# 1nc

### 1nc – definitions

#### “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School, 04 - (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:"Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

### 1nc – debate = game theory

#### Debate is a game which means fairness comes first – the resolution is the starting point, the debate is the process, and the ballot determines and winner and a loser

A – the game has to have a stasis point which all players have access to (resolution)

B – the point of the game should be to have specific solutions to a problem (debate)

C – decide whether or not that solution was preferable (winner and a loser)

Landa and Meirowitz, 09 – Assistant Professors of Department of Politics NYU (Dimitri and Adam, “Game Theory, Information, and Deliberative Democracy” www.princeton.edu/~ameirowi/GTDDfinal032207.pdf)

The game-theoretic approach involves a three-step process. The first step defines a game, which captures (a) the relevant choices that are understood to be available to the players (in models of deliberation, typically, what messages, if any, could be sent, and what decisions could be made after the exchange of messages), (b) what the players know about those choices, about each other, and about the deliberative interaction to which they are a party, and finally, (c) how attractive they would perceive the consequences of those choices to be if they knew everything that there was to know about them. The second step specifies a solution concept, which embodies a set of assumptions about the general behavioral agency ascribed to the players in the model. Given the first two steps, the third step is logically entailed: through well-defined techniques of analysis, one can generate predictions about what types of behavior, with respect to the particular choices analyzed in the model, are and are not mutually consistent - that is, are or are not supportable by equilibria of the specified game. The key question that motivates the game-theoretic analysis is how policy selection is related to private information and preferences when participants engage in equilibrium behavior.

#### Game theory is the best way to understand debate

A – a game can be defined as zero-sum in that one wins and one person loses

B – competitive drive is good

Kelly, 03 – lecturer at the University of Southampton Research & Graduate School of Education (Anthony, “Two-person zero-sum games of strategy” Decision Making using Game Theory Cambridge University Press)

A two-person zero-sum game is one in which the pay-offs add up to¶ zero. They are strictly competitive in that what one player gains, the¶ other loses. The game obeys a law of conservation of utility value, where¶ utility value is never created or destroyed, only transferred from one¶ player to another. The interests of the two players are always strictly¶ opposed and competitive, with no possibility of, or benefit in, cooperation. One player must win and at the expense of the other; a feature¶ known as pareto-efficiency. More precisely, a pareto-efficiency is a¶ situation in which the lot of one player cannot be improved without¶ worsening the lot of at least one other player.¶ Game theory is particularly well-suited to the analysis of zero-sum¶ games and applications to everyday life (especially sporting contests)¶ abound.

### 1nc - dialogue

#### A stasis point in the game is critical to research and dialogue

A – games allow for two types of communication (monologue or dialogue)

B – the game has a stasis point that allows for focused research but also allows for contestation from both sides

C – monologue is bad because it means teacher never learn from the student they just spoon-deed the students

D – dialogue is critical to bounce ideas off of eachother

Hanghoj, 08 - Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor. (Thorkild, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Process of dialogue outweighs the outcome of debates

A – the ability to have dialogue is based on difference of opinions, it helps us to learn to learn

B – dialogue exposes us to a complexity of perspectives we would not have absorbed otherwise, we learn both sides of the issue and the perspectives of the other groups

C – process outweighs because learning is a perpetual process

Morson, 04 - Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres especially satire, utopia, and the novel; <http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331>)

A belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. This very process would be central. Students would sense that whatever word they believed to be innerly persuasive was only tentatively so: the process of dialogue continues.We must keep the conversation going, and formal education only initiates the process. The innerly persuasive discourse would not be final, but would be, like experience itself, ever incomplete and growing. As Bakhtin observes of the innerly persuasive word: Its creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition. It is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely, developed, applied to new material, new conditions; it enters into interanimating relationships with new contexts. . . . The semantic structure of an innerly persuasive discourse is not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean. (DI, 345–6) We not only learn, we also learn to learn, and we learn to learn best when we engage in a dialogue with others and ourselves. We appropriate the world of difference, and ourselves develop new potentials. Those potentials allow us to appropriate yet more voices. Becoming becomes endless becoming. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. Difference becomes an opportunity (see Freedman and Ball, this volume). Our world manifests the spirit that Bakhtin attributed to Dostoevsky: “nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is in the future and will always be in the future.”3 Such a world becomes our world within, its dialogue lives within us, and we develop the potentials of our ever-learning selves. Letmedraw some inconclusive conclusions, which may provoke dialogue. Section I of this volume, “Ideologies in Dialogue: Theoretical Considerations” and Bakhtin’s thought in general suggest that we learn best when we are actually learning to learn. We engage in dialogue with ourselves and others, and the most important thing is the value of the open-ended process itself. Section II, “Voiced, Double Voiced, and Multivoiced Discourses in Our Schools” suggests that a belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. Teachers would not be trying to get students to hold the right opinions but to sense the world from perspectives they would not have encountered or dismissed out of hand. Students would develop the habit of getting inside the perspectives of other groups and other people. Literature in particular is especially good at fostering such dialogic habits. Section III, “Heteroglossia in a Changing World” may invite us to learn that dialogue involves really listening to others, hearing them not as our perspective would categorize what they say, but as they themselves would categorize what they say, and only then to bring our own perspective to bear. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. The chapters in this volume seem to suggest that we view learning as a perpetual process. That was perhaps Bakhtin’s favorite idea: that to appreciate life, or dialogue, we must see value not only in achieving this or that result, but also in recognizing that honest and open striving in a world of uncertainty and difference is itself the most important thing. What we must do is keep the conversation going.

## OFF

#### Their Methodology is Misguided – Reliance on Culture as a Politically Subversive Tool Outside the System Plays into the Fetishization of Diversity Within the Corporate University - Your Aff Just Becomes Another Tool of Recruitment

Jane Juffer former director of the Latino/a Studies Initiative @ Penn State 2001 “The Limits of Culture Latino Studies, Diversity Management and the Corporate University” Nepantla: Views from South 2.2 [*quals continued*: Associate Professor of English @ Cornell]

A new set of possibilities—for some, an ominous set—confronts Latino cultural studies in the age of globalization, migration, and the corporatization of the university. Growing minority enrollments, led by Latinas/os,1 have prompted many colleges and universities to expand services and courses related to multiculturalism; administrators are reportedly worried they won’t be ready for the increasingly diverse student populations predicted for coming years. There are new commitments to expand access to higher education for Latinas/ os, often in conjunction with privxate monies. In June 2000, for example, President Bill Clinton announced the formation of the 2010 Alliance, a partnership of corporate, foundation, and community leaders that will seek to double the number of Latino students who graduate from college over the next ten years. In describing the program, Clinton was careful to not lay the blame for low retention rates on Latino students but rather on structural questions of access (Kiviat 2000, A39). In September 1999, Bill and Melinda Gates pledged to spend $1 billion over twenty years to send twenty thousand low-income minority students to college; the Hispanic Scholarship Fund will help administer the program. Unfortunately, these commitments come with an agenda that seems antithetical to the activist roots of Latino studies: the articulation At the summer 2000 meeting of the National Governors Association held at Pennsylvania State University, Alan Greenspan (2000), chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, credited the “free flow” of information between universities, business, and government for U.S. economic growth: If we are to remain pre-eminent in transforming knowledge into economic value, the U.S. system of higher education must remain the world’s leader in generating scientific and technological breakthroughs and in preparing workers to meet the evolving demands for skilled labor. . . . Ina global environment in which prospects for economic growth now depend importantly on a country’s capacity to develop and apply new technologies, our universities are envied around the world. The payoffs—in terms of the flow of expertise, new products and startup companies, for example—have been impressive. Perhaps the most frequently cited measures of our success have been the emergence of significant centers of commercial innovation and entrepreneurship where creative ideas flow freely between local academic scholars and those in industry. In the 11 July 2000 edition of the Penn StateNewswire, the university used the conference, held at its Research Park, to publicize its own status as the “number 2 university in the country in industry-sponsored research.” As Bill Readings argued in his 1996 The University in Ruins, the decline of the nation-state and the ascendancy of the transnational corporation have transformed the university’s mission from one of citizen production for the nation-state to worker production for the global economy. Indeed, we have reached the rather unusual historical moment when big business joins forces with universities to defend affirmative action in the interest of developing a diverse and well-trained workforce. Corporate support figured significantly in the University of Michigan’s recent court victory in a battle over its affirmative action admissions policies; a federal judge ruled in favor of the policies and cited, among other things, the evidence put forth by the university and corporations about the benefits of diversity programs. Twenty Fortune 500 companies signed a brief filed on the university’s behalf, and General Motors submitted a separate supporting brief. The brief by the twenty companies argues that “higher education is so vital to the companies’ efforts ‘to hire and maintain a diverse work force,’and to employ people ‘who have been educated in a diverse environment,’that the government has a compelling interest in allowing public colleges to continue using affirmative action in admissions” (Schmidt 2000c, A22). Multiculturalism, within which Latino studies now often finds its financial if not its philosophical legitimation, has become diversity management for a newly compliant university population.As the University of Indiana’s Department of Human Resources has said on its Website, “diversity” is “a customer service issue.” Critics including Readings (1996), Slavoj Žižek (1997), Masao Miyoshi (2000), Cary Nelson and Stephen Watt (1999),Wahneem aLubiano (1996),HenryGiroux (1999),andStanley Aronowitz (2000), among others, have documented the extent to which corporate management tactics and corporate contracts have come to dominate many universities; some of these critics have focused on the co-optation of multiculturalism within this corporate shift. Žižek (1997, 46), in one of the most virulent condemnations, proclaims that “the problematic of multiculturalism—the hybrid coexistence of diverse cultural life-worlds—which imposes itself today is the form of appearance of its opposite, of the massive presence of capitalism as universal world system.” In fact, it has perhaps become more common to see critiques of multiculturalism from the Left than from the Right (acknowledging the reductiveness but ongoing purchase of those categories).3

#### You Should Evaluate Their Resistance Claims With a High Degree of Skepticism – Asserting That You Exist Outside of the System You Critique Makes Their Advocacy Blind to the Forces That Dictate Its Use

Jane Juffer former director of the Latino/a Studies Initiative @ Penn State 2001 “The Limits of Culture Latino Studies, Diversity Management and the Corporate University” Nepantla: Views from South 2.2 [*quals continued*: Associate Professor of English @ Cornell]

It is tempting, in the face of the corporate shift, to simply retreat into the classroom and the scholarly journal where, it is easy to pretend, management does not exercise its influence. Yet it is this conception of culture as a space of opposition that is most effective when most “pure” that I wish to challenge. Many cultural critics have been reluctant to think through our necessary engagement with corporatization, choosing instead to posit culture as a site of freedom where one can imagine standing outside corporate influences, and hence suggesting that the critic speaks from a moral position outside market forces. For example, in a recent boundary 2 issue on the university, Masao Miyoshi (2000, 12) berates humanities scholars for their inadequate response to corporatization: “Although some minimal room is still left for serious inquiry and criticism in academia, such space is rapidly shrinking, and the ranks of independent eccentrics are fast thinning.” The question begged is why only “independent eccentrics” can engage in “serious criticism.” Although corporatization is a relatively new phenomenon, the practice of linking cultural criticism to resistance is not, and Miyoshi’s exhortation builds on a tradition of literary and cultural criticism that sees (noncommodified) culture as an alternative to power. Resistance through culture is an important practice in Latino cultural criticism; it performs a legitimating function within the academy even as it locates Latino culture (and hence the critique) seemingly outside co-opting forces. And it is here that I would like to intervene, in an attempt to define an effective political role for Latino cultural studies that is not predicated on clear boundaries of inside/outside the corporate university. Let us begin with the premise that nothing inherent to Latino culture guarantees its resistant status. Although cultural criticism, especially literary criticism, has importantly legitimated the study of Latino culture, we are at a moment in history when we don’t need more literary criticism claiming resistance through texts but rather more work that engages explicitly with institutional, policy, and other material issues—work that shows the routes culture travels in the global economy. In constituting its object of study as a body of cultural texts (most often literary texts) with both distinctive aesthetic and representational characteristics, Latino criticism has too often ignored culture’s material imbrication in routes of distribution and circulation as well as its very mundane place within the routines of everyday life, its very inability to comment on social conditions because it exists on the same plane (i.e., in the same marketplace) as those conditions. The corporate university is clearly one site shaping the uses of culture, and it does not enable cultural studies to try to position culture outside the corporation. As Nelson and Watt (1999, 94) argue, “Corporatization is here to stay. It cannot be stopped, but it can be shaped and, where appropriate, resisted.”6

#### Focusing Our Efforts on the Material Conditions That Alter Culture is Critical to Subverting Power Structures

Jane Juffer former director of the Latino/a Studies Initiative @ Penn State 2001 “The Limits of Culture Latino Studies, Diversity Management and the Corporate University” Nepantla: Views from South 2.2 [*quals continued*: Associate Professor of English @ Cornell]

3. Recognize that the study of culture may not focus on culture at all but rather that it may analyze the spaces in which culture is produced, circulated, and consumed; analysis must not deal exclusively with the text—although the text should not be ignored—but should also examine conditions of production, distribution, and reception. We don’t, for example, need another reading of Sandra Cisneros’s House on Mango Street (there are already about eighty listed in the MLA bibliography). Rather, we should examine Cisneros’s publishing history. What are the effects on distribution of the shift from the independent Latino press Arte Público, which published House in 1984, to Random House, which began publishing Cisneros’s work in 1991 (her contract with Random House is hailed as the first contract with a major house for a Chicana writer)? What are the politics of such mainstreaming of multiculturalism? This analysis should be extended to the politics of distribution at sites such as Barnes and Noble and Borders, which now, in some locations, have “Mexican-American” or “Hispanic” sections. Through these routes, we begin to answer questions of access and literacy, showing, for example, how Chicano fiction is labeled and categorized, and how that shapes access and consumption. In this fashion, we intersect with other public sites and practices rather than just commenting on them, locating ourselves within economic practices—advertising, marketing, distribution, publishing/production, retail—rather than outside. Consequently, we also begin asking questions about mobility and access: Who is buying and reading Chicano fiction, and under what conditions? Again, this approach mitigates against the belief that readings of Latino texts produce a mastery of the Other (even if the professor works against this reading); it shows, rather, that the reading of the text cannot be divorced from material questions of access and literacy, which prompt more questions about who is in the university community and who has been excluded. Pursuing these routes also lays the groundwork for a kind of interdisciplinarity that encompasses not only the humanities but also the social sciences; it will raise more job-related issues for students in marketing, health care, advertising, publishing, and even law enforcement, demonstrating the relevance of cultural studies as well as the particular questions it raises that other disciplines might not. This approach simultaneously breaks down the disciplinary structures that maintain the corporate university and acknowledges their ongoing power. As Readings (1996, 177) puts it, “The loosening of disciplinary structures has to be made the opportunity for the installation of disciplinarity as a permanent question.” In the practices of diversity, there are no pure spaces of radical political practices; all spaces “within” the university are defined by the global economic imperative, but that does not translate into “all spaces are equally in the service of the corporation.” Given this, Latino cultural studies must try to define and develop spaces where questions of community are constantly raised but never definitively answered, and where the role of culture in community and subject formation cannot be assumed to be central.

## Case

### 1nc – turn

#### People may join their movement – consumer culture proves they do it just to be different

A – critiques of “mainstream” culture are based on the idea of being an individual to affirm your superiority over “society”

B – empirics prove 60s hippies and 80s goths

Heath and Potter, 04 – philosophy professor at the University of Toronto AND visiting fellow at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique at the Université de Montréal (Joseph and Andrew “Nation of rebels: why counterculture became consumer culture”)

And the thought that wearing Burberry might telegraph the message "I like reality TV and boob jobs," instead of "I prefer classic elegance," is enough to scare most members of the social elite off of the brand. Another way of formulating the problem is to say that Burben became too mainstream and thus ceased to serve as a source of distinction. And it is here that we can see the obvious point of contrast. between the critique of mass society and the problem of consumerism. The traditional critique of mass society suggests that most people are members of the herd, cogs in the machine, victims of mindless conformity They lead vacuous, hollowed-out lives ruled by shallow, materialistic values. They are manipulated to serve the functional requirements of the system, and so will never experience true creativity, freedom or even complete sexuih fulfillment. That having been said, who could possibly want to be member of mass society? If anything, people should be desperate to prove that they are not victims of conformity, that they are not merely cogs in the machine. And of course, as the critique of mass society became increasingly widespread, this is precisely what people tried to do. **Thus** countercultural rebellion—rejecting the norms of "mainstream" society—came to serve as a source of considerable distinction. In a society that prizes individualism and despises conformity, being "a rebel" becomes the new aspirational cate­gory "Dare to be different," we are constantly told. In the '60s, becorning a beat or a hippie was a way of showing that you were not one of the squares or the suits. In the '80s, dressing like a punk or a goth was a way showing mat you were not one of the prep**pies** or the yuppies. It was a way of visibly demonstrating one's rejection of mainstream society, but it was also a tacit affirmation of one's own superiority. It was a way of telegraphing the message **' that** "I, unlike you, have not been fooled by the system. I am not a ; 'mindless cog."

#### Creates a race to the bottom – counterculture is a status symbol that causes more radicalism – the effort to remain exclusive will continue feeding the system

A – if everyone join their movement then it becomes the “norm” hence they have to change again

B – because the movement becomes more common it is forced to always evolve to continue being an “individual”

C – this drives the culture of consumption to reinvent the movement

Heath and Potter, 04 – philosophy professor at the University of Toronto AND visiting fellow at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique at the Université de Montréal (Joseph and Andrew “Nation of rebels: why counterculture became consumer culture”)

The problem, of course, is that not everyone can be a rebel, for the same reason that not everyone can have class and not everyone can have good taste. If everyone joins the counterculture, then the counterculture simply becomes the culture. Then the rebel has to invent a new counterculture, in order to reestablish distinction. -Countercultural style begins as a very exclusive thing. It starts out ."underground." Particular symbols—a love bead, a safety pin, a brand of shoes or cut of jeans, a Maori tattoo, a body piercing, an aftermarket muffler—will serve as points of communication among those who are "in the know." Yet as time passes, the circle of those who are "in the know" expands, and the symbol becomes increasingly common. This naturally erodes the distinction that these markers confer—in the same way that Nascimento cheap­ened the Burberry brand. "The club" becomes less and less elite. As a result, the rebel has to move on to something new. Thus the coun­terculture must constantly reinvent itself. This is why rebels adopt and discard styles as quickly as fashionistas move through brands. In this way, countercultural rebellion has become one of the Major forces driving competitive consumption. As Thomas Frank Writes, With the "alternative" facelift, "rebellion" continues to perform its traditional function of justifying the economy's ever accelerating -: cycles of obsolescence with admirable efficiency. Since our willingness to load up our closets with purchases depends upon an eternal shifting of the products paraded before us, upon our being endlessly convinced that the new stuff is better than the old, we must be persuaded over and over again that the "alternatives" are more valuable than the existing or the previous. Ever since the **a;** 1960s, hip has been the native tongue of advertising, "antiestablishment" the vocabulary by which we are taught to cast off our ?) old possessions and buy whatever they have decided to offer this year. And over the years the rebel has naturally become the cen­tral image of this culture of consumption, symbolizing endless, directionless change, and eternal restlessness with "the establish­ment"—or, more correctly, with the stuff "the establishment" convinced him to buy last year.

### 1nc – overidentification (race)

#### We must eliminate the distance between ideology and ourselves. Overidentification renders visible the obscene dominant nature of ideology that had previously remained hidden.

A – overidentification is a political strategy which is necessary to break down racism, their fantasy of “racism” is bad from a private/safe distance which does nothing

B – we must publically identify with that which we wish to eliminate i.e. the postpunk group Laibach

C – criticizing from a distance is conformism because it doesn’t tear down that which you are opposed to

Zizek, 95 - Philosopher and Psychoanalyst, Institute for Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana (Slavoj, Cardozo Law Review)

How are we to combat effectively this id-evil which, on account of its "elementary" nature, remains impervious to any rational or even purely rhetorical argumentation? Racism is always grounded in a particular fantasy, which by definition resists universalization. n29 The translation of the racist fantasy into the universal medium of symbolic intersubjectivity (the Habermasian ethics of dialogue) **in no way weakens the hold of the racist fantasy upon us**. n30 If we are to undermine this power of fantasy, a different political strategy is needed - a strategy able to incorporate what Lacan called "la traversee du fantasme," n31 a strategy of overidentification, which takes into account the fact that the obscene superego qua basis and support of the public law is operative only insofar as it remains unacknowledged, hidden to the public eye. What if, instead of an ironic critical dissection which reveals their impotence before the face of racism's fantasmatic kernel, we proceed a contrario and publicly identify with the obscene superego? In the process of the disintegration of socialism in Slovenia, the postpunk group Laibach staged an aggressive inconsistent mixture of Stalinism, Nazism, and Blut und Boden ideology. The first reaction of the enlightened leftist critics in Slovenia was to conceive of Laibach as the ironic imitation of totalitarian rituals. However, their support of Laibach was always accompanied by an uneasy feeling: "What if they really mean it? What if they truly identify with the totalitarian ritual?" Or, a more cunning version of it, transferring their own doubt onto the Other: "What if Laibach overestimates its public?" "What if the public takes seriously what Laibach mockingly imitates, so that Laibach actually strengthens what it purports to undermine?" Their uneasy feeling is fed on the assumption that ironic distance is automatically a subversive attitude. What if, on the contrary, the dominant attitude of the contemporary "postideological" universe is precisely the cynical distance towards public values? What if this **distance**, far from posing any threat to the system, **designates the supreme form of conformism**, since the normal functioning of the system required cynical distance? In this case, the strategy of Laibach appears in a new light: it frustrates the system (the ruling ideology) precisely insofar as it is distanced from its ironic imitation; but overidentifi- [\*937] cation with it, by bringing to light the obscene superego underside of the system, suspends its efficiency. n32 The ultimate expedient of Laibach is their deft manipulation of transference; their public (especially intellectuals) is obsessed with the "desire of the Other" - whether Laibach's actual position is truly totalitarian or not. They address Laibach with a question and expect an answer, failing to notice the crucial fact that Laibach itself does not function as an answer but as a question. By means of the elusive character of their desire, the indecision regarding where they actually stand, Laibach compels us to take a position and decide upon our desire. Laibach actually accomplishes here the reversal that defines the psychoanalytic cure. At the outset of the cure is transference: the transferential relationship is put in force as soon as the analyst appears in the guise of the subject who is supposed to know the truth about the patient's desire. When, in the course of the psychoanalysis, the patient complains that he does not know what he wants, the complaint is addressed to the analyst, with the implicit supposition that the analyst already knows it. In other words, insofar as the analyst stands for the big Other, the analyst's illusion lies in reducing his ignorance about his desire to an "epistemological" incapacity: the truth about his desire already exists, it is registered somewhere in the big Other, and one has only to bring it to light and his desiring will run smoothly. The end of psychoanalysis, dissolution of transference, designates the moment when the question that the patient aimed at the analyst turns back towards the patient himself. First, the patient's (hysterical) question addressed an analyst who was supposed to possess the answer; now, the analyst is forced to acknowledge that he is merely a reflective question mark addressed back to the patient. Here, one can explain Lacan's thesis that an analyst is authorized only by himself: n33 the patient becomes the analyst upon assuming that his desire has no support in the Other, that the authorization of his desire has no support in the Other, and that the authorization of his desire can come only from himself. Insofar as this rever- [\*938] sal defines drive, one can explain Lacan's thesis that what takes place at the end of psychoanalysis is the shift from desire to drive. n34

### 1nc – Mexico

#### The history of Korean immigrants has not been kept a secret- commemorated by Koreans and Mexicans- even Lily Yi de Banales pleased with how the status quo operates

Sevilla ’07 [1/3/07, Elsa Sevilla is a staffwriter for the KPBS, “Descendants of Korean Immigrants to Mexico Remember the Past”, http://www.kpbs.org/news/2007/jan/03/descendants-of-korean-immigrants-to-mexico/]

This segment originally aired August 24, 2006. It is part of Mexico’s history which has been kept a secret from the rest of the world, until now: hundreds of Koreans used as forced labor in the Mexican haciendas a century ago. Today, their descendants living in Tijuana and San Diego are keeping their memory alive. Some came to Mexico looking for new opportunities. Others were fleeing the Japanese-Russian invasion of Korea. But they could never imagine the sacrifices they would be forced to make thousands of miles away from home. Lily Yi de Banales, grandparents settled in Mexico: It was difficult. They didn’t know the weather. It was hot. The food was different. It was hard labor. They used to cut with a machete. They had to cut the leaves and it has a lot of thorns like needles. Their hands would bleed. Lily Yi de Banales talks about her grandparents living and suffering in a foreign country. Those who refused to work were jailed and sometimes beaten. Her grandmother was one of those laborers harvesting the Henekuen – a cactus like plant - in Southeastern Mexico. Fibers from the plant were used to make rope and other items. Lily’s cousin, Pedro Diaz, remembers the early days. Pedro Diaz (Spanish): They would head to work very early to the plantation. They would get up early in the morning because the sun was so hot and they would only work until ten in the morning. Looking over pictures brings back memories of the life their grandparents once lived. Because of the language barrier, there were many adjustments to make. Lily Yi de Banales: They changed the names crossing the border, Aduana customs, because they would say, “What is your last name?” And they would say “Yi.” “There is no such last name.” So we all changed our names. More than thirty years later, Lily’s mother, Elvia, would be the first Korean to move north to Tijuana, opening a shoe store. Lily was the first Korean born there. Others would soon follow. Pedro still lives across the border. Pedro Diaz (Spanish): I came to Tijuana when I was 14 years old in 1944. We lived in Quintana Roo. My parents moved here looking for new opportunities. They continue to honor their heritage by preserving traditional costumes and photographs from that era. They also just celebrated the centennial in Merida of the Korean migration to Merida last year. Many Korean dignitaries attended to honor and remember those who made the voyage a century ago. Lily Yi de Banales: We didn’t expect our grandparents to be treated as heroes. They built a statue in honor of the Koreans. They donated $1 million to build a hospital in Merida. Keeping their history alive and staying connected, the community of Mexican Korean Americans honors their past with traditional Korean dishes at a family reunion in Chula Vista every year. It’s a way to stay connected and remember the past. Ninety-two-year-old Sabina Corona Kim was one of the first Koreans born in Merida. Sabina Corona Kim (Spanish): Many ask that question. How do you know Spanish so well? Because we are Korean-Mexicans. I was born in Mexico. What began as a worker program or a way of escaping the oppression in their native country turned into an odyssey for more than 1,000 Koreans. What’s most important to these Mexican-Korean-Americans is preserving history so that the new generations will remember where they came from. Lily Yi de Banales: I’m very proud to have been born in Mexico, very proud to be Korean. Now that we are in the United States, very proud my children were born in the U.S. When the worker program ended, many would never return to their mother land. It is believed there are now some 40,000 descendants living throughout Mexico, Cuba, Hawaii and Southern California. The South Korean government has helped build a museum, statue and a hospital in Merida to honor the Koreans who arrived in Mexico 101 years ago.

### 1nc – Recognition

#### 1AC Impacts Are Inevitable – Deploying Recognition as a Distributive Good Draws Attention Away From the Root Cause of Subordination and Recreates the Hierarchies of the Status Quo

Kelly Oliver 2001 Chair of Philosophy Department @ Stony Brook U Wtinessing: Beyond Recognition p.8

If, as I suggest, those othered by dominant culture are seeking not only, or even primarily, recognition but also bearing witness to something beyond recognition, then our notions of recognition must be reevaluated. Certainly, **notions of recognition that throw us back into a Hegelian master-slave relationship do not help us overcome domination. Even if oppressed people are making demands for recognition**, insofar as those who are dominant are empowered to confer it, **we are thrown back into the hierarchy of domination**, this is to say if the operation of recognition require a recognizer and a recognizee, then we have done no more than replicate the master-slave, subject-other / object hierarchy in this new form. Additionally, **the need to demand recognition from the dominant culture or group is a symptom of the pathology of oppression. Oppression creates the need and demand for recognition**. It is not just that the injustices of oppression create the need for justice. More than this, **the pathology of oppression creates the need in the oppressed to be recognized by their oppressors, the very people most likely not to recognize them. The internalization of stereotypes of inferiority and superiority leave the oppressed with the sense that they are lacking something that only their superior dominators have** or can give the, **the very notion of recognition** as it is deployed in various contemporary theoretical contexts **is, then, a symptom of the pathology of oppression itself.** Implied in this diagnosis is the conclusion that **struggles for recognition and theories that embrace those struggles** may indeed presuppose and thereby **perpetuate the very hierarchies, domination, and injustice that they attempt to overcome.** The notion of recognition becomes more problematic in models where what is recognized is always only something familiar to the subject. In this case, the subject and what is known to him and his experience are once again privileged. **Any real contact with difference or otherness becomes impossible because recognition requires the assimilation of difference into something familiar. When recognition repeats the master-slave or subject-object hierarchy, then it is also bound to assimilate difference back into sameness.**

### 1nc – Politics

#### Their refusal to advocate USFG action hijacks our ability to discuss the politics DA – we think that’s a voting issue IN THIS INSTANCE because of the issue that is at the top of the docket

#### Temporary Window of Bipartisanship Means CIR Will Pass And Top of the Agenda – Obama Focus is Key

A. New Year = Obama new focus on immigration B. support now because congress just passed military bill and spending cuts

Fox News 12/27 December 27, 2013 President Obama Eyes Immigration Reform As A Top Priority For 2014 http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/12/27/president-obama-eyes-immigration-reform-as-top-priority-for-2014/

The last vestiges of 2013's political wrangling officially behind him, President Barack Obama is setting his sights on the coming year, when a number of unfinished tasks will increasingly compete for attention with the 2014 midterm elections.¶ High on the agenda for the start of the year is a renewed push on immigration. Bipartisan consensus about the need for action on immigration in the wake of the 2012 presidential election gave way in 2013 to opposition from conservative House Republicans.¶ U.S. House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, has started offering subtle signs he'll put more weight behind the issue despite continued resistance from the tea party. Vacationing in Hawaii, Obama on Thursday signed into law a bipartisan budget deal softening the blow from scheduled spending cuts and a military bill cracking down on sexual assault. The two bills, passed by Congress with broad bipartisan support, constituted a modest step away from gridlock, and both parties cautiously hoped that spirit of cooperation might linger after New Year's Day.¶ "This law is proof that both parties can work together. We can put aside our differences and find common ground," House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan of Wisconsin, who negotiated the budget deal for Republicans, said in a statement.

#### Understanding the fynction of the government is critical to reshape the partisanship surrounding the way that the public sphere understands immigration policy

Adolf G. Gundersen, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 97-8

In contrast to "deliberation," which means "the thoughtful consider­ation of alternative courses of action,"1 we might think of "partisan­ship" as "struggle to enact a fixed course of action." So defined, the differences between deliberation and partisanship are as obvious as they are profound: deliberation requires openness and the cooperative exercise of the intellect; partisanship presumes closure and involves the factional exercise of rhetorical manipulation or raw power. As a general rule, it also follows that deliberative democracy will flourish in inverse proportion to partisanship. For this reason deliberative democrats need a strategy for eliminating (or at least containing) par­tisanship. This paper advances such a strategy, a strategy which I recommend based on a critique of the two alternatives that have for some time dominated thinking in this area. The first of these alterna­tives is advanced by a wide-range of participatory democrats. On their view, partisanship can not only be contained, but also perhaps elimi­nated altogether, by having would-be partisans confront one another in public decision-making bodies. The participatory strategy ultimately rests on the belief that all partisan conflict is susceptible to transforma­tion as long as partisanship is confronted directly. Indeed, the partici­patory strategy for dealing with partisanship enjoins two sorts of confrontation: confrontation among citizens and confrontation with an actual decision. The second alternative strategy for dealing with parti­sanship that I examine here, no less well known, is Madisonian. Its strategy for limiting partisanship is in many ways the mirror image ofthat proposed by participatory democrats. Where the participatory strategy puts its faith in confrontation, the Madisonian strategy puts its faith in separation—again of two sorts. For the Madisonian, the worst effects of partisanship can be contained by first separating citi­zens from the actual task of decision-making and then by institution­alizing separate sources of decision-making power.Although I believe there is something to be learned from both the participatory and the Madisonian strategies for dealing with par­tisanship, I end up rejecting both of them in favor of an alternative which weds Madisonian institutional insights to participatory demo­crats' concern with the individual citizen. I argue that the best way to limit the unavoidable influence of partisanship is to confine par­tisan maneuvering to the latter stages of decision making and policy formation. I conclude that both distance and proximity can be made to serve the ends of deliberative democracy, that, indeed, distance and proximity must be combined in any effective strategy for limit­ing partisanship. That deliberation and partisanship are mutually exclusive does not seem particularly controversial. Deliberation is a process of weighing alternative courses of action. Partisanship is the exercise of power on behalf of a chosen course of action. Especially when viewed in the context of democratic politics, deliberation and partisanship thus seem irreconcilable. First, and most obviously, deliberation involves weigh­ing alternatives; partisanship involves coercion, negotiation, or, in its most discursive form, rhetorical manipulation. Second, deliberation requires balancing or adjudicating between a plurality of views; par­tisanship presupposes that one view has been judged superior (or advantageous). Third, deliberation requires only an opposing view­point; partisanship requires an opponent.

**Immigration reform triggers a Radical Right white supremacist backlash that ends in a racial civil war**

**Scaminaci 09**

[James Scaminaci III, September 25th, 2009, http://www.splcenter.org/blog/2009/09/24/immigrants-out-to-destroy-us-washington-times-columnist-warns/]

If you put the FAIR-inspired Washington Times article into context, the white supremacists in the Radical Right–including John Tanton’s network–are preparing for revolution and secession which are code words for a racial civil war to create a white Christian theocracy. The context of Minutemen bearing arms to intimidate immigrant workers and children; of bringing weapons to town hall meetings; threatening to kill union workers who come to the same health care town hall meetings; threatening to come armed at the next Tea Party march on Washington, D.C.; threatening a million man, armed militia march on D.C.; threatening to kill federal law makers who do not vote to make English the official language; Chuck Norris’ call to fly a revolutionary flag for a revolutionary movement; and, the right-wing smear of liberal treachery all lead to the conclusion that comprehensive immigration reform that includes a path to citizenship for millions of undocumented immigrants could be the last straw for the white supremacist movement. They do not hide their revolutionary agenda. They do not hide their agenda for a Christian theocracy. They do not hide their assault on birthright citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment for all persons born here. All of their declaration of principles (see the Declaration Alliance or Oath Keepers) all include the concluding language of the Declaration of Independence–pledging their lives and sacred honor. It is time to take seriously their agenda, their actions, and their rhetoric about revolution, secession, and a racial civil war.

### 1nc – utopian fails

#### Even if they win a risk of collective action – individual self-interest means no one acts or they act in their self-interest reproducing mainstream structures

A – rules are necessary or else others will fill in and they will make rules based on their self interest

B – this causes collective action problems where people are lazy so they feel other people will do the job for them

Heath and Potter, 04 – philosophy professor at the University of Toronto AND visiting fellow at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique at the Université de Montréal (Joseph and Andrew “Nation of rebels: why counterculture became consumer culture”)

What both sides in this debate fail to consider is that coercion may be necessary even in the absence of evil. Perfectly free and equal individuals often have an incentive to adopt coercively enforced rules of conduct to govern their interactions. So the essence of coercion in society is not always a sign of domination, of the need to control evil or of one group imposing its will upon another. Often everyone is better off when everyone is governed by a set of enforced rules. Indeed, when left to do as they please people will tend to generate their own rules and create a new social order, complete with its own system of punishment and reward. They do so because these types of systems are in their interest, both as individuals and as a group. This is the lesson that should have been learned from the commune experiments of the '60s. Nearly every one of these communes was founded with the goal of creating a harmonious living space based upon mutual sharing and cooperation. Naturally, it was assumed that with everyone committed to the project, there would be no reason for explicit rules and regulations. Everything could be organized informally; people would pitch in to do the necessary work and would take out no more than their fair shan Yet the reality proved to be much different. No matter how much goodwill went into creating these communes, a completely open system inevitably led to conflict. As a result, people who wanted to keep the group functioning smoothly had to start creating rules. And these rules, once created, had to be enforced. In other words, communal living arrangements tended either to fall apart or to start reproducing many of the features of mainstream society that they had been created in order to avoid. The central mistake they made was to assume that because a particular group of people have a collective interest in securing a certain outcome, each individual in that group will also have an individual interest in doing what is necessary to achieve that outcome. It is natural to assume that because we, as a community, need food and shelter, people will spontaneously do what is necessary to secure food and to keep the shelter in good repair. The problem with this assumption is that individual incentives are often not aligned in such a way as to promote the collective good. In particular, because everyone is a little bit lazy, there is a tendency to hang back a little bit before doing any work, in the hope that someone else will come along and do it. Everyone who has lived with roommates knows the pattern. Why do the dishes right away, when someone else may get fed up and do them first? Why replace the milk you drank, when someone might be going to the store? Why sweep the stairs, etc.? Of course, if everyone thinks this way, then the dishes will never get done, no milk will be bought and the stairs will never get swept. In fact, life among roommates often becomes something of a contest to see who will be the first to break down and clean up. The person with the highest tolerance for filth has the advantage and will usually be able to get away with doing the least work. Even then, the level of cleanliness in the house will usually be lower than anyone would like, including the most filth-tolerant. The problem is that, in the absence of rules, no one has an incentive to invest an optimal level of effort in the task. Situations of this type are known as "collective action problems"—cases where everyone would like to see a particular outcome but no one has the incentive to do what is necessary in order to bring it about. The most well-known example of such a situation is the now famous "prisoner's dilemma." The name refers to a story that is used to illustrate the situation: Imagine you and a friend rob a bank. The police know that you've done it, but they don't have enough evidence to convict you. They do, however, know about your little drug habit, and so they raid your apartment one day and find enough evidence to charge you and your friend with possession of narcotics. They wheel you both down to the station, put you in separate interrogation rooms. After a slight delay, a cop comes in and says, "You're looking at one year prison for the drug-possession charge. We are, however, reasonable men. If you are willing to testify against your accomplice for the bank robbery, we would be willing to let those charges drop. Think about it for a few minutes. I'll be back."

#### Institutional rules prove its reverse causal

A – rules are able to solve these problems

B – examples of rules prove that they can benefit others not just ourselves

Heath and Potter, 04 – philosophy professor at the University of Toronto AND visiting fellow at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique at the Université de Montréal (Joseph and Andrew “Nation of rebels: why counterculture became consumer culture”)

When we examine the rules of everyday social interaction more closely, we can see that a surprising number of them have as their purpose the elimination of collective action problems. Having to wait in line, for example, is a source of constant annoyance, whether it is at the bank, at the supermarket or on the on-ramp to the expressway. The average American spends over thirty minutes a day waiting in line for one thing or another. Economists constantly condemn this as an unproductive use of time and energy. Yet the primary function of queues is to speed up the process of moving everyone through. Each individual has an incentive to rush to the front of the line and cut in ahead of the others. But if everyone does so, then the resulting crush slows everyone down, so that the entire group gets through more slowly. Single file is faster than "single pile." This becomes tragically apparent when there is a fire in a crowded building and those who are trying to escape fail to form an orderly queue at the exits. As a result, many more die than would otherwise have been necessary. This is a form of prisoner's dilemma. Rushing the front of the line is like testifying against your partner—it improves your situa­tion, but only by creating greater costs for others. When the oth­ers turn around and do the same thing to you, the result is worse for everyone. The institution of queuing is thus in everyone's interest (even though it may not feel that way some days). The rules that govern turn-taking in a conversation have much the same structure (everyone wants to get a word in, but no one can hear if everyone talks at once). It's also why you're not supposed to talk during movies, not supposed to enter an intersection unless you're sure you can clear it, not supposed to lie, not supposed to urinate in public places, not supposed to litter in parks not supposed to play loud music at night, not supposed to burn leaves in the backyard, and so on and so forth. The examples could be multiplied indefinitely. The important point about these rules is that they all represent instances in which everyone benefits from the constraints the rules impose. Thus, far from repressing our fundamental needs and desires, these rules are precisely what enable us to satisfy them.

### 1nc – counterculture

#### The aff empirically fails to create change – institutional engagement is the only way to alter social structures

A – their movement fails because the theory they have on society is wrong, the world is prosaic and wants to do the right thing and cooperate

B – Social institutions exist to help spread the benefits and to ease the burdens on society

C – their movement is counterproductive because it distracts energy from initiatives that solve the problems and encourages contempt of such activities

D – the movement is hedonistic and thinks that if you follow what is fun it will be liberating – wrong

E – Civil Rights movement and the Feminist movement have achieved progress by working within “the system” through democratic political action

Heath and Potter, 04 – philosophy professor at the University of Toronto AND visiting fellow at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique at the Université de Montréal (Joseph and Andrew “Nation of rebels: why counterculture became consumer culture”)

In the '60s, the baby boomers declared their implacable opposition to "the system." They renounced materialism and greed, rejected the discipline and uniformity of the McCarthy era, and set out to build a new world based on individual freedom. Wnat ever hap­pened to this project? Forty years later, "the system" does not appear to have changed very much. If anything, consumer capital­ism has emerged from decades of countercultural rebellion much stronger than it was before. If Debord thought that the world was saturated with advertising and media in the early '60s, what would he have made of the 21st century? In this book, we argue that decades of countercultural rebellion have failed to change anything because the theory of society on which the countercultural idea rests is false. We do not live in the Matrix, nor do we live in the spectacle. The world that we live in is in fact much more prosaic. It consists of billions of human beings, each pursuing some more or less plausible conception of the good, trying to cooperate with one another, and doing so with varying degrees of success. There is no single, overarching system that integrates it all. The culture cannot be jammed because there **is** no such thing as "the culture" or "the system." There is only a hodge­podge of social institutions, most tentatively thrown together, which distribute the benefits and burdens of social cooperation in ways that sometimes we recognize to be just, but that are usually manifestly inequitable. In a world of this type, countercultural rebellion is not just unhelpful, it is positively counterproductive. Not only does it distract energy and effort away from the sort of initiatives that lead to concrete improvements in people's lives, but it encourages wholesale contempt for such incremental changes. According to the countercultural theory, "the system" achieves order only through the repression of the individual. Pleasure is inherently anarchic, unruly, wild. To keep the workers under con­trol, the system must instill manufactured needs and mass-produced desires, which can in turn be satisfied within the framework of the technocratic order. Order is achieved, but at the expense of pro­moting widespread unhappiness, alienation and neurosis. The solution must therefore lie in reclaiming our capacity for sponta­neous pleasure—through polymorphous perversity, or perform­ance art, or modern primitivism, or mind-expanding drugs, or Whatever else turns your crank. In the countercultural analysis, simply having fun comes to be seen as the ultimate subversive act. Hedonism is transformed into a revolutionary doctrine. Is it any wonder then that this sort of countercultural rebellion has reinvigorated consumer capitalism? It's time for a reality check. Having fun is not subversive, and it doesn't undermine any system. In fact, widespread hedonism makes it more difficult to organize social movements, and much more difficult to persuade anyone to make a sacrifice in the name of social justice. In our view, what the progressive left needs to do is disentangle the concern over ques­tions of social justice from the countercultural critique—and to jet­tison the latter, while continuing to pursue the former. From the standpoint of social justice, the big gains that have been achieved in our society over the past half-century have all come from measured reform within the system. The civil rights movement and the feminist movement have both achieved tan­gible gains in the welfare of disadvantaged groups, while the social safety net provided by the welfare state has vastly improved the condition of all citizens. But these gains have not been achieved by "unplugging" people from the web of illusions that governs their lives. They have been achieved through the laborious process of democratic political action—through people making arguments, conducting studies, assembling coalitions and legislating change. We would like to see more of this. Less fun perhaps, but potentially much more useful.

# 2nc

## FW

### 2nc – overview

#### Topical version of the aff is for the government to make available visas and the proof of citizenship easier at the border – this is their Roberts evidence

장 ’93 [1993, 장 Robert S. is a Professor of Law and an Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, He also serves on the advisory board of Berkeley’s Asian American Law Journal. “Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space”, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1241]

#### **I am a second generation Korean** American without **any achievements in life** and I have no education. What is it you want to hear from me? My life is not worth telling to anyone. You know, it seems to me there's no use in me telling you all this! **I was just a simple worker, a farmworker** around here. My story is not going to interest anybody. I Of the different voices in which I speak, I have been most comfortable with the one called silence. Silence allowed me to escape notice when I was a child. I could become invisible, and hence safe. Yet now I find myself leaving the safety of my silence. I wonder if this is wise. I teach legal writing; I want to teach substantive law.2 I have been told that engaging in nontraditional legal scholarship may hurt my job prospects, that I should write a piece on intellectual property, where my training as a molecular biologist will lend me credibility. I try to follow this advice, but my mind wanders. I think about the American border guard who stopped me when I tried to return to the United States after a brief visit to Canada. My valid Ohio driver's license was not good enough to let me return to my country. He asked me **where my passport was**. I told him that I did not have one and that it was my understanding that I did not need one, that a driver's license was sufficient. He told me that a driver's license is not proof of citizenship. We were at an impasse. I asked him what was going to happen. He said that he might have to detain me. I looked away. I imagined the phone call that I would have to make, **the embarrassment I would feel** as I told my law firm in Seattle that I would not be at work the next day, or maybe even the day after that-**until I could prove that I belonged.** I thought about my naturalization papers which were with my parents in Ohio. I thought about how proud I had been when I had become a citizen. Before then, I had been an alien. Being a citizen meant that I belonged, that I had the same rights as every other American. At least, that is what I used to believe. Things have happened since then that have changed my mind. Like the time I was driving in the South and was refused service at a service station. Or the time I was stopped in New Jersey for suspicion of possessing a stolen vehicle. At first, it was just two cops. Then another squad car came. Four big (white) policemen for one small (Asian) man, in a deserted parking lot-no witnesses if it came to that. Perhaps they were afraid that I might know martial arts, which I do, but I am careful never to let them know. When my license and registration checked out, they handed back my papers and left without a word. **They could not even ~~say~~ that one word, "Sorry,"** which would have allowed me to leave that incident behind. I might have forgotten it as a mistake, one of those unpleasant things that happen. Instead, **I have to carry it with me** because of the anger I feel, and because of the fear- fear of the power that certain people are able to exercise over me because of this (contingent) feature that makes me different. **No matter how hard I scrub, it does not come clean. No matter how hard I try**, and I do try, **I can never be as good as everyone else. I can never be white.** These are the thoughts that intrude when I think about intellectual property. I try to push them away; I try to silence them. But I am tired of silence. And so, I ~~raise my voice~~.

#### The ballot is key to change – they have to lose to realize working within the system is best

A – games are not reality so it provides a safe space for testing even if it means failure

B – the only way to learn how to play the game is by failing at it repeatedly

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Emotional. Games invoke a range of powerful emotions, from curiosity to frustration to joy (Lazarro, 2004). They provide many positive emotional experiences, such as optimism and pride (McGonigal, 2011). Crucially, they also help players persist through negative emotional experiences and even transform them into positive ones. The most dramatic example of emotional transformation in a game is around the issue of failure. Because games involve repeated experimentation, they also involve repeated failure. In fact, for many games, the only way to learn how to play the game is to fail at it repeatedly, learning something each time (Gee, 2008). Games maintain this positive relationship with failure by making feedback cycles rapid and keeping the stakes low. The former means players can keep trying until they succeed; the latter means they risk very little by doing so. In schools, on the other hand, the stakes of failure are high and the feedback cycles long. Students have few opportunities to try, and when they do, it is high stakes. Little wonder that students experience anxiety, not anticipation, when offered the chance to fail (Pope, 2003). Gamification offers the promise of resilience in the face of failure, by reframing failure as a necessary part of learning. Gamification can shorten feedback cycles, give learners low-stakes ways to assess their own capabilities, and create an environment in which effort, not mastery, is rewarded. Students, in turn, can learn to see failure as an opportunity, instead of becoming helpless, fearful or overwhelmed.

### 2nc – at: we cant participate

#### Game theory is key for people of all education levels to be engaged and develop new skills

Klopfer et al.,09 – An Education Arcade Group through MIT (Eric and Scot Osterweil, and Katie Salen, “Moving Learning Games Forward: Obstacles, Opportunities and Openness” <http://education.mit.edu/papers/MovingLearningGamesForward_EdArcade.pdf)djm>

An educational game should put players in touch with what is fundamentally engaging about the subject, should help them build a scaffolding of core concepts, and should motivate them to go deeper. In doing this, we are not tricking the player into engaging with the topic (a claim that many games, particularly math games often make) but are rather enabling them to partake in those pleasures of the discipline that motivate its expert practitioners. Not everything offered in the traditional curriculum lends itself to this approach, and educational game creators need to acknowledge that. In order to advance the cause of educational games we should be wary of overreaching by claiming that games single-handedly teach the subject matter, at least in the way the word “teach” is commonly understood. Games promote understanding, motivation, and enjoyment, and are terrific at immersing players in complex, feedback-rich problem spaces (Schaffer, 2006). And while they are most often not sufficient in and of themselves for a course of study, they can help many students advance beyond the temporary memorization of facts and procedures, attainments that are usually lost when classes stop. They can offer entry points into subject matter or ways of interacting with information that leads players to investigate further, outside the game. Building on the premise that learning is an immersive process mediated by social activity and technological tools, games and learning researchers have begun to show how the design of video games imbed effective learning principles in highly motivating contexts (Gee, 2003). Squire (2004), for example, in his work with low-income African American students engaged in playing Civilization III, both in a high school and an after school setting, found that the participants, especially those reported to be among the lowest performing, “developed new vocabularies, better understandings of geography, and more robust concepts of world history.” Civilization III is a highly complex computer strategy game with its players succeeding by building empires—through a recursive process of trial and error—by way of managing resources, employing diplomatic and trading skills, and managing the advancement of culture and military power. Squire’s participants were identified by their teachers as underachieving in history classes or otherwise disinterested in historical subject matter, yet they were able to engage in a game which asked them to account for a host of interacting variables, including, among others, the implications of working within six types of civilizations (e.g., American, Aztecs, Iroquois, Zulu, etc.), six government (despotism, anarchy, communism, democracy, etc.), and 13 geographical terrains (jungle, tundra, grasslands, flood plains and so on). Squire reports that engagement in this history-based game simulation, motivated some to ask questions like, “Why is it that Europeans colonized the Americas, and why did Africans and Asians not colonize America or Europe?” (Squire, 2006, p. 21)— questions, to be sure, that rarely surface in American history textbooks which tend to narrativize American and European history as the great westward expansion (Wertsch, 1998). Squire’s research, like that of others in this new field, points to how the very design attributes of video games support learning (Squire, 2004). Squire’s classic studies of Civilization III have shown that the play of games can work as a pathway toward engaging kids in research around topics they never would have considered relevant or of interest prior to the play of the game. In this instance, games can simply introduce players to possible futures for their own academic engagement.

### 2nc – game theory outweighs

#### The process of debate teaches us portable skill that outweigh – data proves that has the biggest influence over negative education

Dimitri Landa and Adam Meirowitz Assistant Professors of Department of Politics, New York University 2009 Game Theory, Information, and Deliberative Democracy www.princeton.edu/~ameirowi/GTDDfinal032207.pdf

Although normative theorists have fashioned the research agenda of deliberative democratic¶ theory, that same informational engine is the key motivation behind the now very extensive game-theoretic literature on communication. An emerging body of work in this literature focuses specifically on policymaking in deliberative institutions. One might anticipate, therefore, that there would¶ be a great deal of interaction between the normative and the game-theoretic work on deliberation.¶ Alas, that is not the case. While the game-theoretic studies sometimes explicitly challenge assertions that emerge in the normative literature, game-theorists tend to exert little effort to making¶ their results accessible to a considerably less technical normative theory readership and rarely undertake the reconstruction of the normative arguments in a manner consistent with the insights¶ from the game-theoretic models. The influence in the opposite direction is, arguably, even weaker:¶ with very few exceptions, the normative literature on deliberation has, essentially, taken no account¶ of the presence of the game-theoretic work on deliberation and ignores the fundamental incentive¶ problems that surface in nearly all relevant game-theoretic studies.¶ The dissimilar styles of exposition and the high entry costs are, surely, at least in part responsible for why the two approaches do not see eye-to-eye. But though not irrelevant, these reasons¶ are, not surprisingly, rarely invoked self-consciously. The explicit reasons that appear prima facie¶ more defensible and which appear in print are, in our reading, three-fold: (1) it is unclear how¶ to make sense of the analytical/structural relationship between these approaches: what kind of¶ contribution, if any, can each approach make to the pursuit of the agenda set by the other? (2) the¶ communication analyzed by game theorists is of a fundamentally different epistemic type, and the game-theoretic results are, therefore, largely irrelevant to deliberative democratic theory; and (3) the game-theoretic approach omits key social and philosophic determinants of deliberation, and its conclusions are therefore also irrelevant because they are an artifact of these omissions. In one form or another these reasons have been called up to justify what we believe is an unfortunate divide between the two approaches. While sometimes useful in maintaining the conversation - itself, ultimately, a rarity - they are also, on close examination, not supportable as reasons for maintaining the status quo course of mutual avoidance.

# 1nr

### 2nc – turn

#### Their radical shift never stops – as people adopt it they are forced to go further and further

A – their movement becomes subversive when society begins to accept it, or what they call “co-option”

Heath and Potter, 04 – philosophy professor at the University of Toronto AND visiting fellow at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique at the Université de Montréal (Joseph and Andrew “Nation of rebels: why counterculture became consumer culture”)

How many times can the system be subverted without any noticeable effect before we begin to question the means of subversion? If insanity truly is doing the same thing again and again while expecting a different result, then it must be madness to think that any of this radicalism is going to undermine the system. How many more decades will it take before we realize that nuns who say "fuck" are not radical, they are simply entertainment? Here's a quick list of things that, in the past fifty years, have been considered extremely subversive: smoking, longhair for men, short hair for women, beards, miniskirts, bikinis, heroin, jazz music, rock music, punk music, reggae music, rap music, tattoos, underarm hair, graffiti, surfing, scooters, piercings, skinny ties, not wearing a bra, homosexuality, marijuana, torn clothing, hair gel, mohawks, afros, birth control, postmodernism, plaid pants, organic vegetables, army boots, interracial sex. Nowadays, you can find every item on this list in a typical Britney Spears video (with the possible exception of underarm hair and organic vegetables). Countercultural rebels have become like doomsday prophets, forced to constantly push back the date on which the world is posed to end, as one deadline after another passes by uneventfully. Each time a new symbol of rebellion gets "co-opted" by the systern, countercultural rebels are forced to go further and further^ prove their alternative credentials, to set themselves apart from despised masses. Punks started out with multiple ear piercirr When that became too common, they moved on to nose piercia then eyebrow, tongue and navel piercing. When high school gir started getting those, the rebels moved into "primitive" styles, to" Balinese ear blocks or ampallangs. One can see a self-radicalizing tendency at work here that is highly characteristic of countercultural movements. The fundamental problem is that rebellion against aesthetic and sartorial norms is not actually subversive. Whether people have piercings and tattoos, what kind of clothes they wear, what music they listen to, simply does not matter from the standpoint of the capitalist system. Corporations are fundamentally neutral when it comes to gray flannel suits and biker jackets. No matter what the style, there will always be merchants lined up to sell it. And any successful rebel style, becau. i it confers distinction, will automatically attract imitators. Because there is no genuine subversion involved, there is nothing to stop everyone from adopting the same style. Anyone can get a piercing < grow their hair long. So anything that is "alternative" or "cool" and has the least bit to recommend it will inevitably be "mainstreamed This creates a dilemma for the rebel. Sartorial markers that on< served as a source of distinction find their significance eroded. This leaves the rebel with two choices: accept the inevitable and be o1 L I taken by the masses, or resist further, by fmding some new, moi t-extreme style, one that has not yet attracted as many imitators anu thus can still serve as a source of distinction. What the rebel is looking for, in the end, is the unco-optable subculture. Like the gambler in the Leonard Cohen song, looking for the card so high and wild he'll never need to play another, the countercultural rebel is looking for a path that no one else will follow, a look so extreme that it will never be mainstream. "" I be problem is that by the time the imitators start to fall away, ^usually for a pretty good reason.

### Oliver 2nc

The Aff’s Reconciliation of History Impossible – Their Positioning of Each Historical Narrative as Innately Separate Gravitates Towards Hierarchical Structures that Presuppose Superiority Within the Dominant Ideology

Kelly Oliver 2001 Chair of Philosophy Department @ Stony Brook U Wtinessing: Beyond Recognition p.17

What Fanon realizes is that the logic of recognition that is part and parcel of colonialism and oppression makes those in power the active agents of recognition and those without power the passive recipients. This is why, rather than embrace a recognition model of identity and self-worth, or unproblematically endorse the struggle for recognition of oppressed people, Fanon suggests that active meaning making and self-creation are necessary to fight oppression and overcome the psychic damage of colonization. Fanon ends his section on Hegel by questioning Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s idea that “the self takes its place by opposing itself”. Contra Fichte, Fanon believes that “man is a yes” to life, love and generosity but also a no to scorn, degradation, exploitation and the butchery of freedom. He concludes that to be a yes, humans must be educated to be “actional” and not just “reactional”. In a sense, humans must learn not to oppose themselves. Fanon argues that one of the main reasons that Hegel’s dialectic cannot apply to real master-slave situations is that “the Black man was acted upon. Values that had not been created by his actions, values that had not been born of the systolic tide of his blood, danced in a hued whirl round him” (1967, 220). The oppressed must learn to be actional and create their own meaning.

Colonization makes the dominant group the creator of value sand meaning for the oppressed. Even if the enslaved are freed and given the rights of citizenship, insofar as they are not allowed to create their own values, they aremain oppressed. It is not recognition per se that is at stake in overcoming oppression: rather, for Fanon it is the power to create meaning and value for oneself. That is to say, it is precisely the ability to overcome the logic of recognition instilled by the colonial situation – a logic that demand that values are conferred fro the dominant culture without any active agency on the part of the oppressed themselves- that enables freedom and respect.

Turns the Case

Patchen Markell 2003 Assistant Prof of Poli Sci @ U of C Bound by Recognition p. 17

**While it may be tempting to conclude that the problematic ontological assumptions behind the politics of recognition simply render it impotent, this is too simple**. **the politics of recognition may both misunderstand and in a certain sense be congruent with the injustices it purports to combat. If the assumptions about sovereignty, action and identity that underwrite the ideal of recognition constitute a misrecognition of a deeper sort** – a failure to acknowledge certain fundamental conditions of human activity – **the irony is that many instances of injustice in relations of identity and difference can themselves be understood as expressions of a misrecognition of the same kind. This common blind spot** does not make the pursuit of recognition unjust per se, nor does it mean that he politics of recognition cannot sometimes produce concrete improvements in the conditions of life of the people it aims to benefit. But it **does render even the best-intentioned versions of the politics of recognition ill-equipped to diagnose and respond effectively to the underlying relations of subordination that give rise to systematic, identity based social and political instability. And it also make this politics especially prone to become complicit with injustice, either reinforcing the very problems it hopes to combat, or helping to create new relations of social and political subordination.**

### Kriticism of Recognition is a Prereq

Our Criticism is a Prerequisite

Patchen Markell 2003 Assistant Prof of Poli Sci @ U of C Bound by Recognition p. 179

Just as, for Young, the distributive approach presupposes that we know what the various goods are and how much of them there is to go around, the principle of giving what is due likewise presupposes that we have already determined who the relevant parties to a distribution are – that is, that we have recognized them, both in the sense of having picked them out, and in the sense of having ascertained enough about their identities to be able to judge what, in the way of respect or esteem, they are owed. But **the question of justice on the terrain of identity and difference can not be addressed in this way**, because it concerns the quality of the recognitive relations through which identity itself is brought into being and reproduced. **This means two things. First, every attempt to specify the set of agents to whom an issue of justice pertains will itself,**

**as an act of identification and recognition be potential site of injustice**; and as such will demand a kind of critical scrutiny that cannot appeal to a distributive principle. **And, second, even among agent show already have standing within a jurisdiction, every appeal to the identity as settled criterion of distribution will likewise be a potential site of** (nondistributive) **injustice, both because existing patterns of identity and difference may beat the traces of past wrongs, and even more fundamentally because those people for whom justice is a live issue are not done becoming who they are**; or, better, who they will turn out to have been

### 2nc – extremism external

#### Their drive to be different causes them to go to the extreme further entrenching competitive consumption rather than breaking it down – turns the aff

A – their idea of being separate from the market actually re-entrenches market values because they are still trying to be part of society just set apart

B – symbolic resistance does not disrupt the system but when rebellions do disrupt the movement is just being a nuisance

Heath and Potter, 04 – philosophy professor at the University of Toronto AND visiting fellow at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique at the Université de Montréal (Joseph and Andrew “Nation of rebels: why counterculture became consumer culture”)

Some people have jobs. But while they may not have the time or the money to share Rose's lifestyle, they can at least endorse her values, and embrace her aesthetic, by purchasing organic tea. Here's the rub: The values that Real Simple magazine promotes have superior prestige precisely because they are antimaterialist. Growing your own tea, rather than buying the cheap mass produced stuff, makes you seem like a better person, more in touch with the earth. Thus "dropping out" of the tea market in order to make your own does not really strike a blow against consumerism; it just creates a market for more expensive, "all-natural” organic tea for those who do not have the time to grow it themselves. In other words, it exacerbates competitive consumption rather than reduces it. This is why the hippies didn't need to sell out in order to become yuppies. It's not that the system "co-opted" their dissent, it's that they were never really dissenting. As Michelle Rose and other have proved, rejecting materialist values, and rejecting mass society, does not force you to reject consumer capitalism. If you really want to opt out of the system, you need to "do a Kaczynski" and go off and live in the woods somewhere (and not commute back and forth in a Range Rover). Because the everyday acts of symbolic resistance that characterize countercultural rebellion are not actually disruptive to "the system," anyone who follows the logic of countercultural thinking through to its natural conclusion will find herself drawn into increasingly extreme forms of rebellions. The point at which this rebellion becomes disruptive generally coincides with the point at which it becomes genuinely antisocial And then you're not so much being a rebel as you are simply being, a nuisance.

### 2nc – utopian fails

#### The aff’s totalizing viewpoint ignores cultures ability to adapt – this creates politically disastrous consequences

A – the movement says the system is “dominant” which is a reason anything that rejects it is acceptable

B – \*if their solvency claims are true that it spills over then it results in anti-social behavior that transgresses into politics

Heath and Potter, 04 – philosophy professor at the University of Toronto AND visiting fellow at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique at the Université de Montréal (Joseph and Andrew “Nation of rebels: why counterculture became consumer culture”)

One way in which people establish the requisite trust is by demonstrating their willingness to play by the rules in small symbolic ways. This is the core function of courtesy and good manners. Greeting someone politely, holding the door open, using the correct salad fork and adopting a benevolent demeanor all help to reassure others that there are no nasty surprises in store—that the interaction will unfold pretty much as it is supposed to. Thus, all the dumb little rules that we are supposed to follow, far from serving as ply a constraint on individuality, freedom and self-expression, actually turn out to serve a valuable function. Every little action serves as a cue, allowing others to infer what is likely to follow. It is precisely this trust mechanism that is exploited by the best in artists and psychopaths, who are invariably charming and polite. Strictly speaking, it is a false inference to conclude that people who play by the rules when it comes to the small stuff will also play by the rules when it comes to the big stuff. Con artists prove this, by doing the former and not the latter. Yet does this mean that we should all stop making that inference, that we should all stop trusting one another? If we did, it would make almost all social life impossible. Life without culture, in other words, would be a state of permanent culture shock. So what can we say about the demand for conformity to social norms? Is this the tyranny of the majority? Is this mass society, trying to dominate the individual and to punish any sign of uniqueness or creativity? Absolutely not. The countercultural rebels took the observation that all social norms are enforced, and concluded, on this basis, that all of culture is a system of domination. A continuum was posited between Adolf Hitler and Emily Post—both were regarded just as fascists, trying to impose their rules on people in order to deny them pleasure. Any rebellion against any sort of social norm was therefore positively valued. Yet the primary consequence of this analysis has been a shocking decline in civility, most of all in the United States (where people now routinely respond to "thank you" by grunting "uh-huh"). It's enough to make anyone think twice. The decline in manners, far from setting anyone free, seems to have simply played into the hands of those with antisocial attitudes (and political platforms). Anyone who has ever dabbled in subculture will have first-hand experience of the many subtle ways in which social norms are enforced. As a former punk rocker coming from a small town, I too co-opt dissent. Yet as time passed, the more obvious explanation became increasingly difficult to resist. People initially respond tounusual social conduct with expressions of disapproval. This' how human culture works. It's also a perfecdy understandab response. When someone who is visibly deranged gets onto subway, no one rushes to sit down next to him. This is not so rnu due to any specific fear, but simply because the other passengers' not know what to expect, and they don't need the hassle. Yet suH cultural rebellion is not random; it fits a very tightly scripted pa tern. This is what allows hippies or punks to "make a statement' with their appearance and not simply be dismissed as lunatics. In other words, it is the alternative norms of the subculture that identify it as a movement of dissent and not merely social deviance. Precisely because of that fact, people eventually get used to it. It becomes "normal" to have a few punks hanging out at the mall. As a result, the adverse reactions go away; people learn what to expect from them. This is how culture changes. It's not co-optation—it's a simple mechanism of adaptation. Here I think we can see the basic error in countercultural think­ing. Countercultural rebels take the fact that social norms are enforced and interpret this as a sign that social order as a whole is a system of repression. They then interpret the punitive response elicited by the violations of these norms as confirmation of the theory. The result, too often, is simply a glamorization of anti­social behavior—transgression for the sake of transgression. In everyday life this is usually harmless, but politically this mode of thinking can be disastrous. It leads countercultural activists to reject not just existing social institutions but any proposed alterna­tive as well, on the grounds that the alternative would also need to be institutionalized and thus coercively imposed. This is what underlies the countercultural dismissal of traditional leftist politics as "merely institutional."

### 2nc - rejection

#### The Free Love Movement Proves That Rejection Creates Voids in the System That Make Future Oppression Inevitable – This Demand to Reject the Entire Structure Also Makes Positive Change is Impossible

Heath and Potter, 04 – philosophy professor at the University of Toronto AND visiting fellow at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique at the Université de Montréal (Joseph and Andrew “Nation of rebels: why counterculture became consumer culture”)

The idea of a counterculture is ultimately based on a mistake. At best, countercultural rebellion is pseudo-rebellion: a set of dramatic gestures that are devoid of any progressive political economic consequences and that detract from the urgent task of building a more just society. In other words, it is rebellion that provides entertainment for the rebels, and nothing much else. At worst, countercultural rebellion actively promotes unhappiness, by undermining or discrediting social norms and institutions that actually serve a valuable function. In particular, the idea of counterculture has produced a level of contempt for democratic politics that has consigned most of the progressive left to the political wilderness for over three decades. In order to see where it all went wrong, one need look no further than the controversy that erupted over an enormously popular little dating manual called The Rules. Published in 1996 by Ellen Fein and Sherrie Schneider, the book was noted primarily for the retrograde character of much of the advice it offered. Women were instructed to play hard to get, to insist that the man pay for dinner, to avoid casual sex and to never, ever tell a man what to do. Feminists responded with outrage. "I fought in the trenches for years so that my daughter wouldn't have to grow up in the same repressive, sexist culture that I had to deal with," they said. 'And this is how she repays me? By voluntarily adopting the same backward rules that we fought so desperately to overcome?" Yet with all of the furor that accompanied this episode, the central lesson was missed. What the popularity of The Rules shows is that bad rules are better than no rules. Feminists were quite right to fight tooth and nail against the old rules that used to govern relations between the sexes. Those rules were based upon the assumption that the man would go on to become the breadwinner, tht woman a housewife. As a result, these rules actively contributed to the reproduction of that pattern. But instead of trying to replace these rules with better ones—ones that would have put men and women on an equal footing—too many early feminists bought into the myth of counterculture. They assumed that the very existence of rules was a symptom of the oppression of women. In order for men and women to be equal, therefore, they concluded that it would be necessary to abolish the rules, not reform them. "Free love" was proposed as a substitute for "going steady." Love was like a beautiful flower, they claimed, which should be left free to unfold in its own natural way, without the artificial constraints of social convention. Thus the sexual revolution had the effect of destroying all of the traditional social norms that had governed relations between the sexes, without replacing them with any new ones. What it left was a complete void. As a result, my generation, which came of age in the late '70s, was forced to invent for itself some way of dealing with all the tricky problems of adolescence. The result was not liberation, it was hell. The absence of settled rules meant that no one knew what to expect from anyone else. For a bunch of adolescents this was deeply anxiety-provoking. We never knew where we stood with one another, or what we were supposed to do next. Anything that resembled "dating" was deeply uncool and therefore out of the question. So you couldn't ask a girl out. You could try to bump into her at a party, maybe hang out, get wasted and then have sex "Going out" was something that began only afterward, and even then it was always accompanied by ironic scare quotes. Against this background, it is hardly surprising that so many young women reached out for The Rules. Many feminists had already noticed, early on, that "free love" had opened the door to the sexual exploitation of women in our society on a massive scale, if the initial feminist assumption had been that because men were the oppressors, all of the rules governing relations between the sexes had to have been rigged to the man's advantage. The fact that many of these rules were obviously for the defense of women, designed to protect them from men, somehow escaped notice. Camille Paglia caused a furor in the '80s when she pointed out that many of these fussy old social conventions actually had the rather important function of reducing the risk of rape. Similarly, the old ' shotgun wedding" rule forced men to take some responsibility for the children they fathered. The erosion of this norm has been one of the main factors contributing to the widespread feminiza-non of poverty in the Western world. In fact, if you were to ask a group of men to think up their ideal set of dating rules, they would probably choose something very much like the "free love" arrangement that emerged out of the sexual revolution. You only have to tour a gay bathhouse to see how men choose to organize their sex lives when they don't have to cater to feminine sensibilities. Yet these possibilities were all ignored, primarily due to the power of the countercultural analysis: women are an oppressed group, it was argued, and social norms are the mechanism of oppression. Therefore the solution is to abolish all the rules. Freedom for women thus becomes equated with freedom from social norms. In the end, this was a disastrous equation. Not only did it set up a completely unobtainable state as the ideal of liberation, but it created a tendency to dismiss as "co-optation" or "selling out" any acceptance of reforms that might actually lead to tangible improvements in women's lives. How could we have gone so far astray?