# 1NC

## 1NC – 1

#### Economic engagement is distinct from diplomatic engagement

Derrick 98 (Robert, Lieutenant Colonel US Army, “ENGAGEMENT: THE NATIONS PREMIER GRAND STRATEGY, WHO'S IN CHARGE?,” 1998, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA342695>)

Economic engagement covers a wide range of programs. Financial incentives are an effective engagement tool since countries usually interact with the US when money is involved. Whether it is obtaining funding for a national program; acquiring materiel, food or medicine; or maintaining Most Favored Nation 12Status, financial aide has always been a preferred way for the US to affect the behavior of others. Diplomatic engagement ranges from recognition of sovereign states and foreign governments, to presidential visits, to all aspects of the embassy itself. The mere existence of an embassy is an engagement tool. Through official diplomatic ceremonies, informal meetings, and embassy employees living among the locals, the Department of State's presence is engagement in and of itself. Similarly, "...overseas...forces embody global military engagement. They serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies; contribute uniquely to the stability, continuity, and flexibility that protects US interests; and are crucial to continued democratic and economic development."14 In addition to our presence overseas, our military engagement consists of a variety of military to military and political to military events. U.S. and host nation defense forces conduct combined exercises to improve cooperation and strengthen ties. Much of the peacetime efforts of the DOS and DOD are engagement. This is in the form of forward presence, regional exercises, and infrastructure construction projects. The engagement tools of three of our five instruments of our National Power: Military, Economic and Political, (Geographical and National Will being the other two), listed below in Figure 3, are a few examples of how the US uses these powers to stay engaged.

Military Diplomatic Economic

CJCS Exercises State Recognition Agcy for Intl Devi

Depl for Trng (DFT) Presidential Visits Econ Spt Fund (ESF)

Intl Mil Ed & Tr (IMET) Demarshe Fgn Mil Sales (FMS)

Counterdrug Spt (CD) Treaties & Health Aid

Mobile Tr Teams (MTT) Agreements

#### Vote negative---they make the topic “Resolved: Latin America,” explodes the topic to include anything that involves the US and a Topic country.

#### Limits key in the context of engagement – meaning is inherently unclear

**Resnick 1** (Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States Programme at RSIS, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, [Ebsco](http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=1b56e6b4-ade2-4052-9114-7d107fdbd019%40sessionmgr12&vid=2&hid=24&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=4437301))

A second problem associated with various scholarly treatments of engagement is the tendency to define the concept too broadly to be of much help to the analyst. For instance, Cha's definition of engagement as any policy whose means are "non-coercive and non-punitive" is so vague that essentially any positive sanction could be considered engagement. The definition put forth by Alastair lain Johnston and Robert Ross in their edited volume, Engaging China, is equally nebulous. According to Johnston and Ross, engagement constitutes "the use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising power's behavior."(n14) Likewise, in his work, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy, Robert Litwak defines engagement as "positive sanctions."(n15) Moreover, in their edited volume, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan define engagement as "a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives."(n16) As policymakers possess a highly differentiated typology of alternative options in the realm of negative sanctions from which to choose--including covert action, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, containment, limited war and total war--it is only reasonable to expect that they should have a similar menu of options in the realm of positive sanctions than simply engagement. Equating engagement with positive sanctions risks lumping together a variety of discrete actions that could be analyzed by distinguishing among them and comparing them as separate policies.

#### The affirmative must defend the nature of fiat – they can only defend the benefits and consequences of hypothtetical implementation of the plan by the USFG – anything else is unpredictable and prevents subsantitve debate – hold them to the fiatted action of the plan

## 1NC – 2

#### Terrorists goals are ideological; not political; there is no negotiation---only regulated violence in a utilitarian framework can solve

Whitman 7 (Jeffery, Prof of Philosophy, Religion, and Classical Studies Susquehanna University, “Just War Theory and the War on Terrorism A Utilitarian Perspective,” http://www.mesharpe.com/PIN/05Whitman.pdf)

Nonetheless, there was something different about the 9/11 attacks that is troubling, and that difference is the nihilistic nature of the attackers. Most, but not all, terrorist activity has a political or religious goal of some sort as its aim—the liberation of a minority group, the establishment of a new state, the removal of a perceived oppressor. Al-Qaeda professes a political goal, but its actions belie its claims. It claims to be fighting for the cause of Palestinian freedom and for oppressed Muslims everywhere, but it has appropriated the Islamic religion and the concept of jihad in order to recruit suicide bombers with the promise of martyrdom and entry into Paradise. In so doing, the political goal, if it ever existed, has become subservient to eschatological concerns. Political failure has become an irrelevant distraction that is trumped by the reward of eternal life. As Michael Ignatieff notes concerning al-Qaeda, their goals are less political than apocalyptic, securing immortality for themselves while calling down a mighty malediction on the Great Satan. Goals that are political can be engaged politically. Apocalyptic goals, on the other hand, are impossible to negotiate with. They can only be fought by force of arms. (2004, 125–126) This version of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, represented by such groups as Hamas, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda, seems particularly intractable. These groups, especially insofar as they employ suicide-bomber tactics, have become death cults (Ignatieff 2004, 126–127). There can be no negotiated settlement, so the only solution seems to be a violent one aimed at the utter destruction of the terrorists. And yet, a purely violent and largely military response runs significant risks, both morally and pragmatically, for the counterterrorist forces. The risks are especially poignant for a liberal democracy like the United States, for the use of purely military means, particularly the brutal military means that may seem necessary to defeat terrorism, may run contrary to the very principles a liberal democracy represents (Ignatieff 2004, 133–136).6 Thus the terrorist threat represented by al-Qaeda–like groups presents a difficult and somewhat unique challenge for the United States. Nonetheless, I remain convinced that a utilitarian conceptualization of just war theory can help us to successfully navigate between the Scylla of losing the fight against terrorism and the Charybdis of abandoning the principles that define our liberal democracy.

#### A violent war on terror is the only way to solve

Hanson 10—Senior Fellow, Hoover. Former visiting prof, classics, Stanford. PhD in classics, Stanford (Victor Davis, The Tragic Truth of War, 19 February 2010, http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson021910.html)

Victory has usually been defined throughout the ages as forcing the enemy to accept certain political objectives. “Forcing” usually meant killing, capturing, or wounding men at arms. In today’s polite and politically correct society we seem to have forgotten that nasty but eternal truth in the confusing struggle to defeat radical Islamic terrorism. What stopped the imperial German army from absorbing France in World War I and eventually made the Kaiser abdicate was the destruction of a once magnificent army on the Western front — superb soldiers and expertise that could not easily be replaced. Saddam Hussein left Kuwait in 1991 when he realized that the U.S. military was destroying his very army. Even the North Vietnamese agreed to a peace settlement in 1973, given their past horrific losses on the ground and the promise that American air power could continue indefinitely inflicting its damage on the North. When an enemy finally gives up, it is for a combination of reasons — material losses, economic hardship, loss of territory, erosion of civilian morale, fright, mental exhaustion, internal strife. But we forget that central to a concession of defeat is often the loss of the nation’s soldiers — or even the threat of such deaths. A central theme in most of the memoirs of high-ranking officers of the Third Reich is the attrition of their best warriors. In other words, among all the multifarious reasons why Nazi Germany was defeated, perhaps the key was that hundreds of thousands of its best aviators, U-boaters, panzers, infantrymen, and officers, who swept to victory throughout 1939–41, simply perished in the fighting and were no longer around to stop the allies from doing pretty much what they wanted by 1944–45. After Stalingrad and Kursk, there were not enough good German soldiers to stop the Red Army. Even the introduction of jets could not save Hitler in 1945 — given that British and American airmen had killed thousands of Luftwaffe pilots between 1939 and 1943. After the near destruction of the Grand Army in Russia in 1812, even Napoleon’s genius could not restore his European empire. Serial and massive Communist offensives between November 1950 and April 1951 in Korea cost Red China hundreds of thousands of its crack infantry — and ensured that, for all its aggressive talk, it would never retake Seoul in 1952–53. But aren’t these cherry-picked examples from conventional wars of the past that have no relevance to the present age of limited conflict, terrorism, and insurgency where ideology reigns? Not really. We don’t quite know all the factors that contributed to the amazing success of the American “surge” in Iraq in 2007–08. Surely a number of considerations played a part: Iraqi anger at the brutish nature of al-Qaeda terrorists in their midst; increased oil prices that brought massive new revenues into the country; General Petraeus’s inspired counterinsurgency tactics that helped win over Iraqis to our side by providing them with jobs and security; much-improved American equipment; and the addition of 30,000 more American troops. But what is unspoken is also the sheer cumulative number of al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorists that the U.S. military killed or wounded between 2003 and 2008 in firefights from Fallujah to Basra. There has never been reported an approximate figure of such enemy dead — perhaps wisely, in the post-Vietnam age of repugnance at “body counts” and the need to create a positive media image. Nevertheless, in those combat operations, the marines and army not only proved that to meet them in battle was a near death sentence, but also killed thousands of low-level terrorists and hundreds of top-ranking operatives who otherwise would have continued to harm Iraqi civilians and American soldiers. Is Iraq relatively quiet today because many who made it so violent are no longer around? Contemporary conventional wisdom tries to persuade us that there is no such thing as a finite number of the enemy. Instead, killing them supposedly only incites others to step up from the shadows to take their places. Violence begets violence. It is counterproductive, and creates an endless succession of the enemy. Or so we are told. We may wish that were true. But military history suggests it is not quite accurate. In fact, there was a finite number of SS diehards and kamikaze suicide bombers even in fanatical Nazi Germany and imperial Japan. When they were attrited, not only were their acts of terror curtailed, but it turned out that far fewer than expected wanted to follow the dead to martyrdom. The Israeli war in Gaza is considered by the global community to be a terrible failure — even though the number of rocket attacks against Israeli border towns is way down. That reduction may be due to international pressure, diplomacy, and Israeli goodwill shipments of food and fuel to Gaza — or it may be due to the hundreds of Hamas killers and rocketeers who died, and the thousands who do not wish to follow them, despite their frequently loud rhetoric about a desire for martyrdom. Insurgencies, of course, are complex operations, but in general even they are not immune from eternal rules of war. Winning hearts and minds is essential; providing security for the populace is crucial; improving the economy is critical to securing the peace. But all that said, we cannot avoid the pesky truth that in war — any sort of war — killing enemy soldiers stops the violence. For all the much-celebrated counterinsurgency tactics in Afghanistan, note that we are currently in an offensive in Helmand province to “secure the area.” That means killing the Taliban and their supporters, and convincing others that they will meet a violent fate if they continue their opposition. Perhaps the most politically incorrect and Neanderthal of all thoughts would be that the American military’s long efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq to kill or capture radical Islamists has contributed to the general safety inside the United States. Modern dogma insists that our presence in those two Muslim countries incited otherwise non-bellicose young Muslims to suddenly prefer violence and leave Saudi Arabia, Yemen, or Egypt to flock to kill the infidel invader. A more tragic view would counter that there was always a large (though largely finite) number of radical jihadists who, even before 9/11, wished to kill Americans. They went to those two theaters, fought, died, and were therefore not able to conduct as many terrorist operations as they otherwise would have, and also provided a clear example to would-be followers not to emulate their various short careers. That may explain why in global polls the popularity both of bin Laden and of the tactic of suicide bombing plummeted in the Middle Eastern street — at precisely the time America was being battered in the elite international press for the Iraq War. Even the most utopian and idealistic do not escape these tragic eternal laws of war. Barack Obama may think he can win over the radical Islamic world — or at least convince the more moderate Muslim community to reject jihadism — by means such as his Cairo speech, closing Guantanamo, trying Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in New York, or having General McChrystal emphatically assure the world that killing Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists will not secure Afghanistan. Of course, such soft- and smart-power approaches have utility in a war so laden with symbolism in an age of globalized communications. But note that Obama has upped the number of combat troops in Afghanistan, and he vastly increased the frequency of Predator-drone assassination missions on the Pakistani border. Indeed, even as Obama damns Guantanamo and tribunals, he has massively increased the number of targeted assassinations of suspected terrorists — the rationale presumably being either that we are safer with fewer jihadists alive, or that we are warning would-be jihadists that they will end up buried amid the debris of a mud-brick compound, or that it is much easier to kill a suspected terrorist abroad than detain, question, and try a known one in the United States. In any case, the president — immune from criticism from the hard Left, which is angrier about conservative presidents waterboarding known terrorists than liberal ones executing suspected ones — has concluded that one way to win in Afghanistan is to kill as many terrorists and insurgents as possible. And while the global public will praise his kinder, gentler outreach, privately he evidently thinks that we will be safer the more the U.S. marines shoot Taliban terrorists and the more Hellfire missiles blow up al-Qaeda planners. Why otherwise would a Nobel Peace Prize laureate order such continued offensive missions? Victory is most easily obtained by ending the enemy’s ability to resist — and by offering him an alternative future that might appear better than the past. We may not like to think all of that entails killing those who wish to kill us, but it does, always has, and tragically always will — until the nature of man himself changes.

#### Risk is high now

Matthew, et al, 10/2/13 [ Bunn, Matthew, Valentin Kuznetsov, Martin B. Malin, Yuri Morozov, Simon Saradzhyan, William H. Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev. "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism." Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2, 2013, Matthew Bunn. Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School andCo-Principal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Military Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. • Martin Malin. Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. • Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security expert and writer from 1993 to 2008. • William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration from 2006 to 2009. • Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces). Leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces from 1994 to 1996. • Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to 1997, section head - deputy chief of staff of the Defense Council of Russia from 1997 to 1998.<http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html>]

I. Introduction In 2011, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies published “The U.S. – Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism.” The assessment analyzed the means, motives, and access of would-be nuclear terrorists, and concluded that the threat of nuclear terrorism is urgent and real. The Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits in 2010 and 2012 established and demonstrated a consensus among political leaders from around the world that nuclear terrorism poses a serious threat to the peace, security, and prosperity of our planet. For any country, a terrorist attack with a nuclear device would be an immediate and catastrophic disaster, and the negative effects would reverberate around the world far beyond the location and moment of the detonation. Preventing a nuclear terrorist attack requires international cooperation to secure nuclear materials, especially among those states producing nuclear materials and weapons. As the world’s two greatest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia have the greatest experience and capabilities in securing nuclear materials and plants and, therefore, share a special responsibility to lead international efforts to prevent terrorists from seizing such materials and plants. The depth of convergence between U.S. and Russian vital national interests on the issue of nuclear security is best illustrated by the fact that bilateral cooperation on this issue has continued uninterrupted for more than two decades, even when relations between the two countries occasionally became frosty, as in the aftermath of the August 2008 war in Georgia. Russia and the United States have strong incentives to forge a close and trusting partnership to prevent nuclear terrorism and have made enormous progress in securing fissile material both at home and in partnership with other countries. However, to meet the evolving threat posed by those individuals intent upon using nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes, the United States and Russia need to deepen and broaden their cooperation. The 2011 “U.S. - Russia Joint Threat Assessment” offered both specific conclusions about the nature of the threat and general observations about how it might be addressed. This report builds on that foundation and analyzes the existing framework for action, cites gaps and deficiencies, and makes specific recommendations for improvement. “The U.S. – Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism” (The 2011 report executive summary): • Nuclear terrorism is a real and urgent threat. Urgent actions are required to reduce the risk. The risk is driven by the rise of terrorists who seek to inflict unlimited damage, many of whom have sought justification for their plans in radical interpretations of Islam**;** by the spread of information about the decades-old technology of nuclear weapons; by the increased availability of weapons-usable nuclear materials; and by globalization, which makes it easier to move people, technologies, and materials across the world. • Making a crude nuclear bomb would not be easy, but is potentially within the capabilities of a technically sophisticated terrorist group, as numerous government studies have confirmed. Detonating a stolen nuclear weapon would likely be difficult for terrorists to accomplish, if the weapon was equipped with modern technical safeguards (such as the electronic locks known as Permissive Action Links, or PALs). Terrorists could, however, cut open a stolen nuclear weapon and make use of its nuclear material for a bomb of their own. • The nuclear material for a bomb is small and difficult to detect, making it a major challenge to stop nuclear smuggling or to recover nuclear material after it has been stolen. Hence, a primary focus in reducing the risk must be to keep nuclear material and nuclear weapons from being stolen by continually improving their security, as agreed at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010. • Al-Qaeda has sought nuclear weapons for almost two decades. The group has repeatedly attempted to purchase stolen nuclear material or nuclear weapons, and has repeatedly attempted to recruit nuclear expertise. Al-Qaeda reportedly conducted tests of conventional explosives for its nuclear program in the desert in Afghanistan. The group’s nuclear ambitions continued after its dispersal following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Recent writings from top al-Qaeda leadership are focused on justifying the mass slaughter of civilians, including the use of weapons of mass destruction, and are in all likelihood intended to provide a formal religious justification for nuclear use. While there are significant gaps in coverage of the group’s activities, al-Qaeda appears to have been frustrated thus far in acquiring a nuclear capability; it is unclear whether the the group has acquired weapons-usable nuclear material or the expertise needed to make such material into a bomb. Furthermore, pressure from a broad range of counter-terrorist actions probably has reduced the group’s ability to manage large, complex projects, but has not eliminated the danger. However, there is no sign the group has abandoned its nuclear ambitions. On the contrary, leadership statements as recently as 2008 indicate that the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.

#### The affirmatives call for “Empathic Solidarity” breaks from the status quo, but it also breaks the foundation of deterrence; their ethics result in preemptive nuclear war

Dipert 6 (Randall, PhD, Professor of Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, “Preventive War and the Epistemological Dimension of the Morality of War,” https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1291-dipert-preventive-war)

One might think that this principle would give little guidance in recommending anticipatory wars. However, let us suppose that John Rawls, following Raymond Aron and others, is correct in claiming that democratic states (‘liberal constitutional democracies’) have very few except legitimate reasons to go to war, and consequently rarely do go to war for ‘bad’ reasons (Rawls 1999: 47).42 Some wars might still occur because of epistemic mistakes or from (legitimate) mutual fear and distrust trust\*/something Rawls seems not to consider. Let us further suppose that this general level of warfare in a region or in the world gradually decreases in those places where there exist nothing but constitutional democracies. Let us further suppose that democracy can be imposed, or the conditions for democracy can be created, by the correct application of military force. Then there are circumstances in which, if the conditions for the permissibility of preventive of war are met, then preventive war is further recommended by this second principle. There is an interesting question here, beyond philosophical considerations, about whether a nation should formulate and announce policies of exactly what conditions will, and what conditions will not, trigger preventive war. 43 But there is another and telling side of this coin: what if we should have and announce a policy of never engaging in any preemptive or preventive war? Here I think we are encouraging a hostile enemy to prepare an offensive, including weapons development, right up an actual attack. If there do exist, or can possibly exist, truly devastating weapons, this is to invite their development and one’s own annihilation. Even a small nuclear power with ballistic missiles (perhaps positioning missiles on ocean freighters on the high seas) would be free to inflict devastating attacks. While large, stable countries such as China and the former USSR, have historically been deterred by the policy of massive nuclear retaliation, it is unlikely that all nuclear nations with ballistic missiles (including terrorist organizations), will remain deterrable. I believe that such a policy of banning or foreswearing preventive war would almost certainly result in more, rather than fewer, wars and deaths, because it would embolden more state-like entities to believe that they could succeed in an unjust war, especially in ideological wars whose ‘success’ consists simply in inflicting harm on its enemy at all costs.44 To announce a policy of rejecting any preemptive or preventive war is thus almost certainly mistaken and violates my second principle insofar as it increases possible threats. The rare and careful use of restricted preemptive and preventive war, under unspecified conditions, in the world we are likely to have for centuries\*/without, for example, militarily dominant international organizations willing to punish with force the illegitimate use of force\*/is actually likely to make the world more safe. This is not a conclusion that I am especially happy with.45

#### Rule utilitarianism applied to just war theory solves their offense; the alternative is mutually exclusive with their risk calculus which they have to defend

Whitman 7 (Jeffery, Prof of Philosophy, Religion, and Classical Studies Susquehanna University, “Just War Theory and the War on Terrorism A Utilitarian Perspective,” http://www.mesharpe.com/PIN/05Whitman.pdf)

How might the rule-utilitarian perspective for just war theory helpfully inform the war on terrorism? Several potential benefits seem especially salient. The first major advantage that such a perspective lends to the fight against terrorism is that it avoids the temptation to turn the fight into a utopian crusade against evil.27 While it is true that some of the perpetrators of the current terrorism have taken on the nihilistic perspective described earlier (and therefore represent a kind of evil beyond compromise), most of the people who seem to sympathize with their attacks against U.S. and Western interests are not evil people. Many of them have genuine grievances with the polices of Western nations, and their support for terrorism can be weakened or even eliminated if some of those grievances are addressed. Casting the war against global terrorism as a struggle between good and evil would seem to invoke a fight-to-the-death struggle, but seeing the struggle in this way defies the reality of the situation, a reality better addressed in utilitarian terms. While there can be no compromise between good and evil, a more nuanced understanding of what motivates support for Islamic terrorism (e.g., the real or perceived bias of U.S. policy against Arab and Muslim interests) would show that not all of our foes are part of some undifferentiated evil. Recognizing this fact would enable us to recognize that moral considerations place limits on the use of military force—in terms of both means and ends—in prosecuting this war. And these limits can be best applied through the tenets of just war theory supported by a ruleutilitarian foundation. The struggle against terrorism will be a long struggle, and it will require the kind of balancing of means to ends that the utilitarian calculus promotes. The proper goal in the end is not the complete destruction of all terrorist groups and their supporters (as if such a goal were even possible). Instead, the goal must be more moderate, though no less challenging. Quoting Joseph Boyle. The state of affairs in which the prospect of terrorist activity is not a serious threat to people’s conduct of their lives but part of the disagreeable but acceptable risks of modern life is a reasonable public goal in relationship to terrorism generally, as it is in relationship to criminal activity more generally. (2003, 168)

## 1NC – 3

#### Iran deal will succeed---but Obama needs capital to stop a second round of sanctions

Parsi 11/20 (Trita Parsi is founder and president of the National Iranian American Council and an expert on US-Iranian relations, Iranian foreign politics, and the geopolitics of the Middle East, “Negotiations with Iran show promise, but true test comes later,” http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/11/iran-us-negotiationsgenevanuclearprogram.html)

After objections by France caused a momentary disruption, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) are once again united and meeting in Geneva this week with Iranian representatives to strike a deal on Iran's nuclear program. The prospects for success appear favorable. However, it is also clear that the real hurdles to an enduring deal will not be encountered now, but after the first agreement has been concluded. This is partly because Washington's ability to give concessions has not been truly tested yet. The misinformation spread by Israeli cabinet ministers and opponents of President Barack Obama in the U.S. Congress notwithstanding, most of concessions in the first phase of the deal currently being negotiated in Geneva will be provided by Tehran. In return, the United States and European Union are offering very little. The sanctions relief is minimal and carefully avoids congressional approval. Obama has spent a lot of political capital in the past two weeks simply to convince Congress not to adopt new sanctions. If a deal is reached this week in Geneva, Obama will be faced with the much taller order of getting Congress to actually roll back existing sanctions. Unfortunately, negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program have in the past passed the first hurdle, only to fall apart during the second step, when a final deal must be concluded. Eagerness and pressure to reach a first deal, combined with lack of common clarity on what exactly had been agreed upon, contributed to this.

#### Plan costs capital and is a flip-flop

Williams 13 (Carol, currently at the LA Times, A foreign correspondent for 25 years, Carol J. Williams traveled to and reported from more than 80 countries in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, Political calculus keeps Cuba on U.S. list of terror sponsors. <http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-cuba-us-terror-list-20130502,0,2494970.story#ixzz2YmmqmyTI>, 5/3/13)

The decision to retain Cuba on the list surprised some observers of the long-contentious relationship between Havana and Washington. Since Fidel Castro retired five years ago and handed the reins of power to his younger brother, Raul, modest economic reforms have been tackled and the government has revoked the practice of requiring Cubans to get “exit visas” before they could leave their country for foreign travel. There was talk early in Obama’s first term of easing the 51-year-old embargo, and Kerry, though still in the Senate then, wrote a commentary for the Tampa Bay Tribune in 2009 in which he deemed the security threat from Cuba “a faint shadow.” He called then for freer travel between the two countries and an end to the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba “that has manifestly failed for nearly 50 years.” The political clout of the Cuban American community in South Florida and more recently Havana’s refusal to release Gross have kept any warming between the Cold War adversaries at bay. It’s a matter of political priorities and trade-offs, Aramesh said. He noted that former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton last year exercised her discretion to get the Iranian opposition group Mujahedeen Khalq, or MEK, removed from the government’s list of designated terrorist organizations. That move was motivated by the hopes of some in Congress that the group could be aided and encouraged to eventually challenge the Tehran regime. “It’s a question of how much political cost you want to incur or how much political capital you want to spend,” Aramesh said. “President Obama has decided not to reach out to Cuba, that he has more important foreign policy battles elsewhere.”

#### Capital is key---its on the brink and failure risks middle east war

Merry 11/19 (Robert W. Merry is political editor of The National Interest and the author of books on American history and foreign policy, “Obama and Netanyahu Go to War,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/obama-netanyahu-go-war-9420?page=1)

President Obama finds himself in a weakened state. His health care law is sapping his political strength and generating intense anxiety among his Democratic troops in Congress. His performance rating is at an all-time low. His trust with the American people is deteriorating badly, as reflected in a recent Quinnipiac University poll. His political capital is ebbing. And into this dire political situation comes a new challenge that will test the president’s resolve and mettle in a big way. If he wants to save his high-stakes effort to foster a negotiated agreement with Iran over its nuclear program, he must take on, directly, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israel lobby in the United States. If he doesn’t, Congress will kill his effort; the opportunity to find a peaceful solution will be lost; and chances for war with Iran will rise ominously. Indeed, administration officials have warned that the current congressional push for new sanctions on Iran, in the midst of his delicate efforts, would constitute "a march to war."

#### Middle east war goes global and nuclear

Primakov 9 - Doctor of Economics, Professor, executive member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Head of the Center for Situational Analysis at the Russian Academy of Sciences

Yevgeny Primakov is President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation; Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; member of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs. The Fundamental Conflict: The Middle East Problem in the Context of International Relations. Russia in Global Affairs Vol 7 No 3. 2009. http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/105702/ichaptersection\_singledocument/71a40dca-23cb-411d-9c5d-a7ce495e2522/en/12.pdf

The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally. During the Cold War, amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that time objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the United States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both superpowers in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt (which followed Cairo’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States – contrary to the widespread belief in various countries, including Russia – not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed – along with the Soviet Union – for the cessation of the armed action. Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington urged each other to cool down their “clients.” When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. On July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli forces, which later claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation repeated itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S. military involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the Middle East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor of interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a private conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been done amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to “demonstrate” Soviet military presence in Egypt in response to Israel’s refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict. The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real threat of the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st century this conclusion no longer conforms to the reality. The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a technological level that would let it make such a decision (the “Japanese model”) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens a dangerous prospect of a nuclear collision in the region, which would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world. The transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which increases the latter’s danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the Middle East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive strike against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such a strike can be launched by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obama’s position does not completely rule out such a possibility.

## 1NC – 4

#### The United States federal government will initiate binding consultation with United States military leaders including, at least, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, and relevant generals and admirals, over whether the United States will remove Cuba from the State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism

#### The United States federal government will advocate the adoption of the proposed mandates, and should implement the results of the consultation.

#### The military will accept if the administration negotiates---otherwise it’ll backlash

Hooker 4 - Colonel Richard D. Hooker, Jr., Ph.D. from the University of Virginia in international relations and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, served in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Winter 2004, “Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations,” Parameters, p. 4-18

More current is the suggestion that party affiliation lends itself to military resistance to civilian control in policy matters, especially during periods of Democratic control. The strongest criticism in this vein is directed at General Colin Powell as a personality and gays in the military as a policy issue, with any number of prominent scholars drawing overarching inferences about civil-military relations from this specific event.21 This tendency to draw broad conclusions from a specific case is prevalent in the field but highly questionable as a matter of scholarship. The record of military deference to civilian control, particularly in the recent past, in fact supports a quite different conclusion. Time and again in the past decade, military policy preferences on troop deployments, the proliferation of nontraditional missions, the draw-down, gender issues, budgeting for modernization, base closure and realignment, and a host of other important issues were overruled or watered down. Some critics, most notably Andrew Bacevich, argue that President Clinton did not control the military so much as he placated it: “The dirty little secret of American civil-military relations, by no means unique to this [Clinton] administration, is that the commander-in-chief does not command the military establishment; he cajoles it, negotiates with it, and, as necessary, appeases it.”22 This conclusion badly overreaches. Under President Clinton, military force structure was cut well below the levels recommended in General Powell’s Base Force recommendations. US troops remained in Bosnia far beyond the limits initially set by the President. Funding for modernization was consistently deferred to pay for contingency operations, many of which were opposed by the Joint Chiefs. In these and many other instances, the civilian leadership enforced its decisions firmly on its military subordinates. On virtually every issue, the military chiefs made their case with conviction, but acquiesced loyally and worked hard to implement the decisions of the political leadership.

#### AND – CMR is on the brink – no consultation means extinction

THOMAS E. RICKS, member of Harvard University's Senior Advisory Council on the Project on U.S. Civil-Military Relations, Center for a New American Security, Pulitzer Prize winning former reporter for the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post, Foreign Policy Mag, 6/5,2012, “Covert Wars, Waged Virally”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/books/confront-and-conceal-by-david-sanger.html>, KENTUCKY

Mr. Sanger’s sure touch in discussing foreign policy falters when he addresses the Pentagon. He incorrectly states that “battlespace” is a term of cyberwar, when it actually is United States military jargon for any sort of battlefield, conventional or not. More important, Mr. Sanger seems unaware that a large number of military officers agreed with President Obama that Iraq was a “war of choice,” and a huge mistake. Nor by the time Mr. Obama took office was “much of the military ... running on autopilot.” Rather, after five years of sweating and bleeding in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military was engaged in a good deal of soul-searching about those wars. The “surge” in Iraq was largely the product of military dissidents who believed that invading Iraq had been a mistake. These are minor blemishes in an important book. I raise them mainly because of the warning signal they send about civil-military relations under President Obama. White House mistrust and suspicion of generals is not a recipe for an effective use of military force because it impedes the candid sort of discussion that consciously brings to the surface differences, examines assumptions and hammers out sustainable strategies. Rather, it suggests that Mr. Obama and those around him are repeating some of the dysfunctionality that characterized the dealings of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson with the Pentagon during the descent into the Vietnam War. With Syria hanging fire, a nuclear-armed Pakistan on the brink and the Afghan war dragging on, that is not a reassuring state of affairs.

## 1NC – Case

#### The ends justify the means

Isaac 2 – (Jeffrey, Professor of PoliSci @ Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD Yale, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” Dissent Magazine Vol 49 Issue 2)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law [it] can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### In the face of extinction you have to weigh consequences - outweighs all else

Bok 88 (Sissela Bok, Professor of Philosophy @ Brandeis University, 1988, Applied Ethical Theory, ed. Rosenthal and Shehadi, pg. 203)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through your actions a law-making member in a universal kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy,” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously – perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish. To avoid self-contradiction, the Categorical imperative would, therefore, have to rule against the Latin maxim on account of its cavalier attitude toward the survival of mankind. But the ruling would then produce a rift in the application of the Categorical Imperative. Most often the Imperative would ask us to disregard all unintended but foreseeable consequences, such as the death of innocent persons, whenever concern for such consequences conflicts with concern for acting according to duty. But, in the extreme case, we might have to go against even the strictest moral duty precisely because of the consequences.

#### Voting aff does nothing to resolve US imperialism---its too engrained

Ferguson 2009 (Niall, American Interest, http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=335&MId=16)

So much for the American predicament. What of Posen’s alternative grand strategy based on American self-restraint? The terms he uses are themselves revealing. The United States needs to be more “reticent” about its use of military force, more “modest” about its political goals overseas, more “distant” from traditional allies, and more “stingy” in its aid policies. Good luck to the presidential candidate who laces his next foreign policy speech with those adjectives: “My fellow Americans, I want to make this great country of ours more reticent, modest, distant and stingy!” Let us, however, leave aside this quintessentially academic and operationally useless rhetoric. What exactly does Posen want the United States to do? I count six concrete recommendations. The United States should: 1) Abandon the Bush Doctrine of “preemption”, which in the case of Iraq has been a policy of preventive war. Posen argues that this applies even in cases of nuclear proliferation. By implication, he sees preventive war as an inferior option to deterrence, though he does not make clear how exactly a nuclear-armed Iran would be deterred, least of all if his second recommendation were to be implemented. 2) Reduce U.S. military presence in the Middle East (“the abode of Islam”) by abandoning “its permanent and semi-permanent land bases in Arab countries.” Posen does not say so, but he appears to imply the abandonment of all these bases, not just the ones in Iraq, but also those in, for example, Qatar. It is not clear what would be left of Central Command after such a drastic retreat. Note that this would represent a break with the policy not just of the last two Presidents, but with that of the last 12. 3) Ramp up efforts to provide relief in the wake of natural disasters, exemplified by Operation Unified Assistance after the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004. No doubt the American military did some good in the wake of the tsunami, but Posen needs to explain why a government that so miserably bungled the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina less than a year later should be expected to be consistently effective in the wake of natural disasters. 4) Assist in humanitarian military interventions only “under reasonable guidelines” and “in coalitions, operating under some kind of regional or international political mandate.” Does Posen mean that he would favor sending American troops to Darfur at the same time as he is withdrawing them from other “abodes of Islam?” He does not say. 5) Promote not democracy abroad but “the rule of law, press freedom and the rights of collective bargaining.” Here again I am experiencing cognitive dissonance. The government that sought systematically to evade the Geneva Conventions in order to detain indefinitely and torture suspected terrorists as an upholder of the rule of law? 6) Stop offering “U.S. security guarantees and security assistance, [which] tend to relieve others of the need to do more to ensure their own security.” This is in fact the most important of all Posen’s recommendations, though he saves it until last. He envisages radical diminution of American support for other members of NATO. Over the next ten years, he writes, the United States “should gradually withdraw from all military headquarters and commands in Europe.” In the same timeframe it should “reduce U.S. government direct financial assistance to Israel to zero”, as well as reducing (though not wholly eliminating) assistance to Egypt. And it should “reconsider its security relationship with Japan”, whatever that means. Again, this represents a break with traditional policy so radical that it would impress even Noam Chomsky, to say nothing of Osama bin Laden (who would, indeed, find little here to object to). Posen, in other words, has proceeded from relatively familiar premises (the limits of American “hyperpower”) to some quite fantastic policy recommendations, which are perhaps best summed up as a cross between isolationism and humanitarianism. Only slightly less fantastic than his vision of an American military retreat from the Middle East, Europe and East Asia is Posen’s notion that it could be sold to the American electorate—just six years after they were the targets of the single largest terrorist attack in history—in the language of self-effacement. Coming from a man who wants to restart mainstream debate on American grand strategy, that is pretty rich.

#### Discursive othering doesn’t result in ‘uncontrollable violence’

Rodwell 5 (Jonathan Rodwell is a PhD student at Manchester Met. researching the U.S. Foreign Policy of the late 70's / rise of ‘neo-cons’ and Second Cold War, “Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson,” http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm)

To be specific if the U.S. and every other nation is continually reproducing identities through ‘othering’ it is a constant and universal phenomenon that fails to help us understand at all why one result of the othering turned out one way and differently at another time. For example, how could one explain how the process resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq but didn’t produce a similar invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when that country (and by the logic of the Regan administrations discourse) the West was threatened by the ‘Evil Empire’. By the logical of discourse analysis in both cases these policies were the result of politicians being able to discipline and control the political agenda to produce the outcomes. So why were the outcomes not the same? To reiterate the point how do we explain that the language of the War on Terror actually managed to result in the eventual Afghan invasion in 2002? Surely it is impossible to explain how George W. Bush was able to convince his people (and incidentally the U.N and Nato) to support a war in Afghanistan without referring to a simple fact outside of the discourse; the fact that a known terrorist in Afghanistan actually admitted to the murder of thousands of people on the 11h of Sepetember 2001. The point is that if the discursive ‘othering’ of an ‘alien’ people or group is what really gave the U.S. the opportunity to persue the war in Afghanistan one must surly wonder why Afghanistan. Why not North Korea? Or Scotland? If the discourse is so powerfully useful in it’s own right why could it not have happened anywhere at any time and more often? Why could the British government not have been able to justify an armed invasion and regime change in Northern Ireland throughout the terrorist violence of the 1980’s? Surely they could have just employed the same discursive trickery as George W. Bush? Jackson is absolutely right when he points out that the actuall threat posed by Afghanistan or Iraq today may have been thoroughly misguided and conflated and that there must be more to explain why those wars were enacted at that time. Unfortunately that explanation cannot simply come from the result of inscripting identity and discourse. On top of this there is the clear problem that the consequences of the discursive othering are not necessarily what Jackson would seem to identify. This is a problem consistent through David Campbell’s original work on which Jackson’s approach is based[iii]. David Campbell argued for a linguistic process that ‘always results in an other being marginalized’ or has the potential for ‘demonisation’[iv]. At the same time Jackson, building upon this, maintains without qualification that the systematic and institutionalised abuse of Iraqi prisoners first exposed in April 2004 “is a direct consequence of the language used by senior administration officials: conceiving of terrorist suspects as ‘evil’, ‘inhuman’ and ‘faceless enemies of freedom creates an atmosphere where abuses become normalised and tolerated”[v]. The only problem is that the process of differentiation does not actually necessarily produce dislike or antagonism. In the 1940’s and 50’s even subjected to the language of the ‘Red Scare’ it’s obvious not all Americans came to see the Soviets as an ‘other’ of their nightmares. And in Iraq the abuses of Iraqi prisoners are isolated cases, it is not the case that the U.S. militarily summarily abuses prisoners as a result of language. Surely the massive protest against the war, even in the U.S. itself, is also a self evident example that the language of ‘evil’ and ‘inhumanity’ does not necessarily produce an outcome that marginalises or demonises an ‘other’. Indeed one of the points of discourse is that we are continually differentiating ourselves from all others around us without this necessarily leading us to hate fear or abuse anyone.[vi] Consequently, the clear fear of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, and the abuses at Abu Ghirab are unusual cases. To understand what is going on we must ask how far can the process of inscripting identity really go towards explaining them? As a result at best all discourse analysis provides us with is a set of universals and a heuristic model

#### Discourse analysis is tautology; if nothing is neutral all of their evidence has the same epistemological bias---linear causality is inevitable and has explanatory power

Rodwell 5 (Jonathan Rodwell is a PhD student at Manchester Met. researching the U.S. Foreign Policy of the late 70's / rise of ‘neo-cons’ and Second Cold War, “Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson,” http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm)

Next, discourse analysis as practiced exists within an enormous logical cul-de-sac. Born of the original premise that each discourse and explanation has it’s own realities, what results is a theoretical approach in which a critique is actually impossible because by post-structural logic a critique can only operate within it’s own discursive structure and on it’s own terms. If things only exist within specific languages and discourse you must share the basic premises of that discourse to be able to say anything about it. But what useful criticisms can you make if you share fundamental assumptions? Moreover remembering the much argued for normative purposes of Jackson’s case he talks about the effects of naturalizing language and without blushing criticises the dangerous anti-terror rhetoric of George W. Bush. The only problem is Jackson has attempted to illustrate that what is moral or immoral depends on the values and structures of each discourse. Therefore why should a reader believe Richard Jackson’s idea of right and wrong any more than George W. Bush’s? Fundamentally if he wishes to maintain that each discourse is specific to each intellectual framework Jackson cannot criticise at all. By his own epistemological rules if he is inside those discourses he shares their assumptions, outside they make no sense What actually occurs then is an aporia - a logical contraction where a works own stated epistemological premises rob it of the ability to contain any critical force. Such arguments are caught between the desire to maintain that all discursive practices construct their own truths, in which case critiques are not possible as they are merely one of countless possible discursive truths with no actually reason to take then seriously, or an appeal to material reality, but again the entire premises of post structural linguistics rejects the idea of a material reality.[vii] In starting from a premise that it is not possible to neutrally describe the real world, the result is that without that real world, discourse analysis actually has nothing to say. The issue of the material real world, or ‘evidence’ is actually the issue at the heart of the weakness of post-structural discourse analysis, though it does hold the potential to at least rescue some of it’s usefulness. The problem is simple, in that the only way Jackson or any post-structuralist can operationalise their argument is with an appeal to material evidence. But by the logic of discourse analysis there is no such thing as neutral ‘evidence’. To square this circle many post-struturalist writers do seem to hint at complexity and what post-structural culturalists might call ‘intertextuality’, arguing for ‘favouring a complexity of interactions’ rather than ‘linear causality’[viii]. The implication is that language is just one of an endless web of factors and surely this prompts one to pursue an understanding of these links. However, to do so would dangerously undermine the entire post-structural project as again, if there are discoverable links between factors, then there are material facts that are identifiable regardless of language. Consequently, rather than seeking to understand the links between factors what seems to happen is hands are thrown up in despair as the search for complexity is dropped as quickly as it is picked up. The result is one-dimensional arguments that again can say little. This is evident in Jackson’s approach as he details how words have histories and moreover are part of a dialectic process in which ‘they not only shape social structures but are also shaped by them’.[ix] However we do not then see any discussion of whether, therefore, it is not discourse that is the powerful tool but the effect of the history and the social structure itself. Throughout Jackson’s argument it is a top down process in which discourse disciplines society to follow the desire of the dominant, but here is an instance of a dialectic process where society may actually be the originating force, allowing the discourse in turn to actually to be more powerful. However we simply see no exploration of this potential dialectic process, merely the suggestion it exists.

#### Jackson and critical terror studies are wrong – no evidence to substantiate their claims and no viable alternative

Jones and Smith, 9 - \* University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia AND \*\* King's College, University of London, London, UK (David and M.L.R.,“We're All Terrorists Now: Critical—or Hypocritical—Studies “on” Terrorism?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 32, Issue 4 April 2009 , pages 292 **–** 302**,** Taylor and Francis)

The journal, in other words, is not intended, as one might assume, to evaluate critically those state or non-state actors that might have recourse to terrorism as a strategy. Instead, the journal's ambition is to deconstruct what it views as the ambiguity of the word “terror,” its manipulation by ostensibly liberal democratic state actors, and the complicity of “orthodox” terrorism studies in this authoritarian enterprise. Exposing the deficiencies in any field of study is, of course, a legitimate scholarly exercise, but what the symposium introducing the new volume announces questions both the research agenda and academic integrity of journals like *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* and those who contribute to them. Do these claims, one might wonder, have any substance?

Significantly, the original proposal circulated by the publisher Routledge and one of the editors, Richard Jackson, suggested some uncertainty concerning the preferred title of the journal. *Critical Studies on Terrorism* appeared last on a list where the first choice was *Review of Terror Studies*. Evidently, the concision of a review fails to capture the critical perspective the journal promotes. Criticism, then, is central to the new journal's philosophy and the adjective connotes a distinct ideological and, as shall be seen, far from pluralist and inclusive purpose. So, one might ask, what exactly does a critical approach to terrorism involve?

What it Means to be Critical

The editors and contributors explore what it means to be “critical” in detail, repetition, and opacity, along with an excessive fondness for italics, in the editorial symposium that introduces the first issue, and in a number of subsequent articles. The editors inform us that the study of terrorism is “a growth industry,” observing with a mixture of envy and disapproval that “literally thousands of new books and articles on terrorism are published every year” (pp. l-2). In adding to this literature the editors premise the need for yet another journal on their resistance to what currently constitutes scholarship in the field of terrorism study and its allegedly uncritical acceptance of the Western democratic state's security perspective.

Indeed, to be critical requires a radical reversal of what the journal assumes to be the typical perception of terrorism and the methodology of terrorism research. To focus on the strategies practiced by non-state actors that feature under the conventional denotation “terror” is, for the critical theorist, misplaced. As the symposium explains, “acts of clandestine non-state terrorism are committed by a tiny number of individuals and result in between a few hundred and a few thousand casualties *per year over the entire world*” (original italics) (p. 1). The United States's and its allies' preoccupation with terrorism is, therefore, out of proportion to its effects.1 At the same time, the more pervasive and repressive terror practiced by the state has been “silenced from public and … academic discourse” (p. 1).

The complicity of terrorism studies with the increasingly authoritarian demands of Western, liberal state and media practice, together with the moral and political blindness of established terrorism analysts to this relationship forms the journal's overriding assumption and one that its core contributors repeat ad nauseam. Thus, Michael Stohl, in his contribution “Old Myths, New Fantasies and the Enduring Realities of Terrorism” (pp. 5-16), not only discovers ten “myths” informing the understanding of terrorism, but also finds that these myths reflect a “state centric security focus,” where analysts rarely consider “the violence perpetrated by the state” (p. 5). He complains that the press have become too close to government over the matter. Somewhat contradictorily Stohl subsequently asserts that media reporting is “central to terrorism and counter-terrorism as political action,” that media reportage provides the oxygen of terrorism, and that politicians consider journalists to be “the terrorist's best friend” (p. 7).

Stohl further compounds this incoherence, claiming that “the media are far more likely to focus on the destructive actions, rather than on … grievances or the social conditions that breed [terrorism]—to present episodic rather than thematic stories” (p. 7). He argues that terror attacks between 1968 and 1980 were scarcely reported in the United States, and that reporters do not delve deeply into the sources of conflict (p. 8). All of this is quite contentious, with no direct evidence produced to support such statements. The “media” is after all a very broad term, and to assume that it is monolithic is to replace criticism with conspiracy theory. Moreover, even if it were true that the media always serves as a government propaganda agency, then by Stohl's own logic, terrorism as a method of political communication is clearly futile as no rational actor would engage in a campaign doomed to be endlessly misreported.

Nevertheless, the notion that an inherent pro-state bias vitiates terrorism studies pervades the critical position. Anthony Burke, in “The End of Terrorism Studies” (pp. 37-49), asserts that established analysts like Bruce Hoffman “specifically exclude states as possible perpetrators” of terror. Consequently, the emergence of “critical terrorism studies” “may signal the end of a particular kind of traditionally state-focused and directed 'problem-solving' terrorism studies—at least in terms of its ability to assume that its categories and commitments are immune from challenge and correspond to a stable picture of reality” (p. 42).

Elsewhere, Adrian Guelke, in “Great Whites, Paedophiles and Terrorists: The Need for Critical Thinking in a New Era of Terror” (pp. 17-25), considers British government-induced media “scare-mongering” to have legitimated an “authoritarian approach” to the purported new era of terror (pp. 22-23). Meanwhile, Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass, in “The Terrorist Subject: Terrorist Studies and the Absent Subjectivity” (pp. 27-36), find the War on Terror constitutes “*the* single,” all embracing paradigm of analysis where the critical voice is “not allowed to ask: what is the reality itself?” (original italics) (pp. 28-29). The construction of this condition, they further reveal, if somewhat abstrusely, reflects an abstract “desire” that demands terror as “an ever-present threat” (p. 31). In order to sustain this fabrication: “Terrorism experts and commentators” function as “realist policemen”; and not very smart ones at that, who while “gazing at the evidence” are “unable to read the paradoxical logic of the desire that fuels it, whereby *lack* turns to*excess*” (original italics) (p. 32). Finally, Ken Booth, in “The Human Faces of Terror: Reflections in a Cracked Looking Glass” (pp. 65-79), reiterates Richard Jackson's contention that state terrorism “is a much more serious problem than non-state terrorism” (p. 76).

Yet, one searches in vain in these articles for evidence to support the ubiquitous assertion of state bias: assuming this bias in conventional terrorism analysis as a fact seemingly does not require a corresponding concern with evidence of this fact, merely its continual reiteration by conceptual fiat. A critical perspective dispenses not only with terrorism studies but also with the norms of accepted scholarship. Asserting what needs to be demonstrated commits, of course, the elementary logical fallacy *petitio principii*. But critical theory apparently emancipates (to use its favorite verb) its practitioners from the confines of logic, reason, and the usual standards of academic inquiry.

Alleging a constitutive weakness in established scholarship without the necessity of providing proof to support it, therefore, appears to define the critical posture. The unproved “state centricity” of terrorism studies serves as a platform for further unsubstantiated accusations about the state of the discipline. Jackson and his fellow editors, along with later claims by Zulaika and Douglass, and Booth, again assert that “orthodox” analysts rarely bother “to interview or engage with those involved in 'terrorist' activity” (p. 2) or spend any time “on the ground in the areas most affected by conflict” (p. 74). Given that Booth and Jackson spend most of their time on the ground in Aberystwyth, Ceredigion, not a notably terror rich environment if we discount the operations of *Meibion Glyndwr* who would as a matter of principle avoid *pob sais* like Jackson and Booth, this seems a bit like the pot calling the kettle black. It also overlooks the fact that *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* first advertised the problem of “talking to terrorists” in 2001 and has gone to great lengths to rectify this lacuna, if it is one, regularly publishing articles by analysts with first-hand experience of groups like the Taliban, Al Qaeda and *Jemaah Islamiyah*.

A consequence of avoiding primary research, it is further alleged, leads conventional analysts uncritically to apply psychological and problem-solving approaches to their object of study. This propensity, Booth maintains, occasions another unrecognized weakness in traditional terrorism research, namely, an inability to engage with “the particular dynamics of the political world” (p. 70). Analogously, Stohl claims that “the US and English [sic] media” exhibit a tendency to psychologize terrorist acts, which reduces “structural and political problems” into issues of individual pathology (p. 7). Preoccupied with this problem-solving, psychopathologizing methodology, terrorism analysts have lost the capacity to reflect on both their practice and their research ethics.

By contrast, the critical approach is not only self-reflective, but also and, for good measure, self-reflexive. In fact, the editors and a number of the journal's contributors use these terms interchangeably, treating a reflection and a reflex as synonyms (p. 2). A cursory encounter with the *Shorter Oxford Dictionary* would reveal that they are not. Despite this linguistically challenged misidentification, “reflexivity” is made to do a lot of work in the critical idiom. Reflexivity, the editors inform us, requires a capacity “to challenge dominant knowledge and understandings, is sensitive to the politics of labelling … is transparent about its own values and political standpoints, adheres to a set of responsible research ethics, and is committed to a broadly defined notion of emancipation” (p. 2). This covers a range of not very obviously related but critically approved virtues. Let us examine what reflexivity involves as Stohl, Guelke, Zulaika and Douglass, Burke, and Booth explore, somewhat repetitively, its implications.

Reflexive or Defective?

Firstly, to challenge dominant knowledge and understanding and retain sensitivity to labels leads inevitably to a fixation with language, discourse, the ambiguity of the noun, terror, and its political use and abuse. Terrorism, Booth enlightens the reader unremarkably, is “a politically loaded term” (p. 72). Meanwhile, Zulaika and Douglass consider terror “the dominant tropic [sic] space in contemporary political and journalistic discourse” (p. 30). Faced with the “serious challenge” (Booth p. 72) and pejorative connotation that the noun conveys, critical terrorologists turn to deconstruction and bring the full force of postmodern obscurantism to bear on its use. Thus the editors proclaim that terrorism is “one of the most powerful signifiers in contemporary discourse.” There is, moreover, a “yawning gap between the 'terrorism' signifier and the actual acts signified” (p. 1). “[V]irtually all of this activity,” the editors pronounce *ex cathedra*, “refers to the *response* to acts of political violence not the violence itself” (original italics) (p. 1). Here again they offer no evidence for this curious assertion and assume, it would seem, all conventional terrorism studies address issues of homeland security.

In keeping with this critical orthodoxy that he has done much to define, Anthony Burke also asserts the “instability (and thoroughly politicized nature) of the unifying master-terms of our field: 'terror' and 'terrorism'” (p. 38). To address this he contends that a critical stance requires us to “keep this radical instability and inherent politicization of the concept of terrorism at the forefront of its analysis.” Indeed, “without a conscious reflexivity about the most basic definition of the object, our discourse will not be critical at all” (p. 38). More particularly, drawing on a jargon-infused amalgam of Michel Foucault's identification of a relationship between power and knowledge, the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School's critique of democratic false consciousness, mixed with the existentialism of the Third Reich's favorite philosopher, Martin Heidegger, Burke “*questions the question*.” This intellectual *potpourri* apparently enables the critical theorist to “question the ontological status of a 'problem' before any attempt to map out, study or resolve it” (p. 38).

Interestingly, Burke, Booth, and the symposistahood deny that there might be objective data about violence or that a properly focused strategic study of terrorism would not include any prescriptive goodness or rightness of action. While a strategic theorist or a skeptical social scientist might claim to consider only the complex relational situation that involves as well as the actions, the attitude of human beings to them, the critical theorist's radical questioning of language denies this possibility.

The critical approach to language and its deconstruction of an otherwise useful, if imperfect, political vocabulary has been the source of much confusion and inconsequentiality in the practice of the social sciences. It dates from the relativist pall that French radical post structural philosophers like Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, cast over the social and historical sciences in order to demonstrate that social and political knowledge depended on and underpinned power relations that permeated the landscape of the social and reinforced the liberal democratic state. This radical assault on the possibility of either neutral fact or value ultimately functions unfalsifiably, and as a substitute for philosophy, social science, and a real theory of language.

The problem with the critical approach is that, as the Australian philosopher John Anderson demonstrated, to achieve a genuine study one must either investigate the facts that are talked about or the fact that they are talked about in a certain way. More precisely, as J.L. Mackie explains, “if we concentrate on the uses of language we fall between these two stools, and we are in danger of taking our discoveries about manners of speaking as answers to questions about what is there.”2 Indeed, in so far as an account of the use of language spills over into ontology it is liable to be a confused mixture of what should be two distinct investigations: the study of the facts about which the language is used, and the study of the linguistic phenomena themselves.

It is precisely, however, this confused mixture of fact and discourse that critical thinking seeks to impose on the study of terrorism and infuses the practice of critical theory more generally. From this confused seed no coherent method grows.

What is To Be Done?

This ontological confusion notwithstanding, Ken Booth sees critical theory not only exposing the dubious links between power and knowledge in established terrorism studies, but also offering an ideological agenda that transforms the face of global politics. “[*C*]*ritical knowledge*,” Booth declares, “*involves understandings of the social world that attempt to stand outside prevailing structures, processes, ideologies and orthodoxies while recognizing that all conceptualizations within the ambit of sociality derive from particular social/historical conditions*” (original italics) (p. 78). Helpfully, Booth, assuming the manner of an Old Testament prophet, provides his critical disciples with “*big-picture* navigation aids” (original italics) (p. 66) to achieve this higher knowledge. Booth promulgates fifteen commandments (as Clemenceau remarked of Woodrow Wilson's nineteen points, in a somewhat different context, “God Almighty only gave us ten”). When not stating the staggeringly obvious, the Ken Commandments are hopelessly contradictory. Critical theorists thus should “avoid exceptionalizing the study of terrorism,”3 “recognize that states can be agents of terrorism,” and “keep the long term in sight.” Unexceptional advice to be sure and long recognized by more traditional students of terrorism. The critical student, if not fully conversant with critical doublethink, however, might find the fact that she or he lives within “Powerful theories” that are “constitutive of political, social, and economic life” (6th Commandment, p. 71), sits uneasily with Booth's concluding injunction to “stand outside” prevailing ideologies (p. 78).

In his preferred imperative idiom, Booth further contends that terrorism is best studied in the context of an “academic international relations” whose role “is not only to interpret the world but to change it” (pp. 67-68). Significantly, academic—or more precisely, critical—international relations, holds no place for a realist appreciation of the status quo but approves instead a Marxist ideology of praxis. It is within this transformative praxis that critical theory situates terrorism and terrorists.

The political goals of those non-state entities that choose to practice the tactics of terrorism invariably seek a similar transformative praxis and this leads “critical global theorizing” into a curiously confused empathy with the motives of those engaged in such acts, as well as a disturbing relativism. Thus, Booth again decrees that the gap between “those who hate terrorism and those who carry it out, those who seek to delegitimize the acts of terrorists and those who incite them, and those who abjure terror and those who glorify it—is not as great as is implied or asserted by orthodox terrorism experts, the discourse of governments, or the popular press” (p. 66). The gap “between us/them is a slippery slope, not an unbridgeable political and ethical chasm” (p. 66). So, while “terrorist actions are always—without exception—wrong, they nevertheless might be contingently excusable” (p. 66). From this ultimately relativist perspective gang raping a defenseless woman, an act of terror on any critical or uncritical scale of evaluation, is, it would seem, wrong but potentially excusable.

On the basis of this worrying relativism a further Ken Commandment requires the abolition of the discourse of evil on the somewhat questionable grounds that evil releases agents from responsibility (pp. 74-75). This not only reveals a profound ignorance of theology, it also underestimates what Eric Voeglin identified as a central feature of the appeal of modern political religions from the Third Reich to Al Qaeda. As Voeglin observed in 1938, the Nazis represented an “attractive force.” To understand that force requires not the abolition of evil [so necessary to the relativist] but comprehending its attractiveness. Significantly, as Barry Cooper argues, “its attractiveness, [like that of al Qaeda] cannot fully be understood apart from its evilness.”4

The line of relativist inquiry that critical theorists like Booth evince toward terrorism leads in fact not to moral clarity but an inspissated moral confusion. This is paradoxical given that the editors make much in the journal's introductory symposium of their “responsible research ethics.” The paradox is resolved when one realizes that critical moralizing demands the “ethics of responsibility to the terrorist other.” For Ken Booth it involves, it appears, empathizing “with the ethic of responsibility” faced by those who, “in extremis” “have some explosives” (p. 76). Anthony Burke contends that a critically self-conscious normativism requires the analyst, not only to “critique” the “strategic languages” of the West, but also to “take in” the “side of the Other” or more particularly “engage” “with the highly developed forms of thinking” that provides groups like Al Qaeda “with legitimizing foundations and a world view of some profundity” (p. 44). This additionally demands a capacity not only to empathize with the “other,” but also to recognize that both Osama bin Laden in his *Messages to the West* and Sayyid Qutb in his Muslim Brotherhood manifesto *Milestones* not only offer “well observed” criticisms of Western decadence, but also “converges with elements of critical theory” (p. 45). This is not surprising given that both Islamist and critical theorists share an analogous contempt for Western democracy, the market, and the international order these structures inhabit and have done much to shape.

Histrionically Speaking

Critical theory, then, embraces relativism not only toward language but also toward social action. Relativism and the bizarre ethicism it engenders in its attempt to empathize with the terrorist other are, moreover, histrionic. As Leo Strauss classically inquired of this relativist tendency in the social sciences, “is such an understanding dependent upon our own commitment or independent of it?” Strauss explains, if it is independent, I am committed as an actor and I am uncommitted in another compartment of myself in my capacity as a social scientist. “In that latter capacity I am completely empty and therefore completely open to the perception and appreciation of all commitments or value systems.” I go through the process of empathetic understanding in order to reach clarity about my commitment for only a part of me is engaged in my empathetic understanding. This means, however, that “such understanding is not serious or genuine but histrionic.”5 It is also profoundly dependent on Western liberalism. For it is only in an open society that questions the values it promotes that the issue of empathy with the non-Western other could arise. The critical theorist's explicit loathing of the openness that affords her histrionic posturing obscures this constituting fact.

On the basis of this histrionic empathy with the “other,” critical theory concludes that democratic states “do not always abjure acts of terror whether to advance their foreign policy objectives … or to buttress order at home” (p. 73). Consequently, Ken Booth asserts: “If terror can be part of the menu of choice for the relatively strong, it is hardly surprising it becomes a weapon of the relatively weak” (p. 73). Zulaika and Douglass similarly assert that terrorism is “always” a weapon of the weak (p. 33).

At the core of this critical, ethicist, relativism therefore lies a syllogism that holds all violence is terror: Western states use violence, therefore, Western states are terrorist. Further, the greater terrorist uses the greater violence: Western governments exercise the greater violence. Therefore, it is the liberal democracies rather than Al Qaeda that are the greater terrorists.

In its desire to empathize with the transformative ends, if not the means of terrorism generally and Islamist terror in particular, critical theory reveals itself as a form of Marxist unmasking. Thus, for Booth “*terror has multiple forms*” (original italics) and the real terror is economic, the product it would seem of “global capitalism” (p. 75). Only the *engagee* intellectual academic finding in deconstructive criticism the philosophical weapons that reveal the illiberal neo-conservative purpose informing the conventional study of terrorism and the democratic state's prosecution of counterterrorism can identify the real terror lurking behind the “manipulation of the politics of fear” (p. 75).

Moreover, the resolution of this condition of escalating violence requires not any strategic solution that creates security as the basis for development whether in London or Kabul. Instead, Booth, Burke, and the editors contend that the only solution to “the world-historical crisis that is facing human society globally” (p. 76) is universal human “emancipation.” This, according to Burke, is “the normative end” that critical theory pursues. Following Jurgen Habermas, the godfather of critical theory, terrorism is really a form of distorted communication. The solution to this problem of failed communication resides not only in the improvement of living conditions, and “the political taming of unbounded capitalism,” but also in “the telos of mutual understanding.” Only through this telos with its “strong normative bias towards non violence” (p. 43) can a universal condition of peace and justice transform the globe. In other words, the only ethical solution to terrorism is conversation: sitting around an un-coerced table presided over by Kofi Annan, along with Ken Booth, Osama bin Laden, President Obama, and some European Union pacifist sandalista, a transcendental communicative reason will emerge to promulgate norms of transformative justice. As Burke enunciates, the panacea of un-coerced communication would establish “a secularism that might create an enduring architecture of basic shared values” (p. 46).

In the end, un-coerced norm projection is not concerned with the world as it is, but how it ought to be. This not only compounds the logical errors that permeate critical theory, it advances an ultimately utopian agenda under the guise of *soi-disant* cosmopolitanism where one somewhat vaguely recognizes the “human interconnection and mutual vulnerability to nature, the cosmos and each other” (p. 47) and no doubt bursts into spontaneous chanting of Kumbaya.

In analogous visionary terms, Booth defines real security as emancipation in a way that denies any definitional rigor to either term. The struggle against terrorism is, then, a struggle for emancipation from the oppression of political violence everywhere. Consequently, in this Manichean struggle for global emancipation against the real terror of Western democracy, Booth further maintains that universities have a crucial role to play. This also is something of a concern for those who do not share the critical vision, as university international relations departments are not now, it would seem, in business to pursue dispassionate analysis but instead are to serve as cheerleaders for this critically inspired vision.

Overall, the journal's fallacious commitment to emancipation undermines any ostensible claim to pluralism and diversity. Over determined by this transformative approach to world politics, it necessarily denies the possibility of a realist or prudential appreciation of politics and the promotion not of universal solutions but pragmatic ones that accept the best that may be achieved in the circumstances. Ultimately, to present the world how it ought to be rather than as it is conceals a deep intolerance notable in the contempt with which many of the contributors to the journal appear to hold Western politicians and the Western media.6

It is the exploitation of this oughtistic style of thinking that leads the critic into a Humpty Dumpty world where words mean exactly what the critical theorist “chooses them to mean—neither more nor less.” However, in order to justify their disciplinary niche they have to insist on the failure of established modes of terrorism study. Having identified a source of government grants and academic perquisites, critical studies in fact does not deal with the notion of terrorism as such, but instead the manner in which the Western liberal democratic state has supposedly manipulated the use of violence by non-state actors in order to “other” minority communities and create a politics of fear.

Critical Studies and Strategic Theory—A Missed Opportunity

Of course, the doubtful contribution of critical theory by no means implies that all is well with what one might call conventional terrorism studies. The subject area has in the past produced superficial assessments that have done little to contribute to an informed understanding of conflict. This is a point readily conceded by John Horgan and Michael Boyle who put “A Case Against 'Critical Terrorism Studies'” (pp. 51-74). Although they do not seek to challenge the agenda, assumptions, and contradictions inherent in the critical approach, their contribution to the new journal distinguishes itself by actually having a well-organized and well-supported argument. The authors' willingness to acknowledge deficiencies in some terrorism research shows that critical self-reflection is already present in existing terrorism studies. It is ironic, in fact, that the most clearly reflective, original, and *critical* contribution in the first edition should come from established terrorism researchers who critique the critical position.

Interestingly, the specter haunting both conventional and critical terrorism studies is that both assume that terrorism is an existential phenomenon, and thus has causes and solutions. Burke makes this explicit: “The inauguration of this journal,” he declares, “indeed suggests broad agreement that there is a phenomenon called terrorism” (p. 39). Yet this is not the only way of looking at terrorism. For a strategic theorist the notion of terrorism does not exist as an independent phenomenon. It is an abstract noun. More precisely, it is merely a tactic—the creation of fear for political ends—that can be employed by any social actor, be it state or non-state, in any context, without any necessary moral value being involved.

Ironically, then, strategic theory offers a far more “critical perspective on terrorism” than do the perspectives advanced in this journal. Guelke, for example, propounds a curiously orthodox standpoint when he asserts: “to describe an act as one of terrorism, without the qualification of quotation marks to indicate the author's distance from such a judgement, is to condemn it as absolutely illegitimate” (p. 19). If you are a strategic theorist this is an invalid claim. Terrorism is simply a method to achieve an end. Any moral judgment on the act is entirely separate. To fuse the two is a category mistake. In strategic theory, which Guelke ignores, terrorism does not, ipso facto, denote “absolutely illegitimate violence.”

Intriguingly, Stohl, Booth, and Burke also imply that a strategic understanding forms part of their critical viewpoint. Booth, for instance, argues in one of his commandments that terrorism should be seen as a conscious human choice. Few strategic theorists would disagree. Similarly, Burke feels that there does “appear to be a consensus” that terrorism is a “form of instrumental political violence” (p. 38). The problem for the contributors to this volume is that they cannot emancipate themselves from the very orthodox assumption that the word terrorism is pejorative. That may be the popular understanding of the term, but inherently terrorism conveys no necessary connotation of moral condemnation. “Is terrorism a form of warfare, insurgency, struggle, resistance, coercion, atrocity, or great political crime,” Burke asks rhetorically. But once more he misses the point. All violence is instrumental. Grading it according to whether it is insurgency, resistance, or atrocity is irrelevant. Any strategic actor may practice forms of warfare. For this reason Burke's further claim that existing definitions of terrorism have “specifically excluded states as possible perpetrators and privilege them as targets,” is wholly inaccurate (p. 38). Strategic theory has never excluded state-directed terrorism as an object of study, and neither for that matter, as Horgan and Boyle point out, have more conventional studies of terrorism.

Yet, Burke offers—as a critical revelation—that “the strategic intent behind the US bombing of North Vietnam and Cambodia, Israel's bombing of Lebanon, or the sanctions against Iraq is also terrorist.” He continues: “My point is not to remind us that states practise terror, but to show how mainstream *strategic doctrines* are terrorist in these terms and undermine any prospect of achieving the normative consensus if such terrorism is to be reduced and eventually eliminated” (original italics) (p. 41). This is not merely confused, it displays remarkable nescience on the part of one engaged in teaching the next generation of graduates from the Australian Defence Force Academy. Strategic theory conventionally recognizes that actions on the part of state or non-state actors that aim to create fear (such as the allied aerial bombing of Germany in World War II or the nuclear deterrent posture of Mutually Assured Destruction) can be terroristic in nature.7 The problem for critical analysts like Burke is that they impute their own moral valuations to the term terror. Strategic theorists do not. Moreover, the statement that this undermines any prospect that terrorism can be eliminated is illogical: you can never eliminate an abstract noun.

Consequently, those interested in a truly “critical” approach to the subject should perhaps turn to strategic theory for some relief from the strictures that have traditionally governed the study of terrorism, not to self-proclaimed critical theorists who only replicate the flawed understandings of those whom they criticize. Horgan and Boyle conclude their thoughtful article by claiming that critical terrorism studies has more in common with traditional terrorism research than critical theorists would possibly like to admit. These reviewers agree: they are two sides of the same coin.

Conclusion

In the looking glass world of critical terror studies the conventional analysis of terrorism is ontologically challenged, lacks self-reflexivity, and is policy oriented. By contrast, critical theory's ethicist, yet relativist, and deconstructive gaze reveals that we are all terrorists now and must empathize with those sub-state actors who have recourse to violence for whatever motive. Despite their intolerable othering by media and governments, terrorists are really no different from us. In fact, there is terror as the weapon of the weak and the far worse economic and coercive terror of the liberal state. Terrorists therefore deserve empathy and they must be discursively engaged.

At the core of this understanding sits a radical pacifism and an idealism that requires not the status quo but communication and “human emancipation.” Until this radical post-national utopia arrives both force and the discourse of evil must be abandoned and instead therapy and un-coerced conversation must be practiced. In the popular ABC drama *Boston Legal* Judge Brown perennially referred to the vague, irrelevant, jargon-ridden statements of lawyers as “jibber jabber.” The Aberystwyth-based school of critical internationalist utopianism that increasingly dominates the study of international relations in Britain and Australia has refined a higher order incoherence that may be termed Aber jabber. The pages of the journal of *Critical Studies on Terrorism* are its natural home.

#### Biopolitics not so bad

**Dickinson** **2004** – University of Cincinnati (Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakasble. Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state

is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90

Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering.

This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.

#### Things are getting better

**Goldstein, 12/7/11** [Joshua, professor of international relations at American University, National Public Radio, “War and Violence on the Decline in Modern Times”, http://www.npr.org/2011/12/07/143285836/war-and-violence-on-the-decline-in-modern-times]

GOLDSTEIN: Well, think about that war that started 70 years ago, World War II. That was a war in which the levels of violence were 100 times higher than the wars today. And if you measure it, the 1990s were double today. The Cold War years were triple.

So in the United States, we've had a hard decade of war, no doubt about it, and one war is one too many. The things that still happen are heartbreaking and terrible. But overall, the trend is downward. And the big piece of this trend is that the most terrible, destructive wars are between the large national armies with their tank formations and their submarines and airplanes, and nowhere in the world today anymore are two of those large national armies fighting each other head-to-head.

This is a **huge change from history**, when they were fighting each other most of the time, and it means that what we're left with are smaller wars, still terrible but smaller, more limited in size and geographically limited civil wars. And that's a big change.

CONAN: Well, saying that there are fewer war deaths this past decade than at any time in the past 100 years, isn't that another way of indicting the past 100 years and maybe this decade is the anomaly?

GOLDSTEIN: Well, no, because the past 100 years were - there was a big explosion of violence in the early part of the 20th century, but the 17th century was no picnic either. The Thirty Years' War destroyed a third of the population of Germany, and back through history there have been terrible wars much of the time.

And even in prehistoric times, as many as a quarter of the men in a society not infrequently died in wars. So it's actually a new thing and something that's developed in the least 60 years and especially the last 20 years. And we can talk about why it is, and Steven Pinker will have more to say about that also, but the big change is that people are finding other ways to solve their problems, not through war, and we're seeing an actual shrinking in the number of people killed worldwide.

#### Ethical obligations are tautological—the only coherent rubric is to maximize number of lives saved

**Greene 2010** – Associate Professor of the Social Sciences Department of Psychology Harvard University (Joshua, Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul”, [www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf](http://www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf), WEA)

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is anyrationallycoherentnormativemoral theory that can accommodateourmoral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization.

It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide.  How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977).

Missing the Deontological Point  
I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstoodwhatKant and like-minded deontologistsare all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b).This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are notdistinctivelydeontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view.  
In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people asmereobjects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-beingin the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be.  
What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will getcharacteristically deontological answers. Some will betautological: "Because it's murder!"Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about thembecause they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

#### No risk of runaway interventions

**Weiner 2007**

Michael Anthony, J.D. Candidate, Vanderbilt School of Law, 2007, “A Paper Tiger with Bite: A Defense of the War Powers Resolution,” http://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/manage/wp-content/uploads/Weiner.pdf

IV. CONCLUSION: THE EXONERATED WPR AND THE WOLF IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING The WPR is an effective piece of war powers legislation. As Part III made clear, no presidential unilateral use of force since 1973 has developed into a conflict that in any way resembles the WPR's impetus, Vietnam. Rather, the great majority of these conflicts have been characterized by their brevity, safety, and downright success. Yes, there have been tragic outcomes in Lebanon and Somalia; but what happened in response to those tragedies? In Lebanon, President Reagan actually submitted to being Congress's "messengerboy," 203 asking for its permission, per the WPR, to continue the operation. And in Somalia, at the first sight of a looming disaster, it was President Clinton who cut short the operation. Thus, from 1973 on, it is easy to argue that sitting Executives have made responsible use of their power to act unilaterally in the foreign affairs realm. The WPR has even contributed to a congressional resurgence in the foreign affairs arena. In many of these conflicts, we have seen Congress conducting numerous votes on whether and how it should respond to a unilaterally warring Executive. In some of the conflicts, Congress has come close to invoking the WPR against rather impetuous Executives. 20 4 In Lebanon, Congress actually succeeded in the task.20 5 It is this Note's contention, though, that even when Congress failed to legally invoke the WPR, these votes had normative effects on the Executives in power. Such votes demonstrate that Congress desires to be, and will try to be, a player in foreign affairs decisions. So, perhaps the enactment of the WPR, the rise of Congress (at least in the normative sense) and the successful string of unilateral presidential uses of force are just a series of coincidences. This Note, however, with common sense as its companion, contends that they are not. Rather, it is self-evident that the WPR has played a significant role in improving the implementation of presidential unilateral uses of force.

#### No risk of tyranny

Rosman 96 [Michael E. Rosman (General Counsel @ Center for Individual Rights; JD from Yale); Review of “FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH”; Constitutional Commentary 96 (Winter, p. 343-345)]

Of course, the other branches also shove at the boundaries of branch power--FDR's Court-packing plan being one notable example of this practice. Sometimes the law of unintended consequences grabs hold. Perhaps the Court-packing plan concentrated the Justices' minds on finding ways to hold New Deal legislation constitutional, but it also blew up in FDR's face politically.

At least for the last two hundred years, however, no branch has managed to expand its power to the point of delivering an obvious knock-out blow to another branch. Seen from this broader perspective, cases such as Morrison,(33) Bowsher v. Synar,(34) and Mistretta v. United States(35) surely alter the balance of branch power at a given historical moment, but do not change the fundamental and brute fact that the Constitution puts three institutional heavyweights into a ring where they are free to bash each other.

Judicialocentrism tends to obscure this obvious point because it causes people to dwell on the hard cases that reach the Supreme Court. The power of separation of powers, however, largely resides in its ability to keep the easy cases from ever occurring. For instance, Congress, although it tries to weaken the President from time to time, has not tried to reduce the President to a ceremonial figurehead a la the Queen of England. Similarly, Congress does not make a habit of trying cases that have been heard by the courts. This list could be continued indefinitely.

The Supreme Court has had two hundred years to muck about with separation-of-powers doctrine. Over that time, scores of Justices--each with his or her own somewhat idiosyncratic view of the law--have sat on the bench. Scholars have denounced separation-of-powers jurisprudence as a mess. But the Republic endures, at least more or less. These historical facts tend to indicate that the Court need not rush to change its approach to separation of powers to prevent a slide into tyranny.

# Block

## 2NC

### T

#### They are diplomatic and military engagement---allows affs that transfer arms, training or do military aid

**Resnick 1** (Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States Programme at RSIS, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, [Ebsco](http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=1b56e6b4-ade2-4052-9114-7d107fdbd019%40sessionmgr12&vid=2&hid=24&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=4437301))

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS •Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations •Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes •Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa MILITARY CONTACTS •Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa •Arms transfers •Military aid and cooperation •Military exchange and training programs •Confidence and security-building measures •Intelligence sharing **ECONOMIC CONTACTS •Trade agreements and promotion •Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants** CULTURAL CONTACTS •Cultural treaties •Inauguration of travel and tourism links •Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25)

### XTRA T

#### Removing Cuba from the terror list opens up arms sales and individual financial transitions

Boston Globe 13 (“Talk grows of taking Cuba off terror list,” http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/02/21/cuba-label-terrorist-state-longer-justified-some-officials-say/CmVFXsVC4M1R1WbHE8lb0H/story.html)

In addition to Cuba, the list of terrorist sponsors includes Syria, Sudan, and Iran. Inclusion imposes strict sanctions. For example, it prohibits the United States from selling arms, providing economic assistance, and restricts financial transactions between citizens. Countries that were removed from the list in recent years include North Korea, Libya, and Iraq.

### K

#### War turns structural violence but not the other way around

Joshua Goldstein, Int’l Rel Prof @ American U, 2001, War and Gender, p. 412

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So,”if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

#### Reducing existential risk is desirable in every framework—our argument doesn’t require extreme utilitarianism.

Nick Bostrom, Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School, Director of the Future of Humanity Institute, and Director of the Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology at the University of Oxford, recipient of the 2009 Eugene R. Gannon Award for the Continued Pursuit of Human Advancement, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the London School of Economics, 2011 (“The Concept of Existential Risk,” Draft of a Paper published on ExistentialRisk.com, Available Online at <http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html>, Accessed 07-04-2011) We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters: I believe a better basis for ethical theory in this area can be found in quite a different direction—in a commitment to the future of humanity as a vast project, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. The aspiration for a better society—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—is a part of this project. So are the potentially endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding, and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able, in turn, to have the lives of their children and grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavorable to the carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it. … Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population-at-a-time, considered in isolation from how it got that way. We owe, I think, some loyalty to this project of the human future. We also owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it. (28: 472-473) Since an existential catastrophe would either put an end to the project of the future of humanity or drastically curtail its scope for development, we would seem to have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it, in Adams’ view. We also note that an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences, suggesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a similar vein, an ethical view emphasizing that public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation by all stakeholders would favor existential-risk mitigation if we suppose, as is plausible, that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies upon reasonable deliberation (even if hypothetical future people are not included as stakeholders). We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants.[24] We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus. Further, many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).[25] We might also consider the issue from a less theoretical standpoint and try to form an evaluation instead by considering analogous cases about which we have definite moral intuitions. Thus, for example, if we feel confident that committing a small genocide is wrong, and that committing a large genocide is no less wrong, we might conjecture that committing omnicide is also wrong.[26] And if we believe we have some moral reason to prevent natural catastrophes that would kill a small number of people, and a stronger moral reason to prevent natural catastrophes that would kill a larger number of people, we might conjecture that we have an even stronger moral reason to prevent catastrophes that would kill the entire human population.

### 2NC – Link

Jackson – This fundamental belief in the instrumental rationality of political violence as an effective and legitimate tool of the state is open to a great many criticisms, not least that it provides the normative basis from which non-state terrorist groups frequently justify their own (often well-intentioned) violence (Oliverio and Lauderdale 2005, Burke 2008). There is from this viewpoint an ethical imperative to try and undermine the widespread acceptance that political violence is a mostly legitimate and effective option in resolving conflict

#### The affirmative is national suicide – allying with centralized governmental institutions is necessary for survival---rejecting the security state invites more violence

Brooks, ‘1 (David, senior editor for the Weekly Standard, The Weekly Standard, 11/5, lexis,

http://www.theweeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/000/424hwkwa.asp?pg=1)

Obviously nobody knows what the future years will feel like, but we do know that the next decade will have a central feature that was lacking in the last one: The next few years will be defined by conflict. And it's possible to speculate about what that means. The institutions that fight for us and defend us against disorder--the military, the FBI, the CIA--will seem more important and more admirable. The fundamental arguments won't be over economic or social issues, they will be over how to wield power--whether to use American power aggressively or circumspectly. We will care a lot more about ends--winning the war--than we will about means. We will debate whether it is necessary to torture prisoners who have information about future biological attacks. We will destroy innocent villages by accident, shrug our shoulders, and continue fighting. In an age of conflict, bourgeois virtues like compassion, tolerance, and industriousness are valued less than the classical virtues of courage, steadfastness, and a ruthless desire for victory. Lookig back, the striking thing about the 1990s zeitgeist was the presumption of harmony. The era was shaped by the idea that there were no fundamental conflicts anymore. The Cold War was over, and while the ensuing wars--like those in Bosnia and Rwanda --were nettlesome, they were restricted to global backwaters. Meanwhile, technology was building bridges across cultures. The Internet, Microsoft ads reminded us, fostered communication and global harmony. All around the world there were people casting off old systems so they could embrace a future of peace and prosperity. Chinese Communists were supposedly being domesticated by the balm of capitalist success. Peace seemed in the offing in Northern Ireland and, thanks to the Oslo process, in the Middle East. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush were elected president of the United States. Neither had performed much in the way of military service. Neither was particularly knowledgeable about foreign affairs. Both promised to be domestic-policy presidents. In that age of peace and prosperity, the top sitcom was "Seinfeld," a show about nothing. Books appeared with titles like "All Connected Now: Life in the First Global Civilization." Academics analyzed the twilight of national sovereignty. Commerce and communications seemed much more important than politics. Defense spending was drastically cut, by Republicans as well as Democrats, because there didn't seem to be any clear and present danger to justify huge budgets. The army tried to recruit volunteers by emphasizing its educational benefits, with narcissistic slogans like "An Army of One." Conservatives, of all people, felt so safe that they became suspicious of the forces of law and order. Conservative activists were heard referring to police as "bureaucrats with badges"; right-wing talk radio dwelt on the atrocities committed by the FBI, the DEA, and other agencies at places like Ruby Ridge and Waco. Meanwhile, all across the political spectrum, interest in public life waned, along with the percentage of adults who bothered to vote. An easy cynicism settled across the land, as more people came to believe that national politics didn't really matter. What mattered instead, it seemed, were local affairs, community, intimate relations, and the construction of private paradises. When on rare occasions people talked about bitter conflict, they usually meant the fights they were having with their kitchen renovators. Historians who want to grasp the style of morality that prevailed in the 1990s should go back to the work of sociologist Alan Wolfe. In books like "One Nation, After All" and "Moral Freedom," Wolfe called the prevailing ethos "small scale morality." Be moderate in your beliefs, and tolerant toward people who have other beliefs. This is a moral code for people who are not threatened by any hostile belief system, who don't think it is worth it to stir up unpleasantness. "What I heard as I talked to Americans," Wolfe wrote of his research, "was a distaste for conflict, a sense that ideas should never be taken so seriously that they lead people into uncivil, let alone violent, courses of action." But now violence has come calling. Now it is no longer possible to live so comfortably in one's own private paradise. Shocked out of the illusion of self-reliance, most of us realize that we, as individuals, simply cannot protect ourselves. Private life requires public protection. Now it is not possible to ignore foreign affairs, because foreign affairs have not ignored us. It has become clear that we are living in a world in which hundreds of millions of people hate us, and some small percentage of them want to destroy us. That realization is bound to have cultural effects. In the first place, we will probably become more conscious of our American-ness. During the blitz in 1940, George Orwell sat in his bomb shelter and wrote an essay called "England Your England." It opened with this sentence: "As I write, highly civilised human beings are flying overhead, trying to kill me." What struck him at that moment of danger was that it really does matter whether you are English or German. The nation is a nursemaid that breeds certain values and a certain ethos. Orwell went on to describe what it meant to be English. Now Americans are being killed simply because they are Americans. Like Orwell, Americans are once again becoming aware of themselves as a nationality, not just as members of some ethnic community or globalized Internet chat group. Americans have been reminded that, despite what the multiculturalists have been preaching, not all cultures are wonderfully equal hues in the great rainbow of humanity. Some national cultures, the ones that have inherited certain ideas--about freedom and democracy, the limits of the political claims of religion, the importance of tolerance and dissent--are more humane than other civilizations, which reject those ideas. As criticism of our war effort grows in Europe, in hostile Arab countries, and in two-faced countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which dislike our principles but love our dollars, Americans will have to articulate a defense of our national principles and practices. That debate in itself will shape American culture. We will begin to see ourselves against the backdrop of the Taliban. During the Cold War, we saw ourselves in contrast to the Soviet Union. Back then, we faced a godless foe; now we are facing a god-crazed foe. As we recoil from the Islamic extremists, we may be less willing to integrate religion into political life. That would mean trouble for faith-based initiatives and religion in the public square. On the other hand, democracies tend to become patriotic during wartime, if history is any guide, and this will drive an even deeper wedge between regular Americans and the intellectual class. Literary critic Paul Fussell, a great student of American culture in times of war, wrote a book, "Wartime," on the cultural effects of World War II. Surveying the culture of that period, he endorsed the view of historian Eileen Sullivan, who wrote, "There was no room in this war culture for individual opinions or personalities, no freedom of dissent or approval; the culture was homogeneous, shallow and boring." The earnest conformity that does prevail in wartime drives intellectuals--who like to think of themselves as witty, skeptical, iconoclastic dissidents--batty. They grow sour, and alienated from mainstream life. For every regular Joe who follows the Humphrey Bogart path in "Casablanca," from cynicism to idealism, there is an intellectual like Fussell, whose war experiences moved him from idealism to lifetime cynicism. There are other cultural effects. For example, commercial life seems less important than public life, and economic reasoning seems less germane than cultural analysis. When life or death fighting is going on, it's hard to think of Bill Gates or Jack Welch as particularly heroic. Moreover, the cost-benefit analysis dear to economists doesn't really explain much in times of war. Osama bin Laden is not motivated by economic self-interest, and neither are our men and women who are risking their lives to defeat him. To understand such actions, you need to study history, religion, and ethics. The people who try to explain events via economic reasoning begin to look silly. Here is the otherwise intelligent economist Steve Hanke, in Forbes, analyzing bin Laden: "Don't make the mistake of interpreting the events of Sept. 11 purely in terms of terrorism and murder. . . . The terrorists are a virulent subset of a much larger group of anticapitalists, one that includes many politicians, bureaucrats, writers, media types, academics, entertainers, trade unionists and, at times, church leaders. The barbarians at the gates are more numerous than you thought." But the most important cultural effect of conflict is that it breeds a certain bloody-mindedness or, to put it more grandly, a tragic view of life. Life in times of war and recession reminds us of certain hard truths that were easy to ignore during the decade of peace and prosperity. Evil exists. Difficulties, even tragedies, are inevitable. Human beings are flawed creatures capable of monstrosity. Not all cultures are compatible. To preserve order, good people must exercise power over destructive people. That means that it's no longer sufficient to deconstruct ideas and texts and signifiers. You have to be able to construct hard principles so you can move from one idea to the next, because when you are faced with the problem of repelling evil, you absolutely must be able to reach a conclusion on serious moral issues. This means you need to think in moral terms about force--and to be tough-minded. During the Cold War, Reinhold Niebuhr was a major intellectual figure. In 1952, he wrote "The Irony of American History." The tragedy of the conflict with communism, he argued, was that, "though confident of its virtue, [America] must yet hold atomic bombs ready for use so as to prevent a possible world conflagration." The irony of our history, he continued, is that we are an idealistic nation that dreams of creating a world of pure virtue, yet in defeating our enemies we sometimes have to act in ways that are not pure. "We take, and must continue to take, morally hazardous action to preserve our civilization," Niebuhr wrote. "We must exercise our power." We have to do so while realizing that we will not be capable of perfect disinterestedness when deciding which actions are just. We will be influenced by dark passions. But we still have to act forcefully because our enemies are trying to destroy the basis of civilization: "We are drawn into an historic situation in which the paradise of our domestic security is suspended in a hell of global insecurity." Niebuhr's prescription was humble hawkishness. He believed the United States should forcefully defend freedom and destroy its enemies. But while doing so, it should seek forgiveness for the horrible things it might have to do in a worthy cause. To reach this graduate-school level of sophistication, you have to have passed through elementary courses in moral reasoning. It will be interesting to see whether we Americans, who sometimes seem unsure of even the fundamental moral categories, can educate ourselves sufficiently to engage in the kind of moral reasoning that Niebuhr did. The greatest political effect of this period of conflict will probably be to relegitimize central institutions. Since we can't defend ourselves as individuals against terrorism, we have to rely on the institutions of government: the armed forces, the FBI, the CIA, the CDC, and so on. We are now only beginning to surrender some freedoms, but we will trade in more, and willingly. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers, "Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. . . . To be more safe, [people] at length become willing to run the risk of being less free." Moreover, we will see power migrate from the states and Capitol Hill to the White House. "It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority," Hamilton continued. This creates rifts on both left and right, because both movements contain anti-establishment elements hostile to any effort to relegitimize central authorities. The splits have been most spectacular on the left. Liberals who work in politics--Democrats on Capitol Hill, liberal activists, academics who are interested in day-to-day politics--almost all support President Bush and the war effort. But many academic and literary leftists, ranging from Eric Foner to Susan Sontag to Noam Chomsky, have been sour, critical, and contemptuous of America's response to September 11. The central difference is that the political liberals are comfortable with power. They want power themselves and do not object to the central institutions of government, even the military, exercising power on our behalf. Many literary and academic liberals, on the other hand, have built a whole moral system around powerlessness. They champion the outgroups. They stand with the victims of hegemony, patriarchy, colonialism, and all the other manifestations of central authority. Sitting on their campuses, they are powerless themselves, and have embraced a delicious, self-glorifying identity as the outmanned sages who alone can see through the veils of propaganda in which the powerful hide their oppressive schemes. For these thinkers, virtue inheres in the powerless. The weak are sanctified, not least because they are voiceless and allegedly need academics to give them voices. These outgroup leftists dislike the Taliban, but to ally themselves with American power would be to annihilate everything they have stood for and the role they have assigned themselves in society. The splits on the right have been quieter, but no less important. Anti-establishmentarianism on the right comes in libertarian and populist forms. Its adherents have noticed that during wartime, the power of the state tends to expand. "Wars are nasty things: They make governments grow," Grover Norquist of Americans for Tax Reform told the Washington Post. This skepticism applies not only to any new social programs that might emerge in this centralizing moment, but to proposals to strengthen the forces of law and order. "We don't like the bad guys either. But let's not sacrifice our freedoms because the FBI and CIA want more power," Norquist told the Boston Globe. Since September 11, conservatives have broken down into two camps: those who fear that Bush will go squishy on Iraq, and those who fear that he will go squishy on capital gains. The conservatives who fear that the United States won't take out Saddam are national security conservatives. They don't think it's worth getting into a big fight over reducing taxes at a moment of national crisis. They value free market reforms, but believe that right now other conservative agenda items should take a back seat to national security. The libertarian, anti-government, "leave us alone" conservatives, such as Dick Armey and Tom DeLay, believe Bush should use his popularity to push through capital gains tax reductions and the like. They detest the domestic bipartisanship that Bush has cultivated on Capitol Hill. They believe that national security arguments should not be used to strengthen the hand of Washington. On balance, George W. Bush is behaving more like a national security conservative (without, of course, committing himself on Iraq). He embraces every Democrat he can wrap his arms around. He has tried to reduce partisan conflict on the stimulus package. He would not even think of raising divisive social issues. He seeks to clear the domestic front so he can focus on the fight against terror. No longer the compassionate conservative, he has, with impressive decisiveness, turned himself into a fighting conservative. What the Bush administration is now presenting, and what the public seems to want, is Rudy Giuliani-ism on a global scale. Giuliani took over a city plagued by crime and apparently ungovernable. He didn't stop to ponder the root causes of crime, or whether the '60s had sent America into irreversible decline. Giuliani is not even particularly interested in the general moral fabric of the city. He's not conservative on the social issues. Instead, he's interested in preventing acts of disorder. He is a guy who sits around with his friends watching the "Godfather" movies and reciting the lines. He simply went after the bad guys and the actual things they did to create disorder. He and his police commissioners worked aggressively to arrest people who broke the law. By doing this, Giuliani restored order, so that New Yorkers could go out and live whatever sorts of lives they wanted to lead. His approach was: Every morning you strap on your armor and you go out to battle the evil ones. It's more important to be feared than loved. You maneuver situations so as to get your rivals in the place where you want them to be. Then they have to make concessions. His instinct was always: Give me authority. Hold me accountable. For Bush, the leader of the free world, the issue is terrorism, not street crime. But now he too is engaged in the effort to restore order so that people can go about their lives. He is the one rounding up the posse, forsaking social issues and other moral debates for a straightforward act of international prosecution. He is reasserting authority to show that under Pax Americana, the world is governable. What we may end up with, therefore, is an America in which the old split between hawks and doves is no longer relevant. Instead our political landscape will have a few intellectuals on the fringes, while the main argument unfolds--to borrow Machiavelli's terms--between the lions and the foxes. Lions believe in the aggressive use of power. For them the main danger is appeasement. They worry that we will be half-hearted and never really tackle our problems. Foxes, by contrast, believe you have to move cleverly and subtly. They worry that America will act unilaterally and tear its coalition and trample upon our own freedoms. It's interesting that the people who are lions on foreign policy also tend to be lions on domestic policy, while the foxes are fox-like both abroad and at home. So we have new arguments. Do we give higher priority to cracking down on domestic terror or preserving civil liberties? Do we give higher priority to destroying all terrorist states, or to preserving our alliances? In these debates, so far, The Weekly Standard, the New Republic, and the Washington Post have made the case for the lions. The New York Times, Robert Novak, Hillary Clinton, Colin Powell, Barney Frank, and Jack Kemp have supported the foxes. It may truly be a strange new world. At the start of the civil war, nobody could have foreseen how the war would alter the domestic political culture, producing a raft of legislation ranging from the Homestead Act to the transcontinental railway to currency reform. The war ended with a grand march by the Union armies through Washington, an event that symbolized America's emergence as a unified nation and a superpower in the making. "Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained," Lincoln declared in his Second Inaugural. "Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding." It's impossible to know if the renewed confidence in government that we already see will translate into a new sort of big government activism, as some liberals are predicting. There is certainly precedent for that, as writers like Robert Nisbet (in "The Present Age") and Robert Higgs (in "Crisis and Leviathan") have shown. War, Randolph Bourne observed in 1917, "is the health of the state." But history never repeats itself neatly. No one can predict the political and cultural consequences of a war, any more than the course of the war itself. But it does seem clear that we have moved out of one political and cultural moment and into another. We have traded the anxieties of affluence for the real fears of war. We have moved from an age of peace to an age of conflict, and in times of conflict people are different. They go to extremes. Some people, and some nations, turn cowardly or barbaric. Other people, and other nations, become heroic, brave, and steadfast. It all depends on what they have in them. War isn't only, as Bourne said, the health of the state. It's the gut-check of the nation.

#### Any Cuba engagement is appeasement – shatters cred + war

Rubin 11 (Jennifer Rubin, Washington Post, “Obama’s Cuba appeasement”, Washington Post, 8/18, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/obamas-cuba-appeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL_blog.html>)

The chairwoman of the foreign affairs committee, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen was equally irate: “According to news reports, the Administration attempted to barter for the freedom of wrongly imprisoned U.S. citizen Alan Gross by offering to return Rene Gonzalez, a convicted Cuban spy who was involved in the murder of innocent American citizens. If true, such a swap would demonstrate the outrageous willingness of the Administration to engage with the regime in Havana, which is designated by the U.S. as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Regrettably, this comes as no surprise as this Administration has never met a dictatorship with which it didn’t try to engage. It seems that a rogue regime cannot undertake a deed so dastardly that the Obama Administration would abandon engagement, even while talking tough with reporters. Cuba is a state-sponsor of terrorism. We should not be trying to barter with them. We must demand the unconditional release of Gross, not engage in a quid-pro-quo with tyrants.” As bad as a prisoner exchange would have been, the administration actions didn’t stop there. The Associated Press reported, “The Gross-Gonzalez swap was raised by former New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, as well as by senior U.S. officials in a series of meetings with Cuban officials. Richardson traveled to Cuba last month seeking Gross’ release. He also told Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez that the U.S. would be willing to consider other areas of interest to Cuba. Among them was removing Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; reducing spending on Cuban democracy promotion programs like the one that led to the hiring of Gross; authorizing U.S. companies to help Cuba clean up oil spills from planned offshore drilling; improving postal exchanges; ending a program that makes it easier for Cuban medical personnel to move to the United States; and licensing the French company Pernod Ricard to sell Havana Club rum in the United States.” Former deputy national security adviser Elliott Abrams explained, “It is especially offensive that we were willing to negotiate over support for democracy in Cuba, for that would mean that the unjust imprisonment of Gross had given the Castro dictatorship a significant victory. The implications for those engaged in similar democracy promotion activities elsewhere are clear: local regimes would think that imprisoning an American might be a terrific way to get into a negotiation about ending such activities. Every American administration faces tough choices in these situations, but the Obama administration has made a great mistake here. Our support for democracy should not be a subject of negotiation with the Castro regime.” The administration’s conduct is all the more galling given the behavior of the Castro regime. Our willingness to relax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemic reforms. To the contrary, this was the setting for Gross’s imprisonment. So naturally the administration orders up more of the same. Throughout his tenure, President Obama has failed to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake. He has offered armfuls of goodies and promised quietude on human rights; the despots’ behavior has worsened. There is simply no downside for rogue regimes to take their shots at the United States. Whether it is Cuba or [Iran,](http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/280214/iran-dangerous-and-diplomacy-has-failed-jamie-m-fly" \t "_blank) the administration reverts to “engagement” mode when its engagement efforts are met with aggression and/or domestic oppression. Try to murder a diplomat on U.S. soil? We’ll sit down and chat. Grab an American contractor and try him in a kangaroo court? We’ll trade prisoners and talk about relaxing more sanctions. Invade Georgia, imprison political opponents and interfere with attempts to restart the peace process? We’ll put the screws on our democratic ally to get you into World Trade Organization. The response of these thuggish regimes is entirely predictable and, from their perspective, completely logical. What is inexplicable is the Obama administration’s willingness to throw gifts to tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind.

### Rule Util Solves---2NC

#### Only our methodology can create lasting peace

Whitman 7 (Jeffery, Prof of Philosophy, Religion, and Classical Studies Susquehanna University, “Just War Theory and the War on Terrorism A Utilitarian Perspective,” http://www.mesharpe.com/PIN/05Whitman.pdf)

The rule-utilitarian perspective on just war theory serves to highlight another important consideration when waging the war on terrorism. Successful prosecution of the fight against terrorism necessarily involves establishing a more just peace around the world—a peace in which all people enjoy a reasonable level of economic well-being, political freedom, and domestic security and tranquility. Without these goods, people’s lives can take on a degree of hopelessness and bitterness that terrorist organizations can exploit in recruiting fighters and supporters to their cause. This fight really is a fight for the “hearts and minds” of the people in places where terrorism thrives. Therefore, as the war goes forward, special concern needs to be focused on jus post bellum issues. Strategies need to be focused on righting wrongs and not on revenge. In seeking to establish a just peace, we need to carefully discriminate between terrorists (with whom compromise may be impossible) and their civilian sympathizers, who may have genuine grievances amenable to some sort of political solution. Whatever “terms of peace”31 come to pass must protect the domestic rights of all concerned and not place disproportionate burdens (economic or political) on either side of the dispute. Attaining these goals requires, once again, a utilitarian calculus. After all, the criteria of jus post bellum are best derived from a concern with generating utility-maximizing rules for concluding wars, and applying these criteria often requires interpreting these general rules through the prism of maximizing benefits over harms.

## PTX

#### Nuclear War causes all of your impacts

Katz 82 [Arthur M, PHD in Chemistry from University of Rochester and MS in Meteorology from MIT, Cambridge Massachusetts, Pg 73]

Ikte recognized the potential for conflict between rural and suburban populations and urban evacuees. He believed that despite rural resistance, the overwhelming numbers of evacuees would force a grudging sharing of goods. However, this may not be the case. Limited nuclear war is strongly biased by its very nature to create the potential for these conflicts. Moreover, the problem is likely to be exaggerated in the United States. If the central city population is evacuated to the suburban and rural areas, the racial composition of the population will change. Almost 25 percent of the population in the central cities of the 157 SMSAs discussed above is nonwhite, while only 6 percent of the suburban and rural population is nonwhite. Moreover, the income distribution is very different, with the inner cities generally being poorer. Thus a combination of class and racial conf1ict may exacerbate the social tensions that existed in a situation similar to England in World War II. This will be particularly true if the war remains unterminated for any substantial period of time. This type of emerging racial conflict arose in Japan at the end of World War II: "The Koreans, who have been imported for labor, are feared and suspected of plotting against the Japanese .... Rumors and recrimination regarding a scapegoat minority such as the Koreans rose especially sharply. Given the changing but still unstable state of relations between white and nonwhite, and rich and poor groups in the United States, a dangerous conflict-laden situation might emerge under the conditions of terror and stress. Add to this the normal urban-suburban rural lifestyle dichotomies, and there is the potential of extreme disruption, perhaps even more long-lasting and threatening to societal stability than the physical damage.

Get real, ACA is not Obama’s Katrina---he can recover---this is only a brink for our link argument that capital is fragile, theirevidence is partisan propaganda

Time, Magazine, 11/21/13

(“Healthcare.gov Is, Like, the Twelfth “Obama’s Katrina” So Far,”http://entertainment.time.com/2013/11/21/healthcare-gov-is-like-the-twelfth-obamas-katrina-so-far/)

You don’t have to have read very deeply in the minutiae of the Healthcare.gov fiasco to have picked up on a certain musical meme in the coverage: the Affordable Care Act is “Obama’s Katrina.” The implication is clear: that like the New Orleans hurricane and flood, the health care reform effort is a disaster, it claimed innocent victims, and it has undermined public confidence in government. There is a bright side to all of this, however. If Healthcare.gov is Obama’s Katrina, then we could not ask for a more experienced leader to deal with the problem. Because according to the news and punditry of the last five years, President Obama has had at least a dozen “Obama’s Katrina”s so far. Probably the most widespread usage of the phrase “Obama’s Katrina” before now came during the BP oil spill in 2010. There at least you had history maybe not repeating but rhyming: a natural an environmental disaster (if not a massive loss of human life), the location in the Gulf near New Orleans, a seemingly paralyzed government response. And, of course, it had partisan utility: Karl Rove, who had some experience with the actual Katrina, christened the spill thus in the Wall Street Journal. But “Obama’s Katrina” would not limit itself to one geographic region, or to environmental disasters, or to disasters at all. At conservative site Breitbart.com, days before the 2012 election, Hurricane Sandy was “Obama’s Katrina.” After tornadoes devastated the Midwest, commentators (including Katrina’s Michael “Heckuva Job” Brown) likened the disaster to “Obama’s Katrina,” criticizing the President for an overseas trip. Sequestration has been Obama’s Katrina. The New Republic dubbed the 2011 debt ceiling crisis Obama’s Katrina. (But, fair’s fair, also “Boehner’s Katrina.” Everyone gets a Katrina!) Earlier this year, conservative Washington Post blogger Jennifer Rubin wrote that, “In a way, the NSA intelligence gathering is Obama’s Katrina.” Sure! In a way, what isn’t? I could go on and on, but writing in ThinkProgress, Judd Legum recently identified several more “Obama’s Katrina”s in the media: the bank bailout, Benghazi, unemployment, the underwear bomber, the IRS scandal, and the earthquake in Haiti. Obviously there are partisan motives behind plenty of these, but not exclusively: one of Legum’s examples, for instance, comes from liberal New York magazine columnist Frank Rich. Beyond the desire of one party to score a two-fer–christening a scandal for the opposition while ameliorating one of their own past scandals in the process–there’s the good-old-fashioned reflex of the media to cast This Thing in terms of That Other Thing. God knows it didn’t originate with the Obama Administration; we’ve lived through four decades of “-gates” by now. It’s just easier to have a precooked bit of hyperbole that declares, “This is big news” than to go through the trouble of distinguishing how this news is different from other news. There was one Katrina. There was one Watergate. Maybe Healthcare.gov will be a failure whose ramifications will reverberate for years; maybe it won’t. But one news cliché or another won’t make it so. The only way we’ll know that for sure is if, four or eight years from now, partisans and pundits are calling the next President’s problems his or her Healthcare.gov.

Healthcare won’t eat up the agenda---the vote will be in December

AP, Associated Press, 11/15

(“Health care dispute could delay Iran sanctions,” http://news.yahoo.com/health-care-dispute-could-delay-iran-sanctions-173836624--politics.html)

Under pressure from President Barack Obama, the Democratic-controlled Senate could delay a likely vote on a new round of tough sanctions on Iran. With talks between Western powers and Tehran scheduled in Geneva next week, the president has spoken to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., and other senators pressing for a delay in any additional penalties while dispatching Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of State John Kerry to Capitol Hill to make a similar argument. "If we're serious about pursuing diplomacy, then there's no need for us to add new sanctions on top of the sanctions that are already very effective and that brought them to the table in the first place," Obama said at the White House on Thursday. Several Republicans and Democrats have rebuffed Obama, insisting that sanctions forced Iran to negotiate and the United States should not back down now. Four Republican senators — New Hampshire's Kelly Ayotte, Florida's Marco Rubio, Texas' John Cornyn and Illinois' Mark Kirk — wrote to Obama on Friday expressing serious concerns that the United States was considering sanctions relief for Iran "valued at up to $20 billion - and, in exchange, Iran would not be required to dismantle a single centrifuge, close a single facility or ship outside its borders a single kilogram of enriched uranium." The four talked about working with other senators on increased penalties on Iran. Sen. Bob Casey, D-Pa., said in a statement Thursday, "At this time, I see no reason to let up the pressure," while 63 House Republicans and Democrats wrote to Senate leaders urging them to act quickly on sanctions. Republican and Democratic aides said Friday that debate on the annual defense bill could be delayed until later next week, in part because of Senate action on a separate pharmaceutical bill. Senators are expected to press for a vote on Iran sanctions as part of the defense bill, but that vote could slip until December. Sen. David Vitter, R-La., wanted a vote during consideration of the pharmaceutical legislation on his measure to make lawmakers disclose which of their aides are enrolling in the president's new health care law as part of an ongoing effort to discredit "Obamacare." Time spent on that bill could give Reid time to delay the defense bill and a likely vote on tough, new penalties on Iran just as negotiators are sitting down in Switzerland. In a statement, Vitter said Reid couldn't use his amendment as an excuse. "I'll be filing and asking for a vote on my amendment to show Congress' hidden Obamacare exemptions, but I will absolutely not give Reid the ability to hide the Obama priority of blocking Iran sanctions," Vitter said Friday. The House overwhelmingly approved the sanctions in July. The legislation blacklisted Iran's mining and construction sectors and committed the U.S. to the goal of eliminating all Iranian oil exports worldwide by 2015. The Senate Banking Committee pushed off its parallel bill this week so lawmakers are eyeing the Senate defense bill. Earlier, Samantha Power, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said the administration needs more time — without new sanctions — to pursue a deal with Iran. "We have to test this regime," she said on "CBS This Morning." One key obstacle, she said, would be the "generations of suspicion" between Washington and Tehran. Pressure has been building within both parties in Congress to toughen economic sanctions already in place. Iran repeatedly has denied it is trying to build nuclear weapons. Asked about Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's assertion last week that Iran is taking advantage of U.S. and international patience, Power said she doesn't believe that's the case. "The sign that this is not a good deal" for Iran is that Tehran hasn't yet accepted it, she said.

Fix bill solves

Kaminsky 11-13 (Ross,- senior fellow of the Heartland Institute, self-employed trader and investor “BAILING OUT OBAMA”)

This makes the Republican debate over how — or whether — to ease the burden of Obamacare absolutely critical, not only for the 2014 elections but for the long-term relevancy of the Republican Party and the conservative movement. There are two leading Republican-sponsored bills that aim to allow people to keep their prior health insurance plans. A bill sponsored by House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Fred Upton (R-MI) would truly grandfather all health insurance plans (not just policy holders) that existed on January 1, 2013, so that not only could people who have them now (or had them until recently) keep them, but others could buy them as well. The relief would last only until the end of 2014. This is in contrast to a Senate bill sponsored by Ron Johnson (R-WI) that would simply make true Obama’s promise that “if you like your plan you can keep it” — forever (unless the insurance company changes or cancels the plan). Relatives or employees of the plan holder may also be added to plans, if such addition would have been permitted prior to the enactment of Obamacare. Johnson argues that he has crafted a simpler bill because it has a greater chance of passage than the House bill. And it certainly does. But it is a terrible idea. Republicans have been complicit in all sorts of bailouts, from cars to mortgage GSEs to banks to homeowners to cars (again). AD FEEDBACK If those were all bad ideas, a bailout of the Obama administration is even worse. Much worse. Like the most transparently bad political idea of the past decade — and that was a decade that included Republicans nominating John McCain and Todd Akin, shutting down the government without any winning strategy in mind (while distracting from the unfolding Obamacare disaster), and going along with George W. Bush’s “compassionate conservatism” — which my political dictionary defines as “liberalism; or a strategy to make the GOP irrelevant.” As Jonah Goldberg put it, “One of the first rules of politics when your opponent is whacking himself in the face with a semi-frozen flounder, is to let them do it for as long as possible.” These Republican bills, especially the Senate bill, dramatically and unnecessarily soften the blows. It’s true that Senator Johnson’s bill would tend to hurt the long-run sustainability of Obamacare by allowing people who might otherwise be forced into exchanges to keep their plans. But as Keynes noted, in the long run, we are all dead (even with the glory of Obamacare). In order to save the country from Obamacare’s eventual intentional destruction of the private health insurance industry, Republicans must win elections — starting in less than a year. Simply delaying the inevitable results of the Affordable Care Act — which is what Sen. Johnson’s bill would accomplish — would be worse than doing nothing. Not only does it allow the continuation of Obama’s fundamental assault on the health care industry, but it bails out vulnerable Democrats in 2014 and 2016, decreasing the likelihood of a GOP majority in the Senate and larger majority in the House, and — this being the reason that Bill Clinton opened his mouth to begin with — taking pressure off of eventual Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton when she is asked “Do you support or oppose Obamacare?” — which a decent Republican strategy could turn into the political equivalent of “have you stopped beating your wife yet?” And it does all this while receiving not a penny in political ransom. The House bill is slightly better in that it allows people to keep their plans and allows others to buy those grandfathered plans — but only through 2014. While having plan availability for only a year may seem curious at first — why not allow people to keep their plans forever? — and while there are questions about whether insurance companies would keep plans in existence if the expectation is that they will vanish in a year anyway, the politics of it are admirable: Imagine Democratic panic going into the 2014 elections if what is happening now with millions of people losing health insurance coverage were happening all over again. There’s a reason that White House Press Secretary Jay “Is My Nose Growing Yet?” Carney says that the Upton bill would “do more harm,” that the Washington Post says “the Upton bill is the biggest threat to Obamacare so far,” and that influential conservative PACs are supporting the measure. But when you have a hostage as valuable as President Obama, or at least his legacy, even the Upton bill seems like too small a ransom demand. Obama's plummeting popularity and Clinton's public thinly-veiled criticism of Obama will encourage many Democrats to vote for a Republican bill in order to save their own skins. Republicans should exact a painfully high price, not just because it's good policy, but because revenge against these bullies and tyrants would be too sweet not to savor. In the short term, even the Upton bill will be sold by Democrats and seen by many Americans as Congress simply fixing a mistake in the bill’s drafting so that Obama can keep his often-made lie-promise without even having to admit that his own Secretary of Health and Human Services set the grandfathering rules that caused this mess. That always-intended-to-be-broken promise can and will, *if Republicans don’t help him*, turn Barack Obama into a lame duck with three years remaining in his petty dictatorship and create a Republican majority in the Senate for the final two years of Obama’s dreary anti-American melodrama. Why would Republicans agree to bail out a president who is about to destroy what little political capital he has remaining, without getting a huge payoff in return? This is no time to play nice, no time to compromise for compromise's sake. This is time to ask "What would Obama do?" and then do it right back to him, but harder. Both the Johnson and Upton bills also assume, without good reason, that simply allowing insurance companies to keep plans in existence means that they will. With processes in place to terminate plans, with cancelation notices already sent, and with Obamacare-compliant plans perhaps more profitable, it is far from certain that any "keep your plan" modification to the ACA will actually result in most current individual market plan-holders actually keeping the plan they like. If Republicans try to fix something that is beyond fixing, they risk looking less capable of making a difference, thus damaging their anti-Obamacare narrative for 2014. After all, if "the damage is already done," voters have a different calculation going forward than if damage can be prevented by repeal. This argues even further toward extreme caution in any bill which would appear to *help Obama* keep his false promise. Republicans must be careful as they play this hand, knowing that if they call for substantial reform to Obamacare — reform so significant that it could be seen as nearly undoing the law, or at least making other changes worthy of GOP compromise — Democrats will say, “Yet again, the GOP is holding the country hostage, preventing your ability to keep your health insurance in order to get some extreme conservative policy wish.” But the GOP should bravely go down that road anyway, demanding something important — something like tort reform, or interstate purchase of health insurance combined with other structural reforms — while trying to keep partial relief from the negative impact of Obamacare limited to one year so that repeal remains an issue — the issue — in 2014. Keeping the issue alive — a standard trick of Democrats on issues such as gay rights and immigration — should be the top priority of Republicans, above being able to pat themselves on the back and say, “See, we helped you keep your policy (for now.)” And, yes, above actually helping some people in the short term. After all, as Bastiat reminded us, "it almost always happens that when the immediate consequence (of a law) is favorable, the ultimate consequences are fatal."

#### The plan means Obama must be involved

**Leogrande 4/11** William M. Leogrande, professor in the department of government at American University's School of Public Affairs in Washington, D.C., 2013, “The Cuba Lobby” The most powerful lobby in Washington isn't the NRA. It's the Castro-hating right wing that has Obama's bureaucrats terrified and inert, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/11/the\_cuba\_lobby\_jay\_z?page=0,0

The Cuba Lobby's power to derail diplomatic careers is common knowledge among foreign-policy professionals. Throughout Obama's first term, midlevel State Department officials cooperated more closely and deferred more slavishly to congressional opponents of Obama's Cuba policy than to supporters like John Kerry, the new secretary of state who served at the time as Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman. When Senator Kerry tried to get the State Department and USAID to reform the Bush administration's democracy-promotion programs in 2010, he ran into more opposition from the bureaucracy than from Republicans. If Obama intends to finally keep the 2008 campaign promise to take a new direction in relations with Cuba, the job can't be left to foreign-policy bureaucrats, who are so terrified of the Cuba Lobby that they continue to believe, or pretend to believe, absurdities -- that Cubans are watching TV Martí, for instance, or that Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism. Only a determined president and a tough secretary of state can drive a new policy through a bureaucratic wasteland so paralyzed by fear and inertia.

#### Momentum still exists-pause has created time for a sustainable deal

**Maloney, Brookings senior fellow, 11-11-13**

(Suzanne, “Washington And Tehran Find That A Nuclear Breakthrough Is Hard To Do”, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/iran-at-saban/posts/2013/11/11-iran-nuclear-negotiations-zarif-challenge>, ldg)

The failure should be kept in perspective. After all, the latest Geneva round still represents the most serious, sustained dialogue between leading American and Iranian officials since the revolution. And while surely the six foreign ministers who rushed to Geneva would have preferred a photo-op finish complete with a signing ceremony, the engagement of all these principals in the diplomatic grunt work of trying to hammer out mutually acceptable terms should have a salutary impact on their state's investment in an eventual outcome. Despite the doom-sayers, diplomacy will go on. The incentives that all parties see for achieving a negotiated agreement remain just as powerful as ever, and the disincentives surrounding any possible alternative course continue to loom large even for skeptics of the process. The time-out may be just what the embryonic process needs — a chance to buy time and space to work through the continuing contentious issues. The controversy among some of America’s allies over the terms proposed in the talks will help sell the deal within Iran, to the extent that it needs selling. And a protracted germination is a far more viable path to a sustainable solution than an agreement that is rushed to conclusion amidst a fragmenting political coalition.

#### PC deciding factor for talks

**Leverett et al., Penn St. IR professor, 11-4-13**

(Flynt, “America’s Moment of Truth on Iran”, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/04/americas-moment-of-truth-on-iran/>, ldg)

If Obama does not conclude a deal recognizing Iran’s nuclear rights, it will confirm suspicions already held by many Iranian elites—including Ayatollah Khamenei—and in Beijing and Moscow about America’s real agenda vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic. It will become undeniably clear that U.S. opposition to indigenous Iranian enrichment is not motivated by proliferation concerns, but by determination to preserve American hegemony—and Israeli military dominance—in the Middle East. If this is so, why should China, Russia, or rising Asian powers continue trying to help Washington—e.g., by accommodating U.S. demands to limit their own commercial interactions with Iran—obtain an outcome it does not actually want? America can also fail Iran’s test if it is unable to provide comprehensive sanctions relief as part of a negotiated nuclear settlement. The Obama administration now acknowledges what we have noted for some time—that, beyond transitory executive branch initiatives, lifting or even substantially modifying U.S. sanctions to support diplomatic progress will take congressional action. During Obama’s presidency, many U.S. sanctions initially imposed by executive order have been written into law. These bills—signed, with little heed to their long-term consequences, by Obama himself—have also greatly expanded U.S. secondary sanctions, which threaten to punish third-country entities not for anything they’ve done in America, but for perfectly lawful business they conduct in or with Iran. The bills contain conditions for removing sanctions stipulating not just the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, but also termination of Tehran’s ties to movements like Hizballah that Washington (foolishly) designates as terrorists and the Islamic Republic’s effective transformation into a secular liberal republic. The Obama administration may have managed to delay passage of yet another sanctions bill for a few weeks—but Congressional Democrats no less than congressional Republicans have made publicly clear that they will not relax conditions for removing existing sanctions to help Obama conclude and implement a nuclear deal. If their obstinacy holds, why should others respect Washington’s high-handed demands for compliance with its extraterritorial (hence, illegal) sanctions against Iran? Going into the next round of nuclear talks in Geneva on Thursday, it is unambiguously plain that Obama will have to spend enormous political capital to realign relations with Iran. America’s future standing as a great power depends significantly on his readiness to do so.