# Round Report vs. Ransom Everglades BG

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## Oil DA

#### Economy is growing – reforms – oil income key to sustainability

Olga Kuvshinova 9/27 – Writer for Russia Beyond the Headlines,(“Investment in infrastructure to fuel economic growth”, <http://rbth.ru/business/2013/09/27/investment_in_infrastructure_to_fuel_economic_growth_30229.html>, AW)

The government has also completed a number of construction megaprojects, and government investment has decreased by 20 percent in real terms. Over the next year, there will be no such decline, and the "base effect" that had a negative impact on economic growth this year will, on the contrary, enhance growth. This effect in the second half of 2013 is predicted to improve growth in GDP to 2.2 percent, compared to 1.4 percent in the first half. Meanwhile, growth in private investment (excluding state-owned companies) is projected to slow down from 11 percent this year to 5 percent in 2014. Therefore, the Ministry expects a rather large contribution from quasi-budget projects — construction of roads using money from the National Welfare Fund (NWF). Related: Russian Railways invests $18.7 billion in Far East Russia dreams of creating an alternative to Suez High-speed trains to help address transport problems Infrastructure is an opportunity to increase potential growth, and the government should therefore actively participate in this," says Oleg Zasov, director of a department in the Ministry. However, budget rules impose restrictions, and, therefore, oil and gas income is the only source of funding available. An easing of the Central Bank's monetary policy is expected to maintain the high rates of growth in consumer lending — at least 20 percent per year, offsetting the slowdown of the growth in real incomes. As recently as a month ago, it was assumed that the latter, in 2014–2016, would be higher or at the level of 2013. This growth will be slowed down not so much because of the decision to index tariffs for the population in 2014 (their addition to the inflation rate will only be about 0.2 percentage points), but because of the pension reform that starts in 2015.

#### Plan solves stability - this bolsters the oil industry

**Lugar, 12 –** (Richard Lugar, Senator from Indiana. December 21, 2012. “OIL, MEXICO, AND THE TRANSBOUNDARY AGREEMENT,” http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/)//SDL

Congressional attention to the Mexican energy situation is critical¶ for understanding bilateral issues between our countries and¶ for consideration of U.S. energy security. The United States has a¶ profound interest in economic prosperity and political stability in¶ Mexico, and energy is foundational to both interests. Oil is vital for¶ the Mexican federal budget, underwriting both social programs and¶ law and order, and the oil industry is an important aspect of broader¶ economic activity. Stability and growth, or lack thereof, in Mexico’s¶ oil and gas sector can directly impact issues of bilateral concern.

#### Oil prices key to Russia’s economy – over half of government revenue

**Schuman, 12 –** (Michael Schuman, Associated Press Staff Writer for Times. July 5, 2012. “Why Vladimir Putin Needs Higher Oil Prices,” http://business.time.com/2012/07/05/why-vladimir-putin-needs-higher-oil-prices/)//SDL

But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its economic performance, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself.¶ Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude has been increasing. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government’s revenues.¶ What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily not just on oil, but high oil prices. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago.¶ Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity.

**Russian economic decline causes nuclear war**

**Filger 9** (Sheldon, Author – Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction”, <http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356>)

**In Russia**, historically, **economic** health **and** political **stability are intertwined** to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that **desperate personnel would** illicitly **sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations**. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

## T

**Economic engagement is a long-term strategy that promotes structural linkage between two economies – plan doesn’t do either**

**Mastanduno, 1** – professor of Government at Dartmouth College (Michael, “Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice” <http://web.archive.org/web/20120906033646/http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf>

The basic causal logic of economic engagement, and the emphasis on domestic politics, can be traced to Hirschman. He viewed economic engagement as a **long-term, transformative strategy**. As one state gradually expands economic interaction with its target, the resulting (asymmetrical) interdependence creates vested interests within the target society and government. The beneficiaries of interdependence become addicted to it, and they protect their interests by pressuring the government to accommodate the source of interdependence. **Economic engagement is a form of structural linkage**; it is a means to get other states to *want* what you want, rather than to *do* what you want. The causal chain runs from economic interdependence through domestic political change to foreign policy accommodation.

**Good is not good enough – precise definition outweighs**

**Resnick 01** – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a **precondition for effective policymaking**. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an **erratic, ad hoc fashion** risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error **undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research**. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they **undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy**.

## K

#### Trying to better Latin America by forging economic connections is part of a long history of US imperialism – both protectionism and free trade are two sides of the same colonial way of thinking

Grosfoguel (Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies Department at UC Berkeley) 2000

(Ramon, “Developmentalism, Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America” Nepantla: Views from South, Volume 1, Issue 2, pg 359-361)

The modern idea that treated each individual as a free centered subject with rational control over his or her destiny was extended to the nation-state level. Each nation-state was considered to be sovereign and free to rationally control its progressive development. The further elaboration of these ideas in classical political economy produced the grounds for the emergence of a developmentalist ideology. Developmentalism is linked to liberal ideology and to the idea of progress. For instance, one of the central questions addressed by political economists was how to increase the wealth of nations. Different prescriptions were recommended by different political economists; namely, some were free-traders and others neomercantilist. In spite of their policy discrepancies, they all believed in national development and in the inevitable progress of the nation-state through the rational organization of society. The main bone of contention was how to ensure more wealth for a nation-state. According to Immanuel Wallerstein,

This tension between a basically protectionist versus a free trade stance became one of the major themes of policy-making in the various states of the world-system in the nineteenth century. It often was the most significant issue that divided the principal political forces of particular states. It was clear by then that a central ideological theme of the capitalist world-economy was that every state could, and indeed eventually probably would, reach a high level of national income and that conscious, rational action would make it so. This fit very well with the underlying Enlightenment theme of inevitable progress and the teleological view of human history that it incarnated. (1992a, 517)

Developmentalism became a global ideology of the capitalist world-economy. In the Latin American periphery these ideas were appropriated in the late eighteenth century by the Spanish Creole elites, who adapted them to their own agenda. Since most of the elites were linked to, or part of, the agrarian landowner class, which produced goods through coerced forms of labor to sell for a profit in the world market, they were very eclectic in their selection of which Enlightenment ideas they wished to utilize. Free trade and national sovereignty were ideas they defended as part of their struggle against the Spanish colonial monopoly of trade. However, for racial and class reasons, the modern ideas about individual freedom, rights of man, and equality were underplayed. There were no major social transformations of Latin American societies after the independence revolutions of the first half of the nineteenth century. The Creole elites left untouched the colonial noncapitalist forms of coerced labor as well as the racial/ethnic hierarchies. White Creole elites maintained after independence a racial hierarchy where Indians, blacks, mestizos, mulattoes and other racially oppressed groups were located at the bottom. This is what Aníbal Quijano (1993) calls “coloniality of power.”

During the nineteenth century, Great Britain had become the new core power and the new model of civilization. The Latin American Creole elites established a discursive opposition between Spain’s “backwardness, obscurantism and feudalism” and Great Britain’s “advanced, civilized and modern” nation. Leopoldo Zea, paraphrasing José Enrique Rodó, called this the new “northernmania” (*nordomanía*), that is, the attempt by Creole elites to see new “models” in the North that would stimulate develop- ment while in turn developing new forms of colonialism (Zea 1986, 16–17). The subsequent nineteenth-century characterization by the Creole elites of Latin America as “feudal” or in a backward “stage” served to justify Latin American subordination to the new masters from the North and is part of what I call “feudalmania,” which would continue throughout the twentieth century.

Feudalmania was a device of “temporal distancing” (Fabian 1983) to produce a knowledge that denied coevalness between Latin America and the so-called advanced European countries. The denial of coevalness created a double ideological mechanism. First, it concealed European responsibility in the exploitation of the Latin American periphery. By not sharing the same historical time and existing in different geographical spaces, each region’s destiny was conceived as unrelated to each other region’s. Second, living different temporalities, where Europe was said to be at a more advanced stage of development than Latin America, reproduced a notion of **European superiority**. Thus Europe was the “model” to imitate and the **developmentalist goal was to “catch up**.” This is expressed in the dichotomy **civilization/barbarism**seen in figures such as Domingo Faustino Sarmiento in Argentina.

The use of both neomercantilist and liberal economic ideas en- abled the nineteenth-century Iberoamerican elites to oscillate between protectionist and free-trade positions depending on the fluctuations of the world economy. When they were benefiting from producing agrarian or mining exports in the international division of labor dominated at the time by British imperialism, liberal economic theories provided them with the rational justification for their role and goals. But when foreign competition or a world economic crisis was affecting their exports to the world market, they shifted production toward the internal markets and employed neomercantilist arguments to justify protectionist policies. In Chile, Argentina, and Mexico there were neomercantilist and economic nationalist arguments that anticipated many of the arguments developed one hundred years later by the Prebisch-CEPAL school1 and by some of the dependentistas (Potasch 1959; Frank 1970; Chiaramonte 1971). For example, the 1870s developmentalist debate was the most important economic debate in Argentina during the nineteenth century and one of the most important in Latin America. An industrial development plan using protectionist neomercantilist policies was proposed. This movement was led by a profes- sor of political economy at the University of Buenos Aires and member of the Cámara de Diputados, Vicente F. López. López’s group was supported by the agrarian landowners, artisans, peasants, and incipient industrial capitalists. Although all of them were protectionists, not all were economic nationalists. The protectionist position of the agrarian landowners was due to the 1866 and 1873 world economic crises, which had negatively affected export prices on wool, Argentina’s major export item at the time. Thus López promoted the development of a national cloth industry as a transitional solution to the world depression. The movement ended once the wool producers shifted to cattle raising and meat exports.

#### Coloniality generates a permanent state of exception which is the root cause of the death ethics of war and underwrites a hellish existence where death, murder, war, rape, and racism are ordinary

Nelson Maldonado-Torres, associate professor of comparative literature at Rutgers, ‘8 [Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity, p. 217-21]

Dussel, Quijano, and Wynter lead us to the understanding that what happened in the Americas was a transformation and naturalization of the non-ethics of war—which represented a sort of exception to the ethics that regulate normal conduct in Christian countries—into a more stable and long-standing reality of damnation, and that this epistemic and material shift occurred in the colony. Damnation, life in hell, is colonialism: a reality characterized by the naturalization of war by means of the naturalization of slavery, now justified in relation to the very constitution of people and no longer solely or principally to their faith or belief. That human beings become slaves when they are vanquished in a war translates in the Americas into the suspicion that the conq uered people, and then non-European peoples in general, are constitutively inferior and that therefore they should assume a position of slavery and serfdom. Later on, this idea would be solidified with respect to the slavery of African peoples, achieving stability up to the present with the tragic reality of different forms of racism. Through this process, what looked like a "state of exception" in the colonies became the rule in the modern world. However, deviating from Giorgio Agarnben's diagnosis, one must say that the colony--long before the concentration camp and the Nazi politics of extermination--served as the testing ground for the limits and possibilities of modernity, thereby revealing its darkest secrets." It is race, the coloniality of power, and its concomitant Eurocentrism (and not only national socialisms or forms of fascism) that allow the "state of exception" to continue to define ordinary relations in this, our so-called postmodern world.

Race emerges within a permanent state of exception where forms of behavior that are legitimate in war become a natural part of the ordinary way of life. In that world, an otherwise extraordinary affair becomes the norm and living in it requires extraordinary effort." In the racial/ colonial world, the "hell" of war becomes a condition that defines the reality of racialized selves, which Fanon referred to as the damnes de la terre (condemned of the earth). The damne (condemned) is a subject who exists in a permanent "hell," and as such, this figure serves as the main referent or liminal other that guarantees the continued affirmation of modernity as a paradigm of war. The hell of the condemned is not defined by the alienation of colonized productive forces, but rather signals the dispensability of racialized subjects, that is, the idea that the world would be fundamentally better without them. The racialized subject is ultimately a dispensable source of value, and exploitation is conceived in this context as due torture, and not solely as the extraction of surplus value. Moreover, it is this very same conception that gives rise to the particular erotic dynamics that characterize the relation between the master and its slaves or racialized workers. The condemned, in short, inhabit a context in which the confrontation with death and murder is ordinary. Their "hell" is not simply "other people," as Sartre would have put it-at least at one point - but rather racist perceptions that are responsible for the suspension of ethical behavior toward peoples at the bottom of the color line. Through racial conceptions that became central to the modern self, modernity and coloniality produced a permanent state of war that racialized and colonized subjects cannot evade or escape.

The modern function of race and the coloniality of power, I am suggesting here, can be understood as a radicalization and naturalization of the non-ethics of war in colonialism." This non-ethics included the practices of eliminating and enslaving certain subjects-for example, indigenous and black-as part of the enterprise of colonization. From here one could as well refer to them as the death ethics of war. War, however, is not only about killing or enslaving; it also includes a particular treatment of sexuality and femininity: rape. Coloniality is an order of things that places people of color within the murderous and rapist view of a vigilant ego, and the primary targets of this rape are women. But men of color are also seen through these lenses and feminized, to become fundamentally penetrable subjects for the ego conquiro. Racial- ization functions through gender and sex, and the ego conquiro is thereby constitutively a phallic ego as well." Dussel. who presents this thesis of the phallic character of the ego cogito, also makes links, albeit indirectly, with the reality of war.

And thus, in the beginning of modernity, before Descartes discovered ... a terrifying anthropological dualism in Europe, the Spanish conquistadors arrived in America. The phallic conception of the European-medieval world is now added to the forms of submission of the vanquished Indians. "Males," Bartolome de las Casas writes, are reduced through "the hardest, most horrible, and harshest serfdom"; but this only occurs with those who have remained alive, because many of them have died; however, "in war typically they only leave alive young men (mozos) and women.""5 The indigenous people who survive the massacre or are left alive have to contend with a world that considers them to be dispensable. And since their bodies have been conceived of as inherently inferior or violent, they must be constantly subdued or civilized, which requires renewed acts of conquest and colonization. The survivors continue to live in a world defined by war, and this situation is peculiar in the case of women. AsT. Denean Sharpley-Whiting and Renee T, White put it in the preface to their anthology Spoils oJ War: Women oJ Color, Cultures, and Revolutions: A sexist and/or racist patriarchal culture and order posts and attempts to maintain, through violent acts of force if necessary, the subjugation and inferiority of women of color. As Joy James notes, "its explicit, general premise constructs a conceptual framework of male [and/or white] as normative in order to enforce a politicaljracial, economic, cultural. sexual] and intellectual mandate of male [and/or white] as superior." The warfront has always been a "feminized" and "colored" space for women of color. Their experiences and perceptions of war, conA ict, resistance, and struggle emerge from their specific racial-ethnic and gendered locations ... Inter arma silent leges: in time of war the law is silent," Walzer notes. Thus, this volume operates from the premise that war has been and is presently in our midst.” The links between war, conquest, and the exploitation of women's bodies are hardly accidental. In his study of war and gender, Joshua Goldstein argues that conquest usually proceeds through an extension of the rape and exploitation of women in wartime." He argues that to understand conquest, one needs to examine: I) male sexuality as a cause of aggression; 2) the feminization of enemies as symbolic domination; and 3) dependence on the exploitation of women's labor-including reproduction." My argument is, first, that these three elements came together in a powerful way in the idea of race that began to emerge in the conquest and colonization of the Americas. My second point is that through the idea of race, these elements exceed the activity of conquest and come to define what from that point on passes as the idea of a "normal" world. As a result, the phenomenology of a racial context resembles, if it is not fundamentally identical to, the phenomenology of war and conquest. Racism posits its targets as racialized and sexualized subjects that, once vanquished, are said to be inherently servile and whose bodies come to form part of an economy of sexual abuse, exploitation, and control. The coloniality of power cannot be fully understood without reference to the transformation and naturalization of war and conquest in modern times.

Hellish existence in the colonial world carries with it both the racial and the gendered aspects of the naturalization of the non-ethics of war. "Killability" and "rapeability" are inscribed into the images of colonial bodies and deeply mark their ordinary existence. Lacking real authority, colonized men are permanently feminized and simultaneously represent a constant threat for whom any amount of authority, any visible trace of the phallus is multiplied in a symbolic hysteria that knows no lirnits.?" Mythical depiction of the black man's penis is a case in point: the black man is depicted as an aggressive sexual beast who desires to rape women, particularly white women. The black woman, in turn, is seen as always already sexually available to the rapist gaze of the white, and as fundamentally promiscuous. In short, the black woman is seen as a highly erotic being whose primary function is fulfilling sexual desire and reproduction. To be sure, any amount of "penis" in either one represents a threat, but in his most familiar and typical forms the black man represents the act of rape- "raping" -while the black woman is seen as the most legitimate victim of rape- "being raped." In an antiblack world black women appear as subjects who deserve to be raped and to suffer the consequences-in terms of a lack of protection from the legal system, sexual abuse, and lack of financial assistance to sustain themselves and their families-just as black men deserve to be penalized for raping, even without having committed the act. Both "raping" and "being raped" are attached to blackness as if they form part of the essence of black folk, who are seen as a dispensable population. Black bodies are seen as excessively violent and erotic, as well as being the legitimate recipients of excessive violence, erotic and otherwise." "Killability" and "rapeability" are part of their essence, understood in a phenomenological way. The "essence" of blackness in a colonial anti-black world is part of a larger context of meaning in which the death ethics of war gradually becomes a constitutive part of an allegedly normal world. In its modern racial and colonial connotations and uses, blackness is the invention and the projection of a social body oriented by the death ethics of war." This murderous and raping social body projects the features that define it onto sub-Others in order to be able to legitimate the same behavior that is allegedly descriptive of them. The same ideas that inspire perverted acts in war--particularly slavery, murder, and rape--are legitimized in modernity through the idea of race and gradually come to be seen as more or less normal thanks to the alleged obviousness and non-problematic character of black slavery and anti-black racism. To be sure, those who suffer the consequences of such a system are primarily blacks and indigenous peoples, but it also deeply affects all of those who appear as colored or close to darkness. In short, this system of symbolic representations, the material conditions that in part produce and continue to legitimate it, and the existential dynamics that occur therein (which are also at the same time derivative and constitutive of such a context) are part of a process that naturalizes the non-ethics or death ethics of war. Sub-ontological difference is the result of such naturalization and is legitimized through the idea of race. In such a world, ontology collapses into a Manicheanism, as Fanon suggested."

#### Our alternative is to seek the Death of American Man.

#### Epistemic and semiotic struggle key – must seek the Death of American Man to solve war culture

Maldonado Torres ‘5 (Nelson, associate professor of comparative literature at Rutgers “Decolonization and the New Identitarian Logics after September 11,” *Radical Philosophy Review* 8, n. 1 (2005): 35-67)

Inspired by these Fanonian insights l have articulated elsewhere the idea of a weak utopian project as bringing about the Death of European Man.67 I think that the peculiar intricacies between "estadounidense" patriotism, Eurocentrism, the propensity to war, and the continued subordination of the theoretical contributions of peoples from the south call for a reformulation of this idea.68 Today, after the post- 1989 and post-September 11 patriotism we shall call more directly simply for the Death of American Man.6 By American Man I mean a concept or figure, a particular way of being-in-the-world, the very subject of an episteme that gives continuity to an imperial order of things under the rubrics of liberty and the idea of a Manifest Destiny that needs to be accomplished. American Man and its predecessor and still companion European Man are unified under an even more abstract concept, Imperial Man. Imperial gestures and types of behavior are certainly not unique to Europe or "America." A radical critique and denunciation of Latin American Man, and of ethno-class continental Man in general, is what 1 aim at in my critique. "Man," here, refers to an ideal of humanity, and not to concrete human beings. It is that ideal which must die in order for the human to be born.

It should be clear that what I call for and defend here is epistemological and semiotic struggle, which takes the form of critical analysis and the invention and shar­ing of ideas that allow humans to preserve their humanity. A subversive act is that which helps us to deflate imperial and continental concepts of Man, such as referring to "Americans" in a way that designates their own particular provinciality rather than by a concept through which they appropriate the whole extent of the so-called "New World." Popular culture in the u\_s. has picked up on many Spanish words and phrases (such as "Ay Caramba,.. "Hasta Ia vista, baby," and several others), but "" has failed to adopt the central one (perhaps because Latin@s have not insisted on it enough): "estadounidense." "Estadounidense" is one of the most important words that U.S. Americans learn from Spanish. It could be considered one of the most precious gifts (not an imperial but a decolonial one) from Spanish and Hispanic culture to the Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture that Huntington reifies and s e e k s to protect. As I have argued elsewhere, unfortunately, reception of gifts and hospitality are two fundamental modes of humanity that those who occupy and assume the position of Master most resist. Indeed, the reception or resistance of decolonizing gifts provides a measure of the presence of coloniality.

Before being a challenge, Latin@s in this country have been colonized and ra­ cialized subjects as well as collaborators in different forms of racialization. Many Latin@s, especially conservative ones, desire the American and Americano Dream­ most often they desire it until they realize that it turns into a nightmare, both for oth­ ers and for themselves. While the culturalist-nationalist response to the Americana Dream consists in taking away the possibility of dreaming this dream in Spanish, a decolonial response rather abandons the very idea of the American or Americana Dream and offers as a gift the possibility for the Anglo-Saxon U . S . American to dream the "estadounidense" dream-a dream that does not have anything to do about speaking one language or another, but about learning from others basic ideas about how to conceive of oneself, in this case, to see oneself as a nation-in-relation rather than as a continental being.71

#### The way the Aff produced knowledge comes first – we have a responsibility to attack colonial thinking in ourselves and our community or systemic violence and dehumanization are inevitable

Wanzer (Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at the University of Iowa in Iowa City) 2012

(Darrel, “Delinking Rhetoric, or Revisiting Mcgee’s Fragmentation Thesis Through Decoloniality” Page 654, DKE)

In short, I would submit that we all (regardless of whether we are interested in discursive con/texts explicitly marked by colonialism or imperialism) must seek to become decolonial rhetoricians. Rather than be “at the service” of Continental philosophy as so many in our ranks seem to be, we should adopt a decolonial attitude that aids in “shifting the geography of reason, by unveiling and enacting geopolitics and body-politics of knowledge” by putting our disciplinary tools in rhetoric “at the service of the problem being addressed.” It is not enough, however, to leave this task to scholars of color. Such a move is dangerous insofar as it continues to relegate these important questions to the margins of the discipline while constructing a fıction of “inclusion” that remains authorized by the hubris of zero point epistemology.45 We who are colonized or function in some way Otherwise cannot be the only ones leading the charge to delink rhetoric from modern/coloniality. An ethic of decolonial love requires those who benefıt most from the epistemic violence of the West to renounce their privilege, give the gift of hearing, and engage in forms of praxis that can more productively negotiate the borderlands between inside and outside, in thought and in being. We need not, as I have shown with McGee, throw out the baby with the bathwater; however, it is crucial that rhetoricians begin to take the decolonial option seriously if we wish to do more than perpetuate “a permanent state of exception”46 that dehumanizes people of color and maintains the hubris of a totalizing and exclusionary episteme.

## CP

#### CP Text: The United States federal government should enter into prior binding consultation with the relevant indigenous peoples of [Mexico] over [investment in maquiladoras]. The United States will advocate [investment in maquiladoras] throughout the process of consultation and implement the result.

#### Prior consultation with Latin American indigenous peoples over engagement is critical to avert cultural and physical annihilation

Kinnison, 11 – (Akilah Jenga Kinnison, J.D. Candidate, University of Arizona College of Law. 2011. “INDIGENOUS CONSENT: RETHINKING U.S. CONSULTATION POLICIES IN LIGHT OF THE U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,” http://www.arizonalawreview.org/pdf/53-4/53arizlrev1301.pdf)//SDL

¶ Due to the nature of large-scale extractive activities, there seems to be a ¶ ¶ shift in the international arena toward viewing states’ duty to consult with ¶ ¶ indigenous peoples as falling on the consent end of the consultation–consent ¶ ¶ spectrum. Some argue that, where activities directly impact indigenous peoples’ ¶ ¶ right to “use, enjoy, control, and develop their traditional lands,” there is a norm ¶ ¶ developing that recognizes that full consent, rather than just meaningful ¶ ¶ consultation, is required.206 For instance, former Special Rapporteur on the ¶ ¶ Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People ¶ ¶ Rodolfo Stavenhagen has stated that “the free, informed and prior consent, as ¶ ¶ well as the right to self-determination of indigenous communities and peoples, ¶ ¶ must be considered as a necessary precondition” for “major development projects” ¶ ¶ affecting indigenous lands.207 Such “major development projects” include “the ¶ ¶ large scale exploitation of natural resources including subsoil resources.”208 ¶ ¶ Stavenhagen has argued that indigenous peoples have the “right to say no” to ¶ ¶ certain development projects.¶ ¶ Furthermore, there are strong arguments for why, even if such a norm has ¶ ¶ not yet crystallized, states should adopt this interpretation of FPIC for large-scale ¶ ¶ extractive activities. First, the power to withhold consent can be seen as necessary ¶ ¶ to enforce other important indigenous rights beyond rights of consultation and ¶ ¶ participation.210 This is particularly true in the context of extractive industries, ¶ ¶ whose projects implicate numerous other indigenous rights due to their ability to ¶ ¶ threaten indigenous peoples’ physical and cultural survival.211 For instance, the ¶ ¶ ability to withhold consent allows indigenous communities to enforce their ¶ ¶ community property rights, protect their sacred spaces, and maintain their culture ¶ ¶ and relationship with the land. ¶ Additionally, there are reservations about how “meaningful” indigenous ¶ ¶ participation can be in the absence of the power to withhold consent.212 As ¶ ¶ Professor Brant McGee comments: “Absent the ability to walk away from the ¶ ¶ bargaining table, indigenous groups would simply be participating in a ¶ ¶ meaningless exchange of views designed to fulfill a legal requirement.”213 Given ¶ ¶ the stakes and zero-sum potential of large-scale extractive projects, “[t]here is no ¶ ¶ such thing as partial consent in this context.”¶ ¶ 214 Therefore, indigenous peoples ¶ ¶ must be equipped with the ability to withhold consent in order to engage in ¶ ¶ meaningful negotiation. Special Rapporteur Anaya has stated: “[T]he principles of ¶ ¶ consultation and consent are aimed at avoiding the imposition of the will of one ¶ ¶ party over the other, and . . . instead striving for mutual understanding and ¶ ¶ consensual decision-making.”215 Yet without the power to withhold consent in ¶ ¶ zero-sum situations where destructive impacts on indigenous lands and culture are ¶ ¶ high, indigenous people are left with little bargaining power and therefore may be ¶ ¶ unable to participate in meaningful consultation. ¶ Promoting an interpretation of FPIC that gives indigenous peoples the ¶ ¶ right to withhold consent in the context of large-scale extractive projects is also ¶ ¶ good policy from the state and corporate perspectives because it can make projects ¶ ¶ more successful. Professor Lisa J. Laplante and attorney Suzanne A. Spears ¶ ¶ propose that extractive industries can diffuse costly opposition to projects by ¶ ¶ engaging in community “consent processes.”216 Conflicts with communities can create obstacles for a particular project as well as for the corporation itself.217 ¶ ¶ Global campaigns against particular companies have been waged—as exemplified ¶ ¶ by “ProtestBarrick.net,” which is a campaign entirely devoted to publicizing ¶ ¶ opposition to Barrick Gold Corporation.218 Such campaigns can damage a ¶ ¶ company’s reputation, which Laplante and Spears refer to as “an extractive ¶ ¶ industry company’s lifeblood.”219 Additionally, opposition can be costly due to the ¶ ¶ public relations campaigns corporations must launch in response to community ¶ ¶ opposition,220 legal costs to fend off efforts to shut down projects, and losses in ¶ ¶ profitability. For example, after the ¶ ¶ Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a limited ¶ ¶ injunction against Barrick in the Cortez Hills case, the company’s stock dropped ¶ ¶ 8.43%, despite the fact that the project did not ultimately shut down.¶ Thus, when states believe a development project is in the public interest, ¶ ¶ they should seek to engage the community in consent processes, rather than ¶ ¶ consultation processes, both to protect the rights of indigenous peoples and also to ¶ ¶ promote the long-term benefit of the project itself. As Laplante and Spears ¶ ¶ explained: ¶ Whereas consultation processes require only that extractive industry ¶ ¶ companies [or the state] hear the views of those potentially affected ¶ ¶ by a project and then take them into account when engaging in ¶ ¶ decision-making processes, consent processes require that host ¶ ¶ communities actually participate in decision-making processes. ¶ ¶ Consent processes give affected communities the leverage to ¶ ¶ negotiate mutually acceptable agreements under which projects may ¶ ¶ proceed¶ Interpreting FPIC as respecting the right of indigenous peoples to withhold consent ¶ ¶ for large-scale extractive projects, therefore, gives communities the tools necessary ¶ ¶ to protect their rights as well as to bargain with state and corporate actors in order ¶ ¶ to move forward with development projects on mutually beneficial terms. ¶ In sum, within the context of large-scale extractive industries, it is in the ¶ ¶ best interest of states to take a consent-based approach to operationalizing the ¶ ¶ principle of FPIC found in instruments such as the U.N. Declaration. ¶ The United States has articulated a commitment to the importance of ¶ ¶ indigenous consultation both through its endorsement of the U.N. Declaration on ¶ ¶ the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and its domestic policies, such as E.O. 13,175 ¶ ¶ and President Obama’s Tribal Consultation Memorandum. However, in order to ¶ ¶ fully realize this commitment, the United States should embrace a policy shift away from the currently articulated meaningful consultation standard. U.S. law and policy should move toward viewing indigenous consultation as involving a spectrum of requirements—with good-faith, meaningful consultation as a minimum and with consent required in certain contexts, including large-scale extractive industries.

#### Cultural Genocide

Smith, 6 – (Andrea, Assistant Professor of Media and Cultural Studies at UC Riverside, Appropriation of Native American Religious Traditions, Encyclopedia of Women and Religion in North America, Vol. 1, pg. 104-105)

Native spiritualities are land based — they are tied to the landbase from which they originate. When Native peoples fight for cultural/spiritual preservation, they are ultimately fighting for the landbase which grounds their spirituality and culture. For this reason, Native religions are generally not proselytizing. They are typically seen by Native peoples as relevant only to the particular landbase from which they originate; they are not necessarily applicable to peoples coming from different landbases. In addition, as many scholars have noted, Native religions are practice centered rather than belief centered. That is, Christianity is defined by belief in a certain set of doctrinal principles about Jesus, the Bible, etc. Evangelical Christianity holds that one is “saved” when one professes belief in Jesus Christ as one’s Lord and Savior. But what is of primary important in Native religions is not being able to articulate belief in a certain set of doctrines, but being able to take part in the spiritual practice of one’s community. In fact, it may be more important that a ceremony be done correctly than it is for everyone in that ceremony to know exactly why everything must be done in a certain way. As Vine Deloria (Dakota) notes, from a Native context, religion is “a way of life” rather than “a matter of proper exposition of doctrines.” Even if Christians do not have access to church, they continue to be Christians as long as they believe in Jesus. Native spiritualities, by contrast, may die if the people do not practice the ceremonies, even if the people continue to believe in their power. Native communities argue that Native peoples cannot be alienated from their land without committing cultural genocide. This argument underpins many sacred sites cases, although usually to no avail, before the courts. Most of the court rulings on sacred sites do not recognize this difference between belief-centered and practice-centered traditions or the significance of land-based spiritualities. For instance, in Fools Crow v. Gullet (1983), the Supreme Court ruled against the Lakota who were trying to halt the development of additional tourist facilities in the Black Hills. The Court ruled that this tourism was not an infringement on Indian religious freedom because, although it would hinder the ability of the Lakota to practice their beliefs, it did not force them to relinquish their beliefs. For the Lakota, however, stopping the practice of traditional beliefs destroys the belief systems themselves. Consequently, for the Lakota and Native nations in general, cultural genocide is the result when Native landbases are not protected. When we disconnect Native spiritual practices from their land bases, we undermine Native peoples’ claim that the protection of the land base is integral to the survival of Native peoples and hence undermine their claims to sovereignty. This practice of disconnecting Native spirituality from its land base is prevalent in a wide variety of practices of cultural and spiritual appropriation, from New Agers claiming to be Indian in a former life to Christians adopting Native spiritual forms to further their missionizing efforts. The message is that anyone can practice Indian spirituality anywhere. Hence there is no need to protect the specific Native communities and the lands that are the basis of their spiritual practices.

#### Extinction – each loss contributes to an invisible threshold

Stavenhagen, 90 – (Rodolfo, Professor @ the United Nations University, The Ethnic Question pg. 73)

The struggle for the preservation of the collective identity of culturally distinct peoples has further implications as well. The cultural diversity of the world’s peoples is a universal resource for all humankind. The diversity of the worlds cultural pool is like the diversity of the world’s biological gene pool. A culture that disappears due to ethnocide or cultural genocide represents a loss for all humankind. At a time when the classic development models of the post war era have failed to solve the major problems of mankind, people are again looking at so called traditional cultures for at least some of the answers. This is very clear, for example, as regards to agricultural and food production, traditional medicine, environmental management in rural areas, construction techniques, social solidarity in times of crises, etc. The world’s diverse cultures have much to offer our imperiled planet. Thus the defense of the collective rights of ethnic groups and indigenous peoples cannot be separated from the collective human rights of all human beings.

## Case

Util is inevitable even with deontology

Joshua Green Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Harvard University, Joshua, November 2002 "The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It", 314

Some people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take priority over which. If that’s what we mean by 302 “balancing rights,” then we are wise to shun this sort of talk. Attempting to solve moral problems using a complex deontological algorithm is dogmatism at its most esoteric, but dogmatism all the same. However, it’s likely that when some people talk about “balancing competing rights and obligations” they are already thinking like consequentialists in spite of their use of deontological language. Once again, what deontological language does best is express the thoughts of people struck by strong, emotional moral intuitions: “It doesn’t matter that you can save five people by pushing him to his death. To do this would be a violation of his rights!”19 That is why angry protesters say things like, “Animals Have Rights, Too!” rather than, “Animal Testing: The Harms Outweigh the Benefits!” Once again, rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and absoluteness of the answer. But sometimes rights talk persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has faded. One thinks, for example, of the thousands of children whose lives are saved by drugs that were tested on animals and the “rights” of those children. One finds oneself balancing the “rights” on both sides by asking how many rabbit lives one is willing to sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so on, and at the end of the day one’s underlying thought is as thoroughly consequentialist as can be, despite the deontological gloss. And what’s wrong with that? Nothing, except for the fact that the deontological gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth that there really are “rights,” etc. Best to drop it. When deontological talk gets sophisticated, the thought it represents is either dogmatic in an esoteric sort of way or covertly consequentialist.

Survival of political order is key to ethics

Stenlisli 3 (“Pace nr.1” accessed onlinehttp://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/ )

The debate on political realism, a set of ontological assumptions about international politics, has been a central theme in international relations over the past 40 years. Many scholars and politicians have wrestled over the question of the limitations and insights of realism. Still, realism seems very much alive today, one reason perhaps being that the value of realism as an analytical tool seems to become more relevant to policymakers in times of crises. In turn, such changes cause further debate among realists and their critics. In PACEM 5:2 (2002), Commander Raag Rolfsen[(1)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/" \l "1%231" \t "_blank) in practise argues that we are in need of a new framework for analysing international politics. According to Rolfsen, A situation characterized by globalisation, democratisation and a new sense of shared vulnerability demands a novel theoretical framework for world politics. Rolfsen`s aim is indeed ambitious, but his state of departure is surprising: political realism cannot provide this framework because, again according to Rolfsen, it was developed in an undemocratic environment.[(2)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/" \l "2%232" \t "_blank) Thus, we are not far from concluding that realism is corrupted and that realists are conspicuous people.[(3)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/" \l "3%233" \t "_blank) This bold proclamation illuminates the front between idealism and realism in a manner that is not typical of Norwegian academic discourses on international relations. Rolfsen has delivered a substantial and refreshing article. It is of such originality and importance that it deserves to be debated and criticised, which is no evident feature in contributions on world politics in Norway. Having said that, my motivation to engage in such a debate does not spring from a wholehearted embracement of realism. Rather, its source is the belief that a theory of foreign policy cannot do without significant elements of realism. Traditional security policy can never remove our vulnerability. At this point there simply is no disagreement between “realists” and “idealists”. However, security has an instrumental value in ensuring other ends. Thus, acknowledging our vulnerability does not remove the value and importance of security as phenomenon and concept.[(4)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/" \l "4%234" \t "_blank) In this article, I will discuss whether the effort to construct a new security concept possibly can succeed when it simultaneously becomes an attack on political realism (PR). Rolfsen undoubtedly deals some blows against Hans Morgenthau’s Theory of International Politics, although the same points have been made by others before him.[(5)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/" \l "5%235" \t "_blank) Indeed, political realism has to be anchored to ideals and visions of desired end states beyond its basic assumptions,[(6)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/" \l "6%236" \t "_blank) but my main line of argument is that any attempt at establishing a basis for ethical conduct in politics is bound to remain a purely theoretical construction without empirical relevance if it is not mixed with a sound and thorough understanding of PR. The reason simply is, that since the existence of a polity is a precondition for thinking about, implementing and evaluating policies in other areas, politics based on realism is required in the first place in order to secure the polity. There can be no democracy without a modern state, and no state without a minimum level of security through a monopoly of violence. Herein lies a significant aspect of what makes the state legitimate to its citizens. In this way, one can even claim that all normative evaluations and - theories implicitly rest on minimum requirements both to the practises and theoretical considerations of realism.[(7)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/" \l "7%237" \t "_blank) Indeed, one should at least question whether attempts at denying the empirical relevance of PR could lead us into paralysis or hypocrisy. The latter can even serve, unintentionally to be sure, as a basis for demonising opponents, thus functioning as a (moral) sentiment that forms the basis of a more hawkish or brutal conduct in international crisis than is necessary. The prudence found in Morgenthau should not be seen as cynical or a-ethical, but rather as a configuration of thought that should balance our aspirations to fulfil what Morgenthau calls the ultimate aims of politics. The central political problem is exactly how to translate these aspirations (like democracy and human rights) into feasible and efficient decisions. But in order to pursue these important goals, the ability to use power, be it hard or soft, is required.

Extinction outweighs – it’s the most horrible impact imaginable and precedes rights

Schell 82 (Jonathan, Professor at Wesleyan University, *The Fate of the Earth*, pages 136-137)

Implicit in everything that I have said so far about the nuclear predicament there has been a perplexity that I would now like to take up explicitly, for it leads, I believe, into the very heart of our response-or, rather, our lack of response-to the predicament. I have pointed out that our species is the most important of all the things that, as inhabitants of a common world, we inherit from the past generations, but it does not go far enough to point out this superior importance, as though in making our decision about ex- tinction we were being asked to choose between, say, liberty, on the one hand, and the survival of the species, on the other. For the species not only overarches but contains all the benefits of life in the common world, and to speak of sacrificing the species for the sake of one of these benefits involves one in the absurdity of wanting to de- stroy something in order to preserve one of its parts, as if one were to burn down a house in an attempt to redecorate the living room, or to kill someone to improve his character. ,but even to point out this absurdity fails to take the full measure of the peril of extinction, for mankind is not some invaluable object that lies outside us and that we must protect so that we can go on benefiting from it; rather, it is we ourselves, without whom everything there is loses its value. To say this is another way of saying that extinction is unique not because it destroys mankind as an object but because it destroys mankind as the source of all possible human subjects, and this, in turn, is another way of saying that extinction is a second death, for one's own individual death is the end not of any object in life but of the subject that experiences all objects. Death, how- ever, places the mind in a quandary. One of-the confounding char- acteristics of death-"tomorrow's zero," in Dostoevski's phrase-is that, precisely because it removes the person himself rather than something in his life, it seems to offer the mind nothing to take hold of. One even feels it inappropriate, in a way, to try to speak "about" death at all, as. though death were a thing situated some- where outside us and available for objective inspection, when the fact is that it is within us-is, indeed, an essential part of what we are. It would be more appropriate, perhaps, to say that death, as a fundamental element of our being, "thinks" in us and through us about whatever we think about, coloring our thoughts and moods with its presence throughout our lives

One is morally obligated to divert to utilitarianism if the alternative is extinction.

Kateb**,** prof. of politics at Princeton University, **19**92 (George, “The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture”, p. 12)

The main point, however, is that utilitarianism has a necessary pace in any democratic country's normal political deliberations. But its advocates must know its place, which ordinarily is only to help to decide what the theory of rights leaves alone. When may rights be overridden by government? I have two sorts of cases in mind: overriding a particular right of some persons for the sake of preserving the same right of others, and overriding the same right of everyone for the sake of what I will clumsily call "civilization values." An advocate of rights could countenance, perhaps must countenance, the state's overriding of rights for these two reasons. The subject is painful and liable to dispute every step of the way. For the state to override is, sacrifice—a right of some so that others may keep it. the situation must be desperate. I have in mind, say, circumstances in which the choice is between sacrificing a right of some and letting a right of all be lost. The state (or some other agent) may kill some (or allow them to he killed), if the only alternative is letting every-one die. It is the right to life which most prominently figures in thinking about desperate situations. I cannot see any resolution but to heed the precept that "numbers count." Just as one may prefer saving one's own life to saving that of another when both cannot be saved, so a third parry—let us say, the state—can (perhaps must) choose to save the greater number of lives and at the cost of the lesser number, when there is otherwise no hope for either group. That choice does not mean that those to be sacrificed are immoral if they resist being sacrificed. It follows, of course, that if a third party is right to risk or sacrifice the lives of the lesser for the lives of the greater number when the lesser would otherwise live, the lesser are also not wrong if they resist being sacrificed.

Our ethical obligation to secure justice demands calculative thought—the alternative is the continuation of violence and oppression

Campbell 99 (David, Prof of Int’l Politics @ Univ. of Newcastle, Moral Spaces, p. 46-7)

That undecidability resides within the decision, Derrida argues, "that justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable cannot and should not serve as alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, or between institutions or states and others."9' Indeed, "incalculable justice requires us to calculate." From where does this insistence come? What is behind, what is animating, these imperatives? It is both the character of infinite justice as a heteronomic relationship to the other, a relationship that because of its undecidability multiplies responsibility, and the fact that "left to itself, the incalculable and giving (donatrice) idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst, for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation."92 The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty, a duty that inhabits the instant of madness and compels the decision to avoid "the bad," the "perverse calculation," even "the worst." This is the duty that also dwells with deconstruction and makes it the starting point, the "at least necessary condition," for the organization of resistance to totalitarianism in all its forms. And it is a duty that responds to practical political concerns when we recognize that Derrida names the bad, the perverse, and the worst as those violences "we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism." Furthermore, the duty within the decision, the obligation that recognizes the necessity of negotiating the possibilities provided by the impossibilities of justice, is not content with simply avoiding, containing, combating, or negating the worst violence-though it could certainly begin with those strategies. Instead, this responsibility, which is the responsibility of responsibility, commissions a "utopian" strategy. Not a strategy that is beyond all bounds of possibility so as to be considered "unrealistic," but one which in respecting the necessity of calculation, takes the possibility summoned by the calculation as far as possible, "must take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find ourselves and beyond the already identifiable zones of morality or politics or law, beyond the distinction between national and international, public and private, and so on."94 As Derrida declares, "The condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible: the testing of the aporia from which one may invent the only possible invention, the impossible invention."95 This leads Derrida to enunciate a proposition that many, not the least of whom are his Habermasian critics, could hardly have expected: "Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. We cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or with sophistication, at least not without treating it too lightly and forming the worst complicities." 6

**Extinction**

**Lamb, 2008** (Robert, Staff Writer, B.A. in creative writing from the University of Tennessee, “What would nuclear winter be like?”, How Stuff Works, <http://science.howstuffworks.com/nuclear-winter.htm/printable>)

What would nuclear winter be like? ­Call it par­anoia or keen insight, but humans have long pondered the possibility that the end of the world won't come as the result of warring gods or cosmic mishap, but due to our own self-destructive tendencies. Once nomads in the primordial wilds, we've climbed a ladder of technology, taken on the mantle of civilization and declared ourselves masters of the planet. But how long can we lord over our domain without destroying ourselves? After all, if we learned nothing else from "2001: A Space Odyssey," it's that if you give a monkey a bone, it inevitably will beat another monkey to death with it. Genetically fused to our savage past, we've cut a blood-drenched trail through the centuries. We've destroyed civilizations, waged war and scarred the face of the planet with our progress -- and our weapons have grown more powerful. Following the first successful test of a nuclear weapon on July 16, 1945, Manhattan Project director J. Robert Oppenheimer brooded on the dire implications. Later, he famously invoked a quote from the Bhagavad Gita: "Now I am become death, the destroyer of worlds." ­In the decades following that detonation, humanity quaked with fear at atomic weaponry. As the global nuclear arsenal swelled, so, too, did our dread of the breed of war we might unleash with it. As scientists researched the possible ramifications of such a conflict, a new term entered the public vernacular: nuclear winter. If the sight of a mushroom cloud burning above the horizon suggests that the world might end with a bang, then nuclear winter presents the notion that post-World War III humanity might very well die with a whimper. Since the early 1980s, this scenario has permeated our most dismal visions of the future: Suddenly, the sky blazes with the radiance of a thousand suns. Millions of lives burn to ash and shadow. Finally, as nuclear firestorms incinerate cities and fo­rests, torrents of smoke ascend into the atmosphere to entomb the planet in billowing, black clouds of ash. The result is noontime darkness, plummeting temperatures and the eventual death of life on planet Earth. ­The theory of nuclear winter is essentially one of environmental collateral damage. While a nuclear attack might target a nation's military infrastructure or population centers, the assault could inflict massive harm to Earth's atmosphere. It's easy to take the air we breathe for granted, but the atmosphere is a vital component of all life on this planet. In fact, scientists believe it co-evolved to its present state along with Earth's unicellular organisms. It protects us from dangerous levels of solar radiation, but also allows the sun to heat our world. Sunlight shines through the atmosphere and warms the planet's surface, which then emits terrestrial radiation that heats the air. If sufficient ash from burning cities and forests ascended into the sky, it could effectively work as an umbrella, shielding large portions of the Earth from the sun. If you diminish the amount of sunlight that makes its way to the surface, then you diminish the resulting atmospheric temperature -- as well as potentially interfere with photosynthesis. Examples of this scenario have occurred on a smaller scale in recent history. For instance, the 1883 eruption of the Indonesian volcano Krakatoa blasted enough volcanic ash into the atmosphere to lower global temperatures by 2.2 degrees F (1.2 degrees C) for an entire year [source: Maynard]. Decades earlier in 1815, the eruption of Mount Tambora in Indonesia blocked enough sunlight around the globe to cause what came to be known as "the year without summer" [source: Discovery Channel] That following year, residents in the United States experienced summer snows and temperatures between 5 and 10 degrees F (3 and 6 degrees C) less than average. This drop in temperatures devastated crops and caused hundreds of thousands of deaths -- not counting those who perished in Indonesia. Some archeologists theorize that an even greater cataclysm occurred 65 million years ago when an asteroid collided with Earth. Called the K-T boundary extinction event, some experts believe this collision may have ejected enough ash and debris into the atmosphere to cause an impact winter. The premise is the same as nuclear winter, only with a different method of generating the atmospheric debris. Some paleontologists suspect such an impact winter brought about the extinction of the dinosaurs. Nuclear Winter and the Ozone Some scientists predict that nuclear winter would be followed by an even harsher spring. They theorize that the sunlight bounced back up from the smoke clouds would heat up nitrogen oxides in the stratosphere. At high temperatures, the nitrogen oxides, which formed due to blast-burned oxygen, would deplete the ozone layer at much higher than normal rates. ­Natural disasters aren't the only proven temperature changers. At the close of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein torched 736 Kuwaiti oil wells. The fires raged for nine months, during which average local air temperatures fell by 18.3 degrees F (10.2 degrees C) [source: McLaren]. ­As severe as these examples seem, nuclear winter theorists provided a far bleaker forecast should nuclear war erupt between the nuclear superpowers of United States and the then-Soviet Union. In the 1980s theorists predicted decade-long temperate decreases of as much as 72 degrees F (40 degrees C) [source: Perkins]. Such a winter could finish the destruction that nuclear war started, sending the survivors down a chilling path of famine and starvation.

**Nuclear extinction outweighs all other impacts-even if the risk of extinction is small, its magnitude requires evaluation before all else**

**Schell, 1982** (Jonathan, professor at Wesleyan University, former writer and editor at the New Yorker, “The Fate of the Earth,” pg. 93-94)

<To say that human extinction is a certainty would, of course, be a misrepresentation—just as it would be a misrepresentation to say that extinction can be ruled out. To begin with, we know that a holocaust may not occur at all. If one does occur, the adversaries may not use all their weapons. If they do use all their weapons, the global effects, in the ozone and elsewhere, may be moderate. And if the effects are not moderate but extreme, the ecosphere may prove resilient enough to withstand them without breaking down catastrophically. These are all substantial reasons for supposing that mankind will not be extinguished in a nuclear holocaust, or even that extinction in a holocaust is unlikely, and they tend to calm our fear and to reduce our sense of urgency. Yet at the same time we are compelled to admit that there may be a holocaust, that the adversaries may use all their weapons, that the global effects, including effects of which we are as yet unaware, may be severe, that the ecosphere may suffer catastrophic breakdown, and that our species may be extinguished. We are left with uncertainty, and are forced to make our decisions in a state of uncertainty. If we wish to act to save our species, we have to muster our resolve in spite of our awareness that the life of the species may not now in fact be jeopardized. On the other hand, if we wish to ignore the peril, we have to admit that we do so in the knowledge that the species may be in danger of imminent self-destruction. When the existence of nuclear weapons was made known, thoughtful people everywhere in the world realized that if the great powers entered into a nuclear-arms race the human species would sooner or later face the possibility of extinction. They also realized that in the absence of international agreements preventing it an arms race would probably occur. They knew that the path of nuclear armament was a dead end for mankind. The discovery of the energy in mass—of "the basic power of the universe"—and of a means by which man could release that energy altered the relationship between man and the source of his life, the earth. In the shadow of this power, the earth became small and the life of the human species doubtful. In that sense, the question of human extinction has been on the political agenda of the world ever since the first nuclear weapon was detonated, and there was no need for the world to build up its present tremendous arsenals before starting to worry about it. At just what point the species crossed, or will have crossed, the boundary between merely having the technical knowledge to destroy itself and actually having the arsenals at hand, ready to be used at any second, is not precisely knowable. But it is clear that at present, with some twenty thousand megatons of nuclear explosive power in existence, and with more being added every day, we have entered into the zone of uncertainty, which is to say the zone of risk of extinction. But the mere risk of extinction has a significance that is categorically different from, and immeasurably greater than, that of any other risk, and as we make our decisions we have to take that significance into account. Up to now, every risk has been contained within the frame of life; extinction would shatter the frame. It represents not the defeat of some purpose but an abyss in which all human purposes would be drowned for all time. We have no right to place the possibility of this limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risks that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our particular transient moment of human history. To employ a mathematical analogy, we can say that although the risk of extinction may be fractional, the stake is, humanly speaking, infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still infinity

. In other words, once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although, scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species. In weighing the fate of the earth and, with it, our own fate, we stand before a mystery, and in tampering with the earth we tamper with a mystery. We are in deep ignorance. Our ignorance should dispose us to wonder, our wonder should make us humble, our humility should inspire us to reverence and caution, and our reverence and caution should lead us to act without delay to withdraw the threat we now pose to the earth and to ourselves.

In trying to describe possible consequences of a nuclear holocaust, I have mentioned the limitless complexity of its effects on human society and on the ecosphere—a complexity that sometimes seems to be as great as that of life itself. But if these effects should lead to human extinction, then all the complexity will give way to the utmost simplicity—the simplicity of nothingness. We—the human race—shall cease to be.>

# Block

#### The affirmatives failure to consult removes indigenous peoples from participation in public affairs --- Prior and binding consultation with the indigenous communities of Mexico is critical to preserve culture.

Trejo ’11 (Karen, chief of staff at EOG Workforce Solutions, responsible for human resource PVM insurance, Human resources Mendez Group Business Advisors, LAPress, 7/30/13 http://www.lapress.org/articles.asp?art=6426)

**The violation of the right to consultation, which is constitutionally established, is systematic in Mexico, as is the right to participation in public affairs.** One of the primary reasons, according to reports from civil society organizations, has to do with a governmental strategy to illegally impose infrastructural megaprojects in indigenous and rural areas, as well as in nature reserves. **This problem has been aggravating social and agrarian conflicts in various regions of the country; this in turn has increased the vulnerability of indigenous communities that**, not having been informed or consulted, **are seriously threatened with the dispossession of their lands, environmental degradation and forced displacement.** Priscila Rodríguez, a lawyer with the Mexican Center for Environmental Law, or CEMDA, explains that among the factors that prevent the indigenous communities from fully securing the right to consultation is the failure to apply Article 2 of the Mexican Constitution, which requires authorities to carry out consultation processes when it comes to planning and implementing legislation, development programs, and infrastructural construction projects that impact the communities’ territories and natural resources. In March 2010, a debate began in the House of Representatives over a bill called the Consultation with Indigenous Peoples and Communities to regulate that article; from December to May, a consultation process was conducted with indigenous peoples and communities in several states across the country to discuss the project. The result was not encouraging. While this initiative, promoted by the center-right Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI, envisages **the obligation of federal and state governments, as well as the legislature**, to ensure the right to prior consultation with the indigenous communities on issues relating mainly to the establishment of legislative measures, the care and enjoyment of natural resources in their territories, and the implementation of operating rules and regulations in social programs at all three levels of government, it also **maintains that neither public budget allocation nor the appointment of leaders in charge of the specialized agencies that deal with indigenous peoples**, except the delegates of the National Commission for the Development of Indigenous Peoples, or CDI, **may be the subject of consultation.** Nor can it be considered binding law because it does not impose penalties on officials and/or private companies for breach of agreements or if the consultations are n/ot performed properly. Against this backdrop, social activists for the rights of indigenous peoples in Mexico have formally requested the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, IACHR, to chair a working group with the Mexican state and civil society to bring this bill in line with standards for the protection of human rights established by international treaties that Mexico has ratified. This proposal has not yet materialized.

### Net-Benefit

#### Consultation creates procedural norms and cultural protections that the difference between life and death for indigenous peoples

Rodriguez-Garavito 2010

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The reverse of the domination effect consists in the emancipatory possibilities presented by consultation processes. In practice, consultation is simultaneously a means to both perpetuate and challenge profound inequalities among actors situated in minefields. While they dilute indigenous political demands, procedural norms also create precious opportunities and tools—sometimes the only ones available—for halting (or at least postponing) irreversible cultural and environmental harm and founding or re-founding processes of collective mobilization. The ethnographic evidence demonstrates that consultation’s emancipatory effect can be direct or indirect. The effect is direct when subaltern actors—indigenous communities and their allies—demand compliance with procedural norms and propose interpretations of them that mitigate power asymmetries vis-à-vis consultation’s dominant actors. The process itself has emancipatory potential, to the extent that it establishes strict requirements that reduce the gap between the conditions of actual consultations, on the one hand, and those necessary for genuine deliberation, on the other. As we saw earlier, procedural regulations are not irrelevant. Once they are put into operation, they make a difference that can be, literally, a difference between life and death. For example, an indigenous people’s survival can depend on the possibility that not only do their members have standing to participate in consultation, but so do allied national indigenous organizations who—due to their legal expertise or experience in other consultations—can help balance out power relations. As the U.N. Rapporteurship and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have recognized, whether the standard of consultation or the standard of consent is applied can determine the fate of an indigenous people affected by a large-scale economic project. The Embera of northern Colombia have experienced this difference between life and death literally.

## perm both

#### Permutation do both fails --- Consultation must happen prior to exploration, exploitation, or relocation to prevent deliberate and inadvertent cultural destruction.

Tamang 05 (Parsuharm. Indigenous expert, UN member. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. January 17-19, 2005. <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CDUQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.un.org%2Fesa%2Fsocdev%2Funpfii%2Fdocuments%2Fworkshop_FPIC_tamang.doc&ei=fWX1UbzpAYWWrgHzmICYDw&usg=AFQjCNF5rEZ6DyHFYN3q6mSr9dcoV-LVeQ&sig2=2afHkknmQTU37Lc2nW7fQA&bvm=bv.49784469,d.aWM> ) Ji

ILO convention (Human Rights Law):¶ 29. ILO 169/1989 refers to the principles of FPIC: Article 6, 7, 16, 16 and 22 provides that the government shall:¶ (a) consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures ¶ (b). in particular through their representative institutions; establish means by which these peoples can freely participate to at least the same extent as other sectors of population;¶ (C) assist these peoples’ own institutions and initiatives and in appropriate cases provide the resources for these purposes.¶ 30. In general the Convention specifies that consultation should take place specifically in the following circumstances:¶ (a) When considering legislative or administrative measures that are likely to affect indigenous and tribal peoples {article 6.1 (a)};¶ (b) Prior to exploration or exploitation of sub-surface resources (article 15.2);¶ ( c). When any consideration is being given to indigenous and tribal peoples’ capacity to alienate their lands or to transmit them outside their own communities (article 17);¶ (d). Prior to relocation, which should take place only with the FPIC of IPs (article 16);¶ (e). On the organisation and operation of special vocational training programmes (article 22).¶

## Kritik

#### Coloniality makes war and genocide inevitable

Mignolo (Professor of Romance Languages at Duke University) 5

(Walter, “The Idea of Latin America,” pg. 11) //DDI13

The logic of coloniality can be understood as working through four wide domains of human experience: (1) the economic: appropriation of land, exploitation of labor, and control of finance; (2) the political: control of authority; (3) the civic: control of gender and sexuality; (4) the epistemic and the subjective/personal: control of knowledge and subjectivity. The logic of coloniality has been in place from the conquest and colonization of Mexico and Peru until and beyond the war in Iraq, despite superficial changes in the scale and agents of exploitation/control in the past five hundred years of history. Each domain is interwoven with the others, since appropriation of land or exploitation of labor also involves the control of finance, of authority, of gender, and of knowledge and subjectivity.8 The operation of the colonial matrix is invisible to distracted eyes, and even when it surfaces, it is explained through the rhetoric of modernity that the situation can be “corrected” with “development,” “democracy,” a “strong economy,” etc. What some will see as “lies” from the US presidential administration are not so much lies as part of a very well-codified “rhetoric of modernity,” promising salvation for everybody in order to divert attention from the increasingly oppressive consequences of the logic of coloniality. To implement the logic of coloniality requires the celebratory rhetoric of modernity, as the case of Iraq has illustrated from day one. As capital and power concentrate in fewer and fewer hands and poverty increases all over the word, the logic of coloniality becomes ever more oppressive and merciless. Since the sixteenth century, the rhetoric of modernity has relied on the vocabulary of salvation, which was accompanied by the massive appropriation of land in the New World and the massive exploitation of Indian and African slave labor, justified by a belief in the dispensability of human life – the lives of the slaves. Thus, while some Christians today, for example, beat the drum of “pro-life values,” they reproduce a rhetoric that diverts attention from the increasing “devaluation of human life” that the thousands dead in Iraq demonstrate. Thus, it is not modernity that will overcome coloniality, because it is precisely modernity that needs and produces coloniality.

#### Colonization reinforces a patriarchal state – allows gender domination and exclusion

**Lugones, 7**

**(**María, "Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System." *Hypatia* 22, no. 1 (2007): 187-188, doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2007.tb01156.x.)//SDL //DDI13

The imposition of the European state system, with its atten- dant legal and bureaucratic machinery, is the most enduring legacy of European colonial rule in Africa. One tradition that was exported to Africa during this period was the exclusion of women from the newly created colonial public sphere. ...The very process by which females were categorized and reduced to ‘‘women”made them ineligible for leadership roles. ...The emergence of women as an identifiable category, defined by their anatomy and subordinated to men in all situations, resulted, in part, from the imposition of a patriarchal colonial state. For females, colonization was a twofold process of racial inferioriza- tion and gender subordination. The creation of “women” as a category was one of the very first accomplishments of the colo- nial state. It is not surprising, therefore, that it was unthinkable for the colonial government to recognize female leaders among the peoples they colonized, such as the Yorhbl. ...The transfor- mation of state power to male-gender power was accomplished at one level by the exclusion of women from state structures. This was in sharp contrast toYonib state organization, in which power was not gender-determined. (123-25)

Oyewijmi recognizes two crucial processes in colonization, the imposition of races with the accompanying inferiorization of Africans, and the inferiorization of anafemales. The inferiorization of anafemales extended very widely-fiom exclusion from leadership roles to loss of control over property and other important economic domains. Oyewiimi notes that the introduction of the Western gender system was accepted by Yoruba males, who thus colluded with the inferiorization of anafemales. So, when we think of the indifference of nonwhite men to the violences exercised against nonwhite women, we can begin to have some sense of the collaboration between anamales and Western colonials against anafemales. Oyewhmi makes clear that both men and women resisted cultural changes at different levels. Thus, while in the West the challenge of feminism is how to proceed from the gender-saturated category of “women” to the fullness of an unsexed humanity. For Yo&bA obinrin, the challenge is obvi- ously different because at certain levels in the society and in some spheres, the notion of an “unsexed humanity” is neither a dream to aspire to nor a memory to be realized. It exists, albeit in concatenation with the reality of separate and hierarchical sexes imposed during the colonial period. (156)

We can see, then, that the scope of the coloniality of gender is much too narrow. Quijano assumes much of the terms of the modern/colonial gender system’s hegemonic light side in defining the scope of gender. I have gone out- side the coloniality of gender in order to examine what it hides, or disallows from consideration, about the very scope of the gender system of Eurocentered global capitalism. So, though I think that the coloniality of gender, as Quijano pointedly describes it, shows us very important aspects of the intersection of race and gender, it follows rather than discloses the erasure of colonized women from most areas of social life. It accommodates rather than disrupt the narrowing of gender domination. Oyewamfs rejection of the gender lens in characterizing the inferiorization of anafemales in modem colonization makes clear the extent and scope of the inferiorization. Her understanding of gender, the colonial, Euro- centered capitalist construction is much more encompassing than Quijano’s. She enables us to see the economic, political, and cognitive inferiorization as well as the inferiorization of anafemales regarding reproductive control.

## F/w

#### Epistemology must be the focus of debate – questioning Western knowledge production is the only way to end its privileging that creates hierarchies between nations and races

Mignolo (Professor of Literature in Duke University, Joint Appointments in Cultural Anthropology and Romance Studies) 2009

Walter, “Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom,” Theory, Culture, & Society, 161-163, NDW //DDI13

ONCE UPON a time scholars assumed that the knowing subject in the disciplines is transparent, disincorporated from the known and untouched by the geo-political configuration of the world in which people are racially ranked and regions are racially configured. From a detached and neutral point of observation (that Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gómez (2007) describes as the hubris of the zero point), the knowing subject maps the world and its problems, classifies people and projects into what is good for them. Today that assumption is no longer tenable, although there are still many believers. At stake is indeed the question of racism and epistemology (Chukwudi Eze, 1997; Mignolo, forthcoming). And once upon a time scholars assumed that if you ‘come’ from Latin America you have to ‘talk about’ Latin America; that in such a case you have to be a token of your culture. Such expectation will not arise if the author ‘comes’ from Germany, France, England or the US. In such cases it is not assumed that you have to be talking about your culture but can function as a theoretically minded person. As we know: the first world has knowledge, the third world has culture; Native Americans have wisdom, Anglo Americans have science. The need for political and epistemic delinking here comes to the fore, as well as decolonializing and decolonial knowledges, necessary steps for imagining and building democratic, just, and non-imperial/colonial societies. Geo-politics of knowledge goes hand in hand with geo-politics of knowing. Who and when, why and where is knowledge generated (rather than produced, like cars or cell phones)? Asking these questions means to shift the attention from the enunciated to the enunciation. And by so doing, turning Descartes’s dictum inside out: rather than assuming that thinking comes before being, one assumes instead that it is a racially marked body in a geo-historical marked space that feels the urge or get the call to speak, to articulate, in whatever semiotic system, the urge that makes of living organisms ‘human’ beings. By setting the scenario in terms of geo- and body-politics I am starting and departing from already familiar notions of ‘situated knowledges’. Sure, all knowledges are situated and every knowledge is constructed. But that is just the beginning. The question is: who, when, why is constructing knowledges (Mignolo, 1999, 2005 [1995])? Why did eurocentered epistemology conceal its own geo-historical and bio-graphical locations and succeed in creating the idea of universal knowledge as if the knowing subjects were also universal? This illusion is pervasive today in the social sciences, the humanities, the natural sciences and the professional schools. Epistemic disobedience means to delink from the illusion of the zero point epistemology. The shift I am indicating is the anchor (constructed of course, located of course, not just anchored by nature or by God) of the argument that follows. It is the beginning of any epistemic decolonial de-linking with all its historical, political and ethical consequences. Why? Because geo-historical and bio-graphic loci of enunciation have been located by and through the making and transformation of the colonial matrix of power: a racial system of social classification that invented Occidentalism (e.g. Indias Occidentales), that created the conditions for Orientalism; distinguished the South of Europe from its center (Hegel) and, on that long history, remapped the world as first, second and third during the Cold War. Places of nonthought (of myth, non-western religions, folklore, underdevelopment involving regions and people) today have been waking up from the long process of westernization. The anthropos inhabiting non-European places discovered that s/he had been invented, as anthropos, by a locus of enunciations self-defined as humanitas. Now, there are currently two kinds or directions advanced by the former anthropos who are no longer claiming recognition by or inclusion in the humanitas, but engaging in epistemic disobedience and de-linking from the magic of the Western idea of modernity, ideals of humanity and promises of economic growth and financial prosperity (Wall Street dixit). One direction unfolds within the globalization of a type of economy that in both liberal and Marxist vocabulary is defined as ‘capitalism’. One of the strongest advocates of this is the Singaporean scholar, intellectual and politician Kishore Mahbubani, to which I will return later. One of his earlier book titles carries the unmistakable and irreverent message: Can Asians Think?: Understanding the Divide between East and West (2001). Following Mahbubani’s own terminology, this direction could be identified as de-westernization. Dewesternization means, within a capitalist economy, that the rules of the game and the shots are no longer called by Western players and institutions. The seventh Doha round is a signal example of de-westernizing options. The second direction is being advanced by what I describe as the decolonial option. The decolonial option is the singular connector of a diversity of decolonials. The decolonial paths have one thing in common: the colonial wound, the fact that regions and people around the world have been classified as underdeveloped economically and mentally. Racism not only affects people but also regions or, better yet, the conjunction of natural resources needed by humanitas in places inhabited by anthropos. De - colonial options have one aspect in common with de-westernizing arguments: the definitive rejection of ‘being told’ from the epistemic privileges of the zero point what ‘we’ are, what our ranking is in relation to the ideal of humanitas and what we have to do to be recognized as such. However, decolonial and de-westernizing options diverge in one crucial and in - disputable point: while the latter do not question the ‘civilization of death’ hidden under the rhetoric of modernization and prosperity, of the improvement of modern institutions (e.g. liberal democracy and an economy propelled by the principle of growth and prosperity), decolonial options start from the principle that the regeneration of life shall prevail over primacy of the production and reproduction of goods at the cost of life (life in general and of humanitas and anthropos alike!). I illustrate this direction, below, commenting on Partha Chatterjee’s re-orienting ‘eurocentered modernity’ toward the future in which ‘our modernity’ (in India, in Central Asia and the Caucasus, in South America, briefly, in all regions of the world upon which eurocentered modernity was either imposed or ‘adopted’ by local actors assimilating to local histories inventing and enacting global designs) becomes the statement of interconnected dispersal in which decolonial futures are being played out. Last but not least, my argument doesn’t claim originality (‘originality’ is one of the basic expectations of modern control of subjectivity) but aims to make a contribution to growing processes of decoloniality around the world. My humble claim is that geo- and body-politics of knowledge has been hidden from the self-serving interests of Western epistemology and that a task of decolonial thinking is the unveiling of epistemic silences of Western epistemology and affirming the epistemic rights of the racially devalued, and decolonial options to allow the silences to build arguments to confront those who take ‘originality’ as the ultimate criterion for the final judgment.

#### We must change the terms of discussion to cause concrete change - focusing on the enunciated conceals inherent injustice while focus on the enunciation has the ability to break down racism and patriarchy by changing what it means to be human

Mignolo (Professor of Literature in Duke University, Joint Appointments in Cultural Anthropology and Romance Studies) 2009

Walter, “Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom,” Theory, Culture, & Society, 163-166, NDW //DDI13

The introduction of geo-historical and bio-graphical configurations in processes of knowing and understanding allows for a radical re-framing (e.g. decolonization) of the original formal apparatus of enunciation.2 I have supported in the past those who maintain that it is not enough to change the content of the conversation, that it is of the essence to change the terms of the conversation. Changing the terms of the conversation implies going beyond disciplinary or interdisciplinary controversies and the conflict of interpretations. As far as controversies and interpretations remain within the same rules of the game (terms of the conversation), the control of knowledge is not called into question. And in order to call into question the modern/colonial foundation of the control of knowledge, it is necessary to focus on the knower rather than on the known. It means to go to the very assumptions that sustain locus enunciations. In what follows I revisit the formal apparatus of enunciation from the perspective of geo- and bio-graphic politics of knowledge. My revisiting is epistemic rather than linguistic, although focusing on the enunciation is unavoidable if we aim at changing the terms and not only the content of the conversation. The basic assumption is that the knower is always implicated, geo- and body-politically, in the known, although modern epistemology (e.g. the hubris of the zero point) managed to conceal both and created the figure of the detached observer, a neutral seeker of truth and objectivity who at the same time controls the disciplinary rules and puts himself or herself in a privileged position to evaluate and dictate. The argument is structured as follows. Sections I and II lay out the ground for the politics of knowledge geo-historically and bio-graphically, contesting the hegemony of zero point epistemology. In Section III, I explore three cases in which geo- and body-politics of knowledge comes forcefully to the fore: one from Africa, one from India and the third from New Zealand. These three cases are complemented by a fourth from Latin America: my argument is here. It is not the report of a detached observer but the intervention of a decolonial project that ‘comes’ from South America, the Caribbean and Latinidad in the US. Understanding the argument implies that the reader will shift his or her geography of reasoning and of evaluating arguments. In Section IV, I come back to geo- and body-politics of knowledge and their epistemic, ethical and political consequences. In Section V, I attempt to pull the strings together and weave my argument with the three cases explored, hoping that what I say will not be taken as the report of a detached observer but as the intervention of a decolonial thinker. In semiotics, a basic distinction has been made (Emile Benveniste) between the enunciation and the enunciated. The distinction was necessary, for Benveniste, to ground the floating sign central to Ferdinand de Saussure’s semiology and its development in French structuralism. Benveniste turned to the enunciation and, by doing so, to the subject producing and manipulating signs, rather than the structure of the sign itself (the enunciated). With this distinction in mind, I would venture to say that the interrelated spheres of the colonial matrix of power (economy, authority, gender and sexuality, and knowledge/subjectivity) operate at the level of the enunciated while patriarchy and racism are grounded in the enunciation. Let’s explore it in more detail (Benveniste, 1970; Todorov, 1970). Benveniste laid out the ‘formal apparatus of enunciation’ that he described on the bases of the pronominal system of any language (although his examples were mainly European languages), plus the temporal and spatial deitics or markers. The pronominal system is activated in each verbal (that is, oral or written) enunciation. The enunciator is of necessity located in the first person pronoun (I). If the enunciator says ‘we’, the first person pronoun is presupposed in such a way that ‘we’ could refer to either the enunciator and the person or persons being addressed, or by ‘we’ the enunciator could mean he or she and someone else, not including the addressee. The remaining pronouns are activated around the I/we of the enunciation. The same happens with temporal and spatial markers. The enunciator can only enunciate in the present. The past and the future are meaningful only in relation to the present of the enunciation. And the enunciator can only enunciate ‘here’, that is, wherever she is located at the moment of enunciation. Thus, ‘there’, ‘behind’, ‘next to’, ‘left and right’ etc., are meaningful only in reference to the enunciator’s ‘here’. Now let’s take a second step. The extension of linguistic theory and analysis from the sentence to discourse prompted the introduction of ‘discursive frame’ or ‘conversation frame’. Indeed, engaging in conversation, letter writing, meetings of various kinds, etc., requires more than the formal apparatus of enunciation: it requires a frame, that is, a context familiar to all participants, be it in business meetings, casual conversations, internet messages, etc. While in everyday life frames are not regulated but rather operate through consensual agreements, disciplinary knowledge requires more complex and regulated frames known today as ‘scholarly disciplines’. In the European Renaissance, the disciplines were classified into the ‘trivium’ and the ‘cuadrivium’, while Christian theology was the ceiling under which both the trivium and the cuadrivium were housed. ‘Beyond’ that ceiling was the world of pagans, gentiles and Saracens. In 18th-century Europe, the movement toward secularization brought with it a radical transformation of the frame of mind and the organization of knowledge, the disciplines and the institutions (e.g. the university). The Kantian-Humboldtian model3 displaced the goals and the format of the Renaissance university and instead promoted the secularization of the university founded on secular science (from Galileo to Newton) and on secular philosophy, and both declared war against Christian theology (Kant, 1991 [1798]). During the first quarter of the 19th century, the reorganization of knowledge and the formation of new disciplines (biology, economy, psychology) left ‘behind’ the trivium and the cuadrivium and marched toward the new organization between human sciences (social sciences and the humanities) and natural sciences.4 Wilhelm Dilthey (1991) came up with his ground-breaking epistemic distinction between ideographic and nomothetic sciences, the first concerned with meaning and interpretations, the second with laws and explanations.5 These are still distinctions that hold true today, even if there have been, at the surface, disciplines that have crossed lines in one or other direction and pushed toward interdisciplinarity that more often than not is based on these distinctions, although not addressing them. So then we have moved from the formal apparatus of enunciation to frames of conversations, to disciplines and to something that is above the discipline, a super-frame that I would name ‘cosmology’. The history of knowledge-making in modern Western history from the Renaissance on will have, then, theology and philosophy-science as the two cosmological frames, competing with each other at one level, but collaborating with each other when the matter is to disqualify forms of knowledge beyond these two frames. Both frames are institutionally and linguistically anchored in Western Europe. They are anchored in institutions, chiefly the history of European universities and in the six modern (e.g. vernacular) European and imperial languages: Italian, Spanish and Portuguese, dominant from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, and German, French and English, dominant from the Enlightenment onward. Behind the six modern European languages of knowledge lay its foundation: Greek and Latin – not Arabic or Mandarin, Hindi or Urdu, Aymara or Nahuatl. The six mentioned languages based on Greek and Latin provided the ‘tool’ to create a given conception of knowledge that was then extended to the increasing, through time, European colonies from the Americas to Asia and Africa. In the Americas, notably, we encounter something that is alien to Asian and African regions: the colonial European university, such as the University of Santo Domingo (1538), the University of Mexico (1551), the University of San Marcos, Lima (1551) and Harvard University (1636). The linguistic, institutional foundation, management and practices that knowledge-making brings allow me to extend Benveniste’s formal apparatus of enunciation and to elaborate on enunciation and knowledge-making focusing on the borders between the Western (in the precise linguistic and institutional sense I defined above) foundation of knowledge and understanding (epistemology and hermeneutics) and its confrontation with knowledge- making in non-European languages and institutions in China,6 in the Islamic Caliphate, or education in the institutions of the Maya, Aztecs and Incas that the Encyclopaedia Britannica has deigned to describe as ‘education in primitive and early civilizations’.7 Perhaps Frantz Fanon conceptualized better than anyone else what I have in mind for extending Benveniste’s formal apparatus of enunciation. In Black Skin, White Masks (1967 [1952]) Fanon made an epistemic foundational statement about language that no one in the heated atmosphere of structuralism and post-structuralism picked up in the 1960s. And it was still ignored by the most semantic and philological orientation of Emile Benveniste’s approaches to language. This is what Fanon (pp. 17–18) said: To speak means to be in a position to use a certain syntax, to grasp the morphology of this or that language, but it means above all to assume a culture, to support the weight of a civilization . . . The problem that we confront in this chapter is this: The Negro of the Antilles will be proportionally whiter – that is, he will come closer to being a real human being – in direct ratio to his mastery of the French language.8 Fanon’s dictum applies to the disciplines but also to the sphere of knowledge in general: the Negro of the Antilles, the Indian from India and from the Americas or New Zealand and Australia, the Negro from sub-Saharan Africa, the Muslim from the Middle East or Indonesia, etc., ‘will come closer to being a real human being in direct ratio to his or her mastery of disciplinary norms’. Obviously, Fanon’s point is not to be recognized or accepted in the club of ‘real human beings’ defined on the basis of white knowledge and white history, but to take away the imperial/colonial idea of what it means to be human. This is a case, precisely, in which the assault to the imperiality of modern/colonial loci of enunciations (disciplines and institutions) is called into question. A case in point was the question asked by many philosophers in Africa and South America during the Cold War, and is being asked today by Latino and Latina philosophers in the United States.

## Links

### State

#### The coloniality linked with the idea of America creates a logical structure of colonial domination that wants to control and dominate the planet

Mignolo (Professor of Romance Languages at Duke University) 5

(Walter, “The Idea of Latin America,” pg 5) //DDI13

How do these two entangled concepts, modernity and coloniality, work together as two sides of the same reality to shape the idea of “America” in the sixteenth century and of “Latin” America in the nineteenth? Modernity has been a term in use for the past thirty or forty years. In spite of differences in opinions and deﬁnitions, there are some basic agreements about its meaning. From the European perspective, modernity refers to a period in world history that has been traced back either to the European Renaissance and the “discovery” of America (this view is common among scholars from the South of Europe, Italy, Spain, and Portugal), or to the European Enlightenment (this view is held by scholars and intel-lectuals and assumed by the media in Anglo-Saxon countries – England, Germany, and Holland – and one Latin country, France). On the other side of the colonial difference, scholars and intellectu-als in the ex-Spanish and ex-Portuguese colonies in South America have been advancing the idea that the achievements of modernity go hand in hand with the violence of coloniality. The difference, to reiterate, lies in which side of each local history is told. O’Gorman’s “invention of America” theory was a turning point that put on the table a perspective that was absent and not recognized from the existing European and imperial narratives. Let’s agree that O’Gorman made visible a dimension of history that was occluded by the partial “discovery” narratives, and let’s also agree that it is an example of how things may look from the varied experiences of coloniality. America, as a concept, goes hand in hand with that of modernity, and both are the self-representation of imperial projects and global designs that originated in and were implemented by European actors and institutions. The invention of America was one of the nodal points that contributed to create the conditions for imperial European expansion and a lifestyle, in Europe, that served as a model for the achievements of humanity. Thus, the “discovery and conquest of America” is not just one more event in some long and linear historical chain from the creation of the world to the present, leaving behind all those who were not attentive enough to jump onto the bandwagon of modernity. Rather, it was a key turning point in world history: It was the moment in which the demands of modernity as the ﬁnal horizon of salvation began to require the imposition of a speciﬁc set of values that relied on the logic of coloniality for their implementation. The “invention of America” thesis offers, instead, a perspective from coloniality and, in consequence, reveals that the advances of modernity outside of Europe rely on a colonial matrix of power that includes the renaming of the lands appropriated and of the people inhabiting them, insofar as the diverse ethnic groups and civilizations in Tawantinsuyu and Anáhuac, as well as those from Africa, were reduced to “Indians” and “Blacks.” The idea of “America” and of “Latin” America could, of course, be accounted for within the philosophical framework of European modernity, even if that account is offered by Creoles of European descent dwelling in the colonies and embracing the Spanish or Portuguese view of events. What counts, however, is that the need for telling the part of the story that was not told requires a shift in the geography of reason and of understanding. “Coloniality,” therefore, points toward and intends to unveil an embedded logic that enforces control, domina-tion, and exploitation disguised in the language of salvation, progress, modernization, and being good for every one. The double register of modernity/coloniality has, perhaps, never been as clear as it has been recently under the administration of US president George W. Bush. Pedagogically, it is important for my argument to conceptualize “modernity/coloniality” as two sides of the same coin and not as two separate frames of mind: you cannot be modern without being colonial; and if you are on the colonial side of the spectrum you have to transact with modernity – you cannot ignore it. The very idea of America cannot be separated from coloniality: the entire continent emerged as such in the European consciousness as a massive extent of land to be appropriated and of people to be converted to Christianity, and whose labor could be exploited. Coloniality, as a term, is much less frequently heard than “moder-nity” and many people tend to confuse it with “colonialism.” The two words are related, of course. While “colonialism” refers to spe-ciﬁc historical periods and places of imperial domination (e.g., Spanish, Dutch, British, the US since the beginning of the twentieth century), “coloniality” refers to the logical structure of colonial domination underlying the Spanish, Dutch, British, and US control of the Atlantic economy and politics, and from there the control and management of almost the entire planet. In each of the particu-lar imperial periods of colonialism – whether led by Spain (mainly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) or by England (from the nineteenth century to World War II) or by the US (from the early twentieth century until now) – the same logic was maintained; only power changed hands.

### Econ

#### Western forms of development lead to extinction

Walter Mignolo, William H. Wannamaker Professor of Literature at Duke University, ’11 [The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options, p. 336] //DDI13

Events of this kind have been common, particularly in the past sixty years. I am sure that when Amartya Sen wrote Development as Freedom, he did not think of development as going hand in hand with expropriation and killing, if necessary, rather than with freedom. The attitude of President Alan Garcia is consistent with the kind of subjectivity that characterizes capitalist culture: a state politics that privileges "development" at the cost of the lives of citizens, who are just guilty of existing. In spite of the massacre, the historical process initiated by the political society is irreversible; or as Quijano states, instances of the global process could be and are defeated here and there, or perhaps life on the planet is extinguished before, but the decolonial march of the global political society has reached the point of no return

## Oil DA

#### **Increased investment allows for Mexican energy development**

**Lugar, 12 –** (Richard Lugar, Senator from Indiana. December 21, 2012. “OIL, MEXICO, AND THE TRANSBOUNDARY AGREEMENT,” http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/)//SDL

Any number of management, regulatory, and financial reforms¶ could be beneficial to Mexico’s energy future, but putting oil production¶ on a sustainable growth path will require IOC investment¶ and expertise. Many interlocutors expressed that another incremental¶ reform would not be worth the political effort; as one observer¶ stated, ‘‘If there’s anything we’ve learned on energy reforms¶ in Mexico, it is that if reforms are incremental, they don’t work.’’

#### Timeframe – speculation creates an immediate impact

**Brannon, 12 –** (Ike Brannon, Associated Press Staff Writer for National Review. March 29, 2012. “Domestic Oil Policies Do Impact Oil Prices,” http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/294768/domestic-oil-policies-do-impact-oil-prices-ike-brannon)//SDL

¶ If a speculator expects prices to rise in the future, he will make large investments in oil today that he may then sell at the later, higher price. For those with the means, there is much money to be made in this way, and the actions of speculators can and do influence the world price of oil. The expectation of higher prices leads to greater consumption which, like any increase in demand, leads to higher prices, creating a self-fulfilling prophesy.¶ ¶ It works the opposite way as well: If speculators began to anticipate prices falling in the future, they would want to sell their shares sooner rather than later, since delaying will force them to accept lower prices. This would result in an immediate increase in supply, which would in turn bring down prices today.

#### Nuclear war and extinction

Steven **Starr**, independent writer who has been published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology Center for Arms Control, April 0**8**, “Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict”, International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, http://inesap.org/bulletins, umn-rks

The failure of the U.S. and Russia to relax their Cold War nuclear confrontation has led each nation to continue to operate under policies that assume the opposing side could authorize a disabling nuclear attack against them. Both nations consequently still maintain a large fraction of their strategic nuclear arsenals on high-alert status, with their intercontinental missiles able to be launched within 30 seconds to 3 minutes, apparently operating under the policy of launch-on-warning.36 Thus the moderate war simulated in the new research, which as noted contains a destructive power equivalent to that contained by these high-alert arsenals, can be ordered and executed by either of these nations in less time than it takes to read this article. The studies predict that a moderate nuclear war would loft 50 million metric tonnes of soot in the stratosphere, causing average global surface air temperatures to plummet 3.5–4° C, roughly half the drop predicted for the large war.37 Consider that average global temperature declines of 3–4° C would prevent all grain production in Canada, and a single night below freezing is sufficient to destroy the entire Asian rice crop.38 Because of its rapid onset, even a mild nuclear winter (although the duration would be much briefer) would cause more stress to plant and animal life than would a severe Ice Age.39 Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict Compared with Global Warming Climatic changes resulting from nuclear conflict would occur many thousands of times faster – and thus would likely be far more catastrophic – than the climatic changes predicted as a result of global warming.40 The rapidity of the war-induced changes, appearing in a matter of days and weeks, would allow human populations and the whole plant and animal kingdoms no time to adapt. It is worth noting that the same methods and climate models used to predict global warming were used in these studies to predict global cooling resulting from nuclear war. These climate models have proved highly successful in describing the cooling effects of volcanic clouds during extensive U.S. evaluations and in international intercomparisons performed as part of the Fourth Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.41 Predicted drops in average global temperatures caused by small, moderate, and large nuclear conflicts are contrasted with the effects of global warming during the last century in Figure 4 and with average surface air temperatures during the last 1,000 years in Figure 5. There are, of course, other important considerations which must be made when estimating the overall environmental and ecological impacts of nuclear war. These must include the release of enormous amounts of radioactive fallout, pyrotoxins, and toxic industrial chemicals into the ecosystems. A decade after the conflict, when the smoke begins to clear, there will also be massive increases in the amount of deadly ultraviolet light which will reach the surface of the Earth as a result of ozone depletion. All these by-products of nuclear war must be taken into account when comparing the danger of nuclear conflict to other potential dangers now confronting humanity and life on Earth. Conclusions We cannot allow our political and military leaders to continue to ignore the potential cataclysmic climatic and environmental consequences posed by the use of nuclear weapons. Civilization remains at risk from nuclear winter despite a three-fold reduction in global nuclear arsenals during the last 20 years. This is due in part to the fact that nuclear arms control agreements have focused primarily on the dismantlement of delivery systems and have failed to include the verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads. Future negotiations must consider all the potential effects of the total number of nuclear weapons in the nuclear arsenals.44 The U.S. and Russia must recognize the senselessness of continued planning for a nuclear first-strike which, if launched, would make the whole world including their own country uninhabitable. As a first step, they should end their preparations for the pre-emptive use of their nuclear arsenals, stand-down their high-alert strategic nuclear forces, and eliminate the standard operating procedure of launch-on-warning.45

#### High alert guarantees accidents – kills all life and happens 30 minutes

Helen **Caldicott**, founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility and former Nobel Peace Prize nominee, 200**2**, “The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush’s Military-Industrial Complex”, New Press: New York, p. 7-12

If launched from Russia, nuclear weapons would explode over American cities thirty minutes after takeoff. (China's twenty missiles are liquidfueled, not solid-fueled. They take many hours to fuel and could not be used in a surprise attack, but they would produce similar damage if launched. Other nuclear-armed nations, such as India and Pakistan, do not have the missile technology to attack the U.S.) It is assumed that most cities with a population over 100,000 people are targeted by Russia. During these thirty minutes, the U.S. early-warning infrared satellite detectors signal the attack to the strategic air command in Colorado. They in turn notify the president, who has approximately three minutes to decide whether or not to launch a counterattack. In the counterforce scenario the US. government currently embraces, he does launch, the missiles pass mid-space, and the whole operation is over within one hour. Landing at 20 times the speed of sound, nuclear weapons explode over cities, with heat equal to that inside the center of the sun. There is practically no warning, except the emergency broadcast system on radio or TV, which gives the public only minutes to reach the nearest fallout shelter, assuming there is one. There is no time to collect children or immediate family members. The bomb, or bombs-because most major cities will be hit with more than one explosion-will gouge out craters 200 feet deep and 1000 feet in diameter if they explode at ground level. Most, however, are programmed to produce an air burst, which increases the diameter of destruction, but creates a shallower crater. Half a mile from the epicenter all buildings will be destroyed, and at 1.7 miles only reinforced concrete buildings will remain. At 2.7 miles bare skeletons of buildings still stand, single-family residences have disappeared, 50 percent are dead and 40 percent severely injured.' Bricks and mortar are converted to missiles traveling at hundreds of miles an hour. Bodies have been sucked out of buildings and converted to missiles themselves, flying through the air at l00 miles per hour. Severe overpressures (pressure many times greater than normal atmospheric have popcorned windows, producing millions of shards of flying glass, causing decapitations and shocking lacerations. Overpressures have also entered the nose, mouth, and ears, inducing rupture of lungs and rupture of the tympanic membranes or eardrums. Most people will suffer severe burns. In Hiroshima, which was devastated by a very small bomb-13 kilotons compared to the current 1000 kilotons-a child actually disappeared, vaporized, leaving his shadow on the concrete pavement behind him. A mother was running, holding her baby, and both she and the baby were converted to a charcoal statue. The heat will be so intense that dry objects-furniture, clothes, and dry wood-will spontaneously ignite. Humans will become walking, flaming torches. Forty or fifty miles from the explosion people will instantly be blinded from retinal burns if they glance at the flash. Huge firestorms will engulf thousands of square miles, fanned by winds from the explosion that transiently exceed 1000 miles per hour. People in fallout shelters will be asphyxiated as fire sucks oxygen from the shelters. (This happened in Hamburg after the Allied bombing in WWII when temperatures within the shelters, caused by conventional bombs, reached 1472 degrees Fahrenheit.)" Most of the city and its people will be converted to radioactive dust shot up in the mushroom cloud. The area of lethal fallout from this cloud will depend upon the prevailing wind and weather conditions; it could cover thousands of square miles. Doses of 5000 rads (a rad is a measure of radiation dose) or more experienced by people close to the explosion-if they are still aliv-will produce acute encephalopathic syndrome. The cells of the brain will become so damaged that they would swell. Because the brain is enclosed in a fixed bony space, there is no room for swelling, so the pressure inside the skull rises, inducing symptoms of excitability, acute nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, severe headache, and seizures, followed by coma and death within twenty-four hours. A lower dose of 1000 rads causes death from gastrointestinal symptoms. The lining cells of the gut die, as do the cells in the bone marrow that fight infection and that cause blood clotting. Mouth ulcers, loss of appetite, severe colicky abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, and bloody diarrhea occur within seven to fourteen days. Death follows severe fluid loss, infection, hemorrhage, and starvation. At 450 rads, 50 percent of the population dies. Hair drops out, vomiting and bloody diarrhea occurs, accompanied by bleeding under the skin and from the gums. Death occurs from internal hemorrhage, generalized septicemia, and infection. Severe trauma and injuries exacerbate the fallout symptoms, so patients die more readily from lower doses of radiation. Infants, children, and old people are more sensitive to radiation than healthy adults. Within bombed areas, fatalities will occur from a combination of trauma, burns, radiation sickness, and starvation. There will be virtually no medical care, even for the relief of pain, because most physicians work within The United States owns 103 nuclear power plants, plus many other dangerous radioactive facilities related to past activities of the cold war. A 1000- kiloton bomb (1 megaton) landing on a standard iooo megawatt reactor and its cooling pools, which contain intensely radioactive spent nuclear fuel, would permanently contaminate an .' area the size of western Germany3 The International Atomic Energy Agency now considers these facilities to be attractive terrorist targets, ' post-September 11,2001. Millions of decaying bodies-human and animal alike-will rot, infected with viruses and bacteria that will mutate in the radioactive-environment to become more lethal. Trillions of insects, naturally ' resistant to radiation-flies, fleas, cockroaches, and lice--will transmit disease from the dead to the living, to people whose immune mechanisms have been severely compromised by the high levels of background radiation. Rodents will multiply by the millions among the corpses and shattered sewerage systems. Epidemics of diseases now controlled by immunization and good hygiene will reappear: such as measles, polio, typhoid, cholera, whooping cough, diphtheria, smallpox, plague, tuberculosis, meningitis, malaria, and hepatitis. Anyone who makes it to a fallout shelter and is not asphyxiated in it, will need to stay there for at least six months until the radiation decays sufficiently so outside survival is possible. It has been postulated that perhaps older people should be sent outside to scavenge for food because they will not live long enough to develop malignancies from the fallout (cancer and leukemia have long incubation periods ranging from five to sixty But any food that manages to grow will be toxic because plants concentrate radioactive elements.\*/ Finally, we must examine the systemic global effects of a nuclear . , war. Firestorms will consume oil wells, chemical facilities, cities, and forests, covering the earth with a blanket of thick, black, radioactive , I I ' smoke, reducing sunlight to 17 percent of normal. One year or more ' ) , will be required for light and temperature to return to normalper- "r haps supranormal values, as sunlight would return to more than its , , usual intensity, enhanced in the ultraviolet spectrum by depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer. Subfreezing temperatures could destroy the biological support system for civilization, resulting in massive starvation, thirst, and hypothermia.5 To quote a 1985 SCOPE document published by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, "the total loss of human agricultural and societal support systems would result in the loss of almost all humans on Earth, essentially equally among combatant and noncombatant countries alike . . . this vulnerability is an aspect not currently a part of the understanding of nuclear war; not only are the major combatant countries in danger, but virtually the entire human population is being held hostage to the large-scale use of nuclear weapons. . . .",! i The proposed START I11 treaty between Russia and America, even if it were implemented, would still allow 3000 to 5000 hydrogen bombs to be maintained on alert."the threshold for nuclear winter? One thousand loo-kiloton bombs blowing up loo cities7-a I c distinct possibility given current capabilities and targeting plans. On January 25,1995, military technicians at radar stations in northern Russia detected signals from an American missile that had just been launched off the coast of Norway carrying a US. scientific probe. Although the Russians had been previously notified of this launch, the alert had been forgotten or ignored. Aware that US. submarines could launch a missile containing eight deadly hydrogen bombs fifteen minutes from Moscow, Russian officials assumed that America had initiated a nuclear war. For the first time in history, the Russian computer containing nuclear launch codes was opened. President Boris Yeltsin, sitting at that computer being advised on how to launch a nuclear war by his military officers, had only a three minute interval to make a decision. At the last moment, the US. missile veered off course. He realized that Russia was not under attack.' If Russia had launched its missiles, the U.S. early-warning satellites would immediately have detected them, and radioed back to Cheyenne Mountain. This would have led to the notification of the president, who also would have had three minutes to make his launch decision, and America’s missiles would then have been fired from their silos. We were thus within minutes of global annihilation that day. Today, Russia’s early-warning and nuclear command systems are deteriorating. Russia’s early warning system fails to operate up to seven hours a day because only one-third of its radars are functional, and two of the nine global geographical areas are covered by its missile-warning satellites are not under surveillance for missile detection. To make matters worse, the equipment controlling nuclear weapons malfunctions frequently, and critical electronic devices and controllers sometimes switch to combat mode for no apparent reason. According to the CIA, seven times during the fall of 1996 operations at some Russian nuclear weapons facilities were severely disrupted when robbers tried to “mine” critical communications cables for their copper! This vulnerable Russian system could easily be stressed by an internal or international political crisis, when the danger of accidental or indeed intentional nuclear war would become very real. And the U.S. itself is not invulnerable to error. In August 1999, for example, when the National Imagery and Mapping Agency was installing a new computer to deal with the potential Y2K problems, this operation triggered a computer malfunction which rendered the agency “blind” for days; it took more than eight months for the defect to be fully repaired. As the New York Times reported, part of America’s nuclear early-warning system was rendered incompetent for almost a year. (At that time I was sitting at a meeting in the west wing of the White House discussing potentially dangerous Y2K nuclear weapons glitches. Several Pentagon officials blithely reassured me that everything would function normally during the roll-over. But in fact, their intelligence system had already been disabled.) Such a situation has the potential for catastrophe. If American cannot observe what the Russians are doing with their nuclear weapons—or vice versa—especially during a serious international crisis they are likely to err on the side of “caution,” which could mean that something as benign as the launch of a weather satellite could actually trigger annihilation of the planet. This situation became even more significant after the September 11 attack.

#### It’s the only existential risk

Nick **Bostrum**, Professor of Philosophy, Yale University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,” 200**2**, www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

## Case

### extinction outweighs

Richard Ochs, DC Black Panther, president of the Aberdeen Proving Ground Superfund Citizens Coalition, member of the Depleted Uranium Task force of the Military Toxics Project and a member of the Chemical Weapons Working Group. After completing a course in Atomic and Nuclear Physics at Muhlenberg College, he transferred to the University of Maryland, where he had a split major in history and political science. He was a founding member of the Students for a Democratic Society at College Park, June 9th 2002, “BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY”, <http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html>, KENTUCKY

Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE. Ironically, the Bush administration has just changed the U.S. nuclear doctrine to allow nuclear retaliation against threats upon allies by conventional weapons. The past doctrine allowed such use only as a last resort when our nation’s survival was at stake. Will the new policy also allow easier use of US bioweapons? How slippery is this slope? Against this tendency can be posed a rational alternative policy. To preclude possibilities of human extinction, "patriotism" needs to be redefined to make humanity’s survival primary and absolute. Even if we lose our cherished freedom, our sovereignty, our government or our Constitution, where there is life, there is hope. What good is anything else if humanity is extinguished? This concept should be promoted to the center of national debate.. For example, for sake of argument, suppose the ancient Israelites developed defensive bioweapons of mass destruction when they were enslaved by Egypt. Then suppose these weapons were released by design or accident and wiped everybody out? As bad as slavery is, extinction is worse. Our generation, our century, our epoch needs to take the long view. We truly hold in our hands the precious gift of all future life. Empires may come and go, but who are the honored custodians of life on earth? Temporal politicians? Corporate competitors? Strategic brinksmen? Military gamers? Inflated egos dripping with testosterone? How can any sane person believe that national sovereignty is more important than survival of the species? Now that extinction is possible, our slogan should be "Where there is life, there is hope." No government, no economic system, no national pride, no religion, no political system can be placed above human survival. The egos of leaders must not blind us. The adrenaline and vengeance of a fight must not blind us. The game is over. If patriotism would extinguish humanity, then patriotism is the highest of all crimes.

Realism is the way states act and is grounded in human nature

Thayer, Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and a consultant to the Rand Corporation, 4 [Thayer Bradley, Ph.D, Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and a consultant to the Rand Corporation, "Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict"]

In chapter 2, I explain how evolutionary theory contributes to the realist theory of international relations and to rational choice analysis.  First, realism, like the Darwinian view of the natural world, submits that international relations is a competitive and dangerous realm, where statesmen must strive to protect the interests of their state before the interests of others or international society.  Traditional realist arguments rest principally on one of two discrete ultimate causes, or intellectual foundations of the theory.  The first is Reinhold Niebuhr's argument that humans are evil.  The second, anchored in the thought of Thomas Hobbes and Hans Morgenthau, is that humans possess an innate animus dominandi - a drive to dominate.  From these foundations, Niebuhr and Morgenthau argue that what is true for the individual is also true of the state: because individuals are evil or possess a drive to dominate so too do states because their leaders are individuals who have these motivations.   argue that realists have a much stronger foundation for the realist argument than that used by either Morgenthau or Niebuhr.  My intent is to present an alternative ultimate cause of classical realism: evolutionary theory.  The use of evolutionary theory allows realism to be scientifically grounded for the first time, because evolution explains egoism.  Thus a scientific explanation provides a better foundation for their arguments than either theology or metaphysics.  Moreover, evolutionary theory can anchor the branch of realism termed offensive realism and advanced most forcefully by John Mearsheimer.  He argues that the anarchy of the international system, the fact that there is no world government, forces leaders of states to strive to maximize their relative power in order to be secure.  I argue that theorists of international relations must recognize that human evolution occurred in an anarchic environment and that this explains why leaders act as offensive realism predicts.  Humans evolved in anarchic conditions, and the implications of this are profound for theories of human behavior.  It is also important to note at this point that my argument does not depend upon "anarchy" as it is traditionally used in the discipline - as the ordering principle of the post-1648 Westphalian state system.  When human evolution is used to ground offensive realism, it immediately becomes a more powerful theory than is currently recognized.  It explains more than just state behavior; it begins to explain human behavior.  It applies equally to non-state actors, be they individuals, tribes, or organizations.  Moreover, it explains this behavior before the creation of the modern state system.  Offensive realists do not need an anarchic state system to advance their argument.  They only need humans.  Thus, their argument applies equally well before or after 1648, whenever humans form groups, be they tribes in Papua New Guinea, conflicting city-states in ancient Greece, organizations like the Catholic Church, or contemporary states in international relations.

Realism is inevitable – power politics are necessary for survival

John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science, Co-Director, Program on International Security Policy, University of Chicago, 9/17/04, “Can China Rise Peacefully?”, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0034b.pdf>

Survival is a state’s most important goal, because a state cannot pursue any other goals if it does not survive. The basic structure of the international system forces states concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. The international system has three defining characteristics. First, the main actors are states that operate in anarchy, which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. Second, all great powers have some offensive military capability, which means that they have the wherewithal to hurt each other. Third, no state can know the intentions of other states with certainty, especially their future intentions. It is simply impossible, for example, to know what Germany or Japan’s intentions will be towards their neighbors in 2025. In a world where other states might have malign intentions as well as significant offensive capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by the fact that in an anarchic system there is no night-watchman for states to call if trouble comes knocking at their door. Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it. No Americans, for example, worry that Canada or Mexico will attack the United States, because neither of those countries is powerful enough to contemplate a fight with Uncle Sam. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest great power, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon – that is, the only great power in the system

#### Neoliberalism solves inequality and poverty in Latin America

Haslam 12 – School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa (Paul Alexander Haslam, “Globalization in Latin America and Its Critics” International Studies Association, Volume 14, Issue 2, June 19 2012, Wiley Online Library)

After 30 years of liberal economic reforms and deeper integration into the world economy, is Latin America better-off? Many observers point to the poverty, exclusion, inequality, and disempowerment that continue to characterize the region. But the most recent figures suggest that the last decade has seen significant improvements in both poverty and inequality. In 1990, the percentage of indigent and non-indigent poor in Latin America stood at 48.3% of the population—some 200 million people. Twelve years later in 2002, the poor had declined to 44%, but due to population growth, the number of poor had increased to 221 million people. By 2009, the last year for which figures are available, the indigent and non-indigent poor had declined to 32.1% of the population, or 183 million people. These recent numbers are significantly lower, in percentage terms, than pre-crisis Latin America, circa 1980. Even the global financial crisis of 2008 only added 3 million more people to the ranks of the poor (Economic Commission for Latin America, the Caribbean (ECLAC) 2010:11). Inequality has also declined over the 2002–2009 period, with the Gini coefficient falling slightly and the income gap narrowing in the vast majority of countries (ibid.:15). The story of the last decade, therefore, has been relatively effective poverty and inequality reduction in Latin America—at the same time that the region has deepened its integration with the world economy. The reasons for this turnaround, and the sustainability of the changes, are important subjects of debate. Something has changed in the region. Some cite the rise of the new left, macro-economic stability, and the commodity boom that has swelled government coffers. Others claim that politics has also become more authentically representative, social programs are being better targeted on the poor, and the education gap has diminished.

The neoliberal system's sustainable

Worstall ‘12

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So, using GDP, can we have infinite economic growth on a finite planet by just making ever more things? No, clearly, we cannot: there is a limit to the number of atoms available to us. But that's not actually what we're measuring in GDP: we're not measuring the amount, tonnage (it was the Soviets who measured that), volume or even number of things that are made. We are measuring the value. So, is there a limit to the amount of value that we can add? A useful way of thinking about technological advance is that it offers us either better ways of doing old things or the opportunity to do entirely new things. Either of which can also be described as the ability to add more value. Which leads us to the conclusion that as long as technology keeps advancing then we can continue to add more value and thus we can continue to have more economic growth. Strange as it may seem, this explanation built purely on standard neoclassical economics is exactly the same as the diagnosis that Herman Daly gives us in ecological economics. He tells us that we face real and imminent resource constraints (I don't agree, but let's go with his argumenent) and that thus we can have no more quantitative growth. This "quantitative" is the same as the above "more stuff". Daly also talks about qualitative growth. The "qualitative" is equal to the "add more value" and I suspect the only reason Daly doesn't say so is that he wants to be able to define what is valuable for people: you know the sort of thing, more walking in forests, more digging our own veg patches, rousing choruses of Kumbaya, as opposed to the neoclassical method of measuring value, which is what you, each and individually, value. Walks in the woods are just fine but so are steaks, excessive booze and even Simon Cowell. Whatever floats your boat. As an example, let's have a glimspe of an extreme form of Daly's "steady-state economy". This is one where resources from the environment are taken only at the rate that that environment can support. Renewables are used only at the rate at which they can be renewed. We're not chewing up mountains to make copper: we're only recycling that copper we've already got. Is economic growth possible here? Yes, obviously it is. For while we've got limited resources to play with, it is still always open to us to find new ways to add value to them. To be silly about it, we've got 1 million tonnes of copper and that's it. We use that copper to make paperweights. Then we learn how to make copper into computer motherboards and we recycle all paperweights into computers. We value the computers more than the paperweights: we've just had GDP growth, we've just had economic growth, with no increase in the consumption of resources. Even in this steady-state economy therefore, even one in which everything is recycled, we can still have economic growth through advancing technology. This advancing technology is known as an increase in total factor productivity (TFP). What we'd like to know next is how much limiting ourselves to only this type of growth is going to limit total growth. Bob Solow once worked out that 80 per cent of the economic growth in 20th-century market economies came from TFP growth. Only 20 per cent came from more resource use: in the socialist economies there was no TFP growth, and all growth came from greater resource use. So we can indeed have quite a lot of economic growth even in the greenest of economies, can we not? How do we make sure that we get that right kind of growth, one that doesn't chew up those natural resources which are a constraint? The logical answer here is to set up a committee of people to study which resources are constrained. We can then charge people higher prices for trying to use them: this will encourage them to either use other, unconstrained, resources or to figure out ways to achieve the same goals with fewer of our limited resources. Sounds like a plan – and, amazingly, we've already got that committee and that method of charging higher prices. It's called "the market", which is really an abstraction, one we must be careful not to reify, but a useful one all the same. It's really just all humans-as-producers interacting with all humans-as-consumers. If the producers find a resource more difficult to find, then they'll be less willing to do so; prices rise and consumers use less of it.

#### Quality of life is skyrocketing worldwide by all measures

Ridley 10 (visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of *The Economist*, and award-winning science writer, Matt, *The Rational Optimist*, pg. 13-15)

If my fictional family is not to your taste, perhaps you prefer statistics. Since 1800, the population of the world has multiplied six times, yet average life expectancy has more than doubled and real income has risen more than nine times. Taking a shorter perspective, in 2005, compared with 1955, the average human being on Planet Earth earned nearly three times as much money (corrected for inflation), ate one-third more calories of food, buried one-third as many of her children and could expect to live one-third longer. She was less likely to die as a result of war, murder, childbirth, accidents, tornadoes, flooding, famine, whooping cough, tuberculosis, malaria, diphtheria, typhus, typhoid, measles, smallpox, scurvy or polio. She was less likely, at any given age, to get cancer, heart disease or stroke. She was more likely to be literate and to have finished school. She was more likely to own a telephone, a flush toilet, a refrigerator and a bicycle. All this during a half-century when the world population has more than doubled, so that far from being rationed by population pressure, the goods and services available to the people of the world have expanded. It is, by any standard, an astonishing human achievement. Averages conceal a lot. But even if you break down the world into bits, it is hard to find any region that was worse off in 2005 than it was in 1955. Over that half-century, real income per head ended a little lower in only six countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia), life expectancy in three (Russia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), and infant survival in none. In the rest they have rocketed upward. Africa’s rate of improvement has been distressingly slow and patchy compared with the rest of the world, and many southern African countries saw life expectancy plunge in the 1990s as the AIDS epidemic took hold (before recovering in recent years). There were also moments in the half-century when you could have caught countries in episodes of dreadful deterioration of living standards or life chances – China in the 1960s, Cambodia in the 1970s, Ethiopia in the 1980s, Rwanda in the 1990s, Congo in the 2000s, North Korea throughout. Argentina had a disappointingly stagnant twentieth century. But overall, after fifty years, the outcome for the world is remarkably, astonishingly, dramatically positive. The average South Korean lives twenty-six more years and earns fifteen times as much income each year as he did in 1955 (and earns fifteen times as much as his North Korean counter part). The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton did in 1955. The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955. Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy in 1951. The proportion of Vietnamese living on less than $2 a day has dropped from 90 per cent to 30 per cent in twenty years. The rich have got richer, but the poor have done even better. The poor in the developing world grew their consumption twice as fast as the world as a whole between 1980 and 2000. The Chinese are ten times as rich, one-third as fecund and twenty-eight years longer-lived than they were fifty years ago. Even Nigerians are twice as rich, 25 per cent less fecund and nine years longer-lived than they were in 1955. Despite a doubling of the world population, even the raw number of people living in absolute poverty (defined as less than a 1985 dollar a day) has fallen **since the 1950s**. The percentage living in such absolute poverty has dropped by more than half – to less than 18 per cent. That number is, of course, still all too horribly high, but the trend is hardly a cause for despair: at the current rate of decline, it would hit zero around 2035 – though it probably won’t. The United Nations estimates that poverty was reduced more in the last fifty years than in the previous 500.