# 1nc

## 1NC – ptx

#### Immigration coming now – Boehner wants a vote

CBS News, 4/25

(Jake Miller, “John Boehner mocks House Republicans for avoiding immigration reform,” <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/john-boehner-mocks-house-republicans-for-avoiding-immigration-reform/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+cbsnews%2Ffeed+(CBSNews.com)>

House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, mocked his Republican colleagues for being too scared to reform the nation's immigration laws during a speech Thursday in his home district.¶ ¶ "Here's the attitude: 'Ohhhh. Don't make me do this. Ohhhh. This is too hard,'" he told a meeting of the Middletown Rotary Club.¶ ¶ "We get elected to make choices. We get elected to solve problems and it's remarkable to me how many of my colleagues just don't want to," he continued. "They'll take the path of least resistance."¶ ¶ Boehner said his work pushing the House of Representatives to deal with immigration reform has earned him a few bruises. "I've had every brick and bat and arrow shot at me over this issue just because I wanted to deal with it. I didn't say it was going to be easy," he said.¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ In a strong bipartisan vote last June, the Senate passed a comprehensive immigration reform bill, including a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. House Republican leaders have said they will not schedule a vote on the Senate bill, and the lower chamber has not advanced a comprehensive bill of its own, though several smaller measures on border security and immigration law enforcement have cleared the House Judiciary Committee.¶ President Obama and congressional Democrats have roasted the House for failing to act on immigration reform. They've accused Boehner of appeasing his party's far right wing at the expense of sensible, bipartisan policy. Even some Senate Republicans have predicted that the Senate bill would pass if Boehner ever brought it to the floor.¶ ¶ Boehner, ultimately the only person who could force the House to vote on a bill, has said he recognizes the nation's immigration system is broken, but he's also said he doesn't want to get out in front of his conference - that he wants the House to "work its will" on immigration.¶ ¶ His tone on Thursday could be a sign that the speaker is prepared to administer a dose of tough medicine to House Republicans, but it may also earn him a few more bruises from his party's right flank.¶

#### Drains capital – Backlash and hostage taking on unrelated priority legislation is empirically proven, likely in future and specifically true for Rubio

LeoGrande, 12

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The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### PC Key

**Mali 4-17**

Obama: Immigration reform will be 'issue that haunts' GOP

BY [MEGHASHYAM MALI](http://washingtonexaminer.com/author/meghashyam-mali) is an assistant managing editor of the Washington Examiner. He previously served as an online editor for the Hill.| APRIL 17, 2014

President Obama said that [immigration reform](http://washingtonexaminer.com/section/immigration) would be an “issue that haunts” Republicans if they failed to act and pressed [House](http://washingtonexaminer.com/obama-immigration-reform-will-be-issue-that-haunts-gop/article/www.washingtonexaminer.com/politics/house-of-representatives) Speaker JohnBoehner, R-Ohio, to use his “political capital” to find a solution. “There's always gonna be a limit to what I can do in the absence of action by [Congress](http://washingtonexaminer.com/politics/congress),” Obama said in an interview aired Thursday on "CBS This Morning." “I think it is very important for Congress to recognize that this is going to be an issue that haunts them until it gets solved.” A comprehensive bill passed the [Senate](http://washingtonexaminer.com/section/senate) last year, but House Republicans say they will address the issue with a piecemeal approach focusing first on border security. House GOP leaders unveiled their own principles for reform earlier this year, but quickly shelved plans to act. Boehner said it was unlikely immigration reform would pass before [November's midterms](http://washingtonexaminer.com/section/2014-elections) and has ignored Democratic calls to bring the Senate bill to a vote. Obama has pressed Republicans on immigration, urging them in a statement Wednesday to “listen to the will of the American people” and pass comprehensive reform. Republicans say Obama must do more to enforce laws already on the books and accuse him of using the issue for political gain ahead of November. House Majority Leader [Eric Cantor](http://washingtonexaminer.com/section/eric-cantor), R-Va., spoke to Obama about immigration reform on Wednesday, blasting the president after in a statement for what he called “partisan messaging.” “We have a window in this legislative session. I think that the speaker, John Boehner, is sincere about wanting to get it done,” Obama said in the interview. “But so far, at least, he has not been willing to spend the political capital to move his caucus to allow a vote in the House.” Obama is also facing pressure from immigrant rights groups to use executive action to halt all deportations but has resisted those calls, saying that meaningful reform must come from Capitol Hill.

#### Immigration reform expands skilled labor—spurs relations and economic growth in China and India.

LA Times 11/9/12 [Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world\_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html]

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China." There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

#### US-Indian relations avert South Asian nuclear war.

Schaffer 2 [Spring 2002, Teresita—Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Security, Washington Quarterly, Lexis]

Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can benefit by closer cooperation. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

## 1NC – Generic – Warming/Water Wars

**The plan’s untouchable fiat designates it as an off-budget project — this has a snowball effect** **- and independently destroys the economy**

**Greenspan 96** (Former FRB Chairman, 4-17, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 142 Cong Rec H 3497)

On behalf of myself and the other members of the Board, I am pleased to respond to your letter of September 26requesting comment on proposals to move the transportation trust funds off-budget. As a general matter, it has been the practice of the Board not to take positions on the details of the individual tax and spending issues that are before the Congress. However, the shifting of certain spending categories off-budget raises some broader concerns, with implications for discipline and control over federal outlays. Notably, moving some spending categories off-budget would lead to fragmentation of the budgeting process and would detract from the unified budget as an indicator of the government's fiscal operations and hence of the **impact** of the U.S. budget on credit markets and **the economy**. Moreover, it could **weaken the ability of** the **Congress to prioritize and control spending effectively**. As the letters from OMB Director Rivlin and former-OMB Director Miller make clear, responsible budgeting requires a comprehensive framework for setting priorities and assessing competing claims on national resources. The unified budget, as commonly presented to include the social security trust funds, combines all fiscal transactions in one place. It thus helps policymakers and the public understand the trade-offs among government programs, and between public and private spending. Moreover, as the focal point of the budget process, it places individual programs on a more comparable footing as they compete for federal funding and thus helps the President and the Congress to resolve competing demands on the nation's resources. Moving programs off-budget raises the risk that resource trade-offs would become obscured and could engender cynicism in financial markets and the public at large about the commitment and ability of the government to control federal spending.

**Air Force pushing for CTL**

**Sassoon 08** (David Sassoon, Founder of Solve Climate and MA in Journalism from Columbia University; “Coal Loses Steam,” 2/12/2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/feb/12/coallosessteam)

The Air Force is the other place where dirty coal is finding protection, thanks to interest in transforming coal into liquid jet fuel. It's a horribly polluting and expensive process that can't get off the ground unless there's guaranteed demand - which the Air Force is trying to provide. In charge of the effort was Ron Sega, the Air Force's chief energy executive. He resigned as undersecretary last August, and has now turned up on the board of directors of the coal-to-liquid fuel developer Rentech, Inc. But representative Henry Waxman, using a provision in the 2007 energy bill that renders use of liquid coal illegal, is blocking this unilateral gambit to circumvent democratic policymaking on energy and climate issues.

**Causes warming and water shortages**

**Sierra Club 07** (<http://www.sierraclub.org/coal/downloads/2007-04liquidcoalfactsheet.pdf>)

Liquid coal, or coal that has been converted to liquid fuel, is being promoted as a cure-all to our nation’s energy problems by Big Coal and its allies. However, these polluting giants fail to tell the real story. The truth is that liquid coal is plagued with economic and environmental downsides from the time the coal is mined until long after the liquid is burned. Beyond the conventional pollution long associated with coal, liquid coal also releases almost **double** the global **warming emissions** per gallon as regular gasoline. In addition to being a global warming snafu, the powers behind liquid coal want the government to funnel billions in subsidies and tax breaks to artificially create an entirely new industry. At a time when we need to be reducing our carbon emissions, liquid coal represents perhaps the dirtiest, most expensive, and most dangerous energy gamble we could take. Fortunately, however, there are real solutions like efficiency and renewables that can lead us to a cleaner, healthier energy future. Double the Carbon Dioxide Emissions of Regular Gasoline Liquid coal is produced when coal is converted into transportation fuels. Manufactured by converting coal into a gas and then into a synfuel, liquid coal requires huge inputs of both coal and energy. In fact, one ton of coal produces only two barrels of fuel.1 Due to the inefficient conversion process, the properties of dirty coal, and the large amounts of energy required to convert coal to liquids, liquid coal produces almost double the global warming emissions as regular gasoline.2 Put another way, driving a hybrid on liquid coal makes it as dirty as a Hummer H3 filled with regular gasoline.3 Even if the carbon released during production was somehow captured and stored—a technology known as carbon capture and sequestration that remains unproven at any meaningful scale—liquid coal would still release 4 to 8 percent more global warming pollution than regular gasoline.4 Other Environmental Costs In addition to the serious implications of liquid coal for global warming, liquid coal would cause a range of other environmental problems. More than 4 gallons of water are needed for every gallon of transportation fuel produced, threatening our limited water supplies.5 The potential for water shortages is even greater in the West where water is scarcer, and where unfortunately there has been a growing interest in building coal-to-liquid plants.

**Water scarcity causes Central Asian war**

**Priyadarshi 12** Nitish, lecturer in the department of environment and water management at Ranchi University in India, “War for water is not a far cry”, June 16, <http://www.cleangangaportal.org/node/44>

That's been a constant dilemma for the Central Asian states since they became independent after the Soviet break-up. ¶ Much of Central Asia's water flows from the mountains of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, leaving downstream countries Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan dependent and worried about the effects of planned hydropower plants upstream. ¶ Tashkent fears that those two countries' use of water from Central Asia's two great rivers -- the Syr Darya and Amu Darya -- to generate power will diminish the amount reaching Uzbekistan, whose 28 million inhabitants to make up Central Asia's largest population. ¶ After the collapse of communism in the 1990s, a dispute arose between Hungary and Slovakia over a project to dam the Danube River. It was the first of its type heard by the International Court of Justice and highlighted the difficulty for the Court to resolve such issues decisively. There are 17 European countries directly reliant on water from the Danube so there is clear potential for conflict if any of these countries act selfishly.¶ Experts worry that dwindling water supplies could likely result in regional conflicts in the future. For example, in oil-and-gas rich Central Asia, the upstream countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan hold 90 percent of the region's water resources, while Uzbekistan, the largest consumer of water in the region, is located downstream.

**Extinction**

**Blank 2k** Stephen J. - Expert on the Soviet Bloc for the Strategic Studies Institute, “American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region”, World Affairs. 9-22

In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat. 72 Thus Many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in which third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus. For example, many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other side's stakes, since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a client's defeat are not well established or clear as in Europe. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the kind of rapid and almost uncontrolled escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally but probably could not prevail in a long war against Russia - or if it could, would trigger a potential **nuclear blow** (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia's declared nuclear strategies) - **the danger of major war is higher here than** almost **everywhere else**. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other’s perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and, (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.74

## ASPEC

## New Affs

## Security (blue)

**The affirmatives paranoid securitized approaches to politics result in a drive for certainty that can never be reconciled - orthodox IR’s atomistic approach to global problems makes extinction inevitable and descionmaking impossible**

**Ahmed 12** Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis

3. From securitisation to militarisation 3.1 Complicity

This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct **discourses of 'scarcity'** in response to **ecological, energy and economic crises** (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-specific socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often **implicated in the acceleration of these very crises** (historical sociology and historical materialism). Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics. Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, **globalising insecurity on a massive scale - in the very process of seeking security**.85 In Cox's words, because positivist IR theory **'does not question the present order** [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it'.86 **Orthodox IR** **sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour** as a normal function of instrumental reason -thus **rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten** to permanently erode state power and security by destroying **the very conditions of human existence**. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both **realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises.** By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and **critically interrogate** how **prevailing social, political and economic structures** are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the **proliferation of symptom-led solutions** focused on the expansion of state/regime military-political power rather than any attempt to transform **root structural causes**.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to **militarised responses** designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to **accurately diagnose global crises,** directly accentuates a **tendency to 'securitise' them** - and this, ironically, fuels the **proliferation of violent conflict** and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity. 'Securitisation' refers to a **'speech act'** - an act of labelling - whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of 'security', therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, **all in the name of survival itself**. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper 'dual' structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military-police measures in purported response to an existential danger. The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating 'new security challenges', and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 **All that remains to examine is on the 'surface'** of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises **other than to reduce them to their symptoms.** Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises **not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to 'new security challenges'** such as 'low-intensity' intra-state conflicts; **inequality and poverty**; **environmental degradation**; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; **proliferation** of weapons of mass destruction; and international **terrorism**.91 Although the majority of such 'new security challenges' are non-military in origin - whether their referents are states or individuals - the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily **examined through the lenses of military-political power.**92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military-political capacities to maintain existing power structures, **to keep the lid on**.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state's adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations - **rationalising violence** toward them as a control mechanism. Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential **'threat-multipliers' of traditional security issues** such as **'political instability** around the world, **the collapse of governments and** the creation of **terrorist safe havens'**. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources. The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a 'stress-multiplier' that will 'exacerbate tensions' and 'complicate American foreign policy'; while the EU perceives it as a 'threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability'.95 In practice, this generates an **excessive preoccupation** **not with the causes** of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, **but with their purportedly inevitable impacts**, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, **this 'securitisation' of global crises does not render us safer**. Instead, by **necessitating more violence**, while **inhibiting preventive action**, **it guarantees greater insecurity**. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conflict up to 2050. It warns of 'resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies', particularly due to a projected 'youth bulge' in the South, which 'will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy'. This will prompt a 'return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets'. Finally, climate change will 'compound' these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘The implications for future conflict are ominous.’97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.’98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: ‘The world’s middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.’99 Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the **problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups** in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to **any social group** which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how secur-itisation **paradoxically generates insecurity** by **reifying a process of militarization** against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, **externalising states** from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous 'outsiders\*. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new "outsider\* identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of 'Otherisation'. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying **'discursive complex**", where **representations about terrorism** and non-Western populations are premised on 'the construction of stark boundaries\* that 'operate to exclude and include\*. Yet these exclusionary discourses are 'intimately bound up with political and economic processes', such as strategic interests in **proliferating military bases in the Middle East**, economic interests in control of **oil**, and the wider political goal of **'maintaining American hegemony**\* by **dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100** But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests — exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military-political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of 'othering\* in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously 'included\* groups become 'ideologically recast' and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines — eventually **legitimising their annihilation**.102 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and 'Otherised' in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of 'inclusion\*, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.1 3 This recalls Lemkin's recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project - or colonial project — designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. **Only by interrogating the dynamic** and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the **emergence of genocidal intent** become explicable. Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new 'outsider' group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of **mass violence**, which may or may not eventually **culminate in actual genocide**, can become **legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises**.105 This does not imply that the securitisation of global crises by Western defence agencies is genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the breakdown of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed 'outsider' group vindicating various forms of violence.

**This permanent state of emergency transforms the state into an apparatus of death—creates a state of exception.**

**Davis ’12** – contributed essays to race and class, contributor to Confronting Capitalism: Dispatches from a Global Movement (James, At War with the Future: Catastrophism and the Right, “Catastrophism: The Apocalyptic Politics of Collapse and Rebirth”, PM Press, p. 100)

The catastrophist right frequently opens political terrain on the far right that the state can exploit. By framing questions like immigration as catastrophic problems, the state is able to respond with harsh and previously off-limits policies. Anti-immigrant sentiment is promoted throughout the European and American center-right, and in both places border "protection" and surveillance are expanding fiefdoms of the security state. Border Patrol is one of the largest law enforcement agencies in the United States. In the EU, or rather outside it, immigrant detention is outsourced to locations beyond the fortress walls, and beyond the news. Political attacks on multiculturalism from the center-right in Europe are in response to a resurgent and increasingly dynamic far right putting these "problems" onto the table. Since the 1980s, the social democratic and liberal left in Europe and the United States has embraced neoliberalism. It has actively promoted the global expansion of capital and deregula-tion while attacking the organized working class. But the center-left must also pay homage to ideas of justice and equality, most often directly at odds with their concrete economic policies, or fear a loss of support to competitors further to the left. While extreme right formations have pulled mainstream conservative parties further to the right, the left is also vulnerable to right-wing agitation on questions where the left has traditionally been strong, but is more recently contradicted. Increasingly, these contradictions between economic liberalization and social or economic justice cannot be avoided by center-left parties and this vulnerability provides an opportunity for the right to fragment and disorient the left. In part, for the mainstream right, immigrant scapegoating, along with attacks on multiculturalism and on the economic position of the working class, is an electoral strategy that puts the left and social democratic opposition on the defensive. In periods of economic decline and insecurity, fear generated around these cultural and social issues helps to obscure coherent critiques of economic life. Reproduced as state catastrophism they help to reinforce this fragmentation of the left. Fear is the bedfellow of right-wing catastrophism and it is expertly manipulated by the state. A right-wing catastrophic vision of the state extends back at least to Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes's Leviathan posits civil war as the state of nature. To tame and achieve dominion over that hellish prospect, Hobbes envisions a "commonwealth" of men held together by contract and the dictatorial power of the sover-eign who will "punish with corporal or pecuniary punishment or ignominy" those who fail to abide by the rules.60 It stands in con-trast to the more optimistic prescriptions of Montesquieu and Rousseau that articulated the rule of law, and its implicit countervailing foci of power, over the rule of men. The Enlightenment crystallized a set of ideas that had been forming in Europe since Martin Luther. It began as a break with the dictatorial rule of the Pope and the idea of individual political liberty, and the individual that the Enlightenment presented remains a central doctrine of democratic political thought.61 Hobbes emphasized (and this is why he remains a touchstone of authoritarian ideology) that violence is at the heart of politics. There is only a choice between the ordered monopoly on violence that codifies a set of sociopolitical arrangements, the state, or an inchoate and tempestuous violence that sets each against all. Hobbes is the founder of a right-wing tradition that has as its core assumption a notion of human nature as predatory and selfish and this tradition gets made and remade against Rousseau and certain versions of Enlightenment thought right up to today. Hobbes is not the first catastrophist, but he was perhaps the best known and, at the dawn of capitalism, identified catastrophe as the disease for which the state is a cure. Conservatives hold him in special regard and there are few liberals who are not Hobbesians at heart either: Hillary Clinton, Tony Blair, and Barack Obama would all agree that the state of nature is war. If state power is an apparatus, then catastrophism is employed to expand it. States recognize that catastrophe must be averted **by whatever means** are available, and they understand that catastrophe aversion is a powerful political multiplier. FDR used it when he sold the New Deal, and Hitler proclaimed it when he invaded Poland. In the section "Creating Tomorrow's Dominant Force," the Project for the New American Century indicated that their transformative project to remake an American world was likely to be a long one "absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event— like a new Pearl Harbor."62 Conspiracists mistake that to indicate a scripting of the attacks of September11, 2001, but it can be more accurately read as the simple recognition that catastrophe or the threat of catastrophe makes radical change possible. Goering pointed out that when it comes to persuading people of the need to go to war, "all you have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists."63 Catastrophe can then be anything that makes war look like the better option. State catastrophism often indicates an exchange of political and social freedoms for relief from fear.64 The aftermath of September 11 confirms the idea that the promotion and management of fear is the foremost technique for those who wish to exercise control over events. The saturation of American culture with reminiscences of World War II in the years following 9 /11 was an extroverted yearning for a "popular" emergency and simultaneously a bulwark for an unpopular one. Confronted with a threat or the imaginary landscape of threats, the state, like the sovereign, allows itself room for exceptional action and response. In the arena of hypothetical disasters, the state does not resort to a judicial standard of proof, instead "urgent conjecture must sometimes take the place of proof" and the greater the supposed threat the greater the onus on the skeptic to prove a negative, that there is no threat.65 The detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb in 1949 shocked Western intelligence services and disrupted U.S. plans to contain the Soviets to the territory they controlled at the end of World War II. The National Security Council warned President Truman that, "The United States ... is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design."66 The NSC assumed that war with the Soviets was inevitable and, when fighting broke out in Korea in 1950, its catastrophist interpretation of Soviet foreign policy became the governing American orthodoxy. Truman declared a state of emergency and four troop divisions were dispatched to Germany: "The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civili-zation itself."67 Within two years, the United States would relocate massive air, ground, and naval forces to Europe and, guided by NSC doctrine, embark on a long-term strategy to intensify the global military and political struggle with communism under the banner of the Cold War and atomic Armageddon. "The present world situation, however, is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin, for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world."68 George Kennan, then a senior Soviet analyst in the State Department, demurred from the NSC line arguing that Stalin had no taste for territory where he could not have direct political or military control, but it was too late. The ship had sailed with Truman to the Cold War.69 Asked after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to outline the dif-ference between an assumption that Iraq had WMDs and the hypothesis that Saddam might "move to acquire those weapons," President Bush responded: "So what's the difference?" His refusal to recognize the distinction between the possibility of a fact and the possibility of a desire to establish facts may have seemed novel, but it is consistent in the history of exceptions to the supposedly normal course of state action. Writing about the Weimar constitution in 1921, Carl Schmitt observed that the ability of the president to declare a "state of emergency" implicitly recognized that dictatorial power was a feature of the state. He later distinguished an enemy of the state as "in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible."70 States routinely deploy emergency powers to deal with the vagaries of nature and disaster but these instances are generally temporary and localized. It is in the case of war that emergency power is most spectacularly invoked. In Giorgio Agamben's interpretation, the kind of violence Schmitt valorizes transforms the state into an **"apparatus of death"** and "the state of emergency defines a regime of the law within which the norm is valid but cannot be applied (since it has no force), and where acts that do not have the value of law acquire the force of law."71 Schmitt argued that it is impossible to predict the nature of threats or the conditions of any emergency so it is impossible to prescribe any legal form or limit to sovereign action. Post 9/11, Schmitt's key insight plays on in the procedural gymnastics over torture, assassination, kidnapping, drone murder, domestic spying, extra judicial internment, and the limits of executive power. Until the twenty-first century, one could still assume that the United States was constitutionally distinct from any of Hobbes's prescriptions. But Dick Cheney's contention that presidential power and what the president does is the same thing echoes Schmitt (and Hobbes) from beyond the grave. Schmitt's assertion that it is "precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject of sovereignty" recognizes that the exception becomes the rule and for him confirms that fascism is not incompatible with democracy. Henry Paulson's TARP fund for the financial sector following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 was a catastrophe of another sort. Announcing the program, Paulson stated that the initial $700 billion would be used to relieve banks of worthless mortgage-backed securities, but the bill never specified how these jubilee funds would be spent. The threat that Paulson iden-tified was the insolvency of many banks as a result of the collapse in value of their mortgage holdings, and the consequent "clogging up" of lending and money markets. Within weeks though, banks were using the money to consolidate and buy other banks rather than sanitizing their capital base. Paulson's threat to "the financial security of all Americans—their retirement savings, their home values, their ability to borrow" was not averted.72 But neither did the economy collapse. As much as the threats may or may not be real, the outcomes may not be as intended or the intended outcomes may not be as stated. In 2008, the invocation of imminent catastrophe allowed for a departure from normal procedures necessitating secrecy, speed, and huge quantities of money. Brad Sherman of the House of Representatives from California was warned that "the market would drop two or three thousand points the first day, another couple thousand the second day, and a few members were even told that there would be martial law in America if we voted no."73 \* \* \* Catastrophism has a long history on the right and both the state and the organized far right understand it and wield it skillfully to achieve political and propaganda goals, as this chapter has sought to show. Disease catastrophists view the achievements of the left as suicidal threats to traditional order and this view is universal on the right.74 Cure catastrophists believe that violent conflict will resolve and defeat these threats and some among that group, like Breivik and Timothy McVeigh, desire to quicken its arrival.75 In the contemporary period, marked by persistent economic and environmental crises, catastrophes are more visible and their invocation is even more common. For the left, as outlined elsewhere in this book, this presents serious problems in trying to form a political understanding that is useful for organizing and for social movements. But for the right, catastrophism is not counterproductive. As we have seen, it allows the right to influence and even dominate many political questions and at the state level real victories are being achieved. Catastrophism is a less ambivalent strategy for the right than for its adversaries on the left. From a rhetorical standpoint, catastrophism is a win/win for the right as there is no accountability for false prophecy. On the one hand, it rallies the troops and creates a sense of urgency. On the other hand, though, fear and paranoia serve a rightist political predisposition more than a left or liberal one. Authoritarian politics benefits more than left politics from fear. Twenty-first-century capitalism is characterized ' by a high degree of insecurity for all workers, both middle and working class, and fear and vulnerability constitute a growing part of the social landscape. The right can profit from exploiting these conditions, and in light of their achievements over the last generation they will continue to do so. Ironically, it is the collapse of the left that has offered up the space for them to do it, so the weeds are growing in the beloved ruins of the Keynesian state. The right has built a popular opposition to the welfare state and to income redistribution by shaping resentment against minority groups. **Catastrophism** for the right **is the fight against equality and for war, hierarchy, and state violence**. In a thoroughgoing way, right-wing catastrophe manages to materialize Samuel Huntington's prediction that "the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural."76 Catastrophism is one way to shift the focus from the essential questions of public policy, democracy, equality, access to education and health, environment, etc. and onto **abstractions about civilization**, culture, and threats to the prevailing social order that promise instability and worse. It is ironic that the contemporary right has found in identity a politics to sustain itself, much like it charges the left with having done. But in a period of declining incomes, chaotic public finances, and persistently high unemployment, the promises and predictions of a "catastrophically convulsed America that descends into a Balkanized ruin and social collapse" seeps into the right-wing Zeitgeist and finds scapegoats by successfully fragmenting an already fragile and divided political landscape. Which, of course, is the point.77

**Our alternative is to refuse technocratic debates in favor of subjecting the 1ac’s discourse to rigorous democratic scrutiny**

Aziz **Rana 12**, Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School; A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School; PhD., Harvard University, July 2012, “NATIONAL SECURITY: LEAD ARTICLE: Who Decides on Security?,” 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1417

But this mode of popular involvement comes at a key cost. Secret information is generally treated as worthy of a higher status than information already present in the public realm—the shared collective information through which ordinary citizens reach conclusions about emergency and defense. Yet, oftentimes, as with the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, although the actual content of this secret information is flawed,197 its status as secret masks these problems and allows policymakers to cloak their positions in added authority. This reality highlights the importance of approaching security information with far greater **collective skepticism**; it also means that security judgments may be more ‘Hobbesian’—marked fundamentally by epistemological uncertainty as opposed to verifiable fact—than policymakers admit.

If the objective sociological claims at the center of the modern security concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does this meahn for reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the relationship between liberty and security? Above all, it indicates that **the central problem with** the **procedural solutions** offered by constitutional scholars-emphasizing **new statutory frameworks** or greater judicial assertiveness-is that they **mistake a question of politics for one of law**. In other words, such scholars ignore the extent to which governing practices are the **product of background political judgments** about threat, **democratic knowledge**, professional expertise, and the necessity for insulated decision-making. To the extent that Americans are convinced that they face continuous danger from hidden and potentially limitless assailants-danger too complex for the average citizen to comprehend independently-**it is inevitable** that institutions (**regardless of legal reform** initiatives) will operate to centralize power in those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise. Thus, any systematic effort to challenge the current framing of the relationship between security and liberty must **begin by challenging the underlying assumptions about knowledge** and **security upon which legal and political arrangements rest.** Without a sustained and public debate about **the validity of security expertise**, its supporting institutions, and the broader legitimacy of secret information, **there can be no substantive shift** in our constitutional politics. The problem at present, however, is that it remains unclear which popular base exists in society to raise these questions. Unless such a base fully emerges, we can expect our prevailing security arrangements to become ever more entrenched.

## ADV 1

#### US nuclear deterrence credibility is strong- means no impact to perception

Donna Miles citing CR Kehler, 4-5-2013; head of US Strategic Command, “Nuclear Deterrence Remains Key Stratcom Mission, Commander Says” http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119703

American Forces Press Service

Maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent -- and the ability to operate its nuclear capabilities effectively if directed by the president -- was a foundation of U.S. national security throughout the Cold War, said Air Force Gen. C. Robert Kehler, the Stratcom commander. Yet Stratcom’s nuclear deterrence mission remains as critical as at any time in U.S. history, Kehler said, injected with a renewed focus and sense of urgency by the president’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the new national defense strategy. So even as the United States began withdrawing numerous weapons abroad, deactivated entire classes of weapons and reduced its nuclear stockpile by 75 percent since the height of the Cold War, it has ensured that it maintains sufficient deterrent capability. “As long as nuclear weapons exist, U.S. Strategic Command’s top priority must be to deter nuclear attack with a safe, secure and effective strategic nuclear deterrent force,” Kehler told the House and Senate armed services committees earlier this month. Kehler’s job is to look across the entire nuclear enterprise to ensure it remains operationally viable, and to verify the safety and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile. That includes the triad of ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-capable heavy bombers and associated aerial tankers, and the assured warning and command-and-control system that interconnects them. “I can assure you that today’s nuclear weapons and triad of delivery platforms are safe, secure and effective,” Kehler reported in testimony to the congressional panels.

### 1NC

**Prolif solves war – empirics prove**

**Denney 13** (graduate at Yonsei University, Editor in Chief of Yonsei Journal of International Studies, citing Kenneth Waltz: American political scientist, faculty at University of California Berkeley and Columbia, prominent neorealist scholar in international relations, founder of structural realism, noted proliferation apologist (Steven, “His “Other” Legacy: Kenneth Waltz’s Defense of Nuclear Proliferation”, 5/21/13; <http://sinonk.com/2013/05/21/his-other-legacy-kenneth-waltzs-defense-of-nuclear-proliferation/>)

Kenneth Waltz, an IR giant, passed away last week. The professor was a mastermind mathematician and a genius logistician. A political scientist at both Berkeley and Columbia University and the founder of structural realism, he will be read by IR students for as long as there is an international system, and probably by historians once there isn’t. However, Waltz was also unabashed in his views and unwavering in the defense of theory, and thus hands down another legacy as well. Waltz’s formal legacy will likely be overshadowed, or at least closely followed, in the public arena by his logical but ultimately dogmatic defense of the spread of nuclear weapons. The set of arguments he laid out throughout the latter half of a prolific academic career provide all the reasons states such as North Korea need to defend the legitimacy of their nuclear weapons programs. They are reasons cited almost daily by KCNA and on the pages of Rodong Sinmun. Waltz belonged to a school of scholars who believe that the immutable forces of history and the structural constraints of the international system can be used to explain state behavior. At the most fundamental level, Waltz based his arguments on the unitary (state) model, whereby the state is made up of many parts but is approached, analyzed, and understood as one entity. As such, he posited the notion that individuals, institutions, and ideas matter little in the long run. What matters most is structure. In the current structure, Waltz asserts, states exist in perpetual anarchy and, as a result, rely on self-help to protect their sovereignty and national security. **In the age of nuclear weapons this imperative necessitates the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent, and this is especially the case for states living with an existential threat from a nuclear rival.** In other words: North Korea. Many instinctively respond that this is bad for peace and stability; however, Waltz argued stubbornly to the contrary. In a monograph entitled “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better,” he used “rational deterrence theory” to contend **that peace and stability would be best served by “the gradual spread of nuclear weapons.”** A slow spread “is better than no spread or rapid spread,” he argued, writing: **Nuclear weapons have been the second force working for peace in the post-war world.** They make the cost of war seem frighteningly high and thus discourage states from starting any wars that might lead to the use of such weapons. **Nuclear weapons have helped maintain peace between the great powers and have not led their few other possessors into military adventures.** Building on this argument in a debate with Scott Sagan in 2007 (moderated by Richard Betts), Waltz declared that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is a fail-safe way for any country to protect its “vital interests,” meaning its sovereignty. If a country has nuclear weapons, it will not be attacked militarily in ways that threaten its manifestly vital interests. **That is 100 percent true, without exception, over a period of more than ﬁfty years.**

**New proliferators will build small arsenals – uniquely stable**

**Seng, 98** [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.203-206]

However, this "state of affairs" is not as dangerous as it might seem. The nuclear arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will be small and, consequently, the command and control organizations that manage chose arsenals will be small as well. The small arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will mitigate against many of the dangers of the highly delegative, 'non-centralized' launch procedures Third World states are likely to use. This will happen in two main ways. First, only a small number of people need be involved in Third World command and control. The superpowers had tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and thousands of nuclear weapons personnel in a variety of deployments organized around numerous nuclear delivery platforms. A state that has, say, fifty nuclear weapons needs at most fifty launch operators and only a handful of group commanders. This has both quantitative and qualitative repercussions. Quantitatively, the very small number of people 'in the loop' greatly diminishes the statistical probability that accidents or human error will result in inappropriate nuclear launches. All else being equal, the chances of finding some guard asleep at some post increases with the number of guards and posts one has to cover. Qualitatively, small numbers makes it possible to centrally train operators, to screen and choose them with exceeding care, 7 and to keep each of them in direct contact with central authorities in times of crises. With very small control communities, there is no need for intermediary commanders. Important information and instructions can get out quickly and directly. Quality control of launch operators and operations is easier. In some part, at least, Third World states can compensate for their lack of sophisticated use-control technology with a more controlled selection of, and more extensive communication with, human operators. Secondly, and relatedly, Third World proliferators will not need to rely on cumbersome standard operating procedures to manage and launch their nuclear weapons. This is because the number of weapons will be so small, and also because the arsenals will be very simple in composition. Third World stares simply will not have that many weapons to keep track of. Third World states will not have the great variety of delivery platforms that the superpowers had (various ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long range bombers, fighter bombers, missile submarines, nuclear armed ships, nuclear mortars, etc., etc.), or the great number and variety of basing options, and they will not employ the complicated strategies of international basing that the superpowers used. The small and simple arsenals of Third World proliferators will not require highly complex systems to coordinate nuclear activities. This creates two specific organizational advantages. One, small organizations, even if they do rely to some extent of standard operating procedures, can be flexible in times of crisis. As we have discussed, the essential problem of standard operating procedures in nuclear launch processes is that the full range if possible strategic developments cannot be predicted and specified before the fact, and thus responses to them cannot be standardized fully. An unexpected event can lead to 'mismatched' and inappropriate organizational reactions. In complex and extensive command and control organizations, standard operating procedures coordinate great numbers of people at numerous levels of command structure in a great multiplicity of places. If an unexpected event triggers operating procedures leading to what would be an inappropriate nuclear launch, it would be very difficult for central commanders to “get the word out' to everyone involved. The coordination needed to stop launch activity would be at least as complicated as the coordination needed to initiate it, and, depending on the speed of launch processes, there may be less time to accomplish it. However, the small numbers of people involved in nuclear launches and the simplicity of arsenals will make it far easier for Third World leaders to 'get the word out' and reverse launch procedures if necessary. Again, so few will be the numbers of weapons that all launch operators could be contacted directly by central leaders. The programmed triggers of standard operating procedures can be passed over in favor of unscripted, flexible responses based on a limited number of human-to-human communications and confirmations. Two, the smallness and simplicity of Third World command and control organizations will make it easier for leaders to keep track of everything that is going on at any given moment. One of the great dangers of complex organizational procedures is that once one organizational event is triggered—once an alarm is sounded and a programmed response is made—other branches of the organization are likely to be affected as well. This is what Charles Perrow refers to as interactive complexity, 8 and it has been a mainstay in organizational critiques of nuclear command and control s ystems.9 The more complex the organization is, the more likely these secondary effects are, and the less likely they are to be foreseen, noticed, and well-managed. So, for instance, an American commander that gives the order to scramble nuclear bombers over the U.S. as a defensive measure may find that he has unwittingly given the order to scramble bombers in Europe as well. A recall order to the American bombers may overlook the European theater, and nuclear misuse could result. However, when numbers of nuclear weapons can be measured in the dozens rather than the hundreds or thousands, and when deployment of those weapons does not involve multiple theaters and forward based delivery vehicles of numerous types, tight coupling is unlikely to cause unforeseen and unnoticeable organizational events. Other things being equal, it is just a lot easier to know all of what is going on. In short, while Third World states may nor have the electronic use-control devices that help ensure that peripheral commanders do nor 'get out of control,' they have other advantages that make the challenge of centralized control easier than it was for the superpowers. The small numbers of personnel and organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even if a few more people have their fingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite, informed and unambiguous decision to press that button.

#### New arsenals aren’t destabilizing – small arsenals, no aggression, and deterrence solves

Forsyth 12 [James Wood Forsyth Jr., PhD, currently serves as professor of national security studies, USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He earned his PhD at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver. He has written on great-power war, intervention, and nuclear issues, “The Common Sense of Small Nuclear Arsenals,” Summer, Strategic Studies Quarterly, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/summer/forsyth.pdf]

Whatever its logical shortcomings, it is important to stress that deterrence worked—it kept the Cold War “cold” and allowed international life to go on without a catastrophic nuclear war. After 70 years, **most analysts agree** on the basic dynamics of deterrence, and the contemporary debate regarding deterrence, when not addressing the problem of nonstate actors, tends to pivot on force structure considerations. 19 Here, the behavior of states with small nuclear arsenals is instructive. As previously mentioned, most states with nuclear arsenals have not acquired large numbers of nuclear weapons. Instead, they appear content with a relatively small arsenal **capable** **of** warding off an attack as well as dissuading others from interfering in their internal and external affairs. But of the two roles nuclear weapons seem to play—deterrence and dissuasion—is one more important than another? For India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons play a decidedly deter­ rent role. But if one were to free Britain of its NATO obligations, who exactly would Britain be deterring today? What about France? Neither of these countries is as hard-pressed in the security arena as India or Pakistan, yet both hold on to nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons still “hold power at bay,” one must wonder whose power is being held at bay and how. It is important not to overinterpret this. Nuclear weapons serve a purpose. How else can one explain why nine states have them, while others appear to want them? But what purpose do they serve, in general? To answer that question, one must look at what nuclear weapons do for states. Among other things, nuclear weapons socialize leaders **to the dangers of adventurism and**, in effect, halt them from behaving or responding recklessly **to provocation**. 20 Statesmen may not want to be part of an international system that constrains them, but that is the system that results among nuclear powers. Each is socialized to the capabilities of the other, and the relationship that emerges is one tempered by caution **despite** the composition, goals, or **desires** of its leaders. In short, nuclear weapons deter and dissuade.

### 1nc – no change

#### Single instances of action do not change perceptions of us

**Fettweis**, **08** (Christopher – professor of political science at Tulane, Credibility and the War on Terror, Political Science Quarterly, Winter)

Since Vietnam, scholars have been generally unable to identify cases in which high credibility helped the United States achieve its goals. The shortterm aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, did not include a string of Soviet reversals, or the kind of benign bandwagoning with the West that deterrence theorists would have expected. In fact, the perceived reversal in Cuba seemed to harden Soviet resolve. As the crisis was drawing to a close, Soviet diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov angrily told his counterpart, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again."37 Kissinger commented in his memoirs that "the Soviet Union thereupon launched itself on a determined, systematic, and long-term program of expanding all categories of its military power .... The 1962 Cuban crisis was thus a historic turning point-but not for the reason some Americans complacently supposed."38 The reassertion of the credibility of the United States, which was done at the brink of nuclear war, had few long-lasting benefits. The Soviets seemed to learn the wrong lesson. There is actually scant evidence that other states ever learn the right lessons. Cold War history contains little reason to believe that the credibility of the superpowers had very much effect on their ability to influence others. Over the last decade, a series of major scholarly studies have cast further doubt upon the fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions. Employing methods borrowed from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence theorists, Jonathan Mercer argued that threats are far more independent than is commonly believed and, therefore, that reputations are not likely to be formed on the basis of individual actions.39 While policymakers may feel that their decisions send messages about their basic dispositions to others, most of the evidence from social psychology suggests otherwise. Groups tend to interpret the actions of their rivals as situational, dependent upon the constraints of place and time. Therefore, they are not likely to form lasting impressions of irresolution from single, independent events. Mercer argued that the interdependence assumption had been accepted on faith, and rarely put to a coherent test; when it was, it almost inevitably failed.40

### 1nc – no impact

#### No impact to credibility – allies won’t abandon us and adversaries can’t exploit it

Walt 11 (Stephen, Professor of International Relations – Harvard University, “Does the U.S. still need to reassure its allies?” Foreign Policy, 12-5, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/05/us\_credibility\_is\_not\_our\_problem)

A perennial preoccupation of U.S. diplomacy has been the perceived need to reassure allies of our reliability. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. leaders worried that any loss of credibility might cause dominoes to fall, lead key allies to "bandwagon" with the Soviet Union, or result in some form of "Finlandization." Such concerns justified fighting so-called "credibility wars" (including Vietnam), where the main concern was not the direct stakes of the contest but rather the need to retain a reputation for resolve and capability. Similar fears also led the United States to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons in Europe, as a supposed counter to Soviet missiles targeted against our NATO allies. The possibility that key allies would abandon us was **almost always exaggerated**, but U.S. leaders remain overly sensitive to the possibility. So Vice President Joe Biden has been out on the road this past week, telling various U.S. allies that "the United States isn't going anywhere." (He wasn't suggesting we're stuck in a rut, of course, but saying that the imminent withdrawal from Iraq doesn't mean a retreat to isolationism or anything like that.) There's nothing really wrong with offering up this sort of comforting rhetoric, but I've never really understood why USS.S. leaders were so worried about the credibility of our commitments to others. For starters, given our remarkably secure geopolitical position, whether U.S. pledges are credible is **first and foremost** a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help. We should therefore take our allies' occasional hints about realignment or neutrality with some skepticism; they have every incentive to try to make us worry about it, but in most cases little incentive to actually do it.

## Cyber

### 1nc – squo solves

#### New legislation solves cyber-defense

Butt, 13 (Professor James Martin Center for Nonprolif at the Monterey Institute for International Studies, 3-22-’13, Yousaf, “Rabid Response” Foreign Policy, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/22/rabid_response>)

The government is already taking steps to require stricter standards in designing more secure operating systems. Last month, President Obama signed an executive order and issued an accompanying presidential policy directive (PPD-21) that calls for a voluntary public-private approach to address cyber-threats to critical infrastructure. The measures appear to be a mixed bag: They encourage government agencies to share unclassified threat information with critical infrastructure operators, which is eminently sensible, but they also aim to impose mandatory regulations down the road, which may not be flexible enough to deal with rapidly mutating cyber-threats. The soundest solutions will likely come from innovation rather than legislation. One promising avenue for improving cybersecurity seems to be by migrating processing and data to a secure "cloud." Just as most of us place our money in a bank and not under the mattress, the future of secure computing might be in deterring cyberattacks by holding a small encrypted share in a massive cloud. There is also a growing realization that some norms or rules for cybersecurity are a good idea. For example, this week, NATO's Co-operative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence released rules governing the conduct of cyberattacks by its members. Until recently, the United States was wary of negotiating rules of the road for cyberspace, essentially claiming that the laws of war sufficed. But following a series of well-publicized cyberattacks against the United States, the Obama administration now favors establishing ground rules for cyberspace, going so far as berating China for not abiding by (largely non-existent) international cyber norms. That won't be easy -- the United States would like to focus on cyber-espionage, while Russia and China want any rules to leave them free to censor the Internet -- but it is an essential step.

### 1nc – cyber

#### Cyber war infeasible

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(Paul, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” American Military University)

The Department of Homeland Security worries that our critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) may be exposed, both directly and indirectly, to multiple threats because of CIKR reliance on the global cyber infrastructure, an infrastructure that is under routine cyberattack by a “spectrum of malicious actors” (National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2009). CIKR in the extremely large and complex U.S. economy spans multiple sectors including agricultural, finance and banking, dams and water resources, public health and emergency services, military and defense, transportation and shipping, and energy (National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2009). The disruption and destruction of public and private infrastructure is part of warfare, without this infrastructure conflict cannot be sustained (Geers 2011). Cyber-attacks are desirable because they are considered to be a relatively “low cost and long range” weapon (Lewis 2010), but prior to the creation of Stuxnet, the first cyber-weapon, the ability to disrupt and destroy critical infrastructure through cyber-attack was theoretical. The movement of an offensive cyber-weapon from conceptual to actual has forced the United States to question whether offensive cyber-attacks are a significant threat that are able to disrupt or destroy CIKR to the level that national security is seriously degraded. It is important to understand the risk posed to national security by cyber-attacks to ensure that government responses are appropriate to the threat and balance security with privacy and civil liberty concerns. The risk posed to CIKR from cyber-attack can be evaluated by measuring the threat from cyber-attack against the vulnerability of a CIKR target and the consequences of CIKR disruption. As the only known cyber-weapon, Stuxnet has been thoroughly analyzed and used as a model for predicting future cyber-weapons. The U.S. electrical grid, a key component in the CIKR energy sector, is a target that has been analyzed for vulnerabilities and the consequences of disruption predicted – the electrical grid has been used in multiple attack scenarios including a classified scenario provided to the U.S. Congress in 2012 (Rohde 2012). Stuxnet will serve as the weapon and the U.S. electrical grid will serve as the target in this risk analysis that concludes that there is a low risk of disruption or destruction of critical infrastructure from a an offensive cyber-weapon because of the complexity of the attack path, the limited capability of non-state adversaries to develop cyber-weapons, and the existence of multiple methods of mitigating the cyber-attacks. To evaluate the threat posed by a Stuxnet-like cyber-weapon, the complexity of the weapon, the available attack vectors for the weapon, and the resilience of the weapon must be understood. The complexity – how difficult and expensive it was to create the weapon – identifies the relative cost and availability of the weapon; inexpensive and simple to build will be more prevalent than expensive and difficult to build. Attack vectors are the available methods of attack; the larger the number, the more severe the threat. For example, attack vectors for a cyberweapon may be email attachments, peer-to-peer applications, websites, and infected USB devices or compact discs. Finally, the resilience of the weapon determines its availability and affects its usefulness. A useful weapon is one that is resistant to disruption (resilient) and is therefore available and reliable. These concepts are seen in the AK-47 assault rifle – a simple, inexpensive, reliable and effective weapon – and carry over to information technology structures (Weitz 2012). The evaluation of Stuxnet identified malware that is “unusually complex and large” and required code written in multiple languages (Chen 2010) in order to complete a variety of specific functions contained in a “vast array” of components – it is one of the most complex threats ever analyzed by Symantec (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). To be successful, Stuxnet required a high level of technical knowledge across multiple disciplines, a laboratory with the target equipment configured for testing, and a foreign intelligence capability to collect information on the target network and attack vectors (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). The malware also needed careful monitoring and maintenance because it could be easily disrupted; as a result Stuxnet was developed with a high degree of configurability and was upgraded multiple times in less than one year (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Once introduced into the network, the cyber-weapon then had to utilize four known vulnerabilities and four unknown vulnerabilities, known as zero-day exploits, in order to install itself and propagate across the target network (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Zero-day exploits are incredibly difficult to find and fewer than twelve out of the 12,000,000 pieces of malware discovered each year utilize zero-day exploits and this rarity makes them valuable, zero-days can fetch $50,000 to $500,000 each on the black market (Zetter 2011). The use of four rare exploits in a single piece of malware is “unprecedented” (Chen 2010). Along with the use of four unpublished exploits, Stuxnet also used the “first ever” programmable logic controller rootkit, a Windows rootkit, antivirus evasion techniques, intricate process injection routines, and other complex interfaces (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) all wrapped up in “layers of encryption like Russian nesting dolls” (Zetter 2011) – including custom encryption algorithms (Karnouskos 2011). As the malware spread across the now-infected network it had to utilize additional vulnerabilities in proprietary Siemens industrial control software (ICS) and hardware used to control the equipment it was designed to sabotage. Some of these ICS vulnerabilities were published but some were unknown and required such a high degree of inside knowledge that there was speculation that a Siemens employee had been involved in the malware design (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). The unprecedented technical complexity of the Stuxnet cyber-weapon, along with the extensive technical and financial resources and foreign intelligence capabilities required for its development and deployment, indicates that the malware was likely developed by a nation-state (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). Stuxnet had very limited attack vectors. When a computer system is connected to the public Internet a host of attack vectors are available to the cyber-attacker (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002). Web browser and browser plug-in vulnerabilities, cross-site scripting attacks, compromised email attachments, peer-to-peer applications, operating system and other application vulnerabilities are all vectors for the introduction of malware into an Internetconnected computer system. Networks that are not connected to the public internet are “air gapped,” a technical colloquialism to identify a physical separation between networks. Physical separation from the public Internet is a common safeguard for sensitive networks including classified U.S. government networks. If the target network is air gapped, infection can only occur through physical means – an infected disk or USB device that must be physically introduced into a possibly access controlled environment and connected to the air gapped network. The first step of the Stuxnet cyber-attack was to initially infect the target networks, a difficult task given the probable disconnected and well secured nature of the Iranian nuclear facilities. Stuxnet was introduced via a USB device to the target network, a method that suggests that the attackers were familiar with the configuration of the network and knew it was not connected to the public Internet (Chen 2010). This assessment is supported by two rare features in Stuxnet – having all necessary functionality for industrial sabotage fully embedded in the malware executable along with the ability to self-propagate and upgrade through a peer-to-peer method (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Developing an understanding of the target network configuration was a significant and daunting task based on Symantec’s assessment that Stuxnet repeatedly targeted a total of five different organizations over nearly one year (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) with physical introduction via USB drive being the only available attack vector. The final factor in assessing the threat of a cyber-weapon is the resilience of the weapon. There are two primary factors that make Stuxnet non-resilient: the complexity of the weapon and the complexity of the target. Stuxnet was highly customized for sabotaging specific industrial systems (Karnouskos 2011) and needed a large number of very complex components and routines in order to increase its chance of success (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). The malware required eight vulnerabilities in the Windows operating system to succeed and therefore would have failed if those vulnerabilities had been properly patched; four of the eight vulnerabilities were known to Microsoft and subject to elimination (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Stuxnet also required that two drivers be installed and required two stolen security certificates for installation (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011); driver installation would have failed if the stolen certificates had been revoked and marked as invalid. Finally, the configuration of systems is ever-changing as components are upgraded or replaced. There is no guarantee that the network that was mapped for vulnerabilities had not changed in the months, or years, it took to craft Stuxnet and successfully infect the target network. Had specific components of the target hardware changed – the targeted Siemens software or programmable logic controller – the attack would have failed. Threats are less of a threat when identified; this is why zero-day exploits are so valuable. Stuxnet went to great lengths to hide its existence from the target and utilized multiple rootkits, data manipulation routines, and virus avoidance techniques to stay undetected. The malware’s actions occurred only in memory to avoid leaving traces on disk, it masked its activities by running under legal programs, employed layers of encryption and code obfuscation, and uninstalled itself after a set period of time, all efforts to avoid detection because its authors knew that detection meant failure. As a result of the complexity of the malware, the changeable nature of the target network, and the chance of discovery, Stuxnet is not a resilient system. It is a fragile weapon that required an investment of time and money to constantly monitor, reconfigure, test and deploy over the course of a year. There is concern, with Stuxnet developed and available publicly, that the world is on the brink of a storm of highly sophisticated Stuxnet-derived cyber-weapons which can be used by hackers, organized criminals and terrorists (Chen 2010). As former counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke describes it, there is concern that the technical brilliance of the United States “has created millions of potential monsters all over the world” (Rosenbaum 2012). Hyperbole aside, technical knowledge spreads. The techniques behind cyber-attacks are “constantly evolving and making use of lessons learned over time” (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002) and the publication of the Stuxnet code may make it easier to copy the weapon (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). However, this is something of a zero-sum game because knowledge works both ways and cyber-security techniques are also evolving, and “understanding attack techniques more clearly is the first step toward increasing security” (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002). Vulnerabilities are discovered and patched, intrusion detection and malware signatures are expanded and updated, and monitoring and analysis processes and methodologies are expanded and honed. Once the element of surprise is lost, weapons and tactics are less useful, this is the core of the argument that “uniquely surprising” stratagems like Stuxnet are single-use, like Pearl Harbor and the Trojan Horse, the “very success [of these attacks] precludes their repetition” (Mueller 2012). This paradigm has already been seen in the “son of Stuxnet” malware – named Duqu by its discoverers – that is based on the same modular code platform that created Stuxnet (Ragan 2011). With the techniques used by Stuxnet now known, other variants such as Duqu are being discovered and countered by security researchers (Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security 2011). It is obvious that the effort required to create, deploy, and maintain Stuxnet and its variants is massive and it is not clear that the rewards are worth the risk and effort. Given the location of initial infection and the number of infected systems in Iran (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) it is believed that Iranian nuclear facilities were the target of the Stuxnet weapon. A significant amount of money and effort was invested in creating Stuxnet but yet the expected result – assuming that this was an attack that expected to damage production – was minimal at best. Iran claimed that Stuxnet caused only minor damage, probably at the Natanz enrichment facility, the Russian contractor Atomstroyeksport reported that no damage had occurred at the Bushehr facility, and an unidentified “senior diplomat” suggested that Iran was forced to shut down its centrifuge facility “for a few days” (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). Even the most optimistic estimates believe that Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was only delayed by months, or perhaps years (Rosenbaum 2012). The actual damage done by Stuxnet is not clear (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010) and the primary damage appears to be to a higher number than average replacement of centrifuges at the Iran enrichment facility (Zetter 2011). Different targets may produce different results. The Iranian nuclear facility was a difficult target with limited attack vectors because of its isolation from the public Internet and restricted access to its facilities. What is the probability of a successful attack against the U.S. electrical grid and what are the potential consequences should this critical infrastructure be disrupted or destroyed? An attack against the electrical grid is a reasonable threat scenario since power systems are “a high priority target for military and insurgents” and there has been a trend towards utilizing commercial software and integrating utilities into the public Internet that has “increased vulnerability across the board” (Lewis 2010). Yet the increased vulnerabilities are mitigated by an increased detection and deterrent capability that has been “honed over many years of practical application” now that power systems are using standard, rather than proprietary and specialized, applications and components (Leita and Dacier 2012). The security of the electrical grid is also enhanced by increased awareness after a smart-grid hacking demonstration in 2009 and the identification of the Stuxnet malware in 2010; as a result the public and private sector are working together in an “unprecedented effort” to establish robust security guidelines and cyber security measures (Gohn and Wheelock 2010).

### 2nc – at: China I/L

#### No Chinese cyber threat – they don’t have the capabilities to attack the US

Tim Lohman, tech analyst, 10-31-2011, “China a minimal cyber security threat: Paper”, http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/405767/china\_minimal\_cyber\_security\_threat\_paper/

Despite growing concern about China’s cyber-warfare capabilities, Australia and other Western nations have little to worry about when it comes to their national security. That’s the view of Desmond Ball, a professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, who in a recent journal paper argues China's offensive capabilities are limited and its own Internet security has notable deficiencies and vulnerabilities. According to Ball, China had carried out a number of high-profile and successful hacks, denial of service attacks and website defacements in recent years. However, its offensive cyber-warfare capabilities were “fairly rudimentary.” [ With the increasing threat of cyber crimes, protect yourself and stay informed on the latest news with Computerworld's Security newsletter ] “[China has] evinced little proficiency with more sophisticated hacking techniques,” the paper reads. “The viruses and Trojan Horses they have used have been fairly easy to detect and remove before any damage has been done or data stolen. There is no evidence that China’s cyber-warriors can penetrate highly secure networks or covertly steal or falsify critical data. “They would be unable to systematically cripple selected command and control, air defence and intelligence networks and databases of advanced adversaries, or to conduct deception operations by secretly manipulating the data in these networks.” According to Ball, the capability gap in anti-virus and network security applications between China and other nations was immense. “China’s cyber-warfare authorities must despair at the breadth and depth of modern digital information and communications systems and technical expertise available to their adversaries,” the paper reads. In Ball’s view, and despite having an information warfare (IW) plan since 1995 and conducting cyber exercises since 1997, China’s cyber-warfare capability was not expected to better rivals for several decades. “At best, [China] can employ asymmetric strategies designed to exploit the (perhaps relatively greater) dependence on IT by their potential adversaries…” the paper reads. “China’s cyber-warfare capabilities are very destructive, but could not compete in extended scenarios of sophisticated IW operations. In other words, they function best when used pre-emptively, as the PLA now practices in its exercises. In sum, the extensive Chinese IW capabilities, and the possibilities for asymmetric strategies, are only potent if employed first.”

### 1nc – no war - generic

#### No US-China War

**Moss 13** (Trefor Moss, The Diplomat, 2/10/13, 7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War, thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true)

But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan: 1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either. 2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war woud be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders. 3. Question marks over the PLA’s operational effectiveness.The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary. 4. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. As the new leaders find their feet and jockey for position amongst themselves, they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions – war with Japan and possibly the U.S. being the biggest of them all. 5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase. 6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships.There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before). 7. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners. In light of these constraints, Abe should be able to push back against China – so long as he doesn’t go too far. He was of course dealt a rotten hand by his predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, whose bungled nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands triggered last year’s plunge in relations. Noda’s misjudgments raised the political temperature to the point where neither side feels able to make concessions, at least for now, in an attempt to repair relations. However, Abe can make the toxic Noda legacy work in his favor. Domestically, he can play the role of the man elected to untangle the wreckage, empowered by his democratic mandate to seek a new normal in Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese assertiveness would be met with a newfound Japanese assertiveness, restoring balance to the relationship. It is also timely for Japan to push back now, while its military is still a match for China’s. Five or ten years down the line this may no longer be the case, even if Abe finally grows the stagnant defense budget. Meanwhile, Abe is also pursuing diplomatic avenues. It was Abe who mended Japan’s ties with China after the Koizumi years, and he is now trying to reprise his role as peacemaker, having dispatched his coalition partner, Natsuo Yamaguchi, to Beijing reportedly to convey his desire for a new dialogue. It is hardly surprising, given his daunting domestic laundry list, that Xi Jinping should have responded encouragingly to the Japanese olive branch. In the end, Abe and Xi are balancing the same equation: They will not give ground on sovereignty issues, but they have no interest in a war – in fact, they must dread it. Even if a small skirmish between Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft occurs, the leaders will not order additional forces to join the battle unless they are boxed in by a very specific set of circumstances that makes escalation the only face-saving option. The escalatory spiral into all-out war that some envisage once the first shot is fired is certainly not the likeliest outcome, as recurrent skirmishes elsewhere – such as in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated.

### 1nc – no war

#### Recent Change in Chinese Leadership means Peace with Taiwan

Tatar, 13 - analyst at the International Economic Relations and Global Issues Program at the Polish Institute of International Affairs [Justyna Szczudlik, 4/26/13, http://www.pism.pl/files/?id\_plik=13507, 7.8.13,]

The change of leadership in China after the CCP Congress and parliamentary session showed that one of the basic priorities of the policy of China’s new leaders are cross-strait relations. CCP Secretary General and PRC Chairman Xi Jinping replaced Hu Jintao as chief of the party’s working group on Taiwan; Wang Yi, the former chief of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council (TAO), who, contrary to his two predecessors, did not serve as ambassador to the U.S., was elevated to the post of minister of foreign affairs; and a deputy minister of foreign affairs, Zhang Zhijun, was nominated as TAO head.¶ Reunification will remain the main goal of China’s Taiwan policy. The framework of cross-strait relations is based on Hu Jintao’s six-point proposal announced in 2008 (“One China” principle, economic cooperation, cultural dialogue, people-to-people relations, protection of sovereignty, termination of hostilities and a peace agreement), and the CCP-KMT 1992 consensus on “one China, different interpretations.” Adhering to that framework, in April Xi Jinping presented his four expectations about cross-strait relations, perceived as an operational level of Hu’s six points: promotion of economic cooperation, strengthening high-level economic negotiations, acceleration of post-ECFA talks, and rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.¶ Supposedly, a quite new element in the PRC approach towards Taiwan may be pressure to launch political talks. Chinese leaders will be raising political issues as a next step in defusing tensions and increasing cooperation between the mainland and the island. Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream,” defined as “a great restoration of the Chinese nation,” could be interpreted as a signal to put pressure on Taiwan to start political talks. What is more, then-TAO chief, Wang Yi, in March mentioned comprehensive cross-strait relations, which means consultations should not be restricted. As political cooperation is a sensitive issue, this matter should be dealt with according to the rule of negotiating the easiest topics first then the complicated ones later, but with the assumption that political talks will be launched first on the academic level. A similar approach was presented by Zhang Zhijun in his first remarks about Taiwan after assuming the TAO chief post, when at the 11th Cross-Strait Relations Symposium held in China in late March he claimed that political talks should not be perceived as a restricted topic.

# 2nc

## Framework O/V

## Shaffer - 13

#### Reliance on state abstractions forces us to succumb to group think logic and cede agency – we become complicit with cycles of violence and form a societal apathy which prevents action – turns case – independent reason to vote neg

Butler Shaffer 3/12/13 [Butler Shaffer teaches at the Southwestern University School of Law, 1958, University of Nebraska, Lincoln; B.A., Political Science, 1959, and J.D., 1961, University of Chicago; Member, Colorado and Nebraska State Bars, Less Dangerous Targets, <http://archive.lewrockwell.com/shaffer/shaffer268.html>, ml]

Owners of the established order insist that their serfs limit the range of their inquiries to subjects that do not disturb the tranquility of their minds. The owners depend upon a select group to be the keepers of the questions to be asked in our world, and woe unto those who dare wander beyond the boundaries of the permitted. Journalist Peter Arnett, television personality Bill Maher, and presidential candidate Ron Paul suffered the consequences of daring to raise unapproved questions. One of the deadliest practices in which we humans engage involves identifying ourselves with abstractions – such as institutions, belief systems, and other entities – which, by definition, lie beyond our individual selves. In so doing, we not only separate ourselves from others, but substitute the interests and values of the abstractions for our inner personal sense of meaning and direction. In each instance, we generate the psychological and societal conflicts and contradictions that define our world. I explored this topic in my book, Calculated Chaos: Institutional Threats to Peace and Human Survival. An all-too-common reaction to such conflict-driven behavior is to unconsciously engage in psychological projection or transference. This involves attributing one’s "dark side" feelings or fears to others; or the shifting of long-held emotions from one person to another. In either instance, the person engaging in such practices operates on the illusion that, by transferring the source of the problem to another, the inner sense of discord can be resolved. Modern politics could not exist without such thinking, as groups endeavor to control state power in efforts to punish, reform, or otherwise regulate their respective herds of scapegoats. As our world becomes increasingly politicized – with the range of state power reaching ever deeper into the details of human action – there is a growing awareness that all political systems are the organization and mobilization of violence. It is not just that such institutions employ violence, but that enjoying a monopoly on the use of violence is what defines them. Persons who identify themselves with a nation-state often find it disturbing to realize, even unconsciously, that the system with which they find their meaning in life might behave contrary to other values they hold. This can cause them to either deny or suppress the evidence of the wrongdoing**. This is why** – following the end of World War II – so many German people were unwilling to acknowledge the tyrannical nature of the Nazi regime (see, e.g., Milton Mayer’s They Thought They Were Free). It also helps to explain the actions of so many Republicans booing Ron Paul for his maintaining that America’s militaristic foreign policy has been responsible for most anti-American sentiments throughout the world. The politically-faithful try to resolve any unconscious inner turmoil by projecting their "dark side" traits onto others. Institutionalized minds are unwilling to consider causal explanations for destructive, violent behavior by looking within the system with which they identify their sense of being. To do otherwise not only indicts the agency with which they have entwined their egos, but condemns themselves for [1] being indistinguishable from the collective wrongdoer, and [2] allowing their thinking to be taken over by such external purposes. As one’s nation-state expands its violence throughout the world, enlarges its use of torture and police-brutality, and operates under the direction of a president who announces his rightful authority to kill persons of his choosing, one wonders if a point might arise at which even the most submissive follower questions the premises of the system? The nature of life – including its spiritual qualities – cannot be wholly repressed, no matter the degree of intimidation, force, and other influences brought to bear on behalf of the proposition "my country, right or wrong." No matter how deeply this life force is suppressed, it will eventually erupt with volcanic force to proclaim its primacy over the institutional sociopaths **who want to control and manipulate** it for their anti-life purposes. How are statists to react to the growing expression of discontent and anger over the destructive nature of political systems? Bear in mind that a collective mindset is essential to the mobilization of energies upon which state power depends. Such thinking requires the conflicts that necessarily result from the division of mankind into mutually-exclusive identity groupings. When people organize themselves and their interests according to racial, ethnic, religious, gender, nationality, or other categories, such divisions generate the discord that superficial minds interpret as the confirmation of Thomas Hobbes’ view of human nature as a constant struggle of "all against all." Focusing upon the topic of "violence against women" reinforces the intergroup conflicts upon which politics is grounded. It is as though some transcendent principle is at stake in the outcome of the discussion or legislation. But who could possibly be in favor of such violence? Who might engage in such acts of cruelty? Why men, of course! Feminism has long been based on the proposition that, throughout human history, "men" have suppressed and exploited "women" for their distinct purposes. Without recognizing that it is the coercive powers of the state that systematically allows some to subdue others, many feminists now insist upon the "equal right" of women to be ground up in the machinery of war. Some have gone so far as to advance the illusion that the process of sexual reproduction – a product of millions of years of biological evolution and not male dominance – is a form of rape. In order to reinforce the boundaries of collective identities – to keep the respective herds together – it is essential to continually reinforce the idea that other groups of people represent a collective threat to one’s own. Racism, homophobia, bigotry, exploitation, terror, and prejudice are the more notable words used by some to describe the threats posed by others. When the eminent political philosopher, George W. Bush, declared "if you’re not with us, you’re against us," he was articulating the mindset that mature people long ago left on the grade-school playground. "Violence against women?" What about the problem of violence against people, an issue that might dissolve intergroup identities and bring about a common purpose of men and women to confront the deadly practices – such as war – that are destroying humanity? Ahhh, but concern for "violence against people" implicates the political system that depends for its existence upon war. Randolph Bourne’s warning that "war is the health of the state" was confirmed when, in the twentieth century alone, at least 200,000,000 people were killed by this depraved system through which so many continue to seek "meaning" or "purpose" to their lives. To inquire into the deeper nature of violence would raise questions that might soon put the established order out of business. Men and women may come to understand that violence is the very essence of government, and that political systems must regularly engage in its exercise in order to maintain and reinforce their authority over what Erasmus called the "many-headed multitude." The destructive consequences of violent-driven behavior must be deflected to other causal explanations if the state is to sustain whatever credibility remains to it. This is why transference and projection are so useful to it. The current economic dislocations brought on by government regulatory and monetary policies become attributed to business "greed;" and as most people are totally ignorant of economics, they eagerly accept such an explanation. When a young man killed twenty children at a school in Connecticut, the bourgeoisie accepted the proposition that guns were the cause, and that private ownership of such weapons – a long-sought establishment objective – must be eliminated. But when twenty-one children and fifty-some adults were murdered by the collective forces of the FBI and ATF, no voices were heard in the mainstream media, academia, or halls of Congress to abolish these agencies. Indeed, the song-and-dance one witnessed from these institutional voices was a condemnation of the victims for having "strange" religious views. I believe most of us have an inner sense of the sacred nature of life, such that we are troubled – even unconsciously – when we see it purposefully destroyed or otherwise treated with disrespect. We can sympathize with the suffering of an animal because our ego identities are not drawn into conflict with it; but seek other expressions for – or choose to ignore – the miseries inflicted upon our fellow humans by the systems with which we identify our sense of being. Thus, David Koresh was to blame for the machine-gunning, gassing, and burning to death of the Branch Davidians; Iraqi and Afghan civilians have been justifiably killed for the offense of being, well, Iraqis and Afghans whose presence in their homes was not consistent with American and Israeli political ambitions. As long as our conditioning drives us to separate ourselves into conflict-ridden groupings that institutional voices advise us are our "enemies" against whom we need the "protection" of the state, we shall continue the societal insanity that now defines "mankind." We must have the intelligence and courage to step outside the restrictive circles into which we compartmentalized ourselves. Only in so doing will we be able to withdraw our individual energies from the systematic violence with which we mindlessly destroy one another as well as ourselves. The established order is desperately fighting for its survival against the individualizing and decentralizing energies that are causing vertical structures of force to collapse into horizontal networks of mutual connectedness. Its frantic efforts will intensify into an expansion of warfare, police brutality, surveillance, assassinations, imprisonment without trial, torture, and whatever other tools of violence it deems useful for maintaining its power over the rest of us. There is no level of theatrics, propaganda disguised as "news," contrived threats or disasters, or other means that will not be used to reinforce the collective mindset. One need only watch films of Hitler’s harangues to stadiums filled with tens of thousands of men and women caught up in the fervor of a frenzied, mob mentality to see such powerful dynamics in action. There are no limits to what the institutional elite may resort to maintain its power. Your first line of defense is to withdraw your energies from the violent and destructive games upon which the elitists depend. When such people refer to children as "our most important assets" or "resources," they are inadvertently telling you of your status in the political arrangement. You, too, are but an "asset," a form of state-owned property, a "resource" to be used for whatever ends suit the elitists, but certainly not for purposes of your own. You will be encouraged to maintain your differences with other groups of equally-conditioned people, with the state intervening to referee the disputes it has carefully constructed. It matters not whether your groupings consist of "men" against "women," "blacks" against "whites," "gays" against "straights," "immigrants" against "native-born," "businessmen" against "consumers," "labor" against "management," or any of a seemingly endless supply of paired opponents. It is sufficient that you insist upon the priorities of your group and, in so doing, continue to keep the game going!

## Beier

#### Policy Simulation Exists in a Space of Constant Re-presentations of reality through the repackaging of reality into artificially linear events that are coded to fit the affirmatives preconceived frame of truth – failure to interrogate this precession of simulacra turns debaters into docile actors that cede agency to dominant power structures

Ian Beier MA in Communication Studies @ UNLV 2010 “Cascading Simulation: A Critical Perspective On Barack Obama‘S Foreign Policy During The 2008 Presidential Election” thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Communication Studies Department of Communication Studies Greenspun College of Urban Affairs Graduate College University of Nevada, Las Vegas August 2010

This section of the paper establishes my method for analyzing Obama‘s speech. I argue that media critics and rhetorical critics understand spectacle in an incomplete way, particularly in the case of presidential campaigns. In both cases, academics appear to take a near-totalizing approach to their research, arguing that either media, in particular television, acts as a universal filter that controls public perception, or the presidency controls the message by manipulating the media. 5 Spectacle, however, is not restricted to either media control or presidential control of the message; rather, spectacle is the result of a cascade of meaning downward from the candidate‘s message and the media‘s re-presentation of that message. Put simply, the media cannot report if there is no story and acts as the key medium for transmitting the message to the public. I look at scholarship from both ends of this academic spectrum, highlighting this middle road to understanding political and presidential spectacles. In order to do so, I briefly discuss the traditional roots of spectacle, followed by its application in media studies and presidential discourse. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of ―cascading activation‖ as a way of understanding the interaction between the multiple levels of simulation, describing a new mode of analysis that I refer to as ―cascading simulation.‖¶ Guy Debord and Jean Baudrillard: The Roots of Spectacle¶ The theory of spectacle emerges from Guy Debord‘s 1960‘s ―situationist‖ manifesto¶ entitled Society of the Spectacle, which critiques advanced capitalism‘s ability to shape our view of the world only in terms of its market value.6 According to Debord, ―the whole life of those societies in which modern conditions of production prevail presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles. All that was once directly lived has become mere representation.‖7 Capitalism reproduces the reality that defines a person‘s lived experience through a ―self-portrait of power‖8 in terms of goals toward accumulation. Within the relationship between the public and capitalism the audience passively accepts representations and images of fantasy as truth claims, which act as a filter for conceptualizing identity and the ideal representation of the self. The consumers‘ self-worth is defined as a system of itemized capital, where the system of capitalism reorients want-based goods into need-based goods. Inherent in Debord‘s understanding of the spectacle, likely a result of its Marxist roots, is the concept of morality. Here, the empowered create the spectacle as a means to control and alienate the disempowered.¶ At the same time as Debord‘s neo-Marxist critique of capitalism, French scholar Jean Baudrillard developed a much more postmodern approach to spectacle, suggesting that the proliferation of media creates an excess of information that has the potential to destabilize the distinctions between ―reality‖ and ―appearance.‖ In his initial essays published in the book Simulation, Baudrillard posits that there are three levels of simulation: first-order, where the re-presentation of the real is observably an artificial representation; second-order, where the re-presentation ―blurs the boundaries between reality and representation;‖9 and third-order, where representations become re- presentations because they exist as ―generation[s] [of reality] by models of a real without origin or reality.‖10 Within third-order simulation, events play out based on a preprogrammed logic that scripts interpretation based on a predestined end.¶ I am most concerned with the third-order, which Baudrillard argues is the only form of representation that exists in a world of constant exposure to media and technology. Here, society is stuck in a ―precession of simulacra‖11 or ―hyperreality‖12 where a non- represented reality is nonexistent and the description ―of the real [acts as a substitution for] the real itself.‖13 Put another way, the simulation substitute‘s reality with its own set of referential signs that fundamentally alters the meaning of a particular event. Culture is so engrained in the flow of information that mediation through news reports plays an integral part in shaping meaning, often times substituting for reality itself while ―dominating almost every aspect of our public and private lives.‖14 This is a point that has shown up in movies such as Apocalypse Now, Network, Wag the Dog, and most notably the Matrix where a fictitious narrative replaces reality in order to alter the audiences‘ perception of news or conflict.15¶ Similarities between Baudrillard and Debord certainly exist, as they both take note of the spectacle created by representation. Further, Baudrillard‘s initial method of deconstruction further demonstrates a similarity, as he employed a combination of ―semiological and neo-Marxist perspectives‖16 to disengage from simulation. Still, significant differences exist between the two scholars in their characterization of the spectacle.¶ Baudrillard‘s main contention is that you cannot escape the simulacra. As Richard Lane notes, Baudrillard rejects Debord‘s ethical characterizations of the spectacle, arguing that it is not necessarily ―a ̳fake‘ existence in the sense of the representation blurring with the real‖ to create repression, but instead ―is another type of ̳reality,‘ and that is how the subject experiences it.‖17 Indeed, Debord‘s theory of the spectacle assumes space where there is an inside (the have-nots) and an outside (the haves) within the simulation. However, Baudrillard argues that there is no outside of simulation, making a genuine or true understanding of reality impossible.¶ In this sense, the hierarchical space between the spectator and the spectacle that creates exclusion is nonexistent. As Iain Thomson explained in a lecture connecting Debord to Baudrillard:¶ There is thus no longer any exteriority to the spectacle, no uncontaminated standpoint outside the spectacle from which we could call it into question. This ubiquitous spread of the spectacle means that critique can only be imminent, taking place from within, and that the cultural critic is at best like a participant observer in a madhouse, or (as Nietzsche put it), a cultural physician treating an illness from which he or she suffers as well.18 For Baudrillard, then, the subject can never fully experience reality outside of re- presentation. Not only does it shape the way the public interprets status quo politics, but it also determines the nature of appropriate strategies used to change it. Ultimately, this leads Baudrillard to dismiss Debord‘s theory as a ―radical fiction,‖ arguing that ―the proliferation of images, information [and] signs . . . overshadows production.‖19 In other words, Baudrillard believes that technological processing has replaced capital in the political economy as the critical signifier within society.¶ In all, theories of spectacle argue that representational force supersedes reality. For Debord, this spectacle representation is value-laden and creates systems of alienation and repression along the productive values defined by capitalism. For Baudrillard, this system is somewhat value-neutral and engulfs all experience. This point is particularly important, as it highlights a key difference between the two theorists. Baudrillard does not recognize Marxist-types of exclusion because it is impossible to exist outside of spectacle. In other words, while individuals may be able to provide direction to how others perceive the simulation, these individuals are not just actors but also objects of simulation because the simulation itself is what calls the original action into being.¶ Baudrillard‘s theories of simulation and hypperreality have significantly influenced the study of spectacle in media criticism. Today, many scholars in the area attribute their analysis to his descriptions of technology as a tool of mediation that ultimately defines how individuals interpret reality. Here, scholars suggest that the media‘s re-presentation of the event contains an ideological charge that ―evokes a dramatic setting‖ for evaluating political leaders‘ efforts to deal with ―external and internal enemies‖ to the stability of the¶ polity.20 This portion of the theoretical foundations highlights these trends in scholarship, looking at the works of media critics who draw from Baudrillard‘s theories on simulation in their analysis of media report.¶ For postmodern media critics, the 1980s acts as a key turning point in how the media operates in society because of the proliferation of technology. As Mark Poster notes:¶ Until the late 1980s technical constraints limited the media‘s ability [to transmit information] . . . The great limitation, then, of the first electronic media age is that images could only be transmitted from a small number of centers to a large number of receivers . . . [This scarcity of senders] encouraged and justified, without much thought or consideration, the capitalist or nation-state exploitation of image transmission.21¶ The government, or a few large media conglomerates, could centralize and monopolize media messages because they were the only ones that had the capacity to ―deliver the news.‖22 This meant that there was little space for alternative viewpoints outside of those sanctioned by those in power, often times resulting in a spectacle that supports the status quo.¶ However, with the advent of the Internet and proliferation of ―independent‖ media outlets, accessibility for both the creator and consumer to particular types of information greatly expanded, granting the media greater control over the message and the ability to present the information in ―real-time.‖23 Kevin Glynn notes:¶ As we proliferate ever more and finer mediating technologies for live, real-time, hyperspeed information delivery, as the old television adage ̳you are there‘ is taken to the -nth degree, and as we ramp up our immersive apparatuses of sound and image perfection, all of which claim to take us closer and closer to the reality of the event¶ itself, that reality paradoxically recedes into hyperrealistic simulation.24¶ Media reports attempt to place the public as close to the event as possible by maximizing accessibility of information. This assessment acts as a simulation that disrupts temporal reality. Rather than allowing the event to linearly play out, this evaluation suspends the event in time and provides a pre-evaluation for how the event plays out. Events no longer take place in a vacuum, but instead are subject to a constant mediated repackaging to suit the particular demands of the moment or ―pre-set mediated frames.‖25 Thus, the speaker‘s intent is irrelevant to what frame the media deems appropriate for evaluation. For example, if the media frames diplomacy with rogue nations in the context of the Global War on Terror, they would argue that the negotiations fail because the other countries‘ regimes support terrorism or the foundations of radical Islam. As a result, the public may respond negatively by pushing for a more hardline response from the administration. This process of re-presentation within predetermined frames is particularly important in the context of the interaction between political leaders and the media because ―it is through television that the discoursal nature of major political events is played out.‖26 As Douglas Kellner notes:¶ [P]olitics is . . . becoming a mode of spectacle in which the codes of media culture determine the form, style, and appearance of presidential politics, and party politics in turn becomes more cinematic and spectacular. . . . Consequently, U.S. presidential politics . . . can be perceived as media spectacles, in which media politics becomes a major constituent of presidential elections, governance, and political success or failure.27¶ Indeed, providing a particular frame to a political process becomes a means of legitimation in the public‘s eye. As Murray Edelman notes, ―everyday reporting of the political spectacle systematically reinforces the assumption that leaders are critical to the courses of governmental action. News accounts highlight the talk and actions of leaders and of high officials and upon policy differences and agreements.‖28 The ability of the media to control the public‘s interpretation of political events constitutes a counter- hegemonic move that disrupts government control of the message, in turn making the media a potent player in politics.¶ This is particularly true in the context of television media, which has ―the ability to absorb and transform other major social institutions . . . by turning them into entertainment and popular culture.‖29 In the context of a presidential campaign, the media transforms an informative deliberative process into a system characterized as a competitive race. The media uses competitive discourse to describe poll numbers, speeches and the ability to capture constituents as proverbial steps closer to the finish- line.¶ Most significant, perhaps, is media‘s ability to lull the public into passivity. Postmodern media critics argue that media messages contain rhetorical power that keeps the public docile; ultimately preventing public interrogation because ―individuals are always vulnerable and usually can do little more than react, chiefly by keeping abreast of the news that concerns them and by acquiescing in the realities it creates.‖30 Spectacle, then, is staged upon social anxieties of uncertainty where the media‘s prescribed way forward, whether they are accepting or rejecting the political leadership of the status quo, is the only way to maintain stability and security. This is important in relation to the argument regarding television as a site that transforms culture into forms of entertainment, as the public can exist only as a spectator, not a participant, in a race.¶ In all, media critics argue that the advent of new media technologies in the latter half of the twentieth century allowed them to monopolize control of the message, thereby making them the ultimate arbiters of intent behind political speech. This interpretation is displaced from temporal reality and ultimately evaluated by the media in a nonlinear fashion that is based on predetermined frameworks rather than actual outcomes. This is particularly important in relation to presidential campaigns, where the media reframes the deliberative elements of the campaign into entertainment, thereby removing the participatory elements implicit within democratic institutions. In order to demonstrate this trend, critics examine how the media‘s selection of camera angles and alterations in the video re-presentation during the speech represent conscious choices that influence the perception of the event itself. Additionally, the accessibility of newspapers extends spectacle to textual re-presentations, as written media can reinterpret events based on what they choose to highlight. This illustrates the power of media in spectacle construction. On the other side of the debate over agency in spectacle, critics argue that the¶ politician controls the meaning behind events. This school of thought is heavily influenced by previous scholarship on presidential speech and campaigns. Much of this research assumes a direct, unmitigated transaction between the speaker and the audience. In these studies the receiver (public) is a passive participant that the speaker (president) acts upon, rather than interacts with, through dialogue. In this relationship the media merely act as a transmitter, rather than interpreter, of information. This section looks at the development of political spectacle, which argues that the speaker, namely the president or other high-ranking government officials, creates the simulation. This analysis will briefly discuss rhetorical scholarship on presidential speech, followed by a discussion of how these scholarly influences alter how critics see spectacle.¶ Previous studies demonstrate that the nature of the presidency is largely rhetorical, as the scope and power of the position is ultimately shaped by how the president defines their leadership role in relation to particular exigencies.31 As a result, George Edwards and Desmond King suggest that the legitimacy of presidential power is largely rhetorical because ―both politics and policy revolve around the presidents‘ attempts to garner public support, for both themselves and their policies.‖32 A large part of this rhetorical maneuvering revolves around the president‘s ability to construct an image of leadership through the use of ideologically charged discourses that appeal to easily recognizable principles,33 generally defined in terms of nationalism, which the public can rally behind as justifications for political decisions.34¶ This is essential because, as Edelman notes, ―regardless of the consequences of officials‘ actions, which contemporaries cannot know, the ability to create oneself as the ideal type [of candidate] maintains followings [among the public].‖35 If successful, presidential rhetoric has an opportunity to ―define political reality‖36 because ―the presidential definition is stipulated, offered as if it were natural and uncontroversial rather than chosen and contestable.‖37 In many ways, this ability to define reality comes from a presumption of truth implicit within presidential speech. Here, the public tends to defer to presidential characterizations because the average citizen assumes the president has access to better information and expertise, allowing them to make the best available decision.38 This area of scholarship suggests a naming function implicit within the presidency that dictates the public‘s understanding of the world through ideological ―half-truths‖39 that act as an epistemological paradigm. appealing to commonly held values.44 Typically, these seemingly ―universal‖ appeals are situated within dualisms that heighten issue-specific differences between the candidates.¶ This universal frame helps determine how the audience comes to understand their campaign‘s platforms because voters find value-laden claims more persuasive than pragmatic considerations.45 This exclusionary function is an important component of political rhetoric because it reveals one of the most important traits of persuasion. That is, it is easiest to influence the opinion of others when they perceive that there are no viable alternatives.¶ Rhetorical scholar Keith Erickson‘s piece ―Presidential Spectacles: Political Illusionism and the Rhetoric of Travel‖ is a prime example of presidential rhetoric as spectacle. For Erickson, travel spectacle should be analyzed differently because the presentation is what grants the speech act rhetorical power, not the content of the speech itself. Robert Schmull suggests visually absorbing images capture the public‘s imagination better than lengthy speeches, making it much more likely that the audience remembers what they saw rather than what they heard.46 Here, the travel spectacle is the text or rhetorical artifact. In this sense, Erickson suggests that form supersedes content, as the images of the presentation function as ―ideological forms of pictorial power that possess the capacity to persuade, deceive, or otherwise influence spectators . . . to justify and maintain certain forms of collective conduct.‖47 Understanding spectacle as primarily presentational rhetoric is quite significant to rhetorical scholarship on presidential address and presidential campaigns. If speeches are only given to heighten the rhetorical power of the image, then the words used in these speeches only retain rhetorical significance when they add to the public‘s collective¶ memory of the speech. Thus, presidential addresses, even when discussing particular policies, are largely ceremonial in nature because ―reliance on images, as opposed to informed dialogue, discourse, or debate enables administrations to side-step the public forum, avoid interactive decision making, and to address spectators epideictically.‖48 The speaker is merely attempting to align themselves with the values of the audience rather than call them to action through active deliberation, as ―travel spectacles merely gratify affectively; in general, they do not resolve issues because their reassurances are but substitutes for achievement.‖49 The idea that travel merely glosses over controversy is particularly important in the context of presidential campaigns, as it further signifies the notion that campaign orations are a hybrid of deliberative means and epideictic ends.¶ Obviously, the idea that spectacle creates rhetorical opportunities for manipulation pays homage to media criticism. However, Erickson‘s work is important because it demonstrates how presidential scholarship reverses the presumptive agent-object relationship between the media and the president prevalent in Baudrillard‘s analysis. For Erickson, the president is the agent rather than the object of manipulation.¶ Indeed, there is quite a bit of doubt among rhetorical critics who question whether the media truly interrogates the content of its reports, as media pundits see ―travel spectacles [as] not only ̳newsworthy‘ but functionally convenient, cost-effective visual attention- getters that simplify complex political information.‖50 In essence, the travel spectacle does the leg work of constructing the story for the media. Here, the media ―coverage [of the travel spectacle] . . . fails to interpret or identify nascent signs of White House manipulation‖51 because correspondents are rarely invested in the story enough to ―sit around Air Force One asking why they‘re writing these stories.‖52 Recent scholarship on the Bush administration demonstrates this claim, arguing that the passivity of the media allows outright manipulation. As Kellner notes, ―in addition to cultivating right-wing media that broadcast their messages of the day and intimidating the mainstream corporate media, the Bush administration has created fake media and bought conservative commentators to push their policies.‖53 Examples include the administration‘s distribution of videos that are presented as local broadcasting54 and the administration‘s planting of fake reporters who asked loaded questions at White House Press Conferences.55¶ Limiting the text to include only the presentation of the speaker and their attempts to frame media coverage ignores the fact that the media does not simply replicate the event. On its own, Erickson‘s method does not account for the dynamic relationship between the public, the media, and the candidate during a presidential campaign because it presumes a static media that merely regurgitates the entirety of the event as directed by the candidate. Taken to its logical extreme, this would mean that every media account would represent every picture and a full transcript of the entire speech. However, there is no ―universalized media conglomerate.‖56 Newspapers and reporters have political preferences that, no matter how hard they try, appear in the way that they ―report the news.‖ In effect, the idea that the public receives the entirety of the message is bizarrely incomplete because the only part of the public that has a ―pure representation‖ of the event are those taking the pictures and writing the stories. Not only is this a dangerously myopic way to view travel spectacle in presidential speeches, but it becomes far less applicable in the context of campaign rhetoric where there is an active and ongoing discursive exchange between the public and the candidate. In presidential campaigns the candidate‘s attention is on persuading the public to vote for them. In this discussion, the media acts as a mediator between the two parties and not the primary target of rhetorical influence.¶ As a result of what Erickson sees as the media‘s inability to interrogate its own messages, he suggests that it is up to the rhetorical critic to reveal the inadequacies of travel spectacle whenever they emerge in order to limit presidential abuses of power and sustain a constructive relationship between the public and the president.57 While I do not find Erickson‘s demand that critics enact their research as social actors particularly compelling, his comments are still insightful because they highlight readily observable elements of travel spectacle that critics should be able to identify. Erickson suggests there are five core elements of the travel spectacle that are worthy of interrogation, arguing that critics should examine how spectacles: favor visual over verbal eloquence, simplify complex political issues, narratively interpret presidential agendas, synoptically reify presidential personae, and construct political realities.¶ In all, political spectacle emerges from scholarship that sees the presidency as a rhetorically powerful position that can control public opinion through defining political reality in terms of common beliefs and values. These appeals are largely metaphorical in nature, where the persuasive value of presidential speech is largely determined by the speaker‘s ability to align their position within historical narratives that denote leadership. This is particularly important in the context of presidential campaigns, as candidates utilize these deliberative arguments as an ingratiation strategy based on potentialities that appeal to voter perceptions. Often times, this simulation of presidential leadership acts as a substitution for the candidate‘s actual experience because the visual enactment resonates within the mind of the public. Within this interaction between the candidate and the public, the media acts as a passive transmitter of messages that the candidate can manipulate in order to maximize their appeal. Thus, the ―sound-byte‖ culture creates an rhetorical environment where the candidates framing of the issue invites criticism and interpretation. The next section outlines a rhetorical hybrid between media and political spectacle grounded in the idea that both have significant roles in creating meaning in contemporary political culture.

## Links

### Link – Deterrence Fear

#### Deterrence theory creates spirals of distrust -- Most recent psychological and neuroscience research proves.

Neta CRAWFORD Poli Sci @ Boston University 11 [*Realism and World Politics* Ed. Ken Booth p. 173]

For example, research on fear suggests that long-held assumptions of deterrence theory are probably not simply wrong but dangerously so. Research in political psychology has shown that ‘deterrence is inadequate as an explanatory theory of international relations because the growing body of empirical evidence’ does not support the theory.69 Recent research on fear implies that the notion that deterrence threats can be manipulated with great confidence is folly. We cannot expect decision-makers to respond to threats by doing elaborate (or even boundedly rational) calculations of costs, risks and benefits, yet policy-makers are still counselled as if this were possible. This is not simply because signalling resolve is difficult. Fear, and also anger and perceived humiliation, affect the ways people reason and react to threats fear is a powerful source and re-enforcer of both the cognitive and motivated biases that interfere with the communication and reception of deterrent threats. Fear can become institutionalized and self-reinforcing. To the extent that our theories, uninformed by research on fear, have guided decision-makers and shaped foreign policies by promoting the use of threats, they have made the world more dangerous rather than less. The path to decreased tension, conflict resolution, and improved security lies in re-examining the relationship between ‘human nature’, political practices and institutions and in devising policies that actually decrease fear and enhance trust.

#### Institutionalizing fearful politics creates destructive spirals. Security based on fear instead of trust creates insecurity spirals, confirmation bias, and path dependency.

Neta CRAWFORD Poli Sci @ Boston University 11 [*Realism and World Politics* Ed. Ken Booth p. 165-169]

Fear, homo politicus and the structures of world politics I make three arguments about fear. First, fear is not only a private experience. Fear can be institutionalized within organizations and in patterns of action and reaction between groups, including states. Second, institutionalized fear may become a perceptual filter and analogical trigger. Third, fear may become a self-sustaining climate, almost independent of its initial trigger, and difficult to dislodge even in the face of evidence that the threat has diminished. These arguments suggest that the deliberate attempt to use fear as a precise tool of foreign policy is likely to be counterproductive and dangerous in the short and long term. Conversely, as Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler argue, trust can mitigate security dilemma spirals.36 To the extent that the anarchical structure of world politics, the lack of a hegemonic power to enforce law and order among nations, creates the conditions for insecurity, such insecurity also waxes and wanes. In other words, the structural condition of anarchy is relatively constant, but fear and the level of felt insecurity among nations is not constant. Foreign policy is, to a large degree, about managing threats and fear—we threaten others or make treaties with them so they will not become a threat to us.37 How we think and feel about ourselves and others is as important as the brute facts of anarchy or military technology. Announced preventive war doctrines may initiate a spiral of anticipation. Although neurobiologists and psychologists understand a great deal about the effects of fear on individuals, we know relatively less about the effects of fear on political communities and organizations. Yet in the same way that traumatic fear is written on the bodies of individual victims of violence—literally seared into the brain—traumatic fear can be institutionalized in foreign policies and military doctrine. This institutionalization of fear, in turn, writes itself on the bodies of individuals. Thus, I am using biology, on one level, as both metaphor/analogy and on another level, to show how biology and institutional dynamics interact. The nature/nurture dichotomy is erased as we see biological and social processes interacting to produce a particular political reality. While fear is a private experience, it is also socially (intersubjectively) moulded and understood. The things that individuals fear, what a group finds dangerous, and how they react to threats, is as much culturally and politically defined, as it is idiosyncratic to individuals.38 The remarkable diversity in human cultures, long documented by anthropologists, extends to a diversity in responses to scarcity and threat.39 Emotions can be heightened or soothed in particular cultural and institutional contexts. Emotions can also be mirrored in organizations, political climates, and the international system. These social mirrors can in turn affect individual emotions in an escalatory feedback loop of potentially spiralling fear. In sum, fear is not only written on our individual bodies, but through institutionalization, fear may also be written in the body politic, with political consequences. Fear can be institutionalized. Institutionalization occurs when a group incorporates a belief, practice, or feeling into its repertoire of taken-for-granted knowledge of the world and its behavioural routines. During institutionalization, there is room for disagreement about how to deal with a novel problem. The organization then invents procedures for assessing and organizing knowledge about the problem (intelligence gathering and threat assessment in the case of terrorism). The organization then develops standard operating procedures and routines for handling challenges. While the response to a situation might have once involved a very conscious move to use new knowledge or been motivated by a fresh emotion or understanding, once institutionalized, the organization no longer makes an ad hoc response to a situation. The organization sees the world through the newly institutionalized beliefs and feelings, recognizes a situation as something that it should address and uses guidelines for data gathering and information processing that are appropriate for the newly institutionalized beliefs or feelings. Once the response is institutionalized, the problem and its solution are normalized and become, in many ways, taken for granted. The routinized information sorting, categorization, and response becomes a schema that actors tend not to reflect upon. Schemas are ‘higher order knowledge structures . . . that embody expectations guiding lower order processing of the stimulus concept.’40 Like grammar, schemas provide a framework for understanding incoming information and quickly articulating a response. ‘In particular, information that fits into existing schemata . . . is noticed earlier, considered more valid, and processed much faster than information that contradicts or does not fit into any particular schema.’41 Schemas tend to persist, even in the face of disconfirming evidence. Individuals will often ignore information that disconfirms the schema, or in some cases, struggle to make the evidence fit the existing schema. Schemas may change if the incoming evidence is undeniably, unambiguously not in keeping with the existing schema. Thus, schema research supports what we know intuitively about individual decision-makers: humans classify evidence on the basis of abstract, pre-existing notions, and they are loath to change their pre-existing beliefs, even when confronted with strong counter-evidence.42 Attention to threat and fear management can become an institutionalized schema within states as a pattern of organizing intelligence gathering, perceptions, and plans guiding action and reaction between individuals and groups. Fear is institutionalized, for example, in ethnic and racial conflicts when groups who are presumed to be dangerous to each other are physically separated. In colonial Africa, the colonizers’ fear was institutionalized in pass books that the colonized had to carry so that the colonizers knew who someone was and whether they had good reason to be where they were at any given time. Fear is both acknowledged and institutionalized in the fence Israel built between Palestinians and Israelis in 2002 and 2003 and in the process of establishing and maintaining checkpoints along that border. In each case, an individual’s fear may be both partly resolved and normalized through the practices of the organizations charged with meeting a particular threat. The fence allows some actual physical control of a perceived threat and the illusion of greater control. On the other hand, the passbook or the fence separating others may also remind, rehearse, reinforce and heighten the fear and animosity between groups. Institutionalized fear may increase individual fear. Like pass books and fences, military strategies are the conscious and unconscious institutionalization of a fear schema. Defensive doctrines are certainly rooted in fear and uncertainty. Yet even ostensibly aggressive strategies may have fear at their root if the aggressive aim is rooted in a larger insecurity about the long-term intentions of the other. For example, fear of certain and imminent war led to the development of pre-emptive strategies in Europe prior to the First World War. In the late 1800s, Germany feared that war with Britain, France and Russia was likely, indeed inevitable. It was also common at the beginning of the last century to believe that the best defence is a good offence.43 The German Chief of Staff, Alfred Von Schlieffen developed the Schlieffen Plan: Germany would pre-emptively strike France, and then after France was defeated in six weeks, Germany would strike Russia. The French also had an offensive strategy—Plan 17—to avenge their losses in the Franco-Prussian war. So did Russia, which thought pre-emption could succeed quickly against both Austria and Germany. Assuming war was inevitable, all sides built up their military forces. When a crisis occurred (the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in June 1914) reciprocal fear of surprise attack and mobilization escalated. Each side—Germany, France, and Russia—believed war was inevitable and thought they were doomed if their country did not go first. All mobilized in an action-reaction sequence. And when they went to war in August 1914, nearly all leaders thought pre-emption would work and that the war would be over in a few weeks or months. Fear is institutionalized not only when it drives a state to adopt a particular military doctrine, but when actors assume that fear ‘works’—that the deliberate production of fear in an adversary can coerce the target. Indeed, when not based on simple denial or destruction, military strategy rests on fear—the promise of more punishment withheld in exchange for capitulation or compliance. For example, the German and Allied Second World War strategies of terror bombing depended on and institutionalized the production of fear in the belief that fear makes others capitulate. Fear did not work as the planners hoped in this case. More recently, the US Pentagon’s 2003 ‘shock and awe’ strategy for Operation Iraqi Freedom was as much about creating fear and paralysis among the Iraqi military as it was about using the US military’s advantages in information, speed, and manoeuvre to destroy Iraqi military forces or kill their soldiers. Fear was institutionalized in US deterrence doctrine during the Cold War—the US sought to prevent attack by threatening adversaries with a devastating response. Only the threat of ‘mutual assured destruction’, in this view, could assure US survival. Similarly, when Waltz argues that nuclear proliferation should not be feared, but rather ‘welcomed’ because it would help to ‘maintain peace’, he was assuming that the deliberate production of fear works and that fear ought to be institutionalized: ‘Where nuclear weapons threaten to make the costs of wars immense, who will dare to start them? Nuclear weapons make it possible to approach the deterrent ideal.’44 Second, fear and other emotions may become perceptual filters and analogical triggers. Fear may be taken by institutional actors as information and become a filter by which organizations develop information about self and other. Just as individuals who are frightened tend to search for confirmation of their view of the threat and discount disconfirming evidence, organizations operating in a climate of fear may do so. Standard operating procedures may in fact put threatening information on the fast track. The biological and psychological tendency to recall previous fearful situations, and reason analogously, may magnify the effect of fear. Emotions may be translated into attributions of the other’s hostile intentions. Fear thus affects the development and organization of institutional knowledge. Emotional relationships between groups and the emotional climate may be concretized in expectations and ways of creating knowledge. United States threat-assessment practices during the post-9/11 era illustrate the institutionalization of fear in both perception and planning. The US shifted from basing military planning on a potential adversary’s intentions and likely threats to the ‘capabilities-based approach’ where the US attempts to, ‘anticipate the capabilities that an adversary might employ’ and ‘focuses more on how an adversary might fight than who the adversary might be and where war might occur’.45 The 2001 United States Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) suggests that the rationale for capabilities-based planning is uncertainty or ‘unpredictability’.46 The ‘concept reflects the fact that the United States cannot know with confidence what nation, combination of nations, or non-state actor will pose threats to vital U.S. interests or those of allies and friends decades from now’.47 Indeed, if one focuses on what might happen, the scenarios for threats proliferate. As General Ralph Eberhart, who was in charge of the military’s role in homeland security in 2002 said of the possible threats: ‘the list goes on and on. We can all envision the terrible things that might happen.’48 Thus, according to the QDR, ‘the United States will not be able to develop its military forces and plans solely to confront a specific adversary in a specific geographic area. Instead the United States could be forced to intervene in unexpected crises against opponents with a wide range of capabilities.’49 Third, fear may become a self-sustaining climate, almost independent of its initial trigger, and difficult to dislodge even in the face of evidence that the threat has diminished. Emotions and charged emotional relationships may permeate the international system and long outlast initial cause for emotions. There may, in other words, be an international climate of fear and distrust that is beyond any structural or material reasons that states may have to fear other states. Narratives of historical enmity, harm and aggression will rehearse and reinforce the fearful relationship. On the other hand, the development of a positive emotional relationship may help diminish or render irrelevant the structural reasons that states leaders might have to distrust and fear each other. In this way, emotions can create their own dynamics or spirals of action and reaction. All these effects of fear are potentially self-reinforcing. Initial fear may be institutionalized in the adoption of an emotional attitude about the other and the world (that it is threatening), which affects the intelligence gathering and assessment functions of organizations. Fear may be institutionalized in the adoption of technologies (for example, fences, and x-rays of baggage at airports), rules of procedure and military doctrines that are intended to reduce the subjective sense of threat and fear, but which may simultaneously and inadvertently heighten fear. Fear determines perceptions and the responses to perceived threats (whether actual or anticipated). The deliberate production of fear in others is thus very risky, and likely does not operate in the way that deterrence theory predicts. But the deliberate production of fear is at the root of deterrence and compellence strategies—the rational actor will respond to credible threats of unacceptable damage by backing down. In Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling suggests that, ‘it is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply. It is latent violence that can influence someone’s choice . . . It is the expectation of more violence that gets the wanted behaviour, if the power to hurt can get it at all.’50 Sometimes. The traditional rational actor view of foreign policy decision-makers deemphasizes the effects of fear on perception, cognition and memory on the assumption that humans are rational calculators. Yet threats may only increase the adversary’s intransigence precisely because the target is actually frightened and angry, triggering a cascade of both individual and institutional responses.51

### Alt Solves

#### Building empathy and trust helps overcome fear and security dilemma spirals—turns their group think arguments

Neta CRAWFORD Poli Sci @ Boston University 11 [*Realism and World Politics* Ed. Ken Booth p. 170-171]

At the level of foreign policy decision-making, fear may not only increase the tendency to misunderstand or dismiss the adversary’s point of view, but it may also cause decision-makers to ignore divergent interpretations or even stifle internal disagreement and dissent. Those who are afraid tend to look for more threats. The fearful tend to rally around the flag, and attempt to bolster their sense that they are right. Tom Pyszczynski, Sheldon Solomon, and Jeff Greenberg suggest that the fear of death can decrease tolerance for disconfirming information and views: ‘when thoughts of death are salient, people generally become less tolerant and more hostile toward those with diverging views. In dozens of experiments, mortality salience has been shown to lead to more negative evaluations of those with different political orientations and attitudes toward a diverse array of subjects.’52 ‘Groupthink’, a tendency to value consensus over critical thinking and an unquestioning adherence to the beliefs and decisions of the group—rises when actors are gripped by fear. When groupthink occurs, group members’ ‘striving for unanimity override[s] their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action’ and leads to a ‘deterioration in mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment’.53 To the extent that groups are already ethnocentric, nationalist and militarist, fear will likely magnify the salience of those beliefs and their policy impact.54 Those who question the worldview dominant in strongly identified groups will be viewed negatively.55 Focusing on fear (and anger) may suggest why some regions seem to have long periods of war and crisis. Each crisis feeds the spiral of fear and distrust, and generations may grow up primed to fear their neighbours. Protracted, intergenerational conflicts are probably those where the baseline of underlying biology has shifted toward hyper-arousal among elite decision-makers on both sides, at the same time that fear becomes institutionalized in a positive feedback loop that is difficult to break or mitigate. Individual and group perceptions of repeated insults lead to anger which tends, like fear, to decrease the quality of information processing, while at the same time increasing group confidence and the willingness to take risks.56 As Booth and Wheeler argue, security dilemmas are both about interpreting the other’s motives, intentions and capabilities and about determining a response.57 Fear thus keeps active security dilemma action-reaction dynamics that produce a spiral of mutual hostility and escalation. How can foreign policy decision-makers ameliorate the deleterious effects of individual and institutionalized fear? At the organizational level, intelligence that disconfirms potentially threatening information that will induce fear should be forwarded alongside the threatening information. Decision-makers should be reminded not to discount the disconfirming evidence and organizations should be tasked with looking for non-threatening cues. Fear is obviously not the only important emotional relationship between groups or states. The degree of empathy and trust that groups feel toward one another may account for the quality of their relationship. Richard Rorty has argued that dehumanization accounts for ethnic cleansing, while increased sentimentality and empathy account for our willingness to intervene in such conflicts.58 Some historical cases suggest that the development of empathy over long periods of time can have important political consequences. For example, increased empathy accounts, in part, for the end of legalized slavery and formal colonialism.59 And Lynn Hunt argues that the development of human rights over the long term depends on the development of greater sympathy and empathy towards others, starting in the eighteenth century.60 Regions characterized by security communities or successful post-conflict peacebuilding, may have achieved their success by first ratcheting down the effects of fear and gradually increasing the effects of empathy and the capacity to trust. Indeed, the literature on fear and empathy I have reviewed suggests that confidence-building measures, such as data exchanges, cultural exchanges, exercises in conciliation, and the graduated reciprocation in tension reduction (GRIT), are extremely important if understudied by political science.61 Trust building and maintaining mechanisms must be institutionalized in routine practices and expectations to have their greatest effects.62

### Iran

#### Using crises discourse to describe Iran recreates a militarized notion of violence and intervention and makes peaceful negotiations impossible – also no impact to them getting the bomb

Jordan Trafton 3/24/13 [Jordan Trafton is a freshman IR Major at the University of Pennsylvania, “Securitized Iran: Threat or Not?” <http://sirjournal.org/2013/03/24/securitized-iran-threat-or-not/>, ml]

“Nuclear Armageddon!” and “Kissinger Predicts Nuclear war with Iran” are just a few of the striking headlines a quick Google search on Iran will lead to. The issue of Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons has been a concern in the international community for years. High military officials in the United States describe Iran as the greatest challenge to national security. However, how much truth is behind such statements? The United States reigns dominant in the international arena, disposing of foes at its whim. Is Iran a legitimate threat, or is the call to arms analogous to the invasion of Iraq post 9/11: an empty danger used to justify consolidation of political will to give funding to the military, which ultimately resulted in unnecessary violence? The logic of hegemony requires the construction of threats. As the sole super power, the United States faces a world of uncertain threats to its absolute control over the globe. Each new thorn is an existential crisis to the very identity of the hegemon. This subsequently makes it impossible for the United States to distinguish between enemies that are truly in opposition to U.S. interests and those that are not. When the United States takes action and intervenes, it inevitably creates the very enemy it wished to destroy. This resistance should be predictable; take the invasion of Afghanistan for example. Over 100,000 troops were mobilized in a counter-insurgency (dubbed “COIN”) effort to eradicate militant Taliban influences in the country. However, most high-level members—those associated with the terrorist group Al-Qaeda—had already fled to locations outside of the country. The United States had this information, evident from its focused drone strikes against the Haqqani group, a labeled terrorist organization with ethnic ties to the Afghani Pashtuns, in the tribal area North Waziristan just within the Pakistani border. Nevertheless, the U.S. chose to engage in a brute-force effort to gain control of Afghanistan and “liberate” the country with the same counter-insurgency surge methods used in Iraq. This strategy, which increased boots on the ground by 60,000 between 2006-2009, ended up failing, of course, as the mountainous and diverse terrain, decentralized tribal regions, and massively corrupt government of Afghanistan posed insurmountable challenges, to name just a few setbacks. The end result was to breed more terrorist sentiment; in fact the same U.S. method used in Iraq increased terrorism worldwide sevenfold, according to Peter Bergen, a research fellow at the Center on Law and Security. Unpopular drone strikes killed innocent civilians, solidifying hatred against the United States. Insensitive and intrusive measures—middle-of-the-night searches, unjustified imprisonment, and unnecessary beatings—only added to the growing negative sentiment. The lesson learned in Afghanistan can aid us in our understanding of the U.S. approach to Iran. In its efforts to justify its sole preeminence, the United States often exaggerates threats to legitimate its rule. What exactly is the magnitude or probability of Iran posing a serious risk to the security of the United States? Michael Edwards, a Distinguished Fellow at Demos, gives some convincing common sense arguments in his article published last year. First and foremost, “all U.S. intelligence agencies universally agree that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program.” Iran may be developing the capabilities to build a nuclear warhead, though there is no conclusive evidence on when the red line will be crossed. Just this week, on March 14th President Obama claimed that U.S. intelligence “thinks” Iran will develop nuclear weapons in a year. “Right now, we think it would take over a year or so for Iran to actually develop a nuclear weapon.” In addition, Iran has never attacked the United States or its interests overseas. In the last 270 years Iran has not even invaded or engaged in military combat with another country, Edwards writes. Even if Iran were to possess a bomb, what logical sense would it make to attack the United States? Any strike would guarantee their immediate destruction. Though Iran’s political leaders enjoy dramatic statements, including President Ahmadinejad’s statement that Iran plans to “wipe Israel off the face of the map,” much like North Korea’s leadership, self-preservation is always their top priority. Additionally, Iran’s annual defense budget is only around $5 billion. For reference, the United States spends 110 times that amount and accounts for half the world’s defense spending combined. Nevertheless hyperbole dominates military discourse, as the recent U.S. annual Threat Report puts Iran 3rd on the list behind cyberwarfare and organized terrorism. Iran has been described as a hostile threat in popular discourse following the September 11th terror attacks. Marym Jahedi analyzes the linguistic representations of Iran specifically by the New York Times in the International Journal of English Linguistics in 2012. The words we use matter in international relations; by depicting Iran as a nation state committed to violence and terror we limit our responses and proposed solutions to aggressive and militarized ones. Our lexical choices separate our friends from foes, categorizing Iran as the “out-group,” away from the allies of the United States. Jahedi elaborates further: The net effect of the discourse themes, strategies and associated linguistic means of realization in the stereotypical **construction of Iran** in TNYT would be that of the negative Other, a nation of people that formed part of George W. Bush’s contentious “axis of evil” thesis – malevolent, untrustworthy, violent, and a threat to world peace despite the subsequent U.S. administration efforts at positive engagement for some semblance of normalcy in bilateral relations. Iran may or may not stand as a legitimate threat to the United States. However, we should be aware that there is bias towards inflating the risk of a potential threat because there is a sole hegemon, demonstrated by the Afghan invasion. Pervasive headlines in the U.S. media like “Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike is the Least Bad Option,” should cause hesitation; not only may such aggressively violent measures gain popularity but Iran also sees how it’s being described in discussions within the United States, suggesting a resistant stance and complicating peaceful solutions. The type of discourse surrounding U.S. engagement with Iran influences policy decisions. Recently, the United States, China, France, Russia, Britain, and Germany have started “P5+1 talks” with Iran in a renewed effort towards diplomacy. As the harsh international pressure and sanctions imposed on Iran last summer have not succeeded in halting its nuclear development, a new approach is critical. If this strategy can be genuine and sincere, unnecessary bloodshed may be avoided. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that historical depiction of Iran by the United States is one of violence and fundamentalism—a representation couched in the language of dire security. Iran has expressed interest in allowing access to the International Atomic Energy Agency for certain sites and classified data, though it hinges on the update of a comprehensive Non-Proliferation Treaty. Hopefully the United States will not give into its negatively discursive past and rather will attempt to understand the perspective of the Iranians, avoiding the friend-enemy distinction that is ever present in international relations.

### Cyber

#### Reject their ev - it's **exaggerated** and financially biased

Rid 13

Thomas Rid, Reader in War Studies at King's College London, His most recent book is Cyber War Will Not Take Place, also a non-resident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations in the School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, PhD in political science from Humboldt University of Berlin, OC Register, March 15, 2013, "Thomas Rid: Hype, fear-mongering hurts cyberwar", http://www.ocregister.com/articles/systems-499977-cyber-control.html

LONDON – The White House likes a bit of threat. In his State of the Union address, Barack Obama wanted to nudge Congress yet again into passing meaningful legislation. The president emphasized that America's enemies are "seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions and our air traffic control systems." After two failed attempts to pass a cybersecurity act in the past two years, he added swiftly: "We cannot look back years from now and wonder why we did nothing in the face of real threats to our security and our economy." Fair enough. A bit of threat to prompt needed action is one thing. Fear-mongering is something else: counterproductive. Yet too many a participant in the cybersecurity debate reckon that puffery pays off. The Pentagon, no doubt, is the master of razzmatazz. Leon Panetta set the tone by warning again and again of an impending "cyber Pearl Harbor." Just before he left the Pentagon, the Defense Science Board delivered a remarkable report, "Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat." The paper seemed obsessed with making yet more drastic historical comparisons: "The cyber threat is serious," the task force wrote, "with potential consequences similar to the nuclear threat of the Cold War." The manifestations of an all-out nuclear war would be different from cyberattack, the Pentagon scientists helpfully acknowledged. But then they added, gravely, that "in the end, the existential impact on the United States is the same."A reminder is in order: The world has yet to witness a single casualty, let alone fatality, as a result of a computer attack. Such statements are a plain insult to survivors of Hiroshima. After all, a bit of fear helps to claim – or keep – scarce resources when austerity and cutting seems out-of-control. The report recommended allocating the stout sum of $2.5 billion for its top two priorities alone, protecting nuclear weapons against cyberattacks and determining the mix of weapons necessary to punish all-out cyber-aggressors. Then there are private computer security companies. Such firms, naturally, are keen to pocket some of the government's money earmarked for cybersecurity. And hype is the means to that end. Which leads to the next point: The media want to sell copy through threat inflation. "In Cyberspace, New Cold War," the headline writers at the Times intoned in late February. "The U.S. is not ready for a cyberwar," shrieked the Washington Post earlier this week. Instead of calling out the above-mentioned Pentagon report, the paper actually published two supportive articles on it and pointed out that a major offensive cyber capability now seemed essential "in a world awash in cyber-espionage, theft and disruption." The Post should have reminded its readers that the only military-style cyberattack that has actually created physical damage – Stuxnet – was actually executed by the United States government. Finally, the intelligence community tags along with the hype because the NSA and CIA are still traumatized by missing 9/11. Missing a "cyber 9/11" would be truly catastrophic for America's spies, so erring on the side of caution seems the rational choice. This means that the quality of the public debate suffers, as experts as well as journalists have no choice but to rely on industry reports of sometimes questionable quality or anonymous informants whose veracity is hard to assess.

### China

#### The affirmative’s discourse surrounding China constitutes China as a foreign other to protect American identity. The K is prior—their discourse is part and parcel of the affirmative’s policy.

Turner 13—Oliver Turner is a Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester. He is the author of *American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy* (Routledge, forthcoming) [“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, FirstView Articles, pp 1-22, Cambridge University Press 2013]

In his analysis of the China Threat Theory Chengxin Pan argues that the ‘threat’ is an imagined construction of American observers.15 Pan does not deny the importance of the PRC's capabilities but asserts that they appear threatening from understandings about the United States itself. ‘[T]here is no such thing as “Chinese reality” that can automatically speak for itself’, Pan argues. ‘[T]o fully understand the US “China threat” argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature’.16 The geographical territory of China, then, is not separate from or external to, American representations of it. Rather, it is actively constitutive of those representations.17 The analysis which follows demonstrates that China ‘threats’ to the United States have to some extent always been established and perpetuated through representation and discourse. Michel Foucault described discourse as ‘the general domain of all statements’, constituting either a group of individual statements or a regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements.18 American discourse of China can therefore be manifest as disparate and single statements about that country or as collectives of related statements such as the China Threat Theory. Ultimately, American representations of China are discursive constructions of truths or realities about its existence. The article draws in part from the work of David Campbell who suggests that dangers in the international realm are invariably threats to understandings about the self. ‘The mere existence of an alternative mode of being’, argues Campbell, ‘the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible … is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.’19 As a result, interpretations of global danger can be traced to the processes by which states are made foreign from one another through discourses of separation and difference.20 In this analysis it is demonstrated that particular American discourses have historically made the US foreign from China. Case study one for example demonstrates that nineteenth-century racial discourses of non-white immigrant Chinese separated China from a United States largely defined by its presumed Caucasian foundations. In case study two we see that Cold War ideological discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the democratic-capitalist US. These types of discourses are shown to have constituted a ‘specific sort of boundary producing political performance’.21 Across the history of Sino-US relations then when ‘dangers’ from China have emerged, they have always been perceived through the lens of American identity. In consequence, they have always existed as dangers to that identity. In this analysis it is argued that a key purpose of depicting China as a threat has been to protect components of American identity (primarily racial and ideological) deemed most fundamental to its being. As such, representations of a threatening China have most commonly been advanced by, and served the interests of, those who support actions to defend that identity. The case study analyses which follow reveal that this has included politicians and policymaking circles, such as those within the administration of President Harry Truman which implemented the Cold War containment of the PRC. It also exposes the complicity of other societal individuals and institutions including elements of the late nineteenth-century American media which supported restrictions against Chinese immigration to the western United States. It is demonstrated that, twice before, this discursive process of separating China from the United States has resulted in a crisis of American identity. Crises of identity occur when the existing order is considered in danger of rupture. The prevailing authority is seen to be weakened and rhetoric over how to reassert the ‘natural’ identity intensifies.22 Case studies one and two expose how such crises have previously emerged. These moments were characterised by perceived attacks upon core assumptions about what the United States was understood to be: fundamentally white in the late nineteenth century and democratic-capitalist in the early Cold War. Case study three shows that while today's China ‘threat’ to US security is yet to generate such a crisis, we must learn from those of the past to help avoid the types of consequences they have previously facilitated. As Director Clapper unwittingly confirmed then the capabilities and intentions of a ‘rising’ China are only part of the story. International relations are driven by forces both material and ideational and the processes by which China is made foreign from, and potentially dangerous to, the United States are inseparable from the enactment of US China policy. This is because, to reaffirm, American discourses of China have never been produced objectively or in the absence of purpose or intent. Their dissemination is a performance of power, however seemingly innocent or benign.23 This is not to claim causal linkages between representation and foreign policy. Rather, it is to reveal the specific historical conditions within which policies have occurred, through an analysis of the political history of the production of truth.24 Accordingly, this analysis shifts from a concern with ‘why’ to ‘how’ questions. ‘Why’ questions assume that particular practices can happen by taking for granted the identities of the actors involved.25 They assume, for instance, the availability of a range of policy options in Washington from the self-evident existence of a China threat. ‘How’ questions investigate the production of identity and the processes which ensure that particular practices can be enacted while others are precluded.26 In this analysis they are concerned with how and why China ‘threats’ have come to exist, who has been responsible for their production and how those socially constructed dangers have established the necessary realities within which particular US foreign policies could legitimately be advanced. US China policy, however, must not be narrowly conceived as a ‘bridge’ between two states.27 In fact, it works on behalf of societal discourses about China to reassert the understandings of difference upon which it relies.28 Rather than a final manifestation of representational processes, then, US China policy itself works to construct China's identity as well as that of the United States. As the case study analyses show, it perpetuates discursive difference through the rhetoric and actions (governmental acts, speeches, etc.) by which it is advanced and the reproduction of a China ‘threat’ continues. In such a way it constitutes the international ‘inscription of foreignness’, protecting American values and identity when seemingly threatened by that of China.29 As Hixson asserts, ‘[f]oreign policy plays a profoundly significant role in the process of creating, affirming and disciplining conceptions of national identity’, and the United States has always been especially dependent upon representational practices for understandings about its identity.30 In sum, this article advances three principal arguments. First, throughout history ‘threats’ from China towards the United States have never been explicable in terms of material forces alone. They have in part been fantasised, socially constructed products of American discourse. The physical contours of Sino-American relations have been given meaning by processes of representation so that China has repeatedly been made threatening no matter its intentions. Second, representations of China ‘threats’ have always been key to the enactment and justification of US foreign policies formulated in response. Specifically, they have framed the boundaries of political possibility so that certain policies could be enabled while potential alternatives could be discarded. Third, US China policies themselves have reaffirmed discourses of foreignness and the identities of both China and the United States, functioning to protect the American identity from which the ‘threats’ have been produced.

## Adv 2

### China Cyber

#### Russia and China can’t cyberattack the US – they only use it to crack down on their own populations

**Rid 12** (Thomas Rid, reader in war studies at King's College London, is author of "Cyber War Will Not Take Place" and co-author of "Cyber-Weapons.", March/April 2012, “Think Again: Cyberwar”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar?page=full)

"The West Is Falling Behind Russia and China." Yes, but not how you think. Russia and China are busy sharpening their cyberweapons and are already well steeped in using them. The Russian military clandestinely crippled Estonia's economy in 2007 and Georgia's government and banks in 2008. The People's Liberation Army's numerous Chinese cyberwarriors have long inserted "logic bombs" and "trapdoors" into America's critical infrastructure, lying dormant and ready to wreak havoc on the country's grid and bourse in case of a crisis. Both countries have access to technology, cash, and talent -- and have more room for malicious maneuvers than law-abiding Western democracies poised to fight cyberwar with one hand tied behind their backs. Or so the alarmists tell us. Reality looks quite different. Stuxnet, by far the most sophisticated cyberattack on record, was most likely a U.S.-Israeli operation. Yes, Russia and China have demonstrated significant skills in cyberespionage, but the fierceness of Eastern cyberwarriors and their coded weaponry is almost certainly overrated. When it comes to military-grade offensive attacks, America and Israel seem to be well ahead of the curve. Ironically, it's a different kind of cybersecurity that Russia and China may be more worried about. Why is it that those countries, along with such beacons of liberal democracy as Uzbekistan, have suggested that the United Nations establish an "international code of conduct" for cybersecurity? Cyberespionage was elegantly ignored in the suggested wording for the convention, as virtual break-ins at the Pentagon and Google remain a favorite official and corporate pastime of both countries. But what Western democracies see as constitutionally protected free speech in cyberspace, Moscow and Beijing regard as a new threat to their ability to control their citizens. Cybersecurity has a broader meaning in non-democracies: For them, the worst-case scenario is not collapsing power plants, but collapsing political power.b The social media-fueled Arab Spring has provided dictators with a case study in the need to patrol cyberspace not only for subversive code, but also for subversive ideas. The fall of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi surely sent shivers down the spines of officials in Russia and China. No wonder the two countries asked for a code of conduct that helps combat activities that use communications technologies -- "including networks" (read: social networks) -- to undermine "political, economic and social stability." So Russia and China are ahead of the United States, but mostly in defining cybersecurity as the fight against subversive behavior. This is the true cyberwar they are fighting.

#### China's program is too weak

Lu 13

Dr. Lu Jinghua is a Research Fellow for the Center on China-America Defense Relations at the PLA Academy of Military Science, China US Focus, June 7, 2013, "China’s Cyber Threat: Real or Imaginary?", http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/chinas-cyber-threat-real-or-imaginary/

It is the first time for the United States to directly condemn the Chinese government and military for cyber activities in an official document. However, not all these accusations are new. We can find similar arguments in previous reports and some newest reports such as the IP Commission Report. They have reflected the US concerns that its military superiority, economic prosperity and diplomatic influence would be undermined because of China’s cyber activities. Undoubtedly, China has enhanced its cyber capabilities. But would these advancements really be threatening America’s national interests?

According to some American scholars, the development of Chinese strategy in the domain of cyber warfare can be traced to the early 1990s. Pursuit of information dominance is given highest priority in the PLA not only because cyberspace is an emerging and critical domain for military competition, but also because cyber warfare strategy is in accordance with Sun Tzu's notion of “subduing the enemy without fighting.” That is, China enjoys “unique cultural advantages” in developing and using cyber capabilities. However, after two decades of development, the PLA is still aiming to “attain major progress in informationzation” while “bearing in mind the primary goal of accomplishing mechanization.” It is obvious that the PLA is still in the early process of informationization. In contrast with China, the US has a military with most IT applications and is the first one to establish a Cyber Command. Also, America is widely recognized as the main researcher, developer and user of Stuxnet, which is the only well-known computer network malware to cause significant damages to physical infrastructure. Through an in-depth analysis of this case, we can draw the conclusion that cyberspace is not an asymmetric domain for weaker actors to achieve unexpected advantages. Rather, it can only widen current gaps between strong countries and weak ones. In this sense, is it necessary for the strongest military power to feel afraid of a weak one?

#### Zero impact to cyber arms race --- overwhelming consensus of qualified authors goes neg

- No motivation---can’t be used for coercive leverage

- Defenses solve---benefits of offense are overstated

- Too difficult to execute/mistakes in code are inevitable

- AT: Infrastructure attacks

- Military networks are air-gapped/difficult to access

- Overwhelming consensus goes neg

Colin S. Gray 13, Prof. of International Politics and Strategic Studies @ the University of Reading and External Researcher @ the Strategic Studies Institute @ the U.S. Army War College, April, “Making Strategic Sense of Cyber Power: Why the Sky Is Not Falling,” U.S. Army War College Press, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1147.pdf>

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: THE SKY IS NOT FALLING¶ This analysis has sought to explore, identify, and explain the strategic meaning of cyber power. The organizing and thematic question that has shaped and driven the inquiry has been “So what?” Today we all do cyber, but this behavior usually has not been much informed by an understanding that reaches beyond the tactical and technical. I have endeavored to analyze in strategic terms what is on offer from the largely technical and tactical literature on cyber. What can or might be done and how to go about doing it are vitally important bodies of knowledge. But at least as important is understanding what cyber, as a fifth domain of warfare, brings to national security when it is considered strategically. Military history is stocked abundantly with examples of tactical behavior un - guided by any credible semblance of strategy. This inquiry has not been a campaign to reveal what cy ber can and might do; a large literature already exists that claims fairly convincingly to explain “how to . . .” But what does cyber power mean, and how does it fit strategically, if it does? These Conclusions and Rec ommendations offer some understanding of this fifth geography of war in terms that make sense to this strategist, at least. ¶ 1. Cyber can only be an enabler of physical effort. Stand-alone (popularly misnamed as “strategic”) cyber action is inherently grossly limited by its immateriality. The physicality of conflict with cyber’s human participants and mechanical artifacts has not been a passing phase in our species’ strategic history. Cyber action, quite independent of action on land, at sea, in the air, and in orbital space, certainly is possible. But the strategic logic of such behavior, keyed to anticipated success in tactical achievement, is not promising. To date, “What if . . .” speculation about strategic cyber attack usually is either contextually too light, or, more often, contextually unpersuasive. 49 However, this is not a great strategic truth, though it is a judgment advanced with considerable confidence. Although societies could, of course, be hurt by cyber action, it is important not to lose touch with the fact, in Libicki’s apposite words, that “[i]n the absence of physical combat, cyber war cannot lead to the occupation of territory. It is almost inconceivable that a sufficiently vigorous cyber war can overthrow the adversary’s government and replace it with a more pliable one.” 50 In the same way that the concepts of sea war, air war, and space war are fundamentally unsound, so also the idea of cyber war is unpersuasive. ¶ It is not impossible, but then, neither is war conducted only at sea, or in the air, or in space. On the one hand, cyber war may seem more probable than like environmentally independent action at sea or in the air. After all, cyber warfare would be very unlikely to harm human beings directly, let alone damage physically the machines on which they depend. These near-facts (cyber attack might cause socially critical machines to behave in a rogue manner with damaging physical consequences) might seem to ren - der cyber a safer zone of belligerent engagement than would physically violent action in other domains. But most likely there would be serious uncertainties pertaining to the consequences of cyber action, which must include the possibility of escalation into other domains of conflict. Despite popular assertions to the contrary, cyber is not likely to prove a precision weapon anytime soon. 51 In addition, assuming that the political and strategic contexts for cyber war were as serious as surely they would need to be to trigger events warranting plausible labeling as cyber war, the distinctly limited harm likely to follow from cyber assault would hardly appeal as prospectively effective coercive moves. On balance, it is most probable that cyber’s strategic future in war will be as a contribut - ing enabler of effectiveness of physical efforts in the other four geographies of conflict. Speculation about cyber war, defined strictly as hostile action by net - worked computers against networked computers, is hugely unconvincing.¶ 2. Cyber defense is difficult, but should be sufficiently effective. The structural advantages of the offense in cyber conflict are as obvious as they are easy to overstate. Penetration and exploitation, or even attack, would need to be by surprise. It can be swift almost beyond the imagination of those encultured by the traditional demands of physical combat. Cyber attack may be so stealthy that it escapes notice for a long while, or it might wreak digital havoc by com - plete surprise. And need one emphasize, that at least for a while, hostile cyber action is likely to be hard (though not quite impossible) to attribute with a cy - berized equivalent to a “smoking gun.” Once one is in the realm of the catastrophic “What if . . . ,” the world is indeed a frightening place. On a personal note, this defense analyst was for some years exposed to highly speculative briefings that hypothesized how unques - tionably cunning plans for nuclear attack could so promptly disable the United States as a functioning state that our nuclear retaliation would likely be still - born. I should hardly need to add that the briefers of these Scary Scenarios were obliged to make a series of Heroic Assumptions. ¶ The literature of cyber scare is more than mildly reminiscent of the nuclear attack stories with which I was assailed in the 1970s and 1980s. As one may observe regarding what Winston Churchill wrote of the disaster that was the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, “[t]he terrible ‘Ifs’ accumulate.” 52 Of course, there are dangers in the cyber domain. Not only are there cyber-competent competitors and enemies abroad; there are also Americans who make mistakes in cyber operation. Furthermore, there are the manufacturers and constructors of the physical artifacts behind (or in, depending upon the preferred definition) cyber - space who assuredly err in this and that detail. The more sophisticated—usually meaning complex—the code for cyber, the more certain must it be that mistakes both lurk in the program and will be made in digital communication.¶ What I have just outlined minimally is not a reluc - tant admission of the fallibility of cyber, but rather a statement of what is obvious and should be anticipat - ed about people and material in a domain of war. All human activities are more or less harassed by friction and carry with them some risk of failure, great or small. A strategist who has read Clausewitz, especially Book One of On War , 53 will know this. Alternatively, anyone who skims my summary version of the general theory of strategy will note that Dictum 14 states explicitly that “Strategy is more difficult to devise and execute than are policy, operations, and tactics: friction of all kinds comprise phenomena inseparable from the mak - ing and execution of strategies.” 54 Because of its often widely distributed character, the physical infrastruc - ture of an enemy’s cyber power is typically, though not invariably, an impracticable target set for physical assault. Happily, this probable fact should have only annoying consequences. The discretionary nature and therefore the variable possible characters feasible for friendly cyberspace(s), mean that the more danger - ous potential vulnerabilities that in theory could be the condition of our cyber-dependency ought to be avoidable at best, or bearable and survivable at worst. Libicki offers forthright advice on this aspect of the subject that deserves to be taken at face value: ¶ [T]here is no inherent reason that improving informa - tion technologies should lead to a rise in the amount of critical information in existence (for example, the names of every secret agent). Really critical information should never see a computer; if it sees a computer, it should not be one that is networked; and if the computer is networked, it should be air-gapped.¶ Cyber defense admittedly is difficult to do, but so is cyber offense. To quote Libicki yet again, “[i]n this medium [cyberspace] the best defense is not necessarily a good offense; it is usually a good defense.” 56 Unlike the geostrategic context for nuclear-framed competition in U.S.–Soviet/Russian rivalry, the geographical domain of cyberspace definitely is defensible. Even when the enemy is both clever and lucky, it will be our own design and operating fault if he is able to do more than disrupt and irritate us temporarily.¶ When cyber is contextually regarded properly— which means first, in particular, when it is viewed as but the latest military domain for defense planning—it should be plain to see that cyber performance needs to be good enough rather than perfect. 57 Our Landpower, sea power, air power, and prospectively our space systems also will have to be capable of accepting combat damage and loss, then recovering and carrying on. There is no fundamental reason that less should be demanded of our cyber power. Second, given that cyber is not of a nature or potential character at all likely to parallel nuclear dangers in the menace it could con - tain, we should anticipate international cyber rivalry to follow the competitive dynamic path already fol - lowed in the other domains in the past. Because the digital age is so young, the pace of technical change and tactical invention can be startling. However, the mechanization RMA of the 1920s and 1930s recorded reaction to the new science and technology of the time that is reminiscent of the cyber alarmism that has flour - ished of recent years. 58 We can be confident that cyber defense should be able to function well enough, given the strength of political, military, and commercial motivation for it to do so. The technical context here is a medium that is a constructed one, which provides air-gapping options for choice regarding the extent of networking. Naturally, a price is paid in convenience for some closing off of possible cyberspace(s), but all important defense decisions involve choice, so what is novel about that? There is nothing new about accepting some limitations on utility as a price worth paying for security.¶ 3. Intelligence is critically important, but informa - tion should not be overvalued. The strategic history of cyber over the past decade confirms what we could know already from the science and technology of this new domain for conflict. Specifically, cyber power is not technically forgiving of user error. Cyber warriors seeking criminal or military benefit require precise information if their intended exploits are to succeed. Lucky guesses should not stumble upon passwords, while efforts to disrupt electronic Supervisory Con - trol and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems ought to be unable to achieve widespread harmful effects. But obviously there are practical limits to the air-gap op - tion, given that control (and command) systems need to be networks for communication. However, Internet connection needs to be treated as a potential source of serious danger.¶ It is one thing to be able to be an electronic nuisance, to annoy, disrupt, and perhaps delay. But it is quite another to be capable of inflicting real persisting harm on the fighting power of an enemy. Critically important military computer networks are, of course, accessible neither to the inspired amateur outsider, nor to the malignant political enemy. Easy passing reference to a hypothetical “cyber Pearl Harbor” reflects both poor history and ignorance of contemporary military common sense. Critical potential military (and other) targets for cyber attack are extremely hard to access and influence (I believe and certainly hope), and the technical knowledge, skills, and effort required to do serious harm to national security is forbiddingly high. This is not to claim, foolishly, that cyber means absolutely could not secure near-catastrophic results. However, it is to say that such a scenario is extremely improbable. Cyber defense is advancing all the time, as is cyber offense, of course. But so discretionary in vital detail can one be in the making of cyberspace, that confidence—real confidence—in cyber attack could not plausibly be high. It should be noted that I am confining this particular discussion to what rather idly tends to be called cyber war. In political and strategic practice, it is unlikely that war would or, more importantly, ever could be restricted to the EMS. Somewhat rhetorically, one should pose the question: Is it likely (almost anything, strictly, is possible) that cyber war with the potential to inflict catastrophic damage would be allowed to stand unsupported in and by action in the other four geographical domains of war? I believe not.¶ Because we have told ourselves that ours uniquely is the Information Age, we have become unduly respectful of the potency of this rather slippery catch-all term. As usual, it is helpful to contextualize the al - legedly magical ingredient, information, by locating it properly in strategic history as just one important element contributing to net strategic effectiveness. This mild caveat is supported usefully by recognizing the general contemporary rule that information per se harms nothing and nobody. The electrons in cyber - ized conflict have to be interpreted and acted upon by physical forces (including agency by physical human beings). As one might say, intelligence (alone) sinks no ship; only men and machines can sink ships! That said, there is no doubt that if friendly cyber action can infiltrate and misinform the electronic informa - tion on which advisory weaponry and other machines depend, considerable warfighting advantage could be gained. I do not intend to join Clausewitz in his dis - dain for intelligence, but I will argue that in strategic affairs, intelligence usually is somewhat uncertain. 59 Detailed up-to-date intelligence literally is essential for successful cyber offense, but it can be healthily sobering to appreciate that the strategic rewards of intelligence often are considerably exaggerated. The basic reason is not hard to recognize. Strategic success is a complex endeavor that requires adequate perfor - mances by many necessary contributors at every level of conflict (from the political to the tactical). ¶ When thoroughly reliable intelligence on the en - emy is in short supply, which usually is the case, the strategist finds ways to compensate as best he or she can. The IT-led RMA of the past 2 decades was fueled in part by the prospect of a quality of military effec - tiveness that was believed to flow from “dominant battle space knowledge,” to deploy a familiar con - cept. 60 While there is much to be said in praise of this idea, it is not unreasonable to ask why it has been that our ever-improving battle space knowledge has been compatible with so troubled a course of events in the 2000s in Iraq and Afghanistan. What we might have misunderstood is not the value of knowledge, or of the information from which knowledge is quarried, or even the merit in the IT that passed information and knowledge around. Instead, we may well have failed to grasp and grip understanding of the whole context of war and strategy for which battle space knowledge unquestionably is vital. One must say “vital” rather than strictly essential, because relatively ignorant armies can and have fought and won despite their ig - norance. History requires only that one’s net strategic performance is superior to that of the enemy. One is not required to be deeply well informed about the en - emy. It is historically quite commonplace for armies to fight in a condition of more-than-marginal reciprocal and strategic cultural ignorance. Intelligence is king in electronic warfare, but such warfare is unlikely to be solely, or even close to solely, sovereign in war and its warfare, considered overall as they should be.¶ 4. Why the sky will not fall. More accurately, one should say that the sky will not fall because of hostile action against us in cyberspace unless we are improb - ably careless and foolish. David J. Betz and Tim Ste vens strike the right note when they conclude that “[i]f cyberspace is not quite the hoped-for Garden of Eden, it is also not quite the pestilential swamp of the imagination of the cyber-alarmists.” 61 Our understanding of cyber is high at the technical and tactical level, but re - mains distinctly rudimentary as one ascends through operations to the more rarified altitudes of strategy and policy. Nonetheless, our scientific, technological, and tactical knowledge and understanding clearly indicates that the sky is not falling and is unlikely to fall in the future as a result of hostile cyber action. This analysis has weighed the more technical and tactical literature on cyber and concludes, not simply on balance, that cyber alarmism has little basis save in the imagination of the alarmists. There is military and civil peril in the hostile use of cyber, which is why we must take cyber security seriously, even to the point of buying redundant capabilities for a range of command and control systems. 62 So seriously should we regard cyber danger that it is only prudent to as - sume that we will be the target for hostile cyber action in future conflicts, and that some of that action will promote disruption and uncertainty in the damage it will cause.¶ That granted, this analysis recommends strongly that the U.S. Army, and indeed the whole of the U.S. Government, should strive to comprehend cyber in context. Approached in isolation as a new technol - ogy, it is not unduly hard to be over impressed with its potential both for good and harm. But if we see networked computing as just the latest RMA in an episodic succession of revolutionary changes in the way information is packaged and communicated, the computer-led IT revolution is set where it belongs, in historical context. In modern strategic history, there has been only one truly game-changing basket of tech - nologies, those pertaining to the creation and deliv - ery of nuclear weapons. Everything else has altered the tools with which conflict has been supported and waged, but has not changed the game. The nuclear revolution alone raised still-unanswered questions about the viability of interstate armed conflict. How - ever, it would be accurate to claim that since 1945, methods have been found to pursue fairly traditional political ends in ways that accommodate nonuse of nuclear means, notwithstanding the permanent pres - ence of those means.¶ The light cast by general strategic theory reveals what requires revealing strategically about networked computers. Once one sheds some of the sheer wonder at the seeming miracle of cyber’s ubiquity, instanta - neity, and (near) anonymity, one realizes that cyber is just another operational domain, though certainly one very different from the others in its nonphysi - cality in direct agency. Having placed cyber where it belongs, as a domain of war, next it is essential to recognize that its nonphysicality compels that cyber should be treated as an enabler of joint action, rather than as an agent of military action capable of behav - ing independently for useful coercive strategic effect. There are stand-alone possibilities for cyber action, but they are not convincing as attractive options either for or in opposition to a great power, let alone a superpower. No matter how intriguing the scenario design for cyber war strictly or for cyber warfare, the logic of grand and military strategy and a common sense fueled by understanding of the course of strategic history, require one so to contextualize cyber war that its independence is seen as too close to absurd to merit much concern.

#### No cyber war and cyber attacks have minimal impact – no casualties

Ronald Bailey, award-winning science analyst, 8-16-13, “Cyberwar Is Mostly Bunk”, <http://reason.com/archives/2013/08/16/cyberwar-is-mostly-bunk>, 8-24-13

The U.S. Cyber Command, or USCYBERCOM, was launched with great fanfare in 2010 to conduct "full-spectrum military cyberspace operations...in order to ensure U.S. and allied freedom of action in cyberspace, while denying the same to our adversaries." In a recent speech, former director of national intelligence Michael McConnell warned that the U.S. "is fighting a cyberwar today, and we are losing." This week the media was atwitter over the "cyberwar" against various news services, apparently instigated by supporters of Syria's President Bashar al-Assad. Since 2010, USCYBERCOM's budget and its ranks have both swelled. It is now housed in a $358 million headquarters at Fort Meade, which is also home to the National Security Agency. Reuters reports that it is "adding 3,000 and 4,000 new cyber warriors under its wing by late 2015, more than quadrupling its size." In the 2014 budget Cyber Command spending will grow by $800 million to $4.7 billion. Is McConnell right? Is the U.S. losing a cyberwar? In his intriguing new book, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, Thomas Rid, a War Studies scholar at King's College in London, argues that not we are not currently engaged in a cyberwar, and indeed that such a "war" is unlikely ever to take place. Rid is a careful thinker who believes that the public and policymakers are being misled about the magnitude of harm that cyberattacks can inflict. War, Carl von Clauswitz wrote, "is an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will." Citing this definition, Rid argues: "All war, pretty simply, is violent. If an act is not potentially violent, it's not an act of war, and it's not an armed attack." Without violence, war becomes a metaphor, like the war on obesity or the war on cancer. Clauswitz also argued in a war, a political goal must be attributed to one of the sides. With no goal and no attribution, the activity is something other than war. Rid proceeds to see how well recent cyberattacks fit these criteria. Consider, for example, the denial of service attacks against Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008, which evidently emanated from Russia. While somewhat disruptive, these "attacks" involved no violence, had no clear political goals, and could not be firmly attributed to the Russian government. At worst, they fall into a middle ground of infotech-mediated aggression that does not amount to war, a zone occupied by acts of sabotage, espionage, and subversion. The chief aim of war is to harm the bodies of the enemy. While some computer code might be able to manipulate some machinery into harming a person, the experience of violence is greatly attenuated compared to being shot at by a machine gun or bombed by a plane. Unlike conventional bombs and missiles, computer code does not carry its own explosive charge. To do physical damage it must be aimed at machinery that can damage itself when its operations are disrupted. The first reported casualty of a cyberattack, Rid predicts, will produce a lot of fear and a massive public outcry. But in the meantime, "Not a single human being has ever been killed or hurt as the result of a code triggered cyber attack." The most famous case of weaponized code causing physical damage is the Stuxnet worm, which disrupted Iran's nuclear enrichment centrifuges at Natanz. Evidently, the U.S. and Israel developed and targeted this highly sophisticated software, which reportedly delayed Iran's nuclear program by as much as two years. Rid argues that Stuxnet is not an example of warfare, but of sabotage. "Cyber attacks which are designed to sabotage a system may be violent, or the vast majority of the cases, non-violent,” argues Rid. Sabotage is aimed chiefly at things, not people. In addition, most saboteurs do not want to be identified. Rid cites several examples of cybersabotage, including the Shamoon attack (likely unleashed by coders located in Iran) against the oil company Saudi Aramco in 2012, which wiped the data from several thousand of the companies' computers. Yet it harmed no critical oil production and control facilities. Another form of cyberattack—exfiltrating data from computers—is best classified as espionage. The Shady RAT attacks, for example, downloaded data from 13 U.S. defense companies, six U.S. government agencies, five national Olympic Committees, three electronics companies, three energy companies, and two think tanks in 2011. The pilfering (apparently organized by Chinese hackers) was discovered in 2011; it's not clear what was taken. The Flame attack, discovered in 2012, was aimed at Iran's oil industry. That “bug on steroids” had the remarkable capabilities; it could turn on an infected computer's microphone, take screen shots, log keystrokes, and overhear Skype conversations, as well as exfiltrate documents. Given its intricacy, Kaspersky Lab, the Russian computer security firm, suspects that Flame was devised by the same groups that created Stuxnet. Cyberespionage, Rid notes, carries less risk of violence than traditional cloak-and-dagger spying. It also has a greater tendency to blur the lines between foreign and domestic surveillance. Rid suggests that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, adopted in 1978, "imposed severe limits on the use of intelligence agencies inside the U.S." Edwin Snowden's recent revelations have shown that the limits weren't so severe after all. Finally, infotech can be used to subvert. Rid argues that modern communications technologies have made it much easier to launch movements against the existing order but harder to maintain discipline among the would-be subverters. The anti-globalization movement at the turn of the century, for example, was savvy in its use of information technologies but petered out as its often contradictory goals proliferated. "Subversion," Rid notes, has quite different meanings and effects in liberal and authoritarian regimes. Occupy Wall Street was a form of more or less legitimate subversion in the U.S.; Occupy Tahrir Square in Egypt has quite a different political valence. "In liberal democracies subversion has been successfully legalized and institutionalized," Rid writes. Meanwhile, authoritarian regimes such as China and Russia tried to push for the United Nations to adopt an "International code of conduct for information security." The proposed code of conduct would have specifically obligated nations to “combat” the use of information and communication technologies that “undermines other countries' political, economic and social stability.” Rid frets, "The real risk for liberal democracies is not that these technologies empower individuals more than the state; the long-term risk is that they empower the state more than individuals." Given the NSA spying scandal, this observation seems disturbingly prescient. "Open systems," Rid argues, "no matter if we're talking about a computer's operating system or a society's political system, are more stable and run more securely." That much is absolutely right. Ultimately, Rid makes a strong case that “cyber war has never happened in the past, it does not occur in the present, and it is highly unlikely that it will disturb our future.”

### Grid

#### Prevention measures are taken to prevent massive blackouts & escalation.

DoE 9/10/04 – U.S. Department of Energy [Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, “Is Our Power Grid More Reliable One Year After the Blackout?”, State Energy Program, Sept.-Oct./04, http://www.eere.energy.gov/state\_energy\_program/feature\_detail\_info.cfm/fid=32?print]

The U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force publication, The August 14, 2003 Blackout One Year Later: Actions Taken in the United States and Canada to Reduce Blackout Risk (PDF 236 KB) Download Acrobat Reader, details the actions taken to improve grid reliability. For example, shortly after the Task Force identified direct causes of the August 14 blackout, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and NERC set to correct them. The U.S. Canada Power System Outage Task Force conducted a massive investigation into the causes of the blackout and made 42 recommendations to improve power system operations. In December 2003, FERC ordered FirstEnergy to study the adequacy of transmission and generation facilities in northeastern Ohio. The results were submitted in April 2004 and recommendations are now being incorporated into FirstEnergy's operations and strategic plan. In February 2004, NERC directed FirstEnergy, the MISO, PJM Interconnection, and the East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement on actions each organization needed by June 30, 2004, to reduce the potential of future blackouts. NERC then approved and verified their compliance plans. In response to the April 2004 Final Report, FERC took the following actions to clarify and develop reliability standards: \* Commissioned a firm to analyze transmission line outages related to inadequate tree trimming — a major contributor to the August 14 blackout — and determine best practices for preventing this problem. See the "Utility Vegetation Management and Bulk Electric Reliability Report from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" (PDF 92 KB). \* Began to require transmission owners to file reports on their tree trimming practices. \* Affirmed the need to strengthen and clarify NERC's operating reliability standards. Meanwhile, NERC strengthened its policies on emergency operations, operations planning, and reliability coordinator procedures and will include compliance metrics in its operating policies and planning standards by February 2005. New standards for managing vegetation and calculating transmission line ratings are also being developed; procedures for training and certifying operators are being revised.

#### Zero impact to grid failures, even ones caused by cyber attacks

Douglas Birch 10-1-12, former foreign correspondent for the Associated Press and the Baltimore Sun who has written extensively on technology and public policy, 10/1/12, “Forget Revolution,” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget\_revolution?page=full

Government officials sometimes describe a kind of Hieronymus Bosch landscape when warning of the possibility of a cyber attack on the electric grid. Imagine, if you will, that the United States is blindsided by an epic hack that interrupts power for much of the Midwest and mid-Atlantic for more than a week, switching off the lights, traffic signals, computers, water pumps, and air conditioners in millions of homes, businesses, and government offices. Americans swelter in the dark. Chaos reigns! ¶ Here's another nightmare scenario: An electric grid that serves two-thirds of a billion people suddenly fails in a developing, nuclear-armed country with a rich history of ethnic and religious conflict. Rail transportation is shut down, cutting off travel to large swathes of the country, while many miners are trapped underground. ¶ Blackouts on this scale conjure images of civil unrest, overwhelmed police, crippled hospitals, darkened military bases, the gravely injured in the back of ambulances stuck in traffic jams. ¶ The specter of what Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has called a "digital Pearl Harbor" led to the creation of U.S. Cyber Command, which is tasked with developing both offensive and defensive cyber warfare capabilities, and prompted FBI Director Robert Mueller to warn in March that cyber attacks would soon be "the number one threat to our country." Similar concerns inspired both the Democrats and Republicans to sound the alarm about the cyber threat in their party platforms. ¶ But are cyber attacks really a clear and present danger to society's critical life support systems, capable of inflicting thousands of casualties? Or has fear of full-blown cybergeddon at the hands of America's enemies become just another feverish national obsession -- another of the long, dark shadows of the 9/11 attacks? ¶ Worries about a large-scale, devastating cyber attack on the United States date back several decades, but escalatedfollowing attacks on Estonian government and media websites during a diplomatic conflict with Russia in 2007. That digital ambush was followed by a cyber attack on Georgian websites a year later in the run-up to the brief shooting war between Tbilisi and Moscow, as well as allegations of a colossal, ongoing cyber espionage campaign against the United States by hackers linked to the Chinese army. ¶ Much of the concern has focused on potential attacks on the U.S. electrical grid. "If I were an attacker and I wanted to do strategic damage to the United States...I probably would sack electric power on the U.S. East Coast, maybe the West Coast, and attempt to cause a cascading effect," retired Admiral Mike McConnell said in a 2010 interview with CBS's 60 Minutes. ¶ But the scenarios sketched out above are not solely the realm of fantasy. This summer, the United States and India were hit by two massive electrical outages -- caused not by ninja cyber assault teams but by force majeure. And, for most people anyway, the results were less terrifying than imagined. ¶ First, the freak "derecho" storm that barreled across a heavily-populated swath of the eastern United States on the afternoon of June 29 knocked down trees that crushed cars, bashed holes in roofs, blocked roads, and sliced through power lines. ¶ According to an August report by the U.S. Department of Energy, 4.2 million homes and businesses lost power as a result of the storm, with the blackout stretching across 11 states and the District of Columbia. More than 1 million customers were still without power five days later, and in some areas power wasn't restored for 10 days. Reuters put the death tollat 23 people as of July 5, all killed by storms or heat stroke. ¶ The second incident occurred in late July, when 670 million people in northern India, or about 10 percent of the world's population, lost power in the largest blackout in history. The failure of this huge chunk of India's electric grid was attributed to higher-than-normal demand due to late monsoon rains, which led farmers to use more electricity in order to draw water from wells. Indian officials told the media there were no reports of deaths directly linked to the blackouts. ¶ But this cataclysmic event didn't cause widespread chaos in India -- indeed, for some, it didn't even interrupt their daily routine. "[M]any people in major cities barely noticed the disruption because localized blackouts are so common that many businesses, hospitals, offices and middle-class homes have backup diesel generators," the New York Timesreported. ¶ The most important thing about both events is what didn't happen. Planes didn't fall out of the sky. Governments didn't collapse. Thousands of people weren't killed. Despite disruption and delay, harried public officials, emergency workers, and beleaguered publics mostly muddled through. ¶ The summer's blackouts strongly suggest that a cyber weapon that took down an electric grid even for several days could turn out to be little more than a weapon of mass inconvenience.¶ That doesn't mean the United States can relax. James Lewis, director of the technology program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, believes that hackers threaten the security of U.S. utilities and industries, and recently penned an op-ed for the New York Times calling the United States "defenseless" to a cyber-assault. But he told Foreign Policy the recent derecho showed that even a large-scale blackout would not necessarily have catastrophic consequences.

# 1nr

# Sacred Cow

## 2NC Link – General

**The Plan will be taken off-budget – that allows for a flood of new Sacred Cows – causes a massive deficit**

**Kasich 96**, Former Chair of the House Budget Committee, 4-19-96 (John, “Truth in Budgeting Act won't balance a thing,” The Times Union)

The objective of this bill, in Washington-speak, is to take the **transportation spending** ''off-budget'' -- in other words, to give it special status so the rules that apply to almost all other portions of the budget won't apply to this category. Supporters of this plan say it is justified because the federal government is somehow hoarding taxes earmarked for transportation programs and spending them elsewhere. Those who are really interested in ''truthful budgeting'' know nothing could be farther from the truth. In fact, Washington has spent more from the Highway Trust Fund than it has received in earmarked taxes in 12 of the past 15 years. In 1994 alone, the federal government collected $ 18 billion in trust fund taxes but spent $ 22 billion on trust fund programs. By exempting transportation spending from the rules that apply to most other federal spending, we **could be creating a deficit disaster**. Both the White House and the congressional budget offices estimate that exempting transportation from the restraints could increase the federal budget deficit by more than $ 20 billion over the next five years. This means that to get to a balanced budget, other, non-transportation programs must be cut by $ 20 billion. Proponents of this measure are notably silent on where these cuts should fall. Off-budget proponents also claim that more federal spending is needed to improve the nation's infrastructure. This, too, misses the point. Part of the problem is not how much the federal government is spending but how we spend it. For starters, between 1991 and 1997, more than $ 6 billion in trust fund taxes will pay for more than 500 ''demonstration'' projects for the districts of powerful members. These projects don't address national transportation needs, and an association of state transportation officials has asked that the practice of earmarking ''demonstration projects'' be stopped. Yet if we took the **transportation funds ''off-budget''** and removed the restraints that now apply, the door would certainly be open for even more of these shenanigans in the future. But what is most dangerous about the bill is this: If we give one federal program vaunted budget status, who will be next? Lobbyists around town can't wait to see if ''off-budget'' will be their fiscal fountain of youth. To prove this, look at who is on each side of the issue: Transportation lobbyists unanimously support preferential treatment for transportation spending; accountability-in-government and balanced-budget groups, academics and Wall Street all strongly oppose the measure. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, who usually refrains from commenting on congressional spending policy, said that taking trust funds off-budget ''could weaken the ability of the Congress to prioritize and control spending . . . (and) could engender cynicism in financial markets and the public at large about the commitment and ability of government to control federal spending.''

**They ensure every pet project gets funded**

**Boskin, 96** (Michael Boskin, senior fellow at the Hoover Institute; Congressional Record, 142 Con Rec H, 4/17/1996, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1996-04-17/html/CREC-1996-04-17-pt1-PgH3497-3.htm)

I believe it is likely that moving one popular spending program primarily financed by earmarked revenues off-budget would lead to a stampede first of other trust funds off-budget and then all other spending programs seeking to be funded with earmarked revenue sources. This would quickly render sensible tax and budget policy impossible.

**They cause an influx of new sacred cows**

March **Goldwein** **11**, June 24, 2011, (http://crfb.org/category/document-type/policy-paper Budget Path: How Feds Can Avert the Fiscal Crisis The Public Manager | June 24, 2011)  Make no mistake: … of those cuts.

Make no mistake: the United States is not immune from a debt crisis. We are already in debt to the tune of 65 percent of our economy, a level higher than any time since the Truman Administration. On our current path, that level will exceed 90 percent—a level many economists consider as the danger zone—by the end of this decade. In fact, if you account for state and local debt, we are nearly there already. At some point, our creditors will lose faith in our ability to repay our debt. No one can know for sure when we will reach this tipping point. But we do know that the bond markets are fickle and can turn on us fast. And turn on us they will. Without a plan to control the growth of entitlement spending and make other tax and spending changes, our national debt will reach levels that no country could possibly sustain. The choice before us isn’t whether (or not) to cut spending or whether (or not) to increase taxes. The choice is whether to act now on our own terms, or later when a crisis forces such action upon us. Many experts have suggested that the political system will not be able to act before an actual crisis occurs. I don’t accept this as an inevitability—not if our leaders can come together and support a bold but balanced plan of spending cuts, entitlement changes, and tax reforms. An ambitious plan to stabilize the debt can be enacted, and it can be done in a way that is comprehensive, progrowth, and protects those truly in need. The Fiscal Commission proved that such a plan is possible, and its recommendations garnered the support of 11 out of 18 commissioners. This bipartisan supermajority included five Democrats, five Republicans, and one Independent, ranging from Senator Dick Durbin on the left to Senator Tom Coburn on the right. The commission’s recommendations are now at the center of the deficit discussion in Washington. Whether or not these deliberations and negotiations lead somewhere could literally be the difference between prosperity and ruin. Fiscal Commission Recommendations The recommendations reported by the Fiscal Commission in December 2010 would reduce the deficit by nearly $4 trillion through 2020, and put the debt on a stable and declining path through at least 2035. The recommendations were quite comprehensive, hitting nearly every area of the budget. This approach was necessary not only to match the magnitude of the problem, but also to build a bipartisan coalition. No member of Congress would put his or her sacred cow on the chopping block without knowing that others would as well. And few members of the public are willing to accept higher taxes, lower benefits, or fewer government services unless it is in the spirit of shared sacrifice in which their fellow Americans are doing the same.

**They cause extra programs to get funded**

**Defense Daily 01** (March 6, Lexis)

"I always have a concern about supplementals, " Lott said, adding that members frequently use them to add "a few extra cars to that engine," a reference to spending items not in the original supplemental request. While some congressional leaders, including Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Warner (R-Va.) have pressed the Bush administration to submit a defense supplemental to address immediate readiness concerns, the administration has said it will not do so until Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has finished his top-to-bottom review of the Pentagon.

## Sacred Cow DAs Good

**Resolutional basis – Fiat is permanent – increase definition**

**HEFC 04** (Higher Education Funding Council for England, “Joint Committee on the Draft Charities Bill Written Evidence”, June 2004, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200304/jtselect/jtchar/167/167we98.htm)

9.1  The Draft Bill creates an obligation on the principal regulator to do all that it "reasonably can to meet the compliance objective in relation to the charity".[45] The Draft Bill defines the compliance objective as "to increase compliance by the charity trustees with their legal obligations in exercising control and management of the administration of the charity".[46] 9.2  Although the word "increase" is used in relation to the functions of a number of statutory bodies,[47] such examples demonstrate that "increase" is used in relation to considerations to be taken into account in the exercise of a function, rather than an objective in itself. 9.3  HEFCE is concerned that an obligation on principal regulators to "increase" compliance per se is unworkable, in so far as it does not adequately define the limits or nature of the statutory duty. Indeed, the obligation could be considered to be ever-increasing.

**Should requires this as well**

**Summer 94** (Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14)

The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.[16](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn16)  ¶5 Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.[17](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn17) The order's language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used.[18](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn18) When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.[19](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn19) True minutes[20](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn20) of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by the statutory policy of this State. IV CONCLUSION Nisi prius judgments and orders should be construed in a manner which gives effect and meaning to the complete substance of the memorial. When a judge-signed direction is capable of two interpretations, one of which would make it a valid part of the record proper and the other would render it a meaningless exercise in futility, the adoption of the former interpretation is this court's due. A rule - that on direct appeal views as fatal to the order's efficacy the mere omission from the journal entry of a long and customarily implied phrase, i.e., "and the same hereby is" - is soon likely to drift into the body of principles which govern the facial validity of judgments. This development would make judicial acts acutely vulnerable to collateral attack for the most trivial of reasons and tend to undermine the stability of titles or other adjudicated rights. It is obvious the trial judge intended his May 18 memorial to be an in praesenti order overruling Dollarsaver's motion for judgment n.o.v. It is hence that memorial, and not the later June 2 entry, which triggered appeal time in this case. Because the petition. in error was not filed within 30 days of May 18, the appeal is untimely. I would hence sustain the appellee's motion to dismiss.[21](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn21)  Footnotes: [1](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker2fn1) The pertinent terms of the memorial of May 18, 1993 are: IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BRYAN COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA COURT MINUTE /18/93 No. C-91-223 After having heard and considered arguments of counsel in support of and in opposition to the motions of the Defendant for judgment N.O.V. and a new trial, the Court finds that the motions should be overruled. Approved as to form: /s/ Ken Rainbolt /s/ Austin R. Deaton, Jr. /s/ Don Michael Haggerty /s/ Rocky L. Powers Judge [2](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker2fn2) The turgid phrase - "should be and the same hereby is" - is a tautological absurdity. This is so because "should" is synonymous with ought or must and is in itself sufficient to effect an inpraesenti ruling - one that is couched in "a present indicative synonymous with ought." See infra note 15.[3](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker2fn3) Carter v. Carter, Okl., [783 P.2d 969](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=10645), 970 (1989); Horizons, Inc. v. Keo Leasing Co., Okl., [681 P.2d 757](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=9677), 759 (1984); Amarex, Inc. v. Baker, Okl., [655 P.2d 1040](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=5345), 1043 (1983); Knell v. Burnes, Okl., [645 P.2d 471](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=5225), 473 (1982); Prock v. District Court of Pittsburgh County, Okl., [630 P.2d 772](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=4989), 775 (1981); Harry v. Hertzler, 185 Okl. 151, [90 P.2d 656](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=13059), 659 (1939); Ginn v. Knight, 106 Okl. 4, 232 P. 936, 937 (1925). [4](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker2fn4) "Recordable" means that by force of [12 O.S. 1991 § 24](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=93563&date=11/8/94) an instrument meeting that section's criteria must be entered on or "recorded" in the court's journal. The clerk may "enter" only that which is "on file." The pertinent terms of [12 O.S. 1991 § 24](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=93563&date=11/8/94) are: "Upon the journal record required to be kept by the clerk of the district court in civil cases . . . shall be entered copies of the following instruments on file: cont… Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to **imply an obligation** and to be **more than advisory**); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, [802 P.2d 813](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=802&box2=P.2D&box3=813) (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker2fn14) In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

**And so does Substantial**

**Words and Phrases 64** (40 W&P 759)

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; **certain**; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; **opposed to form**; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; **undivided**; sole; opposed to inclusive.

**And Resolved**

**AHD 06** (American Heritage Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)

Resolve TRANSITIVE VERB:1. To make a **firm** decision about. 2. To cause (a person) to reach a decision. See synonyms at decide. 3. To decide or express by formal vote.

# Prolif

### 1nc – theory wrong

#### Credibility theory is incoherent — empirically denied

Jonathan Mercer 13, associate professor of political science at the University of Washington in Seattle and a Fellow at the Center for International Studies at the London School of Economics. Bad Reputation, 28 August 2013, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139376/jonathan-mercer/bad-reputation

Even if Assad were so simpleminded, the administration’s critics are wrong to suggest that the president should have acted sooner to protect U.S. credibility. After the red line was first crossed, Obama could have taken the United States to war to prevent Assad from concluding that an irresolute Obama would not respond to any further attacks -- a perception on Syria’s part that seems to have now made a U.S. military response all but certain. But going to war to prevent a possible misperception that might later cause a war is, to paraphrase Bismarck, like committing suicide out of fear that others might later wrongly think one is dead.

It is also possible that the United States did not factor into Assad’s calculations. A few months before the United States invaded Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s primary concerns were avoiding a Shia rebellion and deterring Iran. Shortsighted, yes, but also a good reminder that although the United States is at the center of the universe for Americans, it is not for everyone else. Assad has a regime to protect and he will commit any crime to win the war. Finally, it is possible that Assad never doubted Obama’s resolve -- he just expects that he can survive any American response. After all, if overthrowing Assad were easy, it would already have been done.

### Deterrence Works 2NC

#### Experts Agree Deterrence Theory Applies to Iran

Paul Starobin, Contributing Editor of Atlantic Monthly, 2006 National Journal, "Of Mullahs and MADness", 5.20.2006

Thus, for some hard-liners, the discussion is best focused on whether a pre-emptive U.S. military strike could decimate or severely retard Iran's nuclear program. **"**There is only one thing worse than military action, [and] that is a nuclear-armed Iran**,"** Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., declared recently. Less stridently, President Bush has called "unacceptable" the Tehran regime's possession of the bomb. But those who state the matter as McCain et al do are implicitly assuming that Iran's mullahs -- unlike the Red Chinese and other zealots who have had nukes -- are outside the boundaries of deterrence. And yet the system of deterrence -- which follows the principle of "mutually assured destruction," or MAD -- is nearly as old as the Atomic Age and has, so far, a perfect track record. Nuclear weapons have been deployed only one time, and that was when one nation, the United States, possessed a monopoly on them, at the close of World War II. And the United States used the bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki "against an essentially defeated enemy," as Robert Oppenheimer, the father of the A-bomb, put it. Although McCain's belligerent quote garnered headlines, a quiet piece of news is this: Most analysts who have studied Iran believe that the mullahs are, in fact, deterrable. "They respect superior power when they confront it," Kenneth Pollack, a National Security Council staffer in the Clinton White House, said in an interview. Pollack, who backed the Iraq war, added that he views **the mullahs as less reckless than Saddam Hussein, who pulled "crazy stunts" like the attempted assassination of the first President Bush.**

#### Iranian Nuclearization is Based on Political Insecurities – Proves its Passive Acquisition

Christopher Layne, Professor of Political Science @ Texas A&M 2006, The American Conservative, April 10

The U.S. experience with China illustrates an important point: the reasons states acquire nuclear weapons are primarily to gain security and, secondarily, to enhance their prestige. This certainly was true of China, which believed its security was threatened by the United States and by the Soviet Union. It was also true of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and is true of Iran. As Gavin writes, “In some ways, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ early analysis of China mirrors the Bush administration’s public portrayal of Iraq in the lead-up to the war. Insofar as Iraq was surrounded by potential nuclear adversaries (Iran and Israel) and threatened by regime change by the most powerful country in the world, Saddam Hussein’s desire to develop nuclear weapons may be seen as understandable.” The same can be said for Iran, which is ringed by U.S. conventional forces in neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq and in the Persian Gulf, and which is a stated target of the Bush administration’s policy of regime change and democratization. Tehran may be paranoid, but in the United States and Israel, it has real enemies. It is Iran’s fear for its security that drives its quest to obtain nuclear weapons.

#### And Fanatic Arguments Are False

Barry Posen, Professor of Political Science at MIT, 2006 Century Foundation Report, "A Nuclear Armed Iran: A Difficult but not Impossible Policy Problem"

A premise of the foregoing fears is that Iran is led by religious fanatics, who might be more interested in the next world than this one. The current president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has made statements that have caused observ ers to doubt his risk aversion and his grasp on reality. It is important to note, however, that in Iran’s governing structure, the president does not have much influence over security policy. This belongs to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Though its implications are much disputed, he has issued a fatwa against the development, production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons.15 This suggests awareness that nuclear weapons are particularly destructive and terrible. Iran’s religious leaders have in the past shown themselves sensitive to costs. The founder of Iran’s revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, ceased the war with Iraq in the 1980s when he determined that the costs were too great.16 By modern standards these costs were high, perhaps half a million dead. But those casualties pale against the casualties of a nuclear exchange with Israel. And Iran’s suffering in a nuclear exchange with Israel would pale against its likely suffering in an exchange with the United States.

### Iran Prolif Good Module

#### Iran Prolif Solves Middle East Tensions and Risks of Retaliation

Ehsaneh Sadr, Dept of Government and Politics at Univ. Maryland 2005 Middle East Policy, Summer

In an article on U.S. options for a post- Cold War nuclear policy, Charles Glaser criticizes the work of foreign-policy analysts who “focus on a single criterion for evaluating U.S. security – the damage United States society would suffer in a war – but overlook other criteria for measuring U.S. security, specifically those criteria that measure the likelihood of war.”61 The same criticism might be leveled at Israeli security analysts whose preoccupation with the devastation a nuclear Iran could inflict upon the Jewish nation clouds their evaluation of the ways in which the acquisition of nuclear weapons affects the likelihood that Iran would initiate hostilities in the first place. The above analysis indicates that a nuclearized Iran is extremely unlikely to pose an existential threat to Israel. The doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction holds in the Iranian context: Iran’s clerical rulers, anxious to protect their own power, citizens and civilization, will not launch a war that will lead to their own destruction. Iran’s rulers are extremely unlikely to pass nuclear material on to terrorist actors whose loyalty they cannot ensure. They are also unlikely to step up conventional or terrorist harassment of Israel for fear of the escalation of hostilities to nuclear warfare**.** The impact of Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weaponsupon Israel’s regional interestsis less problematic than one might think. Although the regime-change option would be off the table, it is not clear that it has ever been a feasible alternativegiven current geopolitical realities. Any increase in domestic political support for the Iranian regime is likely to be temporary**.** Iran may indeed be empowered to pursue its own regional interests, but such pursuit is not necessarily bad for Israeli interests. Finally, it will be many years before Iran’s weapons stockpile begins to approach Israel’s and the latter is compelled to engage in an expensive arms race. Indeed, there is reason to believe that Iran’s access to nuclear weapons may increase the prospects for regional stability and even Middle East peace. Given the horrendous consequences of an accidental nuclear war, it will be imperative that Iran and Israel develop some sort of ability to communicate with one another directly. It is not outside the realm of possibility that the institutionalization of such communications may be the first step in the normalization of relations between the two countries and the future integration of Israel into its neighborhood**.**

#### Snowball Arguments Are Hype

Kenneth Waltz, Prof. at UC Berkeley & Genius, 2007 Journal of International Affairs, "A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster", Summer

First, nuclear proliferation is not a problem because nuclear weapons have not proliferated. "Proliferation" means to spread like wildfire. We have had nuclear military capability for over fifty years, and we have a total of nine militarily capable nuclear states. That's hardly proliferation; that is, indeed, glacial spread**.** If another country gets nuclear weapons, and if it does so for good reasons,then that isn't an object of great worry**.** Every once in a while, some prominent person says something that's obviously true. Recently, Jacques Chirac [president of France] said that if Iran had one or two nuclear weapons, it would not pose a danger. Well, he was right. Of course, he had to quickly retract it and say, "Oh no, that slipped out, I didn't know the microphone was on!" Second, it doesn't matter who has nuclear weapons. Conversely, the spread of conventional weapons makes a great deal of difference. For instance, if a Hitler-type begins to establish conventional superiority, it becomes very difficult to contain and deter him. But, with nuclear weapons, it's been proven without exception that whoever gets nuclear weapons behaves with caution and moderation. Every country--whether they are countries we trust and think of as being highly responsible, like Britain, or countries that we distrust greatly, a**nd for very good reasons, l**ike China during the Cultural Revolution--behaves with such caution.

#### YOUR ESCALATION ARGUMENTS ARE WRONG TOO – KARGIL PROVES

Kenneth Waltz, Prof. at UC Berkeley & Genius, 2007 Journal of International Affairs, "A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster", Summer

Richard Betts: All perfectly clear! Ken, since Scott emphasized the lessons that can be drawn from the case of Pakistan, how do you see those parallels or lessons differently? What happened in Kargil was a game of chicken, a slippery slope upon which it isn't clear which side has the incentive to be the first to stop. How can you be sure we weren't simply lucky in that case and that in another Kargil instance that slippery slope would go to the lengths you're confident won't happen? Kenneth Waltz: In a world in which countries had only conventional weapons, that slippery slope would indeed lead to a conventional war**.** A number of Indians and Pakistanis think that what prevented the Kargil conflict from becoming the fourth war between the two countries was that each had nuclear weapons and knew the other had them as well**.** They each knew there was a limit to how far they could go. As one Indian military officer said, "We found, **as we expected,** that the trigger for war does not lie on the Kashmir frontier." It lies where there are vital interests at stake**.** Of course skirmishes take place, and of course conflicts can and will occur. But they will be contained as they always were. Nuclear optimists, like me, deal with the world as it has been for more than fifty years. Pessimists deal with hypothetical disasters that have never occurred. It seems to me that the optimists are the realists and the pessimists are the ones who are off in some ill-defined hypothesized world.

### AT: Iran Prolif 🡪 Regional Aggression

No Risk of Regional Aggression – Threat of Force Would Prevent Any Risk of Use

Barry Posen, Professor of Political Science at MIT, 2006 New York Times, "We Can live with a Nuclear Iran", Feb. 27

Tehran could not rule out the possibility that others with more and better nuclear weapons would strike Iran first, should it provoke a crisis or war. Judging from Cold War history, **if the Iranians so much as appeared to be readying their nuclear forces for use, the United States might consider a pre- emptive nuclear strike.** Israel might adopt a similar doctrine in the face of an Iranian nuclear arsenal. These are not developments to be wished for, but they are risks that a nuclear Iran must take into account. Nor are such calculations all that should counsel caution. Iran's military is large, but its conventional weapons are obsolete. Today the Iranian military could impose considerable costs on an American invasion or occupation force within Iran, but only with vast and extraordinarily expensive improvements could it defeat the American military if it were sent to defend the Gulf states from Iranian aggression. Each time a new nuclear-weapons state emerges, we rightly suspect that the world has grown more dangerous. The weapons are enormously destructive, humans are fallible, organizations can be incompetent, and technology often fails us. But as we contemplate the actions, including war, that the United States and its allies might take to forestall a nuclear Iran, we need to coolly assess whether and how such a specter might be deterred and contained.

#### More Evidence – The Risk of a Military Curb Stomping Checks Iranian Aggression

Ehsaneh Sadr, Dept of Government and Politics at Univ. Maryland, 2005 Middle East Policy, Summer

Israel might also be concerned that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would enhance its international prestige and power so that it could more successfully attain its regional goals. While these concerns are legitimate, the negative implications for Israeli interests might not be significant. To begin with, the continued presence of the American superpower’s formidable military in the Middle East is likely to dampen any strategic leverage Tehran might have hoped to gain over its neighbors as a result of its nuclearization. Iran is not likely to be in a position to use its nukes to bully smaller Gulf states so long as the United States retains a significant presence in the region.