# 1ac

Same as Round 1

# 2ac

## 2ac direct talks

#### “Economic engagement” doesn’t require formal governmental dialogue

Haass 00 – Richard N. Haass, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, “Engaging Problem Countries”, Brookings Policy Brief, No. 61, June,

<http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/18245/1/Engaging%20Problem%20Countries.pdf>?1

Engagement as a policy is not merely the antithesis of isolation. Rather, it involves the use of economic, political, or cultural incentives to influence problem countries to alter their behavior in one or more realms. Such a strategy can take a variety of forms. *Conditional* engagement is a government-to-government affair in which the United States offers inducements to a target regime in exchange for specified changes in behavior. This was the approach favored in 1994 when the United States and North Korea entered into a framework agreement under which Pyongyang pledged to curtail its nuclear weapons development in exchange for shipments of fuel, construction of a new generation of nuclear power-generating reactors, and a degree of diplomatic normalization. In contrast, *unconditional* engagement is less contractual, with incentives being extended without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Unconditional engagement makes the most sense in promoting civil society in hopes of creating an environment more conducive to reform.

## CP

### 2ac – congress key

#### Doesn’t solve – congressional jurisdiction

US COTA 91 – Congress Office of Technology Assessment (“Redesigning Defense: Planning the Transition to the Future U.S. Defense Industrial Base”, OTA-ISC-500, July 1991, http://ota-cdn.fas.org/reports/9134.pdf)//javi

The objective of greater NADIB integration would be to rationalize defense production within the North American continent by enabling both countries to specialize in the areas where they are most proficient. Congress could help achieve this goal by removing some or all of the existing legislative and policy barriers to free trade in defense and dual-use products between the two countries and by appropriating funds for the codevelopment and coproduction of defense equipment by U.S. and Canadian firms. The repeal of U.S. protectionist legislation might be made conditional on Ottawa’s willingness to drop its offset requirements. Such congressional action would need to be supplemented with additional measures by the executive branch. For example, the U.S. and Canadian defense departments might seek improved coordination in defense R&D policy and a more liberal policy on cross-border transfers of technology so that the research of both countries could be utilized more efficiently. Joint U.S.-Canadian industrial preparedness planning might also be expanded.

### 2AC – PDB

#### Perm Do Both – XOs link to politics while the perm empirically avoids it

Weiner 1/14 (Sarah, Very good former debater, works @ Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Fast Tracking Nuclear Treaties*, 1/14/13, http://csis.org/blog/fast-tracking-nuclear-treaties)

It would appear as if nuclear agreements are stuck between a rock and a hard place. President Obama could act independently, provoking congressional backlash and raising Constitutional objections, or he could submit agreements to the Senate for their advice and consent, likely to receive much of the former but too little of the latter. Fortunately, there is a third way forward, a half-step between independent executive action and cumbersome treaty ratification in the Senate. The Administration should consider submitting future international nuclear pacts to Congress in the form of congressional-executive agreements. This alternative ratification process, frequently used for trade and financial treaties, lowers the bar for Congressional consent without excluding the legislative branch from the treaty process.

### 2ac – certainty key

#### Certainty key – prevent loss of production and hit to national security

General Adams, 13 – Brigadier General for the U.S. Army (Retired) (John, “REMAKING AMERICAN SECURITY: SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES & NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS ACROSS THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE” http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/RemakingAmericanSecurityMay2013.pdf)djm

Accordingly, this report examined a series of defense industrial base sectors that are vital to U.S. security. Some are especially important and require immediate attention to prevent critical loss of supply or production capacity, constituting an immediate threat to national security. Some sectors are vulnerable to immediate disruption arising from excessive or misaligned foreign dependency, while others face longer-term challenges. In general, the risks posed to many sectors of the defense industrial base may prove very difficult to fix, because they are a part of powerful, prevailing trends in the international technology market and the global economy. All of these challenges demand our best strategic thinking about how to prevent or contain significant and potentially dangerous risks to national security. This report investigates those risks and is a call to action to mitigate them.

## K

### 2ac- Normal

#### The Role of the Ballot is to simulate the enactment of the plan—specifically beneficial in the context of Latin America

Baxter 10 (Jorge, Education Specialist, Department of Education and Culture in the Organization of American States, Former Coordinator of the Inter-American Program on Education for Democratic Values and Practices at the OAS, PHD in International Comparative Education and Policy from University of Maryland College Park, “Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Inter-American Journal of Education for Democracy, 3(2), 224-254, <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/ried/article/viewFile/1016/1307>, Accessed: 7/30/13)OG

In the context of international¶ education cooperation and international¶ development in Latin America, where**¶** there are great asymmetries in power and¶ resources, it seems that this critique could¶ have some validity. However, rather than**¶** concluding that deliberation and participation**¶** should be reduced, one could conclude (as¶ is argued in this paper) that they should**¶** be enhanced and expanded. Those that¶ advocate for a “thicker” democratization in¶ the region would likely advocate for a more**¶** substantive approach to deliberation in policy¶ which establishes certain parameters such¶ as “education is an intrinsic human right,”¶ and which would place an emphasis on¶ achieving quality education outcomes¶ for all as the goal. This does not mean that¶ they would not advocate for deliberation but¶ rather would set parameters for deliberation¶ in order to ensure that the outcomes do not¶ lead to “unjust” policy (e.g., a policy that¶ might promote more inequity in education).¶ Those that advocate for a “thinner” approach¶ to democratization would tend to advocate¶ for a procedural approach to deliberation in¶ education policy and would most likely place¶ emphasis on equal opportunity of access¶ to quality education.¶ Instability critique: Education in Latin¶ America suffers from too much instability and¶ is too politicized. Increasing participation and¶ deliberation would only further politicize the¶ situation and polarize those who advocate for¶ educational reform and those who block it.¶ The average term of a minister of education¶ is one-and-a-half years; each time a new¶ minister comes to office, new policies are¶ passed which, according to deliberative¶ democratic theory, would need to be reasoned¶ and debated with citizens. Deliberation in this¶ context would promote even more instability¶ and would lead to further politicization of¶ education reform.¶ Response: Political instability and¶ lack of continuity in policy reform are serious¶ limitations that to some degree are inherent¶ in democratic institutions and processes. The¶ reality is that if any education reform is to¶ succeed in the long term, it needs more than¶ the efforts of governments or international¶ organizations. It needs the sustained support¶ of stakeholders across sectors (public,¶ private, and civil society) and over time. It¶ has been argued that the main problem in¶ basic education in Latin America is the lack¶ of a broad social consensus, recognizing¶ that there is a problem of equity and quality¶ in the provision of education (Schiefelbein,¶ 1997). This lack of broad social consensus¶ is especially challenging where there is, as¶ noted in the critique, a lack of continuity¶ in education reform. Reform in education¶ takes time, sometimes decades. Ensuring¶ continuity in education reform policies is¶ therefore crucial, and this requires public¶ consensus. Deliberative forums convening**¶** government, private sector, and civil society**¶** groups can contribute to developing this public**¶** consensus and to providing more continuity**¶** in policy. Deliberative forums combined**¶** with collaborative projects can help promote**¶** learning, distribute institutional memory,**¶** support capacity-building efforts, and bring**¶** more resources to bear on the education**¶** reform process. Creating a space for citizens¶ to deliberate on the role of education is¶ fundamental for promoting broad social¶ consensus around education reforms. In Latin**¶** America, the most innovative and successful**¶** reforms have all created multiple and**¶** continuous opportunities for diverse groups**¶** across the education sector and society to¶ provide input and to have opportunities for¶ meaningful collaborative action. International¶ organizations, leveraging their regional and¶ international position, can contribute by¶ promoting policy dialogue and collaborative¶ actions among ministries and also with key¶ stakeholders across sectors. The challenge¶ is to develop a better understanding of how¶ deliberation can be used to promote more¶ collaborative as opposed to more adversarial¶ and partisan forms of politics. This is perhaps¶ one area which deliberative theorists need to¶ explore more.¶ 5. Power critique: The final critique relates¶ the possibility that increasing deliberation¶ and participation can lead to increased¶ inequality. Fung and Wright (2003) note¶ that deliberation can turn into domination¶ in a context where “participants in these¶ processes usually face each other from¶ unequal positions of power.” Every reform**¶** in education creates winners and losers, and**¶** very few create “win-win” situations. Those¶ in power would have to submit to the rules of¶ deliberation and relinquish “control” over the¶ various dimensions of democratic decisionmaking.¶ This is naïve and not politically¶ feasible.¶ Response: This is a valid critique¶ worth considering. Structural inequalities**¶** and asymmetries of power in governments**¶** and international institutions in Latin America**¶** have facilitated domination by elites in terms**¶** of authority, power, and control in politics.**¶** Asymmetries of power in international¶ cooperation in education are also clear,¶ especially when powerful financial (World¶ Bank, IDB, IMF) or political (OAS, UNESCO)¶ organizations engage with local stakeholders¶ and condition policy options with funding¶ or political support. What this paper has¶ argued is relevant again here: that instead of**¶** rejecting further democratization in the face**¶** of these challenges, including the challenge**¶** of elite “domination,” what is needed is more**¶** and better democracy, defined in terms of its**¶** breadth, depth, range, and control. Finally,¶ dealing with elite domination in international**¶** deliberative forums will require conscious and¶ skilled facilitation on the part of international¶ organizations, which themselves are often¶ elitist and hegemonic.¶ Final Thoughts: So What?¶ Perhaps the most critical question¶ that emerges in the argument for increased¶ democratization and deliberation is simply:¶ So what? Does increased democratization and¶ deliberation actually lead to better outcomes¶ in education? More empirical research on this¶ critical question is needed. However, experiments**¶** in deliberative democracy in education reform¶ in Brazil through the UNESCO and Ministry of¶ Education Coordinated Action Plan and Porto¶ Alegre‘s Citizen School, and also to some degree¶ at the international level with the OAS pilot¶ experiment in developing a more democratic¶ model of international cooperation from 2001-¶ 2005, have shown that deliberative processes**¶** can enhance learning on the part of those**¶** participating. Fung and Wright (2003) refer to¶ these experiments in deliberation as “schools¶ of democracy” because participants exercise**¶** their capacities of argument, planning, and¶ evaluation. Deliberation promotes joint reflection¶ and consideration of others’ views. Citizens**¶** who participate in deliberative forums develop**¶** competencies that are important not only for**¶** active citizenship (listening, communication,¶ problem-solving, conflict resolution, selfregulation skills) but also crucial for managing**¶** change and school reform. Many of the same**¶** skills that are developed through citizen**¶** deliberation and participation are also essential**¶** for transforming school cultures, promoting**¶** “learning organizations” (Senge, 2000), fostering**¶** communities of reflective practitioners (Schon,¶ 1991) and developing communities of practice**¶** (Wenger, 2001). There is evidence from some¶ research that democratic interactions can create**¶** knowledge that is more rigorous, precise, and**¶** relevant than that produced in authoritarian**¶** environments (Jaramillo, 2005). Another¶ important aspect of enhancing deliberative¶ democracy and democratization is that it moves¶ from a focus on individuals and their own¶ preferences towards more collective forms of¶ learning and collaboration.¶ Up to now, international organizations¶ have endorsed a “thin” version of democratization¶ that is content with formal and centralized¶ mechanisms of “representation” and “policy¶ dialogue.” If a new, more deliberative and¶ democratic model of cooperation in education in¶ the region were to emerge, what would it look¶ like?¶ First of all, a more deliberative and¶ democratic model of international cooperation in¶ education would involve more direct and deeper**¶** forms of participation from everyday citizens,**¶** including teachers, school directors, families,¶ school communities, students, and mesolevel**¶** actors such as civil society organizations.**¶** This participation would move beyond simple**¶** consultation to more authentic forms of joint**¶** decision-making and deliberation. The model¶ would involve more accountability on the¶ part of international organizations in terms¶ of transparency, and would require injecting**¶** ethical reasoning into policies and programming.¶ In addition, a new more democratic model of**¶** international cooperation would expand the**¶** range of policy options available to countries**¶** through devolution of authority, power, and¶ control, combined with oversight and horizontal¶ accountability mechanisms. A more democratic**¶** model of international cooperation would stress**¶** valuing, systematizing, and disseminating**¶** local knowledge and innovation. Finally,**¶** democratization and deliberation in international**¶** cooperation in education would lead to enhanced**¶** learning and agency on the part of participating**¶** countries, groups, and individuals, and thus**¶** contribute to better outcomes in terms of quality**¶** and equity in education at national and local¶ levels.

### Alt Fails -2ac

#### Focus on Mexican labor sovereignty empirically ineffective — the alt fractures movements and lacks concrete policy solutions. (*Perm* best.)

Cowie 97 — Jefferson Cowie, holds a Ph.D. in Labor History from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, former Research Fellow at the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at the University of California-San Diego, 1997 (“National Struggles in a Transnational Economy: A Critical Analysis of US Labor's Campaign Against NAFTA,” *Labor Studies Journal*, Volume 21, Winter, p. 27-28)

Turning a critical eye to labor in the United States, the political project against free trade failed not only to defeat the agreement (although it did come very close), but most importantly, it never generated sophisticated alternatives—or much in the way of political space to consider alternatives—to the economic and political process that was bent on integrating capital but not people.56 The two major arguments marshaled against NAFTA—job losses and the lack of Mexican labor rights—proved to be a nationalistic diversion from constructing meaningful alternatives to the trade deal and often perpetuated chauvinistic notions about US workers' economic security and the level of labor rights enjoyed in the United States. Making the deepening fear over job losses into the overarching metaphor for globalization simply did not foster any alternative positions to global restructuring nor formulate specific ideas about what workers actually might favor. These two tactics also failed in the transnational arena where they [end page 27] exacted a future price in terms of relations with Mexican workers as they tended to turn them into competitors rather than compadres in a common struggle. The other two discursive modes analyzed here, cross border solidarity and international labor rights, have been much more limited in their scope (so as to be invisible and inaudible to many workers) but nonetheless, if carefully done, suggest productive strategies for defusing the tensions fostered by global capital.

### 2ac- Permutation

#### Totalizing critique of economic rationality doesn’t contextualize to the U.S.-Mexico border — perm is best *method* and *policy*.

Purcell and Nevins 5 — Mark Purcell, Associate Professor in the Department of Urban Design and Planning at the University of Washington, holds a Ph.D. in Geography from the University of California-Los Angeles, and Joseph Nevins, Associate Professor of Geography and Chair of Earth Science and Geography at Vassar College, holds a Ph.D. in Geography from the University of California-Los Angeles, 2005 (“Pushing the boundary: state restructuring, state theory, and the case of U.S.–Mexico border enforcement in the 1990s,” *Political Geography*, Volume 24, Issue 2, Available Online at http://faculty.washington.edu/mpurcell/pushingboundary.pdf, Accessed 08-05-2013, p. 230)

The current analysis of the state in critical political-economic state theory is not in a position to think comprehensively about the imperatives that aﬀect the state and shape state restructuring. Given the conventions of its research practice and discourse, it will regularly miss the important role of state-citizen relations, and it will overlook in particular the non-economic aspects of those relations. We argue that this limitation is due primarily to traditional research practice, but that practice is rooted in the theoretical project of critical state theory. Because state theory is concerned theoretically to understand the role the state plays in accumulation and in legitimizing capitalist social relations, in practice it has tended to analyze the state and state change only with respect to these imperatives. But as the case of the U.S.–Mexico boundary shows, the imperatives that aﬀect the state are not limited to accumulation and the legitimacy of capitalist social relations. Clearly a complete analysis of the state must go beyond these two imperatives. We would suggest that although the theoretical project of critical state theory has led in practice to a limitation that has weakened its analysis of the state, this need not be the case. In fact, the theoretical project of critical state theory is far better served by a more inclusive research approach to the state that takes into account a greater range of imperatives that inﬂuence state restructuring. This expanded approach—one that takes seriously the importance of state-citizen relations, among other imperatives—will produce a more complete analysis of the state and state restructuring. A better understanding of the state will allow a better understanding of the role it plays in regulating capitalist society.

### 2AC NAFTA/Trade Good

#### Increased trade benefits all levels of Mexican Society — increases *quality of life* and *takes away power* from the repressive government.

DeLong, professor of Economics at Cal, 2K, J. Bradford DeLong, professor of Economics and chair of the Political Economy major at the University of California, Berkeley. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury in the Clinton Administration under Lawrence Summers. He is also a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and is a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, “NAFTA's (Qualified) Success”, <http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/TotW/nafta.html> Mollie

It is time to conclude that NAFTA--the North American Free Trade Agreement--is a success. It is nearly seven years since the ratification of NAFTA, nearly seven years since then-Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen argued and President Clinton decided that NAFTA should be the second major initiative of his administration. The major argument for NAFTA was that it was the best thing the United States could do to raise the chances for Mexico to become democratic and prosperous, and that the United States had both a strong interest and a neighborly duty to try to help Mexican political and economic development. By that yardstick NAFTA has been a clear success. NAFTA has helped Mexico economically. Over the past five years real GDP has grown at 5.5 percent per year. Even including the sharp shock of the 1995 peso crisis, Mexican real GDP has grown at 3.8 percent per year since the ratification of NAFTA. The urban unemployment rate that was 6 percent in 1992 and rose to 8.5 percent in 1995 is now less than 4 percent. The Mexican boom has been led by the manufacturing, construction, transportation, and communications sectors. Most of all, the Mexican boom has been led by exports: next year Mexico's real exports will be more than three times as large as they were at the ratification of NAFTA, and as a share of GDP exports have grown from a little more than 10 to 17 percent. It is here--in the growing volume of exports and in the building-up of export industries--that NAFTA has made the difference. Four-fifths of Mexico's exports go to the United States. More than two-thirds of Mexico's imports come from the United States. NAFTA guarantees Mexican producers tariff- and quota-free access to the American market. Without this guarantee, a smaller number of Mexican exporters would dare try to develop the strong links with the market north of the Rio Grande that have enabled them to sell their exports. Without this guarantee, few--either in Mexico or from overseas--would have dared to invest in the manufacturing capacity that has allowed Mexico to satisfy United States demand. Without NAFTA's guarantee of tariff- and quota-free access to the American market, we would not have seen the rise in trade within industries between Mexico and the U.S. over the past half decade. Rising intra-industry trade means that Mexico and the U.S. are moving toward a greater degree of specialization and a finer division of labor in important industries like autos--where labor-intensive portions are more and more done in Mexico--and textiles--where the U.S. increasingly does high-tech spinning and weaving and Mexico increasingly does lower-tech cutting and sewing. As economists Mary Burfisher, Sherman Robinson, and Karen Thierfelder put it, NAFTA has nurtured the growth of productivity through "Smithian" efficiency gains that result from "widen[ing] the exent of the market" and capturing "increasing returns to finer specialization." Without NAFTA, would Mexican domestic savings have doubled as a share of GDP since the early 1990s? Surely not. Without NAFTA, would the number of telephone lines in Mexico have doubled in the 1990s? Probably not. Moreover, Mexican exports are by no means low-tech labor- and primary product-intensive goods. More than 20 percent of all Mexican exports are capital goods. More than 70 percent of Mexican manufacturing exports are metal products. Without NAFTA, would U.S. big three auto producers have invested in the Mexican auto industry, and would Mexican exports of autos and auto parts to the U.S. have grown from $10 to $30 billion a year? Surely not. More important, NAFTA has helped Mexico politically. Strong economic growth makes political reform much, much easier: reslicing a growing pie is possible under many circumstances where reslicing a static pie is not. AIncreasing economic integration brings with it pressures for increasing political integration as well: the liquidation of the statist-corporatist PRI order, and a shift toward democratic institutions that are more like those of the industrial democracies that Mexico hopes to join (and to which mexico hopes that NAFTA will serve as a passport of admission). The result has been the first peaceful transfer of power in Mexico in more than a lifetime, with the election to the Mexican presidency of Vicente Fox Queseda. Economist Dani Rodrik describes political democracy as a powerful meta-institution for building the political and economic institutions needed for success: thus Mexico's future looks much brighter now than it did back in the late 1980s when the dominant PRI regularly stole elections and held a hammerlock on Mexico's government.

## CIR

### 2ac- uq

#### The Media is still fighting the new years hangover optimism- Not a chance CIR passes

A. All their evidence is biased because of optimism of the new year B. empirics prove that Boehner always falls flat on his face

Hrafnkell Haraldssonmore, 1/2/14 (“Don’t Expect 2014 to Bring Any Meaningful Change in Immigration Reform”, http://www.politicususa.com/2014/01/02/expect-2014-bring-meaningful-change-immigration-reform.html)

If you’re taking stock of the year just past, you would have to say 2013 left something to be desired. The Republican Party, trying for years to derail our first black president, finally succeeded in shutting down the government. The year ended with cries for his impeachment, assassination, and citizen’s arrest. Things are not likely to get better in 2014.¶ What just happened, New Years Day, is an artificial break in time that has no effect on the forces at play in our nation. Haters are still going to hate, and the Republican Party has demonstrated its hatred not only of the U.S. Constitution but of the United States and all Americans who do not fit into their neat little Evangelical white male box.¶ News outlets are talking about John Boehner and immigration reform. Don’t kid yourself. In The New York Times we find that Boehner’s hints provide “new hope that 2014 might be the year that a bitterly divided Congress reaches a political compromise to overhaul the sprawling system.” You do remember what has happened each and every time Boehner has tried to do anything, right? The extremists yank the carpet out from beneath him. Boehner cries, blah, blah, blah.¶ When will the mainstream media learn that what Boehner wants, or says he wants, means nothing at all? And we shouldn’t assume that “‘step by step’ moves to revise immigration laws” mean steps in the right direction, or big enough steps to make a difference. Boehner, for his part, seems anxious to throw water on the very idea of meaningful reform. As usual, failing to understand what Americans want (as the year closed, a majority of Americans wanted immigration reform), he told reporters,¶ Thoughtful and deliberate are conservative buzzwords for don’t expect change any time soon. This is the party of the status quo, after all, and lately, American conservatism has demonstrated a desire to not only block change but to actually turn the clock back. At times it has seem they want not only to return the 1950s but to rollback the European Enlightenment itself on the way to the 13th century.¶ Ask yourselves this: in what way will allowing more “icky brown people” into the country going to improve election prospects for Republican candidates who preach an America for white Evangelical males? Remember, it was a Republican, Paul Broun, who said in August that “these people” (his term for icky brown people, who are to be contrasted with “freedom loving Americans” – i.e. white Evangelicals) will “vote for the Democrats and keep Democrats in power for perpetuity.”¶ Louie Gohmert’s answer to the immigration problem is not to figure out some way to appeal to Latinos but to reject legislation reform. He thinks Republican tough love – assimilate and learn English or else – will stir warm and fuzzy feelings of love and devotion in immigrants. Whether he really believes this or not, he and Broun are far from alone in rejecting reform.¶ You need look no further than Broun and Gohmert and the evidence of the past two years to see what “thoughtful” and “deliberate” really mean as we head toward the 2014 midterms, but you can, if you want to consider the racist Republican base and people like William Gheen, president of Americans for Legal Immigration PAC (ALIPAC) who warns that if the Tea Party can’t stop immigrant “invasion” there will be violent revolution. That is the measure of how much the Republican base rejects the idea of icky brown people living next to them as equals.¶ If you need an example of how “real Americans” feel about their cherished franchise, look back to Jim Crow. Look, this is the party of xenophobia after all, where immigration reform necessitates an embrace of the “demonization” of white Christian males in the same way that “Happy Holidays” = a War on Christmas. Expect more rhetoric than substance. After all, as Bud Kennedy wrote in the Fort Worth Star-Telegram on the last day of the last year, “Some Republicans still want to turn back.”¶ The New York Times and others might want to realize that reform can as easily mean a step backward as a step forward. They certainly seem to forget who we are dealing with. It was Boehner’s party, after all, which refused to vote on immigration reform in 2013 “because Obama was mean to them.”¶ Do you really think they’re going to suddenly feel Obama is not being mean to them? In what way is this same group of white males going to have a mass change of heart about the “icky brown people” who threaten their comfortable franchise?¶ Meaningful change in 2014? More than likely, what 2014 will bring is John Boehner, assuming he backs any reform at all, falling flat on his face, and how is that a change, let alone meaningful change? It’s not even news.

### 2AC – backlog

**CIR creates a backlog – impossible to solve**

David **North 10**, former Assistant to the U.S. Secretary of Labor and Center for Immigration Studies Fellow, April 7, 2010, “Would Legalization Backlogs Delay Other USCIS Applications? Probably,” Center for Immigration Studies, http://cis.org/north/legalization-backlogs

An interesting question has arisen as a result of a congressional hearing: would a massive legalization program, as many advocates want, slow the processing of applications filed routinely by citizens and legal aliens wanting immigration benefits? The numbers are daunting. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) currently faces six million applications a year according to one news story. The estimates of the number of illegal aliens in the nation runs to 11 or 12 million. Could USCIS handle both these multi-million caseloads with its current paper-based systems? There are many complaints that the backlogs are currently too long on the normal collection of six million cases a year. The government's expert on such things, Frank W. Deffer, Assistant Inspector General for Information Technology in the Department of Homeland Security, told a congressional committee on March 23: "adding 12 million more people to the system would be the **mother of all backlogs**. Clearly to us the systems **could not handle it** now."\

### 2ac – defense spending popular

#### Defense spending is popular among Republicans

Kredo 3/21/13 – award-winning political reporter for the Washington Jewish Week, where he frequently broke national news, Kredo’s work has been featured in outlets such as the Jerusalem Post, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, and Politico, among others (Adam, “GOP united on keeping defense spending intact”, Free Beacon, http://freebeacon.com/defending-defense/)

Republican leaders are dismissing charges that the party is fractured on national security issues following the overwhelming passage of a House GOP budget measure that fully restored recently slashed defense spending. The House on Thursday approved by a vote of 228-191 a wide-ranging budget plan authored by Rep. Paul Ryan (R., Wis.). All but 10 Republicans voted in favor of the budget, while every Democrat voted against it. The Ryan plan would allocate about $560.2 billion in defense spending in 2014. That appropriation would all but negate the effects of the recent sequester, which eradicated millions in defense spending and threw the Pentagon into chaos. The allocation would prevent the Pentagon and United States military from being forced to implement a devastating series of cuts that would imperil not only troop readiness but also their benefits. A similar budget proposal authored by the House’s deficit-conscious Republican Study Committee (RSC) also included this level of defense spending, leading Republican leaders to dismiss charges that the party is fundamentally split on such issues. “The overwhelming conservative support for the Ryan budget and the RSC budget are the best indicators of where the Republican Party is on national security that I have seen in a while,” House Armed Services Committee chairman Howard “Buck” McKeon (R., Calif.) told the Free Beacon following the vote. “After the saga of sequestration, we have come together as a party to declare that our military has been cut too much,” McKeon said. “By passing the House budget, we are making a restoration of vital national security resources a top policy priority, every bit as important as balancing the budget.”

### 2ac – pc

#### Political capital doesn’t exist and isn’t key – winners win

Michael Hirsch 12, chief correspondent for National Journal. He also contributes to [2012 Decoded](http://decoded.nationaljournal.com/contributors/michael-hirsh). Hirsh previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, based in its Washington bureau. He was also Newsweek’s Washington web editor and authored a weekly column for Newsweek.com, “The World from Washington.” Earlier on, he was Newsweek’s foreign editor, guiding its award-winning coverage of the September 11 attacks and the war on terror. He has done on-the-ground reporting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places around the world, and served as the Tokyo-based Asia Bureau Chief for Institutional Investor from 1992 to 1994. <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207>

On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”¶ ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ¶ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.) And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country. Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it. The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea,” as the party suffers in the polls.¶ THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER¶ Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said. Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington. Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories. In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction. Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. If he can get some early wins—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.” Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the falsity of the political-capital concept. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a “post-partisan” president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all people. So Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-term restructuring plan that would “lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.” The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal. Had he understood better that the country was digging in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly was—a giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measure—he might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. But by laying on ambitious programs, and following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet socialist. After that, Obama’s public posturing provoked automatic opposition from the GOP, no matter what he said. If the president put his personal imprimatur on any plan—from deficit reduction, to health care, to immigration reform—Republicans were virtually guaranteed to come out against it. But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOP’s newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different. He seemed to understand that the Republicans needed to reclaim immigration reform as their own issue, and he was willing to let them have some credit. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans don’t have to listen to what I say anymore. And don’t worry about who’s got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where I’m saying this: in a state you were supposed to have won but lost because of the rising Hispanic vote. Obama was cleverly pointing the GOP toward conclusions that he knows it is already reaching on its own: If you, the Republicans, want to have any kind of a future in a vastly changed electoral map, you have no choice but to move. It’s your choice.

### Cyberterror

#### US-Mexico relations are key to solve cyber-security threats – engagement is key

Downie, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University, 11

(Dr. Richard, deputy director and fellow with the CSIS Africa Program, master’s degree in international public policy from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “Critical Strategic Decisions in Mexico: the Future of US/Mexican Defense Relations,” July 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/chds/docuploaded/Dr\_Downie\_OCP\_2011.pdf, ara)

2). Impact on US/Mexico Defense Relationship. The “stay the course” option would potentially offer an additional “sexenio” during which the US and Mexican militaries could expand and mature in the conduct of shared missions. If so, the growing relationship could potentially lead to a network or infrastructure of activities and agreements. Military forces from both countries would continue to exchange intelligence and sensitive information and share operational experiences while working toward a common purpose and objectives. Perhaps eventually, the United States and Mexico could engage in exercises as well as combined operations that would permit the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures that align their efforts not only in the fight against the TCOs, but also in other functional areas such as disaster or humanitarian relief operations, cooperative responses to terrorism, or proliferation of WMDs. Beyond mere confidencebuilding measures, this process could ideally lead to the establishment of protocols or standard operating procedures through which the forces of the two countries could operate in a common framework and ultimately achieve a level of functional interoperability. Although the US/Mexican defense relationship has advanced significantly in the past few years— certainly more quickly than any analyst would have predicted—the relationship is still not mature, stable, or consolidated. The strong US/Canada defense relationship offers a useful example of how military-to-military relations can mitigate the long-term impact of political decisions made on the basis of short-term disagreements between nations. The defense relationship with Canada, for example, involves a rich tradition of agreements and joint commissions, including a bi-national command, such as the US/Canada Permanent Joint Board on Defense, established in 1948; the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), since 1945; and the North America Aerospace Defense Command, based in Colorado Springs, Colorado, which is literally a two-nation command. While cooperative US/Mexican military-to-military initiatives seem to increase almost monthly, there is a long way to go before the United States and Mexico can achieve the kind of mature defense partnership that characterizes the US/Canada relationship. The US/Mexico defense relationship is not yet at a point in which institutional factors can help mitigate political tensions between the two countries. Time is the key element in advancing toward a more institutionalized structure of bilateral or even trilateral cooperation. At a minimum, a sustained process is needed for the US and Mexican militaries to continually enhance their relationship in a manner that benefits both countries. Continuing on the present course would probably entail more and more intrusive U.S. cooperation, both for equipment and training of Mexican law enforcement personnel, as well as for intelligence and other tactical support. The lofty, ultimate goal of such a process from a US viewpoint could be the establishment of a bi-national or even tri-national command in Mexico, addressing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as protection of critical infrastructure intelligence sharing, cyber security, counterterrorism, and perhaps support for counter-TCO efforts. Ideally, this multinational security organization could be under the leadership of a Mexican military or civilian official.36 While international military organizations such as NATO or even NORAD could serve as models, even in the most optimistic of scenarios that level of US/Mexican, and potentially Canadian, cooperation would require many years—even decades—of sustained effort and interaction. As increasing numbers of Mexican military personnel work closely with their US counterparts for longer periods of time, there could be a corresponding reduction in the stigma and barriers to a closer US/Mexico defense relationship arising from our past history.

## Mex pol

### 2ac

#### Won’t be enacted successfully, Nieto no PC now and ideological groups block

Wood 1/3- Duncan, Staff Writer for CNN (“Mexico in 2014: Can Peña Nieto consolidate reform?”, January 3, 2014 http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/01/03/mexico-in-2014-can-pena-nieto-consolidate-reform/\\CLans)

In order to achieve both of these goals, the government must not rest on its laurels of successful reform because although the major legislative changes that were approved by the Congress do indeed mark an impressive change, they will count for little if the government fails to enact secondary legislation that allows for the implementation of the spirit and letter of the reform in the real world of policy. What’s more, once secondary legislation is passed, the government must find the political will to implement it, often running counter to deeply embedded interest groups. Thus far, however, the government’s record on this front is not encouraging. The education reform that was approved early last year was followed by timid secondary laws and the government shows little enthusiasm for taking on the national teachers’ union in the implementation phase. Peña Nieto cannot make the same mistake with the energy reform. The passing of a bold reform in December will mean little if it is not followed by secondary laws that create a strong legal and regulatory framework, along with sound and autonomous institutions, to enhance investor confidence. Big and small oil and gas companies alike are waiting to see exactly what the government is going to do to create a level and fair playing field in the sector in Mexico, and to allow them to maximize the profits from their participation.

#### Corruption tanks success of reform

Pena 1/2- Daniel, Staff Writer for the Huffington Post (“Pemex Blues: The Downside to Mexican Energy Reform”, January 2, 2013 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-pena/pemex-blues-the-downside-to-mexican-energy-reform\_b\_4522216.html\\CLans)

It's easy to tell that 2013 has been an impasse year for Mexico, capped off by Mexico's historic energy reform this month that will open the doors of the state-controlled energy industry to foreign investment , making North America one of the world's largest suppliers of oil and natural gas. Reading the news coverage of the reform, I couldn't help but think of Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie's talk on the danger of a single story. The American coverage has, of course, been a single story reminiscent of the same talking points surrounding NAFTA almost 20 years ago, focusing on the (hopeful) benefits of such a drastic change to Mexico's economy: a more robust private sector injected with fresh capital, a stable means toward growth and a short-term fix to hedge the fluctuating Mexican Peso against other world currencies. Many of these talking points echo those of President Enrique Peña-Nieto, who touts the plan as Mexico's silver bullet to its current economic woes. In its current form, Mexico's energy reform is based on Norway's model, which allows for profit-sharing, but not production-sharing with international companies in oil and natural gas production. One problem though: Mexico is not Norway and state-owned Pemex is hardly a shining example of efficiency. Trickle-down economics and all of its bunk theories aside, corruption is the other problem everyone is thinking about but nobody is really talking about with concern to this plan. Currently, Pemex supplies Mexico with one third of all its revenue, paying nearly $70 billion in taxes on a 99.7% tax rate. To the casual observer, one third of all revenue from a single source should seem a little odd given the diversity of other economies with similar GDP's to Mexico. And indeed it should be a red flag to the average Mexican citizen given that Pemex Executives and Mexican politicians have reportedly embezzled billions of dollars from the nationalized corporation. Peña-Nieto's plan fails to address such corruption. And it can only be assumed that Pemex executives and the politicians benefiting from the decisions of those executives--many in the ranks of Peña-Nieto's own party--will remain safely intact after Mexico's energy reform is enacted. Though Peña-Nieto has been grilled on questions concerning the way corruption might manifest given a new injection of capital into Pemex, he's been reluctant to give answers so as to minimize wave-making within the ranks of his own party, the PRI. And there's also the fact that Mexico is in crisis, at war with itself. Conservative estimates of the number of people killed in Mexico's ongoing drug war rests at just over 60,000 . One needs only to look as far as South Sudan to understand the ramifications of foreign energy investment in a country whose stability continues to crumble. While Mexico is not South Sudan, it is undeniable that Mexico could face many of the same problems as South Sudan given its energy resources and its ability to protect them. Mexico holds the fourth largest reserves of shale gas in the world and an entire gulf of oil untapped due to Pemex's inability to extract those resources. Whlle foreign investment might seem like the silver bullet for Peña-Nieto and many of his allies, I wonder if this move might exacerbate some or all of Mexico's ailments. As a nationalized brand, Pemex touches most every life in Mexico. And one can only hope that the change in Mexico's constitution will bring about a change in Mexico's mode of business as well.

#### Lack of Significant Reforms in Education and Taxes Means There is No Climate for investment for energy reform to be productive

Roger Noriega is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute 12/16 2013Mexico’s Reforms: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

By Roger F. Noriega and Felipe Trigos

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PEMEX will also be opened to private and foreign investment, and the company’s operations and financial management will be more efficient. For example, a key provision will reduce the amount of revenue that PEMEX funnels into the government’s budget from more than 80 percent of PEMEX’s revenues to no more than 4.7 percent. This is one of the cornerstones of the reform, because it will allow PEMEX to invest what it needs in exploration and operations in order to become profitable.¶ The creation of a “Mexican Petroleum Fund” will channel adequate money to a sustainable pension fund for PEMEX employees, provide a reliable source of funding for infrastructure (30 percent of revenues), and invest in PEMEX’s human capital (10 percent of revenues) to encourage postgraduate education and specialization for the company’s workers.¶ While privatization of Mexico’s oil industry was not seriously considered, the steps taken last week by Mexico’s Congress are ambitious and groundbreaking. Similarly, the prospect of allowing private companies to be involved in the distribution of electricity could help Mexico’s Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) become more profitable and less dependent on the government for its operations.¶ Unfortunately, the fiscal reform adopted earlier this fall is a step in the wrong direction. Beyond overtaxing the wealthy to compensate for social programs, the new tax regime will have a disproportionate negative impact on the productive, salaried middle class. It will not allow the government to raise enough revenue to balance the budget after paying for new spending — the equivalent of 4 percent of GDP — that was adopted to counteract sluggish growth of about 1 percent this year. Populist tax policies and profligate spending threaten the steady growth that Mexico achieved in recent years.¶ Populist tax policies and profligate spending threaten the steady growth that Mexico achieved in recent years.¶ The performance of Mexico’s public education might be described as just plain ugly. Mexico’s student performance ranks among the worst of the OECD countries. Education reform adopted earlier this year, while viewed by many as the first step toward overhauling a key engine of growth, does not tackle inefficiency and corruption. In particular, it limits the impact of teacher evaluations. There is reason to doubt that the government will have the political will to challenge the status quo in applying the new reforms against stiff resistance by the teachers’ union

### 1nc – no war

**No resource wars or conflict over scarcity**

**Tetrais 12**, Senior Fellow at Foundation for Strategic Research, (Bruno- Editorial Board at TWQ, July, “The Demise of Ares: The End of War as We Know It?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol 35 Issue 3, p 7-22, T&F Online)

**The invasion of Kuwait may go down in history as being the last great resource war**. **Future resource wars are unlikely**. There are fewer and fewer conquest wars. Between the Westphalia peace and the end of World War II, nearly half of conflicts were fought over territory. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been less than 30 percent.61 The invasion of Kuwait—a nationwide bank robbery—may go down in history as being the last great resource war. The U.S.-led intervention of 1991 was partly driven by the need to maintain the free flow of oil, but not by the temptation to capture it. (Nor was the 2003 war against Iraq motivated by oil.) As for the current tensions between the two Sudans over oil, they are the remnants of a civil war and an offshoot of a botched secession process, not a desire to control new resources.¶ China's and India's energy needs are sometimes seen with apprehension: in light of growing oil and gas scarcity, is there not a risk of military clashes over the control of such resources? This seemingly consensual idea rests on two fallacies. One is that there is such a thing as oil and gas scarcity, a notion challenged by many energy experts.62 As prices rise, previously untapped reserves and non-conventional hydrocarbons become economically attractive. The other is that spilling blood is a rational way to access resources. As shown by the work of historians and political scientists such as Quincy Wright, the economic rationale for war has always been overstated. And because of globalization, it has become cheaper to buy than to steal. We no longer live in the world of 1941, when fear of lacking oil and raw materials was a key motivation for Japan's decision to go to war. In an era of liberalizing trade, many natural resources are fungible goods. (Here, Beijing behaves as any other actor: 90 percent of the oil its companies produce outside of China goes to the global market, not to the domestic one.)63 There may be clashes or conflicts in regions in maritime resource-rich areas such as the South China and East China seas or the Mediterranean, but they will be driven by nationalist passions, not the desperate hunger for hydrocarbons.¶ Only in civil wars does the question of resources such as oil, diamonds, minerals, and the like play a significant role; this was especially true as Cold War superpowers stopped their financial patronage of local actors.64 Indeed, as Mueller puts it in his appropriately titled The Remnants of War, “Many [existing wars] have been labeled ‘new war,’ ‘ethnic conflict,’ or, most grandly ‘clashes of civilization.’ But in fact, most…are more nearly opportunistic predation by packs, often remarkably small ones, of criminals, bandits, and thugs.”65 It is the abundance of resources, not their scarcity, which fuels such conflicts. The risk is particularly high when the export of natural resources represents at least a third of the country's GDP.66¶ What about fighting for arable land, in light of population growth in Africa and Asia? Even in situations of high population densities, the correlation between the lack of arable lands and propensity to collective violence remains weak.67 Neo-Malthusians such as Jared Diamond believe that the Rwanda tragedy was driven by such scarcity.68 But there was no famine in Rwanda at the time. And the events of 1994 were not a revolt of the poor: Hutu landowners were amongst the most active perpetrators of genocide. There was, however, a significant youth bulge: the 15–24 age group represented 38 percent of the adult population.69 Land scarcity played a role, but at best as a factor explaining the intensity of the violence in some areas.70

# 1AR

### Corruption Turn

#### Reform fails – PEMEX would still hold a monopoly

Licón and Corcora 11/19

[Adriana Gomez Licon, & Katherine Corcora, Writers for AP, 11/19/13 Associated Press, “Fight begins over opening up Mexico's oil monopoly”, <http://www.elpasotimes.com/latestnews/ci_24547155/fight-begins-over-opening-up-mexicos-oil-monopoly>] AS

Sen. Jorge Lavalle, a National Action Party member of the Senate energy commission from the oil state of Campeche, said the proposal would still require the government to approve which kinds of contract to award, depending on the venture. Most of the production sharing would be for exploring shale and deep-water reserves, he said. Shallow-water drilling would continue with the current contracts that give Pemex a monopoly. There would be little difference to Mexicans between production and profit-sharing contracts, he said. "The issue of how we pay neither gives us nor takes away our sovereignty."

### 1nc – no war

#### War for oil’s fiction – best ev disproves

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Despite the fact that oil companies nowadays view war and political turmoil in the Middle East as detrimental to their long-term interests and, therefore, do not support policies that are conducive to war and militarism, and despite the fact that war is no longer the way to gain access to oil, the widespread perception that every US military engagement in the region, including the current invasion of Iraq , is prompted by oil considerations continues. Th e question is why? Behind the Myth of War for Oil The widely-shared but erroneous view that recent US wars of choice are driven by oil concerns is partly due to precedence: the fact that for a long time military force was key to colonial or imperialist control and exploitation of foreign markets and resources, including oil. It is also partly due to perception: the exaggerated notion that both President Bush and Vice President Cheney were “oil men” before coming to the White House. But, as noted earlier, George W. Bush was never more than an ineff ective minor oil prospector and Dick Cheney was never really an oil man; he headed the notorious Halliburton company that sold, and still sells, services to oil companies and the Pentagon .