesian companies comply with the country's environmental regulations, whereas no fewer than 80 percent of the multinationals do so. One out of every 10 foreign companies maintained a standard clearly superior to that of the regulations. This development would go faster if economies were more open and, in particular, if the governments of the world were to phase out the incomprehensible tariffs on environmentally friendly technology. 21 Sometimes one hears it said that, for environmental reasons, the poor countries of the South must not be allowed to grow as affluent as our countries in the North. For example, in a compilation of essays on Environmentally Significant Consumption published by the National Academy of Sciences, we find anthropologist Richard Wilk fretting that: If everyone develops a desire for the Western high-consumption lifestyle, the relentless growth in consumption, energy use, waste, and emissions may be disastrous. 22 But studies show this to be colossal misapprehension. On the contrary, it is in the developing countries that we find the gravest, most harmful environmental problems. In our affluent part of the world, more and more people are mindful of environmental problems such as endangered green areas. Every day in the developing countries, more than 6,000 people die from air pollution when using wood, dung, and agricultural waste in their homes as heating and cooking fuel. UNDP estimates that no fewer than 2.2 million people die every year from polluted indoor air. This result is already “disastrous” and far more destructive than atmospheric pollution and industrial emissions. Tying people down to that level of development means condemning millions to premature death every year. It is not true that pollution in the modern sense increases with growth. Instead, pollution follows an inverted U-curve. When growth in a very poor country gathers speed and the chimneys begin belching smoke, the environment suffers. But when prosperity has risen high enough, the environmental indicators show an improvement instead: emissions are reduced, and air and water show progressively lower concentrations of pollutants. The cities with the worst problems are not Stockholm, New York, and Zürich, but rather Beijing, Mexico City, and New Delhi. In addition to the factors already mentioned, this is also due to the economic structure changing from raw-material-intensive to knowledge-intensive production. In a modern economy, heavy, dirty industry is to a great extent superseded by service enterprises. Banks, consulting firms, and information technology corporations do not have the same environmental impact as old factories. According to one survey of available environmental data, the turning point generally comes before a country's per capita GDP has reached $8,000. At $10,000, the researchers found a positive connection between increased growth and better air and water quality. 23 That is roughly the level of prosperity of Argentina, South Korea, or Slovenia. In the United States, per capita GDP is about $36,300. Here as well, the environment has consistently improved since the 1970s, quite contrary to the picture one gets from the media. In the 1970s there was constant reference to smog in American cities, and rightly so: the air was judged to be unhealthy for 100–300 days a year. Today it is unhealthy for fewer than 10 days a year, with the exception of Los Angeles. There, the figure is roughly 80 days, but even that represents a 50 percent reduction in 10 years. 24 The same trend is noticeable in the rest of the affluent world—for example, in Tokyo, where, a few decades ago, doomsayers believed that oxygen masks would in the future have to be worn all around the city because of the bad air. Apart from its other positive effects on the developing countries, such as ameliorating hunger and sparing people the horror of watching their children die, prosperity beyond a certain critical point can improve the environment. What is more, this turning point is now occurring progressively earlier in the developing countries, because they can learn from more affluent countries' mistakes and use their superior technology. For example, air quality in the enormous cities of China, which are the most heavily polluted in the world, has steadied since the mid-1980s and in several cases has slowly improved. This improvement has coincided with uniquely rapid growth. Some years ago, the Danish statistician and Greenpeace member Bjørn Lomborg, with about 10 of his students, compiled statistics and facts about the world's environmental problems. To his astonishment, he found that what he himself had regarded as self-evident, the steady deterioration of the global environment, did not agree at all with official empirical data. He found instead that air pollution is diminishing, refuse problems are diminishing, resources are not running out, more people are eating their fill, and people are living longer. Lomborg gathered publicly available data from as many fields as he could find and published them in the book The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World. The picture that emerges there is an important corrective to the general prophesies of doom that can so easily be imbibed from newspaper headlines. Lomborg shows that air pollution and emissions have been declining in the developed world during recent decades. Heavy metal emissions have been heavily reduced; nitrogen oxides have diminished by almost 30 percent and sulfur emissions by about 80 percent. Pollution and emission problems are still growing in the poor developing countries, but at every level of growth annual particle density has diminished by 2 percent in only 14 years. In the developed world, phosphorus emissions into the seas have declined drastically, and E. coli bacteria concentrations in coastal waters have plummeted, enabling closed swimming areas to reopen. Lomborg shows that, instead of large-scale deforestation, the world's forest acreage increased from 40.24 million to 43.04 million square kilometers between 1950 and 1994. He finds that there has never been any large-scale tree death caused by acid rain. The oft-quoted, but erroneous statement about 40,000 species going extinct every year is traced by Lomborg to its source—a 20-year-old estimate that has been circulating in environmentalist circles ever since. Lomborg thinks it is closer to 1,500 species a year, and possibly a bit more than that. The documented cases of extinction during the past 400 years total just over a thousand species, of which about 95 percent are insects, bacteria, and viruses. As for the problem of garbage, the next hundred years worth of Danish refuse could be accommodated in a 33-meter-deep pit with an area of three square kilometers, even without recycling. In addition, Lomborg illustrates how increased prosperity and improved technology can solve the problems that lie ahead of us. All the fresh water consumed in the world today could be produced by a single desalination plant, powered by solar cells and occupying 0.4 percent of the Sahara Desert. It is a mistake, then, to believe that growth automatically ruins the environment. And claims that we would need this or that number of planets for the whole world to attain a Western standard of consumption—those “ecological footprint” calculations—are equally untruthful. Such a claim is usually made by environmentalists, and it is concerned, not so much with emissions and pollution, as with resources running out if everyone were to live as we do in the affluent world. Clearly, certain of the raw materials we use today, in presentday quantities, would not suffice for the whole world if everyone consumed the same things. But that information is just about as interesting as if a prosperous Stone Age man were to say that, if everyone attained his level of consumption, there would not be enough stone, salt, and furs to go around. Raw material consumption is not static. With more and more people achieving a high level of prosperity, we start looking for ways of using other raw materials. Humanity is constantly improving technology so as to get at raw materials that were previously inaccessible, and we are attaining a level of prosperity that makes this possible. New innovations make it possible for old raw materials to be put to better use and for garbage to be turned into new raw materials.

Cap is ethical and prevents violence

**Rockwell** Jr., president of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 5/19/**2008**

(Llewellyn, “Everything You Love You Owe to Capitalism,” http://mises.org/story/2982)

And yet, sitting on the other side of the table are well-educated people who imagine that the way to end the world's woes is through socialism. Now, people's definitions of socialism differ, and these persons would probably be quick to say that they do not mean the Soviet Union or anything like that. That was socialism in name only, I would be told. And yet, if socialism does mean anything at all today, it imagines that there can be some social improvement resulting from the political movement to take capital out of private hands and put it into the hands of the state. Other tendencies of socialism include the desire to see labor organized along class lines and given some sort of coercive power over how their employers' property is used. It might be as simple as the desire to put a cap on the salaries of CEOs, or it could be as extreme as the desire to abolish all private property, money, and even marriage. Whatever the specifics of the case in question, socialism always means overriding the free decisions of individuals and replacing that capacity for decision making with an overarching plan by the state. Taken far enough, this mode of thought won't just spell an end to opulent lunches. It will mean the end of what we all know as civilization itself. It would plunge us back to a primitive state of existence, living off hunting and gathering in a world with little art, music, leisure, or charity. Nor is any form of socialism capable of providing for the needs of the world's six billion people, so the population would shrink dramatically and quickly and in a manner that would make every human horror ever known seem mild by comparison. Nor is it possible to divorce socialism from totalitarianism, because if you are serious about ending private ownership of the means of production, you have to be serious about ending freedom and creativity too. You will have to make the whole of society, or what is left of it, into a prison. In short, the wish for socialism is a wish for unparalleled human evil. If we really understood this, no one would express casual support for it in polite company. It would be like saying, you know, there is really something to be said for malaria and typhoid and dropping atom bombs on millions of innocents.

Alt causes more capitalism

Mead, 9 – Senior Fellow @ the Council on Foreign Relations

Walter Russell, <http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2>)

And yet, this relentless series of crises has not disrupted the rise of a global capitalist system, centered first on the power of the United Kingdom and then, since World War II, on the power of the United States. After more than 300 years, it seems reasonable to conclude that financial and economic crises do not, by themselves, threaten either the international capitalist system or the special role within it of leading capitalist powers like the United Kingdom and the United States. If anything, the opposite seems true--that financial crises in some way sustain Anglophone power and capitalist development. Indeed, many critics of both capitalism and the "Anglo-Saxons" who practice it so aggressively have pointed to what seems to be a perverse relationship between such crises and the consolidation of the "core" capitalist economies against the impoverished periphery. Marx noted that financial crises remorselessly crushed weaker companies, allowing the most successful and ruthless capitalists to cement their domination of the system. For dependency theorists like Raul Prebisch, crises served a similar function in the international system, helping stronger countries marginalize and impoverish developing ones. Setting aside the flaws in both these overarching theories of capitalism, this analysis of economic crises is fundamentally sound--and especially relevant to the current meltdown. Cataloguing the early losses from the financial crisis, it's hard not to conclude that the central capitalist nations will weather the storm far better than those not so central. Emerging markets have been hit harder by the financial crisis than developed ones as investors around the world seek the safe haven provided by U.S. Treasury bills, and commodity-producing economies have suffered extraordinary shocks as commodity prices crashed from their record, boom-time highs. Countries like Russia, Venezuela, and Iran, which hoped to use oil revenue to mount a serious political challenge to American power and the existing world order, face serious new constraints. Vladimir Putin, Hugo Chavez, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad must now spend less time planning big international moves and think a little bit harder about domestic stability. Far from being the last nail in America's coffin, the financial crisis may actually resuscitate U.S. power relative to its rivals.

AND - cap is vital to preventing extinction – disease, poverty, and V2L

**Rockwell ’02** (Llewellyn H., President of the Mises Institute, The Free Market, “Why They Attack Capitalism”, Volume 20, Number 10, October, http://www.mises.org/freemarket\_detail.asp?control=418&sortorder-articledate)

If you think about it, this hysteria is astonishing, even terrifying. The market economy has created unfathomable prosperity and, decade by decade, for centuries and centuries, miraculous feats of innovation, production, distribution, and social coordination. To the free market, we owe all material prosperity, all our leisure time, our health and longevity, our huge and growing population, nearly everything we call life itself. Capitalism and capitalism alone has rescued the human race from degrading poverty, rampant sickness, and early death. In the absence of the capitalist economy, and all its underlying institutions, the world’s population would, over time, shrink to a fraction of its current size, in a holocaust of unimaginable scale, and whatever remained of the human race would be systematically reduced to subsistence, eating only what can be hunted or gathered. And this is only to mention its economic benefits. Capitalism is also **an expression of freedom**. It is not so much a social system but the de facto result in a society where individual rights are respected, where businesses, families, and every form of association are permitted to flourish in the absence of coercion, theft, war, and aggression. Capitalism protects the weak against the strong, granting choice and opportunity to the masses who once had no choice but to live in a state of dependency on the politically connected and their enforcers. The high value placed on women, children, the disabled, and the aged— unknown in the ancient world—owes so much to capitalism’s productivity and distribution of power. Must we compare the record of capitalism with that of the state, which, looking at the sweep of this past century alone, has killed hundreds of millions of people in wars, famines, camps, and deliberate starvation campaigns? And the record of central planning of the type now being urged on American enterprise is perfectly abysmal.

Threat construction is good – it allows us to anticipate and prevent danger

Joseph **Berke**, Found. And Dir. Arbours Crisis Centre, **1998,** Even Paranoids Have Enemies, p. 5-6

Internal and external persecution come together in the theoretical model of ‘the paranoid process’ – a set of developmental and defensive mechanisms which serve to delineate the individual’s inner psychic world and his experience of his emerging self, while, at the same time, contributing to the shaping of his sense of significant objects in his experiential world (Meissner 1986). One of this model’s core components, ‘the paranoid construction’ refers to a cognitive reorganization taking place in an attempt to sustain a comfortable sense of self which, however, may be at the expense of reality testing. This process, in its extreme form, leads to the formation of a persecutory bond, where a link is established between, on the one hand, the paranoid individual and, on the other, his persecutors and the terrifying forces that threaten to engulf him. This can become a rigid construction that reinforces the spiral of paranoia-persecution-paranoia. Meissner understands this mechanism as offering a sense of cohesion and durability to a fragile self, though it often involves a high degree of pathology and victimization. Instances of this process abound in individuals, institutions, and groups (including whole nations) where views of internal and external situations are (ab)used to service a brittle sense of identity. Fully recognizing this predicament, and the dangers involved, requires thinking about and tolerating our own conflictual parts. Paradoxically, a certain degree of paranoia is desirable as it is a basis for discrimination (Segal 1994); when we let a new experience touch us, we acknowledge that it may be bad or good, which enables us to anticipate danger. In leaders of an organization, for instance, a certain degree of paranoid potential can be a useful resource, as opposed to a dangerous naivety that would prevent the leader from becoming aware of the situations of activation of aggression in the group, or regression to primitive levels of functioning. Where the leader can be aware of, and apprehend risk and danger, there is the possibility of preparation for the group to face them and cope with them.

## Spark DA

Nuclear war outweighs – their interpretation denies any value to the natural world

**Macauley 96** professor of philosphy and environmental science at Penn State University, (David Macauley, Minding Nature: The philosophers of ecology, p. 74)

We may approach the issue of what Heidegger may teach today’s radical environmentalists by examining an issue about which they and Heidegger would profoundly disagree. Heidegger claimed that there is a greater danger than the destruction of all life on earth by nuclear war.40 For radical environmentalists, it is hard to imagine anything more dangerous than the total destruction of the biosphere! Heidegger argued, however, that worse than such annihilation would he the totally technologized world in which material “happiness” for everyone is achieved, but in which humanity would be left with a radically constricted capacity for encountering the being of entities. This apparently exorbitant claim may be partially mitigated by the following consideration. If human existence lost all relationship to transcendent being, entities could no longer show themselves at all, and in this sense would no longer “be.” Who needs nuclear war, Heidegger asked rhetorically, if entities have already ceased to be? For many environmentalists, such a question reveals the extent to which Heidegger remained part of the human-centered tradition that he wanted to overcome. By estimating so highly human Dasein’s contribution to the manifesting of things, Heidegger may well have underestimated the contribution made by many other forms of life, for which the extinction of humankind’s ontological awareness would be far preferable to their own extinction in nuclear war!

Nuclear war can’t be contained - it will escalate

Carl Sagan, B.A., B.S., and PhD University of Chicago, former professor of biology and genetics at Stanford and professor of astronomy and astro-physics at Harvard, former Director of the Laboratory for Planetary Studies at Cornell, two-time winner of the NASA medal for scientific achievement, Peabody award recipient, and Pulitzer prize winning author, 1984 (*Foreign Affairs*, “Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe” p. Lexis)

No one knows, of course, how many warheads with what aggregate yield would be detonated in a nuclear war. Because of attacks on strategic aircraft and missiles, and because of technological failures, it is clear that less than the entire world arsenal would be detonated. On the other hand, it is generally accepted, even among most military planners, that a "small" nuclear war would be almost impossible to contain before it escalated to include much of the world arsenals. n4 (Precipitating factors include command and control malfunctions, communications failures, the necessity for instantaneous decisions on the fates of millions, fear, panic and other aspects of real nuclear war fought by real people.) For this reason alone, any serious attempt to examine the possible consequences of nuclear war must place major emphasis on large-scale exchanges in the five-to-seven-thousand-megaton range, and many studies have done so. n5 Many of the effects described below, however, can be triggered by much smaller wars.

AND - The immediate aftermath of a nuclear war is months of sub-zero temperatures from which humanity cannot survive

Carl Sagan, B.A., B.S., and PhD University of Chicago, former professor of biology and genetics at Stanford and professor of astronomy and astro-physics at Harvard, former Director of the Laboratory for Planetary Studies at Cornell, two-time winner of the NASA medal for scientific achievement, Peabody award recipient, and Pulitzer prize winning author 1983 <http://www.cooperativeindividualism.org/sagan_nuclear_winter.html>

The U.S. Mariner 9 spacecraft, the first vehicle to orbit another planet, arrived at Mars in late 1971. The planet was enveloped in a global dust storm. As the fine particles slowly fell out, we were able to measure temperature changes in the atmosphere and on the surface. Soon it became clear what had happened: The dust, lofted by high winds off the desert into the upper Martian atmosphere, had absorbed the incoming sunlight and prevented much of it from reaching the ground. Heated by the sunlight, the dust warmed the adjacent air. But the surface, enveloped in partial darkness, became much chillier than usual. Months later, after the dust fell out of the atmosphere, the upper air cooled and the surface warmed, both returning to their normal conditions. We were able to calculate accurately, from how much dust there was in the atmosphere, how cool the Martian surface ought to have been. Afterwards, I and my colleagues, James B. Pollack and Brian Toon of NASA's Ames Research Center, were eager to apply these insights to the Earth. In a volcanic explosion, dust aerosols are lofted into the high atmosphere. We calculated by how much the Earth's global temperature should decline after a major volcanic explosion and found that our results (generally a fraction of a degree) were in good accord with actual measurements. Joining forces with Richard Turco, who has studied the effects of nuclear weapons for many years, we then began to turn our attention to the climatic effects of nuclear war. [The scientific paper, "Global Atmospheric Consequences of Nuclear War," was written by R. P. Turco, 0. B. Toon, T. P. Ackerman, J. B. Pollack and Carl Sagan. From the last names of the authors, this work is generally referred to as "TTAPS."] We knew that nuclear explosions, particularly groundbursts, would lift an enormous quantity of fine soil particles into the atmosphere (more than 100,000 tons of fine dust for every megaton exploded in a surface burst). Our work was further spurred by Paul Crutzen of the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry in Mainz, West Germany, and by John Birks of the University of Colorado, who pointed out that huge quantities of smoke would be generated in the burning of cities and forests following a nuclear war. Groundburst -- at hardened missile silos, for example -- generate fine dust. Airbursts -- over cities and unhardened military installations -- make fires and therefore smoke. The amount of dust and soot generated depends on the conduct of the war, the yields of the weapons employed and the ratio of groundbursts to airbursts. So we ran computer models for several dozen different nuclear war scenarios. Our baseline case, as in many other studies, was a 5000-megaton war with only a modest fraction of the yield (20 percent) expended on urban or industrial targets. Our job, for each case, was to follow the dust and smoke generated, see how much sunlight was absorbed and by how much the temperatures changed, figure out how the particles spread in longitude and latitude, and calculate how long before it all fell out in the air back onto the surface. Since the radioactivity would be attached to these same fine particles, our calculations also revealed the extent and timing of the subsequent radioactive fallout. Some of what I am about to describe is horrifying. I know, because it horrifies me. There is a tendency -- psychiatrists call it "denial" -- to put it out of our minds, not to think about it. But if we are to deal intelligently, wisely, with the nuclear arms race, then we must steel ourselves to contemplate the horrors of nuclear war. The results of our calculations astonished us. In the baseline case, the amount of sunlight at the ground was reduced to a few percent of normal-much darker, in daylight, than in a heavy overcast and too dark for plants to make a living from photosynthesis. At least in the Northern Hemisphere, where the great preponderance of strategic targets lies, an unbroken and deadly gloom would persist for weeks. Even more unexpected were the temperatures calculated. In the baseline case, land temperatures, except for narrow strips of coastline, dropped to minus 250 Celsius (minus 13 degrees Fahrenheit) and stayed below freezing for months -- even for a summer war. (Because the atmospheric structure becomes much more stable as the upper atmosphere is heated and the low air is cooled, we may have severely underestimated how long the cold and the dark would last.) The oceans, a significant heat reservoir, would not freeze, however, and a major ice age would probably not be triggered. But because the temperatures would drop so catastrophically, virtually all crops and farm animals, at least in the Northern Hemisphere, would be destroyed, as would most varieties of uncultivated or domesticated food supplies. Most of the human survivors would starve.

AND - Most recent studies prove our argument - Any nuclear war causes global cooling, devastates the planet

Starr 10 (Steven Starr, writing for The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, nationally renowned scientific journal, text taken from article titled “The Climactic Consequences of Nuclear War” published March 12th, 2010. Text taken from [http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-climatic-consequences-of-nuclear-war])

Although the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review is supposed to include all aspects of the strategy and doctrine that govern the use of U.S. nuclear weapons, it once again will not consider one crucial question: What would be the long-term consequences to Earth's environment if the U.S. nuclear arsenal were detonated during a conflict? This isn't a question to be avoided. [Recent scientific studies](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/ToonRobockTurcoPhysicsToday.pdf" \t "_blank) PDF have found that a war fought with the deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals would leave Earth virtually uninhabitable. In fact, NASA computer models have shown that even a "successful" first strike by Washington or Moscow would inflict catastrophic environmental damage that would make agriculture impossible and cause mass starvation. Similarly, in the January Scientific American, Alan Robock and Brian Toon, the foremost experts on the climatic impact of nuclear war, warn that the environmental consequences of a "regional" nuclear war would cause a global famine that could kill one billion people. Their article, ["Loca Nuclear War: Global Suffering,"](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSciAmJan2010.pdf" \t "_blank) ["Loca Nuclear War: Global Suffering,"](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSciAmJan2010.pdf" \t "_blank) PDF predicts that the detonation of 100 15-kiloton nuclear weapons in Indian and Pakistani megacities would create urban firestorms that would [loft](http://www.nucleardarkness.org/warconsequences/fivemilliontonsofsmoke/" \t "_blank) 5 million tons of thick, black smoke above cloud level. (This smoke would engulf the entire planet within 10 days.) Because the smoke couldn't be rained out, it would remain in the stratosphere for at least a decade and have profoundly disruptive effects. Specifically, the smoke layer would block sunlight, heat the upper atmosphere, and cause massive destruction of protective stratospheric ozone. A [2008 study](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/MillsPNAS.pdf" \t "_blank) PDF calculated ozone losses (after the described conflict) of 25-45 percent above mid-latitudes and 50-70 percent above northern high latitudes persisting for five years, with substantial losses continuing for another five years. Such severe ozone depletion would allow intense levels of harmful ultraviolet light to reach Earth's surface--even with the stratospheric smoke layer in place. Beneath the smoke, the loss of warming sunlight would produce average surface temperatures colder than any experienced in the last 1,000 years. There would be a corresponding shortening of growing seasons by up to 30 days and significant reductions in average rainfall in many areas, with a 40-percent decrease of precipitation in the Asian monsoon region. Basically, the Earth's surface would become cold, dark, and dry. Humans have had some experience with this sort of deadly global climate change. In 1815, the largest volcanic eruption in recorded history took place in Indonesia. Mount Tambora exploded and created a stratospheric layer of sulfuric acid droplets that blocked sunlight from reaching Earth. During the following year, which was known as "The Year without Summer," the northeastern United States experienced snowstorms in June and debilitating frosts every month of the year. In an [earlier study](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-2003-2007.pdf" \t "_blank) PDF, Robock, Toon, and their colleagues predicted that the decreases in average surface temperatures following the nuclear conflict described above would be 2-3 times colder than those experienced in 1816 and that the black soot produced by subsequent nuclear firestorms would remain in the stratosphere five times longer than the acid clouds from volcanic eruptions. In other words, 10 years after a regional nuclear war, Earth's average surface temperatures would still be as cold, or colder, than they were in 1816. Most likely, the long-lived smoke layer would produce a "decade without a summer." Here it's important to point out that the 100 Hiroshima-size weapons detonated in Robock and Toon's regional war scenario contain less than 1 percent of the combined explosive power in the 7,000 or so operational and deployed nuclear weapons the United States and Russia possess. If even one-half of these weapons were detonated in urban areas, Robock and Toon have predicted that the resulting [nuclear darkness](http://www.nucleardarkness.org/index2.php" \t "_blank) would cause daily minimum temperatures to fall below freezing in the largest agricultural areas of the Northern Hemisphere for a period of between one to three years. Meanwhile, average global surface temperatures would become colder than those experienced 18,000 years ago at the height of the last Ice Age. Amazingly, however, no follow-up studies have been initiated to further evaluate the decreases in temperature, precipitation, or ozone depletion predicted to arise from either regional or strategic nuclear war. Large studies were conducted in the 1980s on "nuclear winter" by the U.S. [National Academy of Sciences](http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=540&page=R1" \t "_blank), the World Meteorological Organization, and the International Council for Science's Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment. But given that Robock and Toon's new research has found that these early studies significantly underestimated the climatic and environmental consequences of nuclear war, wouldn't it make sense for such groups to now revisit the subject? At the very least, Washington and Moscow, with 95 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, should be required to investigate the environmental and climatic consequences from a nuclear war created by their nuclear arsenals. Moreover, in the United States, there appears to be a legal basis to force the Defense Department to evaluate the likely consequences of its nuclear arsenal. According to the EPA's [website](http://www.epa.gov/compliance/nepa/" \t "_blank), "The National Environmental Policy Act [NEPA] requires federal agencies to integrate environmental values into their decision-making processes by considering the environmental impacts of their proposed actions and reasonable alternatives to those actions. To meet NEPA requirements, federal agencies [must] prepare a detailed statement known as an Environmental Impact Statement." If that's the case, why not require Defense to create an Environmental Impact Statement for the more than 1,000 U.S. strategic nuclear weapons now on high-alert? To date, the discussion of a nuclear-weapons-free world has included no mention of the environmental consequences of nuclear war. I fear that without such a dialogue, the debate lacks the sense of urgency required to change the nuclear status quo. That's why I believe that a wake-up call from the scientific community is seriously needed. Regardless of how "safe from use" U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons are considered to be, they still could wipe out humanity. Thus, the recognition by Washington that its nuclear arsenal, if used in conflict, will make the whole world--including all of its territory--uninhabitable, is long overdue.

AND - Even a small nuclear war creates nuclear winter – turns all of their impacts and is comparative on timeframe probability and magnitude.

Harrell 9 (Eben Harrell, writer for the Time Magazine, text taken from article titled “The Nuclear Risk: How Long Will Our Luck Hold?” published February 20th, 2009. Text found at [http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1880702,00.html])

In the 1980s, climate scientists in Russia and the U.S. theorized that all-out nuclear war between the superpowers would result in a "nuclear winter," as smoke from the atomic explosions blackened the sky and sent summer temperatures plummeting below freezing — killing crops and eventually starving all those who survived the initial explosions. Now that the risks of an all-out U.S.-Russian exchange have diminished, scientists are looking at the climactic effects of regional nuclear war — and the predictions are still sobering. Alan Robock, a Professor in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University who participated in the original nuclear winter research, recently completed a study on the results of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. He spoke with TIME from his office in New Brunswick, New Jersey. (See pictures from the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks.) Tensions between India and Pakistan have been high recently. If they escalated to all-out nuclear war, what would be the effect to the global climate? We looked at a scenario in which each country used 50 Hiroshima-sized weapons, which they are believed to have in their arsenals. That's enough firepower to kill around 20 million people on the ground. We were surprised that the amount of smoke produced by these explosions would block out sunlight, cool the planet, and produce climate change unprecedented in recorded human history. Your study predicts mass cooling. With all the heat and radioactivity of the explosions, why wouldn't nuclear war warm the planet? It has nothing to do with the radioactivity of the explosions — although that would be devastating to nearby populations. The explosions would set off massive fires, which would produce plumes of black smoke. The sun would heat the smoke and lift it into the stratosphere — that's the layer above the troposphere, where we live — where there is no rain to clear it out. It would be blown across the globe and block the sun. The effect would not be a nuclear winter, but it would be colder than the little ice age [in the 17th and 18th centuries] and the change would happen very rapidly — over the course of a few weeks. Would you be able to see the smoke? The sky would not be blue. It would be grey. And what would the results be for humanity? We calculated that there would be a shortening of the growing season in the mid-latitudes — that includes Europe and America in the Northern Hemisphere — by a couple of weeks. The growing season is defined as the period between the last frost in spring and first frost in the fall. Some crops that need the whole growing season would not reach fruition and there would be no yield. Others would grow more slowly and produce a small yield. In addition there would be less precipitation and it would be darker, also damaging yield. You compound that with [the shutdown of] the current global network of food trading — countries would likely stop shipping food and focus on feeding their own populations — and it's a big crisis. We don't have the resources to do detailed analyses on the impacts of crops in different farming regimes but this suggests it could be a very serious problem. How confident are you that your modeling is correct? We used ModelE, designed by NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies, and one of the models used to produce the results of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The model does an excellent job of simulating climate change that resulted from volcanic eruptions in the past. That gave us confidence. What's more, a group repeated the calculations for the Pakistan-India scenario with a different model at the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, Colo., and the results almost exactly agreed. Their research showed how the smoke from the fires would open up holes in the ozone, which would cause even more problems for humanity. We'd like other people to test the calculations with their models, but we're pretty confident that they'll get the same answer. So we get a clue of the climatic effects of nuclear war from volcanic eruptions? Yes. 1816 was known as the "year without summer." It followed the Tambora Volcano eruption in Indonesia in 1815. It was sudden climate change on a similar scale, and it resulted in a severe famine in Europe, food riots and mass emigrations. Volcanic aerosols have a lifetime of about a year in the stratosphere. The lifetime of soot from nuclear fires is about five years. It's obviously much harder for a society to recover from such an extended cooling. Some scientists, most notably Freeman Dyson of The Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, have stirred controversy by arguing that nuclear weapons are a more urgent environmental threat than global warming. Do you agree? Yes. If India and Pakistan engaged in nuclear war, they would use about 0.3% of the global nuclear stockpile. And still the effects on the climate would be dramatic. Our calculations on nuclear winter from the early 1980s have been confirmed by modern climate models. And fundamentally the situation hasn't changed — even with reduced stockpiles there still exists enough weapons to cause nuclear winter. That's something that maybe people don't realize. I think we have to solve the problem of the existence of all these weapons before we have the luxury of worrying about global warming.

AND - Your author is a double turn – concedes nuke war kills the ozone.

Martin 82 [Brian Martin professor of social sciences at the University of Wollongong Journal of Peace Research, 1982, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82jpr.html]

(b) Ozone. Nuclear war would cause an increase in ultraviolet light from the sun which reaches the earth's surface, due to reductions in stratospheric ozone caused by its catalytic destruction by nitrogen oxides produced in nuclear explosions. This would increase the incidence of skin cancer (which is mostly non-lethal) and possibly alter agricultural productivity, but would be most unlikely to cause widespread death.[7]

Nuclear war causes superfires which kill everything

Strahan ‘95

(Martin M., Nuclear Weapons, The World Heath Association, Tulsa Journal of Comparative International Law, Lexis)

In WHA36.28, the WHA endorsed the Committee’s conclusions in the 1983 report and recommended ongoing studies on the effects of nuclear war. 22 The result of WHA36.28 was an update of the 1983 report compiled and published by the WHO Management Group in 1987. 23 In the 1987 report, the Management Group revisited the devastating effects of nuclear war and added new studies on both the short and long term effects of radiation and fallout. 24 The Management Group found that “the many individual fires caused by. the heat wave would result in huge superfires that could spread widely” and “in such a conflagration no one would survive even in underground shelters.” 25 Finally, the Management Group concluded that famine and disease would be widespread and the world’s health services would be unable to alleviate the situation. 26 The Management Group, using the same language as the Committee in the 1983 report, reiterated that the political steps towards the prevention of nuclear war were not within the province of the Management Group. 27

And prefer our evidence – best scientists conclude nuclear war causes extinction

Carl Sagan, B.A., B.S., and PhD University of Chicago, former professor of biology and genetics at Stanford and professor of astronomy and astro-physics at Harvard, former Director of the Laboratory for Planetary Studies at Cornell, two-time winner of the NASA medal for scientific achievement, Peabody award recipient, and Pulitzer prize winning author 1983 http://www.cooperativeindividualism.org/sagan\_nuclear\_winter.html

But what if nuclear wars can be contained, and much less than 5000 megatons is detonated? Perhaps the greatest surprise in our work was that even small nuclear wars can have devastating climatic effects. We considered a war in which a mere 100 megatons were exploded, less than one percent of the world arsenals, and only in low-yield airbursts over cities. This scenario, we found, would ignite thousands of fires, and the smoke from these fires alone would be enough to generate an epoch of cold and dark almost as severe as in the 5000 megaton case. The threshold for what Richard Turco has called The Nuclear Winter is very low. Could we have overlooked some important effect? The carrying of dust and soot from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere (as well as more local atmospheric circulation) will certainly thin the clouds out over the Northern Hemisphere. But, in many cases, this thinning would be insufficient to render the climatic consequences tolerable -- and every time it got better in the Northern Hemisphere, it would get worse in the Southern. Our results have been carefully scrutinized by more than 100 scientists in the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union. There are still arguments on points of detail. But the overall conclusion seems to be agreed upon: There are severe and previously unanticipated global consequences of nuclear war-subfreezing temperatures in a twilit radioactive gloom lasting for months or longer. Scientists initially underestimated the effects of fallout, were amazed that nuclear explosions in space disabled distant satellites, had no idea that the fireballs from high-yield thermonuclear explosions could deplete the ozone layer and missed altogether the possible climatic effects of nuclear dust and smoke. What else have we overlooked? Nuclear war is a problem that can be treated only theoretically. It is not amenable to experimentation. Conceivably, we have left something important out of our analysis, and the effects are more modest than we calculate. On the other hand, it is also possible-and, from previous experience, even likely-that there are further adverse effects that no one has yet been wise enough to recognize. With billions of lives at stake, where does conservatism lie-in assuming that the results will be better than we calculate, or worse? Many biologists, considering the nuclear winter that these calculations describe, believe they carry somber implications for life on Earth. Many species of plants and animals would become extinct. Vast numbers of surviving humans would starve to death. The delicate ecological relations that bind together organisms on Earth in a fabric of mutual dependency would be torn, perhaps irreparably. There is little question that our global civilization would be destroyed. The human population would be reduced to prehistoric levels, or less. Life for any survivors would be extremely hard. And there seems to be a real possibility of the extinction of the human species.

AND - Nuclear war outweighs global warming. Time frame, makes warming inevitable, and nuclear was turns it with a far larger magnitude

Guardian Unlimited 6 [http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2006/dec/12/nuclearindustry.climatechange]

The scientists said a sudden change to the Earth's ecosystem because of nuclear blasts would be worse than any of the effects predicted by global warming due to greenhouse gases. "Global warming is a problem and we certainly should address it but in 20 years, the temperature might go up by a few tenths of a degree and it will be gradual," said Prof Robock. "We'll be able to adapt from some of it. But the climate change from even the small nuclear war we postulated would be instantaneous and such a shock to the system"

AND - Nuclear war collapses ocean ecosystems

Carl Sagan, B.A., B.S., and PhD University of Chicago, former professor of biology and genetics at Stanford and professor of astronomy and astro-physics at Harvard, former Director of the Laboratory for Planetary Studies at Cornell, two-time winner of the NASA medal for scientific achievement, Peabody award recipient, and Pulitzer prize winning author, 1984 (*Foreign Affairs*, “Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe” p. Lexis)

The darkness alone may cause a collapse in the aquatic food chain in which sunlight is harvested by phytoplankton, phytoplankton by zooplankton, zooplankton by small fish, small fish by large fish, and, occasionally, large fish by humans. In many nuclear war scenarios, this food chain is likely to collapse at its base for at least a year and is significantly more imperiled in tropical waters. The increase in ultraviolet light available at the surface of the earth approximately a year after the war provides an additional major environmental stress that by itself has been described as having "profound consequences" for aquatic, terrestrial and other ecosystems. n17

AND - The impact is extinction

Davidson, founder of the Turtle House Foundation and award-winning Journalist, 2003

(Fire in the Turtle House, p.47-51)

But surely the Athenians had it backward; it’s the land that rests in the lap of the sea. Thalassa, not Gaia, is the guardian of life on the blue planet. A simple, albeit apocalyptic, experiment suggests Thalassa’s power. Destroy all life on land; the ocean creatures will survive just fine. Given time, they’ll even repopulate the land. But wipe out the organisms that inhabit the oceans and all life on land is doomed. “Dust to dust,” says the Bible, but “water to water” is more like it, for all life comes from and returns to the sea. Our ocean origins abid within us, our secret marine history. The chemical makeup of our blood is strikingly similar to seawater. Every carbon atom in our body has cycled through the ocean many times. Even the human embryo reveals our watery past. Tiny gill slits form and then fade during our development in the womb. The ocean is the cradle of life on our planet, and it remains the axis of existence, the locus of planetary biodiversity, and the engine of the chemical and hydrological cycles that create and maintain our atmosphere and climate. The astonishing biodiversity is most evident on coral reefs, often called the “rain forests of the sea.” Occupying less than one-quarter of 1 percent of the global ocean, coral reefs are home to nearly a third of all marine fish species and to as many as nine million species in all. But life exists in profusion in every corner of the ocean, right down to the hydrothermal vents on the seafloor (discovered only in 1977), where more than a hundred newly described species thrive around superheated plumes of sulfurous gasses. The abundance of organisms in the ocean isn’t surprising given that the sea was, as already mentioned, the crucible of life on Earth. It is the original ecosystem, the environment in which the “primordial soup” of nucleic acids (which can self-replicate, but are not alive) and other molecules made the inexplicable and miraculous leap into life, probably as simple bacteria, close to 3.9 billion years ago. A spectacular burst of new life forms called the Cambrian explosion took place in the oceans some 500 million years ago, an evolutionary experiment that produced countless body forms, the prototypes of virtually all organisms alive today. It wasn’t until 100 million years later that the first primitive plants took up residence on *terra firma*. Another 30 million years passed before the first amphibians climbed out of the ocean. After this head start, it’s not surprising that evolution on that newcomer-dry land-has never caught up with the diversity of the sea. Of the thirty-three higher-level groupings of animals (called phyla), thirty-two are found in the oceans and just twelve on land.

Nuclear war causes biological weapons use

The Preparation ‘02

(http://thepreparation.net/Chap6.html)

Mankind has been faced with the threat of nuclear war for some time now, and despite what some people think, the threat hasn't gone away. The threat has shifted somewhat though, towards a threat of nuclear terrorism and nuclear exchanges between lesser military powers. Nuclear war in and of itself never did pose a threat of eliminating all of humanity. A full scale nuclear war in which every nuclear weapon on Earth is used could wipe out around 30% of the Earth's human population (most fatalities in a nuclear war result from after effects of the nuclear exchange such as: radiation poisoning, environmental changes, starvation, ... and social upheaval) and set human technology back 40 years. The larger problem with nuclear war is nuclear weapons will almost never be used alone. Nuclear weapons will be used together with chemical, biological, and conventional weapons, and this combination of weaponry would have the potential of eradicating all human life, if the conflict were world wide.

The impact is extinction

Steinbrunner ‘97

(John D., Senior Fellow – Brookings, Foreign Policy, 12-22, Lexis)

Although human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives and lethal chemicals as potential weapons of mass destruction, there is an obvious, fundamentally important difference: Pathogens are alive, weapons are not. Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce themselves and do not independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these things. That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few pathogens - ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population. The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.

# 1AR

## CapK

**consensus of field experts**

**Ferguson 2 –** Professor of Political Science, Rutgers (Yale, International Relations and the “Third Debate”, ed Jarvis, p 157)

Although there may be no such thing as “absolute truth” (Hollis, 1994:240-247; Fernandez-Armesto, 1997:chap.6), there is often a sufficient amount of intersubjective consensus to make for a useful conversation. That conversation may not lead to proofs that satisfy philosophical nit-pickets, but it can be educational and illuminating. We gain a degree of apparently useful “understanding” about the things we need (or prefer) to “know.”

**empirics**

**Wendt 2k** – Prof International Security and PolSci, Ohio State (Alexander, On the Via Media, Review of International Studies 26)

In the book I argue that, compared to ontology-talk, the value of epistemology talk for a discipline like IR is considerably less than something as imposing as the third ‘Great Debate’ might suggest. What matters more is what there is, not how we can know it, since we clearly do know things, and the ‘how’ of this knowledge will necessarily vary with the many different kinds of questions we ask in our field, and the varied tools at our disposal for answering them.