# 1nc

## Politics

#### CIR Will Pass Now – Obama Has the PC and Hes Pushing IT

By: Reid J. Epstein October 17, 2013 Obama’s latest push features a familiar strategy http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=00B694F1-5D59-4D13-B6D1-FC437A465923

President Barack Obama made his plans for his newly won political capital official — he’s going to hammer House Republicans on immigration.¶ And it’s evident from his public and private statements that Obama’s latest immigration push is, in at least one respect, similar to his fiscal showdown strategy: yet again, the goal is to boost public pressure on House Republican leadership to call a vote on a Senate-passed measure.¶ “The majority of Americans think this is the right thing to do,” Obama said Thursday at the White House. “And it’s sitting there waiting for the House to pass it. Now, if the House has ideas on how to improve the Senate bill, let’s hear them. Let’s start the negotiations. But let’s not leave this problem to keep festering for another year, or two years, or three years. This can and should get done by the end of this year.”¶ (WATCH: Assessing the government shutdown's damage)¶ And yet Obama spent the bulk of his 20-minute address taking whack after whack at the same House Republicans he’ll need to pass that agenda, culminating in a jab at the GOP over the results of the 2012 election — and a dare to do better next time.¶ “You don’t like a particular policy or a particular president? Then argue for your position,” Obama said. “Go out there and win an election. Push to change it. But don’t break it. Don’t break what our predecessors spent over two centuries building. That’s not being faithful to what this country’s about.”¶ Before the shutdown, the White House had planned a major immigration push for the first week in October. But with the shutdown and looming debt default dominating the discussion during the last month, immigration reform received little attention on the Hill.¶ (PHOTOS: Immigration reform rally on the National Mall)¶ Immigration reform allies, including Obama’s political arm, Organizing for Action, conducted a series of events for the weekend of Oct. 5, most of which received little attention in Washington due to the the shutdown drama. But activists remained engaged, with Dream Act supporters staging a march up Constitution Avenue, past the Capitol to the Supreme Court Tuesday, to little notice of the Congress inside.¶ Obama first personally signaled his intention to re-emerge in the immigration debate during an interview Tuesday with the Los Angeles Univision affiliate, conducted four hours before his meeting that day with House Democrats.¶ Speaking of the week’s fiscal landmines, Obama said: “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform.”¶ (Also on POLITICO: GOP blame game: Who lost the government shutdown?)¶ When he met that afternoon in the Oval Office with the House Democratic leadership, Obama said that he planned to be personally engaged in selling the reform package he first introduced in a Las Vegas speech in January.¶ Still, during that meeting, Obama knew so little about immigration reform’s status in the House that he had to ask Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-Calif.) how many members of his own party would back a comprehensive reform bill, according to a senior Democrat who attended.¶ The White House doesn’t have plans yet for Obama to participate in any new immigration reform events or rallies — that sort of advance work has been hamstrung by the 16-day government shutdown.¶ But the president emerged on Thursday to tout a “broad coalition across America” that supports immigration reform. He also invited House Republicans to add their input specifically to the Senate bill — an approach diametrically different than the House GOP’s announced strategy of breaking the reform into several smaller bills.¶ White House press secretary Jay Carney echoed Obama’s remarks Thursday, again using for the same language on immigration the White House used to press Republicans on the budget during the shutdown standoff: the claim that there are enough votes in the House to pass the Senate’s bill now, if only it could come to a vote.¶ “When it comes to immigration reform … we’re confident that if that bill that passed the Senate were put on the floor of the House today, it would win a majority of the House,” Carney said. “And I think that it would win significant Republican votes.”

#### Drains capital – Backlash and hostage taking on unrelated priority legislation is empirically proven, likely in future and specifically true for Rubio – Cuba policy is totally unique – this is the best link card you will ever read

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

**Increasing green cards generates an effective base of IT experts- solves cybersecurity**

**McLarty 9** (Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates and Former White House Chief of Staff and Task Force Co-Chair, “U.S. Immigration Policy: Report of a CFR-Sponsored Independent Task Force”, 7-8, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/19759/us\_immigration\_policy.html)

We have seen, **when you look at the** table of the **top 20 firms that are H1-B visa requestors**, at least 15 of those **are** IT firms. And as we're seeing across industry, much of the hardware and software that's used in this country is not only manufactured now overseas, but **it's developed overseas** by scientists and engineers who were educated here in the United States. **We're seeing a lot more activity around cyber-security, certainly** noteworthy **attacks** here **very recently**. It's becoming an increasingly dominant set of requirements across not only to the Department of Defense, but the Department of Homeland Security and the critical infrastructure that's held in private hands. **Was there any discussion** or any interest from DOD or DHS as you undertook this review on the security **things about what can be done to** try to **generate a more effective group of IT experts here in the U**nited **S**tates, **many of which are coming to the U.S. institutions**, academic institutions **from overseas and** often **returning back? This** potentially **puts us at a competitive disadvantage** going forward. MCLARTY: Yes. And I think your question largely is the answer as well. I mean, **clearly we have less talented students here studying** -- or put another way, more **talented students** studying in other countries that are gifted, talented, really **have a tremendous ability to develop these kind of technology and scientific advances**, we're going to be put at an increasingly disadvantage. Where if they come here -- and **I** kind of **like** Dr. Land's approach of **the green card being handed to them** or carefully put in their billfold or purse as they graduate -- then, obviously, **that's** **going to strengthen**, I think, our system, **our security needs**.

#### Cyberterrorism will cause accidental launch that triggers the Dead Hand and nuclear war

Fritz 9 (Jason, BS – St. Cloud, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control”, Study Commissioned on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, July, www.icnnd.org/Documents/Jason\_Fritz\_Hacking\_NC2.doc)  
*Direct control of launch*   
The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under this rule two authorized personnel must be present and in agreement during critical stages of nuclear command and control. The President must jointly issue a launch order with the Secretary of Defense; Minuteman missile operators must agree that the launch order is valid; and on a submarine, both the commanding officer and executive officer must agree that the order to launch is valid. In the US, in order to execute a nuclear launch, an Emergency Action Message (EAM) is needed. This is a preformatted message that directs nuclear forces to execute a specific attack. The contents of an EAM change daily and consist of a complex code read by a human voice. Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and videos posted to YouTube provide insight into how these work. These are issued from the NMCC, or in the event of destruction, from the designated hierarchy of command and control centres. Once a command centre has confirmed the EAM, using the two-man rule, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to arm the weapons and the message is sent out. These messages are sent in digital format via the secure Automatic Digital Network and then relayed to aircraft via single-sideband radio transmitters of the High Frequency Global Communications System, and, at least in the past, sent to nuclear capable submarines via Very Low Frequency (Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical details of VLF submarine communication methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF reception. Some reports have noted **a Pentagon review**, which **showed a potential** “electronic back door into the **US** Navy’s system for broadcasting nuclear launch orders **to Trident submarines”** (Peterson 2004). The investigation showed that cyber terrorists could **potentially** infiltrate **this network** and insert false orders for launch. The investigation led to “elaborate new instructions for validating launch orders” (Blair 2003). Adding further to the concern of cyber terrorists seizing control over submarine launched nuclear missiles; The Royal Navy announced in 2008 that it would be installing a Microsoft Windows operating system on its nuclear submarines (Page 2008). The choice of operating system, apparently based on Windows XP, is not as alarming as the advertising of such a system is. This may attract hackers and narrow the necessary reconnaissance to learning its **details and potential** exploits. It is unlikely that the operating system would play a direct role in the signal to launch, although this is far from certain. Knowledge **of the operating system** may lead to the insertion of malicious code, which could be used to gain accelerating privileges, tracking, valuable information, and deception **that** could **subsequently** be used to initiate **a** launch. Remember from Chapter 2 that the UK’s nuclear submarines have the authority to launch if they believe the central command has been destroyed. Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of a decapitating strike could also **be used to** engage fail-deadly systems. Open source knowledge is scarce as to whether Russia continues to operate such a system. However evidence suggests that they have in the past. Perimetr, also known as Dead Hand**,** was an automated system set to launch a mass scale nuclear attack in the event of a decapitation strike **against Soviet leadership** and military. In a crisis, military officials would send a coded message to the bunkers, switching on the dead hand. If nearby ground-level sensors detected a nuclear attack on Moscow, and if a break was detected in communications links with top military commanders, the system would send low-frequency signals over underground antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and other military sites, these rockets in turn would broadcast attack orders to missiles, bombers and, via radio relays, submarines at sea. Contrary to some Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's nuclear-armed missiles in underground silos and on mobile launchers can be fired automatically. (Broad 1993) Assuming such a system is still active, cyber terrorists would need to create a crisis situation in order to activate Perimetr, and then fool it into believing a decapitating strike had taken place. While this is not an easy task, the information age makes it easier. Cyber reconnaissance could help locate the machine and learn its inner workings. This could be done by targeting the computers high of level official’s—anyone who has reportedly worked on such a project, or individuals involved in military operations at underground facilities, such as those reported to be located at Yamantau and Kosvinksy mountains in the central southern Urals (Rosenbaum 2007, Blair 2008) Indirect Control of Launch Cyber terrorists could cause incorrect information to be transmitted, received, or displayed at nuclear command and control centres, or shut down these centres’ computer networks completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific sounding rocket was mistaken by Russian early warning systems as a nuclear missile launched from a US submarine. A radar operator used Krokus to notify a general on duty who decided to alert the highest levels. Kavkaz was implemented, all three chegets activated, and the countdown for a nuclear decision began. It took eight minutes before the missile was properly identified—a considerable amount of time considering the speed with which a nuclear response must be decided upon (Aftergood 2000). Creating a false signal in these early warning systems would be relatively easy using computer network operations. The real difficulty would be gaining access to these systems as they are most likely on a closed network. However, if they are transmitting wirelessly, that may provide an entry point, and information gained through the internet may reveal the details, such as passwords and software, for gaining entrance to the closed network. If access was obtained, a false alarm could be followed by something like a DDoS attack, so the operators believe an attack may be imminent, yet they can no longer verify it. This could add **pressure** to the decision making process, and **if coordinated precisely, could** appear as a **first round** EMP burst. Terrorist groups could also **attempt to** launch a non-nuclear missile, such as the one used by Norway, **in an attempt** to fool the system. The number of states who possess such technology is far greater than the number of states who possess nuclear weapons. Obtaining them would be considerably easier, especially when enhancing operations through computer network operations. Combining traditional terrorist methods with cyber techniques opens opportunities neither could accomplish on their own. For example, radar stations might be more vulnerable to a computer attack, while satellites are more vulnerable to jamming from a laser beam, thus together they deny dual phenomenology. Mapping communications networks through cyber reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and automated scanning devices created by more experienced hackers can be readily found on the internet. Intercepting or spoofing communications is a highly complex science. These systems are designed to protect against the world’s most powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are recurring gaffes, and the very nature of asymmetric warfare is to bypass complexities by finding simple loopholes. For example, commercially available software for voice-morphing could be used to capture voice commands within the command and control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and splice it back together in order to issue false voice commands (Andersen 2001, Chapter 16). Spoofing could also be used to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of starting a nuclear war. “ \*\*[they cut off the paragraph]\*\* “In June 1998, a group of international hackers calling themselves Milw0rm hacked the web site of India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and put up a spoofed web page showing a mushroom cloud and the text “If a nuclear war does start, you will be the first to scream” (Denning 1999). Hacker web-page defacements like these are often derided by critics of cyber terrorism as simply being a nuisance which causes no significant harm. However, web-page defacements are becoming more common, and they point towards alarming possibilities in subversion. During the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit letter of apology from Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his political party website (Grant 2007). This took place amid the confusion of mass DDoS attacks, real world protests, and accusations between governments.

## CP

#### The United States Congress should pass a non-binding “sense of congress” resolution stating that the United States federal government should take incremental measures to substantially increase its science and technology cooperation with Cuba.

#### Counterplan Solves Signal and Perception Arguments But Avoids Politics

Longley 2010 (Robert, About.com, US Government Info, http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/uscongress/a/senseof.htm)

When members of the House, Senate or entire Congress want to "send a message," or state an opinion, they try to pass a "sense of" resolution. Since such resolutions do not create law, what good are they? Simple or joint resolutions expressing the "sense of" the Senate, House or Congress merely express a majority opinion. They do not make law and are not enforceable. Only bills and joint resolutions create laws. "Sense of" legislation can come in the form of Simple Resolutions (H.Res. or S.Res.), used to express the opinion of the House or Senate alone, or as Concurrent Resolutions (H.Con.Res. or S.Con.Res.) used to express the opinion of the entire Congress. "Sense of" resolutions can also be added as amendments to regular House or Senate bills. Even when added to regular bills, "sense of" amendments have no force law. "Sense of" resolutions are typically used as: For the record: a way for individual members of Congress to go on the record as supporting or opposing a particular policy or concept; Political persuasion: a simple attempt by a group of members to persuade other members to support their cause or opinion; Appeal to the president: an attempt to get the president to take or not take some specific action (such as S.Con.Res. 2, considered by Congress in January 2007, condemning President Bush's order sending over 20,000 additional U.S. troops into the war in Iraq.), On foreign affairs: a way to express the opinion of the people of the United States to the government of a foreign nation; and Just saying "thanks": a way to send the congratulations or gratitude of Congress to individual citizens or groups. For example, congratulating U.S. Olympic champions or thanking military troops for their sacrifice. "Sense of" resolutions require only a simple majority vote to pass and, since they do not create laws, do not require the signature of the president. Although "sense of" resolutions have no force in law, foreign governments pay close attention to them as evidence of shifts in U.S. foreign policy priorities.

#### Sense of Congress Resolution Solves Via *Better Congressional Signal*, *Future Expectations* and *Anticipatory Behavior Changes* and *Future Binding Policy* – Competes and Avoids Politics Because its Non Binding and there is No Presidential Involvement

Posner 2008 (Eric A, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago and Jacob E. Gersen, Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Stanford LR, December)

The academic literatures on these topics have different concerns, yet the themes are similar. Soft law refers to statements by lawmaking authorities that do not have the force of law (most often because they do not comply with relevant formalities or for other reasons are not regarded as legally binding 12), but nonetheless affect the behavior of others either (1) because others take the statements as credible expressions of policy judgments or intentions that, at some later point, might be embodied in formally binding law and reflected in the coercive actions of executive agents, or (2) because the statements provide epistemic guidance about how the authorities see the world. 13 Individuals, governments, states, and other agents use soft law in order to enter commitments and influence behavior where legal mechanisms are regarded as undesirable. Against this backdrop, it is a puzzle that no parallel literature has emerged in the field of legislation and legislative process. 14 One does not have to look hard to find a similar form of soft law: the congressional resolution. Congressional resolutions - whether concurrent or one-house - generally have no formal legal effect. 15 Periodically, proposals surface to pay more attention to the resolution as a mechanism for influencing statutory interpretation, 16 foreign policy, 17 or some other external matter. Yet the soft statute has [\*578] received little attention in scholarly work on legislation. 18 The conventional wisdom is that such measures lack importance because they do not create binding legal obligations. 19 They are cheap and often happy talk by legislatures, commending military officers for good service or sports teams for winning championships. In fact, many congressional resolutions are very serious: they assert controversial foreign policy judgments, urge the President to intervene in humanitarian crises or to avoid a military conflict, criticize allies and enemies, forecast plans for taxation and regulation, send signals to regulatory agencies about Congress's expectations, criticize the President's interpretations of executive power, advance interpretations of constitutional provisions and statutes, encourage state and local governments to address policy problems, identify public health threats that need funding, and much more. 20 Statutory soft law deserves more attention than it has received, especially in light of the large cognate literatures that examine the workings of soft law in other fields. In the course of analyzing congressional resolutions and other forms of legislative soft law - including hortatory statutes - we advance a general theory that explains the attractiveness of soft law, its advantages and disadvantages, and its place in our constitutional order. We show that soft public law is preferable to hard public law in identifiable cases and contexts. The congressional resolution is essentially a "soft statute" - a device for communicating the policy views and intentions of one or both houses of Congress. Legislative soft law communicates congressional intentions more accurately and cheaply than does a regular statute, which will usually reflect the views of the President as well. Legislative soft law communicates the views of a chamber or the Congress more accurately than do statements of individual legislators, whose views will often diverge from that of the majority. These communications can influence the behavior of the public and of other political institutions through three main mechanisms. First, a congressional communication affects people's beliefs about how Congress will (formally) regulate in the future, to the extent that it credibly reveals the political preferences of Congress (or its members or a substantial coalition of its members or its leadership, etc.). A soft statute thus anticipates a hard statute, [\*579] but when the target audience reacts appropriately to the soft statute, the hard statute may become unnecessary. Second, a congressional communication may have a purely epistemic effect. Information about Congress's views might cause people to change their beliefs about the state of the world. 21 Third, in some settings other institutions that generate formal law take legislative views as an input. Agencies, courts, and the President regularly incorporate legislative views as one of many factors in the construction of binding policy.

## Topicality

1. Interpretation—Plan mandates should be clear, certain and immediate.

Resolved is to make a firm decision about

AHD 6 (American Heritage Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)

**Resolve** TRANSITIVE VERB:1. **To make a firm decision about.** 2. To cause (a person) to reach a decision. See synonyms at decide. 3. To decide or express by formal vote.

1. Violation—The plan merely mentions a incrementalization but doesn’t specify questions of implementation or action. Incramentalism can cause negotiations can last months are years and their refusal to take a stand on when the plan will actually be implemented makes core disad links impossible
2. Vote Neg:
   1. Predictable Ground. All neg link uniqueness hinges on the question of certainty and timing of plan passage. They make it impossible for the negative to win any timely links to disad.
   2. Research—no way to research evidence that hasn’t been written in a future they won’t specify. Impossible to have a predicable and fair debate.

## Neolib

#### The plan attempts to remake the target countries in the image of Northern development through economic engagement. Challenging the limits of neoliberalism in public spaces is key to politicize alternative strategies.

**Sheppard et al., Minnesota geography professor, 2010**

(Eric, “Quo vadis neoliberalism? The remaking of global capitalist governance after the Washington Consensus”, Geoforum, 41.2, ScienceDirect)

We have shown that there have been marked periodic remakings of global capitalist governance from a Washington to a post-Washington consensus, and beyond, in ways that have begun to question some key aspects of global neoliberal governance. Taken together, they hardly represent a consensus. Yet such shifts and disagreements have been contained within a developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary that has, in effect, repeatedly legitimized discourses of first world expertise even as the policies based in this expertise repeatedly fail. In this section, we summarize the elements of this imaginary, and discuss how it has persisted even in the wake of crises that create space for alternative imaginaries. The developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary has three components that are closely intertwined: A stageist, teleological thinking that constitutes capitalism, Euro-North American style, as the highest form of development; a leveling metaphor, according to which a flattening of the world equalizes opportunities for all individuals and places; and an imagining of socio-spatial difference as coexisting with this leveling through its commodification. At the center of mainstream policymaking discussed above is the conception of a single trajectory of development, namely capitalist development, along which all places are imagined as sequenced. Rostow famously articulated such a trajectory in his modernist “non-communist manifesto”, The Stages of Economic Growth (Rostow, 1960). As dependency, post-colonial and post-development theorists have argued, this has the effect of presenting places with no choices about what development means, and of ranking places, and their inhabitants, on a scale of development—according to which the prosperous capitalist societies of western Europe and white settler colonies (North America, Australia and New Zealand) occupy the apex, with respect to which other places are imagined as incomplete in their development. This also implies the desirability of erasing or making over less adequate states of affairs, replacing them with their more efficient and rational Northern exemplars. Notwithstanding very substantial shifts and disagreements in how the apex is imagined (as liberal civilization during the colonial era, as Fordist industrialism after 1945, as neoliberal after 1980, and as good governance and poverty reduction after 1997), the effect is to locate expertise at the apex. If all places are on a common path, then those who have reached the end seem naturally pre-destined to teach others about how to achieve this—even when the paternalist advice is ‘don’t do as I do, but do as I say’ (cf. Chang, 2002 and Chang, 2008). The new development economics’ supplement of Keynesian strategies, while critical of and presenting itself as a departure from the Washington Consensus, still endorses a stageist imaginary. Sachs is explicit about his debt to Rostow, framing the specific diagnostic interventions in any nation in terms of the goal of achieving a healthy (first world capitalist) economic body. Sutured to stageist thinking is an imaginary of flattening, of globalization and capitalist development as a process that is flattening out the world, creating a level playing field that equalizes opportunities everywhere. It is this flattening that enables progress along the stages of development—what Blaut has termed a diffusionist conception of development (Blaut, 1993). Some claim that the world is actually flattening out—that socio-spatial positionality matters less and less, with the implication that it is the conditions in a place, rather than its connectivity to the rest of the world, that becomes the important differentiating factor (for critiques of such claims, in both the mainstream and political economic literatures, see Sheppard, 2002 and Sheppard, 2006). The Washington Consensus, in effect, sought to alter the conditions in place; pressing nations to adopt ‘best practice’ neoliberal governance norms, structural adjustment, which would then enable them to progress towards prosperity in a flat world. The ‘new’ development economists acknowledge that the world is not flat. Thus Sachs and Stiglitz argue that certain differences between nations persist in the face of globalization, creating unequal conditions of possibility for development. Sachs argues that certain biophysical differences can never be erased, making places ‘prisoners’ of their geography (Hausmann, 2001). This barrier can be overcome by directing more investment toward and/or giving more policy latitude to, ‘backward’ cities, regions, and nations. Stiglitz stresses how institutions of global governance reinforce power inequalities that disadvantage the global South, arguing for countervailing policies that favor the latter. Both advocate global redistribution and affirmative action for poor nations in order to redress inequalities resulting from disadvantaged geographical or political positionalities, in the belief that such interventions can level the playing field. Again, a flattened world, or leveled playing field, is seen as providing all places with the same opportunities to advance toward prosperity. Yet a flattened world, within this socio-spatial imaginary, does not mean a homogeneous world. Development economics has long recognized that places differ in their resource endowments, arguing that such differences need not be sources of inequality. Rather, each place is enjoined to find its comparative advantage, and trade in global markets on this basis. In doing so, places develop very different economic specializations, each of which is an equal basis for advancing along the developmental trajectory. More recently, both the World Bank and the new development economics have increasingly come to recognize and value persistent differences in cultural norms and practices across the globe, explicitly distancing themselves from previous quasi-orientalist rankings of cultures. Yet such cultural differences are recognized and valorized in terms of how they can be utilized in the market. As in the case of comparative advantage, the value of such socio-spatial differences is assessed in terms of their commodifiability. For example, Bergeron (2003) analyzes how the World Bank incorporates difference into its attempts to create subjects for the market. Taking the case of microfinance, she notes how the Bank, utilizing Putnam’s conception of social capital, takes the position that “developing social capital is best achieved by tapping into the communities’ own ‘premodern’ modes of collaboration and social life” (p. 403). Where such non-capitalist practices are seen as functional to incorporating subjects into microfinance, they are valued. However, social and cultural differences and practices that are not regarded as commodifiable are dismissed as barriers to development, in need of modernization. By the same token, Sachs’ concerns about geographical disadvantage can be regarded as identifying place-based characteristics that cannot be commodified in terms of comparative advantage, e.g., tropical or inland locations, thus requiring intervention. A variety of forces has contributed to the persistence of this imaginary, for at least the last century. First, its power geometry—its rootedness in hegemonic regions of the global system—has given the imaginary particular power to shape not only thinking in the global North, whose self-image it reinforces, but also the global South, whose residents often have been convinced that their own local knowledge and indigenous practices are inadequate. Second, the imaginary gains traction from its optimism and resonance with the notions of progress, equality, and acknowledgement of difference. While each is defined in a particular, commodified way, their capacity to connect with deep human desires for a better life is enticing. Notwithstanding the power and attractiveness of this imaginary, the failure of globalizing capitalism to bring about the prosperity that it promises, combined with the persistence of contestation, has periodically created moments of both material and cognitive crisis. Capitalism’s ability to reinvent itself through such moments of crisis, thereby reinvigorating this imaginary, can be understood through Derrida’s concept of the supplement. [T]he concept of the supplement…harbors within itself two significations whose cohabitation is as strange as it is necessary. The supplement adds itself…, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of presence… But the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace…; if it fills, it is as one fills a void… As substitute, it is not simply added to the positivity of a presence…, its place is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness. (Derrida, 1976, pp. 144–5) Both Keynesian and Hayekian governance discourses play this supplementary role for capitalism as, arguably, does any global governance discourse. Crises signal the incompleteness of capitalism—marks of an emptiness that require a supplement. Supplements fill capitalism’s emptiness and enrich it, promising a fuller measure of presence. Keynesianism provided exactly this supplement during the Great Depression, filling a gap in capitalism and reinvigorating the socio-spatial imaginary. Hayekian neoliberalism worked similarly when first world Fordism entered its crisis in the later 1970s, only to run into its own difficulties, described above, for which a new supplement is currently being sought. While there is no guarantee that a supplement must emerge to alleviate any crisis, to date this has been the case. 4. Conclusion We have argued that the shifting global governance discourses directed toward the third world since the 1970s can be conceptualized as capitalism’s supplements. As supplements, they have reaffirmed a persistent developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary. Recent discussions of such shifts (e.g., Evans, 2008 and Wade, 2008) invoke Karl Polanyi’s double movement: struggles within nation-states of North Atlantic capitalism, dating back to the 18th century, between those propagating free markets and those seeking to protect society through “powerful institutions designed to check the action of the market relative to labor, land and money” (Polanyi, 2001 [1944], p. 79). The Washington Consensus entailed a shift from the latter to the former pole, albeit at a global scale, generating some nostalgia for national Keynesianism among critical scholars (cf. Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 38). Yet, while new development economics discourses resonate with Keynesian imaginaries, it is doubtful that we are experiencing a return to Polanyi’s institutions, even at a supra-national scale. The decommodification of land, labor and money is not evident, and emergent governance discourses in the US and the UK stress a paternalistic ‘nudging’ of individuals to make the right choices (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). Nevertheless neoliberalism, as we know it, is in question. The current crisis has made Hayekian nostrums unpopular, but faith in the market runs deep, and it will probably take a decade before it becomes clear what supplement emerges to manage this crisis. There is no shortage of candidates for post-neoliberal governance regimes—both progressive and regressive (Brand and Sekler, 2009)—and in a moment of crisis, when supplements are in question, contestations can play a vital role in shaping capitalism’s trajectories, and viability. Challenging the developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary, however, will require not just probing the limits of neoliberalism, but exploring imaginaries that exceed capitalism. Within the academy, a plenitude of conceptual alternatives highlight capitalism’s complicity in producing the inequalities and hierarchies that the developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary claims to overcome, including Marxist, world-systemic, feminist, post-colonial and post-developmental scholarship (cf. Sheppard et al., 2009). These alternatives imagine capitalism, development and governance otherwise – seeking more just and sustainable alternatives that create space for variegated trajectories, uneven connectivities and ineluctable difference, instead of stageism, flattening and commodification. Beyond the academy, civil society is expanding the range of alternatives—and is arguably better equipped to disrupt the current experimentations of global policymakers. Experiencing the disabling effects of capitalism and its supplements, those living precariously actively contest neoliberalization, articulating alternative imaginaries and practices through actions ranging from local initiatives to transnational activist networks. The World Social Forum is just the most prominent of innumerable inter-related counter-neoliberal globalization movements (Fisher and Ponniah, 2003, Glassman, 2001, Evans, 2008, Sheppard and Nagar, 2004, Notes From Nowhere, 2003 and Reitan, 2007). Santos (2008, p. 258) regards its gatherings as a productive forum for “alternative thinking of alternatives”—where different kinds of knowledge about social transformation and emancipation, exceeding the hegemonic epistemologies of the West, are valorized and actively debated, and where the existence of alternatives is asserted without defining their content. It may seem unlikely that such emerging alternatives constitute a serious near-term challenge to capitalist imaginaries, but they are provincializing Western understandings of governance and social transformation, and re-politicizing capitalism. Politicization is essential to make space for transformative rather than affirmative remedies, changing the frameworks that generate unequal power relations, and dismantling EuroAmerican centrism “so as to undo the vicious circle of economic and cultural subordination” (Fraser, 1997, p. 28).

#### Root cause of global environmental degradation is neoliberal drive for profit-try or die for reorganizing social relations

**Abramsky, former Institute of Advanced Studies in Science, Technology and Society fellow, 2010**

(Kolya, Sparking a Worldwide Energy Revolution: Social Struggles in the Transition to a Post-Petrol World, pg 7-9)

The stark reality is that the only two recent periods that have seen a major reduction in global CO2emissions both occurred in periods of very sudden, rapid, socially disruptive, and painful periods of forced economic degrowth—namely the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and the current financial-economic crisis. Strikingly, in May 2009, the International Energy Agency reported that, for the first time since 1945, global demand for electricity was expected to fall. Experience has shown that a lot of time and political energy have been virtually wasted on developing a highly-ineffective regulatory framework to tackle climate change. Years of COPs and MOPs—the international basis for regulatory efforts— have simply proven to be hot air. And, not surprisingly, hot air has resulted in global warming. Only unintended degrowth has had the effect that years of intentional regulations sought to achieve. Yet, the dominant approaches to climate change continue to focus on promoting regulatory reforms, rather than on more fundamental changes in social relations. This is true for governments, multilateral institutions, and also large sectors of so-called "civil society," especially the major national and international trade unions and their federations, and NGOs. And despite the patent inadequacy of this approach, regulatory efforts will certainly continue to be pursued. Furthermore, they may well contribute to shoring up legitimacy, at least in the short term, and in certain predominantly-northern countries where the effects of climate changes are less immediately visible and impact on people's lives less directly. Nonetheless, it is becoming increasingly clear that solutions will not be found at this level. The problem has to do with production, not regulation. The current worldwide system of production is based on endless growth and expansion, which is simply incompatible with a long term reduction in emissions and energy consumption. Despite the fact that localized and punctual moments of reduction may well still occur, the overall energy consumption and emissions of the system as a whole can only increase. All the energy-efficient technologies in the world, though undoubtedly crucial to any long term solution, cannot, on their own, square the circle by reducing the total emissions of a system whose survival is based on continual expansion. This is not to say that developing appropriate regulation is not important—it is completely essential. However, the regulatory process is very unlikely to be the driving force behind the changes, but rather a necessary facilitation process that enables wider changes. Furthermore, regulation that is strong enough to be effective is only likely to come about once wider changes in production are already underway. Energy generation and distribution plays a key role in shaping human relations. Every form of energy implies a particular organization of work and division of labor (both in general, and within the energy sector, in particular). The most significant social, economic, cultural, political, and technological transformations in history were associated with shifts in energy generation: from hunting and gathering to agriculture, from human and animal power for transport and production to wind and the steam engine, from coal to oil and nuclear fission as drivers of industry and war. All these transformations have led to increased concentration of power and wealth. And a very real possibility exists that the coming transformation in the world's energy system will result in similar shifts in power relations. But we live in interesting times. The ecological and social carrying-capacity of our planet and existing social relations are overstretched, snapping in different places. This will trigger a major change in the next few decades, but nobody knows in which direction. Consequently, the most important single factor determining the outcome of this change will be the intensity, sophistication, and creativity of grassroots social mobilization.

#### The alternative is a process of critique that challenges the ideology of capital by prioritizing human development over production

Lebowitz 07 (Michael A. Lebowitz is author of Beyond Capital: Marx’s Political Economy of the Working Class (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Build It Now: Socialism for the Twenty-First Century (Monthly Review Press, 2006), and The Socialist Alternative: Real Human Development (Monthly Review Press, forthcoming in 2008). Portions of this essay were presented as “Going Beyond Survival: Making the Social Economy a Real Alternative” at the Fourth International Meeting of the Solidarity Economy, July 21–23, 2006, at the University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, “Venezuela: A Good Example of the Bad Left of Latin America”, <http://monthlyreview.org/2007/07/01/venezuela-a-good-example-of-the-bad-left-of-latin-america>,)

What constitutes a real alternative to capitalism? I suggest that it is a society in which the explicit goal is not the growth of capital or of the material means of production but, rather, human development itself—the growth of human capacities. We can see this perspective embodied in the Bolivarian Constitution of Venezuela—in Article 299’s emphasis upon “ensuring overall human development,” in the declaration of Article 20 that “everyone has the right to the free development of his or her own personality,” and in the focus of Article 102 upon “developing the creative potential of every human being and the full exercise of his or her personality in a democratic society.”¶ In these passages (which are by no means the whole of that constitution), there is the conception of a real alternative—an economy whose logic is not the logic of capital. “The social economy,” President Hugo Chávez said in September 2003, “bases its logic on the human being, on work, that is to say, on the worker and the worker’s family, that is to say, in the human being.” That social economy, he continued, does not focus on economic gain, on exchange values; rather, “the social economy generates mainly use-value.” Its purpose is “the construction of the new man, of the new woman, of the new society.”¶ These are beautiful ideas and beautiful words, but they are, of course, only ideas and words. The first set comes from a constitution and the second comes from the regular national educational seminar known as Aló Presidente. How can such ideas and words be made real? Let me suggest four preconditions for the realization of this alternative to capitalism.¶ (1) Any discussion of structural change must begin from an understanding of the existing structure—in short, from an understanding of capitalism. We need to grasp that the logic of capital, the logic in which profit rather than satisfaction of the needs of human beings is the goal, dominates both where it fosters the comparative advantage of repression and also where it accepts an increase in slave rations. (2) It is essential to attack the logic of capital ideologically. In the absence of the development of a mass understanding of the nature of capital—that capital is the result of the social labor of the collective worker—the need to survive the ravages of neoliberal and repressive policies produces only the desire for a fairer society, the search for a better share for the exploited and excluded: in short, barbarism with a human face.¶ (3) A critical aspect in the battle to go beyond capitalism is the recognition that human capacity develops only through human activity, only through what Marx understood as “revolutionary practice,” the simultaneous changing of circumstances and self-change. Real human development does not drop from the sky in the form of money to support survival or the expenditures of popular governments upon education and health. In contrast to populism, which produces people who look to the state for all answers and to leaders who promise everything, the conception which truly challenges the logic of capital in the battle of ideas is one which explicitly recognizes the centrality of self-management in the workplace and self-government in the community as the means of unleashing human potential—i.e., the idea of socialism for the twenty-first century.¶ (4) But, the idea of this socialism cannot displace real capitalism. Nor can dwarfish islands of cooperation change the world by competing successfully against capitalist corporations. You need the power to foster the new productive relations while truncating the reproduction of capitalist productive relations. You need to take the power of the state away from capital, and you need to use that power when capital responds to encroachments—when capital goes on strike, you must be prepared to move in rather than give in. Winning the “battle of democracy” and using “political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie” remains as critical now as when Marx and Engels wrote the Communist Manifesto. Consider these preconditions. Are they being met by the new Latin American governments on the left? On the contrary, for the most part, we can see the familiar characteristics of social democracy—which does not understand the nature of capital, does not attack the logic of capital ideologically, does not believe that there is a real alternative to capitalism, and, not surprisingly, gives in when capital threatens to go on strike.¶ “We can’t kill the goose that lays the golden eggs,” announced the social democratic premier of British Columbia in Canada (in the 1970s when I was party policy chairman). Here, crystallized, is the ultimate wisdom of social democracy—the manner in which social democracy enforces the logic of capital and ideologically disarms and demobilizes people.¶ Venezuela, however, is going in a different direction at this point. While the Bolivarian Revolution did not start out to build a socialist alternative (and its continuation along this path is contested every step of the way), it is both actively rejecting the logic of capital and also ideologically arming and mobilizing people to build that alternative.

## SCI-DIP

#### Science Diplomacy is Ineffective – Anti American Sentiment Overwhelms the Benign Outreach of the Aff

Audra J. Wolfe 2013 August 23 is a writer, editor and historian based in Philadelphia. She tweets as @ColdWarScience. http://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2013/aug/23/obama-science-foreign-policy

This new interest in science diplomacy is at least partially explained by the nature of contemporary global problems: issues of resource distribution, climate change, and uneven economic growth can only be solved with input from science. Climate change, for instance, does not respect international borders; addressing it will require international partnerships. Nor do American scientists hold a monopoly on good ideas. For these and a host of other reasons, science diplomacy makes good sense and promises benefits for the countries on either end of scientific exchange.¶ But science diplomacy programmes also draw on a long tradition that holds science and scientists as uniquely qualified to spread American ideals. In the 1960s (the last time that the United States made a sustained effort to use science diplomacy to build international partnerships), the concept was marred by ties to propaganda campaigns and intelligence operations. The idea was that foreign elites who adopted the values of science – objectivity, internationalism, the free exchange of information – would be more receptive to American overtures more generally. This assumption drove most US science diplomacy throughout the Cold War.¶ When government sponsorship was explicit ("overt"), neither intelligence gathering nor pro-American reporting would have come as a surprise: anyone agreeing to participate in a US government-sponsored scientific meeting, circa 1962, probably knew what they were getting into.¶ Things got much murkier when the foreign policy establishment turned to groups of private citizens as ambassadors for science. An oddity of the history of American diplomacy is that the United States routinely conducted its Cold War cultural campaigns through arms-length arrangements. In a few cases, the groups engaged in so-called "private diplomacy" really were unaffiliated, but – more often than not – organisations touting their "independent" work on behalf of the US government received help, usually with financial support channeled through fake philanthropic foundations. The pass-through strategy was common in US international activities from approximately 1948 until 1967, when an article in Ramparts magazine uncovered the CIA's covert funding of the National Student Association (a youth organisation), and caused a major foreign policy scandal.¶ Science turned out to be a particularly good fit for this sort of arm's-length operation. All attempts at private diplomacy offered benefits of economy and plausible deniability, but private science diplomacy carried the additional weight of reinforcing American ideals. The American version of "science" that these scientists and their patrons at the CIA had in mind stressed disinterestedness, objectivity and scientist-driven research organisations. They portrayed Soviet science, in contrast, as enslaved to the state, overly focused on technology and driven by ideology. Who better to spread this message than private scientists, working as individuals? By definition, this worldview undermined the ability of overtly sponsored US government science diplomacy to promote the American message.¶ Consider a specific example. In the early 1960s, the Boulder, Colorado-based Biological Sciences Curriculum Study produced a series of innovative biology textbooks; it's still around today. In 1961, the BSCS started accepting funds from the Asia Foundation (now known to be a CIA pass-through) for its international programmes. Like many of the private organisations that received at least part of their funding through the CIA, the BSCS also received support from legitimate philanthropic organisations, including the Rockefeller Foundation and US government agencies, including the National Science Foundation. Nor is it entirely clear whether the BSCS's leaders were aware of the true source of Asia Foundation funds: Arnold Grobman, the BSCS's long-time executive director, denied any knowledge of such links in an interview with me a few months before his death, in the fall of 2011.¶ In any case, between 1961 and 1967, the BSCS and its overseas affiliates received 10s of thousands of dollars from the Asia Foundation to underwrite the adaptation and translation of biology textbooks in Taiwan, Thailand, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong and other nations on the Chinese perimeter. From the historical evidence, the BSCS's overseas adaptation offices don't appear to be cover for something nefarious: they really did focus on biology curriculum reform, especially textbook translation. The only thing sketchy about these offices was that their support came from a different source than their local participants (and possibly even their American partners) believed.¶ And that's the problem. Covers can be blown. When the Asia Foundation's board of trustees acknowledged their ties to the CIA in 1967 (in an attempt to pre-empt yet another damaging story in Ramparts), the BSCS's entire overseas operation came under suspicion. Indian authorities, for instance, briefly threatened to kick out any group that received funding from the Asia Foundation; it took the BSCS years to re-establish trust with the foreign ministers of education who had previously embraced their work. A similar fate befell almost all projects that involved Americans abroad, as all "private support" became synonymous with "CIA front". Covert operations discredited the concept of cultural diplomacy for a generation.¶ The Obama administration's resurrection of the concept of science diplomacy offers enormous potential. But, once again, the intelligence establishment has found in science diplomacy a convenient cover for its own needs. The CIA's use of a fake vaccination campaign in the hunt for Osama bin Laden and the subsequent withdrawal of aid workers from Pakistan over fears for their safety, are all too familiar. Once again, covert operations are threatening to derail genuinely helpful, hopeful activities that might otherwise go a long way toward building international goodwill. The state department's insistence on calling its science envoys "private citizens", too, is cause for concern. Since the science envoys are obviously doing the state department's work, why not call them "officials" and avoid the potential for confusion? The US has been there before. This time, science diplomacy is worth doing right.

**Budget cuts kill science diplomacy**

**Forrest 12**, Fellow at Center for International Security and Cooperation, 6-18-’12 (Robert, “Congress Could Deal Death Blow to American Scientific Exceptionalism” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-forrest/congress-science-research-budget-cuts\_b\_1606743.html)

Yet as research continues to progress, funding of large scientific projects is waning. Last year, for example, at the Fermi National Laboratory outside Chicago, the Tevatron -- America's largest and most energetic particle collider -- shut down. The four-mile atom smasher was deemed too expensive. The closure signaled the end of U.S. leadership in high energy physics with the Tevatron dethroned by a much more powerful machine, the Large Hadron Collider, a 17-mile behemoth that spans both France and Switzerland. Not only did the Tevatron excel scientifically, but also its development forced scientists to create technologies that now benefit everyone. For example, the technology to mass-produce large superconducting magnets, such as those used in MRI machines, was developed at Fermilab and adopted by industry. Despite the loss of the Tevatron, Fermilab will press ahead to new frontiers, building accelerators that may not be as energetic as their European counterparts, but that are much brighter. Experiments using high-power accelerators may not only continue contributing to scientific understanding of the universe, but could also contribute to our nation's energy independence. Among multiple other uses, novel nuclear reactor designs driven by such high-powered accelerators could mitigate significant problems associated with our current nuclear fuel cycle. These reactors would be much safer and less susceptible to meltdowns; they could also treat our spent nuclear fuel so that it wouldn't need to be stored underground for tens of thousands of years. Many of the new treatments that more safely kill cancer cells, to which Obama referred, are also performed with such accelerators. Beams of accelerator-generated neutrons are fired at the cancerous tumor, killing the malignant cells. This treatment is used against inoperable tumors that may be resistant to conventional radiation therapies. The extent and utility of government supported research and development is profound. It ranges from discovering new and cleaner sources of energy, to space exploration at NASA, research in agriculture and transportation, as well as significant medical advances. The list of possible benefits is long. Yet funding is taking a hit. The U.S. House appropriations committee last month recommended a significant reduction in research and development spending. According to an AAAS analysis, next year's cuts alone could be as high as 8 percent or nearly $5 billion below what the president is requesting. Even more stunning: total non-defense R&D funding would end up 27 percent less than Obama's request over the decade. These dramatic cuts would turn off a unique engine of growth, profoundly inhibit innovation, and deal an astonishing blow to American exceptionalism.

#### No disease impact

Keller 13 -- Analyst at Stratfor, Post-Doctoral Fellow at University of Colorado at Boulder (Rebecca, 2013, "Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential," http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)

Periodic media reports of bird flu, a new SARS-like virus and a case of drug-resistant tuberculosis have kept the world informed, but they have also contributed to a distorted perception of the true threat such contagions pose. Perhaps the greatest value of the media coverage is the opportunity it provides to discuss the uncertainties and the best ways to prepare for biological threats, both natural and man-made. It is important to remember that the risk of biological attack is very low and that, partly because viruses can mutate easily, the potential for natural outbreaks is unpredictable. The key is having the right tools in case of an outbreak, epidemic or pandemic, and these include a plan for containment, open channels of communication, scientific research and knowledge sharing. In most cases involving a potential pathogen, the news can appear far worse than the actual threat. Infectious Disease Propagation Since the beginning of February there have been occurrences of H5N1 (bird flu) in Cambodia, H1N1 (swine flu) in India and a new, or novel, coronavirus (a member of the same virus family as SARS) in the United Kingdom. In the past week, a man from Nepal traveled through several countries and eventually ended up in the United States, where it was discovered he had a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention released a report stating that antibiotic-resistant infections in hospitals are on the rise. In addition, the United States is experiencing a worse-than-normal flu season, bringing more attention to the influenza virus and other infectious diseases. The potential for a disease to spread is measured by its effective reproduction number, or R-value, a numerical score that indicates whether a disease will propagate or die out. When the disease first occurs and no preventive measures are in place, the reproductive potential of the disease is referred to as R0, the basic reproduction rate. The numerical value is the number of cases a single case can cause on average during its infectious period. An R0 above 1 means the disease will likely spread (many influenza viruses have an R0 between 2 and 3, while measles had an R0 value of between 12 and 18), while an R-value of less than 1 indicates a disease will likely die out. Factors contributing to the spread of the disease include the length of time people are contagious, how mobile they are when they are contagious, how the disease spreads (through the air or bodily fluids) and how susceptible the population is. The initial R0, which assumes no inherent immunity, can be decreased through control measures that bring the value either near or below 1, stopping the further spread of the disease. Both the coronavirus family and the influenza virus are RNA viruses, meaning they replicate using only RNA (which can be thought of as a single-stranded version of DNA, the more commonly known double helix containing genetic makeup). The rapid RNA replication used by many viruses is very susceptible to mutations, which are simply errors in the replication process. Some mutations can alter the behavior of a virus, including the severity of infection and how the virus is transmitted. The combination of two different strains of a virus, through a process known as antigenic shift, can result in what is essentially a new virus. Influenza, because it infects multiple species, is the hallmark example of this kind of evolution. Mutations can make the virus unfamiliar to the body's immune system. The lack of established immunity within a population enables a disease to spread more rapidly because the population is less equipped to battle the disease. The trajectory of a mutated virus (or any other infectious disease) can reach three basic levels of magnitude. An outbreak is a small, localized occurrence of a pathogen. An epidemic indicates a more widespread infection that is still regional, while a pandemic indicates that the disease has spread to a global level. Virologists are able to track mutations by deciphering the genetic sequence of new infections. It is this technology that helped scientists to determine last year that a smattering of respiratory infections discovered in the Middle East was actually a novel coronavirus. And it is possible that through a series of mutations a virus like H5N1 could change in such a way to become easily transmitted between humans. Lessons Learned There have been several influenza pandemics throughout history. The 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic is often cited as a worst-case scenario, since it infected between 20 and 40 percent of the world's population, killing roughly 2 percent of those infected. In more recent history, smaller incidents, including an epidemic of the SARS virus in 2003 and what was technically defined as a pandemic of the swine flu (H1N1) in 2009, caused fear of another pandemic like the 1918 occurrence. The spread of these two diseases was contained before reaching catastrophic levels, although the economic impact from fear of the diseases reached beyond the infected areas. Previous pandemics have underscored the importance of preparation, which is essential to effective disease management. The World Health Organization lays out a set of guidelines for pandemic prevention and containment. The general principles of preparedness include stockpiling vaccines, which is done by both the United States and the European Union (although the possibility exists that the vaccines may not be effective against a new virus). In the event of an outbreak, the guidelines call for developed nations to share vaccines with developing nations. Containment strategies beyond vaccines include quarantine of exposed individuals, limited travel and additional screenings at places where the virus could easily spread, such as airports. Further measures include the closing of businesses, schools and borders. Individual measures can also be taken to guard against infection. These involve general hygienic measures -- avoiding mass gatherings, thoroughly washing hands and even wearing masks in specific, high-risk situations. However, airborne viruses such as influenza are still the most difficult to contain because of the method of transmission. Diseases like noroviruses, HIV or cholera are more serious but have to be transmitted by blood, other bodily fluids or fecal matter. The threat of a rapid pandemic is thereby slowed because it is easier to identify potential contaminates and either avoid or sterilize them. Research is another important aspect of overall preparedness. Knowledge gained from studying the viruses and the ready availability of information can be instrumental in tracking diseases. For example, the genomic sequence of the novel coronavirus was made available, helping scientists and doctors in different countries to readily identify the infection in limited cases and implement quarantine procedures as necessary. There have been only 13 documented cases of the novel coronavirus, so much is unknown regarding the disease. Recent cases in the United Kingdom indicate possible human-to-human transmission. Further sharing of information relating to the novel coronavirus can aid in both treatment and containment. Ongoing research into viruses can also help make future vaccines more efficient against possible mutations, though this type of research is not without controversy. A case in point is research on the H5N1 virus. H5N1 first appeared in humans in 1997. Of the more than 600 cases that have appeared since then, more than half have resulted in death. However, the virus is not easily transmitted because it must cross from bird to human. Human-to-human transmission of H5N1 is very rare, with only a few suspected incidents in the known history of the disease. While there is an H5N1 vaccine, it is possible that a new variation of the vaccine would be needed were the virus to mutate into a form that was transmittable between humans. Vaccines can take months or even years to develop, but preliminary research on the virus, before an outbreak, can help speed up development. In December 2011, two separate research labs, one in the United States and one in the Netherlands, sought to publish their research on the H5N1 virus. Over the course of their research, these labs had created mutations in the virus that allowed for airborne transmission between ferrets. These mutations also caused other changes, including a decrease in the virus's lethality and robustness (the ability to survive outside the carrier). Publication of the research was delayed due to concerns that the results could increase the risk of accidental release of the virus by encouraging further research, or that the information could be used by terrorist organizations to conduct a biological attack. Eventually, publication of papers by both labs was allowed. However, the scientific community imposed a voluntary moratorium in order to allow the community and regulatory bodies to determine the best practices moving forward. This voluntary ban was lifted for much of the world on Jan. 24, 2013. On Feb. 21, the National Institutes of Health in the United States issued proposed guidelines for federally funded labs working with H5N1. Once standards are set, decisions will likely be made on a case-by-case basis to allow research to continue. Fear of a pandemic resulting from research on H5N1 continues even after the moratorium was lifted. Opponents of the research cite the possibility that the virus will be accidentally released or intentionally used as a bioweapon, since information in scientific publications would be considered readily available. The Risk-Reward Equation The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.

#### No bio-d impact – it’s resilient

Kareiva et al 12 – Chief Scientist and Vice President, The Nature Conservancy (Peter, Michelle Marvier **--**professor and department chair of Environment Studies and Sciences at Santa Clara University, Robert Lalasz **--** director of science communications for The Nature Conservancy, Winter, “Conservation in the Anthropocene,” http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/journal/past-issues/issue-2/conservation-in-the-anthropocene/)

As conservation became a global enterprise in the 1970s and 1980s, the movement's justification for saving nature shifted from spiritual and aesthetic values to focus on biodiversity. Nature was described as primeval, fragile, and at risk of collapse from too much human use and abuse. And indeed, there are consequences when humans convert landscapes for mining, logging, intensive agriculture, and urban development and when key species or ecosystems are lost.¶ But ecologists and conservationists have grossly overstated the fragility of nature, frequently arguing that once an ecosystem is altered, it is gone forever. Some ecologists suggest that if a single species is lost, a whole ecosystem will be in danger of collapse, and that if too much biodiversity is lost, spaceship Earth will start to come apart. Everything, from the expansion of agriculture to rainforest destruction to changing waterways, has been painted as a threat to the delicate inner-workings of our planetary ecosystem.¶ The fragility trope dates back, at least, to Rachel Carson, who wrote plaintively in Silent Spring of the delicate web of life and warned that perturbing the intricate balance of nature could have disastrous consequences.22 Al Gore made a similar argument in his 1992 book, Earth in the Balance.23 And the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment warned darkly that, while the expansion of agriculture and other forms of development have been overwhelmingly positive for the world's poor, ecosystem degradation was simultaneously putting systems in jeopardy of collapse.24¶ The trouble for conservation is that the data simply do not support the idea of a fragile nature at risk of collapse. Ecologists now know that the disappearance of one species does not necessarily lead to the extinction of any others, much less all others in the same ecosystem. In many circumstances, the demise of formerly abundant species can be inconsequential to ecosystem function. The American chestnut, once a dominant tree in eastern North America, has been extinguished by a foreign disease, yet the forest ecosystem is surprisingly unaffected. The passenger pigeon, once so abundant that its flocks darkened the sky, went extinct, along with countless other species from the Steller's sea cow to the dodo, with no catastrophic or even measurable effects.¶ These stories of resilience are not isolated examples -- a thorough review of the scientific literature identified 240 studies of ecosystems following major disturbances such as deforestation, mining, oil spills, and other types of pollution. The abundance of plant and animal species as well as other measures of ecosystem function recovered, at least partially, in 173 (72 percent) of these studies.25¶ While global forest cover is continuing to decline, it is rising in the Northern Hemisphere, where "nature" is returning to former agricultural lands.26 Something similar is likely to occur in the Southern Hemisphere, after poor countries achieve a similar level of economic development. A 2010 report concluded that rainforests that have grown back over abandoned agricultural land had 40 to 70 percent of the species of the original forests.27 Even Indonesian orangutans, which were widely thought to be able to survive only in pristine forests, have been found in surprising numbers in oil palm plantations and degraded lands.28¶ Nature is so resilient that it can recover rapidly from even the most powerful human disturbances. Around the Chernobyl nuclear facility, which melted down in 1986, wildlife is thriving, despite the high levels of radiation.29 In the Bikini Atoll, the site of multiple nuclear bomb tests, including the 1954 hydrogen bomb test that boiled the water in the area, the number of coral species has actually increased relative to before the explosions.30 More recently, the massive 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico was degraded and consumed by bacteria at a remarkably fast rate.31¶ Today, coyotes roam downtown Chicago, and peregrine falcons astonish San Franciscans as they sweep down skyscraper canyons to pick off pigeons for their next meal. As we destroy habitats, we create new ones: in the southwestern United States a rare and federally listed salamander species seems specialized to live in cattle tanks -- to date, it has been found in no other habitat.32 Books have been written about the collapse of cod in the Georges Bank, yet recent trawl data show the biomass of cod has recovered to precollapse levels.33 It's doubtful that books will be written about this cod recovery since it does not play well to an audience somehow addicted to stories of collapse and environmental apocalypse.¶ Even that classic symbol of fragility -- the polar bear, seemingly stranded on a melting ice block -- may have a good chance of surviving global warming if the changing environment continues to increase the populations and northern ranges of harbor seals and harp seals. Polar bears evolved from brown bears 200,000 years ago during a cooling period in Earth's history, developing a highly specialized carnivorous diet focused on seals. Thus, the fate of polar bears depends on two opposing trends -- the decline of sea ice and the potential increase of energy-rich prey. The history of life on Earth is of species evolving to take advantage of new environments only to be at risk when the environment changes again.¶ The wilderness ideal presupposes that there are parts of the world untouched by humankind, but today it is impossible to find a place on Earth that is unmarked by human activity. The truth is humans have been impacting their natural environment for centuries. The wilderness so beloved by conservationists -- places "untrammeled by man"34 -- never existed, at least not in the last thousand years, and arguably even longer.

#### Species loss causes better-adapted species to evolve

**Dodds 07** – MS in PE. President, North Pacific Research (Donald, The Myth of Biodiversity, http://northpacificresearch.com/downloads/The\_myth\_of\_biodiversity.doc)

Notice next that at least ten times biodiversity fell rapidly; none of these extreme reductions in biodiversity were caused by humans. Around 250 million years ago the number of genera was reduce 85 percent from about 1200 to around 200, by any definition a significant reduction in biodiversity. **Now notice that after this extinction a steep and rapid rise of biodiversity**. In fact, if you look closely at the curve, you will find that **every mass-extinction was followed by a massive increase in biodiversity**. Why was that? Do you suppose it had anything to do with the number environmental niches available for exploitation? If you do, you are right. **Extinctions are necessary for creation.** Each time a mass extinction occurs the **world is filled with new and better-adapted species**. That is the way evolution works, its called survival of the fittest. Those species that could not adapted to the changing world conditions simply disappeared and better species evolved. How efficient is that? Those that could adapt to change continued to thrive. For example, the cockroach and the shark have been around well over 300 million years. There is a pair to draw to, two successful species that any creator would be proud to produce. To date these creatures have successful survived six extinctions, without the aid of humans or the EPA.

#### **US and Cuban science coop is increasing --- hurricanes, biodiversity, and oil.**

Ordonez 12 (Franco, regional correspondent for McClatchy Newspapers, “Scientists work to bridge political gap between Cuba, U.S.,” McClatchy News, 5-21-12, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/05/21/149603/scientists-work-to-bridge-political.html#.UfwlE22DL1U)

VINALES, Cuba — Cuban and American scientists have joined forces in an effort to protect baby sea turtles and endangered sharks. They’re studying Caribbean weather patterns that fuel the hurricanes that have devastated the Southeastern United States. In the process, they’re chipping away at a half-century of government feuding, helping to bring the nations together for talks on vital matters, such as what to do in case of an oil spill. The two countries are so geographically close, and the environmental concerns so similar, that scientists say it’s crucial to combine forces. “If we’re going to have any hope of protecting our environment in the future, from climate change to our shared resources in the Gulf of Mexico, we have to collaborate,” said Dan Whittle, the Cuba program director at the Environmental Defense Fund. Under the Obama administration, cooperation between scientific organizations has increased, scientists say. Visas are being granted more regularly to Cuban scientists and it’s easier for Americans to get the U.S. government licenses needed to do research on the island. Peter Agre, a Nobel laureate in chemistry and the head of the Johns Hopkins Malaria Research Institute, led 18 U.S. scientists associated with the American Association for the Advancement of Science on a trip to Cuba in December to meet with counterparts about potential cooperation in marine and atmospheric sciences, and sustainable fisheries. For some American scientists, going to Cuba is like tasting a piece of forbidden fruit. The scientific landscape has been largely untouched for decades. The U.S. trade embargo, which has been in place for 50 years, has in many ways been a gift to Cuba’s forests, fish populations and coral reefs. It helped insulate Cuba’s ecosystem from the type of tourist development that’s wracked other nations. Sea turtles that feed in Florida journey back each year to nest in Cuba. Many grunts and snapper fish that live off the North Carolina coast also spawn in Cuba. The oceanic whitetip shark has almost disappeared from U.S. waters, but preliminary studies show the predators in abundance around the island. Cuban scientists see the collaboration with Americans as an honest exchange of work, as opposed to a plea for funding or resources. They complain that they don’t get enough credit for their science, and they boast that Cuba represents 2 percent of the Latin American population but has 11 percent of the scientists in the region. There are thousands of Cuban doctors and health professionals on medical missions abroad. The country includes more than 84 protected areas, making up almost 14 percent of the island. In Western Cuba at the 37,500-acre Vinales National Park, environmentalists study ways to protect the vast mountains that are home to an array of native plants and animals, including the renown “painted snails.” Legend has it that the sun painted their vibrant orange and yellow swirled shells. “Of maximum importance is the need to protect and conserve the environment,” said Yamira Valdez, a Cuban environmental specialist at the park. “Our countries can share experiences, criteria. They can see what works here. And we can apply their experience to the work we do.” Scientists and scholars have helped break through political barriers before. An environmental agreement reached with the Soviet Union in the 1970s is often credited with easing Cold War tensions. “So later when things began to loosen up and relations warmed, there was a network of people who knew each other quite well who had actually had dinners together and been to each other’s homes,” said William Reilly, the head of the Environmental Protection Agency under President George H.W. Bush. “That is enormously constructive.” The researchers understand that anything involving Cuba is going to be controversial. A decision to grant President Raul Castro’s daughter a visa to attend an academic conference in San Francisco this week sparked a wave of criticism from Cuban-American groups, calling her an enemy of democracy. But the researchers say their work is focused on science, not politics. Their cooperation will serve as a foundation for future dialogue, they say. “The political relationship at some point, in five years, 50 years, 500 years, whatever it is, will change,” said Vaughan Turekian, an atmospheric geochemist and chief international officer at the American Association for the Advancement of Science. In a rare move last year, the Environmental Defense Fund received State Department approval to bring a senior official from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to Cuba to meet with officials about rebuilding fish stocks for species of fish that populate the region. Oil is a key area of cooperative interest. Scientists have helped facilitate talks between the nations as the specter of an oil spill has raised concerns in both of them. Cuban oceanographers reached out to their U.S. counterparts after the 2010 BP spill to help them gain reassurances that the U.S. government would step in should the gushing petroleum come near Cuban shores. “The ocean doesn’t have borders. It’s more about the currents. It’s more how nature works and which are the vulnerable species,” said Roberto Perez, a scientist at the Antonio Nunez Jimenez Foundation of Man and Nature in Havana. “Fortunately, it didn’t come to our waters, but the idea really opened up the window of opportunity for the governments to talk.” Those conversations have increased as Cuba prepares to drill for oil just 70 miles from the Florida Keys. Last year, the U.S. Treasury Department granted a group of environmentalists and drilling experts, led by the Environmental Defense Fund, permission to travel to Cuban to meet with top officials at the Ministry of Basic Industry, which regulates the energy sector, as well as the state-run petroleum company. The group included Reilly, the co-chair of a bipartisan commission that investigated the 2010 BP spill. He said his goal was to share the commission’s findings with Cuban officials, who had no experience regulating offshore oil and gas, in hopes that they wouldn’t make the same mistakes that led to the BP disaster. When he returned to the United States, Reilly briefed the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement and other administration agencies, whose officials, Reilly said, were very interested to learn that the Cubans were reading the Interior Department’s regulatory reports and planned to adhere to American standards. “That was not known,” he said. U.S. officials also have engaged with the International Maritime Organization, which has sent technical teams to Cuba to evaluate its oil drilling procedures, and Cuban and U.S. officials met in the Bahamas in December along with officials from Mexico and Jamaica to discuss disaster plans. A similar meeting was held in Trinidad and administration officials say more will come. “In fact, we’re all comfortable all the entities that would need licenses to respond appropriately either have them or are in the process of getting them at this point,” said a senior administration official, who requested anonymity in order to speak freely. Reilly notes that his delegation spent several days speaking directly with top Cuban officials and was able to gather specific details about Cuban plans that may not have been discussed at other multinational meetings.

#### No food wars – conflicts are more likely when resources are abundant

**Salehyan** **07** (Idean, assistant professor of political science at the University of North Texas, “The New myth about climate change,” August, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\_id=3922)

These claims generally boil down to an argument about resource scarcity. Desertification, sea-level rise, more-frequent severe weather events, an increased geographical range of tropical disease, and shortages of freshwater will lead to violence over scarce necessities. Friction between haves and have-nots will increase, and governments will be hard-pressed to provide even the most basic services. In some scenarios, mass migration will ensue, whether due to desertification, natural disasters, and rising sea levels, or as a consequence of resource wars. Environmental refugees will in turn spark political violence in receiving areas, and countries in the “global North” will erect ever higher barriers to keep culturally unwelcome—and hungry—foreigners out. The number of failed states, meanwhile, will increase as governments collapse in the face of resource wars and weakened state capabilities, and transnational terrorists and criminal networks will move in. International wars over depleted water and energy supplies will also intensify. The basic need for survival will supplant nationalism, religion, or ideology as the fundamental root of conflict. Dire scenarios like these may sound convincing, but they are misleading. Even worse, they are irresponsible, for they shift liability for wars and human rights abuses away from oppressive, corrupt governments. Additionally, focusing on climate change as a security threat that requires a military response diverts attention away from prudent adaptation mechanisms and new technologies that can prevent the worst catastrophes. First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters.

#### Biotech inevitable.

D'Haeze, ‘7

[Wim, Bio-Engineer in Chemistry and received his Ph.D. in Biotechnology at Ghent University, Senior Technical Writer in the pharmaceutical, "Blooming Biotech and Pharmaceutical Industries," 10-15, The Science Advisory Board, <http://www.scienceboard.net/community/perspectives.193.html>]

Whoever regularly follows the news will recognize that the Biotech and Pharmaceutical Industry is still expanding – booming – in the United States and Europe, but also in major Asian countries such as India, China, and Japan. A pattern that is often observed for pharmaceutical companies is headquartering in a major location in the United States or Europe while branching elsewhere in the United States, Europe, and/or Asia. Those processes are highly dependent on how successfully drug candidates move through the drug development pipelines and on how the drug development process is organized, planned, and executed. Research and Development hubs are located at the East coast (e.g., New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Northern and Central New Jersey) and West coast (e.g., San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Seattle) of the United States and throughout major cities in Europe, but multinational companies have been or are stepping on land in countries throughout Asia as well. Reasons for the latter development may include substantial cheaper labor as compared to that in developed countries and the ability to produce medicines close to the market place. During recent years, India, for example, has become the home of a few hundred registered biotech and pharmaceutical companies and is now positioned within the top-5 producers of pharmaceuticals. Interestingly, the majority of its export (e.g., production of diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (DTP) vaccine) goes to developing countries. Companies such as Biocon, Novo Nordisk, Aventis Pharma, Chiron Behring Vaccines, GlaxoSmithKline, Novozymes, Eli Lilly & Company, and Advanced Biochemicals are all represented in major Indian cities, including Bangalore, Calcutta, Hyderabad, Mumbai, Pune, and New Delhi. In 2005, Indian biotech and pharmaceutical companies represented a revenue of more than US$1 billion and the governmental goal articulated by the Indian Department of Biotechnology is to create a biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry generating US$5 billion in revenues annually and representing one million jobs by roughly three years from now. The government tries to achieve this goal in part by facilitating foreign-owned companies to establish in India, making it easier for investors by centralizing the process, creating at least ten new science parks by 2010, financially supporting new drug discovery proposals and research, and by supporting small biotech and pharmaceutical businesses and start-up companies.

## Relations

#### **Science cooperation is increasing in squo --- meetings prove.**

AFP 11 (Agence France-Presse, “Cuba, US scientists kick off cooperation meeting,” Phys.org, 12-12-11, http://phys.org/news/2011-12-cuba-scientists-cooperation.html)

Scientists from the Cuba and United States will Monday begin a five-day meeting aimed at exploring opportunities for cooperation on range of research fields, including biological and environmental sciences, and science policy, Cuban officials said. The forum, organized by The Academy of Sciences of Cuba (ACC) and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), will be attended by some 40 directors of research centers and researchers from the two countries, said the ACC in statement, according to official Cuban news agency Prensa Latina. The aim is to "reach sustainable collaboration between the two countries," said the agency. The neighbors have not had diplomatic relations since the White House broke off links in 1961, and a strict embargo has strangled ties and trade between them.

#### OAS fails- other groups solve

**Lee ’12** [Brianna, Senior Production Editor for the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Organization of American States,” April 13, <http://www.cfr.org/americas/organization-american-states/p27945>]

One of the OAS's major administrative constraints is its consensus model, which requires a unanimous vote to make many of its decisions. As political ideologies have diversified within the region, this has made it difficult for the OAS to make quick, decisive calls to action. The polarization between American states has also led to one of the OAS's other major shortcomings: its many mandates unrelated to the core mission. In 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the OAS to streamline its processes (VOA) from what she called a "proliferation of mandates," noting that the expansion of mandates without proportional expansion of funding made for an "unsustainable" fiscal future.¶ Election monitoring, one of the OAS's major functions in light of its commitment to democracy, is also restricted by its inability to send election observers without the invitation of state governments. "They can't condemn a country unless that country wants to be condemned," CFR's O'Neil says. Nevertheless, she adds, it has become a norm in many member countries to accept OAS monitors, which she says has been helpful.¶ Within the hemisphere, conflicting views on the OAS's loyalties abound. In the summer 2011 issue of Americas Quarterly, Anthony DePalma sums up the range of mistrust: "Insulza and the OAS itself are widely seen as being bullied by Venezuela (he denies it), as catering to [Venezuelan President] Hugo Chavez's friends in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua (evidence suggests otherwise) and, strangely, still beholden to the U.S., even though Washington seems to have lost interest."¶ Chavez has called the OAS a puppet of the United States; at the same time, in July 2011, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a Republican-sponsored bill to defund the OAS (ForeignPolicy), on the charge that the organization supported anti-democracy regimes in Latin America.¶ Various efforts have been made to create organizations to act as alternatives to the OAS. In 2010, Latin American leaders formed the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), an organization that excludes the United States. Chavez and Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa have expressed the desire for CELAC to eventually supplant the OAS, although Sabatini argues that CELAC is "nothing more than a piece of paper and a dream."¶ Many consider another regional organization, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), to be a useful counterweight to the OAS. UNASUR is regarded by many observers as a means for Brazil to assert its power in the region. O'Neil argues the organization has been able to fulfill some duties that the OAS has been less effective in doing, such as successfully mediating between Ecuador and Colombia during their diplomatic crisis in 2008

**No impact to Latin America**

**Naim 06 (Moises, Foreign Policy no157 40-3, 45-7 N/D 2006, editor of foreign policy magazine)**

For decades, Latin America's weight in the world has been shrinking. It is not an economic powerhouse, a security threat, or a population bomb. Even its tragedies pale in comparison to Africa's. The region will not rise until it ends its search for magic formulas. It may not make for a good sound bite, but patience is Latin America's biggest deficit of all. Latin America has grown used to living in the backyard of the United States. For decades, it has been a region where the U.S. government meddled in local politics, fought communists, and promoted its business interests. Even if the rest of the world wasn't paying attention to Latin America, the United States occasionally was. Then came September 11, and even the United States seemed to tune out. Naturally, the world's attention centered almost exclusively on terrorism, the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, and on the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran. Latin America became Atlantis--the lost continent. Almost overnight, it disappeared from the maps of investors, generals, diplomats, and journalists. Indeed, as one commentator recently quipped, Latin America can't compete on the world stage in any aspect, even as a threat. Unlike anti-Americans elsewhere, Latin Americans are not willing to die for the sake of their geopolitical hatreds. Latin America is a nuclear-weapons free zone. Its only weapon of mass destruction is cocaine. In contrast to emerging markets like India and China, Latin America is a minor economic player whose global significance is declining. Sure, a few countries export oil and gas, but only Venezuela is in the top league of the world's energy market. Not even Latin America's disasters seem to elicit global concern anymore. Argentina experienced a massive financial stroke in 2001, and no one abroad seemed to care. Unlike prior crashes, no government or international financial institution rushed to bail it out. Latin America doesn't have Africa's famines, genocides, an HIV/AIDS pandemic, wholesale state failures, or rock stars who routinely adopt its tragedies. Bono, Bill Gates, and Angelina Jolie worry about Botswana, not Brazil. But just as the five-year-old war on terror pronounced the necessity of confronting threats where they linger, it also underscored the dangers of neglect. Like Afghanistan, Latin America shows how quickly and easy it is for the United States to lose its influence when Washington is distracted by other priorities. In both places, Washington's disinterest produced a vacuum that was filled by political groups and leaders hostile to the United States. No, Latin America is not churning out Islamic terrorists as Afghanistan was during the days of the Taliban. In Latin America, the power gap is being filled by a group of disparate leaders often lumped together under the banner of populism. On the rare occasions that Latin American countries do make international news, it's the election of a so-called populist, an apparently anti-American, anti-market leader, that raises hackles. However, Latin America's populists aren't a monolith. Some are worse for international stability than is usually reported. But some have the potential to chart a new, positive course for the region. Underlying the ascent of these new leaders are several real, stubborn threads running through Latin Americans' frustration with the status quo in their countries. Unfortunately, the United States'---and the rest of the world's--lack of interest in that region means that the forces that are shaping disparate political movements in Latin America are often glossed over, misinterpreted, or ignored. Ultimately, though, what matters most is not what the northern giant thinks or does as much as what half a billion Latin Americans think and do. And in the last couple of decades, the wild swings in their political behavior have created a highly unstable terrain where building the institutions indispensable for progress or for fighting poverty has become increasingly difficult. There is a way out. But it's not the quick fix that too many of Latin America's leaders have promised and that an impatient population demands.

#### **Status quo discussions between US and Cuban scientists solve --- specific to environmental discussions.**

Haven 4-11-13 (Paul, Associated Press Havana reporter, “Under the radar, Cuba and U.S. often work together,” The Associated Press Nation and World, http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci\_22997924/under-radar-cuba-and-u-s-often-work)

HAVANA — Cuba and the United States might be longtime enemies with a bucket overflowing with grievances, but the fast return of a Florida couple who fled U.S. authorities with their two kidnapped children in tow shows the Cold War enemies are capable of remarkable cooperation on many issues. Indeed, diplomats and observers on both sides of the Florida Straits say American and Cuban law enforcement officers, scientists, disaster relief workers, Coast Guard officials and other experts work together on a daily basis, and invariably express professional admiration for each other. "I don't think the story has been told, but there is a real warmth in just the sort of day-to-day relations between U.S. and Cuban government officials," said Dan Whittle, who frequently brings scientific groups to the island in his role as Cuba program director for the Environmental Defense Fund. "Nearly every time I talk to American officials, they say they were impressed by their Cuban counterparts. There really is a high level of mutual respect." Almost none of these technical-level interactions make the headlines, but examples are endless. Just last week, Cuba's top environmental official Ulises Fernandez and several island oil experts attended a conference in New York of the International Association of Drilling Contractors after the State Department expedited their visas. The American government maintains a Coast Guard representative in Cuba, and the two countries work together to interdict suspicious boats. A U.S. diplomat involved in the process said that security officials on both sides are on a first-name basis and that the Cubans happily accept FBI and Coast Guard baseball caps as gifts.

#### Single instances of action do not change perceptions of us

**Fettweis**, **08** (Christopher – professor of political science at Tulane, Credibility and the War on Terror, Political Science Quarterly, Winter)

Since Vietnam, scholars have been generally unable to identify cases in which high credibility helped the United States achieve its goals. The shortterm aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, did not include a string of Soviet reversals, or the kind of benign bandwagoning with the West that deterrence theorists would have expected. In fact, the perceived reversal in Cuba seemed to harden Soviet resolve. As the crisis was drawing to a close, Soviet diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov angrily told his counterpart, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again."37 Kissinger commented in his memoirs that "the Soviet Union thereupon launched itself on a determined, systematic, and long-term program of expanding all categories of its military power .... The 1962 Cuban crisis was thus a historic turning point-but not for the reason some Americans complacently supposed."38 The reassertion of the credibility of the United States, which was done at the brink of nuclear war, had few long-lasting benefits. The Soviets seemed to learn the wrong lesson. There is actually scant evidence that other states ever learn the right lessons. Cold War history contains little reason to believe that the credibility of the superpowers had very much effect on their ability to influence others. Over the last decade, a series of major scholarly studies have cast further doubt upon the fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions. Employing methods borrowed from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence theorists, Jonathan Mercer argued that threats are far more independent than is commonly believed and, therefore, that reputations are not likely to be formed on the basis of individual actions.39 While policymakers may feel that their decisions send messages about their basic dispositions to others, most of the evidence from social psychology suggests otherwise. Groups tend to interpret the actions of their rivals as situational, dependent upon the constraints of place and time. Therefore, they are not likely to form lasting impressions of irresolution from single, independent events. Mercer argued that the interdependence assumption had been accepted on faith, and rarely put to a coherent test; when it was, it almost inevitably failed.40

#### No country will ever turn away from US commitment – even if they are tempted, they know they need a superpower

Alterman 11 (Jon, director and senior fellow of the Middle East Program at CSIS, Former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, June 2011, “Capacity and Resolve: Foreign Assessments of U.S. Power,” http://csis.org/files/publication/110613\_Cohen\_CapacityResolve\_Web.pdf

Beneath the surface, however, is an appreciation of how much of the region’s security order is a consequence of U.S. action and how little ability any other country or collection of countries has to do anything close to what the United States does. While there is fear for the future of the U.S. role, there is at the same time no alternative to it. No other country has the military resources or the will to safeguard what is, in the end, a global commons. Rather than seek to eliminate the U.S. role, regional countries—both friendly and unfriendly—are determined to try to shape it in order to advance their own interests. It is worth pointing out two things at the outset. The first is that much of this is a speculative exercise. Decisions on foreign policy are closely held, with no public consultation, at the highest levels of the Gulf leadership. Those leaders are often mannered when talking with Americans, almost seeming as if they are calibrating their messages to achieve the desired response rather than to give insight into their own thinking. Although it is worth paying attention to words spoken in private, those words need to be supplemented with attention to the actions the leaders take as well as to the parameters of the public debate that they allow to exist. Second, there is a tremendous range of views within the Gulf, not only between Iran, Iraq, and their GCC neighbors, but even within the GCC itself. The United Arab Emirates feels most vulnerable to Iran, for example, while Oman and Qatar seem intent on finding a modus vivendi with Iran. Kuwait feels threatened by everyone in its neighborhood, while Saudi Arabia relies on U.S. backing in order to seek to lead the neighborhood. **For each country, the bilateral relationship with the United States is the most important relation, not least because it protects each country from the predatory actions of its neighbors.** Correspondingly, there is no single “Gulf” or “Arab” view of the United States, nor a single view of U.S. power or U.S. commitment to the region. Even within countries, there seems to be considerable diversity. **Where there is unanimity**, however, **is in the expectation that the region must have some external guarantor, as it has had since the early sixteenth century.**

# 2nc

## CP

### AT: Perm Do the CP

### Should requires certainty and immediacy

### Summer 94 (Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14)

The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.[16](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn16)  ¶5 Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.[17](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn17) The order's language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used.[18](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn18) When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.[19](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn19) True minutes[20](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn20) of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by the statutory policy of this State. IV CONCLUSION Nisi prius judgments and orders should be construed in a manner which gives effect and meaning to the complete substance of the memorial. When a judge-signed direction is capable of two interpretations, one of which would make it a valid part of the record proper and the other would render it a meaningless exercise in futility, the adoption of the former interpretation is this court's due. A rule - that on direct appeal views as fatal to the order's efficacy the mere omission from the journal entry of a long and customarily implied phrase, i.e., "and the same hereby is" - is soon likely to drift into the body of principles which govern the facial validity of judgments. This development would make judicial acts acutely vulnerable to collateral attack for the most trivial of reasons and tend to undermine the stability of titles or other adjudicated rights. It is obvious the trial judge intended his May 18 memorial to be an in praesenti order overruling Dollarsaver's motion for judgment n.o.v. It is hence that memorial, and not the later June 2 entry, which triggered appeal time in this case. Because the petition. in error was not filed within 30 days of May 18, the appeal is untimely. I would hence sustain the appellee's motion to dismiss.[21](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn21)  Footnotes: [1](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker2fn1) The pertinent terms of the memorial of May 18, 1993 are: IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BRYAN COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA COURT MINUTE /18/93 No. C-91-223 After having heard and considered arguments of counsel in support of and in opposition to the motions of the Defendant for judgment N.O.V. and a new trial, the Court finds that the motions should be overruled. Approved as to form: /s/ Ken Rainbolt /s/ Austin R. Deaton, Jr. /s/ Don Michael Haggerty /s/ Rocky L. Powers Judge [2](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker2fn2) The turgid phrase - "should be and the same hereby is" - is a tautological absurdity. This is so because "should" is synonymous with ought or must and is in itself sufficient to effect an inpraesenti ruling - one that is couched in "a present indicative synonymous with ought." See infra note 15.[3](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker2fn3) Carter v. Carter, Okl., [783 P.2d 969](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=10645), 970 (1989); Horizons, Inc. v. Keo Leasing Co., Okl., [681 P.2d 757](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=9677), 759 (1984); Amarex, Inc. v. Baker, Okl., [655 P.2d 1040](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=5345), 1043 (1983); Knell v. Burnes, Okl., [645 P.2d 471](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=5225), 473 (1982); Prock v. District Court of Pittsburgh County, Okl., [630 P.2d 772](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=4989), 775 (1981); Harry v. Hertzler, 185 Okl. 151, [90 P.2d 656](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=13059), 659 (1939); Ginn v. Knight, 106 Okl. 4, 232 P. 936, 937 (1925). [4](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker2fn4) "Recordable" means that by force of [12 O.S. 1991 § 24](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=93563&date=11/8/94) an instrument meeting that section's criteria must be entered on or "recorded" in the court's journal. The clerk may "enter" only that which is "on file." The pertinent terms of [12 O.S. 1991 § 24](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=93563&date=11/8/94) are: "Upon the journal record required to be kept by the clerk of the district court in civil cases . . . shall be entered copies of the following instruments on file: cont…  
Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, [802 P.2d 813](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=802&box2=P.2D&box3=813) (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker2fn14) In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

**Substantial means unconditional and certain**

**Words and Phrases 64** (40 W&P 759)

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

**Resolved means certain**

**AHD 06** (American Heritage Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)

Resolve TRANSITIVE VERB:1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To cause (a person) to reach a decision. See synonyms at decide. 3. To decide or express by formal vote.

## Solvency

### 2NC Counterplan

#### Immediate Legislation Links to Politics – Counterplan Sends a Signal Immediately Solving the Aff and Results in Future Binding Legislation

Posner ‘8 Eric A, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago and Jacob E. Gersen, Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Stanford LR, December

When the lawmaking agent does not comply with the rules, its communications will not be treated as law in the strong sense. Executive officials will not arrest or otherwise sanction people whose behavior is inconsistent with the policy judgment reflected in the communication. However, the public (and other political agents) will often react as though the communication were in fact law, as we have argued. The public might bring its behavior into conformity with the policy goals expressed in the communication because (for example) it predicts that later the lawmaking agent or some other lawmaking agent will convert the communication into law, or because the pronouncement is a focal point for behavior. As behavior changes, it may become easier for the original lawmaking agent to enact a hard-law version of the soft law, or for some other lawmaking agent (such as a court) to convert the soft law into hard law. cont… Hard law is easiest to create in the regulatory setting, where not much more than notice and comment are required. Our topic - statutory law - is a middle case. As we have seen, statute making faces significant formalities, with the result that various soft law substitutes - concurrent resolutions, hortatory statutes, signing statements - have emerged. One might also predict that soft law will become popular in periods of uncertainty, where lawmaking agents might seek to test the waters of public opinion before committing themselves to a hard-law enactment. In many cases, there is nothing troubling about soft law even though it has real effects on people's behavior. One can think of it as a useful regulatory instrument that allows governments to obtain policy goals without resorting to law, which is sometimes too costly, crude, and inflexible. But in other cases, resort to soft law may be troubling. Some people are better at perceiving soft law than others; the latter group will often find themselves in a worse position to control their lives. However, much of this argument turns on current expectations about hard and soft law. If people come to expect that soft law will function as a substitute for hard law, then they will endeavor to identify soft public law in the same way they do hard public law. Soft statutes are recorded alongside hard statutes; identifying the content of concurrent resolutions is no easier or harder than identifying the content of hard resolutions.

### 2NC Solves Foreign Perception

#### Solves congressional signal – foreign governments perceive

Posner ‘8 Eric A, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago and Jacob E. Gersen, Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Stanford LR, December

Alternatively, the soft statute might have Condorcetian effects, revealing that members of Congress independently agree or disagree with the President's assessment. Such a resolution might affect the President's own views, but even if it does not, it could affect the views of important others - the American public or foreign governments, for example. Since the President needs the cooperation of these groups, the soft statute influences future presidential decisions. For example, a concurrent resolution introduced in the 104th Congress expressed Congress's opposition to President Clinton's planned deployment of United States ground forces to Bosnia. 124 A proposed Senate resolution in the next session urged the President to facilitate the withdrawal of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards from Bosnia-Herzegovina. 125 The first resolution signaled potential opposition in Congress. The second expressed support for a potential action by the President. Similarly, a proposed concurrent resolution in 2001 expressed "support for the President in using all means at his disposal to encourage the establishment of a democratically elected government in Iraq." 126 Contrast an alternative proposed resolution urging that the United States work through the United Nations to assure Iraq's compliance with existing U.N. resolutions. 127 Each proposed resolution reveals information both about legislative preferences and about the underlying state of the world.

## AT: CP LINKS TO POLITICS

### IT DON’T THO

#### Avoids even perception of presidential involvement

Posner ‘8 Eric A, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago and Jacob E. Gersen, Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Stanford LR, December

A different rule-of-law objection concerns the enactment of law without the consent of the President. If Congress can regulate with soft statutes, then the constitutional requirement of presentment is rendered void and the President's role in producing legislation is eliminated. The procedural formalities of legislation do not just clarify congressional action; they also ensure that Congress does not cut the President out of the picture. Just such a concern lay behind the Supreme Court's rejection of the legislative veto. The analogous concern can be found in the literature on international soft law. If international law obtains its legitimacy from the consent of states, as is often argued, 100 how can international soft law - that is, international law that lacks [\*599] the consent of at least some states - have any legitimacy? 101 We address the constitutional question in Part IV.C. For now, consider two points. First, to the extent that the regulative power of soft law comes from the fact that it anticipates constitutionally valid hard law (with the President's consent, or approved in another constitutionally accepted way), then the concern falls away. Potentially regulated parties will understand that the congressional resolution does not predict the President's action and will place only as much weight on the resolution as it will bear standing alone. The problem, if there is one, arises only when a congressional resolution affects behavior by generating knowledge about states of the world or supplying focal points, and when courts or other legal institutions use soft law as inputs for statutory interpretation, common law development, and other regulatory activities. In these cases, Congress affects behavior without presidential involvement, but importantly not by using constitutionally prohibited mechanisms. Simple and concurrent resolutions have an old pedigree and are explicitly contemplated by the U.S. Constitution, if not for the specific uses at issue here.

#### Only requires simple majority- allows rapid passage

Kelly, 6 (Michael, Major US Army, Judge Advocates General School, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA456565.)

One check has promise if there is broad public 353 backing..Sense of Congress declarations are non-binding, but Congress can pass them rapidly, when in session, by a simple majority vote. Congress can usethese declarations in conjunction with strategies tomarshall public support or its investigatoryfunctions,354 which rapidly focus public attention.Either way, Congress can generate a lot of political pressure on the president.

## Bioterror

### 1nc – bio-terror

#### Risk of bioterrorism is extremely low – several constraints

Keller 13 (3-7, Rebecca – Analyst at Stratfor, Post-Doctoral Fellow at University of Colorado at Boulder, 2013, "Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential," http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)djm

It is important to remember that the risk of biological attack is very low and that, partly because viruses can mutate easily, the potential for natural outbreaks is unpredictable. The key is having the right tools in case of an outbreak, epidemic or pandemic, and these include a plan for containment, open channels of communication, scientific research and knowledge sharing. In most cases involving a potential pathogen, the news can appear far worse than the actual threat. Infectious Disease Propagation Since the beginning of February there have been occurrences of H5N1 (bird flu) in Cambodia, H1N1 (swine flu) in India and a new, or novel, coronavirus (a member of the same virus family as SARS) in the United Kingdom. In the past week, a man from Nepal traveled through several countries and eventually ended up in the United States, where it was discovered he had a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention released a report stating that antibiotic-resistant infections in hospitals are on the rise. In addition, the United States is experiencing a worse-than-normal flu season, bringing more attention to the influenza virus and other infectious diseases. The potential for a disease to spread is measured by its effective reproduction number, or R-value, a numerical score that indicates whether a disease will propagate or die out. When the disease first occurs and no preventive measures are in place, the reproductive potential of the disease is referred to as R0, the basic reproduction rate. The numerical value is the number of cases a single case can cause on average during its infectious period. An R0 above 1 means the disease will likely spread (many influenza viruses have an R0 between 2 and 3, while measles had an R0 value of between 12 and 18), while an R-value of less than 1 indicates a disease will likely die out. Factors contributing to the spread of the disease include the length of time people are contagious, how mobile they are when they are contagious, how the disease spreads (through the air or bodily fluids) and how susceptible the population is. The initial R0, which assumes no inherent immunity, can be decreased through control measures that bring the value either near or below 1, stopping the further spread of the disease. Both the coronavirus family and the influenza virus are RNA viruses, meaning they replicate using only RNA (which can be thought of as a single-stranded version of DNA, the more commonly known double helix containing genetic makeup). The rapid RNA replication used by many viruses is very susceptible to mutations, which are simply errors in the replication process. Some mutations can alter the behavior of a virus, including the severity of infection and how the virus is transmitted. The combination of two different strains of a virus, through a process known as antigenic shift, can result in what is essentially a new virus. Influenza, because it infects multiple species, is the hallmark example of this kind of evolution. Mutations can make the virus unfamiliar to the body's immune system. The lack of established immunity within a population enables a disease to spread more rapidly because the population is less equipped to battle the disease. The trajectory of a mutated virus (or any other infectious disease) can reach three basic levels of magnitude. An outbreak is a small, localized occurrence of a pathogen. An epidemic indicates a more widespread infection that is still regional, while a pandemic indicates that the disease has spread to a global level. Virologists are able to track mutations by deciphering the genetic sequence of new infections. It is this technology that helped scientists to determine last year that a smattering of respiratory infections discovered in the Middle East was actually a novel coronavirus. And it is possible that through a series of mutations a virus like H5N1 could change in such a way to become easily transmitted between humans. Lessons Learned There have been several influenza pandemics throughout history. The 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic is often cited as a worst-case scenario, since it infected between 20 and 40 percent of the world's population, killing roughly 2 percent of those infected. In more recent history, smaller incidents, including an epidemic of the SARS virus in 2003 and what was technically defined as a pandemic of the swine flu (H1N1) in 2009, caused fear of another pandemic like the 1918 occurrence. The spread of these two diseases was contained before reaching catastrophic levels, although the economic impact from fear of the diseases reached beyond the infected areas. Previous pandemics have underscored the importance of preparation, which is essential to effective disease management. The World Health Organization lays out a set of guidelines for pandemic prevention and containment. The general principles of preparedness include stockpiling vaccines, which is done by both the United States and the European Union (although the possibility exists that the vaccines may not be effective against a new virus). In the event of an outbreak, the guidelines call for developed nations to share vaccines with developing nations. Containment strategies beyond vaccines include quarantine of exposed individuals, limited travel and additional screenings at places where the virus could easily spread, such as airports. Further measures include the closing of businesses, schools and borders. Individual measures can also be taken to guard against infection. These involve general hygienic measures -- avoiding mass gatherings, thoroughly washing hands and even wearing masks in specific, high-risk situations. However, airborne viruses such as influenza are still the most difficult to contain because of the method of transmission. Diseases like noroviruses, HIV or cholera are more serious but have to be transmitted by blood, other bodily fluids or fecal matter. The threat of a rapid pandemic is thereby slowed because it is easier to identify potential contaminates and either avoid or sterilize them. Research is another important aspect of overall preparedness. Knowledge gained from studying the viruses and the ready availability of information can be instrumental in tracking diseases. For example, the genomic sequence of the novel coronavirus was made available, helping scientists and doctors in different countries to readily identify the infection in limited cases and implement quarantine procedures as necessary. There have been only 13 documented cases of the novel coronavirus, so much is unknown regarding the disease. Recent cases in the United Kingdom indicate possible human-to-human transmission. Further sharing of information relating to the novel coronavirus can aid in both treatment and containment. Ongoing research into viruses can also help make future vaccines more efficient against possible mutations, though this type of research is not without controversy. A case in point is research on the H5N1 virus. H5N1 first appeared in humans in 1997. Of the more than 600 cases that have appeared since then, more than half have resulted in death. However, the virus is not easily transmitted because it must cross from bird to human. Human-to-human transmission of H5N1 is very rare, with only a few suspected incidents in the known history of the disease. While there is an H5N1 vaccine, it is possible that a new variation of the vaccine would be needed were the virus to mutate into a form that was transmittable between humans. Vaccines can take months or even years to develop, but preliminary research on the virus, before an outbreak, can help speed up development. In December 2011, two separate research labs, one in the United States and one in the Netherlands, sought to publish their research on the H5N1 virus. Over the course of their research, these labs had created mutations in the virus that allowed for airborne transmission between ferrets. These mutations also caused other changes, including a decrease in the virus's lethality and robustness (the ability to survive outside the carrier). Publication of the research was delayed due to concerns that the results could increase the risk of accidental release of the virus by encouraging further research, or that the information could be used by terrorist organizations to conduct a biological attack. Eventually, publication of papers by both labs was allowed. However, the scientific community imposed a voluntary moratorium in order to allow the community and regulatory bodies to determine the best practices moving forward. This voluntary ban was lifted for much of the world on Jan. 24, 2013. On Feb. 21, the National Institutes of Health in the United States issued proposed guidelines for federally funded labs working with H5N1. Once standards are set, decisions will likely be made on a case-by-case basis to allow research to continue. Fear of a pandemic resulting from research on H5N1 continues even after the moratorium was lifted. Opponents of the research cite the possibility that the virus will be accidentally released or intentionally used as a bioweapon, since information in scientific publications would be considered readily available. The Risk-Reward Equation The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact. As far as continued research is concerned, there is a risk-reward equation to consider. The threat of a terrorist attack using biological weapons is very low. And while it is impossible to predict viral outbreaks, it is important to be able to recognize a new strain of virus that could result in an epidemic or even a pandemic, enabling countries to respond more effectively. All of this hinges on the level of preparedness of developed nations and their ability to rapidly exchange information, conduct research and promote individual awareness of the threat.\

## Bio-D/Disease

### 2nc – Sci- Dip

#### Soft power doesn’t solve—increases resentment

Gray 11—Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England [Colin S., April, “HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER: THE UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY,” Published by Strategic Studies Institute]

An inherent and unavoidable problem with a country’s soft power is that it is near certain to be misassessed by the politicians who attempt to govern soft power’s societal owners and carriers. Few thoroughly encultured Americans are likely to undervalue “the American way” in many of its aspects as a potent source of friendly self-co-option abroad. Often, this self-flattering appreciation will be well justified in reality. But as an already existing instrument of American policy, the soft power of ideas and practical example is fraught with the perils of self-delusion. If one adheres to an ideology that is a heady mixture of Christian ethics (“one nation, under God . . .”), democratic principles, and free market orthodoxy, and if one is an American, which is to say if one is a citizen of a somewhat hegemonic world power that undeniably has enjoyed a notably successful historical passage to date, then it is natural to confuse the national ideology with a universal creed. Such confusion is only partial, but nonetheless it is sufficiently damaging as to be a danger to national strategy. Since it is fallacious to assume that American values truly are universal, the domain of high relevance and scope for American soft power to be influential is distinctly limited. If one places major policy weight on the putative value for policy of American soft power, one needs to be acutely alert to the dangers of an under-recognized ethnocentrism born of cultural ignorance. This ignorance breeds an arrogant disdain for evidence of foreigners’ lack of interest in being coopted to join American civilization. The result of such arrogance predictably is political and even military strategic counterreaction. It is a case of good intentions gone bad when they are pursued with indifference toward the local cultural context. Some people have difficulty grasping the unpalatable fact that much of the world is not receptive to any American soft power that attempts to woo it to the side of American interests. Not all rivalries are resolvable by ideas, formulas, or “deals” that seem fair and equitable to us. There are conflicts wherein the struggle is the message, to misquote Marshal MacLuhan, with value in the eyes of local belligerents. Not all local conflicts around the world are amenable to the calming effect of American soft power. True militarists of left and right, secular and religious, find intrinsic value in struggle and warfare, as A. J. Coates has explained all too clearly. The self-fulfilment and self-satisfaction that war generates derive in part from the religious or ideological significance attributed to it and from the resultant sense of participating in some grand design. It may be, however, that the experience of war comes to be prized for its own sake and not just for the great ends that it serves or promotes. For many, the excitement unique to war makes pacific pursuits seem insipid by comparison. This understanding and experience of moral, psychological, and emotional self-fulfillment increase our tolerance for war and threaten its moral regulation. It transforms war from an instrumental into an expressive activity.49 It is foolish to believe that every conflict contains the seeds of its own resolution, merely awaiting suitable watering through co-option by soft power. To be fair, similarly unreasonable faith in the disciplinary value of (American) military force is also to be deplored.

### 2nc - generic

#### Past pandemics prove that disease doesn’t lead to extinction

**Peters and Chrystal ‘03** (Dr. Clarence, Director of Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases @ UT, and Dr. Ronald, Chairman of Genetics Medicine @ Cornell, FDCH Political Transcripts, “U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHRISTOPHER COX (R-CA) HOLDS HEARING ON COUNTERING THE BIOTERRORISM THREAT”, 3-15, L/N)

PETERS: I think we have one example from the movement of **the Conquistadors to the New World**. They **brought measles, smallpox and a variety of other diseases with them. They didn't wipe out the Indians,** but they destroyed their civilization and were instrumental in the Spaniards being able to conquer the New World with relatively few people. I think we have something going on right now with SARS that we don't know exactly what the end of it's going to be, but we already know that Asian economies are suffering tremendously. My prediction is that they will not be able to control it in China. If that's true, then we will be dealing with repeated introductions in this country for the indefinite future so that we may see a change in our way of life where we are taking temperatures in airports, in addition to taking your shoes off and putting them through the X-ray machine. And we may see emergency rooms rebuilt so that if you have a cough you go in one entrance and go into a negative pressure cubicle until your SARS test comes back. So I think that while **wiping out human life is extremely unlikely**, we have unengineered examples of bugs that have made great impacts on civilizations. COX: Dr. Crystal? CRYSTAL: **The natural examples of what you suggested were, as hundreds of years ago, with smallpox and also with the plague. The plague wiped out one-third of the civilization.** We now have treatments for ordinances (ph) like the plague because they were engineered to be resistant. And if they infected a number of people and had the capability of being spread rapidly from individual to individual, it would cause enormous havoc. I agree with the panel -- **I don't think it would wipe out civilization,** but the consequences to our society would be enormous.

### 2nc – no impact - Biod

#### Most species are useless, key ones are protected.

Maier 09 – Env Scholar @ U of St Francis, Don, “What’s So Good About Biodiversity?”, Paper presented to the 6th Annual Joint International Society for Environmental Philosophy/ISEE Conferencehttp://www.environmentalphilosophy.org/ISEEIAEPpapers/2009/Maier.pdf

Once again, there is suspicion of confusion. Some particular species are good for people to eat. Because people need to eat in order to survive, those species might qualify as critically important. Other species have been found to have value for their production of chemicals of pharmacological value. Particular species have yielded these benefits, not biodiversity, not species diversity. Let us overlook this confusion and presume that the position involves something more like the claim that a great diversity of organisms increases the odds that at least some few of them are or will be around that are good to eat, that some few others of them do or will provide good medicines, and that some few others do or will provide good building materials. There remains an apparent assumption that the resource-providing creatures are a random sample of all creatures. This is almost certainly untrue and we return to this matter of fact just below. But putting this objection aside (and alongside the previously noted confusion), this is still a singularly unconvincing defense of the value of species diversity. The fact is that an extraordinarily tiny minority of creatures has benefited humanity as resource, now or previously. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that this circumstance will change in the future. These facts combine with the other that any economic resource competes with other economic demands. As a consequence, from an economic point of view (which includes both resource and "service" value, the topic of Section 5.3 on "Biodiversity as service provider"), there is scarcely ever justification for not letting a species go extinct – even if the effort required is minimal. Certainly, many, if not most of the symbolic creatures – such as Ursus maritimus (polar bear) and Eubalaena spp. (right whales) – fall into this category. When, as in the case of both these creatures, there is, in fact, a significant economic cost to saving them – for polar bears, reversing climate warming, 124 for right whales, slowing down the ships that traverse their thoroughfares – then the mere possibility of a future benefit from their incremental contribution to species diversity is an essentially nil "expected net present value" (to use the standard economic jargon) by comparison. Faith is one among a group of conservation biologists who fails to understand this when pressing for the "option value" of biodiversity as a resource. 125 There is another objection to the resource rationale. Insofar as conserving biodiversity preserves the likelihood of conserving one or more valuable resources in the future, it also preserves the likelihood of conserving creatures that are destructive of resources or otherwise harmful. Disease organisms, "pests", and parasites contribute to biodiversity or at least species diversity at least as much (and possibly much more) than (for example) the trees that provide good building materials. In fact, because parasitism might be the predominant "lifestyle" on the planet (by some estimates, outnumbering free-living species by a factor of four), conserving biodiversity is far more likely to ensure that parasitic creatures continue to be in good supply. 126 Parasites even come with a diversity bonus – namely, the species on which they are parasitic (their hosts). Polyphagous parasites deliver multiple bonuses. 127 Finally, contrary to the random sample assumption, food for people – the most essential of resources for humans – is actually supplied by organisms in a set that is vanishingly small in the total (species) diversity picture, and that for the most part are carefully maintained and managed by humans on farms. The best recent estimates are that there are around 7,000 cultivated crop species of plants. 128 That is only about 2% of the estimated 320,000 kinds of plants on earth. 129 But that percentage is enormous in comparison to the number of livestock species. There are an estimated 7,600 breeds (in the 2006 Global Databank for Farm Animal Genetic Resources of the FAO – the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations) of perhaps 40 species. 130 That is a barely noticeable diversity in the context of over 9 million other animal species. This news should relieve those who worry about the loss of resources from the loss of biodiversity. Apparently, great diversity of species, at least, is not of any great benefit, considered as either actual or potential resource

### 2nc – Food Wars

#### Double bind- either no food scarcity or there are tons of alt causes

**Adeline 13** – food preservation specialist (02/17, “Food Storage: The Solution to Food Shortage,” http://beforeitsnews.com/survival/2013/02/food-storage-the-solution-to-food-shortage-2462712.html)

We humans need food for proper nutrition. In times of crisis, access to a stable food supply is the key to continued survival. In the presence of natural disasters, human conflicts, climate change, and overpopulation, the threat of food shortages and total famine is not as far-fetched as it seems. Preparing long-term food supplies can buffer the effects of these potential catastrophes. The Anatomy of a Catastrophe Many people think that food shortages may be a thing of the past. Thanks to the marvels of modern technology and scientific farming methods, we have a constant and abundant supply of food. It is difficult to imagine how a food shortage can happen – but it is still a possibility. During ancient times, humans hunted and gathered for food. Then a revolution occurred and changed the course of history: we learned how to cultivate the soil, plant crops, and domesticate animals for a stable source of food. Eventually, modern technology has improved farming and fishing techniques, that food production has now become large-scale. People now depend on hard-working farmers and fishermen for their everyday supply of food. But what happens when the harvests are poor? The farmer will keep his produce to feed his own family first – other people are left without food. Such scenario is still possible today because there are man-made disasters and natural calamities that threaten the world’s food supply. For example, a hurricane rages across the country and floods several states. Our access to food is restricted because travel is nearly impossible. To add to that, business establishments like groceries and supermarkets are probably closed down due to the flood as well as a power outage. Some might argue that this is not a real food shortage scenario because the problem is merely logistics: there is food; it is just that we have no access to it. It is true that natural calamities and wars cause a food shortage only temporarily. However, recent studies show that at present, we consume more than we produce. The UN warns that grain reserves are progressively getting lower because of droughts and crop failures in major food producing countries. The famine in Africa may possibly be felt in other parts of the world. This is an emergency situation that requires us to prepare beforehand. We must have a supply of food and water for us to survive.

## Relations

### 2nc – Latin America

#### It’s becoming more peaceful – data proves

**UNDP 13** [United Nations Development Programme, “UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA,” <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/Understanding%20Social%20Conflict%20in%20Latin%20America%202013%20ENG.pdf>]

One of the central findings of this study addresses social inequalities and institutional legitimacy. The data reveal larger numbers of conflicts in countries with broad social inequality and ¶ regimes that have low institutional legitimacy (Figures 4 and 6). The relationship between institutional legitimacy, social gaps, and the radicalization of conflicts is more complex. Conflicts in societies with higher levels of institutional support are less likely to evolve into violent confrontations. The relationship between social inequality and radicalization is not linear. Instead ¶ it is generally U-shaped, as the countries with medium levels of inequality have fewer cases of ¶ violence and confrontation than countries with high or low levels of inequality (Figure 6). This ¶ is due to the different levels of interaction between State, society, and conflict (particularly ¶ the capacity to manage these elements), as well as the political culture and historical experience of each country. The data also reveal that there are no countries that experienced both ¶ high numbers of social conflicts and high levels of radicalization. This is a positive finding for ¶ the region in terms of democracy and development.¶ The relationship between collective action and radicalization is linked principally to the region’s chronic gaps between institutional capacity and social demands, as well as its political ¶ culture of radicalized collective action. Societies with low levels of conflict, strong institutions, ¶ and relatively high levels of radicalism are prevalent in the region. ¶ The data correlating conflict radicalization and number of conflicts (Figure 5) reveal four combinations of the two variables:¶ • Many conflicts and high levels of radicalization: no cases¶ • Many conflicts and low levels of radicalization: Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Argentina, ¶ Peru, Bolivia, Panama, and Guatemala¶ • Few conflicts and high levels of radicalization: Chile, Venezuela and Uruguay¶ • Few conflicts and low levels of radicalization: Colombia, Dominican Republic, Costa ¶ Rica, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Mexico¶ Figure 6. Number of social conflicts per country and percentage of social conflicts involving ¶ violent clashes¶ In general, there is no direct relationship between the number of conflicts and the level of ¶ radicalization where greater numbers of conflicts correlate with higher levels of violence ¶ (Figure 6). This is consistent with the study’s theoretical framework which considers conflict ¶ to be a key element in processes of social change, particularly in democratic contexts. It also ¶ underscores the risks of destabilization and violence that are implicit in processes of conflict ¶ escalation.¶ The data also show that there is a fragmentation of conflicts that employ violent strategies. ¶ This suggests that there is a multiplication of non-institutionalized conflicts. There is also evidence of a proliferation of more dangerous conflicts that threaten governability. Conflicts ¶ over land represent the largest percentage of this class of conflict. Structural issues, socioeconomic conditions, and institutional failures also continue to be strong sources of instability32¶ . ¶ However, in general the data on conflict radicalization suggest that Latin America seems to be ¶ entering a period of greater stability, and that social conflict does not seriously affect governability. Although these struggles represent a small fraction of the total number of conflicts in ¶ the region, in many cases they reach relatively high levels of violence. Institutional conflicts ¶ related to the nonfulfillment of agreements comprised the next most significant group of violent conflicts. The hypothesis is that these conflicts tend to escalate due to a lack of institutional frameworks capable of offering solutions and platforms for negotiation.

### 2NC OAS

#### The OAS fails – credibility is inherently ineffective

AP 6/4 (Associated Press, “John Kerry seeks changes to OAS,” 6/4/13, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/john-kerry-latin-america-oas-changes-92245.html)//SJF

Secretary of State John Kerry is demanding reforms in the 35-nation Organization of American States as he visits Latin America for the first time since taking office. Leading the U.S. delegation in Guatemala to the annual general assembly of the OAS — an organization he has disparaged as ineffective, inefficient and nearly irrelevant — Kerry will try to convince fellow members of the need for major changes in its bureaucracy and a return to its core mission of promoting human rights, democracy and development. Gutierrez dares GOP to vote down bill Bill reduces benefits for lobbyists Rhee's group tripled its budget Balz book: Christie considered 2012 Udall brother 'hiked everywhere' SEIU pushes House on immigration Officials traveling with Kerry said he also would be making the case against legalization of marijuana at the national level, lobbying for the election of the U.S. candidate for a hemispheric human rights panel and trying to improve badly damaged relations with Venezuela. Kerry arrived Tuesday at the Guatemalan mountain resort of Antigua and began his two-day program with a meeting with Guatemala’s president. Drugs, U.S. immigration reform and good governance were to top the agenda in those talks, the two men told reporters. The OAS often is criticized in the United States and Kerry wrote a scathing editorial about its failures and need to reform three years ago while he was the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He then introduced legislation in Congress aimed at requiring significant budget reforms in the organization. Just last year, shortly before he was nominated to be secretary of state, Kerry penned a letter to the OAS permanent council with three other senators bemoaning that the group “has been forfeiting its effectiveness” with a lack of strategic focus and fiscal recklessness. The State Department said Monday that Kerry believed the bloc was an organization of critical importance to the Americas and that his participation in the general assembly was aimed at helping to strengthen it. “The fact that he is going to the OAS and he is spending two days there participating sends a clear signal that he thinks this remains the premier multilateral organization in the hemisphere,” department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said. “In order to assure that the OAS retains that status, it must refocus on its core principles,” she said, stressing democracy, human rights, development and regional security. “Strengthening it is of course part of (Kerry’s) agenda and part of what he’ll be focused on in the next couple of days.” As a senator in 2010, Kerry made similar, though not as subtle, points in an opinion piece he co-wrote with Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), his successor as head of the Foreign Relations Committee. “Sadly, its culture of consensus has often been the breeding ground of the ideas that reflect the lowest common denominator, rather than the highest ambitions of diplomacy and cooperation,” they wrote in The Miami Herald. The pair excoriated the OAS for becoming “a pliable tool of inconsistent political agendas” and suggested that they agreed with critics who called the organization “a grazing pasture for third-string diplomats.” Psaki played down the last comment, saying she “would hardly call the secretary of state a third-string diplomat.” Kerry’s mere presence at the meeting demonstrates his and the Obama administration’s commitment to improving the OAS, she said. In November 2012, Kerry and Menendez, along with Republican Sens. Richard Lugar of Indiana and Marco Rubio of Florida, wrote that OAS finances had become dangerously precarious and that it must reform, pare back superfluous projects or risk losing support from its prime contributor, the United States. The United States has over the past decades found itself at growing odds with numerous Latin and South American members of the OAS. Many of them, like Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador, are led by leftist or populist leaders who have balked at accepting the dominance of the U.S. in the Americas and pursued policies that often run counter to Washington’s wishes. Apart from Cuba, which has been suspended from the OAS for decades, the U.S. has most differences with Venezuela, whose president, Hugo Chavez, reveled in tweaking Washington until his death last year.

#### OAS cred is unsustainable – distrust and rising alternatives

Lee 12 – Senior Production Editor (Brianna, “The Organization of American States,” 4/13/12, http://www.cfr.org/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/organization-american-states/p27945)//SJF

CFR's Shannon K. O'Neil says the OAS's role as a forum for regular, high-level discussions on issues facing the hemisphere is one of its major strengths. Several other analysts have praised the Inter-American Human Rights Commission as a crucial, objective platform for human rights litigation. However, many state leaders and policymakers have also heavily criticized the OAS for its institutional weakness. Christopher Sabatini, senior policy director for the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, says the OAS as a political entity "has declined precipitously in recent years." However, analysts say, since the Democratic Charter was signed, the organization's consensus around democracy promotion has atrophied. One of the OAS's major administrative constraints is its consensus model, which requires a unanimous vote to make many of its decisions. As political ideologies have diversified within the region, this has made it difficult for the OAS to make quick, decisive calls to action. The polarization between American states has also led to one of the OAS's other major shortcomings: its many mandates unrelated to the core mission. In 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the OAS to streamline its processes (VOA) from what she called a "proliferation of mandates," noting that the expansion of mandates without proportional expansion of funding made for an "unsustainable" fiscal future. Election monitoring, one of the OAS's major functions in light of its commitment to democracy, is also restricted by its inability to send election observers without the invitation of state governments. "They can't condemn a country unless that country wants to be condemned," CFR's O'Neil says. Nevertheless, she adds, it has become a norm in many member countries to accept OAS monitors, which she says has been helpful. Within the hemisphere, conflicting views on the OAS's loyalties abound. In the summer 2011 issue of Americas Quarterly, Anthony DePalma sums up the range of mistrust: "Insulza and the OAS itself are widely seen as being bullied by Venezuela (he denies it), as catering to [Venezuelan President] Hugo Chavez's friends in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua (evidence suggests otherwise) and, strangely, still beholden to the U.S., even though Washington seems to have lost interest." Chavez has called the OAS a puppet of the United States; at the same time, in July 2011, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a Republican-sponsored bill to defund the OAS (ForeignPolicy), on the charge that the organization supported anti-democracy regimes in Latin America. Various efforts have been made to create organizations to act as alternatives to the OAS. In 2010, Latin American leaders formed the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), an organization that excludes the United States. Chavez and Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa have expressed the desire for CELAC to eventually supplant the OAS, although Sabatini argues that CELAC is "nothing more than a piece of paper and a dream." Many consider another regional organization, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), to be a useful counterweight to the OAS. UNASUR is regarded by many observers as a means for Brazil to assert its power in the region. O'Neil argues the organization has been able to fulfill some duties that the OAS has been less effective in doing, such as successfully mediating between Ecuador and Colombia during their diplomatic crisis in 2008. Despite the OAS's shortcomings and questions over its continued relevance in the region, there is a strong call to reform the organization rather than eliminate it altogether.

# 1nr

**2nc – earth science module**

**Turns Science**

**Abbey and Lane 05** (George, Senior Fellow in Space Policy – Baker Institute and Neal, Professor of Physics – Rice University, “United States Space Policy: Challenges and Opportunities”, http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications /wp\_aaas\_spacePolicy.pdf)

Though these foreign-born individuals are an integral part of the continued success of the United States in scientific and technological endeavors, export controls inhibit precisely the type of study that attracts these talented individuals and the research collaboration that benefits U.S. science and technology. While not the subject of this paper, the cumbersome and slow visa approval process compounds the problem by making it much less attractive for foreigners to come to the United States to study, attend conferences, or collaborate on research projects. In a survey of 126 institutions released in October of 2004, the Council of Graduate Schools found an 18-percent decrease in admissions of foreign graduate students in the fall of 2004 compared with the fall of 2003. The graduate school council expected actual enrollments of new foreign graduate students to be down by an amount similar to the 18-percent fall in admissions.16 The NSB identifies three possible outcomes of these trends in the growth and composition of the S&E workforce: “The number of jobs in the U.S. economy that require science and engineering training will grow; the number of U.S. citizens prepared for those jobs will, at best, be level; and the availability of people from other countries who have science and engineering training will decline, either because of visa restrictions or because of intense global competition for people with these skills.”17 The NSB report also notes that actions taken today to alter trends in the U.S. S&E workforce may require 10 to 20 years to take effect. “The students entering the science and engineering workforce in 2004 with advanced degrees decided to take the necessary math courses to enable this career path when they were in middle school, up to 14 years ago. The students making that same decision in middle school today won’t complete advanced training for science and engineering occupations until 2018 or 2020. If action is not taken now to change these trends, we could reach 2020 and find that the ability of U.S. research and education institutions to regenerate has been damaged and that their preeminence has been lost to other areas of the world.”18 Comparison between the U.S. and other industrial nations, as shown in Table 2, clearly illustrates this critical national problem. Concurrent with these educational challenges, the United States faces daunting demographic shifts. The American workforce is aging; over the past 20 years the prime-age (25–56) workforce grew 44 percent, but it will have zero growth over the next twenty years.19 In addition, the increase in the share of workers with post–high school education grew 19 percent during the last twenty years and is projected to grow only 4 percent over the next twenty years. These statistics, when compared to numbers from the NSB’s Science and Engineering Indicators 2004, raise concern about future S&E needs. The report notes that the number of jobs requiring S&E skills in the U.S. labor force is growing almost 5 percent per year. By comparison, the rest of the labor force is growing at just over 1 percent. Before September 11, 2001, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) projected that S&E occupations would increase at three times the rate of all occupations. The rise projected by the BLS was 2.2 million, representing a 47-percent increase in the number of S&E jobs by 2010. The rates of increase between 1980 and 2000 ranged from 18 percent for the life sciences to 123 percent for jobs in math and computer science.20 The average age of the S&E workforce is rising. Many of those who entered the expanding S&E workforce in the 1960s and 1970s (the baby boom generation) are expected to retire in the next 20 years. The children of that generation are not choosing careers in S&E in the same numbers as their parents. During the 1950s and 60s, the U.S. government invested heavily in research and development (R&D). Government research laboratories and agencies conducted a substantial amount of in-house research. This led to the creation of a workforce with significant technical and management capabilities. The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics had outstanding technical skills and potential. The Army Ballistic Missile Agency, formed with Werner Von Braun and his team of scientists and engineers, was equally well qualified. These two groups formed the nucleus of NASA. Within the contractor community, there was a highly qualified workforce that had conducted aeronautical research from the end of World War II through the 1960s. They pushed the limits of aeronautical research with their aircraft and research vehicles and arrived at the edge of space with the X-15. NASA grew to approximately 36,000 employees during the 1960s. That organization today employs approximately 18,000 people. Over the past few years, the aerospace industry has been unable to develop the experienced workforce that they had during the 1960s due to consolidations and the absence of new programs. These are important factors in assessing whether the skill base exists to implement a major new space program. [CONTINUES] One of the most important questions plaguing the current NASA Plan is the degree to which other nations will be invited to join the United States as true partners and to participate in the early planning stages of future human exploration missions. President Bush, in his speech of January 14, 2004, appeared to invite other nations to share the challenges and opportunities of his vision and the new era of discovery. However, NASA leadership subsequently contradicted that promise when then-NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe stated that the new space initiative was “very much going to be a U.S. led endeavor. That’s our intent. And, again, much of what we had been directed and what the President envisions we do is to achieve this set of American, U.S. exploration objectives.”23 This is not an invitation to partnership. Partnership, of course, does not exclude national objectives, but it does require a sharing of vision, objectives, and commitments, at the earliest stages of planning. Otherwise, the United States cannot expect other nations to participate enthusiastically and to provide the necessary staffing and funding. Based on the authors’ conversations, it is clear that scientists, engineers, and policy makers around the world perceive that the United States has no interest in bringing other nations into the planning process, though it expects them to take on the operation of the space station and to provide assistance for other U.S.-led space efforts when asked. Given the present limited U.S. capability to undertake a major program such as returning humans to the Moon and sending them, eventually, to Mars, it is clear that international cooperation is necessary for these missions. Furthermore, even if the United States had all the necessary resources, why would it make sense to go it alone in the scientific and human exploration of space? For international cooperation to be a realistic possibility the United States will have to take a very different approach to prospective partnerships, in tone and in substance. Whatever path the United States chooses to follow with its policies, America does not have a future in space—human exploration, space science, or commercial space activities—without considerable international cooperation. The degree of cooperation that will be necessary will not be possible under current export control and other restrictive policies. The International Space Station and the Space Shuttle programs, as well as many of the most successful robotic science missions, were accomplished with considerable international involvement and the free exchange of data and technical information. Neither of these programs could have been successful under any other conditions. The creation of complex systems, which operate in an integrated fashion in order to support human life in a hostile environment, requires an international partnership, with open discussions and sharing of information and technology. As important a role as these matters play in discouraging cooperation with the United States in space, the issue most threatening to cooperation may well be a growing international perception that the United States intends to control space militarily. Although it is not the subject of this paper, military space policy is a matter of profound importance to the future of U.S. civilian space programs and the space programs of other nations.24 In recent years, the United States has accelerated its efforts to put in place a primitive missile-defense system. The decision was made apparently without any international consultation and before adequate R&D and testing had shown the feasibility of such a system. This action suggested that the United States is impatient to signal to the rest of the world that it intends to treat space differently in the future than it has in the past. Many members of Congress who have been advocating for a missile-defense system for several decades heartily endorsed the decision. Powerful industrial interests are also at stake. Missile defense is only one aspect of the increased military use of space. “The Report of the Commission to Assess the United States National Security Space Management and Organization,” published in 2001, identifies the importance of space to national security and outlines a series of recommendations for the future of military space activities.25 The report proposes, among other things, that the military vigorously pursue capabilities that would enable the President to deploy weapons in space “to deter threats to and, if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests.”26 This proposal represents a departure from President Kennedy’s vision of 1962, when he vowed, “We shall not see space filled with weapons of mass destruction but with instruments of knowledge and understanding.”27 Placing offensive weapons in space would be a cause for alarm throughout the world and, in the context of the issues addressed in this paper, would create a major obstacle to international cooperation in space. American companies could expect an even more restrictive U.S. export control policy. Such restrictions could further damage commercial space activities and preclude the willingness of other nations to join U.S.-led programs for both human and robotic space science and exploration missions. The placement of weapons in space would reinforce in the world community the feeling that the United States increasingly is basing its foreign policy on unilateral initiatives. As such, it would severely impact the progress that has been made over the last fifty years towards multilateral international cooperation. RECOMMENDATIONS The four barriers to progress in the U.S. space program described in this paper need not remain obstacles to future U.S. efforts in space commerce, science and technology, and human exploration. However, in order to remove them, the United States will need to reassess current space policy and, where necessary, make corrections. The world has changed in fundamental ways in the forty years since President Kennedy challenged the American people to take humans to the Moon and return them safely to Earth. The fear of the Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union, has been replaced by a very different, largely decentralized, fear of terrorism. The response of the U.S. government to 9/11 has been to take visible measures to improve the personal safety of American citizens. Some of those measures are placing unintended barriers in the way of progress for the U.S. space program. There is no question that the United States must, as its highest priority, protect its citizens from attacks by terrorists and other hostile forces. However, this can and should be accomplished in a manner that does not damage other national interests. Get Knowledge In and Peaceful Technologies Out The United States should base its export control and visa policies on reason and common sense. Clearly, the government must identify and protect critical technologies, but policies should recognize that the strength of U.S. industry depends on its ability to compete effectively in the world market. This requires exporting goods and cooperating with other countries when doing so is beneficial to American companies. Just as clearly, the United States should prevent individuals who intend to do harm from entering the country; however, the government should put in place a rational and efficient process for making that determination. The future vitality of the U.S. aerospace industry in the increasingly competitive world market and the ability of the United States to undertake major cooperative space-science and human-exploration endeavors, as suggested by the President, depend on the revision of American export controls and other overly restrictive policies. The international community believes that U.S. rules currently display arrogance and a mistaken assumption that the development of advanced technologies is unique to the United States. That the United States is alone in its level of technological development clearly is not the case, nor has it been for some time. The United States must protect its citizens and prevent the proliferation of potentially dangerous technologies. However, restrictions on U.S. products are ineffective, even counterproductive, when substitutes for regulated products exist on the world market. In this situation, embargos and regulations serve no purpose. The United States should identify satellite technologies and processes that are unique and vital to national security interests, hence appropriate for licensing by the State Department under ITAR. All other exports of satellites and satellite components and technologies should be licensed by the Commerce Department. If rational steps are taken to review and modify the U.S. policy on export controls, not only will satellite and related industries be better positioned to compete in the world space market, but such actions might also foster U.S. cooperation with other nations in space activities. As the United States prepares for future space science and human exploration, possibly with an expanded role for industry, as outlined in “A Journey to Innovate, Inspire, and Discover,” the report of the President’s Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy, the best route will be through strong international cooperation, where collaborators share the costs as well as the benefits.28 While the commission did not address export controls, a serious weakness of their report, it is clear that present export control policies should be changed.

### 2nc – tech innovation module

#### Turn tech leadership

Bush and McLarty 09 (Jeb, Former Governor – Florida and Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates, et al., “U.S. Immigration Policy”, CFR Independent Task Force Report, 63, July, http://www.cfr.org/publication/20030/ us\_immigration\_policy.html)

Immigrants are especially important in science, technology, and engineering, which are so critical to U.S. economic competitiveness. Foreign students and immigrants make up more than half the scientific researchers in the United States; in 2006, they received 40 percent of science and engineering PhDs and 65 percent of computer science doctorates. Among postdoctoral students doing research at the highest levels, 60 percent are foreign born. This is not a recent development; even in the 1980s, some 40 percent of engineering and computer science students in the United States came from abroad. On one significant measure of innovation, the number of patents issued each year, the United States far surpasses any country in the world; immigrants produce nearly 25 percent of those patents, or roughly twice their share of the U.S. population.30 Other studies have shown that an increase in the number of foreign graduate students in the United States results in significant increases in the number of patent applications.31 Overall, the share of all patents awarded to U.S. scientists of Chinese and Indian origin grew from just 4 percent in the late 1970s to 14 percent in the early part of this decade; at Intel, the world’s largest semiconductor maker, 40 percent of the patents are for work done by Chinese or Indian immigrants. Just as important, this increased innovation by recent immigrants actually coincided with an increase in the number of patents awarded to native-born scientists as well, indicating that American-born and immigrant scientists are feeding off each other to enhance the country’s overall innovative capacity.32 One in four engineering and technology companies established in the United States between 1995 and 2005 had an immigrant founder.33 The four countries that create the greatest number of new companies per capita—the United States, Canada, Australia, and Israel—all have large immigrant populations.34 It is not an overstatement to say that the United States would not enjoy anything close to its current technological and entrepreneurial leadership if it had maintained a closed immigration policy. Amy Chua, the Yale historian and legal scholar, argues in her recent book, *Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance—and Why They Fall*, that the successful great powers in history have been those able to attract and make use of the most talented people the world has to offer. “At any given historical moment,” she writes, “the most valuable human capital the world has to offer—whether in the form of intelligence, physical strength, skill, knowledge, creativity, networks, commercial innovation, or technological invention—is never to be found in any one locale or with any one ethnic or religious group. To pull away from its rivals on a global scale, a society must pull into itself and motivate the world’s best and brightest, regardless of ethnicity, religion or background.” America, she argues, has been more successful than any other country in the world in recent history in attracting and mobilizing such talents. The Task Force believes that maintaining robust levels of immigration, allowing for fluctuations based on the state of the economy, is firmly in America’s national interests. In particular, continuing to attract highly skilled immigrants is critical to the competitiveness of the U.S. economy, and to America’s ability to remain the world’s leader in innovation. The United States must open its doors more widely to such people.

### Pass – Momentum From Shutdown

#### Victory From the Shutdown Means Obama Has the Momentum to Pass CIR

McMorris, 10/15/13(Evan McMorris, “Obama Has Already Won The Shutdown Fight And He’s Coming For Immigration Next”, http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/obama-has-already-won-the-shutdown-fight-and-hes-coming-for)//Holmes

WASHINGTON — As the fiscal fight roiling Washington nears its end, the White House is already signaling that it plans to use the political momentum it has gained during the shutdown fight to charge back into the immigration debate. And this time, Democratic pollsters and advocates say, they could actually win. The final chapter of the current crisis hasn’t been written yet, but Democrats in Washington are privately confident that they’ll emerge with the upper hand over the conservatives in Congress who forced a government shutdown. And sources say the administration plans to use its victory to resurrect an issue that was always intended to be a top priority of Obama’s second-term agenda. Advocates argue the post-fiscal crisis political reality could thaw debate on the issue in the House, which froze in earlier this year after the Senate passed a bipartisan immigration bill that was led by Republican Sen. Marco Rubio and Democratic Sen. Chuck Schumer. “It’s at least possible with sinking poll numbers for the Republicans, with a [GOP] brand that is badly damaged as the party that can’t govern responsibly and is reckless that they’re going to say, ‘All right, what can we do that will be in our political interest and also do tough things?’” said Frank Sharry, executive director of the immigration reform group America’s Voice. “That’s where immigration could fill the bill.” The White House and Democrats are “ready” to jump back into the immigration fray when the fiscal crises ends, Sharry said. And advocates are already drawing up their plans to put immigration back on the agenda — plans they’ll likely initiate the morning after a fiscal deal is struck. “We’re talking about it. We want to be next up and we’re going to position ourselves that way,” Sharry said. “There are different people doing different things, and our movement will be increasingly confrontational with Republicans, including civil disobedience. A lot of people are going to say, ‘We’re not going to wait.’” The White House isn’t ready to talk about the world after the debt limit fight yet, but officials have signaled strongly they want to put immigration back on the agenda.

#### Obama using PC on CIR now and fiscal fights provide impetus for the GOP to compromise

Hartmann, 10/16/13, writer @ New Yorker(Margaret Hartmann, “Obama Is Over the Shutdown, Wants to Tackle Immigration Reform”, http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/10/obama-plans-for-immigration-reform-post-shutdown.html)//Holmes

Shortly after John Boehner's last-ditch effort to end the shutdown and raise the debt ceiling ended in a humiliating defeat on Tuesday, reports emerged that President Obama was already plotting out his next move, saying of the fiscal crisis, "Once that’s done, you know, the day after – I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform." While Democrats appear to have the upper hand, that still seemed a bit presumptuous. Things ended on Tuesday night with sources reporting that Harry Reid and Mitch McConnell are finalizing a deal, but the nation is still careening toward default. The full transcript of Obama's interview reveals that he actually made the comments earlier in the day, and was bashing House Republicans for starting a "crisis that was unnecessary," then throwing a "little bit of a wrench" in the Senate's effort to get us out of it. But yes, Obama does sound anxious to start talking about immigration again. Obama brought up immigration in an interview with KMEX, L.A.'s Univision affiliate, while rattling off a list of things Congress should be focusing on instead of engaging in childish brinksmanship, such as infrastructure, jobs, and raising the minimum wage. "We shouldn't be inflicting damage on the economy simply because one side doesn't get its way," he said. When asked about immigration reform specifically, Obama said it's not "just a Latino issue," but "an American issue." He explained: We know our economy will grow faster if immigration reform passes. We know businesses will do better if immigration reform passes. We know that deficits will be reduced if immigration reform passes; because people coming out of the shadows, paying more taxes growing, the growth accelerating, all that brings down the deficit, so it's important for everybody. Some advocates say passing immigration reform may actually be easier in the wake of the shutdown. "It’s at least possible with sinking poll numbers for the Republicans, with a [GOP] brand that is badly damaged as the party that can’t govern responsibly and is reckless that they’re going to say, 'Alright, what can we do that will be in our political interest and also do tough things?'" Frank Sharry, executive director of the immigration reform group America’s Voice, told BuzzFeed.

e expectancy. This is not a guarantee of living forever, but it does mean that the sands of time will start pouring in rather than only pouring out. What's more, this exponential progression of information technology will affect our prosperity as well. The World Bank has reported, for example, that poverty in Asia has been cut in half over the past decade due to information technologies and that at current rates it will be cut by another 90 percent over the next decade. That phenomenon will spread around the globe.

**Cuba (Anti Castro) Lobby Links\***

**plan costs PC and angers most powerful lobby - cuba policy requires Obama push and he gets blame anyway –**

**Stieglitz, 11**

Matthew, Law Clerk at Vladeck, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard, P.C, Judicial Intern at United States District Court, Masters @ Cornell University, http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/Fellows2011/Stieglitz-\_Final\_Paper.pdf

CONCLUSION President Barack Obama’s election came with a variety of campaign promises, including addressing the US-Cuba embargo. However, after two years in office, normalized relations with Cuba have yet to materialize. **Recent developments have pushed legislators to review** the continued existence of the embargo**, but the history of the US presidency and the blockade seems to dictate that the American presidency will ultimately be what causes any policy change.** Thus, how and when will the embargo end? Clearly, **American presidents have been directly tied to foreign policy towards Cuba.** However, this does not provide clarity to what the future holds for diplomatic relations with the island. **Progressive policies and actions** in both nations in recent months seem to offer hope of change, yet such a scenario **remains elusive**. During the embargo’s existence, **Cuban-Americans have maintained an active voice against the Castro regime. The community’s leaders have met with and advised multiple US presidents on Cuba, gained immense political clout** in Miami, **and** have **formed one of the most dominant ethnic lobbies in Washington**. **The result has been a hardline stance on Cuba that progressive Cuban-Americans have failed to overcome.** **While the community’s younger generation, as well as recent arrivals** from Cuba, **prefers** a policy of **engagement, normalized relations do not seem feasible at this point in time.** The recent **election victory of House Republicans, combined with the political riskiness of addressing** the US-**Cuba** embargo prior to the 2012 presidential election**, make it highly unlikely** President **Obama will address Cuba** during his first term as president. Nevertheless, his administration has more than enough tools at their disposal to begin moving the Cuba dialogue forward, even if the Executive Office is compromised in its ability to end the embargo.

**Turns not salient – Cuba lacks enough market size or national security importance**

**LeoGrande, 12**

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

Latin America Weighs In

Since the end of the cold war, **Cuba simply hasn't been very important to U.S. national**

**security or foreign relations.** Without its Soviet patron, **Cuba poses no threat to the U**nited **S**tates,

**and with just 11 million people, Cuba (unlike China or even Vietnam) doesn't offer much of a**

**market for U.S. exports. Nothing compels a president to re-examine policy toward Cuba, even**

**though that policy** has been an abject failure for decades-- **which is why relations with Cuba**

**became a domestic political issue driven by the Cuba Lobby, rather than a foreign policy issue.**

### 2nc – at: Dickinson/Ideology

#### Their ev is just a blog post, not peer reviewed and solely in the context of Supreme court nominations – Dickinson concludes neg

Dickinson, 2009 (Matthew, professor of political science at Middlebury College. He taught previously at Harvard University, where he also received his Ph.D., working under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, We All Want a Revolution: Neustadt, New Institutionalism, and the Future of Presidency Research, Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 no4 736-70 D 2009)

Small wonder, then, that initial efforts to find evidence of presidential power centered on explaining legislative outcomes in Congress. Because scholars found it difficult to directly and systematically measure presidential influence or "skill," however, they often tried to estimate it indirectly, after first establishing a baseline model that explained these outcomes on other factors, including party strength in Congress, members of Congress's ideology, the president's electoral support and/or popular approval, and various control variables related to time in office and political and economic context. With the baseline established, one could then presumably see how much of the unexplained variance might be attributed to presidents, and whether individual presidents did better or worse than the model predicted. Despite differences in modeling assumptions and measurements, however, these studies came to remarkably similar conclusions: individual presidents did not seem to matter very much in explaining legislators' voting behavior or lawmaking outcomes (but see Lockerbie and Borrelli 1989, 97-106). As Richard Fleisher, Jon Bond, and B. Dan Wood summarized, "[S]tudies that compare presidential success to some baseline fail to find evidence that perceptions of skill have systematic effects" (2008, 197; see also Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 1996, 127; Edwards 1989, 212). To some scholars, these results indicate that Neustadt's "president-centered" perspective is incorrect (Bond and Fleisher 1990, 221-23). In fact, the aggregate results reinforce Neustadt's recurring refrain that presidents are weak and that, when dealing with Congress, a president's power is "comparably limited" (Neustadt 1990, 184). The misinterpretation of the findings as they relate to PP stems in part from scholars' difficulty in defining and operationalizing presidential influence (Cameron 2000b; Dietz 2002, 105-6; Edwards 2000, 12; Shull and Shaw 1999). But it is also that case that scholars often misconstrue Neustadt's analytic perspective; his description of what presidents must do to influence policy making does not mean that he believes presidents are the dominant influence on that process. Neustadt writes from the president's perspective, but without adopting a president-centered explanation of power. Nonetheless, if Neustadt clearly recognizes that a president's influence in Congress is exercised mostly, as George Edwards (1989) puts it, "at the margins," his case studies in PP also suggest that, within this limited bound, presidents do strive to influence legislative outcomes. But how? Scholars often argue that a president's most direct means of influence is to directly lobby certain members of Congress, often through quid pro quo exchanges, at critical junctures during the lawmaking sequence. Spatial models of legislative voting suggest that these lobbying efforts are most effective when presidents target the median, veto, and filibuster "pivots" within Congress. This logic finds empirical support in vote-switching studies that indicate that presidents do direct lobbying efforts at these pivotal voters, and with positive legislative results. Keith Krehbiel analyzes successive votes by legislators in the context of a presidential veto and finds "modest support for the sometimes doubted stylized fact of presidential power as persuasion" (1998,153-54). Similarly, David Brady and Craig Volden look at vote switching by members of Congress in successive Congresses on nearly identical legislation and also conclude that presidents do influence the votes of at least some legislators (1998, 125-36). In his study of presidential lobbying on key votes on important domestic legislation during the 83rd (1953-54) through 108th (2003-04) Congresses, Matthew Beckman shows that in addition to these pivotal voters, presidents also lobby leaders in both congressional parties in order to control what legislative alternatives make it onto the congressional agenda (more on this later). These lobbying efforts are correlated with a greater likelihood that a president's legislative preferences will come to a vote (Beckmann 2008, n.d.). In one of the most concerted efforts to model how bargaining takes place at the individual level, Terry Sullivan examines presidential archives containing administrative headcounts to identify instances in which members of Congress switched positions during legislative debate, from initially opposing the president to supporting him in the final roll call (Sullivan 1988,1990,1991). Sullivan shows that in a bargaining game with incomplete information regarding the preferences of the president and members of Congress, there are a number of possible bargaining outcomes for a given distribution of legislative and presidential policy preferences. These outcomes depend in part on legislators' success in bartering their potential support for the president's policy for additional concessions from the president. In threatening to withhold support, however, members of Congress run the risk that the president will call their bluff and turn elsewhere for the necessary votes. By capitalizing on members' uncertainty regarding whether their support is necessary to form a winning coalition, Sullivan theorizes that presidents can reduce members of Congress's penchant for strategic bluffing and increase the likelihood of a legislative outcome closer to the president's preference. "Hence, the skill to bargain successfully becomes a foundation for presidential power even within the context of electorally determined opportunities," Sullivan concludes (1991, 1188). Most of these studies infer presidential influence, rather than measuring it directly (Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 1996,128-29; see also Edwards 1991). Interestingly, however, although the vote "buying" approach is certainly consistent with Neustadt's bargaining model, none of his case studies in PP show presidents employing this tactic. The reason may be that Neustadt concentrates his analysis on the strategic level: "Strategically the question is not how he masters Congress in a peculiar instance, but what he does to boost his mastery in any instance" (Neustadt 1990, 4). For Neustadt, whether a president's lobbying efforts bear fruit in any particular circumstance depends in large part on the broader pattern created by a president's prior actions when dealing with members of Congress (and "Washingtonians" more generally). These previous interactions determine a president's professional reputation--the "residual impressions of [a president's] tenacity and skill" that accumulate in Washingtonians' minds, helping to "heighten or diminish" a president's bargaining advantages. "Reputation, of itself, does not persuade, but it can make persuasions easier, or harder, or impossible" (Neustadt 1990, 54).

### 2nc – at: Hirsch

#### PC’s real, observable, and quantifiable---scholarly work proves---and you should reject quibbles like Hirsh

Kimberly L. Casey 8, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at William Jewel College, 2008, “Defining Political Capital: A Reconsideration of Bourdieu’s Interconvertibility Theory,” http://lilt.ilstu.edu/critique/spring%202008/casey.pdf

Abstract: This article examines the concept “political capital” (PC) and its context in American politics. Political capital is ill-defined, little understood, yet an important concept for understanding political exchange and relationships in the political arena. I establish a definition based upon Pierre Bourdieu’s interconvertibility theory, which indicates that capital types, such as economic, social, and symbolic forms, interact and can be exchanged for one another. Since the material and non-material components of capital variations are transposable, it can be argued that no capital form is essentially “pure”—every type of capital contains elements of other varieties. Political capital, therefore, is an amalgamation of capital types combined in various ways for specific political markets. It is market demand that shapes capital formation. Capital elements from other capital types inherent in the candidacy market are identified as an example. An index for measuring this variant of political capital is created, demonstrating its conceptual viability. ¶ Introduction: After the 2004 U.S. presidential election, George W. Bush publicized his intent to utilize “political capital” for future projects garnered as a result of his victory. But what exactly is political capital? However much the term is bandied about by politicians or the press, political capital has no established definition in political science literature. Although it remains ill-defined and unmeasured, it is an important concept for understanding political exchange and relationships in the political arena despite the reservations some political scientists have expressed about its applicability because of its complex material and nonmaterial associations. An analysis of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s interconvertibility theory allows for conceptualization of material and non-material of interactions among capital forms making it possible to define political capital and design an index to measure it based upon previous capital literature.¶ To develop an empirical basis for political capital, this article first examines the associations it connotes in the popular press today. In contrast, a definition of political capital based upon capitalization literature and Bourdieu’s interconvertibility theory is presented. Then, a theory of political capital functions and markets are suggested. Theorizing leads to proposals for objective means of identification and measurement. To illustrate the market association between capital and politics, an index associated with the resources associated with the candidacy market is offered. The paper concludes with directions that studying the concept of political capital may take towards theory-building and framework creation.¶ Defining Political Capital ¶ It is erroneous to refer a “body” of PC literature when seeking a definition. Most writers and concerned actors who invoke the term political capital assume that its meaning is understood. It is inferred to be an entity which political actors possess, build up and spend. 1 However, a definition of “political capital” is typically never stated—the reader or observer is left to determine their own definition based upon the politician’s or journalist’s usage of the term (Suellentrop 2004; Kennicott 2004; “A Year of Setbacks” 2005; and Froomkin 2004). The subjectivity is not reflective of what political capital conceptually means in and to the political arena. Without a sound definition that accurately portrays the elements of political capital as it works within a political marketplaces, such as the electoral arena, and among office holders (executive, legislative, and judicial), bureaucracy, and in society in general, the concept is meaningless. ¶ Defining and utilizing PC as a viable political variable can evolve from the proliferation of capital theories in various fields of study. Political capital can and should be associated with a wide variety of previous “capital” interpretations. The key to explicating political capital is within capital literatures and how they address materialism, non-materialism, and combining the two elements.2¶ The theory of capital is traditionally associated with economics. There is no clear consensus in defining capital as an ideological function applicable beyond material exchange as expounded in economic capital theory, however. Yet nonmaterial forms of capital are well established in scholarly literature. Most of the “capital type” definitions hover around the meaning and terminology of economic capital. Certain theorists believe that all capital forms, regardless of their composition or purpose, connect in some way with economic capital. 3 Pierre Bourdieu’s work is invaluable in understanding capital as conceptually distinguishable from its individual aberrations as a material phenomenon. Bourdieu extends the ideas and metaphor of economic interest (material or physical pursuits) to include non-economic goods and services (symbolic or nonmaterial pursuits). Within this conceptualization, Bourdieu constructs a science of practices that “analyzed all human functions as ‘oriented towards the maximization of material or symbolic profit.’” 4 His theory of capital has limitations, however. He relies on ideal types and lacks the empirical research needed to support much theory. It is impossible to refer to capital-types and not acknowledge Bourdieu’s contributions to multiple capital species (Bourdieu1986; Kane 2001; Putnam 2001; Becker 1993); Fitz-Enz 2000; Davenport 1999; Marr 2005).

### 2nc – homegrown terror module

#### **Immigration reform helps reduce the threat of domestic terrorism**

Price 08, David Price, North Carolina Representative, Chairman of Homeland Security Appropriations sub-committee, “Price Delivers Major Speech On Homeland Security,” 23 June 2008, <http://price.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2723&Itemid=100260>

"Today I will suggest five principal homeland security priorities on which I would advise the next administration to focus. The first is comprehensive immigration reform. This might, at first glance, seem an odd choice as a top priority for the Department of Homeland Security, which – after all – was formed in response to the terrorist threat. But the historic missions of the departmental components did not go away when the Department was formed, and subsuming them under the rubric of combating terrorism is apt to confuse as much as it clarifies. Homeland Security encompasses critical areas of national policy that would demand attention even if 9/11 had not occurred. Immigration, I believe, leads that list. "That is not to say that immigration policy is unrelated to terrorism; control of our borders and knowing who has entered our country – legally or illegally – are directly related to our defense against terrorist threats. Moreover, the intense focus on the broader illegal immigration problem – consisting primarily of an effort to intercept, detain, and deport individuals who illegally cross our borders in search of work and a better life – is distracting the Department's attention and diverting the Department's resources away from the truly dangerous threats and challenges we face. "I want to be clear on that point. The illegal presence of foreign nationals in the United States is a problem, and calls into question our commitment to the integrity of our immigration laws. But we need to put that problem into perspective on two counts: First, the integrity of our immigration laws is compromised primarily by the fact that those laws are grossly unrealistic in relation to our labor market demands. And second, there can be no credible argument that deporting illegal workers should take precedence over efforts to combat smuggling, prevent terrorism, and deport criminal aliens

#### Nuclear war

Hellman 08—professor emeritus of electrical engineering at Stanford University. PhD from Stanford. (Martin, The Odds for Nuclear Armageddon, Spring 2008, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf, AMiles)

The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce whichever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan).