# 1nc

## ASPEC

## New Affs Bad

## Security (blue)

#### **The affirmatives paranoid securitized approaches to politics result in a drive for certainty that can never be reconciled - orthodox IR’s atomistic approach to global problems makes extinction inevitable and descionmaking impossible**

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3. From securitisation to militarisation 3.1 Complicity

This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of 'scarcity' in response to ecological, energy and economic crises (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-specific socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises (historical sociology and historical materialism). Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics. Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale - in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox's words, because positivist IR theory 'does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it'.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason -thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises. By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military-political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to 'securitise' them - and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity. 'Securitisation' refers to a 'speech act' - an act of labelling - whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of 'security', therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper 'dual' structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military-police measures in purported response to an existential danger. The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating 'new security challenges', and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the 'surface' of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to 'new security challenges' such as 'low-intensity' intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such 'new security challenges' are non-military in origin - whether their referents are states or individuals - the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military-political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state's adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations - rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism. Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential 'threat-multipliers' of traditional security issues such as 'political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens'. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources. The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a 'stress-multiplier' that will 'exacerbate tensions' and 'complicate American foreign policy'; while the EU perceives it as a 'threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability'.95 In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this 'securitisation' of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conflict up to 2050. It warns of 'resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies', particularly due to a projected 'youth bulge' in the South, which 'will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy'. This will prompt a 'return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets'. Finally, climate change will 'compound' these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘The implications for future conflict are ominous.’97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.’98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: ‘The world’s middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.’99 Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how secur-itisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarization against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous 'outsiders\*. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new "outsider\* identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of 'Otherisation'. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying 'discursive complex", where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on 'the construction of stark boundaries\* that 'operate to exclude and include\*. Yet these exclusionary discourses are 'intimately bound up with political and economic processes', such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of 'maintaining American hegemony\* by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100 But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests — exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military-political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of 'othering\* in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously 'included\* groups become 'ideologically recast' and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines — eventually legitimising their annihilation.102 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and 'Otherised' in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of 'inclusion\*, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.1 3 This recalls Lemkin's recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project - or colonial project — designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable. Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new 'outsider' group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105 This does not imply that the securitisation of global crises by Western defence agencies is genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the breakdown of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed 'outsider' group vindicating various forms of violence.

#### This permanent state of emergency transforms the state into an apparatus of death—creates a state of exception.

Davis ’12 – contributed essays to race and class, contributor to Confronting Capitalism: Dispatches from a Global Movement (James, At War with the Future: Catastrophism and the Right, “Catastrophism: The Apocalyptic Politics of Collapse and Rebirth”, PM Press, p. 100)

The catastrophist right frequently opens political terrain on the far right that the state can exploit. By framing questions like immigration as catastrophic problems, the state is able to respond with harsh and previously off-limits policies. Anti-immigrant sentiment is promoted throughout the European and American center-right, and in both places border "protection" and surveillance are expanding fiefdoms of the security state. Border Patrol is one of the largest law enforcement agencies in the United States. In the EU, or rather outside it, immigrant detention is outsourced to locations beyond the fortress walls, and beyond the news. Political attacks on multiculturalism from the center-right in Europe are in response to a resurgent and increasingly dynamic far right putting these "problems" onto the table. Since the 1980s, the social democratic and liberal left in Europe and the United States has embraced neoliberalism. It has actively promoted the global expansion of capital and deregula-tion while attacking the organized working class. But the center-left must also pay homage to ideas of justice and equality, most often directly at odds with their concrete economic policies, or fear a loss of support to competitors further to the left. While extreme right formations have pulled mainstream conservative parties further to the right, the left is also vulnerable to right-wing agitation on questions where the left has traditionally been strong, but is more recently contradicted. Increasingly, these contradictions between economic liberalization and social or economic justice cannot be avoided by center-left parties and this vulnerability provides an opportunity for the right to fragment and disorient the left. In part, for the mainstream right, immigrant scapegoating, along with attacks on multiculturalism and on the economic position of the working class, is an electoral strategy that puts the left and social democratic opposition on the defensive. In periods of economic decline and insecurity, fear generated around these cultural and social issues helps to obscure coherent critiques of economic life. Reproduced as state catastrophism they help to reinforce this fragmentation of the left. Fear is the bedfellow of right-wing catastrophism and it is expertly manipulated by the state. A right-wing catastrophic vision of the state extends back at least to Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes's Leviathan posits civil war as the state of nature. To tame and achieve dominion over that hellish prospect, Hobbes envisions a "commonwealth" of men held together by contract and the dictatorial power of the sover-eign who will "punish with corporal or pecuniary punishment or ignominy" those who fail to abide by the rules.60 It stands in con-trast to the more optimistic prescriptions of Montesquieu and Rousseau that articulated the rule of law, and its implicit countervailing foci of power, over the rule of men. The Enlightenment crystallized a set of ideas that had been forming in Europe since Martin Luther. It began as a break with the dictatorial rule of the Pope and the idea of individual political liberty, and the individual that the Enlightenment presented remains a central doctrine of democratic political thought.61 Hobbes emphasized (and this is why he remains a touchstone of authoritarian ideology) that violence is at the heart of politics. There is only a choice between the ordered monopoly on violence that codifies a set of sociopolitical arrangements, the state, or an inchoate and tempestuous violence that sets each against all. Hobbes is the founder of a right-wing tradition that has as its core assumption a notion of human nature as predatory and selfish and this tradition gets made and remade against Rousseau and certain versions of Enlightenment thought right up to today. Hobbes is not the first catastrophist, but he was perhaps the best known and, at the dawn of capitalism, identified catastrophe as the disease for which the state is a cure. Conservatives hold him in special regard and there are few liberals who are not Hobbesians at heart either: Hillary Clinton, Tony Blair, and Barack Obama would all agree that the state of nature is war. If state power is an apparatus, then catastrophism is employed to expand it. States recognize that catastrophe must be averted by whatever means are available, and they understand that catastrophe aversion is a powerful political multiplier. FDR used it when he sold the New Deal, and Hitler proclaimed it when he invaded Poland. In the section "Creating Tomorrow's Dominant Force," the Project for the New American Century indicated that their transformative project to remake an American world was likely to be a long one "absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event— like a new Pearl Harbor."62 Conspiracists mistake that to indicate a scripting of the attacks of September11, 2001, but it can be more accurately read as the simple recognition that catastrophe or the threat of catastrophe makes radical change possible. Goering pointed out that when it comes to persuading people of the need to go to war, "all you have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists."63 Catastrophe can then be anything that makes war look like the better option. State catastrophism often indicates an exchange of political and social freedoms for relief from fear.64 The aftermath of September 11 confirms the idea that the promotion and management of fear is the foremost technique for those who wish to exercise control over events. The saturation of American culture with reminiscences of World War II in the years following 9 /11 was an extroverted yearning for a "popular" emergency and simultaneously a bulwark for an unpopular one. Confronted with a threat or the imaginary landscape of threats, the state, like the sovereign, allows itself room for exceptional action and response. In the arena of hypothetical disasters, the state does not resort to a judicial standard of proof, instead "urgent conjecture must sometimes take the place of proof" and the greater the supposed threat the greater the onus on the skeptic to prove a negative, that there is no threat.65 The detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb in 1949 shocked Western intelligence services and disrupted U.S. plans to contain the Soviets to the territory they controlled at the end of World War II. The National Security Council warned President Truman that, "The United States ... is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design."66 The NSC assumed that war with the Soviets was inevitable and, when fighting broke out in Korea in 1950, its catastrophist interpretation of Soviet foreign policy became the governing American orthodoxy. Truman declared a state of emergency and four troop divisions were dispatched to Germany: "The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civili-zation itself."67 Within two years, the United States would relocate massive air, ground, and naval forces to Europe and, guided by NSC doctrine, embark on a long-term strategy to intensify the global military and political struggle with communism under the banner of the Cold War and atomic Armageddon. "The present world situation, however, is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin, for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world."68 George Kennan, then a senior Soviet analyst in the State Department, demurred from the NSC line arguing that Stalin had no taste for territory where he could not have direct political or military control, but it was too late. The ship had sailed with Truman to the Cold War.69 Asked after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to outline the dif-ference between an assumption that Iraq had WMDs and the hypothesis that Saddam might "move to acquire those weapons," President Bush responded: "So what's the difference?" His refusal to recognize the distinction between the possibility of a fact and the possibility of a desire to establish facts may have seemed novel, but it is consistent in the history of exceptions to the supposedly normal course of state action. Writing about the Weimar constitution in 1921, Carl Schmitt observed that the ability of the president to declare a "state of emergency" implicitly recognized that dictatorial power was a feature of the state. He later distinguished an enemy of the state as "in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible."70 States routinely deploy emergency powers to deal with the vagaries of nature and disaster but these instances are generally temporary and localized. It is in the case of war that emergency power is most spectacularly invoked. In Giorgio Agamben's interpretation, the kind of violence Schmitt valorizes transforms the state into an "apparatus of death" and "the state of emergency defines a regime of the law within which the norm is valid but cannot be applied (since it has no force), and where acts that do not have the value of law acquire the force of law."71 Schmitt argued that it is impossible to predict the nature of threats or the conditions of any emergency so it is impossible to prescribe any legal form or limit to sovereign action. Post 9/11, Schmitt's key insight plays on in the procedural gymnastics over torture, assassination, kidnapping, drone murder, domestic spying, extra judicial internment, and the limits of executive power. Until the twenty-first century, one could still assume that the United States was constitutionally distinct from any of Hobbes's prescriptions. But Dick Cheney's contention that presidential power and what the president does is the same thing echoes Schmitt (and Hobbes) from beyond the grave. Schmitt's assertion that it is "precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject of sovereignty" recognizes that the exception becomes the rule and for him confirms that fascism is not incompatible with democracy. Henry Paulson's TARP fund for the financial sector following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 was a catastrophe of another sort. Announcing the program, Paulson stated that the initial $700 billion would be used to relieve banks of worthless mortgage-backed securities, but the bill never specified how these jubilee funds would be spent. The threat that Paulson iden-tified was the insolvency of many banks as a result of the collapse in value of their mortgage holdings, and the consequent "clogging up" of lending and money markets. Within weeks though, banks were using the money to consolidate and buy other banks rather than sanitizing their capital base. Paulson's threat to "the financial security of all Americans—their retirement savings, their home values, their ability to borrow" was not averted.72 But neither did the economy collapse. As much as the threats may or may not be real, the outcomes may not be as intended or the intended outcomes may not be as stated. In 2008, the invocation of imminent catastrophe allowed for a departure from normal procedures necessitating secrecy, speed, and huge quantities of money. Brad Sherman of the House of Representatives from California was warned that "the market would drop two or three thousand points the first day, another couple thousand the second day, and a few members were even told that there would be martial law in America if we voted no."73 \* \* \* Catastrophism has a long history on the right and both the state and the organized far right understand it and wield it skillfully to achieve political and propaganda goals, as this chapter has sought to show. Disease catastrophists view the achievements of the left as suicidal threats to traditional order and this view is universal on the right.74 Cure catastrophists believe that violent conflict will resolve and defeat these threats and some among that group, like Breivik and Timothy McVeigh, desire to quicken its arrival.75 In the contemporary period, marked by persistent economic and environmental crises, catastrophes are more visible and their invocation is even more common. For the left, as outlined elsewhere in this book, this presents serious problems in trying to form a political understanding that is useful for organizing and for social movements. But for the right, catastrophism is not counterproductive. As we have seen, it allows the right to influence and even dominate many political questions and at the state level real victories are being achieved. Catastrophism is a less ambivalent strategy for the right than for its adversaries on the left. From a rhetorical standpoint, catastrophism is a win/win for the right as there is no accountability for false prophecy. On the one hand, it rallies the troops and creates a sense of urgency. On the other hand, though, fear and paranoia serve a rightist political predisposition more than a left or liberal one. Authoritarian politics benefits more than left politics from fear. Twenty-first-century capitalism is characterized ' by a high degree of insecurity for all workers, both middle and working class, and fear and vulnerability constitute a growing part of the social landscape. The right can profit from exploiting these conditions, and in light of their achievements over the last generation they will continue to do so. Ironically, it is the collapse of the left that has offered up the space for them to do it, so the weeds are growing in the beloved ruins of the Keynesian state. The right has built a popular opposition to the welfare state and to income redistribution by shaping resentment against minority groups. Catastrophism for the right is the fight against equality and for war, hierarchy, and state violence. In a thoroughgoing way, right-wing catastrophe manages to materialize Samuel Huntington's prediction that "the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural."76 Catastrophism is one way to shift the focus from the essential questions of public policy, democracy, equality, access to education and health, environment, etc. and onto abstractions about civilization, culture, and threats to the prevailing social order that promise instability and worse. It is ironic that the contemporary right has found in identity a politics to sustain itself, much like it charges the left with having done. But in a period of declining incomes, chaotic public finances, and persistently high unemployment, the promises and predictions of a "catastrophically convulsed America that descends into a Balkanized ruin and social collapse" seeps into the right-wing Zeitgeist and finds scapegoats by successfully fragmenting an already fragile and divided political landscape. Which, of course, is the point.77

#### Our alternative is to refuse technocratic debates in favor of subjecting the 1ac’s discourse to rigorous democratic scrutiny

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But this mode of popular involvement comes at a key cost. Secret information is generally treated as worthy of a higher status than information already present in the public realm—the shared collective information through which ordinary citizens reach conclusions about emergency and defense. Yet, oftentimes, as with the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, although the actual content of this secret information is flawed,197 its status as secret masks these problems and allows policymakers to cloak their positions in added authority. This reality highlights the importance of approaching security information with far greater collective skepticism; it also means that security judgments may be more ‘Hobbesian’—marked fundamentally by epistemological uncertainty as opposed to verifiable fact—than policymakers admit.

If the objective sociological claims at the center of the modern security concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does this meahn for reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the relationship between liberty and security? Above all, it indicates that the central problem with the procedural solutions offered by constitutional scholars-emphasizing new statutory frameworks or greater judicial assertiveness-is that they mistake a question of politics for one of law. In other words, such scholars ignore the extent to which governing practices are the product of background political judgments about threat, democratic knowledge, professional expertise, and the necessity for insulated decision-making. To the extent that Americans are convinced that they face continuous danger from hidden and potentially limitless assailants-danger too complex for the average citizen to comprehend independently-it is inevitable that institutions (regardless of legal reform initiatives) will operate to centralize power in those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise. Thus, any systematic effort to challenge the current framing of the relationship between security and liberty must begin by challenging the underlying assumptions about knowledge and security upon which legal and political arrangements rest. Without a sustained and public debate about the validity of security expertise, its supporting institutions, and the broader legitimacy of secret information, there can be no substantive shift in our constitutional politics. The problem at present, however, is that it remains unclear which popular base exists in society to raise these questions. Unless such a base fully emerges, we can expect our prevailing security arrangements to become ever more entrenched.

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#### Interpretation – “economic engagement” is an iterated process across multiple areas to influence state behavior – only trade and aid are topical

Resnick 1 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa MILITARY CONTACTS Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa Arms transfers Military aid and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security-building measures Intelligence sharing ECONOMIC CONTACTS Trade agreements and promotion Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants CULTURAL CONTACTS Cultural treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic exchanges (n25) Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state. This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28) Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement. This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

#### Violation – they alter US insurance strategy

#### That’s a voting issue –

#### a) Predictable limits – they explode the topic which overstretches the research burden and incentivizes a shift to generics – hurts critical thinking and produces stale strategizing, hurting research skills.

#### b) Ground – they bypass topic offense based on commodity trading, diplomatic agreements, and investment DAs like SOI.

## ADV 1

### 1nc – no money

Military will run out of cash—means zero new platforms or programs

**Spring 11,** research fellow in national security – Heritage, 12/21/’11

(Baker, “An Unacceptable Squeeze on Defense Modernization”)

Following the enactment of the Budget Control Act earlier this year, the budget for the core defense program is already operating under stringent spending caps. At the same time, per capita expenditures for paying military personnel and operating the force are high and growing rapidly. Under these circumstances, funding for the procurement of new weapons and equipment and for research and development on new defense technologies will be squeezed to a dangerous degree. A Looming Disaster for the Military and U.S. Security Both the Obama Administration and Congress will be tempted to leave the defense spending caps in place—if not to go to even lower caps—now that the sequestration process could be applied to the defense budget under the Budget Control Act. This is a result of the failure of the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction (“super committee”) to agree on an alternative deficit-reduction plan and adopt a policy of “people over platforms” in slicing up the defense budget pie. Given the uncertainties in the application of the sequestration process, it is impossible to calculate precisely how much more the modernization accounts will be squeezed if that process kicks in. Suffice it to say that the problem is likely to become dramatically worse. The implications of the coming squeeze on defense modernization under the existing spending caps should cause great alarm for all concerned, particularly since it comes on the heels of the “procurement holiday” of the 1990s. The result will be a military that lacks the modern weapons and equipment it needs, loses its technological edge over future enemies, and finds itself dependent on a seriously eroded defense industrial base. Congress will have to take two essential steps to avoid a disastrous outcome for the military and U.S. security. First, it will have to increase the existing caps on spending for the core defense program and find savings elsewhere in the federal budget to offset this change, in accordance with Heritage’s December 5 recommendations.[1] Second, it will have to take steps to constrain per capita growth in the cost of compensating military personnel. The Sources of the Modernization Squeeze There are two sources of the squeeze on military modernization. First, the Budget Control Act has established caps on spending for national security and discretionary spending over the next 10 years that translate into inadequate defense budgets under any circumstance. These caps will constitute top-down pressure on the modernization accounts (procurement and research and development) within the defense budget. This top-down pressure will be accompanied by significant pressure from underneath by growth in both the overall and per capita costs of compensating military personnel. These increasing costs are largely driven by the array of defined benefits offered by the Department of Defense to military service members and their dependents, which fall mostly in the areas of military retirement and health care. These would be more effective and efficient if they were converted to defined-contribution plans. According to the Department of Defense (DOD), its overall military manpower costs will rise from roughly $148 billion today to more than $160 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2016. This increase will come in spite of proposed reductions in the number of people serving in the active-duty military. Although the number of active-duty military personnel is projected to drop by about 5 percent from FY 2012 through FY 2016, military personnel spending will rise, thanks to growing per capita compensation costs. Per capita compensation for active-duty personnel is projected to rise by more than 13 percent during the same five-year period. The reduction in the number of active-duty military personnel, as currently projected by the Obama Administration, will create a force that is too small to defend the vital interests of the United States. The Heritage Foundation has recommended that this reduction not be imposed. Accordingly, DOD’s projection of total military manpower costs is well below what is prudent. It is also appropriate to point out that while, according to the Congressional Budget Office, the overall per capita costs for operation and maintenance will come down with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, the per capita costs for operations and maintenance within the core defense program will continue to rise as well. The Scope of the Modernization Squeeze As a result of the twin pressures of the estimated spending caps on the core defense program derived from the Budget Control Act—which still excludes the more stringent caps that would result from the imposition of a partial or full sequestration under the Act—and the rising cost of military compensation, the level of funding for military modernization will necessarily fall to unacceptably low levels. (See chart.) Under this scenario, funding for defense modernization within the core defense program (defined as the sum of DOD’s procurement account and research, development, test, and evaluation account) could fall to roughly $145 billion in current dollars in FY 2016. By way of comparison, $188.4 billion was to go to these accounts under President Obama’s original budget request for FY 2012. Thus, the level of modernization funding is estimated to decline by about $43 billion in current dollars, or 23 percent, over the four-year period. In terms of inflation-adjusted dollars, the decline will be roughly $54 billion (in FY 2012 dollars), or about 29 percent. In other words, President Obama’s original request for the core DOD budget would have devoted roughly 34 percent of that budget to modernization. By 2016, modernization funding could fall to about 26 percent of total DOD funding for its core program. When these comparisons are expanded to provide a broader perspective, the situation becomes even more alarming. For example, the Department of Defense spent more than $226 billion on modernization in FY 1985 (in FY 2012 dollars). This was 39 percent of the total DOD budget. That means DOD could be on a path to cutting modernization’s share of its total budget to little more than one-half of what it was in FY 1985.

### 1nc – no war - generic

#### No US-China War

**Moss 13** (Trefor Moss, The Diplomat, 2/10/13, 7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War, thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true)

But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan: 1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either. 2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war woud be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders. 3. Question marks over the PLA’s operational effectiveness.The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary. 4. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. As the new leaders find their feet and jockey for position amongst themselves, they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions – war with Japan and possibly the U.S. being the biggest of them all. 5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase. 6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships.There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before). 7. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners. In light of these constraints, Abe should be able to push back against China – so long as he doesn’t go too far. He was of course dealt a rotten hand by his predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, whose bungled nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands triggered last year’s plunge in relations. Noda’s misjudgments raised the political temperature to the point where neither side feels able to make concessions, at least for now, in an attempt to repair relations. However, Abe can make the toxic Noda legacy work in his favor. Domestically, he can play the role of the man elected to untangle the wreckage, empowered by his democratic mandate to seek a new normal in Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese assertiveness would be met with a newfound Japanese assertiveness, restoring balance to the relationship. It is also timely for Japan to push back now, while its military is still a match for China’s. Five or ten years down the line this may no longer be the case, even if Abe finally grows the stagnant defense budget. Meanwhile, Abe is also pursuing diplomatic avenues. It was Abe who mended Japan’s ties with China after the Koizumi years, and he is now trying to reprise his role as peacemaker, having dispatched his coalition partner, Natsuo Yamaguchi, to Beijing reportedly to convey his desire for a new dialogue. It is hardly surprising, given his daunting domestic laundry list, that Xi Jinping should have responded encouragingly to the Japanese olive branch. In the end, Abe and Xi are balancing the same equation: They will not give ground on sovereignty issues, but they have no interest in a war – in fact, they must dread it. Even if a small skirmish between Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft occurs, the leaders will not order additional forces to join the battle unless they are boxed in by a very specific set of circumstances that makes escalation the only face-saving option. The escalatory spiral into all-out war that some envisage once the first shot is fired is certainly not the likeliest outcome, as recurrent skirmishes elsewhere – such as in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated.

### 1nc

#### No SCS war

VOA 12 – Voice of America News, 9/4/12, “Will South China Sea Disputes Lead to War?,” http://www.voanews.com/content/south-china-sea-war-unlikely/1501780.html

“A minor military clash in the South China Sea is, rather worryingly, a distinct and growing possibility,” according to Ian Storey from the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. ¶ Storey, an expert on Asia Pacific maritime security, goes even further. He envisions the possibility of differences over fishing rights or energy exploration turning into a military clash. ¶ “Caused by miscalculation, misperception or miscommunication, it’s just a question of time before one these skirmishes results in loss of life,” Storey said. ¶ A South China Sea War is Unlikely¶But that doesn’t mean a war. Storey said an escalation into full-blown conflict is unlikely.¶ “It is in no country’s interests to spill blood or treasure over this issue – the costs far outweigh the benefits,” Storey said. ¶ Other experts agree.¶ James Holmes of the U.S. Naval War College says admires how China has been able to get its way in spreading it claims of sovereignty without becoming a bully.¶ “[China] gradually consolidated the nation's maritime claims while staying well under the threshold for triggering outside -most likely American -intervention,” said Holmes.¶ “Is war about to break out over bare rocks? I don't think so.” writes Robert D. Kaplan, Chief Political Strategist for the geopolitical analysis group Stratfor.¶ Kaplan, however, doesn’t give much hope for negotiations. “The issues involved are too complex, and the power imbalance between China and its individual neighbors is too great,” he said. For that reason, Kaplan says China holds all the cards.¶ Kaplan doesn’t look for Chinese military aggression against other claimants. That, he says, would be counterproductive for its goals in the region.¶ “It would completely undermine its carefully crafted ‘peaceful rise’ thesis and push Southeast Asian countries into closer strategic alignment with the US,” said Kaplan.

### 1nc – no war

#### Recent Change in Chinese Leadership means Peace with Taiwan

Tatar, 13 - analyst at the International Economic Relations and Global Issues Program at the Polish Institute of International Affairs [Justyna Szczudlik, 4/26/13, http://www.pism.pl/files/?id\_plik=13507, 7.8.13,]

The change of leadership in China after the CCP Congress and parliamentary session showed that one of the basic priorities of the policy of China’s new leaders are cross-strait relations. CCP Secretary General and PRC Chairman Xi Jinping replaced Hu Jintao as chief of the party’s working group on Taiwan; Wang Yi, the former chief of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council (TAO), who, contrary to his two predecessors, did not serve as ambassador to the U.S., was elevated to the post of minister of foreign affairs; and a deputy minister of foreign affairs, Zhang Zhijun, was nominated as TAO head.¶ Reunification will remain the main goal of China’s Taiwan policy. The framework of cross-strait relations is based on Hu Jintao’s six-point proposal announced in 2008 (“One China” principle, economic cooperation, cultural dialogue, people-to-people relations, protection of sovereignty, termination of hostilities and a peace agreement), and the CCP-KMT 1992 consensus on “one China, different interpretations.” Adhering to that framework, in April Xi Jinping presented his four expectations about cross-strait relations, perceived as an operational level of Hu’s six points: promotion of economic cooperation, strengthening high-level economic negotiations, acceleration of post-ECFA talks, and rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.¶ Supposedly, a quite new element in the PRC approach towards Taiwan may be pressure to launch political talks. Chinese leaders will be raising political issues as a next step in defusing tensions and increasing cooperation between the mainland and the island. Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream,” defined as “a great restoration of the Chinese nation,” could be interpreted as a signal to put pressure on Taiwan to start political talks. What is more, then-TAO chief, Wang Yi, in March mentioned comprehensive cross-strait relations, which means consultations should not be restricted. As political cooperation is a sensitive issue, this matter should be dealt with according to the rule of negotiating the easiest topics first then the complicated ones later, but with the assumption that political talks will be launched first on the academic level. A similar approach was presented by Zhang Zhijun in his first remarks about Taiwan after assuming the TAO chief post, when at the 11th Cross-Strait Relations Symposium held in China in late March he claimed that political talks should not be perceived as a restricted topic.

## ADV 2

### De-dev

**Economic collapse is inevitable with exponential growth – credible computer models prove now is key**

**MacKenzie 12** (Deobra, a consultant for the New Scientist. “Boom And Doom: Revisiting Prophecies Of Collapse.” Full Date: 1/10/12, <http://www.countercurrents.org/mackenzie100112.htm>)

At the beginning of the 1970s, a group of young scientists set out to explore our future. Their findings shook a generation and may be even more relevant than ever today. The question the group set out to answer was: what would happen if the world’s population and industry continued to grow rapidly? Could growth continue indefinitely or would we start to hit limits at some point? In those days, few believed that there were any limits to growth – some economists still don’t. Even those who accepted that on a finite planet there must be some limits usually assumed that growth would merely level off as we approached them. These notions, however, were based on little more than speculation and ideology. The young scientists tried to take a more rigorous approach: using a computer model to explore possible futures. What was shocking was that their simulations, far from showing growth continuing forever, or even levelling out, suggested that it was most likely that boom would be followed by bust: a sharp decline in industrial output, food production and population. In other words, the collapse of global civilisation. These explosive conclusions were published in 1972 in a slim paperback called The Limits to Growth. It became a bestseller – and provoked a furious backlash that has obscured what it actually said. For instance, it is widely believed that Limits predicted collapse by 2000, yet in fact it made no such claim. So what did it say? And 40 years on, how do its projections compare with reality so far? The first thing you might ask is, why look back at a model devised in the days when computers were bigger than your fridge but less powerful than your phone? Surely we now have far more advanced models? In fact, in many ways we have yet to improve on World3, the relatively simple model on which Limits was based. “When you think of the change in both scientific and computational capabilities since 1972, it is astounding there has been so little effort to improve upon their work,” says Yaneer Bar-Yam, head of the New England Complex Systems Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts. It hasn’t happened in part because of the storm of controversy the book provoked. “Researchers lost their appetite for global modelling,” says Robert Hoffman of company Whatlf Technologies in Ottawa, Canada, which models resources for companies and governments. “Now, with peak oil, climate change and the failure of conventional economics, there is a renewed interest.” The other problem is that as models get bigger, it becomes harder to see why they produce certain outcomes and whether they are too sensitive to particular inputs, especially with complex systems. Thomas Homer-Dixon of the University of Waterloo in Ontario, Canada, who studies global systems and has used WorId3, thinks it may have been the best possible compromise between over-simplification and unmanageable complexity. But Hoffman and Bar-Yam’s groups are now trying to do better. World3 was developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The team took what was known about the global population, industry and resources from 1900 to 1972 and used it to develop a set of equations describing how these parameters affected each other. Based on various adjustable assumptions, such as the amount of non-renewable resources, the model projected what would happen over the next century. The team compares their work to exploring what happens to a ball thrown upwards. World3 was meant to reveal the general behaviour that results – in the case of a ball, going up and then falling down – not to make precise predictions, such as exactly how high the ball would go, or where and when it would fall. “None of these computer outputs is a prediction,” the book warned repeatedly. Assuming that business continued as usual, World3 projected that population and industry would grow exponentially at first. Eventually, however, growth would begin to slow and would soon stop altogether as resources grew scarce, pollution soared and food became limited. “The Limits to Growth said that the human ecological footprint cannot continue to grow indefinitely, because planet Earth is physically limited,” says Jørgen Randers of the Norwegian School of Management in Oslo, one of the book’s original authors. What’s more, instead of stabilising at the peak levels, or oscillating around them, in almost all model runs population and industry go into a sharp decline once they peak. “If present growth trends in world population, industrialisation, pollution, food production and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next 100 years. The most probable result will be a sudden and rather uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity,” the book warned. This was unexpected and shocking. Why should the world’s economy collapse rather than stabilise? In World3, it happened because of the complex feedbacks between different global subsystems such as industry, health and agriculture. More industrial output meant more money to spend on agriculture and healthcare, but also more pollution, which could damage health and food production. And most importantly, says Randers, in the real world there are delays before limits are understood, institutions act or remedies take effect. These delayed responses were programmed into World3. The model crashed because its hypothetical people did not respond to the mounting problems before underlying support systems, such as farmland and ecosystems, had been damaged. Instead, they carried on consuming and polluting past the point the model world could sustain. The result was what economists call a bubble and Limits called overshoot. The impact of these response delays was “the fundamental scientific message” of the study, says Randers. Critics, and even fans of the study, he says, didn’t get this point. The other message missed was not that humanity was doomed, but that catastrophe could be averted. In model runs where growth of population and industry were constrained, growth did level out rather than collapse – the stabilised scenario (see graph, right inset). Yet few saw it this way. Instead, the book came under fire from all sides. Scientists didn’t like Limits because the authors, anxious to publicise their findings, put it out before it was peer reviewed. The political right rejected its warning about the dangers of growth. The left rejected it for betraying the aspirations of workers. The Catholic church rejected its plea for birth control. Critical points The most strident criticisms came from economists, who claimed Limits underestimated the power of the technological fixes humans would surely invent. As resources ran low, for instance, we would discover more or develop alternatives. Yet the Limits team had tested this. In some runs, they gave World3 unlimited, non-polluting nuclear energy – which allowed extensive substitution and recycling of limited materials – and a doubling in the reserves of nonrenewables that could be economically exploited. All the same, the population crashed when industrial pollution soared. Then fourfold pollution reductions were added as well: this time, the crash came when there was no more farmland. Adding in higher farm yields and better birth control helped in this case. But then soil erosion and pollution struck, driven by the continuing rise of industry. Whatever the researchers did to eke out resources or stave off pollution, exponential growth was simply prolonged, until it eventually swamped the remedies. Only when the growth of population and industry were constrained, and all the technological fixes applied, did it stabilise in relative prosperity.The crucial point is that overshoot and collapse usually happened sooner or later in World3 even if very optimistic assumptions were made about, say, oil reserves. “The general behaviour of overshoot and collapse persists, even when large changes to numerous parameters are made,” says Graham Turner of the CSIRO Ecosystem Sciences lab in Crace, Australia. This did not convince those who thought technology could fix every problem. And with so much criticism, the idea took hold that Limits had been disproved. That mantra has been repeated so often that it became the received wisdom, says Ugo Bardi of the University of Florence in Italy, author of a recent book about Limits. “The common perception is that the work was discredited scientifically. I heard it again at a meeting last April,” says Homer-Dixon. “It wasn’t.” It wasn’t just confusion. “Misunderstanding was enhanced by a media campaign very similar to the one that has been recently directed against climate science,” says Bardi. One of the most common myths is that Limits predicted collapse by 2000. Yet as a brief glance at the “standard run” shows, it didn’t (see graph, right). The book does mention a 1970 estimate by the US Bureau of Mines that the world had 31 years of oil left. The bureau calculated this by dividing known reserves by the current rate of consumption. Rates of consumption, however, were increasing exponentially, so Limits pointed out that in fact oil had only 20 years left if nothing changed. But this calculation was made to illustrate the effects of exponential growth, not to predict that there were only 20 years of oil left. When Matthew Simmons, a leading oil-industry banker, finally read Limits in the 1990s, he was surprised to find none of the false predictions he had heard about. On the contrary, he concluded, population and energy growth largely matched the basic simulation. He felt Limits got so much attention, then lost it, partly because the oil shock of 1973 focused minds on resource shortages that were then largely resolved. There have been other recent re-appraisals of the book. In 2008, for instance, Turner did a detailed statistical analysis of how real growth compares to the scenarios in Limits. He concluded that **reality so far closely matches the standard run of World3**. Does that mean we face industrial collapse and widespread death? Not necessarily. A glance at Turner’s curves shows we haven’t yet reached the stage of the standard run, later this century, when such events are predicted. In the model, overshoot and collapse are preceded by exponential growth. Exponential growth starts out looking just like linear growth, says Bar-Yam: only later does the exponential curve start heading skywards. After only 40 years, we can’t yet say whether growth is linear or exponential. We already know the future will be different from the standard run in one respect, says Bar-Yam. Although the actual world population up to 2000 has been similar, in the scenario the rate of population growth increases with time – one of the exponential drivers of collapse. Although Limits took account of the fact that birth rates fall as prosperity rises, in reality they have fallen much faster than was expected when the book was written. “It is reasonable to be concerned about resource limitations in fifty years,” Bar-Yam says, “but the population is not even close to growing [the way Limits projected in 1972].” The book itself may be partly responsible. Bar-Yam thinks some of the efforts in the 1970s to cut population growth were at least partly due to Limits. “If it helped do that, it bought us more time, and it’s a very important work in the history of humanity,” he says. Yet World3 still suggests we’ll hit the buffers eventually. The original Limits team put out an updated study using World3 in 2005, which included faster-falling birth rates. Except in the stabilising scenario, World3 still collapsed. Otherwise, the team didn’t analyse the correspondence between the real world and their 1972 scenarios in detail – noting only that they generally match. “Does this correspondence with history prove our model was true? No, of course not,” they wrote. “But it does indicate that assumptions and conclusions still warrant consideration today.” This remains the case. Forty years on from its publication, it is still not clear whether Limits was right, but it hasn’t been proved wrong either. And while the model was too pessimistic about birth and death rates, it was too optimistic about the future impact of pollution. We now know that overshoot – the delayed response to problems that makes the effects so much worse – will eventually be especially catastrophic for climate change, because the full effects of greenhouse gases will not be apparent for centuries.

**Collapses forces a cultural shift way from growth – polls prove**

**Speth 08** – James Gustave Speth, dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale University, founder of the World Resources Institute, Professor at Vermont Law School, Former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality in the Executive Office of the President, Co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council, 2008, The Bridge at the Edge of the World, p. 211-213

Unfortunately, the surest path to **widespread cultural change** is a cataclysmic event that profoundly affects shared values and delegitimizes the status quo and existing leadership. The Great Depression is a classic example. I believe that both 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina could have led to real cultural change in the United States, both for the better, but America lacked the inspired leadership needed. The most thorough look at this issue from the perspective here is Thomas Homer-Dixon’s The Upside of Down. He argues “that our circumstances today are surprisingly like Rome’s in key ways. Our societies are also becoming steadily more complex and often more rigid. This is happening partly because we’re trying to manage—often with limited success—stresses building inside our societies, including stresses arising from our gargantuan appetite for energy. . . . Eventually, as occurred in Rome, the stresses may become too extreme, and our societies too inflexible to respond, and some kind of **economic** or political **breakdown will occur**. . . . “People often use the words ‘breakdown’ and ‘collapse’ synonymously. But in my view, although both breakdown and collapse produce a radical simplification of a system, they differ in their long-term consequences. Breakdown may be serious, but it’s not catastrophic. Something can be salvaged after breakdown occurs and perhaps rebuilt better than before. Collapse, on the other hand, is far more harmful. . . . “In coming years, I believe, foreshocks are likely to become larger and more frequent. Some could take the form of threshold events—like climate flips, large jumps in energy prices, boundary-crossing outbreaks of new infectious disease, or international financial crises.”23 Homer-Dixon argues that foreshocks and breakdowns can lead to positive change if the ground is prepared. “We need to prepare to turn breakdown to our advantage when it happens—because it will,” he says.24 Homer-Dixon’s point is critically important. Breakdowns, of course, do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes; authoritarian ones and Fortress World are also possibilities. Turning a breakdown to advantage will require both inspired leadership and a new story that articulates a positive vision grounded in what is best in the society’s values and history. A congressman is said to have told a citizens’ group, “If you will lead, your leaders will follow.” But it doesn’t have to be that way. Harvard’s Howard Gardner stresses this potential of true leadership in his book Changing Minds: “Whether they are heads of a nation or senior officials of the United Nations, leaders of large, disparate populations have enormous potential to change minds . . . and in the process they can change the course of history. “I have suggested one way to capture the attention of a disparate population: by creating a compelling story, embodying that story in one’s own life, and presenting the story in many different formats so that it can eventually topple the counterstories in one’s culture. . . . [T]he story must be simple, easy to identify with, emotionally resonant, and evocative of positive experiences.”25 There is evidence that **Americans are ready for another story**. As noted, **large majorities of Americans**, **when polled,** express disenchantment with today’s lifestyles and offer **support** for **values similar to those discussed here**.26 But these values are held along with other strongly felt and often conflicting values, and we are all pinned down by old habits, fears, insecurities

#### Growth causes war

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If this limits-to-growth analysis is at all valid, the implications for the problem of global peace and conflict and security are clear and savage. If we all remain determined to increase our living standards, our level of production and consumption, in a world where resources are already scarce, where only a few have affluent living standards but another 8 billion will be wanting them too, and which we, the rich, are determined to get richer without any limit, then nothing is more guaranteed than that there will be increasing levels of conflict and violence. To put it another way, if we insist on remaining affluent we will need to remain heavily armed. Increased conflict in at least the following categories can be expected. First, the present conflict over resources between the rich elites and the poor majority in the Third World must increase, for example, as ‘development’ under globalisation takes more land, water and forests into export markets. Second, there are conflicts between the Third World and the rich world, the major recent examples being the war between the US and Iraq over control of oil. Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US intervened, accompanied by much high-sounding rhetoric (having found nothing unacceptable about Israel’s invasions of Lebanon or the Indonesian invasion of East Timor). As has often been noted, had Kuwait been one of the world’s leading exporters of broccoli, rather than oil, it is doubtful whether the US would have been so eager to come to its defence. At the time of writing, the US is at war in Central Asia over ‘terrorism’. Few would doubt that a ‘collateral’ outcome will be the establishment of regimes that will give the West access to the oil wealth of Central Asia. Following are some references to the connection many have recognised between rich world affluence and conflict. General M.D. Taylor, US Army retired argued ‘... US military priorities just be shifted towards insuring a steady flow of resources from the Third World’. Taylor referred to ‘… fierce competition among industrial powers for the same raw materials markets sought by the United States’ and ‘… growing hostility displayed by have-not nations towards their affluent counterparts’.62 ‘Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product; within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets’.63 ‘That more than half of the people on this planet are poorly nourished while a small percentage live in historically unparalleled luxury is a sure recipe for continued and even escalating international conflict.’64 The oil embargo placed on the US by OPEC in the early 1970s prompted the US to make it clear that it was prepared to go to war in order to secure supplies. ‘President Carter last week issued a clear warning that any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf would lead to war.’ It would ‘… be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States’.65 ‘The US is ready to take military action if Russia threatens vital American interests in the Persian Gulf, the US Secretary of Defence, Mr Brown, said yesterday.’66 Klare’s recent book Resource Wars discusses this theme in detail, stressing the coming significance of water as a source of international conflict. ‘Global demand for many key materials is growing at an unsustainable rate. … the incidence of conflict over vital materials is sure to grow. … The wars of the future will largely be fought over the possession and control of vital economic goods. … resource wars will become, in the years ahead, the most distinctive feature of the global security environment.’67 Much of the rich world’s participation in the conflicts taking place throughout the world is driven by the determination to back a faction that will then look favourably on Western interests. In a report entitled, ‘The rich prize that is Shaba’, Breeze begins, ‘Increasing rivalry over a share-out between France and Belgium of the mineral riches of Shaba Province lies behind the joint Franco– Belgian paratroop airlift to Zaire. … These mineral riches make the province a valuable prize and help explain the West’s extended diplomatic courtship …’68 Then there is potential conflict between the rich nations who are after all the ones most dependent on securing large quantities of resources. ‘The resource and energy intensive modes of production employed in nearly all industries necessitate continuing armed coercion and competition to secure raw materials.’69 ‘Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product, within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets …’70 Growth, competition, expansion … and war Finally, at the most abstract level, the struggle for greater wealth and power is central in the literature on the causes of war. ‘… warfare appears as a normal and periodic form of competition within the capitalist world economy. … world wars regularly occur during a period of economic expansion. ’71 ‘War is an inevitable result of the struggle between economies for expansion.’72 Choucri and North say their most important finding is that domestic growth is a strong determinant of national expansion and that this results in competition between nations and war.73 The First and Second World Wars can be seen as being largely about imperial grabbing. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territory and resource access. Britain already held much of the world within its empire … which it had previously fought 72 wars to take! ‘Finite resources in a world of expanding populations and increasing per capita demands create a situation ripe for international violence.’74 Ashley focuses on the significance of the quest for economic growth. ‘War is mainly explicable in terms of differential growth in a world of scarce and unevenly distributed resources … expansion is a prime source of conflict. So long as the dynamics of differential growth remain unmanaged, it is probable that these long term processes will sooner or later carry major powers into war.’75 Security The point being made can be put in terms of security. One way to seek security is to develop greater capacity to repel attack. In the case of nations this means large expenditure of money, resources and effort on military preparedness. However there is a much better strategy; i.e. to live in ways that do not oblige you to take more than your fair share and therefore that do not give anyone any motive to attack you. Tut! This is not possible unless there is global economic justice. If a few insist on levels of affluence, industrialisation and economic growth that are totally impossible for all to achieve, and which could not be possible if they were taking only their fair share of global resources, then they must remain heavily armed and their security will require readiness to use their arms to defend their unjust privileges. In other words, if we want affluence we must prepare for war. If we insist on continuing to take most of the oil and other resources while many suffer intense deprivation because they cannot get access to them then we must be prepared to maintain the aircraft carriers and rapid deployment forces, and the despotic regimes, without which we cannot secure the oil fields and plantations. Global peace is not possible without global justice, and that is not possible unless rich countries move to ‘The Simpler Way’.

**Growth makes warming inevitable – adaptation is impossible – it causes extinction**

Roberts 11 – 12/8**/**2011 David Roberts is a staff writer for Grist "The brutal logic of climate change mitigation" www.grist.org/climate-policy/2011-12-08-the-brutal-logic-of-climate-change-mitigation

In my last post, I discussed a new peer-reviewed paper by climate scientists Kevin Anderson and Alice Bows. It paints a grim picture: The commonly accepted threshold of climate "safety," 2 degrees C [3.6 degrees F] temperature rise over pre-industrial levels, is now properly considered extremely dangerous; even 2 degrees C is drifting out of reach, absent efforts of a scale and speed beyond anything currently proposed; our current trajectory is leading us toward 4 or 6 (or 8 or 10) degrees C, which we now know to be a potentially civilization-threatening disaster. Like I said, go ahead and pour yourself a stiff drink. So, what does this grim situation say about our current climate policy efforts? The paper also contains some important insights on that front. Here is how Anderson and Bows frame it: Over the past five years a wealth of analyses have described very different responses to what, at first sight, appears to be the same question: What emission-reduction profiles are compatible with avoiding "dangerous" climate change? However, on closer investigation, the difference in responses is related less to different interpretations of the science underpinning climate change and much more to differing assumptions related to five fundamental and contextual issues. (1) What delineates dangerous from acceptable climate change? (2) What risk of entering dangerous climate change is acceptable? (3) When is it reasonable to assume global emissions will peak? (4) What reduction rates in post-peak emissions is it reasonable to consider? (5) Can the primacy of economic growth be questioned in attempts to avoid dangerous climate change? Keep question (5) in mind. It is almost never raised explicitly in these discussions, but it turns out to be central to how we answer the other questions. Long story short, Anderson and Bows argue that we are systematically blowing smoke up our own asses. (Though, ahem, that's probably not how they would put it.) The thing is, we have ostensibly answered question (1). The Copenhagen Accord has been signed by 141 countries representing over 87 percent of global emissions, including the U.S. and the E.U. It explicitly recognizes "the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius." Climate communiques the world over are full of categorical language: we "must" avoid 2 degrees C! (Despite the fact that new science reveals 2 degrees C to be well within extremely dangerous territory.) We pretend that 2 degrees C is our threshold. Yet the climate scenarios and plans presented to policymakers do not actually reflect that threshold. As Anderson and Bows say, "most policy advice is to accept a high probability of extremely dangerous climate change rather than propose radical and immediate emission reductions." Note, also, that most popular climate scenarios include an implausibly early peak in global emissions -- 2010 in many cases, 2015-16 in the case of the Stern Report, the ADAM project, and the U.K.'s Committee on Climate Change. Why do climate analysts do this? Why do they present plans that contain wildly optimistic assumptions about the peak in global emissions and yet a high probability of overshooting the 2 degrees C target? The answer is fairly simple, and it has to do with the answer to question (4), regarding what level of emissions reductions is reasonable to expect. According to the Stern Review and others, emissions reductions of 3 to 4 percent a year are the maximum compatible with continued economic growth. And so that's the level they use in their scenarios. Yet reductions at that pace offer very little practical hope of hitting 2 degrees C. In other words, climate analysts construct their scenarios not to avoid dangerous climate change but to avoid threatening economic growth. That would make sense if being richer would help us prosper in a 4 degrees C [7.2 degrees F] world. But ... no such luck. Says Anderson in his slideshow presentation: There is a widespread view that a 4 degrees C future is incompatible with an organised global community, is likely to be beyond "adaptation," is devastating to the majority of ecosystems, and has a high probability of not being stable (i.e., 4 degrees C would be an interim temperature on the way to a much higher equilibrium level). To be sure, there is plenty of uncertainty about the impacts of particular levels of temperature rise. (See: recent controversy over climate sensitivity.) Predictions are hard, especially about the future. But if the "widespread view" Anderson identifies is correct -- or even half correct! -- it completely scrambles conventional approaches to the problem. It implies that 4 degrees C must be avoided at literally any cost.

**Growth collapses the environment – that causes extinction**

**Barry 12** (Glen, President and Founder of Ecological Internet, Ph.D. in Land Resources from the University of Wisconsin, “Human Family's Ecocidal Death Wish,” 1/31/12, [http://www.countercurrents.org/barry310112.htm)\*\*we](http://www.countercurrents.org/barry310112.htm)**we) reject any gendered or offensive language used in this evidence

The ecological foundation of being is unraveling before our very eyes. Without ecosystems there is no life. Fiercely loving Earth is the answer. Let's sustain global ecology together like our shared survival and abundance depends upon it. And while we set out using classic civil disobedience tactics, let's not dismiss out of hand any obstruction, uncivil disobedience, sabotage and targeted insurgency tactics - that are non-terrorist - and that may be necessary to achieve global ecological sustainability. The human family's shared survival depends upon passionately defending Earth using all means necessary. Earth's ecosystems are collapsing under the burden of human growth, destroying our one shared biosphere that makes life possible. Industrial growth - frantically destroying ecosystems to feed insatiable, ever-growing appetites - is an aberration, a mistake, a disease. If left untreated, **this will be the end of** the human family, **all life**, and Earth's very being. Infinite economic growth at the expense of ecosystems is impossible, and seeking endless and inequitable growth in consumption and population can only lead to collapse and massive die-off. **Humanity's last** best **chance to** justly and equitably **sustain a** livable **planet is to** protect and restore ecosystems, end fossil fuels, and a people's power Earth revolution to **utterly destroy the ecocidal industrial growth machine**. **We are** all **bloody fools to** tolerate and **not** immediately **overthrow a violent**ly ecocidal **system** that is killing us all. If we all understood the implications of global ecosystem collapse, we would go now, together, and slay the global growth machine. It is too late to escape profound ecological decline, yet complete disastrous social and ecological collapse - and possible end to most or all life - may yet be avoided. Sustaining ecology must become society's central organizing principle or humans and all species face horrendous death. Globally it is time for radical change to simply survive converging ecology, food, war, water, inequity, population, climate, jobs, ocean, and extinction crises. It is deeply troubling most "environmentalists" deny the severity of ecosystem collapse, rejecting out of hand revolutionary measures sufficient to sustain ecology. Earth is dying a death of a billion lashes as ecosystems are liquidated for consumption as if nature has no worth. 80% of old forests are gone, 50% of top soil, 90% of big ocean fish, bee populations are collapsing, we are undergoing abrupt climate change, and two billion are hungry and thirsty - to say nothing of acidic and dead oceans, nitrogen pollution, fracking and tar sands, extinction, desertification, water scarcity, pervasive toxics, and how all these ecological crises interact and reinforce each other. Yes, you read this right - EARTH IS DYING - not that humans are going extinct, but Earth will recover. A whole body of global change and ecology science and intuition indicates Earth is well past its carrying capacity and planetary boundaries, that enough ecosystems have been lost, diminished, and changed forever, that the biogeochemical process that make life possible are failing. **We face an unprecedented** planetary **ecological emergency**.

**Failure to dedevelop ensures global pandemics and extinction – no co-evolution**

**Ryan, ’97** (Frank, M.D., virus X, p. 366)\*\*we reject any offensive or gendered language used in this evidence

How might the human race appear to such an aggressively emerging virus? That teeming, globally intrusive species, with its transcontinental air travel, massively congested cities, sexual promiscuity, and in the less affluent regions — where the virus is most likely to first emerge — a vulnerable lack of hygiene with regard to food and water supplies and hospitality to biting insects' The virus is best seen, in John Hollands excellent analogy, as a swarm of competing mutations, with each individual strain subjected to furious forces of natural selection for the strain, or strains, most likely to amplify and evolve in the new ecological habitat.3 With such a promising new opportunity in the invaded species, natural selection must eventually come to dominate viral behavior. In time the dynamics of infection will select for a more resistant human population. Such a coevolution takes rather longer in "human" time — **too long**, given the ease of spread within the global village. A rapidly lethal and quickly spreading virus simply would not have time to switch from aggression to coevolution. And there lies the danger. Joshua Lederbergs prediction can now be seen to be an altogether logical one. Pandemics are inevitable. Our incredibly rapid human evolution, our overwhelming global needs, the advances of our complex industrial society, all have moved the natural goalposts. The advance of society, the very science of change, has greatly augmented the potential for the emergence of a pandemic strain. It is hardly surprising that Avrion Mitchison, scientific director of Deutsches Rheuma Forschungszentrum in Berlin, asks the question: "Will we survive!” We have invaded every biome on earth and we continue to destroy other species so very rapidly that one eminent scientist foresees the day when no life exists on earth apart from the human monoculture and the small volume of species useful to it. An increasing multitude of disturbed viral-host symbiotic cycles are provoked into self-protective counterattacks. This is a dangerous situation. And we have seen in the previous chapter how ill-prepared the world is to cope with it. It begs the most frightening question of all: could such a pandemic virus cause the extinction of the human species?

### 1nc – econ collapse

#### No impact to economic decline – prefer new data

Daniel Drezner 14, IR prof at Tufts, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43

#### No impact

Brandt and Ulfelder 11—\*Patrick T. Brandt, Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University, is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the School of Social Science at the University of Texas at Dallas. \*\*Jay Ulfelder, Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University, is an American political scientist whose research interests include democratization, civil unrest, and violent conflict. [April, 2011, “Economic Growth and Political Instability,” Social Science Research Network]

These statements anticipating political fallout from the global economic crisis of 2008–2010 reflect a widely held view that economic growth has rapid and profound effects on countries’ political stability. When economies grow at a healthy clip, citizens are presumed to be too busy and too content to engage in protest or rebellion, and governments are thought to be flush with revenues they can use to enhance their own stability by producing public goods or rewarding cronies, depending on the type of regime they inhabit. When growth slows, however, citizens and cronies alike are presumed to grow frustrated with their governments, and the leaders at the receiving end of that frustration are thought to lack the financial resources to respond effectively. The expected result is an increase in the risks of social unrest, civil war, coup attempts, and regime breakdown.

Although it is pervasive, the assumption that countries’ economic growth rates strongly affect their political stability has not been subjected to a great deal of careful empirical analysis, and evidence from social science research to date does not unambiguously support it. Theoretical models of civil wars, coups d’etat, and transitions to and from democracy often specify slow economic growth as an important cause or catalyst of those events, but empirical studies on the effects of economic growth on these phenomena have produced mixed results. Meanwhile, the effects of economic growth on the occurrence or incidence of social unrest seem to have hardly been studied in recent years, as empirical analysis of contentious collective action has concentrated on political opportunity structures and dynamics of protest and repression.

This paper helps fill that gap by rigorously re-examining the effects of short-term variations in economic growth on the occurrence of several forms of political instability in countries worldwide over the past few decades. In this paper, we do not seek to develop and test new theories of political instability. Instead, we aim to subject a hypothesis common to many prior theories of political instability to more careful empirical scrutiny. The goal is to provide a detailed empirical characterization of the relationship between economic growth and political instability in a broad sense. In effect, we describe the conventional wisdom as seen in the data. We do so with statistical models that use smoothing splines and multiple lags to allow for nonlinear and dynamic effects from economic growth on political stability. We also do so with an instrumented measure of growth that explicitly accounts for endogeneity in the relationship between political instability and economic growth. To our knowledge, ours is the first statistical study of this relationship **to simultaneously address** the **possibility of nonlinearity and problems of endogeneity**. As such, we believe this paper offers what is probably the most rigorous general evaluation of this argument to date.

As the results show, some of our findings are surprising. Consistent with conventional assumptions, we find that social unrest and civil violence are more likely to occur and democratic regimes are more susceptible to coup attempts around periods of slow economic growth. At the same time, our analysis shows no significant relationship between variation in growth and the risk of civil-war onset, and results from our analysis of regime changes contradict the widely accepted claim that economic crises cause transitions from autocracy to democracy. While we would hardly pretend to have the last word on any of these relationships, our findings do suggest that the relationship between economic growth and political stability is neither as uniform nor as strong as the conventional wisdom(s) presume(s). We think these findings also help explain why the global recession of 2008–2010 has failed thus far to produce the wave of coups and regime failures that some observers had anticipated, in spite of the expected and apparent uptick in social unrest associated with the crisis.

#### Diversionary intervention will be peaceful and humanitarian, not a military conquest

**Kisangani and Pickering 11 - Professors PolSci KState,** (Emizet and Jeffrey, September, “Democratic Accountability and Diversionary Force: Regime Types and the Use of Benevolent and Hostile Military Force” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 55 No 6, SagePub)\*\*NOTE = SEI = SocioEconomic Interventions, PSI = PoliticoStrategic Military Interventions

As in Kisangani and Pickering (2007), we define benevolent military force as force used over low politics or what we term socioeconomic issues, typically in support of the target government and/or the target population. Examples of socioeconomic interventions (SEIs) include humanitarian relief operations and peaceful missions to safeguard minorities. These types of military interventions usually stand in stark contrast to what we term politicostrategic military interventions (PSIs), which are belligerent operations launched for ‘‘high politics’’ reasons of strategy and enhancing national power (see Souva 2005). Foreign military missions over disputed territory, regional balance of power concerns, or to topple foreign governments offer examples of PSIs. SEI may be an attractive option for diversionary leaders because it fits all of the criteria for successful agenda setting. 2 Most external uses of military force, including SEIs, are salient, headline grabbing issues (Peake 2001). They are also relatively noncomplex events, making it easy for the public to grasp. The fact that they occur infrequently accentuates their ability to impact the public consciousness and by extension the national policy agenda. Perhaps most importantly, because of their diversionary origins, they will command the unfaltering attention of the leadership in the political executive. Presidential or prime ministerial focus on an issue is a critical component of successful agenda setting, as is saturating the media with a consistent message. As Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake (2005, 135) point out, ‘‘When presidents prioritize an issue through their public statements—when they make a concerted effort to influence the agenda—they may have the most success affecting the agenda’’ (also Edwards and Wood 1999). This is why ‘‘. . . the president is an adept agenda setter when it matters most’’ (Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2005, 129). **SEI** is not only well suited for agenda setting, it **may often be preferred over PSI**. After all, political executives that launch military missions for diversionary purposes desire missions that have a high probability of success and little potential for unintended consequences (Levy 1989, 281; Fordham 2002, 576). Benevolent military missions sent to assist a target government in need will almost always entail less risk and less human cost than belligerent missions over high-politics issues. They will have a substantially lower probability of being reciprocated or evolving into fullscale war. 3 They consequently should stand less chance of producing casualties or embarrassing military setbacks. Perhaps because of this, SEI tends to be less likely than PSI to spark a public backlash against the administration or to provide political ammunition for its political opponents. Jentleson and Britton (1998), for example, demonstrate that humanitarian intervention, which corresponds roughly to the conceptualization of SEI, is one of only two forms of external military force that the US public will support for extended periods of time. If SEI garners the same type of public support in other democracies, **the appeal this policy option has for democratic executives contemplating diversion becomes clearer. Even if they would like to use PSI for diversion, some democratic leaders may not be able to**. A major thread of recent diversionary literature focuses on the ability that potential target states have to thwart diversionary uses of force by troubled leaders (Clark 2003). The strategic conflict avoidance thesis presumes that decision makers in states that stand a good chance of becoming diversionary targets alter their behavior to avoid diversionary military force. They tone down rhetoric, make significant conciliatory gestures, or take other visible steps to improve relations with the troubled and potentially diversionary actor, depriving diversionary leaders of opportunities to use force abroad. A number of recent empirical studies confirm that target states do at times behave in this way, particularly when the diversionary state is transparent and powerful (Clark 2003; Fordham 2005).

### 2nc – at: east asian

#### No East Asian war – informal processes secure and maintain East Asian peace

**Weissmann, 09** --- senior fellow at the Swedish School of Advanced Asia Pacific Studies (Mikael Weissmann, “Understanding the East Asian Peace: Some Findings on the Role of Informal Processes,” Nordic Asia Research Community, November 2, 2009, <http://barha.asiaportal.info/blogs/in-focus/2009/november/understanding-east-asian-peace-some-findings-role-informal-processes-mi>)

The findings concerning China’s role in keeping peace in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and on the Korean Peninsula confirm the underlying hypothesis that various informal processes and related mechanisms can help explain the relative peace. Virtually all of the identified processes and related mechanisms have been informal rather than formal. It should be noted that it is not necessarily the same types of processes that have been of importance in each and every case. In different ways these informal processes have demonstrated that the relative lack of formalised security structures and/or mechanisms have not prevented the region from moving towards a stable peace. Informal processes have been sufficient both to prevent tension and disputes from escalating into war and for moving East Asia towards a stable peace.

### 1nc - generic

#### No prolif or cascades, and the timeframe is huge – their ev is biased

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\*\*\*cites Jacques Hymans, USC Associate Professor of IR\*\*\*

### I I I . LESSONS FRO M HISTOR Y Concerns over “regional proliferation chains,” “falling nuclear dominos” and “nuclear tipping points” are nothing new; indeed, reactive proliferation fears date back to the dawn of the nuclear age.14 Warnings of an inevitable deluge of proliferation were commonplace from the 1950s to the 1970s, resurfaced during the discussion of “rogue states” in the 1990s and became even more ominous after 9/11.15 In 2004, for example, Mitchell Reiss warned that “in ways both fast and slow, we may very soon be approaching a nuclear ‘tipping point,’ where many countries may decide to acquire nuclear arsenals on short notice, thereby triggering a proliferation epidemic.” Given the presumed fragility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the ready supply of nuclear expertise, technology and material, Reiss argued, “a single new entrant into the nuclear club could catalyze similar responses by others in the region, with the Middle East and Northeast Asia the most likely candidates.”16 Nevertheless, predictions of inevitable proliferation cascades have historically proven false (see The Proliferation Cascade Myth text box). In the six decades since atomic weapons were first developed, nuclear restraint has proven far more common than nuclear proliferation, and cases of reactive proliferation have been exceedingly rare. Moreover, most countries that have started down the nuclear path have found the road more difficult than imagined, both technologically and bureaucratically, leading the majority of nuclear-weapons aspirants to reverse course. Thus, despite frequent warnings of an unstoppable “nuclear express,”17 William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova astutely note that the “train to date has been slow to pick up steam, has made fewer stops than anticipated, and usually has arrived much later than expected.”18 None of this means that additional proliferation in response to Iran’s nuclear ambitions is inconceivable, but the empirical record does suggest that regional chain reactions are not inevitable. Instead, only certain countries are candidates for reactive proliferation. Determining the risk that any given country in the Middle East will proliferate in response to Iranian nuclearization requires an assessment of the incentives and disincentives for acquiring a nuclear deterrent, the technical and bureaucratic constraints and the available strategic alternatives. Incentives and Disincentives to Proliferate Security considerations, status and reputational concerns and the prospect of sanctions combine to shape the incentives and disincentives for states to pursue nuclear weapons. Analysts predicting proliferation cascades tend to emphasize the incentives for reactive proliferation while ignoring or downplaying the disincentives. Yet, as it turns out, instances of nuclear proliferation (including reactive proliferation) have been so rare because going down this road often risks insecurity, reputational damage and economic costs that outweigh the potential benefits.19 Security and regime survival are especially important motivations driving state decisions to proliferate. All else being equal, if a state’s leadership believes that a nuclear deterrent is required to address an acute security challenge, proliferation is more likely.20 Countries in conflict-prone neighborhoods facing an “enduring rival”– especially countries with inferior conventional military capabilities vis-à-vis their opponents or those that face an adversary that possesses or is seeking nuclear weapons – may be particularly prone to seeking a nuclear deterrent to avert aggression.21 A recent quantitative study by Philipp Bleek, for example, found that security threats, as measured by the frequency and intensity of conventional militarized disputes, were highly correlated with decisions to launch nuclear weapons programs and eventually acquire the bomb.22 The Proliferation Cascade Myth Despite repeated warnings since the dawn of the nuclear age of an inevitable deluge of nuclear proliferation, such fears have thus far proven largely unfounded. Historically, nuclear restraint is the rule, not the exception – and the degree of restraint has actually increased over time. In the first two decades of the nuclear age, five nuclear-weapons states emerged: the United States (1945), the Soviet Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China (1964). However, in the nearly 50 years since China developed nuclear weapons, only four additional countries have entered (and remained in) the nuclear club: Israel (allegedly in 1967), India (“peaceful” nuclear test in 1974, acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998), Pakistan (acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998) and North Korea (test in 2006).23 This significant slowdown in the pace of proliferation occurred despite the widespread dissemination of nuclear know-how and the fact that the number of states with the technical and industrial capability to pursue nuclear weapons programs has significantly increased over time.24 Moreover, in the past 20 years, several states have either given up their nuclear weapons (South Africa and the Soviet successor states Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) or ended their highly developed nuclear weapons programs (e.g., Argentina, Brazil and Libya).25 Indeed, by one estimate, 37 countries have pursued nuclear programs with possible weaponsrelated dimensions since 1945, yet the overwhelming number chose to abandon these activities before they produced a bomb. Over time, the number of nuclear reversals has grown while the number of states initiating programs with possible military dimensions has markedly declined.26 Furthermore – especially since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) went into force in 1970 – reactive proliferation has been exceedingly rare. The NPT has near-universal membership among the community of nations; only India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea currently stand outside the treaty. Yet the actual and suspected acquisition of nuclear weapons by these outliers has not triggered widespread reactive proliferation in their respective neighborhoods. Pakistan followed India into the nuclear club, and the two have engaged in a vigorous arms race, but Pakistani nuclearization did not spark additional South Asian states to acquire nuclear weapons. Similarly, the North Korean bomb did not lead South Korea, Japan or other regional states to follow suit.27 In the Middle East, no country has successfully built a nuclear weapon in the four decades since Israel allegedly built its first nuclear weapons. Egypt took initial steps toward nuclearization in the 1950s and then expanded these efforts in the late 1960s and 1970s in response to Israel’s presumed capabilities. However, Cairo then ratified the NPT in 1981 and abandoned its program.28 Libya, Iraq and Iran all pursued nuclear weapons capabilities, but only Iran’s program persists and none of these states initiated their efforts primarily as a defensive response to Israel’s presumed arsenal.29 Sometime in the 2000s, Syria also appears to have initiated nuclear activities with possible military dimensions, including construction of a covert nuclear reactor near al-Kibar, likely enabled by North Korean assistance.30 (An Israeli airstrike destroyed the facility in 2007.31) The motivations for Syria’s activities remain murky, but the nearly 40-year lag between Israel’s alleged development of the bomb and Syria’s actions suggests that reactive proliferation was not the most likely cause. Finally, even countries that start on the nuclear path have found it very difficult, and exceedingly time consuming, to reach the end. Of the 10 countries that launched nuclear weapons projects after 1970, only three (Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa) succeeded; one (Iran) remains in progress, and the rest failed or were reversed.32 The successful projects have also generally needed much more time than expected to finish. According to Jacques Hymans, the average time required to complete a nuclear weapons program has increased from seven years prior to 1970 to about 17 years after 1970, even as the hardware, knowledge and industrial base required for proliferation has expanded to more and more countries.33 Yet throughout the nuclear age, many states with potential security incentives to develop nuclear weapons have nevertheless abstained from doing so.34 Moreover, contrary to common expectations, recent statistical research shows that states with an enduring rival that possesses or is pursuing nuclear weapons are not more likely than other states to launch nuclear weapons programs or go all the way to acquiring the bomb, although they do seem more likely to explore nuclear weapons options.35 This suggests that a rival’s acquisition of nuclear weapons does not inevitably drive proliferation decisions. One reason that reactive proliferation is not an automatic response to a rival’s acquisition of nuclear arms is the fact that security calculations can cut in both directions. Nuclear weapons might deter outside threats, but leaders have to weigh these potential gains against the possibility that seeking nuclear weapons would make the country or regime less secure by triggering a regional arms race or a preventive attack by outside powers. Countries also have to consider the possibility that pursuing nuclear weapons will produce strains in strategic relationships with key allies and security patrons. If a state’s leaders conclude that their overall security would decrease by building a bomb, they are not likely to do so.36 Moreover, although security considerations are often central, they are rarely sufficient to motivate states to develop nuclear weapons. Scholars have noted the importance of other factors, most notably the perceived effects of nuclear weapons on a country’s relative status and influence.37 Empirically, the most highly motivated states seem to be those with leaders that simultaneously believe a nuclear deterrent is essential to counter an existential threat and view nuclear weapons as crucial for maintaining or enhancing their international status and influence. Leaders that see their country as naturally at odds with, and naturally equal or superior to, a threatening external foe appear to be especially prone to pursuing nuclear weapons.38 Thus, as Jacques Hymans argues, extreme levels of fear and pride often “combine to produce a very strong tendency to reach for the bomb.”39 Yet here too, leaders contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons have to balance the possible increase to their prestige and influence against the normative and reputational costs associated with violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If a country’s leaders fully embrace the principles and norms embodied in the NPT, highly value positive diplomatic relations with Western countries and see membership in the “community of nations” as central to their national interests and identity, they are likely to worry that developing nuclear weapons would damage (rather than bolster) their reputation and influence, and thus they will be less likely to go for the bomb.40 In contrast, countries with regimes or ruling coalitions that embrace an ideology that rejects the Western dominated international order and prioritizes national self-reliance and autonomy from outside interference seem more inclined toward proliferation regardless of whether they are signatories to the NPT.41 Most countries appear to fall in the former category, whereas only a small number of “rogue” states fit the latter. According to one count, before the NPT went into effect, more than 40 percent of states with the economic resources to pursue nuclear programs with potential military applications did so, and very few renounced those programs. Since the inception of the nonproliferation norm in 1970, however, only 15 percent of economically capable states have started such programs, and nearly 70 percent of all states that had engaged in such activities gave them up.42 The prospect of being targeted with economic sanctions by powerful states is also likely to factor into the decisions of would-be proliferators. Although sanctions alone proved insufficient to dissuade Iraq, North Korea and (thus far) Iran from violating their nonproliferation obligations under the NPT, this does not necessarily indicate that sanctions are irrelevant. A potential proliferator’s vulnerability to sanctions must be considered. All else being equal, the more vulnerable a state’s economy is to external pressure, the less likely it is to pursue nuclear weapons. A comparison of states in East Asia and the Middle East that have pursued nuclear weapons with those that have not done so suggests that countries with economies that are highly integrated into the international economic system – especially those dominated by ruling coalitions that seek further integration – have historically been less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons than those with inward-oriented economies and ruling coalitions.43 A state’s vulnerability to sanctions matters, but so too does the leadership’s assessment regarding the probability that outside powers would actually be willing to impose sanctions. Some would-be proliferators can be easily sanctioned because their exclusion from international economic transactions creates few downsides for sanctioning states. In other instances, however, a state may be so vital to outside powers – economically or geopolitically – that it is unlikely to be sanctioned regardless of NPT violations. Technical and Bureaucratic Constraints In addition to motivation to pursue the bomb, a state must have the technical and bureaucratic wherewithal to do so. This capability is partly a function of wealth. Richer and more industrialized states can develop nuclear weapons more easily than poorer and less industrial ones can; although as Pakistan and North Korea demonstrate, cash-strapped states can sometimes succeed in developing nuclear weapons if they are willing to make enormous sacrifices.44 A country’s technical know-how and the sophistication of its civilian nuclear program also help determine the ease and speed with which it can potentially pursue the bomb. The existence of uranium deposits and related mining activity, civilian nuclear power plants, nuclear research reactors and laboratories and a large cadre of scientists and engineers trained in relevant areas of chemistry and nuclear physics may give a country some “latent” capability to eventually produce nuclear weapons. Mastery of the fuel-cycle – the ability to enrich uranium or produce, separate and reprocess plutonium – is particularly important because this is the essential pathway whereby states can indigenously produce the fissile material required to make a nuclear explosive device.45 States must also possess the bureaucratic capacity and managerial culture to successfully complete a nuclear weapons program. Hymans convincingly argues that many recent would-be proliferators have weak state institutions that permit, or even encourage, rulers to take a coercive, authoritarian management approach to their nuclear programs. This approach, in turn, politicizes and ultimately undermines nuclear projects by gutting the autonomy and professionalism of the very scientists, experts and organizations needed to successfully build the bomb.46 Alternative Sources of Nuclear Deterrence Historically, the availability of credible security guarantees by outside nuclear powers has provided a potential alternative means for acquiring a nuclear deterrent without many of the risks and costs associated with developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. As Bruno Tertrais argues, nearly all the states that developed nuclear weapons since 1949 either lacked a strong guarantee from a superpower (India, Pakistan and South Africa) or did not consider the superpower’s protection to be credible (China, France, Israel and North Korea). Many other countries known to have pursued nuclear weapons programs also lacked security guarantees (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) or thought they were unreliable at the time they embarked on their programs (e.g., Taiwan). In contrast, several potential proliferation candidates appear to have abstained from developing the bomb at least partly because of formal or informal extended deterrence guarantees from the United States (e.g., Australia, Germany, Japan, Norway, South Korea and Sweden).47 All told, a recent quantitative assessment by Bleek finds that security assurances have empirically significantly reduced proliferation proclivity among recipient countries.48 Therefore, if a country perceives that a security guarantee by the United States or another nuclear power is both available and credible, it is less likely to pursue nuclear weapons in reaction to a rival developing them. This option is likely to be particularly attractive to states that lack the indigenous capability to develop nuclear weapons, as well as states that are primarily motivated to acquire a nuclear deterrent by security factors (as opposed to status-related motivations) but are wary of the negative consequences of proliferation.

### 1nc – no instability

#### No Chinese Instability

**Kim 07** (Heungkyu,- prof @ Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Korea) 2nd Berlin Conference on Asian Security October “On China’s Internal Stability”)

In the beginning of 21st century. the term "China Risk" as well as "China threat" became popular among China watchers. The famous report "Fault lines in China's Economic Terrain" published by RAND in 2003 already identified eight fault lines, which might seriously affect China's ability to sustain rapid economic growth and predicted how much they affect China's growth. The eight lines (weaknesses) are as follows: unemployment. poverty. and social unrest, corruption. HIV-AIDS and epidemic disease. water resources and pollution, energy consumption and prices, fragile finance system and state-owned enterprises, possible shrinkage of foreign direct investment, and Taiwan and other international conflicts. Following the warning of Western scholars. Chinese government think tanks and scholars are also busy alarming the bell of "China in danger," and have produced numerous articles as well. Table 2 shows the summary of RAND report roughly estimating the potential impacts on China's annual real economic growth. [Text Removed – added for Context] Despite such problems and alarming, Beijing government's confidence in maintaining political stability comes from following several factors. Foremost, Chinese people and intellectuals support the Chinese Communist Party's rule as long as Chinese economy improves. Second. Chinese deep-rooted fear of chaos also contributes the one party rule. Even before the Tiananmen incident occurred in 1989. Deng Xiaoping precisely summarized the Chinese fear by emphasizing the absolute necessity for 'political' stability: "the absolutely crucial task is to maintain (political) stability. Without stability, nothing can be achieved... Third. no political alternative exists. The Communist Party is the only national level political party in effect. Fourth, current governing structure helps Beijing government maintain its legitimacy, and political stability. Rioters and protesters generally do not challenge the decisions of central Chinese authorities. Rather, they challenge local authorities and cadres that are predatory and in violation of national policies. They often seek a resolution by prompting the intervention of central authorities. In contrast to ordinary state-society relationship in the developing countries, Chinese state-society relations do not make the relations between the central government and society confrontational because of the intermediary role of local governments. These peculiar relations are illustrated in Chart 1-1. The relations in Chart 1 are characterized by direct contacts between the state and " society. However, as seen in Chart 1-1, local governments in China function like a buffer zone between Beijing government and the society. This situation considerably reduces direct political pressure against Beijing government. Fifth, so far consensus-building mechanism among top political leaders has worked. The Chinese current decision-making structure doesn't allow a charismatic leader to wield power without being checked and it requires consensus-building and collective decision making procedures if the issue is comprehensive and salient. Although the decision-making process has not been efficient, it has prevented outbreaks of political struggle among top leaders and aborted its political system in danger. Any of the fault lines will not likely cause any serious internal instability in the near future. Higher danger may be bred in Chinese own power sharing system itself. Capacity for building consensus among top political leaders has been the key for maintaining political stability despite of many serious social economic and political problems. How to maintain the consensus-building mechanism and smooth power transition will be crucial to predict the future political stability.

# 2nc

## AT: Scenario Planning

**Risk assessment, experts, and scenario planning args not responsive—they are premediation not forecasting. They aren’t interested in accuracy, but imagining as many possible futures as are possible to speculate and pre-empt**

**De Goede** **2008** (Marieke, Department of European Studies, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. “Beyond Risk: Premediation and the Post-9/11 Security Imagination” Security Dialogue Vol. 39, no. 2-3)

Premediation is a promising term to denote the discursive economies through which terrorist futures are imagined, because it draws attention to the cultural practices of mediation at work**.** It draws attention to the cultural work performed by news media and entertainment industries, as well as by security ‘experts’, consultants and policymakers **– whom Didier Bigo calls the ‘managers of unease’** – in envisioning possible terrorist futures (Bigo, 2002; see also Huysmans, 2006). The close conjunction between the Hollywood culture industry and these ‘managers of unease’ has long been noted by authors like James Der Derian (2001), who coined the term ‘military–industrial–media– entertainment network’ to denote this nexus. For example, Der Derian (2005: 30) notes how, shortly after 9/11, the Institute for Creative Technologies in California – which, according to its website, is dedicated to ‘building partnerships between the entertainment industry, army, and academia’ – began to gather Hollywood screenwriters and directors in order to ‘create possible terrorist scenarios that could be played out in their Marina del Rey virtual reality facilities’ (see also Campbell, 2003: 59–64; Boggs & Pollard, 2006).Security premediation is enabled through a broader turn to risk management as a security technology in diverse domains of **modern life (Simon, 2007; O’Malley, 2004). In the ‘war on terror’, technologies of risk management foster new security initiatives, such as automated passenger screening at borders** and the risk-based detection of suspicious financial transactions (Amoore & de Goede, 2008; Amoore, 2006; Sparke, 2006; Zureik & Salter, 2005). This deployment of risk in the ‘war on terror’ articulates two worlds of post-9/11 globalization: the world of legitimate and productive movement that is to be fostered and expedited, and the world of illegitimate and suspect movement that is to be stopped, questioned and detained. It is on the basis of risk assessment and calculation that ‘legitimate’ flows of money, goods and people are to be separated from the suspect, illegitimate and underground. As Sparke (2006: 13) writes of risk-based ‘smart border’ technologies, their promise is to deliver ‘economic liberty and homeland security with a hightech fix’. Risk and premediation, then, proceed from a shared desire: to imagine, harness and commodify the uncertain future. They share a technological history through their appeal to uncertainty as both a source of threat *and* a spur to creativity. As Pat O’Malley (2004: 4) shows in his exploration of particular representations of risk in management literatures, uncertainty was never *just* a threat to be subdued or eradicated, but was always celebrated for fostering ‘entrepreneurial creativity’ and ‘transformative power’. According to O’Malley (2004: 5), Uncertainty . . . is to be the fluid art of the possible. It involves techniques of flexibility and adaptability, requires a certain kind of ‘vision’ that may be thought of as intuition but is nevertheless capable of being explicated at great length in terms such as . . . ‘governing with foresight.’ Both premediation and (particular forms of) risk management straddle the paradox of celebrating uncertainty while desiring to eradicate it – fostering booming business practices in the process (see Baker & Simon, 2002b; Lobo- Guerrero, 2007). At the same time however, there are substantial differences between risk assessment and what Grusin calls premediation. Most importantly, premediation is not chiefly in the business of *forecasting*. As Grusin (2004: 28) argues, ‘premediation . . . is not necessarily about *getting the future right* as much as it is about trying to imagine or map out as many possible futures as could plausibly be imagined’ (emphasis added). Thus, whereas the logic of risk and forecasting centres on *prediction* of the future, premediation is more selfconsciously ‘creative’ in imagining a variety of futures – some thought likely, others far-fetched, some thought imminent, others long-haul – in order to *enable action in the present.* This is a difference not just in logic or purpose, but also in method: as Grusin (2004: 29) puts it, ‘a weather map does not premediate tomorrow’s storm in the way in which it will be mediated after it strikes’. Instead of the disembodied, statistical and at least seemingly objective method of the forecast, premediation scripts and mediates multiple futures ‘in ways that are almost indistinguishable from the way the future will be mediated when it happens’ (Grusin, 2004: 29). Arguably then, premediation is not about the future *at all*, but about enabling action in the present by visualizing and drawing on multiple imagined futures (Amoore, 2007b). Indeed, as we have seen above, the 9/11 Commission emphasizes precisely this call to action in the present when it understands the challenge of imagination to be ‘to figure out a way to turn a scenario into constructive action’ (9/11 Commission, 2004: 346, emphasis added).Through its self-conscious deployment of imagination, premediation can be understood to address itself to *risk beyond risk* (Ewald, 2002: 249). The imagined catastrophe driving premediation is seen to be simultaneously incalculable *and* demanding new methodologies of calculation and imagination. In this sense, it is akin to a politics of precaution, which, according to Claudia Aradau & Rens van Munster (2007, 2008) is the dispositif through which the ‘war on terror’ has to be understood. ‘Precautionary risk’, write Aradau & van Munster (2007: 101) ‘introduces within the computation of the future its very limit, the infinity of uncertainty and potential damage.’ It is in this very computation of the future at the limit, of course, that financial practices are historically experienced. Indeed, Melinda Cooper (2006: 119) draws out this affinity with speculation when she writes of the logic of precaution: ‘If the catastrophe befalls us, it is from a future without chronological continuity with the past. Though we might suspect something is wrong with the world . . . no mass of information will help us pin-point the precise when, where and how of the coming havoc. *We can only speculate’*.

## Answers

### AT: O’Tuathail

#### O’ Tuathail votes neg

O’ Tuathail, 96 (Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct)

Dalby's second point about the importance of disciplinary context merely reinforces my own caution about the utility of certain metatheoretical forms of early dissident IR within the distinct disciplinary context of political geography. I accept his point that these deconstructions may have been necessary within the context of IR's canon but the method of these deconstructions inevitably reproduced even as they challenged the very project of "theories of international relations." This is why I found David Campbell's attempt to move beyond metatheoretical interrogations of elite theorists to engage histories of the practice of foreign policy so welcome and worthy of note within political geography (and also why I prefer Walker (1988) over Walker (1993)). I fully support the attempts by dissident IR scholars to challenge the eurocentrism of the orthodoxy in their discipline. But part of this struggle is to question the type of knowledge academia creates (elitist or accessible and popular) and for whom it creates this knowledge. Dalby's third point builds upon what he suggests earlier about discourses of IR as a powerful part of the Cold War, an argument he inflates even further in pointing to their importance in "policing the global order and maintaining injustice, poverty and violence." The crucial point that I apparently miss is "the function of the discipline's knowledges as practices of hegemony..." There are two points to be made in response to these exceedingly general claims. First, I would argue that evocations of "hegemony" and "power" often function in decontextualizing ways in some post-structuralist writing. Pronouncing something as hegemonic does not tell us very much about the nature and mechanisms of hegemony; in fact, it seems to substitute for the necessity of documenting the precise nature of hegemony in many instances. I recognize that this is not always possible but, in this case at least, the claim is so broad as to be meaningless. Certainly the concept of hegemony needs to be carefully considered within critical geopolitics. Second, if we get more precise and examine the specific case of IR, there is an argument to be made that this subfield was actually not as powerful a discursive support for Cold War policies as Dalby claims. The number of top level U.S. foreign policy decision makers with Ph. D.'s in International Relations is actually quite tiny. Most have backgrounds in industry, finance, law, diplomatic service, and the military. The disciplining significance of IR and of academia in general is overestimated by Dalby. While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

#### Tuathail votes neg –

#### method shapes policy

Tuathail and Dalby 98 (G. Ó Tuathail, Associate Professor of Geography at Virginia Tech, and S. Dalby, professor of geography and political economy at Carleton University, [Re-Thinking Geopolitics](http://www.nvc.vt.edu/toalg/Website/Publish/Papers/ToalDalbyRethinkingIntro.pdf): Towards a Critical Geopolitics, Routledge, <http://www.nvc.vt.edu/toalg/Website/Publish/Papers/ToalDalbyRethinkingIntro.pdf>)

The essays in this volume demonstrate that there is no geopolitics that is ever `simply Geopolitical.' Geopolitics is already about more boundaries than those on a map, for those boundaries are themselves implicated in conceptual boundary- drawing practices of various kinds. Critical geopolitics is concerned as much with maps of meaning as it is with maps of states. The boundary-drawing practices we seek to investigate in this volume are both conceptual and cartographic, imagi­nary and actual, social and aesthetic. Critical geopolitics is particularly interested in analyzing the interdigitation of all these practices, in examining how certain conceptual spatializations of identity, nationhood and danger manifest themselves across the landscapes of states and how certain political, social and physical geo­graphies in turn enframe and incite certain conceptual, moral and/or aesthetic understandings of self and other, security and danger, proximity and distance, indifference and responsibility. Third, critical geopolitics argues that geopolitics is not a singularity but a plu­rality. It refers to a plural ensemble of representational practices that are diffused throughout societies. While not denying the conventional notion of geopolitics as the practice of statecraft by leaders and their advisors, critical geopolitics com­plements this with an understanding of geopolitics as a broad social and cultural phenomenon. Geopolitics is thus not a centered but a decentered set of practices with elitist and popular forms and expressions. A three-fold typology of geopo­litical reasoning is useful in loosely distinguishing the practical geopolitics of state leaders and the foreign policy bureaucracy from the formal geopolitics of the strategic community, within a state or across a group of states, and the popular geopolitics that is found within the artifacts of transnational popular culture, whether they be mass-market magazines, novels or movies. Each of these different forms of geopolitics has different sites of production, distribution and consumption. Linked together, as seen in Figure 0.1, they com­prise the geopolitical culture of a particular region, state or inter-state alliance. In understanding 'the geopolitical' as a broad socio-cultural phenomena it is important to appreciate both that geopolitics is much more than a specialized knowledge used by practitioners of statecraft and that the different facets of its practices are interconnected in various ways to quotidian constructions of iden­tity, security and danger. Geopolitics saturates the everyday life of states and nations. Its sites of production are multiple and pervasive, both 'high' (like a national security memorandum) and 'low' (like the headline of a tabloid news­paper), visual (like the images that move states to act) and discursive (like the speeches that justify military actions), traditional (like religious motifs in foreign policy discourse) and postmodern (like information management and cyber­war). While its conventionally recognized 'moment' is in the dramatic practices of state leaders (going to war, launching an invasion, demonstrating military force, etc.), these practices and the much more mundane practices that make up the conduct of international politics are constituted, sustained and given mean­ing by multifarious representational practices throughout cultures.

### AT: Kaufman

#### Kaufman goes neg---image of the enemy causes violence

**Kaufman 9** Stuart J, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” *Security Studies* 18:3, p. 433

There are no heroes in this story. Before Camp David, both sides undermined the fundamental premises of the Oslo process, land for peace, with the Israelis grabbing land and the Palestinians withholding peace. At Camp David, the Israelis’ opening position was absurdly stingy on substance, while the Palestinians seemed to reject not just Israeli proposals but Israel itself. After Camp David, those in charge of the guns on both sides—the Israeli mil- itary and Fatah—decided to resort to violence to try to force the other side’s hand. The two sides’ hard-line policies were the result of national identity narratives that created explosive symbolic issues and allowed too little room for either to acknowledge the legitimacy of the other’s concerns, while pre-disposing both sides to believe violence would be effective. As a result, the compromises necessary for a negotiated peace were not politically possible or even well understood by negotiators on either side, while violence was a popular alternative for both.

In sum, narratives of national identity justifying hostility, fears of extinction, and a symbolic politics of extremist mobilization were what drove the escalation of conflict. Arafat was constrained in his negotiations by the symbolic power of the refugee and Jerusalem issues—the former being the centerpiece of the Charter narrative and the latter being the pivotal issue in the Islamist and Declaration narratives. The resulting Palestinian rejection of Israeli symbolic claims on the Temple Mount and indifference to Israeli demographic concerns about a large-scale return of Palestinian refugees convinced Israelis that Palestinians did not accept real peace or Israel’s right to exist.

## Perms

### Sequencing DA

#### Sequencing DA to the perm

**Burke 7** (Anthony, lecturer at Adelaide University School of History and Politics, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: *War against the Other*, p. 31)

<This chapter remains focused on the aporias that lie at the heart of security, rather than pushing into the spaces that potentially lie beyond. This is another project, one whose contours are already becoming clearer and which I address in detail in Chapters 2 and 3.16 What this chapter builds is a genealogical account of security's origins and cultural power, its ability to provide what Walker calls a 'constitutive account of the political’ – as he says, 'claims about common security, collective security, or world security do little more than fudge the contradictions written into the heart of modern politics: we can only become humans, or anything else, after we have given up our humanity, or any other attachments, to the greater good of citizenship'.17 Before we can rewrite security we have to properly understand how security has written us – how it has shaped and limited our very possibility, the possibilities for our selves, our relationships and our available images of political, social and economic order. This, as Walker intriguingly hints, is also to explore the aporetic distance that modernity establishes between our 'humanity' and a secure identity defined and limited by the state. In short, security needs to be placed alongside a range of other economic, political, technological, philosophic and scientific developments as one of the central constitutive events of our modernity, and it remains one of its essential underpinnings.>

### Total Rejection

#### Complete rejection is critical

Neocleous 8 [Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encom passing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conﬂicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The con stant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conﬂicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efﬁcient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be ﬁlled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re afﬁrming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to ﬁll the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to ﬁght for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as signiﬁcant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justiﬁes the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different con ception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143

## Link

### Link – China Generic

#### The affirmative’s discourse surrounding China constitutes China as a foreign other to protect American identity. The K is prior—their discourse is part and parcel of the affirmative’s policy.

Turner 13—Oliver Turner is a Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester. He is the author of *American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy* (Routledge, forthcoming) [“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, FirstView Articles, pp 1-22, Cambridge University Press 2013]

In his analysis of the China Threat Theory Chengxin Pan argues that the ‘threat’ is an imagined construction of American observers.15 Pan does not deny the importance of the PRC's capabilities but asserts that they appear threatening from understandings about the United States itself. ‘[T]here is no such thing as “Chinese reality” that can automatically speak for itself’, Pan argues. ‘[T]o fully understand the US “China threat” argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature’.16 The geographical territory of China, then, is not separate from or external to, American representations of it. Rather, it is actively constitutive of those representations.17 The analysis which follows demonstrates that China ‘threats’ to the United States have to some extent always been established and perpetuated through representation and discourse. Michel Foucault described discourse as ‘the general domain of all statements’, constituting either a group of individual statements or a regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements.18 American discourse of China can therefore be manifest as disparate and single statements about that country or as collectives of related statements such as the China Threat Theory. Ultimately, American representations of China are discursive constructions of truths or realities about its existence. The article draws in part from the work of David Campbell who suggests that dangers in the international realm are invariably threats to understandings about the self. ‘The mere existence of an alternative mode of being’, argues Campbell, ‘the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible … is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.’19 As a result, interpretations of global danger can be traced to the processes by which states are made foreign from one another through discourses of separation and difference.20 In this analysis it is demonstrated that particular American discourses have historically made the US foreign from China. Case study one for example demonstrates that nineteenth-century racial discourses of non-white immigrant Chinese separated China from a United States largely defined by its presumed Caucasian foundations. In case study two we see that Cold War ideological discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the democratic-capitalist US. These types of discourses are shown to have constituted a ‘specific sort of boundary producing political performance’.21 Across the history of Sino-US relations then when ‘dangers’ from China have emerged, they have always been perceived through the lens of American identity. In consequence, they have always existed as dangers to that identity. In this analysis it is argued that a key purpose of depicting China as a threat has been to protect components of American identity (primarily racial and ideological) deemed most fundamental to its being. As such, representations of a threatening China have most commonly been advanced by, and served the interests of, those who support actions to defend that identity. The case study analyses which follow reveal that this has included politicians and policymaking circles, such as those within the administration of President Harry Truman which implemented the Cold War containment of the PRC. It also exposes the complicity of other societal individuals and institutions including elements of the late nineteenth-century American media which supported restrictions against Chinese immigration to the western United States. It is demonstrated that, twice before, this discursive process of separating China from the United States has resulted in a crisis of American identity. Crises of identity occur when the existing order is considered in danger of rupture. The prevailing authority is seen to be weakened and rhetoric over how to reassert the ‘natural’ identity intensifies.22 Case studies one and two expose how such crises have previously emerged. These moments were characterised by perceived attacks upon core assumptions about what the United States was understood to be: fundamentally white in the late nineteenth century and democratic-capitalist in the early Cold War. Case study three shows that while today's China ‘threat’ to US security is yet to generate such a crisis, we must learn from those of the past to help avoid the types of consequences they have previously facilitated. As Director Clapper unwittingly confirmed then the capabilities and intentions of a ‘rising’ China are only part of the story. International relations are driven by forces both material and ideational and the processes by which China is made foreign from, and potentially dangerous to, the United States are inseparable from the enactment of US China policy. This is because, to reaffirm, American discourses of China have never been produced objectively or in the absence of purpose or intent. Their dissemination is a performance of power, however seemingly innocent or benign.23 This is not to claim causal linkages between representation and foreign policy. Rather, it is to reveal the specific historical conditions within which policies have occurred, through an analysis of the political history of the production of truth.24 Accordingly, this analysis shifts from a concern with ‘why’ to ‘how’ questions. ‘Why’ questions assume that particular practices can happen by taking for granted the identities of the actors involved.25 They assume, for instance, the availability of a range of policy options in Washington from the self-evident existence of a China threat. ‘How’ questions investigate the production of identity and the processes which ensure that particular practices can be enacted while others are precluded.26 In this analysis they are concerned with how and why China ‘threats’ have come to exist, who has been responsible for their production and how those socially constructed dangers have established the necessary realities within which particular US foreign policies could legitimately be advanced. US China policy, however, must not be narrowly conceived as a ‘bridge’ between two states.27 In fact, it works on behalf of societal discourses about China to reassert the understandings of difference upon which it relies.28 Rather than a final manifestation of representational processes, then, US China policy itself works to construct China's identity as well as that of the United States. As the case study analyses show, it perpetuates discursive difference through the rhetoric and actions (governmental acts, speeches, etc.) by which it is advanced and the reproduction of a China ‘threat’ continues. In such a way it constitutes the international ‘inscription of foreignness’, protecting American values and identity when seemingly threatened by that of China.29 As Hixson asserts, ‘[f]oreign policy plays a profoundly significant role in the process of creating, affirming and disciplining conceptions of national identity’, and the United States has always been especially dependent upon representational practices for understandings about its identity.30 In sum, this article advances three principal arguments. First, throughout history ‘threats’ from China towards the United States have never been explicable in terms of material forces alone. They have in part been fantasised, socially constructed products of American discourse. The physical contours of Sino-American relations have been given meaning by processes of representation so that China has repeatedly been made threatening no matter its intentions. Second, representations of China ‘threats’ have always been key to the enactment and justification of US foreign policies formulated in response. Specifically, they have framed the boundaries of political possibility so that certain policies could be enabled while potential alternatives could be discarded. Third, US China policies themselves have reaffirmed discourses of foreignness and the identities of both China and the United States, functioning to protect the American identity from which the ‘threats’ have been produced.

### Link – South China Sea – Econ

#### Rhetoric of China’s aggression in the South China Sea and Taiwan is part of a larger discourse of economic securitization – turns case

Nilsson ‘12 (Fredrik, Lund University Graduate School in Poly Sci, “Securitizing China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ An Empirical Study of the U.S. Approach to Chinese Trade Practices, Military Modernization and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea”)

The main objective of this study was to investigate how the United States has approached elements of China’s economic growth and military modernization. By employing securitization theory and neorealist notions of security, I sought to reveal the transformation of the U.S. approach from being of a political nature to becoming issues of security. I employed a slightly modified model of securitization theory, emphasizing the importance of facilitating conditions and the institutional power of securitizing actors. I have argued that the United States has chosen to securitize a range of issues pertaining to China’s rise. The securitizations have been successful in instances where the facilitating conditions have been sufficient. However, securitization ought to be avoided, and the reasons for this become apparent in situations where attempts to securitize have failed, but where the echo of the attempt itself contributes to increased insecurity. Despite China’s claims of a peaceful rise, the United States approach to China’s increasing assertiveness in territorial disputes, its military modernization aimed at developing A2/AD capabilities, and the trade practices that are identified as unfair, is putting stains on a relationship vital to security and economic growth in the 21st century. I have suggested that the securitizations are embedded in a historically unique context and that these facilitating conditions are enabling securitizations that incorporate regional actors in a strategy to externally balance China. Furthermore, the construction of security is dependent not only on a single speech act but rather around these significant facilitating conditions, and sequences of coherent speech acts that shape a wider order of discourse around security. However, the empirics suggest that there are, at times, two orders of discourse operating side by side: one of control, and one of engagement. This is what the Chinese have called the ‘two-handed’ U.S. policy. This has complicated the analysis and the findings have at times been conflicting. The thesis studied securitizing acts in three sectors, and through the findings in the cases the following conclusions can be drawn: Firstly, in the political sector, China’s assertiveness and its subsequent threat to the UNCLOS and vital SLOCs prompted the U.S. to get involved in the South China Sea dispute in 2010. It did so by announcing its national interest in the freedom of navigation and placing the issue within the security realm by emphasizing the importance of security and stability for all nations. The referent object was somewhat difficult to identify since a national interest was emphasized, which would suggest the state being the referent object, but where the threat is posed to international order and law. With the referent object being international law and the established order, the U.S., posing as the main vanguard of these principles, aimed to securitize China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. This is also the case where regional dynamics became most prominent in the securitization process due to other actors’ difficulty to assert their legal claims against a vastly more powerful China. For example, Clinton implied that the U.S. would support the Philippines with the necessary means to protect itself from any aggressor in these disputes, and it would not accept any actor asserting its territorial claims through coercion or intimidation. The order of discourse shaped around the territorial disputes and on China’s harassment of vessels from various states, was clearly one drawing on the wider security discourse and the historical notion of China as a bully. Secondly, I looked at how the U.S. has approached China’s military modernization and how, despite major budget cuts, the Obama administration has emphasized the importance of U.S. operations in the region. The issue of China’s A2/AD capabilities has been identified in the security discourse as the main threat to U.S. commitments in the region, mainly with reference to Taiwan. It is clear from the analysis that the Pentagon is aiming to counter these capabilities by adopting the JOAC and the Air-Sea battle concept. It was, however, somewhat difficult to apply discourse analysis to issues so clearly pertaining to security. This section therefore had a clear neorealist twist to it. Nevertheless, the analytical framework and the discourse analysis illustrated that the aims of securitizations in the military sector were closely tied to those developing in the political sector and I argued that the extraordinary measures were aligned in what could be seen as a grand strategy where securitizations have been deemed a necessary evil. Thirdly, the securitizations of trade and the Chinese currency showcased a good example of security in the economic sector. It also illustrated how the intersubjective dimension in securitization is sometimes insignificant, as in the case of Obama’s executive order, which overrides normal political practice but nevertheless stays within the legal framework. However, the economic sector also illustrated that democratic practice sometimes makes the audience vital, as in the case of the CERORA. This showcased that there are different ways to securitize, and that different instances require distinctive approaches on behalf of the actor. It also illustrated that the performative force of a speech act is dependent on its embeddedness in a wider discourse. The CERORA was seen as too controversial and risky in the current economic climate, and the stakes were too high. China’s currency manipulation has thus not yet been lifted above normal economic practice. It is difficult to determine when an issue obtains security status without reproducing dominant ideas of security and to contribute to the political process of securitization. The temptation to, at times, see issues where there are none can to an extent be avoided by being critical to the speech acts, and by tracing coherence and continuity in the discursive practices. Therefore, as a contribution to the field of security studies on the U.S. approach to China, the empirical cases have illustrated that the U.S. approach is ambiguous, and that the Chinese perception of a two-handed approach is somewhat accurate. U.S. securitizing moves across the three sectors have been successful to a varying degree. This inconsistency complicated the analysis of securitizing acts but it also illustrated the fact that the construction of security goes beyond the speech act. In sum, these findings make up the answer to the research question. However, to follow the important developments in the region it is important that further studies are conducted, and to continuously trace change in the security of the Asia Pacific region. A missing piece is scholarly work conducted from a Chinese perspective, at least in English. I acknowledge that my approach is by its nature to some extent western-centric, and there are always two sides to a coin. Security is a different concept in different parts of the world, and as I stated in the thesis, it is highly dependent on regional and even national differences. The U.S. approach to China under the Obama administration, this thesis argued, is characterized by increasing competition, failure to cooperate on vital issues due to the possibility of a looming power-shift, and difficulties to facilitate the important economic growth of China under its current premises. According to this, and with the facilitating conditions outlined throughout the study, the United States has securitized elements of China’s economic growth and military development to protect American exceptionalism, the ILEO, American jobs and naval supremacy. These ambitions strain the relationship and moves the two powers further apart. As a result, security in the Asia Pacific is not becoming stronger, but might result in increasing unpredictability.

### Link – Econ Deliberation

#### Economic collapse rhetoric shuts down deliberation in favor of an immediate response—creates a violent state of exception that turns the case

Hanan ‘10— Ph.D, Prof of Communication @ Temple (Joshua Stanley, “Managing the Meltdown Rhetorically: Economic Imaginaries and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008”, dissertation The University of Texas at Austin)

By framing the proposed legislation in this particular light, Bush offers us a first example of how the neoliberal state of exception is manifested rhetorically in the sphere of policy. By describing the crisis as “extraordinary times” in need of “decisive action,” he is able to side step his administration’s problematic relationship to Wall Street and the present crisis. Since the economy is not operating normally but is instead in a state of disarray and chaos, the downturn must be addressed without normal argumentative debate. In his desire to postpone deliberation by emphasizing the exceptional nature of the crisis, Bush taps into a more general narrative that emerged during the creation and passage of EESA, namely ethical pragmatism. Like moral critique, ethical pragmatism deploys the state of exception enthymematically as a way of justifying EESA legislation. Unlike moral critique, however, ethical pragmatism links the exception to a completely different set of values. By bringing attention to temporary nature of the present situation, ethical pragmatism argues that deliberation and critique are the enemies. Since the Bush Administration is “working with Congress to address the root cause behind much of the instability in our markets,” this narrative contends the worst thing citizens can do right now is challenge the administration.304 The primary difference between these two rhetorical accounts can thus be located in the way they deploy the state of exception as an enthymeme to explain EESA and the government’s reaction to the present crisis. Whereas the moral critique implies that a state of exception has become a permanent practice under Bush, the latter tries to frame the state of exception as temporary action. Hence, insofar as the narrative of ethical pragmatism attempts to exempt itself from the problem by emphasizing authentic deliberation at a future point in time, it relies on a different model of the state of exception that is more justifiable. Turning now to our second policy artifact—that of Secretary Paulson—we see an additional rendering of ethical pragmatism. Delivered on September 23rd 2008 to the Senate Banking Committee, Paulson’s widely publicized address is particularly useful in illustrating how a temporary understanding of state of exception can be used as an enthymeme to circumvent moral critique.305By emphasizing the “urgent response” that the crisis demands, the former Goldman Sach’s CEO centers his argument on how EESA provides “market stability,” Organizing his narrative around a series of binaries, Paulson’s ethical pragmatism is predicated on the opposition between a healthy and sick economy. By arguing that “illiquid mortgage-related assets … are choking off the flow of credit which is so vitally important to our economy,” for example, Paulson renders the financial system a living entity that has been invaded by foreign agents.306 Through a viral process of multiplication, he illustrates how “[t]hese bad loans have created a chain reaction” that now threatens “the very health of our economy.”307In the same way that a virus can weaken a person’s entire immune system, Paulson wants his audience to see the economy as having been infected by a rapidly proliferating disease—one that must be eradicated quickly by experts, and without debate. By explaining the financial crisis through such metaphors, Paulson is able to argue that his legislation is aimed at excising these "troubled assets from the system.”308The measure is “designed for immediate implementation and [to] be sufficiently large to have maximum impact and restore market confidence.”309 Thus, by addressing the “underlying problem”—troubled assets that are dragging down the entire economy—he has devised an expert program to stabilize the financial system. This plan, while putting taxpayers on the line, will cost American families “far less than the alternative—a continuing series of financial institution failures and frozen credit markets unable to fund everyday needs and economic expansion.”310 It is at the end of Paulson’s speech, however, that we realize the primary goal of his narrative: the desire to frame EESA as a temporary state of exception. In spirit of the “bipartisan consensus for an urgent legislative solution,”311 Paulson argues that there is no time to deliberate and contest the parameters of this bill. Since this “troubled asset purchase program on its own is the single most effective thing we can do to … stimulate our economy,” we must trust Paulson’s authority as Treasury Secretary and pass the bill immediately.312 While it is true that “[w]hen we get through this difficult period…our next task must be to address the problems in our financial system through a reform program that fixes our outdated financial regulatory structure,” Paulson contends that “we must get through this period first.”313 Through his appeals to urgency and expedient action, Paulson’s narrative enthymematically invokes a seemingly temporary state of exception. Since the economy is sick and its pathogen is multiplying rapidly, debate and deliberation about whether EESA is the right form of interventionism must be postponed to a later point in time. While “[w]e must [eventually] have that critical debate” now is not the time to question the crisis of neoliberalism.314 As part of Bush’s executive branch we must trust Paulson when he says he has the “best interest of all Americans” in mind and not risk making the situation even worse. Despite residing in a different sphere of policy than Bush and Paulson, the third rhetor—Fed Chair Ben Bernanke—demonstrates how the narrative of ethical pragmatism can emerge in governmental avenues outside the Executive Branch. Delivered to multiple Congressional committees on September 24 and 25, 2008, Bernanke’s testimony represents perhaps the most explicit attempt to grapple with the contradiction between the Federal government's neoliberal history and its looming Keynesian intervention.315“Despite the efforts of the Federal Reserve, the …global financial markets remain under extraordinary stress," declares Bernanke, rationalizing why, in the case of the present downturn, the neoliberal privileging of monetary policy over fiscal policy will no longer suffice.316 Viewing capitalism through a rhetorical lens similar to that of Paulson, Bernanke describes how "stresses in financial markets have been high and have recently intensified significantly."317 As "rising mortgage delinquencies" spiral out of control and intersect other financial venues "the implications for the broader economy could be quite adverse."318 Bernanke thus declares that "[a]ction by the Congress is urgently required to stabilize the situation."319 If action is not taken immediately to avert the economy’s growing crisis, the situation may become even bleaker. Like Bush and Paulson, central to Bernanke's attitude toward EESA is the need for immediate action. While he acknowledges "the shortcomings and weaknesses of our financial markets and regulatory system" now is not the time to debate the policies underscoring the bill.320 The "development of a comprehensive proposal for reform would require careful and extensive analysis that would be difficult to compress into a short legislative timeframe now available."321 Bernanke thus believes that it "is essential to deal with the crisis at hand" and focus later on building a "stronger, more resilient, and better regulated financial system."322 While Bernanke believes the urgency of the situation is enough of a justification for passing EESA, he does have a response for those who may be critical of the bill’s interventionist tendencies: “Government assistance should be given with the greatest of reluctance,” adding that in the present case such attempts have already been exhausted.323Since the Federal Reserve already “attempted to identify private-sector approaches” but none were forthcoming, the government has no other choice but to bail out the financial sector. By rationalizing EESA as the only possible option, then, Bernanke's narrative of ethical pragmatism is meant to close off the possibility of dissent. For those that feel interventionism is a disgrace to free market capitalism, Bernanke has made it clear that "private-sector arrangements" were taken into account. On the other hand, for who those critique the government for "bailing out Wall Street," Bernanke's appeals imply that debate and deliberation will come at a later point in time. Thus through his stifling of opposition from all sides, Bernanke’s narrative of ethical pragmatism invokes the state of exception as the temporary justification for the government’s economic actions. The Exceptionality of Ethical Pragmatism Bush, Paulson and Bernanke all provide accounts that, while told in slightly different ways, use the strategy of ethical pragmatism to try to suspend critique and discussion. Whether emphasizing “extraordinary times,” “urgency,” or “lack of options,” Bush, Paulson, and Bernanke all invoke the state of exception as the enthymematic justification for their actions. The “exceptional” frame underscoring this series of arguments, then, offers an additional way to grasp why the dissenting narrative—moral critique—may have had so little impact on EESA’s legislation. By rendering of EESA as an emergency measure to save the economy, ethical pragmatism was able to defer debate. Moreover, since ethical pragmatism emerged from the very same sphere in which EESA was introduced—that of policy—it was able to supersede dissident narratives about the bill at an institutional level. Since the former, not the latter, narrative defined the parameters of the policy debate; ethical pragmatism had both a material and discursive advantage. Moral critique’s failure can thus be observed simultaneously in two different rhetorical/institutional contexts. In respect to its own rhetorical argument, moral critique’s use of the state of exception as an explanation for EESA’s passage negated its own critique by affirming that this technique of power does indeed exist. At the same time, through the narrative frame of ethical pragmatism, moral critique was deferred from the realm of policy. Since the “exceptionality” of the situation demanded a suspension of deliberation, it became justified to pass the bill without proper economic argument. We are thus left to conclude that the state of exception has both a discursive and extra-discursive reality since the institutional forms and discourses coincide with one another.

### Turns Case

#### Economic crisis rhetoric flips the case

Hanan ‘10— Ph.D, Prof of Communication @ Temple (Joshua Stanley, “Managing the Meltdown Rhetorically: Economic Imaginaries and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008”, dissertation The University of Texas at Austin)

But if the state of exception is useful for explaining the crisis of neoliberalism, how is it rhetorically manifested? Below I argue that, in the particular case of EESA, two rhetorical narratives—moral critique and ethical pragmatism—have produced a framework for understanding the tension between neoliberalism and Keynesianism.241 By implicitly rendering the Bush administration as a permanent state of exception, moral critique inadvertently negates the very deliberation it desires.242 At the same time, by appealing to the state of exception as a temporary strategy for overcoming the crisis, ethical pragmatism defers deliberation to a future point in time. Thus in the case of EESA we witness the rhetorical constitution of the state of exception in both the expert and policy sector. To illustrate this dual process of rhetorical negation and deferral, I first articulate the position of moral critique. As we will see, specific artifacts from Soros, Batra, Roubini, and Stiglitz highlight how expert discourses share a consistent narrative of disgust and moral reprehension in their figurative depiction of the Bush administration as the antagonist and profiteer of the present crisis.243 By deploying respectively, metaphors of “cronyism,” “crisis profiteering,” “binging and purging,” and “old-fashioned corrupt bribery” to convey their narratives, these rhetors all suggest the administration has rigged EESA to benefit the status quo and further reinforce existing social and economic hierarchies. Instead of creating substantive policy reform, however, moral critique’s structure serves to negate any such change. Since the state of exception is the narrative’s enthymematic explanation for the Bush administration’s abuse of power, the criteria of moral critique paradoxically ensures that its extra-juridical polemic will not be incorporated into EESA. In contrast to this narrative, I then articulate the position of ethical pragmatism. By illustrating how various politicians using this narrative deploy the state of exception in a different enthymematic fashion, I show how critical deliberation about the bill is continually deferred. As we will see, the remarks of Bush, Paulson, and Bernanke, all share a common emphasis on "extraordinary times," "urgency," and "lack of alternative," that allows them to frame their actions as exceptions to the rule.244As a consequence, the device of ethical pragmatism allows them to circumvent their accountability to the public by postponing critique and debate to a future point in time. Hence, in the same way the state of exception both constitutes and negates the expert voices, the same pervasive rhetorical logic is at work in those who speak with a policy voice.

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### Their ev

#### Costs are key – high Medicare costs trade off with aircraft carriers.

Curry 13, Tom, 10/27/13, “Budget bargainers will confront defense v. entitlements tradeoffs,” http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/budget-bargainers-will-confront-defense-v-entitlements-tradeoffs-f8C11469192, Accessed 4/17/14)//DR. H

During the Vietnam War, the phrase “guns versus butter” described the clash between military spending and domestic needs. Today, one way to think about the budget choices Congress faces is an aircraft carrier versus a year of hospice care for a million terminally-ill Medicare recipients.

A House-Senate conference committee begins work in earnest next week to design a budget for the current fiscal year and beyond. The committee faces a Dec. 13 deadline. The goal is to reduce the ever-growing burden of debt -- especially as Baby Boomers leave the workforce and start collecting Medicare and Social Security benefits.

In addition to the inevitable struggle over tax reform and -- for some people at least -- tax increases, the panel of 29 senators and House members will grapple with balancing spending priorities.

The price tag for that new aircraft carrier is $13 billion and rising. The cost of a year of hospice care for terminally ill Medicare recipients is about $16 billion.

In each case the costs are growing. “Gerald R. Ford,” the lead ship in the new generation of aircraft carriers is coming in well over budget. The ship will be christened in two weeks at Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia.

Its cost of construction has grown by more than 20 percent since Congress authorized it in 2008, according to a report last month by the Government Accountability Office.

Meanwhile, the demographics of the outsized Baby Boom generation are inevitably pushing Medicare costs higher and making Medicare a bigger and bigger piece of the federal spending pie.

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that over the next ten years, defense spending -- not including military retirement benefits and veterans’ benefits -- will increase by 25 percent to $724 billion while Medicare outlays increase by 86 percent to more than $1 trillion.

Building Navy ships and providing medical care for older people on Medicare are also both long-term budget commitments.

A worker who retires this year at age 65 becomes eligible for Medicare and has an average life expectancy of about 20 more years.

Every year the Navy submits to Congress its 30-year shipbuilding plan. The Defense Department’s shipbuilding plan calls for 266 ships to be built between now and 2043 at a cost of $580 billion.

Of course federal budgeting isn’t as simple as buying one item and not another, of trading a ship or a fleet of drones for a given number of days of hospital or hospice care. The job of the conference committee as it meets next week isn’t to decide whether or not to build another aircraft carrier, but to set the top-line targets for broad categories of spending.

But an aircraft carrier vs. a year of hospice care for people on Medicare does illustrate what Senate Budget Committee chairman Sen. Patty Murray, House Budget Committee chairman Paul Ryan and their colleagues will need to contend with.

Ryan and President Barack Obama have both said they want to do something to control Medicare’s cost growth. The Medicare cost cutting ideas Obama put on the table in his Fiscal Year 2014 budget proposal – some of which would require higher-income people to pay more for their benefits -- add up to about $268 billion in savings over ten years, about a three percent reduction in Medicare’s cumulative costs over that period.

### 2nc – no money

At best takes decades

**Sarewitz 12,** Co-Director – Consortium for Science, Policy & Outcomes, and Thernstrom, senior climate policy advisor – Clean Air Task Force, ‘12

(Daniel and Samuel, “Introduction,” in Energy Innovation at the Department of Defense: Assessing the Opportunities, March)

In the 2009 Defense Authorization Act, Congress instructed¶ DoD to consider the fully burdened costs of energy in future¶ acquisition decisions (i.e., life-cycle costs attributable to energy¶ consumption). As yet, no information on fully burdened energy¶ costs calculated under DoD’s implementing regulations appears¶ to be publicly available. More to the point, acquisition programs¶ take years to complete, and systems then remain in service for¶ decades. The major programs under way today will dominate¶ DoD energy consumption for the next half century. These¶ programs, such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, reflect decisions¶ made when DoD considered energy consumption primarily¶ as it affected platform range (and carbon footprint was of no¶ concern at all). The F-35 program began in the mid-1990s, when¶ oil sold for around $20 per barrel; low-rate production began in¶ 2005, testing and engineering development will continue until¶ at least 2018, and current plans call for cumulative deliveries of¶ 2,456 aircraft through 2035. Ongoing incremental changes to the¶ F-35’s engine, airframe, and flight controls will at best reduce fuel¶ consumption a little.¶ Major systems invariably cost too much for frequent¶ replacement, and consequently remain in service for lengthy¶ periods. Acquisition costs for the F-35, DoD’s most expensive¶ program, are expected to exceed $385 billion.17 Each Littoral¶ Combat Ship, exclusive of weapons modules, will cost some¶ $500 million (in 2011 dollars); the Navy hopes to buy 55.18 DoD¶ has purchased nearly 28,000 MRAPs for some $44 billion.19¶ Modifications or retrofitting to reduce the energy consumption¶ of existing systems, while frequently suggested, has almost¶ always been rejected as too costly, as for the Abrams. For the¶ B-52, designed in the early 1950s and still an Air Force mainstay,¶ “numerous re-engining studies over the years (at least nine¶ studies since 1984)” have reached the same conclusion: almost¶ regardless of future oil prices, total costs will rise.¶ Although the F-35’s 40-year acquisition cycle is extreme,¶ even low-cost, straightforward programs take so long to¶ complete that equipment may be obsolete by the time it¶ reaches the field. More than four-fifths of the 125,000 diesel¶ generators in DoD’s inventory are decades old, based on¶ designs laid down in the 1960s.20 They burn more fuel than¶ up-to-date equipment—in Iraq and Afghanistan consuming¶ greater quantities than armored vehicles, helicopters, or trucks¶ (including transport convoys that haul in the fuel)—and make¶ more noise, which can alert the enemy.21¶ The Army began work on a family of five new generators¶ (with capacities ranging from 5 to 60 kilowatts) in the late 1990s.¶ Pilot production of the first of these Advanced Medium Mobile¶ Power Sources (AMMPS) units began in 2011.22 Once they are in¶ full production, DoD plans to buy several thousand of the several¶ AMMPS models each year, an annual total of around 10,000.¶ AMMPS generators burn perhaps 20 percent less fuel, depending¶ on the model, than units purchased under the preceding Tactical¶ Quiet Generator (TQG) program, which themselves perform¶ better than the 1960s-era generators that still account for most¶ of DoD’s inventory. Production of TQG generators began in the¶ early 1990s, and procurement of some models will continue until¶ 2015 or beyond. It may take almost as long, two or three decades,¶ to turn over DoD’s inventory of diesel-powered generators as it¶ will to replace existing Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps fighters¶ with the futuristic F-35. The point is simple enough: shorter¶ acquisition cycles may be highly desirable, but repeated efforts¶ at reform since the 1960s have accomplished little; to cut energy¶ consumption over the next two or three decades, the services¶ have no real choice but to change their operating practices.

### 2nc – no war - generic

#### No US-China conflict

Allison & Blackwill 13 -- \*director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Douglas Dillon Professor at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government AND \*\*Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert D., 2013, "Interview: Lee Kuan Yew on the Future of U.S.- China Relations," http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/interview-lee-kuan-yew-on-the-future-of-us-china-relations/273657/)

Interview with Lee Kuan Yew, the founding prime minister of Singapore, one of Asia's most prominent public intellectuals, a member of the Fondation Chirac's honour committee

Competition between the United States and China is inevitable, but conflict is not. This is not the Cold War. The Soviet Union was contesting with the United States for global supremacy. China is acting purely in its own national interests. It is not interested in changing the world. There will be a struggle for influence. I think it will be subdued because the Chinese need the United States, need U.S. markets, U.S. technology, need to have students going to the United States to study the ways and means of doing business so they can improve their lot. It will take them 10, 20, 30 years. If you quarrel with the United States and become bitter enemies, all that information and those technological capabilities will be cut off. The struggle between the two countries will be maintained at the level that allows them to still tap the United States. Unlike U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, there is no irreconcilable ideological conflict between the United States and a China that has enthusiastically embraced the market. Sino-American relations are both cooperative and competitive. Competition between them is inevitable, but conflict is not. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and China are more likely to view each other as competitors if not adversaries. But the die has not been cast. The best possible outcome is a new understanding that when they cannot cooperate, they will coexist and allow all countries in the Pacific to grow and thrive. A stabilizing factor in their relationship is that each nation requires cooperation from and healthy competition with the other. The danger of a military conflict between China and the United States is low. Chinese leaders know that U.S. military superiority is overwhelming and will remain so for the next few decades. They will modernize their forces not to challenge America but to be able, if necessary, to pressure Taiwan by a blockade or otherwise to destabilize the economy. China's military buildup delivers a strong message to the United States that China is serious about Taiwan. However, the Chinese do not want to clash with anyone -- at least not for the next 15 to 20 years. The Chinese are confident that in 30 years their military will essentially match in sophistication the U.S. military. In the long term, they do not see themselves as disadvantaged in this fight.

### 2nc

#### No South China Sea conflict or escalation – their evidence is media exagerration

**Kania 13** – The Harvard Political Review is a journal of politics and public policy published by the Institute of Politics, cites Andrew Ring, a former Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Fellow, and Peter Dutton, Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College (Elsa, 01/11, “The South China Sea: Flashpoints and the U.S. Pivot,” http://harvardpolitics.com/world/the-south-china-sea-flashpoints-and-the-u-s-pivot/)

Equilibrium and Interdependence? One paradox at the heart of the South China Sea is the uneasy equilibrium that has largely been maintained. **Despite** the occasional confrontation and **frequent** diplomatic **squabbling, the situation has never escalated into full-blown physical conflict**. The main stabilizing factor has been that the countries involved have too much to lose from turmoil, and so much to gain from tranquility. Andrew Ring—former Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Fellow—emphasized that “With respect to the South China Sea, we all have the same goals” in terms of regional stability and development. With regional **trade flows and interdependence** critical to the region’s growing economies, conflict could be devastating. Even for China—the actor with by far the most to gain from such a dispute—taking unilateral action would **irreparably tarnish its image** in the eyes of the international community. With the predominant narrative of a “rising” and “assertive China”—referred to as a potential adversary by President Obama in the third presidential debate—China’s behavior in the South China Sea may be sometimes **exaggerated or sensationalized**. Dr. Auer, former Naval officer and currently Director of the Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation at the Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies, told the HPR that “China has not indicated any willingness to negotiate multilaterally” and remains “very uncooperative.” Across its maritime territorial disputes—particularly through recent tensions with Japan in the East China Sea—Auer sees China as having taken a very aggressive stance, and he claims that “Chinese behavior is not understandable or clear.” Nonetheless, in recent incidents, such as a standoff between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal this past April, as Bonnie Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, emphasized, “this is not an either or.” Multiple parties are responsible for the tensions, yet the cycle of action and reaction is **often obscured**. Nonetheless, Glaser believes that “The Chinese have in every one of these cases overreacted—they have sought to take advantage of the missteps of other countries,” responding with disproportionate coercion. In addition, China has begun to use methods of “economic coercion” to assert its interests against trade partners. A Tipping Point? Has the dynamic in the South China Sea shifted recently? Perhaps not in a fundamental sense. But with the regional military buildup, governments have developed a greater capacity to pursue longstanding objectives. According to Peter Dutton, Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, “China’s recent behavior in the East China Sea and assertive policy in the South China Sea” is “a serious concern.” He believes that China’s willingness to resort to force in defense of its territorial claims has been increasing over time, partially as a consequence of its rising power. As such, Dutton sees the situation as reaching a “tipping point in which China is…no longer satisfied with shelving the dispute.” Is confrontation or resolution imminent? Worryingly, Dutton observes, “the international dynamic in the region is motivated largely by fear and anger.” However, **the use of unilateral military force would be a lose-lose for China**,” particularly in terms of its credibility, both among its neighbors and in the international community. The Pivot in the South China Sea From a U.S. perspective, a sustained American presence in the region has long been the underpinning of peace and stability. However, excessive U.S. intervention could disrupt the delicate balance that has been established. Although the U.S. has always sought to maintain a position of neutrality in territorial disputes, remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that referred to the South China Sea as the “West Philippine Sea” led China to challenge U.S. impartiality. If the U.S. engages with its regional allies without seeking enhanced engagement with China, then U.S. actions in the region may be perceived by China as efforts at containment. Moreover, as the U.S. strengthens ties to partners in the region, there is risk of entanglement if conflict were to break out. There has long been an undercurrent of tension between the Philippines and China—most recently displayed in the standoff over the Scarborough Shoal in May 2012. Shortly thereafter, in a visit to Washington D.C., President Aquino sought U.S. commitment to military support of the Philippines in the event of conflict with China on the basis of the 1952 Mutual Defense Treaty. However, despite providing further military and naval support, the U.S. has refrained from making concrete commitments. Although the U.S. would not necessarily be dragged into a dispute, if a confrontation did break out, it might feel compelled to respond militarily to maintain the credibility of commitments to allies and partners in the region. Strong ties to the U.S. and enhanced military capacity could also provoke more confrontational behavior from U.S. partners. Yet, Ring emphasizes that the U.S. navy and military are also unique in the “ability to facilitate military cooperation and communication among all of the claimants” and particularly to “be that bridge…uniquely situated to build some flows of communication” **that could facilitate a peaceful resolution to future incidents.**

#### No SCS escalation – interdependence

Kania 13 [Elsa Kania, Harvard Political Review, 1/11/13, “The South China Sea: Flashpoints and the U.S. Pivot,” <http://www.iop.harvard.edu/south-china-sea-flashpoints-and-us-pivot>, accessed 9/14/13, JTF]

One paradox at the heart of the South China Sea is the uneasy equilibrium that has largely been maintained. Despite the occasional confrontation and frequent diplomatic squabbling, **the situation has never escalated into full-blown physical conflict.** The main stabilizing factor has been that the countries involved have too much to lose form turmoil, and so much to gain from tranquility. Andrew Ring—former Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Fellow—emphasized that “With respect to the South China Sea, we all have the same goals” in terms of regional stability and development. With regional trade flows and interdependence critical to the region’s growing economies, conflict could be devastating. Even for China—the actor with by far the most to gain from such a dispute—taking unilateral action would irreparably tarnish its image in the eyes of the international community. With the predominant narrative of a “rising” and “assertive China”—referred to as a potential adversary by President Obama in the third presidential debate—China’s behavior in the South China Sea may be sometimes exaggerated or sensationalized. Dr. Auer, former Naval officer and currently Director of the Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation at the Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies, told the HPR that “China has not indicated any willingness to negotiate multilaterally” and remains “very uncooperative.” Across its maritime territorial disputes—particularly through recent tensions with Japan in the East China Sea—Auer sees China as having taken a very aggressive stance, and he claims that “Chinese behavior is not understandable or clear.”

**Peace**

**Discourses of peace mask geopolitical security by monopolizing the state’s right to commit violence**

**Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 8 (Michael and Luis, Professor of Politics and Research Fellow at the University of Lancaster, Biopolitics of security in the 21st century: an introduction, review of international studies)**

Modern times have been distinguished by at least two great problematisations of security. Foucault retells the story of the one (geopolitics) as he introduces his novel account of the other (biopolitics).27 The first, revolving around the referent object of sovereign territoriality has been that traditional geopolitical narrative of security which emerged with the establishment of the European state system following the Peace of Augsburg and the Treaty of Westphalia. This military strategic international relations discourse of security came to dominate our modern discourses of security. It articulates what amounts to a needs or value hierarchy in which security is posited as a universal value that is foundational to the very possibility of individual and collective life. Politics emerges from a social contract, founded in this needs hierarchy. It takes the form of a protection racket in which loyalty to state authority is derived from the threat of insecurity said to follow from not having the protection of the state; which apparatuses, in practice, do most of the threatening. The state must therefore always secure its monopoly of the legitimate use of force as the primary security provider. In order to do so it must similarly also monopolise the legitimate definition of threat on the basis of which its claim to monopolise the legitimate use of force is ultimately grounded. Such an account of security has ramified into a whole variety of subsidiary concerns including, for example, civil/military relations; the relative mix of military and other forces which state power (hard and soft) must deploy; the impact of the emergence of international and non-state actors on the state security system; and an irresolvable ‘level of analysis’ debate concerning the radically undecidable relation between individual and collective security. Every traditional geopolitical discourse of security invokes security as the limit condition. War in particular operates as the privileged locus of the real for traditional security analysis; the reality said to trump all other realities in the hierarchy of values and needs that underpin its traditional geostrategic discourses. War here is, of course, construed as one of the instrumental means available to the state as actor. In an earlier lecture series pursuing these themes, however, Foucault controversially reverses Clausewitz’s dictum that war is the extension of politics by other means.28 He argues instead that war is not an instrument available to a political subject, but a grid of intelligibility from which modern accounts of liberal political subjectivity, in particular, arise. One might therefore gloss Foucault, here, and say that security discourse is the logos of war expressed as a logos of peace. In that sense, **political modernity is the extension of war by other means**; global liberal governance, **especially, once it becomes the only remaining standard** bearer of political modernity as a governmental project.

## ADV 2

### 2nc – no impact

#### Global economy’s resilient---learned lessons from ‘08

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf>

It is equally possible, however, that a renewed crisis would trigger a renewed surge in policy coordination. As John Ikenberry has observed, “the complex interdependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates some expanding realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system.”103 The post-2008 economic order has remained open, entrenching these interests even more across the globe. Despite uncertain times, the open economic system that has been in operation since 1945 does not appear to be closing anytime soon.

### Cyprus- THEIR EV

#### Medical tourism offers a life vest for Cyprus’s economy.

Peratikos 13, Polis Peratikos, Cyprus Health Service Promotion Board Officer, International Medical Travel Journal, “Cyprus... at the crossroads of medical tourism,” http://www.imtj.com/articles/2013/cyprus-medical-tourism-30175/, Accessed 4/16/14)//DR. H

Cyprus was one of the first entrants into the European medical tourism sector, and, at an early stage, the country established a national initiative to promote medical tourism. IMTJ spoke to Polis Peratikos, Executive Secretary of the Cyprus Health Services Promotion Board about the current market situation in Cyprus and future plans for medical tourism to Cyprus.

Can you provide a brief overview of the role of Cyprus Health Services Promotion Board in the development of Medical Tourism to Cyprus?

Cyprus is a long established tourist destination with an international reputation. It has been an EU member since 2004 which ensures that all the necessary EU directives are introduced and incorporated into national legislation. It is also in the Euro zone which enables people to budget easily for their expenditures. And... it has a unique position at the continental crossroads between Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East making itself easily accessible.

Health tourism services in Cyprus have seen marked growth and improvement over recent years, creating the need for an organisation whose main concern would be to place Cyprus on the global medical tourism map through a variety of actions.

In 2006, the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce & Industry took the initiative and established the Cyprus Health Services Promotion Board a non-profit organisation whose membership consists of all the major hospital, clinics, doctors and other stakeholders of the medical tourism industry in Cyprus.

The Cyprus Health Services Promotion Board works closely with the Cyprus Tourism Organisation, the Ministry of Energy Commerce Industry and Tourism, the Ministry of Health, the Cyprus Medical Association and the Cyprus Dental Association. All of these organisations serve as ex-officio members on the board of directors of the Cyprus Health Services Promotion Board, enhancing our efforts to promote Cyprus and expand the island’s medical tourism industry.

The majority of our actions are funded by the CTO and the Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism; many of our events are co-organised with the medical and the dental associations.

How is Cyprus doing in the Medical Tourism market?

Medical tourism is a relatively new sector in Cyprus and for this reason there are no actual figures regarding the exact number of patients visiting the country. However, the number of treatment requests is constantly increasing, mainly for dental services, cosmetic and spine surgeries, fertility treatments (IVF) and a vast range of other medical and wellness treatments.

Cyprus is particularly attractive to the UK market, as English is widely spoken throughout the island and due to the fact that most of our doctors are familiar with the UK healthcare system. Other important markets for Cyprus are Germany, the Netherlands, Russia and the Middle East.

Is the market growing /declining/static?

Medical tourism is undoubtedly a growing sector for our tourist industry. Several private initiatives have managed to attract patients from all over the world including the US. The reasonably priced health care, the well-equipped technologically – sophisticated hospitals and clinics, the high nursing standards together with the high standards of tourism as well as our traditional hospitality makes Cyprus a quality destination for medical tourism.

How have the recent EU and economic problem effected healthcare in Cyprus and medical tourism in particular?

We see the crisis as an opportunity for further development. Organisational and structural reforms are already taking place and due to the financial crisis more stakeholders have been in search for new niche markets such as medical tourism. Despite the challenging economic environment, we are witnessing new investment opportunities both for the medical and wellness sector in Cyprus; investments that will enhance our product and quality of treatment.

What is the strategy for Cyprus in medical tourism?

After identifying that medical tourism can become a fundamental pillar of our economy, the Cyprus Tourism Organisation conducted a strategy aiming to establish our island as a popular destination for health travellers. This strategy contains views, opinions of all the stakeholders of the medical tourism industry including hospitals, individual doctors, hotel managers, spa and wellness centers, travel agency companies, medical coordinators, government officials and many more. The main markets for Cyprus have been identified as the UK, Russia and the Middle East. Of course as previously mentioned generally all the countries of the EU are equally important.

#### No invades

### East Asia

#### No chance

Beauchamp, M.Sc IR – LSE, writer – ThinkProgress, former GDS debater, 2/7/14

(Zach, “Why Everyone Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China,” ThinkProgress)

This is all dramatically overblown. War between China and Japan is more than unlikely: it would fly in the face of most of what we know about the two countries, and international relations more broadly. It’s not that a replay of 1914 is impossible. It’s just deeply, vanishingly unlikely.

Power

One of the easiest ways to evaluate the risks of Sino-Japanese war is by reference to three of the most important factors that shape a government’s decision to go to war: the balance of power, economic incentives, and ideology. These categories roughly correspond to the three dominant theories in modern international relations (realism, liberalism, and constructivism), and there’s solid statistical evidence that each of them can play a significant role in how governments think about their decisions to use military force. So let’s take them in turn.

The main source of tension is an East China Sea island chain, called the Senkakus in Japan and Diaoyus in China. While there are other potential flashpoints, the current heightened tensions are centered on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Japan currently controls the islands, but China claims them, and the Chinese military has made increasingly aggressive noises about the islands of late.

But there’s one big factor shaping the balance of power in East Asia that means the talk is likely to remain just that: nuclear weapons. The tagline for World War I in 1914 — “The War To End All Wars” — would have a decidedly different meaning in 2014, as war’s end would be accomplished by the world’s end. So whereas, in 1914, all of the European powers thought they could win the war decisively, East Asia’s great powers recognize the risk of a nuclear exchange between the United States and China to be catastrophic. Carleton University’s Stephen Saideman calls this the end of the “preemption temptation;” nobody thinks they can win by striking first anymore. Indeed, despite the words of some of its military leaders, China (at least nominally) has a no-clash-with-Japan policy in place over the islands.

That also helps explain why the most commonly-cited Senkaku/Diaoyu spark, accidental escalation, isn’t as likely as many suggest. When The Wall Street Journal’s Andrew Browne writes that there’s a “real risk of an accident leading to a standoff from which leaders in both countries would find it hard to back down in the face of popular nationalist pressure,” he’s not wrong. But it won’t happen just because two planes happen across each other in the sky. In 2013, with tensions running high the whole year, Japan scrambled fighters against Chinese aircraft 433 times.

Indeed, tensions have flared up a number of times throughout the years (often sparked by nationalist activists on side of the other) without managing to bleed over into war. That’s because, as MIT East Asia expert M. Taylor Fravel argues, there are deep strategic reasons why each side is, broadly speaking, OK with the status quo over and above nuclear deterrence. China has an interest in not seeming like an aggressor state in the region, as that’s historically caused other regional powers to put away their differences and line up against it. Japan currently has control over the islands, which would make any strong moves by China seem like an attempt to overthrow the status quo power balance. The United States also has a habit of constructive involvement, subtly reminding both sides when tensions are spiking that the United States — and its rather powerful navy — would prefer that there be no fighting between the two states.

Moreover, the whole idea of “accidental war” is also a little bit confusing . Militaries don’t just start shooting each other by mistake and then decide it’s time to have a war.

Rather, an incident that’s truly accidental — say, a Japanese plane firing on a Chinese aircraft in one of the places where their Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) overlap — changes the incentives to go to war, as the governments start to think (perhaps wrongly) that war is inevitable and the only way to win it is to escalate. It’s hard to envision this kind of shift in calculation in East Asia, for all of the aforementioned reasons.

Money

It’s wrong to talk about incentives to go war in purely military terms. A key component of the Senkaku/Diaoyou is economic: the islands contain a ton of natural resources, particularly oil and gas. But far more valuable are the trade ties between the two countries. China is Japan’s largest export market, so war would hurt Japan more than China, but it’d be pretty painful for both.

Proponents of the World War I parallel find a lot to criticize about this point. They like to cite Norman Angell, a pre-World War I international relations theorist famous for arguing that war was becoming economically obsolete. Angell is now often used interchangeably with Dr. Pangloss in international relations talk, a symbol of optimism gone analytically awry.

But Angell gets a bad rap. He didn’t actually say war was impossible; he merely claimed that it no longer was worth the cost (if you remember the aftermath of World War I, he was right about that). The real upshot of Angell’s argument is that, unless there’s some other overwhelming reason to go to war, mutually profitable trade ties will serve as a strong deterrent to war.

Angell may have been wrong about Europe, but he’s probably right about East Asia. M.G. Koo, a political scientist at Chung-Ang University, surveyed several Senkaku-Diaoyu flareups between 1969 and 2009. He found that economic ties between the two countries played an increasingly large role in defusing tensions as the trade relationship between the two countries deepened.

The 1978 crisis over the islands is a good example. Bilateral trade had grown substantially since the end of the last big dispute (1972), but they had entered into a new phase after Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms began in 1978. A key part of the early modernization plan was the Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT) with Japan, a diplomatic treaty that (among other things) “facilitated a rush of Japanese firms into the Chinese market.” According to Koo, “policy circles in China and Japan” had “increasingly recognized that the [Senkaku/Diaoyu] sovereignty issue could possibly jeopardize the PFT negotiations, thus undermining economic gains.” The leadership tamped down tensions and, afterwards, “shelving territorial claims for economic development seemingly became the two countries’ diplomatic leitmotif in the treatment of the island dispute.”

There’s reason to believe today’s China and Japan aren’t bucking the historical pattern. Despite a year of heated rhetoric and economic tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, bilateral trade has been recovering nicely of late. Quartz’s Matt Phillips, looking over the numbers, concluded that “the China-Japan trade war is pretty much over.” Sure, Chinese business leaders are making some nationalistic noises, but Phillips points out that the “lack of mass, nationalistic protests in China suggests the powers-that-be have decided there’s no need for that to hurt an important business relationship.” Trade really does appear to be calming the waves in the East China Sea.

Nationalism

The last thing people worried about war between China and Japan cite is ideology. Specifically, a growing nationalism, linked to the history of antagonism between the two traditional East Asian powers, that threatens to overwhelm the overwhelming military and economic rationales that militate against war.

“At its root,” Asia experts Tatsushi Arai and Zheng Wang write, “the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute is an identity-based conflict in which the divergent memories, perceptions, attitudes, and aspirations of the two national communities combine in volatile combinations.” The gist of the problem is that both countries believe they have historical claims to the islands that extend at least back to 1895; Chinese books date its control way back in the Ming Dynasty. Japan claims it formally annexed the Senkakus after World War II; China claims that Japan should have handed the Diaoyus back as part of its post-World War II withdrawal from Chinese territory.

This historical conflict cuts across modern lines of tension in particularly dangerous ways. Japan, always threatened by China’s overwhelming size, is baseline skeptical of China’s military and economic rise. Aggressive moves in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute suggest to Japanese citizens that China’s plan is to eclipse and ultimately dominate Japan. China, by contrast, still has deep, visceral memories of the brutal Japanese occupation during World War II, and its history books cast Japan as the enemy responsible for its subordinate status in the past two centuries of global politics. Japanese defenses of the Senkakus come across as, once again, an attempt to keep China down.

**Disorder Reps**

**Representations of disorder prop up sovereign power – these spaces are considered exceptions to order, making the manifestation of extreme violence to reassert power an inevitability**

**Rajaram, Dept of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, in ‘6**

**[Prem Kumar,. Alternatives 31, Dystopic Geographies of Empire]**

Foucault understands modern politics as a process of disciplining bodies, thereby creating governable subjectivities. Specific power structures and relations give to the body characteristics generally taken to be inherent to it (such as sexuality). Giorgio Agamben adds to (or distorts) Foucaultian biopower with his conception of homo sacer and the state of exception.16 Agamben focuses especially on a by-effect of the creation of politicized or governable bodies: a remainder or excess, a no-longer-human. The homo sacer is the bare or depoliticized life that is distinguished from politicized forms of life, most clearly manifest in the citizen. Indeed, Agamben argues that the bare life is an excess or by-product of the production of politicized life. Politics for Agamben is an ongoing process of clarification between inclusion and exclusion, between forms of life that the sovereign will protect and represent and those it will not.17 Homo sacer thus “emerges at the point where law suspends itself.”18 The colonial ordering of space through processes of discipline centered on the body inaugurates a space of exception to which the excess or remainder of the process of creating politicized subjects

(or at least subjects perceptible under the structure of recognition produced by the ordering of colonial space) is confined. The process of placing outside is not a casting of the exception out of the norm but rather holding the exception in thrall to the norm. This is a process of “boundary promulgation and boundary perturbation,”19 inaugurating a paradoxical juridico-political space where boundaries denoting and separating an inside from an outside no longer function: The space declared improper for politics is singled out and indicated as the space of politics properly speaking. . . . Bare life, declared outside, is by the same token factually singled out as the object, the inside, the territory par excellence of political action.20 The topography of modern political space is best articulated in terms of a system where the boundary between inside and outside collapses: The exception is situated in a symmetrical position with respect to the example, with which it forms a system. Exception and example constitute the two modes by which a set tries to found and maintain its own coherence.21 This topography works as a system or set in which the border loses its capacity to serve as an instrument or tool of separation precisely because rule and exception, inside and outside, are not distinct from each other, but exist in thrall to each other. The dystopic geography of colonialism imagines putrid spaces. Such imaginations or representation allow for the vindication of processes of order and discipline that transform the space into governable and exploitable place. Imaginations of dystopia contribute to theorizations of the incidents of brutalization and violence. It does not however account adequately for incidents of violence that appear to serve no clearly identifiable disciplinary purpose. Cocky Hahn’s kick is directed not at one who is simply marginalized but one, in Derek Gregory’s Agambenian terminology, “placed beyond the margins.” 22 Indeed the kick is operative; it is an act of placing beyond.