# 1nc

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#### Interpretation – topical affs can only increase financial aid toward the topic countries – NOT the U.S. or other countries

Haass, 2K – Brookings Foreign Policy Studies director

[Richard, and Meghan O'Sullivan, "Introduction" in Honey and Vinegar, ed. by Haass and O'Sullivan, google books]

Architects of engagement strategies have a **wide variety** of incentives from which to choose. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans, and economic aid." Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the institutions that govem it rank among the most potent incentives in today's global market."

#### And the word “Toward” means it is to be in the direction of the topic countries

Michigan Supreme Court 14 [Michigan Reports: Cases Decided in the Supreme Court of Michigan, Volume 180, Google Books]

Under 3 Comp. Laws, § 11510 (5 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 14559), providing that “any person who shall discharge without injury to any other person, any firearm, while intentionally, without malice, aimed at or toward any person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,” etc., acts carelessly done, without design to do mischief, are punishable.¶ 2. Same—“Toward”—Construction of Statute.¶ It is sufficient, in a prosecution for violating the statute, to show that the accused was making use of a rifle pointed in the direction of a passenger on a car and discharged the weapon in that direction, without striking any one. The word “toward” means in a course or line leading in the direction of.

#### Increase means to make greater – excludes extending duration

**Martinez 06** – Justice for the Supreme Court of Colorado (SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO, 129 P.3d 988; 2006 Colo. LEXIS 395, Plaintiff-Appellee: DOUGLAS BRUCE, v. Defendants-Appellants: CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS and KATHRYN YOUNG, City Clerk, in her official capacity as election officer for the city, 2/27, lexis)

Turning, then, to the language of section (3), itself, we assess the plain meaning of "tax increase" as it appears in that section. [\*995] In examining "tax increase" as it appears in Amendment 1, we look to the intent of the voter as it is an initiated constitutional provision. See In re Interrogatories Relating to the Great Outdoors Colo. Trust Fund, 913 P.2d 533, 538 (Colo. 1996) ("[A] court's duty in interpreting a constitutional amendment is to give effect to the will of the people in adopting such amendment."). We also consider how the typical voter would interpret "tax increase," because our concern here is how the form of the election notice affects a voter's understanding of a proposed measure. Accordingly, we consider whether the practical, everyday meaning of "increase" is synonymous with "extension." A tax "extension" suggests the continuation of a tax, whereas a tax "increase" suggests a greater amount will be taxed. Accordingly, a proposal to "extend" a tax implies that neither the amount nor rate of the tax will change from its current rate. Likewise, a tax "increase" indicates that the [\*\*22] tax burden borne by an individual taxpayer will be greater than its present amount. The former indicates a continuation of the status quo, whereas the latter suggests a change that will impose a greater cost on the taxpayer.

#### “Economic” engagement is narrowly limited to trade --- engagement over human rights, democracy, prolif, or drugs isn’t topical

Rose 8 – Andrew K. Rose, Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, and Mark M. Spiegel, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, “Non-Economic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties”, http://halleinstitute.emory.edu/pdfs/PIEF\_Rose\_Spiegel.pdf

1. Introduction

Countries, like people, interact with each other on a number of different dimensions. Some interactions are strictly economic; for instance, countries engage in international trade of goods, services, capital, and labor. But many are not economic, at least not in any narrow sense. For instance, the United States seeks to promote human rights and democracy, deter nuclear proliferation, stop the spread of narcotics, and so forth. Accordingly America, like other countries, participates in a number of international institutions to further its foreign policy objectives; it has joined security alliances like NATO, and international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. In this paper, we concentrate on the interesting and understudied case of international environmental arrangements (IEAs). We ask whether participation in such non-economic partnerships tends to enhance international economic relations. The answer, in both theory and practice, is positive.

**Violation – the Plan just extends the duration of EXISTING engagement that is not economic, it doesn’t INCREASE or CREATE NEW engagement and increase engagement toward Canada**

**That’s a voting issue**

**They destroy limits – they open the floodgates to every engagement policy that’s in the status quo and stop the government from cancelling it AND of the broad nature of in depth debates**

#### Not being economic engagement also kills neg ground because none of our disads apply

**And it destroys neg ground because we can’t get any DAs because they can say the status quo proves they’re all empirically denied**

#### They destroy limits by allowing affs to increase investment in the US or have the US work with the topic countries to invest in another country

#### At best, they’re extra-topical – that’s a voting issue because there’s an unlimited number of extra-topical things that the aff could do that the neg could never predict

## 1nc

#### The affirmatives understanding of sex as either male or female creates political exclusions of the transgender body – resisting this dichotomy is essential to usurp the normative conditions that make all violence possible

Bremer, 13 – PhD in Cultural Sciences @ Gothenburg University (Dr. Signe, “Penis as Risk: A Queer Phenomenology of Two Swedish Transgender Women’s Narratives on Gender Correction Somatechnics” 3.2 (2013): 329–350)

The Legal Advisory Council, at the Swedish NBHW has been consistent in requiring vaginoplasty as an unconditional prerequisite for transgender women’s gender correction. With regard to Vera’s and Tove’s situations, the general practice of Swedish gender-confirming healthcare, at that time, gave the impression that transgender women simply had to go through the procedure.¶ Thus, as I have shown in this article, vaginoplasty has in reality never been a mandatory procedure in theory - neither according to Swedish transgender legislation, nor to international diagnostic criteria. Yet, years of repetition have produced sexual passivity, penis aversion and vaginoplasty as the natural and thus only acceptable path to transgender women’s legal gender recognition in practice. By refusing to accept the meanings which the Swedish society in general, and gender-confirming healthcare in particular, have assigned their bodies, Vera and Tove negotiate with, and resist, the anti-transgender, implicitly racist, colonialist, and bourgeois conditions through which transgender women become recognized as respectable and thus intelligible candidates for legal gender correction. As Vera’s and Tove’s narratives show, attempts to bend the rules of penis aversion have material consequences for transgender women’s future life trajectories. Their situations actualize the limits of bodily self- determination – the somatechnic events when public authorities’ political investments in bodies outweigh the individual citizen. As the abject belly of a pregnant man a legal woman with penis are coupled with ideas of chaos. One common argument in Swedish political documents concerning continued forced castration of transgender people remains that a ‘real’ woman is someone who may or should become the mother of a child. Similar to the pregnant man, a legal woman with a penis would risk creating disarray in the linear kinship between gendered subjects. In light of this argumentation obviating the possibility for women to give life through ejection of semen and for men to become pregnant is the means through which the Swedish state has been able to prevent linear kinship from shattering (Alm 2006: 193; Bremer 2011a).¶ What relevance does an analysis of heretofore legal and cultural conditions have for the situations which transgender women now face in current Swedish gender confirming health-care? My study offers historically important insights in a cultural context situated in a time and space when Sweden’s transgender population was obligated to leave their reproductive capabilities and healthy organs behind as they struggled for legal gender recognition. We must not forget that this is still the reality for transgender people in numerous nations globally. Legally speaking, there should no longer be any hindrance for transgender women to be granted legal status as women without submitting to genital surgery in Sweden. Yet, the shift in legal conditions does not necessarily mean that penis acceptance can no longer be considered a risk for transgender women who undergo gender assessment. These changes do not make the Freudian genealogy of the cultural penis unstick from the penis of flesh. Thus it is reasonable to assume that fetishistic transvestism will remain as the constitutive outside to what is generally assumed by mental professionals working within gender confirming health care as ‘real’ transsexualism. Gender confirming health-care does not only care for the patients who turns to its business – it works to protect the Swedish society from bodies that is historically associated with ideas of disruptive and abject sexual perversions.¶ As a final point, the anti-transgender structures lying behind these processes are not isolated to the members of the Legal Advisory Board or the health care professionals working with gender assessments. These are the same anti-transgender principles of linear gender which lies behind how transgender people globally are always at risk for being subjected to marginalization and gender based violence – be it in the home, the neighborhood, gender segregated public toilets and dressing rooms, swimming pools, gyms, public transport, and park areas. In order for this to change, more profound and radical strategies than those available in a human rights discourse will be needed (Spade 2011).

#### Rejection of the 1ac discourse is key to change the way that policy discourse is shaped – this is key to recognize the way that sex is constructed and operationalized in public discourses

Topp, 10 - PhD @ KU, Director of Debate @ Trinity (Dr. Sarah, “Rhetorical Interactions Of Social Movement Organizations In A Movement: A Study Of The Intersex Rights Advocacy Movement” Submitted to the graduate degree program in Communication Studies and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas )

There is remarkable variety in human physiology. Indeed, the amount of human ¶ variation is truly extraordinary. From size and features to abilities, interests, and ¶ intelligences, there are innumerable differences from one individual to the next. Despite ¶ all of this variation, we tend to assume with relative certainty that human beings develop ¶ “one of two common sets of a particular group of organs” (Dreger, 1998, p. 3). That is, ¶ despite our advanced understanding of genetic anomalies and our attempts to celebrate ¶ difference, we rely on a very basic, but problematic, assumption that all individuals are ¶ either male or female as a consequence of having the corresponding sexual anatomy. It is ¶ true that for a large majority of the world’s population this assumption is relatively safe. ¶ However, for a small percentage of the population, this assumption is not only untrue ¶ because their sexual anatomy is atypical, but also dangerous because they are forced to ¶ face extreme stigma and painful and unnecessary corrective procedures to make them ¶ more “normal.” ¶ Take, for example, Cheryl Chase. When she was eighteen months old, doctors ¶ announced that Cheryl Chase was indeed a girl. Born with “both ovarian and testicular ¶ tissue, a phallus midway between an average penis and an average clitoris, and a vaginal ¶ opening behind her urethra” (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 42), Chase was labeled a “true ¶ hermaphrodite” at birth. Her physiology was considered to be somewhere between ¶ wholly male and wholly female. She underwent many invasive tests and procedures ¶ before doctors made their gender proclamation. Once decided, doctors quickly worked to “correct” her condition. They removed her clitoris, arguing it was too large and therefore ¶ looked too much like a penis, surgically “normalized” her internal reproductive organs, ¶ and prescribed a series of feminizing hormones to be taken as she grew older. As she ¶ matured, she felt neither normal nor feminine. Instead she felt isolated and different. ¶ Her story is similar to Alex A’s. Alex was given a female gender assignment at ¶ birth. Identifying the condition as “labial-scrotum fusion” (Kessler, 1998, p. 1), ¶ physicians decided Alex’s genitalia appeared more female than male. Before age two, ¶ however, Alex’s mother noticed that Alex’s phallus was beginning to enlarge. At ¶ puberty, Alex’s voice deepened and he began to irregularly menstruate from his phallus. ¶ Hoping to correct the condition and make him fully male, an endocrinologist suggested ¶ Alex should undergo genital surgery and begin a daily testosterone regimen. Alex ¶ declined the treatment indicating that his conservative mother disapproved and was thus ¶ “encouraging him to grow breasts” (Kessler, p. 1). By age twenty-four, his breasts did ¶ begin to develop. At that point, another endocrinologist suggested he take estrogen and ¶ undergo a reduction of the clitoris to make him fully a woman. Again, he turned down ¶ the treatment. He was confused by the lack of transparency and contradictory ¶ information from doctors. He felt like a male, but was labeled female and had no idea ¶ what his diagnosis actually was. ¶ Unfortunately, his story, as well as Chase’s, is just one of literally thousands that share similar themes of isolation, stigma, and despair as a result of being diagnosed with ¶ variations of sexual development that are generally called intersexuality (Koyama, 2003). ¶ As more people like them have shared their stories, there has been a growth in advocacy¶ on their behalf. A dedicated core of a few brave individuals has begun championing the ¶ cause of improving the lives of intersex individuals. Devoted to ending the shame, ¶ secrecy, and dangerous medical treatment of intersex individuals, advocates have faced ¶ severe opposition to their message because it forces many people to reexamine a core ¶ idea of human sex identity: that humans are either male or female. Dedicated to ¶ procuring equal treatment and a dignified lifestyle for intersex individuals, intersex ¶ advocates engage in trenchant critiques of not only the medical establishment but also ¶ one another in hopes of proving their position correct. Since their founding, the ¶ organizations fighting for intersex rights have engaged in strident and divisive debates ¶ with one another. As a result, the discourses surrounding intersex advocacy offer a rich ¶ site for exploring the public ideological struggle between several competing perspectives. ¶ In this dissertation, I uncover and investigate many of the underlying tensions and ¶ debates that have arisen among the major advocacy organizations in the fight for intersex ¶ rights. Despite a general rise in public awareness and the scholarly study of intersex ¶ issues, there has been a dearth of rhetorical scholarship that seeks to chronicle and ¶ discuss the dialectics at play in discussions over intersex rights. In this study, I begin to ¶ fill that gap. While rhetorical scholars are not prepared or equipped to discuss the ¶ biological manifestations or the appropriate treatment of intersex, rhetoricians do have ¶ valuable insight to add to the public debate surrounding intersex advocacy. Because one ¶ “will recognize immediately how issues of language, definition, and culture are central” ¶ (Breu and Gardner, 2009, p. 104) to fulfilling the goals of intersex advocacy, one can¶ easily anticipate the ways in which scholars of rhetoric and persuasion might help clarify ¶ and illuminate the debates. The advocacy groups rely on various forms of public sphere ¶ communication to prove their position correct. In the debates over intersex, advocates ¶ engage in a “struggle over meaning,” which provides us with an excellent site to examine ¶ how “rhetors . . . respond to one another in their attempts to understand the world and ¶ persuade others to action” (Stevens, 2006, p. 289). As rhetorical scholars, we are trained ¶ to do just this—to evaluate the relative merits of different arguments and assess the ¶ efficacy of differing forms of communication. In addition to having expertise from ¶ training, we also have an obligation to take a critical stance toward public argument. ¶ Young (1990) argues, that absent such a stance, “many questions about what occurs in ¶ society and why, who benefits and who is harmed, will not be asked, and social theory is ¶ liable to reaffirm and reify the given social reality” (p. 5). However, before analyzing the ¶ key debates among intersex advocates, I first offer some background on intersexuality, ¶ including a summary of the main intersex diagnoses. Second, I review the current state ¶ of literature surrounding intersex advocacy and justify the need for further exploration. ¶ Third, I argue for the expansion of social movement criticism to include a study of social ¶ movement organizations (SMOs). Such an expansion will lay the foundation for a ¶ rhetorical criticism of the key issues being discussed by SMOs within the intersex ¶ advocacy movement. In the chapters that follow I analyze each of the key issues in ¶ depth.

## Contention 2

### 2ac – at: Giroux

\*\* Green = Short Version

#### Squo solves public discourse and giroux’s method recreates intellectual hierarchies

Benjamin Franks 7, Lecturer in Social and Political Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, “Who Are You to tell me to Question Authority?”, Variant issue 29, <http://www.variant.org.uk/29texts/Franks29.html>

Potentially stronger criticisms of Giroux’s text lie precisely in his underlying hypothesis concerning the totalising power of neo-conservatism. Giroux shares with the members of the Frankfurt School, who he approvingly cites, a pessimistic and almost wholly determined account of future social developments, in which the prognosis for alternatives to dominant powers looks bleak. Giroux, like Adorno and Marcuse, fears that we are approaching a one-dimensional future composed of intellectually stunted individuals, who are manipulated by the cultural industries, endorse militarised social hierarchies and engage in relationships conceived of only in terms of market-values. This grim dystopia is subject to continual monitoring by an evermore technologically-equipped police and legitimised by an increasingly subservient, partisan and trivial media. However, whilst Giroux’s account of growing authoritarianism is convincingly expressed, it is potentially disempowering, as it would suggest little space for opposition. It is not simply wishful thinking to suggest that the existing power structures are neither as complete nor as impervious as Giroux’s account would suggest. Whilst the old media of radio, film and television are increasingly dominated by a few giant corporations (p.46), new technologies have opened access to dissident voices and created new forms of communication and organisation. Whilst the military are extending their reach into greater areas of social and political life, and intervening in greater force throughout the globe, resistance to military discipline is also arising, with fewer willing to join the army in both the US and UK.7 Bush’s long term military objectives look increasingly unfeasible as Peter Schoomaker, the former US Chief of Staff, told Congress on December 15, 2006 that even the existing deployment policy is looking increasingly ‘untenable’.8 The ‘overstretch’ of military resources is matched by an economy incapable of fulfilling its primary neo-conservative goals of low taxation, sound national finances and extensive military interventions. Whilst this is not to suggest that the US is on the point of financial implosion, the transition to a fully proto-fascist state is unlikely to be seamless or certain. Giroux’s preferred form of resistance is radical education. The photographs from Abu Ghraib were iconic not just in their encapsulation of proto-fascism, but in their public pedagogic role. Their prominence highlighted the many different sites of interpretation, as Giroux rightly stresses, there is no single way to interpret a photograph, however potent the depiction. The ability to interpret an image requires an ongoing process by a critical citizenry capable of identifying the methods by which a picture’s meanings are constructed (p. 135). Giroux’s critical pedagogy overtly borrows from Adorno’s essay ‘Education After Auschwitz’, and proposes “modes of education that produce critical, engaging and free minds” (p. 141). But herein lies one of the flaws with the text: Giroux never spells out what sorts of existing institutions and social practices are practical models of this critical pedagogy. Thus, he does not indicate what methods he finds appropriate in resisting the proto-fascist onslaught nor how merely interpreting images critically would fundamentally contest hierarchical power-relationships. Questions arise as to the adequacy of his response to the totalising threat he identifies in the main section of the book. Clearly existing academic institutions in the US are barely adequate given the campaigns against dissident academics led by David Horowitz (p.143). Giroux recounts in the final chapter, an interview conducted by Sina Rahmani, his own flight from the prestigious Penn State University to McMaster University in Canada because of managerial harassment following his public criticisms of Penn’s involvement in military research (p. 186). But whilst Giroux recognises that education is far wider than what takes place in institutions of learning there is no account of what practical forms these take. Nor does Giroux give an account of why a critical pedagogy would take priority over informed aesthetic or ethical practices. Such a concentration on education would appear to prioritise those who already have (by virtue of luck or social circumstance) an already existing expertise in critical thinking, risking an oppressive power-relationship in which the expert drills the student into rigorous assessment. This lapse into the role of the strident instructor demanding the correct form of radical response, occasionally appears in Giroux’s text: “within the boundaries of critical education, students have to learn the skills and knowledge to narrate their own stories [and] resist the fragmentation and seductions of market ideologies” (p. 155). Woe betide the student who prefers to narrate the story of the person sitting next to them, or fails to measure up to the ‘educators’ standard of critical evaluation.

#### Giroux’s account of the world is wrong

**Franks, Glasgow political philosophy lecturer, 2007**

(Benjamin, “Who Are You to tell me to Question Authority?”, Variant issue 29, <http://www.variant.org.uk/29texts/Franks29.html>)

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### AT Disposability

#### Their thesis of disposability is wrong- Survival guarantees value to life – it is only devalued when we assume Biopower can devalue it

**Fassin 10, Social Science Prof at Princeton (Didier, Fall, “Ethics of Survival: A Democratic Approach to the Politics of Life” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, Vol 1 No 1, Project Muse)**

“Long before the experience of survival that I am presently facing, I wrote that survival is an original concept which constitutes the very structure of what we call existence. We are, structurally speaking, survivors, marked by this structure of the trace, of the testament. That said, I would not endorse the view according to which survival is more on the side of death and the past than of life and the future. No, deconstruction is always on the side of the affirmation of life.”3 A few weeks before his death, Jacques Derrida gave his last interview in which he developed at length his conception of life as survival. Suffering from a terminal disease, he confided: “Since certain health problems are becoming more pressing, the question of survival and reprieve, which has always haunted me, literally, every moment of my life, in a concrete and tireless way, takes on a different color today.” In reference to a sentence he had used in one of his books (“I would finally like to know how to live”) he [End Page 81] commented with a penetrating irony: “No, I never learned to live. Definitely not! Learning to live should mean learning to die. I never learned to accept death. I remain impervious to being educated in the wisdom of knowing how to die.” However, beyond the emergency of this “shrinking time of reprieve” (which he rejected with humor, saying, “we are not here for a health bulletin”), it is the more general problem of survival on which the philosopher wanted to meditate: “I have always been interested in the question of survival, the meaning of which does not add to life and death. It is originary: life is survival.” In fact, both dimensions were for him intimately related, the personal experience repeating the existential experience, the circumstantial ordeal making the structural reality more evident and more painful. How else to understand that on the verge of death, thinking about survival could become so insistent in this interview, until the final profession of faith? “Everything I say about survival as a complication of the opposition between life and death proceeds from an unconditional affirmation of life. Survival is life beyond life, life more than life, and the discourse I undertake is not about death. On the contrary, it is the affirmation of a living being who prefers life and therefore survival to death, because survival is not simply what remains; it is the most intense life possible.” I want to show that Derrida’s conception of life as survival, in its polysemy and even its ambiguity, may offer an alternative to conceptions of life which, from Benjamin to Agamben, and in a quite different perspective, from Lamarck to Canguilhem, have presented a seductive dualistic framework for the humanities and social sciences. Both visions are inherited from Aristotle. On the one hand, life is presented as biopolitical fact: “Behind the long strife-ridden process that leads to the recognition of rights and formal liberties stands the body of the sacred man with his double sovereign, his life that cannot be sacrificed yet may be killed,” affirms Giorgio Agamben in Homo Sacer, where he develops his theory of “bare life.”4 From the “politicization of life” in totalitarian systems to the “isolation of the sacred life” in contemporary democracies, he therefore establishes a continuum of the power over life. On the other hand, life is conceived as a biological phenomenon: “any datum of experience possible to trace as a history comprised between its birth and its death is living, is the object of biological knowledge,” writes Georges Canguilhem for the entry “Life” in the Encyclopedia Universalis.5 He presents life successively as “animation,” “mechanism,” “organization,” and “information,” in a chronological review of biological theories extending from ancient conceptions to contemporary genetics—and everyone knows that the genome is often said to be the “code of life.” In other words, these two readings present life as what can be put to death (for Agamben), and as what is comprised from birth to death (for Canguilhem). The social sciences have largely drawn from these two repertoires: the former has been used to comprehend the government of populations and human beings; the latter has nourished the sociology and anthropology of sciences and techniques. However different they may be, these two models rest on the same premises. Both treat life as a physical phenomenon, whether it is “bare life” or “biological life” (both philosophers insisting that it is the dimension shared with the entire animal kingdom). And both assume that life can be separated, for scientific or political reasons, from life as an existential phenomenon, whether it is called “qualified life” or “lived experience” (by Agamben [End Page 82] and Canguilhem respectively).6 It seems to me that Derrida’s reflection shatters this distinction: “survival” mixes inextricably physical life, threatened by his cancer, and existential experience, expressed in his work. To survive is to be still fully alive and to live beyond death. It is the “unconditional affirmation” of life and the pleasure of living, and it is the hope of “surviving” through the traces left for the living. There is, I believe, in this revelation much more than the last testimony of a philosopher who did not accustom us to such clarity and simplicity. I see it as an ethical gesture through which life is rehabilitated in its most obvious and most ordinary dimension—life which has death for horizon but which is not separated from life as a social form, inscribed in a history, a culture, an experience. I consider the consequences of this gesture to be decisive for the humanities and social sciences: or so I want to argue here. Too often, in recent years, anthropologists and sociologists have tended, under the influence of the philosophical conceptions of life presented above, to take for granted the distinction between the forms of life they affirm—qualified life versus bare life or physical existence versus existential experience. Indeed this reductionism, when it is employed in the study of biological sciences, is fully justified, although its definition of life often seems hegemonic, or at least forgetful of other possibilities: some even speak of “life itself.” Conversely, when it is applied to the study of human government, it generally has the effect of disqualifying as inferior the lives of individuals or groups that society appears to reduce to their condition of “bare life”: refugees, excluded, marginalized, sick. Having been myself receptive to this dualism, and still sympathetic to the philosophers who proposed it, but also having observed among many colleagues and students the attraction exerted by this paradigm of bare life, I am sensitive not only to the intellectual risk but also to the ethical danger represented by its indiscriminate use in the humanities and social sciences. This is why I will concentrate my critical analysis on the biopolitical rather than biological reading of life

### 1nc – no impact

Environmental collapse doesn’t cause extinction – tech solves

**Science Daily 10**

Science Daily, reprinted from materials provided by American Institute of Biological Sciences, September 1, 2010, "Human Well-Being Is Improving Even as Ecosystem Services Decline: Why?", http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/09/100901072908.htm

Global degradation of ecosystems is widely believed to threaten human welfare, yet accepted measures of well-being show that it is on average improving globally, both in poor countries and rich ones. A team of authors writing in the September issue of BioScience dissects explanations for this "environmentalist's paradox." Noting that understanding the paradox is "critical to guiding future management of ecosystem services," Ciara Raudsepp-Hearne and her colleagues confirm that improvements in aggregate well-being are real, despite convincing evidence of ecosystem decline. Three likely reasons they identify -- past increases in food production, technological innovations that decouple people from ecosystems, and time lags before well-being is affected -- provide few grounds for complacency, however. Raudsepp-Hearne and her coauthors accept the findings of the influential Millennium Ecosystem Assessment that the capacity of ecosystems to produce many services for humans is now low. Yet they uncover no fault with the composite Human Development Index, a widely used metric that incorporates measures of literacy, life expectancy, and income, and has improved markedly since the mid-1970s. Although some measures of personal security buck the upward trend, the overall improvement in well-being seems robust. The researchers resolve the paradox partly by pointing to evidence that food production (which has increased globally over past decades) is more important for human well-being than are other ecosystem services. They also establish support for two other explanations: that technology and innovation have decoupled human well-being from ecosystem degradation, and that there is a time lag after ecosystem service degradation before human well-being will be affected.

### 1nc – china

**The democratic engagement created by the aff ushers in a wave of “sustainable development” that forces the government to factor in the costs of economic development – we’ll end up privileging social and environmental concerns over economic concerns – causing us to implement green protectionism to protect domestic industries and force other countries to comply with our standards**

#### RSPB 04 (10-27-4, Oral evidence taken before the Environmental Audit Committee of the House of Commons, “The Sustainable Development Strategy: Illusion or Reality?,” Thirteenth Report of Session 2003–04, Volume II, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmenvaud/624/624ii.pdf)

Executive Summary and Introduction The UK Sustainable Development Strategy, “a better quality of life”, as well as its annual assessments, have acted as a driver for and kept sustainable development firmly on the table within government, and for the wider policy community. Against specific indicators, the Strategy and its assessments have usefully shown where progress is being made and where it is lagging. We believe that the current review of the Strategy oVers a very important opportunity to ensure sustainable development is at the heart of Government, the devolved administrations, other public sector bodies, and importantly to share the responsibility for delivering this with all stakeholders without shirking their own crucial role. Ensuring global well-being and long-term security (including environmental security) for present and future generations will necessitate cultural, behavioural and value changes that require political leadership and courage. To this end, the RSPB welcomes the opportunity to contribute to this inquiry. We believe that: — The review process should ensure a Strategy Framework for the UK that has coherence, consistency and connectedness and that provides guidance on collectively acknowledged top-level priorities for the UK as a whole. Further to this, it must ensure an action plan for the UK Government addressing sustainability in all non-devolved duties and process. At the same time, it must allow suYcient flexibility to be interpreted and enacted in the light of regional and local diVerences, without sacrificing core principles and objectives. — All government departments, devolved administrations, agencies and regional bodies must embed and mainstream sustainability in all their processes and actions—this should become an explicit duty. — Any definition for sustainable development must reconcile the pursuit of economic growth with the non-negotiable imperative of learning to live within the Earth’s biophysical constraints and carrying capacity. Economic progress should be seen as a means to human and environmental well-being, globally and long term, and not as an end itself. This should be further reflected by key objectives giving equal provision to economic, social and environmental progress, as well as the prudent use of natural resources. — A revised strategy must provide clear guidance on how key objectives should be prioritised, and how inevitable trade-offs should be made when two or more are in conflict. It must show how to make sustainable choices between the short- and long-term costs and benefits, between costs and benefits that are in the interest of society as a whole and those of particular groups, and between those which are not properly reflected in prices. If the strategy does not provide such guidance, it will be provided nowhere else, and decision-makers will inevitably default to prioritising the economic objective. — The Strategy must also make a commitment to create and amend economic, social and environmental policy itself to enable sustainable development.We need a policy framework that: (i) changes prices by internalising external costs. This could be achieved in various ways including higher regulation and standards, rational use of the planning system, liability for damage costs, environmental tax reform, and setting clear, safe targets based on ecological need and assessment; (ii) includes a massive commitment to changing values and behaviour through public education, awareness raising and political leadership. This could include significant spending on a concerted awareness raising campaign; effective and regular use of Ministerial speeches; integrating sustainable development into the heart of the education process, and leading by example through government procurement; (iii) is inclusive of all relevant cross-cutting issues, costs and benefits etc, including environmental and health; and (iv) is explicit in assigning responsibility and duties to all relevant decision-makers, actors and systems—including Government departments and agencies, the economic regulators, and the planning system—and has a follow-up process to ensure action and delivery. We fully recognise the political constraints and challenges inherent to creating a new social and economic paradigm,we applaud government for the progress and commitment it is showing inmany areas.We believe that sustainable development is key to well-being and security and to a safe, healthy, just and equitableworld for present and future generations—richer or as rich in biodiversity.We are keen to work with Government and the devolved administration to ensure this. 2. (Q. A) The Definition of “Sustainable Development” 2.1 A clear, comprehensive and practical definition is crucial for achieving a shared understanding and commitment to delivery of sustainable development. Sustainable development is an inherently complex and challenging concept that tests the way we think, plan, work and live our lives.Arriving at a concise definition that satisfies everyone and captures in comprehensible and usable form principles that are often quite abstract will not be easy, but concrete examples could be usefully used to illustrate it. Does the definition of “sustainable development matter”? 2.2 The Brundtland definition, although broad and conceptual, has international acceptance and embodies the key tenets of sustainable development policy—most notably taking a long-term, future generation perspective. Suggesting that the Brundtland definition puts undue emphasis on environmental concerns questions one of the fundamental premises of sustainable development, the need to work within the ecological carrying capacity of the planet on which we all ultimately depend. 2.3 Based on this premise, a definition that favours the economic or the social over and above the environmental would undermine the concept of sustainable development itself; a concept that relies on a balanced and precautionary approach to development and progress. World poverty and environmental threats have been recognised through successive international conferences, including theWorld Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), as the most significant challenges confronting us globally. In response to this, economic growth has been highlighted as essential for solving social and economic problems in poor countries. It must, however, be recognised internationally as only a tool to achieve sustainable development; it should not be seen as an end in itself. There are limits to the natural resources of our planet and to its ability to absorb pollution and environmental damage caused by unfettered growth—ignoring this will cost us all dearly. 2.4 Linked to the above, one concept that is not included within the Government’s current set of principles for sustainable development is that of “equity”, both within and between countries and within and between generations. This is a significant and serious omission; the concept of equity needs to be central to any definition. 2.5 Any definition of sustainable development should not be so narrow or prescriptive that diVerent bodies cannot respond appropriately to their own situation, or so broad and generic that it is impractical. The challenge of defining (and enacting) sustainable development is both political and methodological, ie how can it be done in a way that is acceptable to very diVerent types of stakeholder and points of view, as well as in a way that is comprehensible, consistent and practical. 2.6 It is important to make sustainable development relevant to all and to ensure everyone understands the part they play. To support this, a broader conceptual definition, such as Brundtland’s, may be interpreted or “operationalised” through diVerent lenses (eg sectoral, social, economic) to make it relevant to diVerent “audiences” more specifically. Nonetheless, there is still the need to ensure “buy-in” to an overarching vision. Is meeting the four key objectives at the same time realistic? 2.7 The Government characterises sustainable development as meeting four main objectives at the same time: — Social progress which recognises the needs of everyone. — EVective protection of the environment. — Prudent use of natural resources. — Maintenance of high and stable levels of economic growth and employment. Whilst recognising that: “no one of these objectives is more important than the another” it acknowledges, “that there can be tensions between achieving them, although in the long term success in one is dependent on the other”. Sustainable development is inherently about balanced and prudent decision-making for today whilst recognising future needs. It is not about prioritising one over the other, and we would stress the need to work safely within ecological limits as the ultimate bottom line. 2.8 Addressing this and making the right trade offs (see below) is particularly challenging when the prevailing national and global paradigm is skewed towards achieving high levels of economic growth and ensuring competitiveness, as demonstrated by the emphasis placed on trade liberalisation per se, rather than on developing a trade system that facilitates the necessary exchange of goods and services in ways that do not harm the environment and benefit society. Is political support for the concept based on its ambiguity? 2.9 Even if political support for sustainable development has partly been based on its “ambiguity”, it has nevertheless served to ensure that sustainable development has been embedded as a broad concept and term. However, we have reached a point where the concept needs to be focused and acted upon. The threats of climate change, increased deforestation, biodiversity loss and social inequity are becoming increasingly real. Sustainability rhetoric needs to become concerted action—“Sustainable development is the only security policy for the future” (Klaus Topfer, UNEP 2004). Making and managing trade-offs 2.10 A central political challenge is that trade-offs must be made among competing objectives, each championed by sets of stakeholderswith different levels of economic and political influence, and by decisionmakers with differing political preferences and allegiances. Little guidance is given in the present strategy on how objectives should be prioritised, or how inevitable trade-oVs should be made when two or more are in conflict. In particular the strategy does little to explain how to make choices between the short- and longterm costs and benefits, between costs and benefits that are in the interest of society as a whole and those of particular groups, and between those which are not properly reflected in prices. Whatever guidance the strategy is able to give, it will be even more important actually to amend and create policy that enables decision-makers to make trade-oVs, and the strategy should signal a clear commitment to do this. The principal way of enabling the integration of multiple public objectives into decision making will be to reflect external costs and benefits in prices—either through regulation and standards, environmental tax reform, or the establishment of ecological limits that can be flexibly met by a variety of market mechanisms. 2.11 The challenges of both today and tomorrow, including reversing negative trends, will involve hard political decisions and choices among different stakeholder perspectives. It will need balanced and transparent decision-making—taking into account local, global and long-term concerns, based on sound science and robust analysis. To this end, the existing Strategy’s 10 principles (plus equity) for sustainable development should be more coherently and vigorously applied. This would moderate the prevailing tendency to privilege economic over social and especially environmental goals whenever a conflict occurs. 2.12 Finally, it should be stressed that the aim is not to diminish the importance of economic development, but to stress the need always to test policy decisions made primarily on economic grounds against the social and environmental consequences they will have.Wherever possible it is important to use economic techniques that calculate—and incorporate—external and future values fairly. The Treasury’s recent discussion of a lower social discount rate is interesting in this regard. Another key challenge in this context is a better understanding of the value of ecosystem services—exactly what is the economic cost of the wild nature we are destroying—and including this value in appraisal tools and policy decisions. 3. (Q. B)Has the Strategy Acted as aDriver or does it Occupy a Limbo Existence whichHas Little Impact on Departments’ Real Priorities? The Strategy as a driver for sustainable development 3.1 The Strategy, as well as its annual assessments, have no doubt acted as a driver and have kept sustainable development firmly on the table. Against the chosen criteria, the Strategy and its assessments have usefully shown where progress is being made and where it is lagging. 3.2 In terms of “driving” sustainable development forward, it is important to distinguish between the two distinct roles the strategy has played. The first has been to describe what the UK has done and is doing in relation to sustainable development, at the sub-national, national, EU and global levels. As such, it has provided a useful (although incomplete) compendium of facts and figures and a measure of progress. The second role has been to indicate the direction that the UK will take on sustainable development by setting objectives, articulating principles, identifying priorities for action and establishing targets for and indicators of progress. In this role, much more work is required (and at the appropriate level post devolution). 3.3 It is diYcult to distinguish between the written Strategy and the various agencies and processes by which the strategy is enacted. Each serves as a catalyst to strengthen and reinforce the other. The written strategy has though served as a focal point, and could be viewed as the principal driver galvanising sustainable development over the past five years. It has helped raise the profile of sustainable development and to make it more meaningful for diVerent policy makers—aided recently by the WSSD process. It may even have contributed to the cultural change increasingly visible within Whitehall. However, overall, there appears to be little evidence of any government department embedding and mainstreaming sustainability in all their processes and actions—although some are doing better than others. 3.4 It is commendable that the UK government has met its international commitments to produce a national sustainable development strategy and has in fact helped lead the way for others. Its greatest strength has most likely been its simple existence. In both form and content, it has already served as a benchmark against which other national strategies are measured and has been a tool by which civil society can hold government to account. Specific impacts of the Strategy since its introduction 3.5 There has been demonstrable progress on several aspects of sustainability in theUKsince the Strategy was produced. This has been most recently shown in Achieving a Better Quality of Life (ABQL 2003) and highlighted recently by the UK Sustainable Development Commission.1 Several aspects of government policy have been modified to some extent by the requirements of sustainability, including through the Energy White Paper, the Strategy for Sustainable Farming and Food and the Framework for Sustainable Production and Consumption. However, others have only incidentally served to advance sustainable development, and some have sent it in the opposite direction—for example the Aviation White Paper. 3.6 Whilst the Strategy has no doubt encouraged other lower level strategies, the lack of strategic clarity within any one strategy (national, regional or issue-specific) has been compounded by the tensions and contradictions between them, and almost no means for policymakers to determine a hierarchy among them when conflict occurs. There are also too few examples of joined up approaches where plans are manifestly linked, eg between housing, energy, water and waste. In general, there is a fundamental problem, from the global to the local community level, of toomany plans and processeswith too little linkage and coordination amongst them. 3.7 Sustainable development appears to be becoming more widely recognised as a key policy goal but both government and society as a whole have not been unified and driven by a single central concern to achieve amore sustainable society for the future.Anumber of the key indicators of sustainability aremoving in the right direction, but not all and many have caveats attached to their success (see below Section 4). There is a greater understanding of the need for a more sustainable society amongst the public, business and in schools and colleges, but the strategy has not been widely enough owned and supported to enable it to drive positive change or to resist those changes in society that are moving in an unsustainable direction. 3.8 More specifically, the introduction of the Climate Change Levy and the extension of the Landfill Tax have been valuable contributions to addressing some of the challenges of sustainable development. However, further progress on introducing other green or environmental taxation measures has been held back by fears about the potential impact on short-term economic growth or the UK’s short-term competitive position. Opportunities and pressing need exist in a wide range of other policy arenas, including pesticides and peat. Influence on departments’ “real priorities”? 3.9 The above examples highlight the concern that the Strategy has worked as long as the solutions have been easy and fit within a department’s “real priorities”. It suggests that more is needed to drive pressing and diffcult decisions towards sustainable solutions. There have been incremental changes but few, if any really major shifts in policy or action, with the possible exception of energy policy and some real progress in agriculture. Whilst this may be a politically expedient approach, the need for leadership and action on issues such as biodiversity loss require bigger and more demanding solutions. Achieving sustainable development needs to become every department’s “real priority”—commitment, consistency, coherence and leadership from the top down and bottom up are crucial to ensuring this. 3.10 The attempt to build sustainable development into the major cross-departmental review processes such as the Comprehensive Spending Review, the Public Service Agreements (PSA), the Budget and structure of taxation has been commendable, but more needs to be done to ensure sustainable development is at the heart of all government policy and action. The Strategy’s impact on mainstreaming the environment 3.11 There is little evidence that the environment has been mainstreamed in terms of objectives and targets set for individual departments in PSAs, departmental strategies and business plans. In several sectors, policies and funding for the environment are still generally bolted on piecemeal to an underlying policy system with which they may be fundamentally at odds. Investments that might reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gases, for example, are rarely given the priority and scale of resources they deserve, often because they are evaluated solely in terms of short-term economic payback instead of longterm impact on sustainability. Similarly, the impacts of depletion of natural resources, build-up of long-term pollution and growing burdens of waste, are still not adequately reflected in prices or in the spending and policy decisions that are made. The result of this is an assortment of relatively ineYcient environmental measures that cost more than they need and perform less eVectively than they should. 3.12 Given their rapid development over the past few years, a significant weakness of the current Strategy is its relative lack of recognition of the importance of sustainability assessment, strategic environmental assessment and integrated policy assessment. Ensuring good and coordinated use of such tools could go a considerable way to addressing many of the shortcomings above. Can a UK Strategy amount to more than a set of principles and aspirations, particularly in the context of devolved government? Is it needed? Should it focus on a small number of key themes and targets? 3.13 Obviously, the original Strategy was developed before devolution had been fully realised. It will therefore be important to consider the continuing role of aUKStrategy, and whether a strategy is necessary for England. One key consideration (and challenge) is to ensure that progress made to date is not disrupted or jeopardised, and that what comes out at the end of the day serves to make headway in changing our approach to external and future values. Providing a national framework, defining principles and giving a “vision” is vitally important to this. The role and mandate for the new UK Strategy or framework should however be clear, and should prevent undue plan proliferation and conflict. 3.14 Coupled with a national monitoring, review and reporting function to enable feedback to international processes such as the UN Commission and Sustainable Development, a UK Strategy should help drive the sustainable development agenda forward in a coherent and eVective way. It should provide best practice and guidance on how to make the necessary but diYcult trade-oVs for long-term sustainability. It should explicitly place expectations on key actors such as the economic regulators, regional decisionmaking bodies, agencies and departments to ensure sustainable development is a core duty. Above all, it should provide leadership and momentum, for example, through political airtime for sustainable development and related key issues through Ministerial speeches at the highest level and at every available opportunity. 3.15 Devolution should enable interpretation, action and implementation to take place at the most appropriate level but within a coordinated framework linking the local to the national, to the regional and to the global. 3.16 To this end, whilst agreeing a definition and vision for sustainable development, a UK Strategy process should allow for consolidation and simplification. This should include a collectively agreed set of top-level countrywide priorities, goals and targets for issues that are crucial to progressing sustainable development across the UK and to meeting our international commitments, including sustainable production and consumption, reducing the rate of global biodiversity loss, and arresting climate change. It should also provide flexibility for local, regional and country interpretation in light of local needs, so long as overarching objectives are not compromised to this end. 3.17 Priorities for Whitehall, through a UK Government Action Plan, should also focus on their nondevolved duties such as such as international development and trade, as well as any added value they can bring through countrywide leadership. 3.19 All Strategies, plans and frameworks should be arrived at through informed, transparent and participatory decision-making. 4. (Q. C) How Effectively do the Indicators Reflect the UK’s “Sustainability gap”? 4.1 The government’s indicators have been an extremely significant and practical tool to make many sustainable development issues real for both decision-makers and the general public. The government’s headline indicators have perhaps done more than anything else to publicise and monitor progress on several priority issues. We have supported and continue to do so, the “basket” approach and the need for a small but comprehensive set of headline indicators to gauge progress. Consistent, robust datasets available over time and into the future have been central to the success of the UK’s indicator set, and we would stress the value of maintaining datasets and consistency long term. 4.2 Although commendable as a means to encourage integrated and long-term thinking on sustainable development, it is questionable if the Government’s indicators are being usefully assimilated together to assess the overall “sustainability gap”. If the focus of sustainability is “a better quality of life”, there are many studies that suggest our consumer-led lifestyles and aspirations are moving us in the opposite direction— longer working hours, less family time, increasing levels of obesity, high suicide rates, increasing poverty gap etc. Could the Government have made greater use of indicators to drive policy and set targets? 4.3 The Government can be applauded for its commitment to the use of indicators and, where a ¶ trend is unacceptable, to adjusting policies and looking for others to join in and take action. However, it is clear from the “Quality of Life Barometer” and other more detailed analysis (eg Assessment of Progress Against Headline Indicators, Sustainable Development Commission, 2004), that several significant trends are negative, for example road traYc volume and householdwaste.Further to this, some indicators have narrow definitions, which paint a false picture, such as the river water quality indicator, which is insensitive to pollution from nutrients and does little to drive action to tackle diVuse pollution. 4.4 More use could have been made of indicators to drive policy and set targets in departmental business plans and PSAs, many of which still have a long way to go to reflect sustainable development. For example, the Department for Transport (DfT) should be required to sign up to the 20% carbon reduction target; the waste PSA looks at recycling rather than waste minimisation and contains nothing on resource production and consumption; there are no departmental targets for large-scale habitat recreation to reflect biodiversity priorities, and no targets for protecting the marine environment. 4.5 On a strongly positive note, Defra’s commitment to reversing the long-term decline in the number of farmland birds by 2020 through a PSA target, may be applauded. We also believe that the existence of the farmland birds indicator may have contributed to the Government’s willingness to maximise the extent to which it can modulate agricultural support to fund agri environment schemes. To what extent do the headline indictors properly reflect “the extent to which the UK is still unsustainable”? What additional or alternative indicators could address this gap? 4.6 In terms of “the extent to which the UK is still unsustainable”, the indicator basket (and/or its interpretation) has been insuYcient on four counts: (i) There is no way to link “consumption” issues and their problems back to the economic indicators (which suggest all is going well). The Government’s consultation on decoupling indicators for sustainable production and consumption was a welcome start in addressing this problem. Further consideration needs to be given to the development of indicators that enable inferences to be drawn about how lifestyles and consumption practices (ie behaviour) are actually changing. It is ultimately these behavioural responses, which will determine how successful we are in attaining a genuinely sustainable path of life. (ii) As addressed in the previous parts of this submission, it fails to redefine economic progress in ways that reveal the very real social and environmental impacts of the current economic growth model. (iii) There remains a need to address the UK’s international impacts and to reflect these in the indicators’ basket. Sustainable development will require market transformation affecting both the supply and demand side of the economy in both domestic and international trade, investment and development spheres. For example, imported products may have a wide range of environmental or social impacts overseas, from the depletion of local habitats (such as forest conversion for oil palm plantations or the destruction of mangrove swamps for intensive shrimp farming) to the greenhouse gas emissions generated from the long-distance transportation of products. iv) A key natural resource sector and environment is arguably missing—the marine environment. Protection, where necessary restoration, and careful management of the use of natural resources forms the basis of sustainable development. There is an urgent need for a marine indicator to demonstrate that we are moving towards this. This indicator could readily be derived from the set of indicators for “coasts and seas” developed for the England Biodiversity Strategy. 5. (Q. D) How can the Concept of Sustainable Consumption be Integrated within the Strategy? Should Sustainable production and consumption be seen as only one constituent part of sustainable development, or as another way of looking at sustainable development itself? 5.1 Sustainable production and consumption (SPC) is a fundamental element of sustainable development. This was as recognised at UNCED (Rio Earth Summit) and encapsulated in Agenda 21, and again at the WSSD where it is one of the chapters of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. International commitments to SPC have thus been defined and conceptualised within the broader context of sustainable development. However, sustainable production and consumption, whilst a very significant field intimately connected to equity, well-being and quality of life, do not embody all of the elements of sustainable development, especially those that relate to culture, and imply a rather mechanistic view of sustainable development. In addition, SCP is primarily a responsibility of the developed, rather than the developing world, both to improve its own record, and to help developing countries avoid falling into a similar trap. 5.2 For the UK, as a developed country with high consumption patterns, SPC should be addressed comprehensively and as a critical part of the sustainable development strategy. “Globally, the 20% of the world’s people in the highest-income countries account for 86% of total private consumption expenditures—the poorest 20% a minuscule 1.3%”.2 This shocking inequality in consumption patterns illustrates the significance of the SPC agenda both to the UK and it place in the wider world. What is the role of government with regard to encouraging changes in consumption? 5.3 The UK Government have a crucial role to play in addressing sustainable consumption (and production). Fundamentally, thismeans challenging our current high-consumption-based economy, culture and way of life—the dominant model of progress and growth. It means driving the resource productivity agenda forward even more aggressively. But it will also mean going beyond this—policies for sustainable development based solely on increasing the “resource productivity” or “eco-eYciency” of the economy will be useless if improvements in eYciency are cancelled out by economic growth leading to greater absolute consumption and resource use. In fact, the overwhelming consensus amongst academics, think tanks and NGOs is that resource productivity will not on its own be enough to reconcile the pursuit of economic growth with the non-negotiable imperative of learning to live within the Earth’s biophysical constraints and carrying capacity.3 5.4 Recognising the challenges and political diYculties inherent to this agenda, the Government must be congratulated for at least opening debate. However, the scale of the sustainability challenges, including addressing ecological limits, and the gravity of the consequences of not meeting them, need more and broader coverage than they have received so far, especially among the **general public**. The Government has a clear and central role in awareness-raising of this kind. Progress will require a massive Government commitment to changing values through individual political leadership, straightforward advertising, and building sustainable development into the heart of the education system and national curriculum. Business and the voluntary sector must also play their part. 5.5 Other ways the Government can influence consumption and change consumer behaviour include: (i) Leading by example through its own procurement policies and those of the public sector, including on international issues such as illegal logging. (ii) Sending the right pricing signals through internalising external costs. This could include: — Higher regulation and standards, especially for buildings and appliances. — More aggressive use of the planning system. — Liability for damage costs (polluter pays). — Environmental tax reform. — Economic systems that minimise waste rather than focus on eYciency. (iii) Addressing demand management—crucial to transport, water and energy issues and to commodities. (iv) Facilitate good choice and oVer viable alternatives to less sustainable options, for example by provide aVordable public transport. (v) Address upfront and adequately issues of social inequity (such as fuel poverty) to ensure the less advantaged can benefit equally from sustainable choices and are not penalised through low income. This should enable policy to be set along rational economic lines. (vi) Reflect seriously on the implications of rising gross national product (GNP). As the sum total of goods and services produced by a given society in a given year, it is principally a measure of the success of a consumer society, to consume. It does not say anything about how good or bad that consumption is and in many instances reflects negative externalities and impacts positively. Further to this, a Fabian report, commissioned by the Sustainable Development Commission,4 cites evidence that rising GDP is now associated with declining well-being. It argues that economic policy should no longer aim at increasing economic growth as measured by GDP, but should use more direct measures of quality of life and environmental sustainability. What difficulties does it face in encouraging changes in consumption? 5.6 Many of the difficulties in progressing a sustainable consumption agenda have been alluded to above—they are inherently political. Convincing people that they should consume less is obviously difficult, and might have fundamental implications for the economic system, including the possibility of lower incomes, and lower tax revenues necessitating lower public spending. The private sector, which largely depends on our consumption, will also be resistant to change. Progress in the corporate responsibility and accountability sphere will be crucial here, as well as a continuing move from a manufacturing to a service economy that does not depend simply on exporting industrial resource use and pollution overseas. 5.7 It should also be recognised that sustainable production and consumption, as evidenced through UN, WTO and the WSSD processes, has been an issue of North-South tension. Developing countries fear that moves towards sustainability in the industrialised world could lead to “green protectionism” in trade, further declines in commodity prices and new constraints on their lifestyles and development paths. An imperative step towards SPC in the UK is working with and delivering positive benefits to developing countries. This will require efforts towards, for example, poverty elimination, environmental regeneration and conservation as well as resources, technology transfer and capacity building at all levels. These steps are vital if international mistrust and policy deadlock are to be overcome.

#### The civic engagement they create to will lead us to try to solve environmental problems leads to the imposition of carbon tariffs on imports from China to increase local production and reduce cheap imports

#### Shekar 08, feminist activist & journalist from India, (Preeti Mangala, “Who gains from the green economy? Making sure the "green wave" doesn't leave out communities of color,” ColorLines Magazine, March, Volume 11, Number 2)

In these efforts lay a hopeful vision—that the crises-ridden worlds of economics and environmentalism would converge to address the other huge crisis—racism in the United States. It is what some of its advocates call a potential paradigm shift that, necessitated by the earth’s climate crisis, can point the way out of “gray capitalism” and into a green, more equitable economy. The engine of this model is driven by the young and proactive leadership of people of color who intend to build a different solution for communities of color. Van Jones, president of the newly formed Green for All campaign, talks about how earlier waves of economic flourishes didn’t much impact Black communities. “When the dotcom boom went bust, you didn’t see no Black man lose his shirt,” he points out, only half joking. “Black people were the least invested in it.” Climate change is the 21st century’s wake-up call to not just rethink but radically redo our economies. Ninety percent of scientists agree that we are headed toward a climate crisis, and that, indeed, it has already started. With the urgent need to reduce carbon emissions, the clean energy economy is poised to grow enormously. This sector includes anything that meets our energy needs without contributing to carbon emissions or that reduces carbon emissions; it encompasses building retrofitting, horticulture infrastructure (tree pruning and urban gardening), food security, biofuels and other renewable energy sources, and more. It’s becoming clear that investing in clean energy has the potential to create good jobs, many of them located in urban areas as state and city governments are increasingly adopting public policies designed to improve urban environmental quality in areas such as solar energy, waste reduction, materials reuse, public transit infrastructures, green building, energy and water efficiency, and alternative fuels. According to recent research by Raquel Pinderhughes, a professor of Urban Studies at San Francisco State University, green jobs have an enormous potential to reverse the decades-long trend of unemployment rates that are higher for people of color than whites. In Berkeley, California, for example, unemployment of people of color is between 1.5 and 3.5 times that of white people, and the per capita income of people of color is once again between 40 to 70 percent of that of white people. Pinderhughes defines green-collar jobs as manual labor jobs in businesses whose goods and services directly improve environmental quality. These jobs are typically located in large and small for-profit businesses, nonprofit organizations, social enterprises, and public and private institutions. Most importantly, these jobs offer training, an entry level that usually requires only a high school diploma, and decent wages and benefits, as well as a potential career path in a growing industry. Yet, though green economics present a great opportunity to lift millions of unemployed, underemployed or displaced workers—many of them people of color—out of poverty, the challenge lies in defining an equitable and workable development model that would actually secure good jobs for marginalized communities. “Green economics needs to be eventually policy-driven. If not, the greening of towns and cities will definitely set in motion the wheels of gentrification,” Pinderhughes adds. “Without a set of policies that explicitly ensures checks and measures to prevent gentrification, green economics cannot be a panacea for the ills of the current economy that actively displaces and marginalizes people of color, while requiring their cheap labor and participation as exploited consumers.” Sustainable South Bronx is among the leading local organizations designing innovative green economic development projects. These precedents should form the core of state and federal green development and jobs programs. In 2001, Majora Carter, who grew up in the area, one of the most polluted in the country, founded the organization with a focus on building a Greenway along the banks of the South Bronx riverfront. The Greenway will create bike and walk paths along two prominent waterfronts, but the plan also calls for policies that calm local traffic, especially that of the dozens of diesel fuel trucks that use the South Bronx as a thoroughfare. They started with a $1.25 million federal transportation grant to transform a decrepit portion of the riverbank into Hunts Points Riverside Park. Within seven years, they’ve raised nearly $30 million from public and private sources for related projects. In 2003, Sustainable South Bronx started Project BEST (Bronx Environmental Stewardship Training) to train local residents, largely young adults, in green collar jobs. The program has become one of the nation’s most successful, boasting a 90 percent job placement rate. Project BEST includes 10 weeks of training in a wide range of green activities, including riverbank and wetlands restoration, urban horticulture, green roof installation and maintenance and hazardous waste clean up. Graduates leave the program with six official certifications as well as what Sustainable South Bronx calls a “powerful environmental justice perspective.” “We wanted to make sure that people had both the personal and financial stake in the betterment of the environment,” said Carter. “They already knew the public health impacts, being a repository for the dirty economy. What they didn’t know was that they could also be direct beneficiaries.” The program helps people find work afterward, and tracks graduates for at least three years to measure their progress. Thus, Sustainable South Bronx builds a constituency for the green economy by creating chances for people to live in it. These communities have to be prepared not just to become practitioners in the new economy, but also as political actors who propose and fight for legislative solutions. The organization has worked with other groups in New York to influence the City’s economic and environmental plans, using legislation to move development ideas that would save the public money as well as providing jobs and improving the environment. Their idea that building green roofs, for example, would prevent the city from having to maintain large water purification systems is slowly finding its way into the Bloomberg Administration’s PlaNYC. A recent City Council decision also beefs up the public participation requirements for particular elements of Plan NYC. Green development should give the people who have been most abandoned by the gray economy a sense of their own power as well as cleaning up the environment. Carter argues that, in addition to good programs on the ground, there also need to be agreements between communities, government and businesses to ensure that all these new trainees can get real jobs. “It means that people are brought in early on in the planning of some of these businesses and the way that our communities will relate to them. It’s not just assuming that people in poor communities aren’t interested in seeing an economy that works for them and with them.” Carter supports political action that results in bond measure, tax incentives and rebate to support that kind of investment, calling these sources a kind of “insurance” for the green future: “It’s a new green deal we’re talking about.” What remains to be seen is how green economics will transition out of current prevalent models of ownership and control. A greener version of capitalism could possibly address some of the repercussions of a consumption economy and the enormous waste it generates. But critics and activists also worry that a “replacement mindset” is largely driving the optimism and energy of greening our industries and jobs. Hybrid cars replace conventional cars, and organic ingredients are promised in a wide variety of products from hand creams to protein bars. Many mainstream environmental festivals like the popular Green Festival held in San Francisco, Washington, D.C. and Chicago, have yet to embrace a democratic diversity. Peddling wonderful green products and services that will reduce your ecological footprint, are accessible, alas, only to elite classes that are predominantly white. “An authentic green economics system is one that would mark the end of capitalism,” notes B. Jess Clarke, editor of Race, Poverty and the Environment. And one that would ensure labor rights and organizing, collective ownership and equality are all at the heart of it, he adds. “The real green movement has not started yet.” A movement toward economic justice requires the mobilizing and organizing of the poorest people for greater economic and political power. A good green economic model would surely be one where poor people’s labor has considerable economic leverage. “Wal-Mart putting solar panels on its store roofs is not a solution,” says Clarke. “We need real solutions and strong measures—**carbon taxes on imports from China** would considerably reduce the incentive of cheap imports and make a push to produce locally.” “Green economics can create a momentum—a political moment akin to the civil rights movement. But unless workers are organized, any success is likely to be marginal. So the key problem is in organizing a political base,” adds Clarke. Green economics, then, is not just a green version of current economic models but a fundamental transformation, outlines Brian Milani, a Canadian academic and environmental expert who has written extensively on green economics. He writes in his book Designing the Green Economy: “Green economics is the economics of the real world—the world of work, human needs, the earth’s materials, and how they mesh together most harmoniously. It is primarily about ‘use value,’ not ‘exchange value’ or money. It is about quality, not quantity, for the sake of it. It is about regeneration—of individuals, communities, and ecosystems—not about accumulation, of either money or material.” The $125 million promised through the Green Jobs Act is admittedly a drop in the bucket as far as the amount of financing and infrastructure needed to implement green jobs, activists say. Among the Democratic presidential candidates, all of whom have proposals for clean energy investment, talk has run into the billions of dollars for green economic stimulus. So who will pay to get the green economy going and train a green workforce? Throughout history we have freely released carbon and other greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere and not had to pay a penny for the privilege. Industrial polluters and utilities may face fines for toxic emissions or releasing hazardous waste, but there has been no cost for emitting carbon as a part of day-to-day business. However, we have come to find that the atmosphere is a limited resource, and it’s getting used up fast. By limiting the total amount of carbon that can be released, and making industries pay for their pollution, global warming policies finally recognize that the atmosphere has value and must be protected. The policy with the most momentum in the U.S. and around the world is to “cap and trade” the amount of carbon that can be emitted every year. With this policy, the government sets a hard target for CO2 emissions, and then companies have to trade credits to get back the right to emit that carbon, no longer for free. One often overlooked fact, though, is that under a “cap and trade” policy, a tremendous amount of money could change hands—the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the new value created by such a policy ranges from $50–$300 billion each year. So far, public debate has focused on setting targets and caps, but the question of who will benefit from those credits has largely been ignored. In fact, many proposals have simply given these valuable new property rights away to polluters for them to sell to each other, because they were the ones who were polluting to begin with. Under an important variant of the “cap and trade” policy called “cap and auction,” the government not only limits the total carbon emissions, but it also captures the value of those carbon credits for public purposes by requiring that all polluters must bid for and buy back the right to emit. A 100-percent auction of permits would give the public ready access to the ongoing funds we will need to reinvest in social equity and bring down poor people’s energy bills, or to support new research, or to launch new projects that not only establish training for green jobs, but create those jobs themselves, rebuilding the infrastructure of our communities for a clean energy economy. However, there can be a lot of slippage between the green economy and green jobs that actually go to workers of color, especially in today’s anti-affirmative action context. In one pilot program, nearly two dozen young people of color were trained to install solar panels, but only one got a job. Ultimately, employers can’t be told who to hire, though there are some ideas about providing incentives, like requiring companies to show they hire locally and diversely before public institutions will invest their assets there. “Green for All,” the campaign launched in September 2007 by the Ella Baker Center and other partners like Sustainable South Bronx and the Apollo Alliance, is currently among the leading advocates pushing for policy that would ensure a racially just framework for green economics to grow and flourish, without which, green economics can end up being just a greening consumption. With a goal to bring green-collar jobs to urban areas, this campaign positions itself as an effort to provide a viable policy framework for emerging grassroots, green economic models. The campaign’s long-term goal is to secure $1 billion by 2012 to create “green pathways out of poverty” for 250,000 people by greatly expanding federal government and private sector commitments to green-collar jobs. “A big chunk of the African-American community is economically stranded,” Van Jones said in The New York Times last fall as the campaign began. “The blue-collar, stepping-stone, manufacturing jobs are leaving. And they’re not being replaced by anything. So you have this whole generation of young Blacks who are basically in economic free fall.” The challenge of making the green economy racially equitable means addressing the question of how to build an infrastructure that includes not just training programs but also the development of actual good jobs and the hiring policies that make them accessible. How can we guarantee that all these new green jobs will go to local residents? As one activist admitted, “There’s just no good answer to this so far.” Many of the answers will have to come in the doing, and the details, as green industry continues to take shape. There are plenty of ideas about how to create equitable policies, as outlined in the report “Community Jobs in the Green Economy” by the Apollo Alliance and Urban Habitat. They include requiring employers who receive public subsidies to set aside a number of jobs for local residents and partner with workforce intermediaries to hire them. Some cities are already requiring developers to reserve 50 percent of their construction jobs for local businesses and residents. Cities can also attach wage standards to their deals with private companies that are pegged to a living wage. In Milwaukee, after two freeway ramps were destroyed downtown, a coalition of community activists and unions won a community benefits agreement from the city to require that the new development include mass transit, green building and living wages for those jobs. As we have learned in many progressive struggles, communities need to be mobilized and actively involved in generating inclusive policies and pushing policymakers to ensure that green economic development will be just and equitable. Bracken Hendricks, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and co-author of Apollo’s Fire: Igniting America’s Clean Energy Economy, says the green economy movement is still in its early stages of building public support. “There is not yet an organized constituency representing the human face of what it means to face climate change. There is an urgent need for a human face, an equity constituency, to enter into the national debate on climate change.”

#### That causes trade wars, causes overwhelming protectionism, and collapses global free trade.

#### Richardson 08, Energy & Security Specialist at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2-27-8 (“Michael, “FEARS OF FIGHT IN GREEN EU AIM,” Canberra Times)

The European Union aims to become the world's leader in the fight against global warming and climate change. But in doing so, it may trigger a ''green'' trade war of retaliation and litigation from China, India and other leading carbon polluters in lower-cost Asian economies that refuse to follow the new environmental and energy-use standards set by Europe and perhaps soon by the United States as well. If this were to happen, it would complicate the Rudd Government's plan to make Australia an honest broker between developed and developing countries in the contentious international negotiations on climate change. It would also **undermine the multilateral trading system** policed by the World Trade Organisation and add momentum to protectionist pressures that already pose a significant challenge to the open international trade regime that has helped bringprosperity to the Asia-Pacific region. The stage was set last month for a fraught round of negotiations over the next few years on pricing energy and changing production processes in major industries around the world when the EU's executive arm, European Commission, presented its detailed proposals for cutting greenhouse gas emissions in Europe. These established individual country targets for the 27 member states to reduce Europe-wide emissions by 20 per cent by 2020 from 1990 levels and ensure that by then 20 per cent of energy comes from renewable sources, such as wind, solar and biofuels, up from 8.5 per cent now. If ratified by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, a key enforcement mechanism will be the EU's beefed-up emissions trading scheme. It will be expanded to cover almost half the European economy. Rather than cut emissions themselves, governments or companies will have the option to invest in reductions outside the EU, receiving credits for about a quarter of the total cut. However, from 2013, energy- intensive industries such as steel- making, cement, paper, glass, chemicals and aluminium producers will have to pay for permits to produce carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas warming the planet. To ensure that these industries do not shift production to Asia or other regions with less stringent regulations to protect theenvironment, the European Commission wants to oblige importers to pay the same greenhouse gas emission charges for non-European goods as domestic producers, in effect imposing hefty ''green'' tariffs on ''dirty'' imports. ''We want industry to remain in Europe,'' commissionpresident Jose Manuel Barroso said. ''We don't want to export our jobs to other parts of theworld.'' The US appears to be moving toward a similar system to pricing, capping and trading carbon emissions. However, China, India and other big emerging Asian economies are extremely reluctant to put this kind of mandatory restriction on their industries, fearing it will drive up costs and give competing economies an edge in foreign markets. They are likely to retaliate against environmental protection measures imposed by the West or challenge them in the WTO. This would strain the WTO's dispute settling mechanisms and ''create divisions along North-South lines,'' India's ambassador to the WTO, Ujal Singh Bhatia, warns.

#### That breaks down our ability to have contact with different people in different places – Flips all of the case and destroys international cooperation needed to solve things like nuclear war.

#### Seita 97, Law Professor at Albany Law School, J.D. from Stanford, M.B.A. from Stanford, (Alex, “Globalization and the Convergence of Values,” Cornell International Law Journal, 30 Cornell Int'l L.J. 429)

In an indirect way, the cultural impact of economic globalization stimulates political globalization. Economic globalization has long introduced aspects of foreign cultures - especially American culture - either directly by the sale of merchandise such as movies and musical recordings, or indirectly through exposure to foreigners. n77 More than in the past, the opening of new markets through economic globalization has brought a flood of people and companies into foreign lands. Personal contact, always **so important in understanding other human beings**, has made foreigners less inscrutable. More business personnel are assigned to overseas offices, more consumers travel abroad as tourists, and more students study in foreign countries. n78 Local residents are more likely than ever before to work for, do business with, or personally know foreigners. In some cases, this transnational encounter may lead to a personal [\*454] affinity with or an **in-depth understanding** of foreign cultures. n79 [\*455] Further, economic globalization has generated an interest in learning foreign languages, primarily English. Perhaps irreversibly, English has become the international language of business and science, with a broader usage than any other language. n80 At the same time, the ability to speak a foreign language other than English gives one a competitive advantage in doing business in nonEnglish-speaking countries. n81 Doing business with foreigners, in their country or in one's own, requires that one communicate with them, cooperate with them, and be exposed to their political and business values. n82 The political values of democracy and human rights, as well as aspects of foreign cultures, are often inseparable (though secondary) components of economic globalization. Thus, countries that seek to benefit from economic globalization must frequently tolerate political globalization and exposure to foreign cultures. As people know more about foreign cultures, some familiarity with foreign political values is bound to arise. II. Technology's Vital Role in Converging Values The advanced communication technology that links much of the world together continues to be crucial to the convergence of economic and political values. This technology is utilized primarily by business entities to facilitate economic globalization. n83 Modern technology has also tended to promote democracy and human rights by making it easier and cheaper for [\*456] people to communicate without censorship across national boundaries. Communication technology not only exposes a national population to foreign ideas, but also concurrently exposes domestic conditions to a global audience. This has occurred because economic globalization involves communication technologies with multiple uses. The same technology that transmits a business proposal may also communicate politically embarrassing or other non-business information. These multiple uses of advanced technology cannot easily be separated from each other, making it difficult to restrict the technology to purely business purposes. A country that wishes to participate in international business cannot isolate itself from all uses of communication technologies unrelated to business dealings. n84 The internet n85 is a recent communication medium with tremendous potential for linking people across national boundaries, furthering mutual interests of the international community, and a myriad of other uses. n86 The internet will become, or may already be, an important or even critical technological medium for business, as well as for scientific research and consumer enjoyment. n87 The internet is the essential part of the "informa- [\*457] tion superhighway," a source of information that promises to change fundamentally human lives. n88 E-mail and computer file transmission on the internet can potentially provide a more powerful (e.g., faster, cheaper, more convenient) business tool than such conventional devices as the postal service, telephones, and faxes. Internet users can transmit and download data, articles, images, movies, speeches, sound recordings, and other information. n89 By providing a forum for the transfer of such information, the internet will help protect the freedoms of expression and choice for followers of any ideological persuasion. n90 Unfortunately, however, it may shield criminal, obscene, [\*458] racist, and terrorist activities as well. n91 A government might attempt to control the content of information transfers. It could screen large numbers of telephone calls, faxes, or computer data; it could restrict access to or intercept messages on the internet. Total censorship, however, would bring a halt to international business. n92 Firms might object if government surveillance is too pervasive. For example, companies might not want government officials to be privy to proprietary information. n93 A certain amount of freedom of communication is therefore assured if a country wishes to be part of a global economy: international firms will leave a nation if censorship prohibitively increases the cost of doing business. This will remain true even if governments attempt to censor communications using the most advanced and cost-effective surveillance technology available. n94 [\*459] Communication technologies not essential to international business transactions also serve to bolster humanitarian political values. International news reporting utilizes communication technologies to broadcast major domestic events of all types on a worldwide screen. There are numerous journalists, broadcasters, and commentators whose professional livelihood depends upon bringing newsworthy stories to a foreign, if not international, audience. While most publicized stories may not involve political events, many do. The competitive members of the news media are unlikely to let stories of outrageous acts completely escape the attention of the international public. Furthermore, these news articles may be read by anyone in the world who has access to the internet. n95 At the same time, news stories alone would not generate international repercussions against repressive governments if purely theoretical political values were involved. There must be influential constituencies that place high priority on the existence of democracy and human rights, that seek to spread those values, and that are galvanized into action upon news of deplorable political conditions. Neither value would flourish unless there were constituencies, either domestic or abroad, that strongly supported it. The presence of democratic governments and strong protections for human rights in the industrialized countries means that these values are expressed to some degree in their business transactions with other countries. n96 Sizable populations in the industrialized countries also attempt to support democracy and human rights abroad through private means. n97 Moreover, as the living standards of developing countries improve, the citizenry of these countries seem to expect more democratization (first) and [\*460] human rights (later). n98 III. The Importance of Globalization Because globalization promotes common values across nations and can make foreign problems, conditions, issues, and debates as vivid and captivating as national, state, and local ones, it contributes to a sense of **world community**. n99 It develops a **feeling of empathy** for the conditions of people abroad, enlarging the group of human beings that an individual will identify with. Globalization thus helps to bring alive persons in foreign lands, making them **fellow human beings** who simply live in different parts of the world rather than abstract statistics of deaths, poverty, and suffering. The convergence of basic political and economic values is thus **fundamentally important** because it helps to establish a **common bond a**mong people in different countries, facilitating **understanding and encouraging cooperation**. All other things being equal, the commonality among countries - whether in the form of basic values, culture, or language - enhances their attractiveness to each other. n100 In addition, convergence increases [\*461] the possibility that a transformation of attitude will take place for those who participate in transnational activities. People will begin to regard foreigners in distant lands with the same concern that they have for their fellow citizens. n101 They will endeavor to help these foreigners obtain basic political rights even though the status of political rights in other countries will have no tangible beneficial impact at home. n102 Convergence does not mean that there is a single model of a market economy, a single type of democracy, or a single platform of human rights. They exist in different forms, and nations may have different combinations of these forms. n103 [\*462] A. The Perspective of One Human Race The convergence of fundamental values through globalization has profound consequences because it increases the chance that a new perspective will develop, one which views membership in the human race as the most significant societal relationship, except for nationality. n104 A person owes his or her strongest collective loyalties to the various societies with which he or she most intensely identifies. Today, this societal identification can be based on numerous factors, including nationality, race, religion, and ethnic group. n105 While it is unlikely that nationality will be surpassed as the most significant societal relationship, globalization and the convergence of values may eventually convince people in different countries that the second most important social group is the human race, and not a person's racial, religious, or ethnic group. n106 One of the first steps in the formation of a society is the recognition by prospective members that they have common interests and bonds. An essential commonality is that they share some fundamental values. A second is that they identify themselves as members belonging to the same community on the basis of a number of common ties, including shared fundamental values. A third commonality is the universality of rights - the active application of the "golden rule" - by which members expect that all must be entitled to the same rights as well as charged with the same responsibilities to ensure that these rights are protected. Globalization promotes these three types of commonalities. Globalization establishes common ground by facilitating the almost universal acceptance of market economies, the widespread emergence of democratic governments, and the extensive approval of human rights. The most visible example is economic. With the end of the Cold War, the free market economy has clearly triumphed over the command economy in the battle of the [\*463] economic paradigms. Because some variant of a market economy has taken root in virtually all countries, there has been a convergence of sorts in economic systems. n107 Further, because it often requires exposure to and pervasive interaction with foreigners - many of whom share the same fundamental values - globalization can enlarge the group that one normally identifies with. Globalization makes many of its participants empathize with the conditions and problems of people who in earlier years would have been ignored as unknown residents of remote locations. This empathy often leads to sympathy and support when these people suffer unfairly. Finally, the combination of shared values and identification produce the third commonality, universality of rights. n108 Citizens of one country will often expect, and work actively to achieve, the same basic values in other countries. They will treat nationals of other nations as they would wish to be treated. The effects of shared values, identification, and universality of rights in globalization could have a pivotal long-term effect - the possibility that a majority of human beings will begin to believe that they are truly part of a single global society - the human race. This is not to say that people disbelieve the idea that the human race encompasses all human beings. Of course, they realize that there is only one human species. Rather, the human race does not usually rank high on the hierarchy of societies for most people. Smaller societies, especially those based on nationality, race, religion, or ethnicity, command more loyalty. n109 The idea of the human race, the broadest and all-inclusive category of the human species, is abstract and has little, if any, impact on the lives of human beings. To believe in the singular importance of the human race requires an attitudinal shift in which a person views the human race seriously. [\*464] This may occur because the convergence of values does not only mean that the people of different countries will share the same basic values. It may also lead to the greater promotion of these values for the people of other countries. Historically and certainly today, America and the other industrial democracies have attempted to foster democracy and human rights in other countries. n110 While some part of this effort has been attributable to "self interest," it has also been due to the empathy that the industrialized democracies have had for other countries. n111 The magnitude of these efforts in the future, as in the past, will depend not solely upon the available financial and human resources of the industrialized democracies. It will also depend upon their national will - a factor undoubtedly influenced by the intensity with which the people of the industrialized democracies identify with people in foreign lands. The perspective that the human race matters more than its component divisions would accelerate cooperative efforts among nations to attack global problems that adversely affect human rights and the quality of human life. n112 Obviously, there is no shortage of such problems. Great suffering still occurs in so many parts of the world, not just from internal armed conflicts, n113 but also from conditions of poverty. n114 There are severe health problems in much of the world which can be mitigated with relatively little cost. n115 There are the lives lost to the AIDS epidemic, and [\*465] the deaths and disabilities caused by land mines. n116 Russia, a nuclear superpower that could end life on this planet, has severe social, economic, and political problems. n117 Making the human race important would not just promote liberal democratic values but would also reduce human suffering and perhaps eliminate completely the risk of nuclear war. B. General Convergence of Values Assuming that the formation of a single human society is a possible outcome, two broad questions should be answered: what kind of human society is being created, and is this society desirable. The answer to the latter question will depend on an evaluator's subjective judgment of the society that is being formed. Undoubtedly, the great majority of human beings would abhor a world society that was being created by the conquests of a totalitarian government. Presumably, most Americans (and many citizens of other countries) would reject even a benevolent, democratic global society in which a world government dominated by other countries dictated laws that governed the lives of all human beings. If either outcome were present, many would call for a halt to globalization. Thus the direction that globalization follows is critical for assessing its appeal. What globalization has brought is a general convergence of fundamental economic and political systems among many nations. These systems are not identical. There are still innumerable differences among countries with market economies, democratic governments, and respectful of human rights. n118 The practices of one country may be intolerable to another coun- [\*466] try. n119 Furthermore, it is unlikely and probably undesirable that economic and political systems will ever exactly converge. Nor is it foreseeable that the nations of the world will coalesce into one. Even among the industrialized democracies, there are enough dissimilarities in market economies, democratic governments, and attitudes towards human rights that make some believe that the differences between these nations outweigh the similarities. For example, Japan is frequently characterized as having a producer-oriented market economy, as compared with the consumer-oriented market economy of the United States. n120 In general, the members of the European Union more extensively regulate their economies than the United States, engaging at times in social engineering that seems contrary to market principles as interpreted by Americans. n121 In the area of criminal justice, the United States is virtually alone in permitting the death penalty and imprisons a much higher percentage [\*467] of its population than other industrialized democracies. n122 Nonetheless, the basic economic and political systems of different countries clearly share more similarities than ever before. When asked to characterize their existing economic and political systems, more people in more countries than ever before will respond that they have a "market" economy, that their government is "democratic," and that they protect "human rights." Importantly, the convergence of values seems to be accompanying the convergence of systems. Certainly, most people in the industrialized democracies would view their existing economic and political systems as expressing the foundational values of their societies - the values that define their society. n123 The convergence of values along liberal demo- [\*468] cratic lines means that nations are better situated to negotiate wealth-maximizing trade agreements and to resolve political disputes peacefully. But in countries in transition from authoritarian to liberal democracy, many people may not yet fully accept their newly established economic and political systems as reflecting fundamental values of what is correct, proper, or right. Whether these transitional countries continue to establish or possess liberal democracies will depend upon how well the systems of liberal democracy work, an outcome that the industrialized democracies should strive vigorously to achieve. Workable systems can evolve into entrenched values. Obviously, the implantation of the values of liberal democracy in Russia is of paramount concern. n124 Nurturing a democratic Russia is in the vital national interest of the United States (and the rest of the world) for very practical reasons - only Russia and the United States possess sufficient nuclear weapons to end human civilization. n125 Whether by unilateral or multilateral extensions of financial assistance or political inclusion, the industrialized democracies should do their utmost to make Russia a strong liberal democracy. Economic aid should be generous, and Russia should be incorporated into the activities of the industrialized democracies as much as possible. n126 Not all basic values are converging and nor, perhaps, should they. Religious values are not converging in the sense that the same general religion, such as Christianity, is taking root in a preponderance of countries. n127 Nevertheless, the convergence of economic and political values means that there is a greater basis for cooperation. For that reason, the [\*469] "West" n128 - that is, the United States and the other industrialized democracies - should support the process of value convergence. Sharing the same values creates similar expectations and a common ground for understanding. The more prevalent reliance upon market forces to direct production and consumption means that nations are more likely to trade with and invest in each other. The relative sameness of political values, for example, the prevelant use of negotiation rather than military force in settling disputes, means that nations can have greater trust in and less to fear from each other.The similarity of basic values also means that the different peoples of humanity are one step closer to viewing themselves primarily as part of one human society - the human race - though represented by different governments.

## Contention 3

### 2ac- Greece proves alt fails

#### Greek collapse disproves plan workability — Otero cites Greece as their blueprint.

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How different is Greece? The beginning of wisdom about the current Greek crisis is to recognize that it is fundamentally political, and that it has been long in the making. Greece’s failure is the outcome of a long process during which populism prevailed over liberalism and became hegemonic in society.¶ Cultural theories relate the fate of states to culture, and more particularly to its geographical and historical determinants. Countries with hot climates (such as those in Africa), situated in dangerous areas (the Middle East or the Balkans, for instance), or with adverse histories (experiences of having been colonized or engulfed by civil war, let us say) are more likely to remain poor and to fail politically than countries that enjoy more temperate climes, safer neighbourhoods, and happier pasts. Cultural interpretations of Greece’s current political maladies (including the common perception of Greeks as lazy) are not in short supply.¶ Institutional theories, by contrast, hold that nations stand or fall by their institutions—strong and resilient institutions mean that major political and economic crises can be withstood, while weak institutions crumple and fold under history’s harsh test. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, for instance, have recently advanced a comprehensive institutional theory of “why nations fail” that attributes this to a lack of political pluralism and therefore of inclusive economic institutions. “Rich nations are rich,” these authors argue, “because they managed to create inclusive institutions.” In contrast, the most common reason for the failure of nations today is the presence of extractive institutions, as these “keep poor countries poor and prevent them from embarking on a path to economic growth.”¶ The Greek case, however, puts both conventional theories to a stern test. Cultural theories fall short of explaining how post-1974 Greece succeeded in building a pluralist political regime despite its ostensibly adverse geographical, historical, and cultural conditioning. And institutional theories are at pains to account for Greece’s recent failure, which was not caused by a lack of inclusive political and economic institutions but rather happened in spite of them.¶ Greece, especially when compared to other similarly debt-ridden European countries such as Spain, Italy, Portugal, or Ireland, is uniquely puzzling in at least two ways. It is both the only country in Europe that saw its state fail in key areas during the recent economic crisis, and the European country that has proven the most resistant to reform. To be credible, therefore, any explanation of the Greek puzzle must account for both the causes that led to state failure and the reasons for the exceptionally strong resistance to reforms aimed at restoring to Greece a sustainable state and the ability to compete in global markets.¶ To this end, I will attempt to synthesize the cultural and institutional theories in order to propose a unified explanation that focuses on the role played by political mechanisms. The beginning of wisdom about the current Greek crisis is to recognize that it is fundamentally political, and that it has been long in the making. Greece’s failure is the outcome of a long process during which populism prevailed over liberalism and became hegemonic in society. I herein understand populism simply as democratic illiberalism and view it as the polar opposite of political liberalism. It will be shown that, after having reached power in 1981, populism permeated Greek politics and produced what I will call a “populist democracy,” which in turn required two mechanisms: a state bent on handing out political rents to practically every member of society; and a party system built to ensure the distribution of these rents in an orderly and democratic way—that is, by turns rather than in one go. Taken together, these two mechanisms led to a fine coordination of aims between the political class and the vast majority of Greeks, enabling both sides to exploit the state and its resources in a seemingly non–zero-sum fashion. ¶ Populism triumphant ¶ Andreas Papandreou (1919–96) rose to power by attacking the liberal foundations of a fledgling postauthoritarian Greek democracy from the left, questioning its legitimacy and rejecting its goals.¶ Whereas Karamanlis, who explicitly acknowledged the multiplicity of conflicts in society, had emphasized moderation and actively pursued political consensus, Papandreou introduced populism in its purest form. A master at politicizing resentment, he offered the Greek people a wholly new symbolic master narrative according to which society was divided between two inherently antagonistic groups—an exploiting “establishment,” both domestic and foreign, and the pure “people” standing in opposition to it. Largely as a result of this division, Greek politics assumed a highly confrontational style and also turned distinctly majoritarian. It was to remain so for more than three decades.¶ In the 1981 national elections, PASOK [12], the party that Papandreou had founded only seven years earlier, won by a landslide and formed its first single-party government. The new government, abandoning Karamanlis’s strategy of state-led growth and now also receiving generous EU handouts, undertook state-directed redistribution. At the same time, political polarization, rather than subsiding, became more intense. By portraying Greek society as torn between the “forces of light” (meaning PASOK voters and sympathizers) and the “forces of darkness” (meaning opposition voters), the new government used the state and its resources to satisfy its own electoral constituencies and reap further electoral gains, while passing the cost on to the whole of society.¶ In 1990, after almost a decade of populism, New Democracy [13] returned to office under the leadership of liberal politician Constantine Mitsotakis. Trying to reverse previous practices, the new government moved swiftly to reinvigorate Greece’s economy, reinforce its political institutions, and repair strained relations with Washington and the European allies. With regard to the economy, the ND government made preparing the country for the European single market the top priority, and accordingly moved to cut public spending and reform the civil service. A privatization agenda was adopted with the same goal in mind. The opposition’s intense resistance made the proposed structural reforms and policy alternatives hard to implement, however, and in 1993 the ND government collapsed, opening the way for Papandreou and PASOK to return to power.¶ After its dismal, defeat-capped spell in power in the early 1990s, ND faced a choice: Should it cling to liberalism or learn to play the game of vote-catching populism? As it turned out, the Mitsotakis government had been liberalism’s feeble last hurrah. Populism’s strong pull soon made it a permanent feature of Greek politics. By the mid-1990s, ND had rebranded itself as a “people’s party” and thereafter tried to outbid PASOK’s already excessive promises. This trend became particularly pronounced when Costas Karamanlis, the founder’s nephew, served as ND’s leader between 1997 and 2009. He expelled the most prominent proponents of political liberalism from the party and took to spouting rhetoric that made him sound more like Andreas Papandreou than like his own uncle and mentor.¶ Indeed, the failure to make badly needed changes in such key areas as pensions and health (under PASOK) and education (under ND) became the most striking feature of all governments in Greece’s populist democracy. Not only were these reforms opposed by strong interests in society and never fully implemented, but the politicians who sought to introduce them were punished at the polls, and some retired from public life. Reformism stood exposed as a political loser.¶ Thus for three decades—from PASOK’s rise to power under Andreas Papandreou in 1981 to the resignation of his son, Prime Minister George Papandreou, to allow a caretaker government to deal with the debt crisis in 2011—Greece’s two major parties had been able to hold office alternately, in most cases commanding ample parliamentary majorities: PASOK ruled during 1981–89, 1993–2004, and 2009–11; ND enjoyed office during 1990–93 and 2004–2009. The stillborn coalition governments that formed during the extraordinary circumstances of the short period extending from June 1989 to April 1990 (and that also included the Greek Communist Party) stand as an unusual parenthesis within the two major parties’ consistent alternation in power.¶ During those decades, Greece developed as a populist democracy, a democratic subtype in which the party in government and (at least) the major opposition party both are populist. What were the nuts and bolts of this system, and how did it last for such a long time? In order to answer these questions, we must first understand the two chief mechanisms that made populist democracy feasible: the redistributive capacity of the increasingly large Greek state and the polarizing mechanics of the Greek party system.¶ Political patronage, Greek-style¶ In the view of many, political patronage is the main cause of the Greek crisis. In mainstream theory, patronage is seen as a linkage between politicians and citizens. Such patron-client ties are “based on direct material inducements targeted to individuals and small groups of citizens whom politicians know to be highly responsive to such side-payments and willing to surrender their vote for the right price.” In this understanding, patronage has two features: first, a distribution of state-related benefits (or political rents) to specifically targeted social groups; and second, the material character of such inducements. Greece’s populist democracy, however, exhibited a variant of patronage whose features are notably different from those recognized by mainstream theory.

### 2AC NAFTA/Trade Good

#### Increased trade benefits all levels of Mexican Society — increases *quality of life* and *takes away power* from the repressive government.

DeLong, professor of Economics at Cal, 2K, J. Bradford DeLong, professor of Economics and chair of the Political Economy major at the University of California, Berkeley. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury in the Clinton Administration under Lawrence Summers. He is also a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and is a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, “NAFTA's (Qualified) Success”, <http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/TotW/nafta.html> Mollie

It is time to conclude that NAFTA--the North American Free Trade Agreement--is a success. It is nearly seven years since the ratification of NAFTA, nearly seven years since then-Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen argued and President Clinton decided that NAFTA should be the second major initiative of his administration. The major argument for NAFTA was that it was the best thing the United States could do to raise the chances for Mexico to become democratic and prosperous, and that the United States had both a strong interest and a neighborly duty to try to help Mexican political and economic development. By that yardstick NAFTA has been a clear success. NAFTA has helped Mexico economically. Over the past five years real GDP has grown at 5.5 percent per year. Even including the sharp shock of the 1995 peso crisis, Mexican real GDP has grown at 3.8 percent per year since the ratification of NAFTA. The urban unemployment rate that was 6 percent in 1992 and rose to 8.5 percent in 1995 is now less than 4 percent. The Mexican boom has been led by the manufacturing, construction, transportation, and communications sectors. Most of all, the Mexican boom has been led by exports: next year Mexico's real exports will be more than three times as large as they were at the ratification of NAFTA, and as a share of GDP exports have grown from a little more than 10 to 17 percent. It is here--in the growing volume of exports and in the building-up of export industries--that NAFTA has made the difference. Four-fifths of Mexico's exports go to the United States. More than two-thirds of Mexico's imports come from the United States. NAFTA guarantees Mexican producers tariff- and quota-free access to the American market. Without this guarantee, a smaller number of Mexican exporters would dare try to develop the strong links with the market north of the Rio Grande that have enabled them to sell their exports. Without this guarantee, few--either in Mexico or from overseas--would have dared to invest in the manufacturing capacity that has allowed Mexico to satisfy United States demand. Without NAFTA's guarantee of tariff- and quota-free access to the American market, we would not have seen the rise in trade within industries between Mexico and the U.S. over the past half decade. Rising intra-industry trade means that Mexico and the U.S. are moving toward a greater degree of specialization and a finer division of labor in important industries like autos--where labor-intensive portions are more and more done in Mexico--and textiles--where the U.S. increasingly does high-tech spinning and weaving and Mexico increasingly does lower-tech cutting and sewing. As economists Mary Burfisher, Sherman Robinson, and Karen Thierfelder put it, NAFTA has nurtured the growth of productivity through "Smithian" efficiency gains that result from "widen[ing] the exent of the market" and capturing "increasing returns to finer specialization." Without NAFTA, would Mexican domestic savings have doubled as a share of GDP since the early 1990s? Surely not. Without NAFTA, would the number of telephone lines in Mexico have doubled in the 1990s? Probably not. Moreover, Mexican exports are by no means low-tech labor- and primary product-intensive goods. More than 20 percent of all Mexican exports are capital goods. More than 70 percent of Mexican manufacturing exports are metal products. Without NAFTA, would U.S. big three auto producers have invested in the Mexican auto industry, and would Mexican exports of autos and auto parts to the U.S. have grown from $10 to $30 billion a year? Surely not. More important, NAFTA has helped Mexico politically. Strong economic growth makes political reform much, much easier: reslicing a growing pie is possible under many circumstances where reslicing a static pie is not. AIncreasing economic integration brings with it pressures for increasing political integration as well: the liquidation of the statist-corporatist PRI order, and a shift toward democratic institutions that are more like those of the industrial democracies that Mexico hopes to join (and to which mexico hopes that NAFTA will serve as a passport of admission). The result has been the first peaceful transfer of power in Mexico in more than a lifetime, with the election to the Mexican presidency of Vicente Fox Queseda. Economist Dani Rodrik describes political democracy as a powerful meta-institution for building the political and economic institutions needed for success: thus Mexico's future looks much brighter now than it did back in the late 1980s when the dominant PRI regularly stole elections and held a hammerlock on Mexico's government.

### 1nc – discrimination good

#### Ethics require calculation – Levinasian ethics are incoherent in a world of multiple others - discrimination key

A – sacrificing yourself for someone else means you ignored all the other people that depend on you

B – responsibility requires discrimination

Hägglund, 06 - PhD candidate in Comparative Literature at Cornell University (Martin, “The Necessity of Discrimination,” Project Muse)

For the same reason, Derrida's notion of "infinite responsibility" should not be conflated with Levinas's. For Derrida, the infinitude of responsibility answers to the fact that responsibility always takes place in relation to a *negative infinity* of others. The negative infinity of responsibility is both spatial (innumerable finite others that exceed my horizon) and temporal (innumerable times past and to come that exceed my horizon). Far from confirming Levinas's sense of responsibility, the negative infinity of others is fatal for his notion of an originary encounter that would give ethics the status of "first philosophy" and be the guiding principle for a metaphysical "goodness." Even if it were possible to sacrifice yourself completely to another, to devote all your forces to the one who is encountered face-to-face, it would mean that you had disregarded or denied all the others who demanded your attention or needed your help. For there are always more than two*,* as Richard Beardsworth has aptly put it [137]. Whenever I turn toward another I turn away from yet another, and thus exercise discrimination. As Derrida points out in *The Gift of Death,* "I cannot respond to the call, the demand, the obligation, or even the love of another without sacrificing the other other, the other others" [68]. Consequently, Derrida emphasizes that the concept of responsibility lends itself *a priori* to "scandal and aporia" [68]. There are potentially an endless number of others to consider, and one cannot take any responsibility without excluding some others in favor of certain others. What makes it possible to be responsible is thus at the same time what makes it impossible for any responsibility to be fully responsible. Responsibility, then, is always more or less discriminating, and infinite responsibility is but another name for the necessity of discrimination. The necessity of discrimination is at the heart of Derrida's thinking, and anyone who wishes to articulate a deconstructive understanding of ethico-political problems needs to elaborate it. I insist on this point since it calls for an approach that is opposed to the numerous attempts to forge an alliance between Derrida and Levinas. One of the first to argue for such an alliance was Robert Bernasconi, who paved the way for later Levinasian readings of Derrida.[23](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/diacritics/v034/34.1hagglund.html" \l "FOOT23) In his essay "The Trace of Levinas in Derrida," Bernasconi claims that "Violence and Metaphysics" should not be understood as taking issue with Levinas's philosophy, but only as pointing out certain necessities that impose themselves on philosophical discourse. Derrida's critique of Levinas would then be limited to the way Levinas uses metaphysical language, and Bernasconi insists **[End Page 56]** that "this should not be confused with passing judgment on what Levinas says" [26]. Thus, Bernasconi disregards the central arguments in Derrida's essay and does not even address the notion of violence that is elaborated there. Bernasconi asserts that "we let the finite stand for the totalizing thought of the tradition of Western ontology, as the infinite stands for the attempt to surpass it" [15]. This is a misleading matrix for discussing Derrida's essay, since Derrida demonstrates the incoherence of such a set-up. Derrida argues that the finite cannot be a totality and that the idea of totality is the idea of the (positive) infinity that Levinas posits as a challenge to the idea of totality. Hence Derrida's insistence on taking "history, that is, finitude, seriously . . . in a sense which tolerates *neither finite totality, nor positive infinity*" [*WD* 117/172, my emphasis]. Because Bernasconi disregards the logic of this argument—which pervades Derrida's entire essay—he misconstrues the difference between Derrida and Levinas. In his later essay "Deconstruction and the Possibility of Ethics" [128], Bernasconi claims that Derrida's argument concerning how alterity already is *in* the Same has been adequately responded to by Levinas, through the latter's recognition that the idea of the Other is reflected within history and within Western ontology, in Plato's Good beyond being and Descartes's idea of the Infinite. But in fact, none of Derrida's criticisms are answered by this move. Derrida's argument is, on the contrary, that alterity cannot be thought in terms of the positive infinity that Levinas subscribes to in Plato and Descartes. Rather, alterity is indissociable from the violence of spacing, which is always already at work in the infinite finitude of différance. Instead of recognizing this argument, Bernasconi reiterates his claim that Derrida is not at odds with Levinas. According to Bernasconi, Derrida never really intended to show that "certain of Levinas's central terms were incoherent" [129]. Rather, Bernasconi formulates the ethics of deconstruction in Levinasian terms, as originating in a face-to-face relation.

### 1nc – moral absolutism

#### Moral absolutism is complicity with violence – it allows people to die for the sake of clean hands

A – moral absolutism means you don’t take action because you are afraid of the purity of your intention

B – moral purity is a form of complicity with violence and injustice because you didn’t lead to that so your hands are clean

C – it kills political effectivness

Isaac, 02 - professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University (Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” Dissent, Spring)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics— as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

### 1nc – nuke war o/w

#### Nuclear war outweighs – possibility of extinction outweighs all ethical principles

Kateb, 84 - professor @ Princeton University (George, “The Inner Ocean”)

Schell's work attempts to force on us an acknowledgment that sounds far-fetched and even ludicrous an acknowledgment that the possibility of extinction is carried by any use of nuclear weapons, no matter how limited or how seemingly rational or seemingly morally justified. He himself acknowledges that there is a difference between possibility and certainty. But in a matter that is more than a matter, more than one practical matter in a vast series of practical matters, in the "matter" of extinction, we are obliged to treat a possibility—a genuine possibility— as a certainty. Humanity is not to take any step that contains even the slightest risk of extinction. The doctrine of no-use is based on the possibility of extinction. Schell's perspective transforms the subject. He takes us away from the arid stretches of strategy and asks us to feel continuously, if we can, and feel keenly if only for an instant now and then, how utterly distinct the nuclear world is. Nuclear discourse must vividly register that distinctive-ness. It is of no moral account that extinction may be only a slight possibility. No one can say how great the possibility is, but no one has yet credibly denied that by some sequence or other a particular use of nuclear weapons may lead to human and natural extinction. If it is not impossible it must be treated as certain: the loss signified by extinction nullifies all calculations of probability as it nullifies all calculations of costs and benefits. Abstractly put, the connections between any use of nuclear weapons and human and natural extinction are several. Most obviously, a sizeable exchange of strategic nuclear weapons can, by a chain of events in nature, lead to earth’s uninhabitability, to “nuclear winter,” or as Schell’s “republic of insects and grass.” But the considerations of extinction cannot rest with the possibility of a sizeable exchange of strategic weapons. It cannot rest with the imperative that a sizeable exchange must not take place. A so-called tactical or “theater” use, or a so-called limited use, is also prohibited absolutely, because of the possibility of immediate escalation into a sizeable exchange of because, even if there were not an immediate escalation, the possibility of extinction would reside in the precedent for future use set by any use whatever in a world in which more than one power possesses nuclear weapons. Add other consequences: the contagious effect of nonnuclear powers who may feel compelled by a mixture of fear and vanity to try to acquire their own weapons, thus increasing the possibility of use by increasing the number of nuclear powers; and the unleashed emotions of indignation, retribution, and revenge which, if not acted on immediately in the form of escalation, can be counter on to seek expression later.

### 1nc – progressivism

#### Consequentialism key to progressivism – their moralism guarantees alienating potential allies and makes progressive reform impossible

A – identifications don’t change people they just show that there is a counter-movement

B – moralism is satisfied with saying that is wrong but doesn’t do anything about it

C – focus on moralism means the focus goes on what the government did wrong and anyone who did that is alienated

Isaac, 02 - professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University (Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” Dissent, Spring)

But what is absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who do not believe that the discourse of “anti-imperialism” speaks to their lives. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states—including most workers and the poor—value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jürgen Habermas has called “constitutional patriotism”: a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious identifications with Subcommandante Marcos or starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live. The ease with which the campus left responded to September 11 by rehearsing an alltoo- familiar narrative of American militarism and imperialism is not simply disturbing. It is a sign of this left’s alienation from the society in which it operates (the worst examples of this are statements of the Student Peace Action Coalition Network, which declare that “the United States Government is the world’s greatest terror organization,” and suggest that “homicidal psychopaths of the United States Government” engineered the World Trade Center attacks as a pretext for imperialist aggression. See http://www.gospan.org). Many left activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions of) Iraqi or Afghan civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next. This is not because of any “disloyalty.” Charges like that lack intellectual or political merit. It is because of a debilitating moralism; because it is easier to denounce wrong than to take real responsibility for correcting it, easier to locate and to oppose a remote evil than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But it exhibits little interest in how and why so many Americans think differently. The “peace” demonstrations organized across the country within a few days of the September 11 attacks—in which local Green Party activists often played a crucial role—were, whatever else they were, a sign of their organizers’ lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, they focused their energy not on the legitimate fear and outrage of American citizens but rather on the evils of the American government and its widely supported response to the terror. Hardly anyone was paying attention, but they alienated anyone who was. This was utterly predictable. And that is my point. The predictable consequences did not matter. What mattered was simply the expression of righteous indignation about what is wrong with the United States, as if September 11 hadn’t really happened. Whatever one thinks about America’s deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that a political praxis preoccupation with this is foolish and self-defeating. The other, more serious consequence of this moralizing tendency is the failure to think seriously about global *politics*. The campus left is rightly interested in the ills of global capitalism. But politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of “solidarity” with certain oppressed groups—Palestinians but not Syrians, Afghan civilians (though not those who welcome liberation from the Taliban), but not Bosnians or Kosovars or Rwandans—and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. The economic discourse of the campus left is a universalist discourse of human needs and workers rights; but it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. This refusal is linked to a peculiar strain of pacifism, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism.

### 1nc – depoliticization turn

#### “Responsibility to the other” depoliticizes action – means horrible atrocities are justified in the name of the other and that the perpetual victimhood of the other must be maintained

A – bombing on moral and ethical justification depoliticizes it

B – this mean the people that you are helping are not longer political subjects but helpless victims which kills their identity

C – this means their help is predicated on the fact that the other is the victim

Zizek, 99 - (Slavoj, “NATO, the left hand of God?” June 29, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/zizek/zizek-nato-the-left-hand-of-god.html)

Not long ago, Vaclev Havel maintained (in an essay titled "Kosovo and the End of the Nation State") that the bombing of Yugoslavia, for which there was no UN mandate, "placed human rights above the rights of states. . . . But this did not come into being in some irresponsible way, as an act or aggression or in contempt of international law. On the contrary. It happened about of respect for rights, for rights that stand above those which are protected by the sovereignty of states. The Alliance acted out of respect for human rights, in a way commanded not only by conscience but by the relevant documents of international law." This "higher law" has its "deepest roots outside the perceptible world." "While the state is the work of man, man is the work of God." In other words: NATO can violate international law because it is acting as the immediate instrument of God's "higher law." If that's not religious fundamentalism, the concept has no meaning. Havel's statement is a great example of what Ulrich Beck back in April called "military humanism" or "military pacifism" (in a feuilleton in the \_Sueddeutscher Zeitung\_). The problem is not so much one of Orwellian oxymora like the famous "War is Peace." (In my opinion the term "pacificism" was never meant seriously. When people buck up and are honest with themselves, the paradox of military pacificism disappears.) [Translators note: "pacifism" has a broader meaning in German than it does in English -- it includes roughly everything we would think of as "anti-war sentiment" or "anti-war movement." So a free translation of "military pacificism" would be roughly "war by people that have always said they were against it." But Beck's phrase is kind of famous, so let's leave it.] The problem is also not that the targets of the bombing weren't chosen on entirely moral grounds. The real problem is that a purely humanitarian, purely ethical justification for NATO's intervention completely depoliticizes it. NATO has shied away from a clearly defined political solution. Its intervention has been cloaked and justified exclusively in the depoliticized language of universal human rights. In this context, men and women are no longer political subjects, but helpless victims, robbed of all political identity and reduced to their naked suffering. In my opinion, this idealist subject-victim is an ideological construct of NATO. Not only NATO, But Also Nostalgics on the Left, Misunderstand the Causes of the War Today we can see that the paradox of the bombing of Yugoslavia is not the one that Western pacifists have been complaining about -- that NATO set off the very ethnic cleansing that it was supposed to be preventing. No, the ideology of victimization is the real problem: it's perfectly fine to help the helpless Albanians against the Serbian monsters, but under no circumstances must they be permitted to throw off this helplessness, to get a hold on themselves as a sovereign and independent political subject - -- a subject that doesn't need the kindly shelter of NATO's "protectorate." No, they have to stay victims. The strategy of NATO is thus perverse in the precise Freudian sense of the word: The other will stay protected so long as it remains the victim.

### 1nc – reversibility

#### The reversibility of “the other” as a subject position means unconditional ethics always devolve into a relationship of domination in a face to face encounter

A – it isn’t logical and not sustainable, it says to be nice to those that hurt you

B – the theory supposes that everyone is going to act on good nature

C – the other is reversible so instead of “you should subject yourself to the other” it could be “you should subject yourself to me”

Hägglund, 6 - PhD candidate in Comparative Literature at Cornell University (Martin, “The Necessity of Discrimination,” Project Muse)

As a result, Levinas's injunction of unconditional submission before the other cannot be sustained. Although Levinas claims to proceed from the face-to-face relation, he evidently postulates that the subject in the ethical encounter either gazes upward (toward the Other as the High) or downward (toward the Other as someone who is helplessly in need, bearing "the face of the poor, the stranger, the widow and the orphan" as a refrain declares in *Totality and Infinity*). But regarding all the situations where you are confronted with an other who assaults you, turns down the offered hospitality, and in turn denies you help when you need it, Levinas has nothing to say. If the other whom I encounter wants to kill me, should I then submit myself to his or her command? And if someone disagrees with me, should I then automatically accept this criticism as a law that is not to be questioned or counterattacked? Questions like these make it clear that Levinas does not at all found his ethics on an intersubjective encounter. Rather, he presupposes that the ethical encounter exhibits a fundamental asymmetry, where the other is an absolute Other who reveals the transcendence **[End Page 52]**of the Good. Accordingly, Levinas condemns every form of self-love as a corruption of the ethical relation, and prescribes that the subject should devote itself entirely to the other. To be ethical is for Levinas to be purely disinterested, to take responsibility for the other without seeking any recognition on one's own behalf.[19](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/diacritics/v034/34.1hagglund.html" \l "FOOT19) It suffices, however, to place yourself face-to-face with someone else to realize that the asymmetry assumed by Levinas is self-refuting. If you and I are standing in front of each other, who is the other? The answer can only be doubly affirmative since "the other" is an interchangeable term that shifts referent depending on who pronounces the words. I am an other for the other and vice versa, as Derrida reinforces in "Violence and Metaphysics." Derrida's argument not only contradicts Levinas's idea of the absolutely Other, but also undercuts his rhetoric. That "the other" is a reversible term means that all of Levinas's ethical declarations can be read against themselves. To say that the I should subject itself to the other is at the same time to say that the other should subject itself to the I, since I am a you and you are an I when we are others for each other. To condemn the self-love of the I is by the same token to condemn the self-love of the other. Indeed, whoever advocates a Levinasian ethics will be confronted with a merciless irony as soon as he or she comes up to someone else and face-to-face declares, "You should subject yourself to the Other," which then literally means, "You should subject yourself to Me, you should obey My law."

### 1nc – at: vtl

#### The fact that their ethics allow sacrificing a greater number of people proves they devalue life

Wasserman and Strudler, 03 - research scholar at the University of Maryland’s institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, AND Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Director of the Ethics Program at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, (David and Alan, “Can a nonconsequentialist count lives?” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31.1)

We have argued that there is not yet an adequate nonconsequentialist account of the abiding conviction that it is wrong to save the lesser rather than the greater number. Such an account must not only explain the core intuition that the numbers count, but it must also plausibly accommodate, or explain why one should reject, another robust intuition about numbers: That failing to save the larger group is a greater wrong the larger the disparity in numbers; that it is a greater wrong to save one person rather than a thousand than to save one person rather than two. A consequentialist offers an easy explanation of this intuition in terms of the greater waste of lives in the former case, but the intuition is less easily explained by an account that faults the rescuer for failing to adopt a decision procedure that respects the equality of the imperiled lives. On such an account, the rescuer who chooses an inappropriate procedure, such as a coin toss or a proportional lottery, commits a single moral error. Although his erroneous choice may wrong more or fewer people, depending on the number of people in the larger group (or the total number of imperiled people), it is not obvious why that choice is worse if it wrongs more people; the coin-tossing rescuer is not like a recidivist who commits serial wrongs. Moreover, even if his choice were regarded as morally worse the greater the number of people it wronged, this would not explain the intuition that the wrongfulness of his choice depends on the *disparity* in numbers between the two sides. It is only if, per Kavka, the rescuer is seen as disregarding the lives of the "excess" members of the larger group that the wrong can be seen as greater the larger the excess. But we have argued that that account is vulnerable to the same criticism as consequentialist accounts, in treating the failure to save the greater number as tantamount to wasting or neglecting lives. It may be that a nonconsequentialist account will have to plausibly reject the intuition that links the disparity in numbers with the magnitude of the wrong if it is to overcome the stubborn appeal of consequentialism in forced choices among lives.

### 2ac- Inevitable

#### Fordism is too entrenched—alt fails.

Lipietz 97 – French engineer, economist and politician, master's degree in economics, previously research director at the French National Centre for Scientific Research, The post-Fordist world: labour relations, international hierarchy and global ecology (Alain, “The post-Fordist world: labour relations, international hierarchy and global ecology,” translated by Angus Cameron, Sussex University, Review of International Political Economy 4:1 Spring 1997, P. 27, <http://www2.cddc.vt.edu/digitalfordism/fordism_materials/papers/lipietz/lipietz.pdf>, RD)

As for the organization of economic networks in its sphere of co- prosperity – the word is not well chosen – that is another matter. The USA only controls those on its northern border (Canada) and a single stretch of its southern border (Mexico). The whole of South America, including those countries that were once so promising (Brazil and Argentina), is now caught up in a backward fl ow of history, highly indebted, too far from a USA which has become too weak, hoping that Japan and Europe will once again show an interest. This seems already to be the case with Chile. The second paradox is that the USA and its periphery compete on the same technological paradigm, and therefore by greater or lesser fl exibility. The result is that the USA seems to be less fl exible than its own periphery. Yet it is necessary, for the south too, to check the real - ities of the capital–labour relationship, for there are invocations in the same place (from Mexico to Argentina) to the virtues of fl exibilization and to the Japanese model . 1 ‘Japanization on the cheap’ The ‘fl exibilization’ achieved in the old Fordist countries, that I have called ‘neo-Taylorism’, only appears in a relative sense. Even if the USA ‘brazilianizes’, it will be a long way from experiencing the low wages and the absence of social provision of the NICs and the Third World. These countries started from an initial position of very strong fl exibility, an ‘endowment’ upon which they relied for the fi rst step of primitive Taylorism and to accede eventually to a state of peripheral Fordism. However, the ‘older industrialized countries’ of the Third World exper - ienced a ‘Cepalian’ form of pre-industrialization, with a regime of import substitution and semi-Fordist industrial relations regulated by corpo-ratism: this was the case with Mexico, Argentina and Brazil. Subsequently these countries are now experiencing a certain ‘refl exibi - lization’, which eventually couples itself to the proclaimed importation of ‘Japanese methods’. 17 The Mexican Hermosillo Ford plant is without doubt the masterpiece of ‘Japanization’ in a region of the world typifi ed by ‘fl exibilization’. It is, therefore, particularly interesting to examine here the reality of the importation of ‘Japanese management methods’. 18 We fi nd that the work at Ford Hermosillo is not found in the end to be the juxtaposition of the Japanese technological paradigm with American fl exibility. If this is Japanization, then it is cosmetic and ideological: Japanization on the cheap.

# 2nc

## Topicality

#### Our interpretation is that the affirmative must increase new types of economic engagement in one of the three topic countries

### Towards

#### Topical affs can only increase financial aid toward the topic countries – NOT toward the U.S. or any other countries

#### They don’t meet this because – NAFTA includes canada

#### They blow the lid off the topic – they allow for multiple versions of every aff – they can work with each topic country to increase investment in the U.S. or any other countries – that creates multiple versions of every aff

#### For example – they create hundreds of versions of the biofuels aff ALONE by being able to invest in ANY country – then multiply that by the 3 topic countries they can choose to work with – then multiply that with EVERY AFF ON THE TOPIC

#### Limits outweigh – they’re key to in-depth education by allowing the neg to prepare case-specific strategies that test every part of the aff – that’s critical to becoming an expert on Latin American economic policy

#### Expertism outweighs because people won’t listen to you if you’re not an expert, they’ll just go to other people for help, which means our education is the only way to get in a position of power to ACTUALLY change things – portable skills are irrelevant if we’re not in a position to use them

### Increase

#### Topical affs can only INCREASE or CREATE NEW engagement – like increasing investment in Mexican biofuels

#### Aff can’t extend the duration of EXISTING engagement – they do this because they just renegotiate nafta which could hypothetically decrease economic engagement – if their uniqueness arguments about how corporations like lower wages is true than changing the labor laws would decrease that trade

#### They explode the topic by allowing the aff to just extend current policies with countries – that makes it impossible to be neg because we’d never be able to get any Disads because the aff could say they’re all empirically denied by the status quo

#### And it let’s the aff prevent policies from being cancelled DECADES from now – and we could never get Disads to that because we can’t get uniqueness for disads DECADES in the future

#### And they destroy limits by making EVERY current engagement policy topical – that prevents in-depth research on affs – which is critical to becoming an expert on Latin American economic policy

## K

### Perm

#### Sequencing is Key – It Determines the Organizational Intent and Functionality of Advocacy – Inclusion of the Binary Logic of the 1AC Collapses the Alternative

Dr. Sarah Topp PhD @ KU, Director of Debate @ Trinity, 2010 “Rhetorical Interactions Of Social Movement Organizations In A Movement: A Study Of The Intersex Rights Advocacy Movement” Submitted to the graduate degree program in Communication Studies and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas

There is much more at stake, however, than just which strategies are adopted by ¶ an organization. Although this is critically important for giving an organization a guide ¶ or direction by which to proceed, the organizational identity crafted by an organization is ¶ also important because it determines who will join or support the organization. The ¶ specific language of the mission statement “may mobilize different segments of activists¶ to participate in different organizations . . .” (Platt and Williams, 2002, p. 338). As a ¶ consequence, organizations prominently feature their mission statement on public ¶ documents and on their webpages. It is often one of the first things that interested readers ¶ will see when first encountering an organization. This is certainly true for the different ¶ intersex advocacy organizations. All four of the groups display either their entire mission ¶ statement or the key phrases of their mission statement in the center of the group’s ¶ homepage. All of them also prominently feature a link or tab that leads readers to a page ¶ that more comprehensively develops their organizational mission. This seems to indicate ¶ that the groups are aware of the importance of mission statements and core organizational ¶ identity when it comes to attracting new members. ¶ Once new members have decided to join the organization, a clear mission ¶ statement is important for the long-term endurance of the organization. Kebede, Shriver, ¶ and Knotterus (2000) argue, “A movement’s endurance depends on its ability to develop ¶ and sustain a strong sense of collective identity” (p. 313). However, once collective ¶ identity begins to weaken either due to organizational change or because the organization ¶ met its purpose, the organization may cease to exist.

#### The Perm Cant Solve – the Affs Labeling of Sex as Either Dualistic Identity of Either Male or Female Creates a Process of Naming That is Impossible to Escape Once the Initial Identification Occurs

Dr. Sarah Topp PhD @ KU, Director of Debate @ Trinity, 2010 “Rhetorical Interactions Of Social Movement Organizations In A Movement: A Study Of The Intersex Rights Advocacy Movement” Submitted to the graduate degree program in Communication Studies and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas

The power of language has long been studied and discussed. Its ability to modify, ¶ create, and disrupt has been recounted countless times. It is no mystery that the names ¶ we give to people have tremendous creative power. This formative potential is inherent ¶ in language. Burke (1974) argues, “The magical decree is implicit in all language; for the ¶ mere act of naming a specific object . . . decrees that it is not to be singled out as such and ¶ such rather than as something other. . . . What we need is correct magic . . . whose ¶ decrees about the naming of real situations is the closest possible approximation to the ¶ situation named” (p. 3-4). Cameron (1999) adds, “Names are a culture’s way of fixing ¶ what will actually count as reality in a universe of overwhelming, chaotic sensations, all ¶ pregnant with a multitude of possible meanings” (p. 10). Thus, once a name has been ¶ chosen it brings into being a particular, singular subject. This is the ontological quality of ¶ language. ¶ Language also plays an important epistemological function in society. In a ¶ general sense, “Language mediates reality to the individual. It makes it possible for one ¶ to find one’s bearings in the world as a person” (Luckmann, 1975, p. 50-51). In ¶ particular, names shape one’s orientation toward the world. A name is an “identifying ¶ tag that follows its referent wherever she goes” (Margolin, 2002, para.3). It is not ¶ something easily changed or reformed. Instead, once a name is selected the individual ¶ receiving the name will find it difficult to detach herself from the implications of that label. This is because, as Vacarescu (2004) argues, “There is an intimate relationship ¶ between language and knowledge, between the act of naming and that of knowledge ¶ production, a relationship in which the former influences, structures and constructs the ¶ latter” (p. 3). Thus a name is not simply an empty label; rather it plays an integral part in ¶ shaping the “details of everyday life” (Vittoria, 1999, p. 370) and in constructing one’s ¶ reality. This is possible because of language’s ability to select certain aspects of reality ¶ while deflecting others (Burke, 1966). ¶ The axiological implications of language cannot be divorced from a discussion of ¶ naming either. The act of naming and accepting a name conveys “powerful imagery” and ¶ “can be a political exercise” (Martin, 1991, p. 83). The ethical implications of choosing a ¶ name are an important concern and the “belief that some labels are more stigmatising ¶ than others may lead to a search for an alternative label that is regarded by the person as ¶ less stigmatizing” (Gillman et al., 2000, p. 395). The potential for some names to ¶ empower and for others to harm is especially evident when particularized in a medical ¶ setting The language of illness, disease, diagnoses and medicine can be particularly ¶ powerful for individual understandings of self. Karkazis and Feder (2008) argue, “The ¶ ways we identify medical conditions—together with their permutations in labels, ¶ identities, or diagnoses attributed to (and sometimes embraced by) individuals ¶ thereafter— are freighted with meaning that is tied to a sense of self” (p. 2016). Gergen ¶ et al. (1996) add, “Diagnoses, official and unofficial, often concretise identities that limit ¶ people; they create black boxes with few, obscure exits, and they form obstacles to more viable and liberating self definitions” (p. 5). Gillman et al. (2000) take this a step further ¶ and argue that diagnoses can be a form of social control that possibly “‘bring forth’ ¶ pathology, create problem saturated identities, and construct careers as patients and ¶ cases” (p. 403). Of course, the individual alone does not complete the process of ¶ diagnosis; a medical expert is an integral player in this process. As such their role should ¶ be explored further. ¶ Medicine and its attendant “discursive practices, such as diagnosis, have been ¶ central to the construction of the subjectivity and the objectification of people . . .” ¶ (Gillman et al., 2000, p. 391). This is because the choice of terminology and the way it is ¶ presented to the patient “may have a profound effect on the patient” (Wood, 1991, p. ¶ 534). Unfortunately, medical practitioners often are untrained in the use of “illness ¶ language to negotiate the relief of the sufferer” (Good, 1977, p. 27). This is especially ¶ problematic because, as Mendez et al. (1988) suggest society empowers certain groups ¶ of people to make definitions . . . of health or sickness, and ‘in consequence, the right to ¶ be heard and be obeyed in those domains’ (p. 145). Thus, if doctors are applying certain ¶ diagnoses to some patients they are not applying neutral labels for a condition; instead, ¶ they are “actively involved in the very production of the phenomena they represent” ¶ (Lackmund, 1998, p. 780). Further, research in medical setting suggests that social meanings attached to illness and disease have a powerful effect on standards of care and ¶ treatment options (Mishler et al., 1981; Cottrell and Schulz, 1993). The names applied by ¶ doctors themselves function to shape their understandings of their patients. The implications of naming stretch beyond the medical realm; “the voice of ¶ medicine” implicates the “voice of the life-world” (Mishler, 1984). In other words, ¶ diagnosis “is often enough the legal basis for provision of health services, welfare ¶ benefits, unemployment certification, worker's compensation claims, and legal ¶ testimony” (Brown, 1995, p. 39). Additionally, the choice of language “influences . . . ¶ how parents view their affected children, how intersex people understand themselves, and ¶ how others not directly involved in medical settings—such as gender and legal scholars, ¶ historians, and media commentators—conceive of and theorize about gender, sex, and the ¶ body” (Reis, 2007, p. 536). It should be clear that the choice of naming, especially in ¶ relationship to a medical condition, has severe implications for how people perceive ¶ themselves and are treated by others; it sets limits on the possibilities open to that ¶ individual. With this general theory in mind, it is now possible to lay out arguments for ¶ what counts as appropriate nomenclature in the debate surrounding intersex advocacy. ¶ Once complete, a more specific discussion of the chosen discourses can ensue.

### Alt solves

#### The Alternative Solves the Case – Discussions of Intersexed Individuals Destabilizes Normative Power Relationships That the Aff Identifies

Dr. Signe Bremer PhD in Cultural Sciences @ Gothenburg University 2013 Penis as Risk: A Queer Phenomenology of Two Swedish Transgender Women’s Narratives on Gender Correction Somatechnics 3.2 (2013): 329–350

This quote from Vera, a preoperative transgender woman, reveals Swedish gender-confirming health care as a system that provides transgender women who aim for juridical gender correction with few options for how to embody and present femininity. ‘Real’ preoperative transgender women are expected to be well-behaved, modest and sexually passive, in line with the white, middle-class standard of respectable femininity that informs the obligatory psychiatric assessment required to alter legal sex. As I will argue here, in the context of Swedish gender-confirming healthcare, such respectability is intimately bound to the cultural genealogy of the penis of flesh. This means that ideas of original, non-performative, sexually active, and white superior masculinity clings to the penis of flesh, just as the penis of flesh always sticks to its history – the phallus.¶ The image of a woman with a penis does similar work to that of the pregnant man – they both destabilize the Swedish society’s naturalized and anti-transgender ideal of unambiguously gendered bodies (Sullivan & Davidmann 2012). Accordingly, alternative forms of gender embodiment (or corporealities) conjure up notions of chaos. The naturalized assumptions that a person’s birth-given material body, legal sex, gender identity, gender expression, sexual desire, parental status, kinship and death point in the same direction position transgender women, who desire legal gender recognition but not genital surgery, within the sphere of the unthinkable, uninhabitable, unintelligible and less human. Therefore – in a psychiatric contex – transgender women are denied sexual pleasure before they are granted the legal status as female. Any sign of sexual activity before vaginoplasty would imply a certain degree of penis acceptance. Thus, I argue, the penis, and transgender women’s acceptance of it, becomes a risk. Denial of transgender women’s sexuality is also coupled with ideas about fetishist transvestism acting as the sexualized and false constitutive outside to ‘real’ and sexually passive male to female transsexualism. According to psychoanalytical theories of sexual pathology, which form the cultural horizon through which transgender women are assessed, fetishism is isolated to the domain of men. Transgender women who turn to gender-confirming healthcare are thus always already perceived as potential male fetishistic transvestites. A transsexual man on the other hand appears as less of a threat – since unlike to his transgender sister he cannot occupy the fetish position.¶

### Link

#### the static understand of sex as only male or female excludes both transgender individuals and hermaphrodites exclusion of these bodies is what makes all exclusions possible – that’s bremer – Rejection of the linguistic dualism of male OR female is key – that’s topp – interrogation of the language is key to alter the way that society and policy occur

#### the affirmative in cross ex said it is all about patriarchal violence that is done against women or homosexual male – that word selection is the societal norm that Bremen says must be destroyed

#### In cross ex I asked about the labor agreement part of the plan he said vega proves solvency – this means their labor standards only apply to their definition of a woman proves that those bodies continue to feel excluded – links turns the aff

Vega 2K Griselda, Organizer of Projects at to Circulate K Central Mexico, University of Iowa College of Law, an attorney with Columbia Legal Services in Yakima, 4 Journal of Gender, Race and& Justice. Maquiladora's Lost Women: The Killing Fields of Mexico-Are NAFTA and NAALC Providing the Needed Protection? 137, Volume 4. Number 2, Fall

Nancy] was just 14, but her forgedID papers said she was 16, old enough to join the thousands of womenworking in the maquiladoras, the foreign-owned "twin plants" whose assembly operations here take advantage of Mexico's cheap labor. Sheknew the risks, had heard about the murders of girls and young womenwhose sexually mutilated bodies for years had turned up withfrightening regularity in the Chihuahuan desert that surrounds this sprawling city on the border between Mexico and Texas.... From1993, when police began keeping track, until this March, 187 womenwere slain in Juarez. The killings occurred so frequently that curiosityseekerscruised the outskirts of town on the weekends, lookingfor-and finding-bodies.Many of the victims worked in the maquilas, as the factories are known. But even though the girl worked the night shift, until 1 a.m.,she felt safe. After all, her 21-year-old sister-in-law worked with her, sharing the hour-long bus ride back to the shantytown where she lived with nine family members on the edge of a smoldering city dump. Then her sister-in-law quit. And one cold night at the end ofMarch, the girl found herself the last passenger on the bus. It was very dark-in her desperately poor neighborhood, there are no streetlights. The driver, a man she knew only by his nickname, El Tolteca, pulledthe bus over to the side of the dirt street. He stood and turned to faceher, put his hands around her neck and began to squeeze. She lostconsciousness.He raped her, beating her face into a bloody mess. Policephotographs show a mass of bruises, and a necklace of angry red weltscircling her throatThis is the image of one of the young women who work in the maquilas ormaquiladoras of Mexico.2 The adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement3 (NAFTA) was hailed as one of the most powerful andcomprehensive treaties of the time NAFTA would join the people and resources of Canada, Mexico, and the United States, but most importantly, itincluded a supplemental labor agreement, the North American Agreement onLabor Cooperation' (NAALC), that would protect all the countries' workers.6 It is this labor agreement that has failed to adequately protect the lives of over230 young Mexican women who have been victims of the latest serial murdersplaguing the Mexican-American border.' NAALC was enacted in an attemptto create international labor standards and curtail any labor abuses that existed. Yet, since entering into force on January 1, 1994, the protection provided by NAALC seems dismal at best, considering that over a period of six years the bodies of over 230 young women have appeared on the outskirts of the towns which are home to the largest maquiladoras in Mexico.

## Case

## 2

### No Solvo

#### The plan doesn’t solve – if their argument about corporatism is correct those corporations will shift their business to china which means that those women lose their jobs which is net worse –

#### China is hurting Mexican manufacturing now

Gallagher and Dussel 14- Kevin, Professor of International Relations at Boston University, Co-director of the Global Economic Governance Initiative, Enrique, Professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, Director of the Center for China-Mexico Studies (“How China crashed the Nafta party”, January 2, 2014 http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/jan/02/china-crashed-nafta-party-free-trade\\CLans

According to western tradition, the gift for the 20th anniversary of a union is china. But, two decades on from the trade nuptials enshrined in the the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta), China is the uninvited guest that has walked away with many of the gifts. In 1993, pro-Nafta Washington thinktanks, such as the Peterson Institute for International Economics, went so far as to say that the agreement would lead to a trade surplus with Mexico for the US, while also providing huge benefits for the Mexican economy. The US had a trade surplus with Mexico in 1994, but since 1995 the US has had an annual trade deficit with Mexico. On the Mexican side, GNI per capita economic growth is now barely one percentage point higher than when Nafta came into force. What has happened since then? Nafta has had at least two phases. In the first (1994-2000) it increased trade, investments, productivity and overall integration, with positive effects in employment and production in several export-oriented sectors in Mexico. In the second phase since 2000, however, Nafta turned sour. Its negotiators in the early 1990s did not anticipate the rise of Asia and particularly of China. Looking back, our research shows that China has significantly penetrated many of the new markets opened by Nafta. In a paper published by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, we document the extent to which Chinese products have taken away market share in the US, and how China has begun to take Mexican markets from the US as well. From 1994 to 2001, Mexico had a honeymoon with the US. No other country enjoyed the same proximity and trade preferences. Although trade increased significantly between the two countries, it failed to translate into per capita income growth and rising employment and wages in Mexico. The honeymoon ended in 2001 when China entered the World Trade Organisation and began to enjoy similar access to the US market. We find that by 2009, 84% of Mexico's manufacturing exports to the US were under threat from China. By threat we mean sectors where China is gaining market share and Mexico is losing it. We also find that 96% of US exports to Mexico are under threat from China. In 2000, the US supplied Mexico with 60.8% of its office machine and computer imports and 70% of the peripheral parts for those machines. Ten years later, the US held only 10% of the Mexican import market in each sector. By contrast, China held 13% of the office machine import market and 5% of the parts market in Mexico in 2000, and, nine years later, it had 48% and 58% of those markets respectively. Simple economics would lead one to think this would be a benefit for Mexico – as the inputs for its electronic industry decreased because imports from China are cheaper than from the US. This should lead to productivity gains and more exports to the States. China and Mexico supplied the US about 5% of the US computer market in 2000; by 2009 China had more than half that market and Mexico did not budge. We performed in-depth case studies alongside this statistical work that further confirm our findings. The yarn-textile-garment chain – similar to furniture, toys and most of Mexico's manufacturing sector – is symbolic in losing more than 50% of its employment since 2000. The US has become an additional loser, since it is the major supplier of Mexican exports. The automobile parts and assembly chain is a big exception in the competition with China, in the US market and in Mexico. Since the beginning of Nafta, Mexico's exports in the US have strengthened, with levels above 30%, while China's share has remained relatively low, mainly for domestic reasons: China's consumption in the auto sector has been dynamic and above its production, in other words the potential for exports has been low. This, however, will change as China's auto companies follow the lead set by other Chinese global multinationals. This is the hangover that will be felt long after the 20th anniversary party. The only remedy will be couples' therapy. From Mexico's vantage point the "Asia pivot" is seen as cheating on a partner. The region needs to revitalise its relationship: it is time to start a conversation about collective financing mechanisms, exchange-rate co-ordination, and strategic sectors for the Nafta region so it can negotiate and see itself as a larger block. That would give us something to celebrate.

### Alt Cause

Massive alt cause - Specifically, The North American Free Trade Agreement’s promotion of cheap American corn has impoverished small farmers – labor unions don’t solve

Gonzalez in 2011, Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law, ’11 [Carmen G., “AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CRITIQUE OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TRADE POLICY, AND THE MEXICAN NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORMS”, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 32 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 723, Spring]  
In order to draw lessons from the Mexican experience with agricultural trade liberalization, it is important to assess who wins and who loses as a consequence of this economic reform. In the United States, the main beneficiaries of trade liberalization in the corn sector are large agricultural enterprises that receive generous agricultural subsidies as well as corn exporters, such as Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland, that undercut Mexican producers by selling corn on world markets at artificially depressed prices. n163 [\*756] Between 1997 and 2005, for example, U.S. agro-exporters dumped corn on Mexican markets at an average of nineteen percent below the cost of production. n164 These exporters also benefit from the U.S. government's provision of export credits to Mexican importers of U.S. corn in order to increase U.S. market share and help U.S. companies compete against foreign producers. n165 In Mexico, the primary beneficiaries are the importers of U.S. corn, particularly large livestock enterprises (who use the corn for animal feed) and processors of soft drinks (who use corn syrup). n166 The two Mexican firms that dominate tortilla production also benefit from depressed corn prices because their market power has enabled them to raise tortilla prices rather than pass on the lower corn prices to consumers. n167 Indeed, public outcry over soaring tortilla prices and over the hoarding of corn flour by the giant tortilla companies in order to drive prices even higher prompted Mexican President Felipe Calderon to impose price controls on tortillas in early 2007. n168¶ The primary losers from trade liberalization are small farmers and consumers in Mexico, particularly traditional and indigenous [\*757] farmers whose livelihoods have been destroyed by the elimination of tariffs and by U.S. agricultural subsidies. However, human health and the environment in both the United States and Mexico have suffered under this arrangement in ways that are not immediately obvious due to the fact that social and environmental externalities (positive and negative) are not reflected in corn prices.¶ Corn production in the United States is more chemical-intensive than the production of other commodities (such as wheat or soybeans) and it is increasingly expanding into dry areas where irrigation is necessary. n169 As corn production expands to meet Mexican demand, U.S. surface and groundwater supplies are increasingly contaminated by agricultural runoff. n170 The contamination of surface waters by nitrogen-containing fertilizers promotes algae blooms that reduce dissolved oxygen in the water, thereby killing fish and other wildlife. n171 The great quantities of nitrogen carried from the nation's agricultural heartland by the Mississippi River have already produced a "dead zone" in the Gulf of Mexico, where marine life cannot survive. n172 Likewise, atrazine, the most common herbicide used on corn, disrupts the endocrine system and is known to cause cancer in rats. n173 Exposure to atrazine poses serious risks for farm workers (many of whom are Mexican immigrants), consumers of corn products, and people who use groundwater downstream from fields where corn is cultivated. n174 Chlorpyrifos, the most common insecticide used in corn production, is a neurotoxin that is particularly dangerous to children who are exposed to it at high levels. n175 Finally, the expansion of corn cultivation into Nebraska, Kansas, Texas, and Colorado to meet growing Mexican demand has necessitated the pumping of additional groundwater for irrigation, resulting in [\*758] unsustainable rates of withdrawal from the Ogallala Aquifer and conflicts over water rights. n176¶ In Mexico, the most significant social externality resulting from the drop in corn prices is growing rural poverty, which has increased rural-to-urban migration and threatens the integrity of indigenous and local farming communities. n177 The most significant environmental externality is the threat to agrobiodiversity posed by the out-migration of the farmers who cultivate Mexico's diverse corn varieties. n178¶ The market price for U.S. corn understates the true social cost of production because it neglects to internalize the human health and environmental costs discussed above. Conversely, the market price for Mexican corn fails to take into account the social and environmental benefits of traditional corn cultivation, including the well-being of indigenous communities and the importance for these communities and for the world's food supply of conserving Mexico's diverse corn varieties.¶ As a consequence of trade liberalization, market failures in the United States interface with market failures in Mexico to create a price structure that misidentifies the United States as the most efficient corn producer, thereby increasing harm to human health and the environment in the United States, undermining the sustainable livelihoods of indigenous communities in Mexico, and jeopardizing Mexico's genetic diversity. n179 Economist James Boyce has referred to this phenomenon as the "globalization of market failure." n180¶ [\*759]

#### Current policies are focused purely on maintaining smooth flows of trade. This locks in conditions of economic and social instability in Mexico—

Wainer in 2011, immigration policy analyst for Bread for the World Institute, in ‘11

[Andrew, “Development and Migration In Rural Mexico”, Bread for the World Institute, Brief No. 11, January]

As the source of 60 percent of all unauthorized immigration¶ to the United States, Mexico is unrivaled¶ as in its importance to U.S. immigration policy¶ (see Figure 1).1 Recognizing this, the U.S. government’s primary¶ response has been reinforcing the country’s 1,969-mile¶ border with its southern neighbor. While this is popular with¶ the public, it hasn’t stopped unauthorized immigration.2¶ Although unauthorized immigration has decreased in recent¶ years, most experts attribute that primarily to the loss¶ of available jobs in the United States rather than increased¶ spending on border enforcement.3¶ U.S. spending on immigration enforcement increased¶ from $1 billion to $15 billion between 1990 and 2009. During¶ this time the U.S. unauthorized immigrant population increased¶ from 3 million to almost 12 million.4 Experts recognize¶ that given the pull of higher wages in the United States,¶ it would take unrealistic amounts of personnel and funding–¶ not to mention the use of lethal force–to stop unauthorized¶ immigration through Mexico.5¶ The enforcement-only approach to migration is ineffective¶ because it ignores some of the principal causes of unauthorized¶ migration to the United States: poverty and inequality¶ in Latin America, particularly in Mexico.6 Although¶ every migrant has his or her own story, most of those stories¶ include the inability to find work or earn enough money in¶ their homeland.¶ In a 2010 case study of an immigrant-sending community¶ in Mexico, 61 percent of male migrants reported that¶ economic opportunities–higher wages and more jobs–were¶ the primary motivating factor for migration to the United¶ States.7 As the 2009 United Nations Human Development¶ Report stated, migration “largely reflects people’s need to¶ improve their livelihoods.”8¶ In order to address immigration pressures directly, the¶ United States must consider a more balanced development¶ agenda toward Mexico and other migrant-sending countries¶ in Latin America. This includes elevating the importance¶ of poverty reduction and job-creation projects targeted to¶ migrant-sending communities—particularly in rural Mexico,¶ where poverty and migration are concentrated.9¶ Building sustainable livelihoods in migrant-sending communities¶ not only has the potential to reduce a major cause¶ of immigration to the United States but could also contribute¶ to the fight against violence and lawlessness in Mexico.¶ While the reasons for the violence are complex, poverty and¶ a lack of economic opportunity for Mexican youth certainly¶ facilitate involvement in illicit activity along with out-migration.¶ 10¶ The U.S. government and multilateral organizations such¶ as the United Nations are expressing increased interest in¶ the nexus of development and migration. The U.S. Agency¶ for International Development (USAID) in particular is supporting¶ research on the role that the diaspora can play in¶ their home countries’ development.11¶ In November 2010, U.S. State Department Assistant Secretary¶ Eric P. Schwartz said, “Governments and international¶ organizations must also better anticipate the impact of development¶ programs on the movement of people.”12 These¶ are a promising signs. But policymakers lack models and a¶ process for converting this increased interest into concrete¶ policies and projects that seek to reduce migration pressures¶ in Latin America in general and in Mexico in particular.¶ U.S. Foreign Assistance to Mexico and the¶ Mérida Initiative¶ The U.S. embassy in Mexico City states on its website,¶ “The lack of opportunities to earn a living wage spurs migration—¶ both internal and international.”13 But the U.S. government’s¶ foreign policy response to the causes of immigration¶ matches its domestic policy: an overwhelming focus on security¶ and law enforcement.14¶ Within the U.S. government’s Latin America assistance¶ portfolio, Mexico has traditionally been a low-priority country¶ because of its status as a middle-income nation. Until¶ 2008, Mexico and Central America received 16.2 percent¶ of foreign assistance funds directed toward Latin America.¶ This typically amounted to $60-70 million per year for Mexico,¶ with more than half of that directed to assist Mexico’s¶ fight against international drug trafficking. Mexico received¶ about $27 million per year in foreign assistance for all nonsecurity¶ programs prior to 2008.15¶ In an effort to combat Mexico’s narcotic trafficking organizations,¶ U.S. assistance was dramatically increased in¶ 2008 through the Mérida Initiative, a multi-year $1.8 billion¶ program focused on law enforcement assistance to¶ Mexican (and, to a lesser extent, Central American)¶ security agencies. Through this program, U.S.¶ assistance to Mexico increased from $65 million¶ in fiscal year 2007 to almost $406 million in fiscal¶ year 2008.16 In 2009, total State Department assistance¶ to Mexico was $786.8 million. Of this total¶ assistance package, $753.8 million—96 percent of¶ U.S. funds to Mexico—was directed toward military¶ and drug enforcement assistance. Although¶ it’s dwarfed by the $10 billion annual border enforcement¶ budget, the Mérida Initiative dominates¶ U.S. foreign assistance to Mexico.17¶ In 2009, U.S. development assistance that could¶ be directed toward job-creation projects that reduce¶ migration pressures totaled $11.2 million,¶ or .01 percent of total U.S. assistance (see Table¶ 1 on next page). The Mérida Initiative increased¶ total U.S. assistance to Mexico but decreased the¶ importance of economic development in the overall¶ Mexican foreign assistance agenda.18 There are¶ U.S. government agencies other than the United¶ States Agency for International Development¶ (USAID) and the State Department that focus¶ on poverty reduction and rural development in¶ Latin America, but within the entirety of U.S. foreign¶ assistance to Mexico, poverty reduction and¶ economic development remain a low priority.19¶ USAID’s lack of emphasis on supporting rural¶ Mexico—where poverty and migration are concentrated—¶ is part of a global foreign assistance trend¶ beginning in the 1980s that de-emphasized agricultural¶ development.20¶ In spite of the growing interest, discussion¶ among U.S. policymakers and practitioners on¶ migration and development has largely been theoretical.¶ Other than remittance projects, there are¶ few models of how to design and implement development¶ projects that seek to reduce migration¶ pressures. In order to translate conceptual discussions¶ into practice, policymakers and practitioners¶ need to know what works in terms of development¶ in migrant-sending communities.21

### Giroux

#### Giroux’s view is overly pessimistic and ignores all opposing writing that suggests that people are no longer willing to join the military or that new technology is giving voice to the dissident – he also doesn’t give a reason why their interrogation should come first and if it should come first what we should be discussing to solve the problems – that’s Franks

### Disposability

#### Life is a process of survival – the desire to continue surviving comes from the unconditional affirmation of life – survival mixes both physical life and experience into one – their reductionist view of life is hegemonic because those individuals whose life is “bare” are viewed as inferior turns their impact – that’s Fassin

#### This isn’t used by the state Fassin is a social science prof at Princeton – that is awk for you

### Enviro

**No impact to the environment – we can use technology to create substitutes and create the conditions needed to grow food and make medicine – that’s Science Daily**

No enviro impact

Brook 13 - Professor at the University of Adelaide, leading environmental scientist, holding the Sir Hubert Wilkins Chair of Climate Change at the School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, and is also Director of Climate Science at the University of Adelaide’s Environment Institute, author of 3 books and over 250 scholarly articles, Corey Bradshaw is an Associate Professor at the University of Adelaide and a joint appointee at the South Australian Research and Development Institute, Brave New Climate,(Barry, 3-4, "Worrying about global tipping points distracts from real planetary threats", http://bravenewclimate.com/2013/03/04/ecological-tipping-points/)

Barry Brook We argue that at the global-scale, ecological “tipping points” and threshold-like “planetary boundaries” are improbable. Instead, shifts in the Earth’s biosphere follow a gradual, smooth pattern. This means that it might be impossible to define scientifically specific, critical levels of biodiversity loss or land-use change. This has important consequences for both science and policy. Humans are causing changes in ecosystems across Earth to such a degree that there is now broad agreement that we live in an epoch of our own making: the Anthropocene. But the question of just how these changes will play out — and especially whether we might be approaching a planetary tipping point with abrupt, global-scale consequences — has remained unsettled. A tipping point occurs when an ecosystem attribute, such as species abundance or carbon sequestration, responds abruptly and possibly irreversibly to a human pressure, such as land-use or climate change. Many local- and regional-level ecosystems, such as lakes,forests and grasslands, behave this way. Recently however, there have been several efforts to define ecological tipping points at the global scale. At a local scale, there are definitely warning signs that an ecosystem is about to “tip”. For the terrestrial biosphere, tipping points might be expected if ecosystems across Earth respond in similar ways to human pressures and these pressures are uniform, or if there are strong connections between continents that allow for rapid diffusion of impacts across the planet. These criteria are, however, unlikely to be met in the real world. First, ecosystems on different continents are not strongly connected. Organisms are limited in their movement by oceans and mountain ranges, as well as by climatic factors, and while ecosystem change in one region can affect the global circulation of, for example, greenhouse gases, this signal is likely to be weak in comparison with inputs from fossil fuel combustion and deforestation. Second, the responses of ecosystems to human pressures like climate change or land-use change depend on local circumstances and will therefore differ between locations. From a planetary perspective, this diversity in ecosystem responses creates an essentially gradual pattern of change, without any identifiable tipping points. This puts into question attempts to define critical levels of land-use change or biodiversity loss scientifically. Why does this matter? Well, one concern we have is that an undue focus on planetary tipping points may distract from the vast ecological transformations that have already occurred. After all, as much as four-fifths of the biosphere is today characterised by ecosystems that locally, over the span of centuries and millennia, have undergone human-driven regime shifts of one or more kinds. Recognising this reality and seeking appropriate conservation efforts at local and regional levels might be a more fruitful way forward for ecology and global change science. Corey Bradshaw (see also notes published here on ConservationBytes.com) Let’s not get too distracted by the title of the this article – Does the terrestrial biosphere have planetary tipping points? – or the potential for a false controversy. It’s important to be clear that the planet is indeed ill, and it’s largely due to us. Species are going extinct faster than they would have otherwise. The planet’s climate system is being severely disrupted; so is the carbon cycle. Ecosystem services are on the decline. But – and it’s a big “but” – we have to be wary of claiming the end of the world as we know it, or people will shut down and continue blindly with their growth and consumption obsession. We as scientists also have to be extremely careful not to pull concepts and numbers out of thin air without empirical support. Specifically, I’m referring to the latest “craze” in environmental science writing – the idea of “planetary tipping points” and the related “planetary boundaries”. It’s really the stuff of Hollywood disaster blockbusters – the world suddenly shifts into a new “state” where some major aspect of how the world functions does an immediate about-face. Don’t get me wrong: there are plenty of localised examples of such tipping points, often characterised by something we call “hysteresis”. Brook defines hysterisis as: a situation where the current state of an ecosystem is dependent not only on its environment but also on its history, with the return path to the original state being very different from the original development that led to the altered state. Also, at some range of the driver, there can exist two or more alternative states and “tipping point” as: the critical point at which strong nonlinearities appear in the relationship between ecosystem attributes and drivers; once a tipping point threshold is crossed, the change to a new state is typically rapid and might be irreversible or exhibit hysteresis. Some of these examples include state shifts that have happened (or mostly likely will) to the cryosphere, ocean thermohaline circulation, atmospheric circulation, and marine ecosystems, and there are many other fine-scale examples of ecological systems shifting to new (apparently) stable states. However, claiming that we are approaching a major planetary boundary for our ecosystems (including human society), where we witness such transitions simultaneously across the globe, is simply not upheld by evidence. Regional tipping points are unlikely to translate into planet-wide state shifts. The main reason is that our ecosystems aren’t that connected at global scales. The paper provides a framework against which one can test the existence or probability of a planetary tipping point for any particular ecosystem function or state. To date, the application of the idea has floundered because of a lack of specified criteria that would allow the terrestrial biosphere to “tip”. From a more sociological viewpoint, the claim of imminent shift to some worse state also risks alienating people from addressing the real problems (foxes), or as Brook and colleagues summarise: framing global change in the dichotomous terms implied by the notion of a global tipping point could lead to complacency on the “safe” side of the point and fatalism about catastrophic or irrevocable effects on the other. In other words, let’s be empirical about these sorts of politically charged statements instead of crying “Wolf!” while the hordes of foxes steal most of the flock.

## 3

### Goldstein

The Link is Reverse Causal – The Potential for War is Inescapable and is the Root Construction of Gender Norms

Goldstein, Professor of IR @ American, 01

Joshua Goldstein Professor of IR @ American U 2001 War and Gender

In understanding gendered war roles, the potential for war matters more than the outbreak of particular wars. As Hobbes put it, war “consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.” Kant similarly distinguished between peace as it had been known in modern Europe through the eighteenth century – merely a lull or cease–fire – and what he called “permanent peace.” From 1815 to 1914, great–power wars largely disappeared, and some people thought warfare itself was withering away. But when conditions changed, the latent potential for warfare in the great–power system emerged again, with a vengeance, in the twentieth century. Thus, like a patient with cancer in remission, a society that is only temporarily peaceful still lives under the shadow of war.3 Plan of the book Chapter 1 describes a puzzle: despite the diversity of gender and of war separately, gender roles in war are very consistent across all known human societies. Furthermore, virtually all human cultures to date have faced the possibility, and frequently the actual experience, of war (although I do not think this generalization will last far into the future). In every known case, past and present, cultures have met this challenge in a gender–based way, by assembling groups of fighters who were primarily, and usually exclusively, male. The empirical evidence for these generalizations, reviewed in the chapter, shows the scope and depth of the puzzle. The chapter then reviews three strands of feminist theory that offer a variety of possible answers to the puzzle. From these approaches, I extract 20 hypotheses amenable to assessment based on empirical evidence (see Table 1.1). The results fill Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. All three feminist approaches turn out to contribute in different ways to understanding the puzzle of gendered war roles. Chapter 2 considers the numerous historical cases in which women for various reasons participated in military operations including combat. This historical record shows that women are capable of performing successfully in war. Thus, the near–total exclusion of women from combat roles does not seem to be explained by women’s inherent lack of ability. This evidence deepens the puzzle of gendered war roles. Many societies have lived by war or perished by war, but very few have mobilized women to fight. Why? Chapter 3 tests five explanations for the gendering of war based on gender differences in individual biology: (1) men’s genes program them for violence; (2) testosterone makes men more aggressive than women; (3) men are bigger and stronger than women; (4) men’s brains are adapted for long–distance mobility and for aggression; and (5) women are biologically adapted for caregiving roles that preclude participation in war. Each of these hypotheses except genetics finds some support from empirical evidence, but only in terms of average differences between genders, not the categorical divisions that mark gendered war roles. Chapter 4 explores dynamics within and between groups, drawing on animal behavior and human psychology. Several potential explanations come from this perspective: (1) “male bonding” is important to the conduct of war; (2) men operate better than women in hierarchies, including armies; (3) men see intergroup relations, as between the two sides in a war, differently from women; and (4) childhood gender segregation leads to later segregation in combat forces. The strongest empirical evidence emerges for childhood segregation, but that segregation does not explain the nearly total exclusion of women as combatants. Chapter 5 discusses how constructions of masculinity motivate soldiers to fight, across a variety of cultures and belief systems. Norms of masculinity contribute to men’s exclusive status as warriors, and preparation for war is frequently a central component of masculinity. I explore several aspects: (1) war becomes a “test of manhood,” helping overcome men’s natural aversion to participating in combat, and cultures mold hardened men suitable for this test by toughening up young boys; (2) masculine war roles depend on feminine roles in the war system, including mothers, wives, and sweethearts; and (3) women actively oppose wars. The last two of these contradict each other, but I argue that even women peace activists can reinforce masculine war roles (by feminizing peace and thus masculinizing war), creating a dilemma for the women’s peace movement. Overall, masculinity does contribute to motivating soldiers’ participation in war, and might do so less effectively with women present in the ranks. Chapter 6 asks whether, beyond their identities as tough men who can endure hardship, soldiers are also motivated by less heroic qualities. Misogyny and domination of women, according to some feminists, underlie male soldiers’ participation in war (thus explaining women’s rare participation as combatants). The chapter explores several diverse possibilities: (1) men’s sexual energies play a role in aggression; (2) women symbolize for male soldiers a dominated group and thus cannot be included in the armed ranks of dominators; and (3) women’s labor is exploited more in wartime than in peace, so patriarchal societies keep women in civilian positions. Chapter 6 explores both the men’s roles in these dynamics, and the corresponding women’s roles as prostitutes, victims, war support workers, and replacement labor for men at war. Chapter 7 concludes that the gendering of war appears to result from a combination of factors, with two main causes finding robust empirical support: (1) small, innate biological gender differences in average size, strength, and roughness; and (2) cultural molding of tough, brave men, who feminize enemies in dominating them. The gendering of war thus results from the combination of culturally constructed gender roles with real but modest biological differences. Neither alone would solve the puzzle. Causality runs both ways between war and gender. Gender roles adapt individuals for war roles, and war roles provide the context within which individuals are socialized into gender roles. For the war system to change fundamentally, or for war to end, might require profound changes in gender relations. But the transformation of gender roles may depend on deep changes in the war system. Multiple pathways of causality and feedback loops are common in biology, acting as stabilizing mechanisms in a dynamic system, and come to the fore at several points in this book. Although I focus mainly on gender’s effects on war, the reverse causality proves surprisingly strong. The socialization of children into gender roles helps reproduce the war system. War shadows every gendered relationship, and affects families, couples, and individuals in surprising ways. The diversity of war and of gender The cross–cultural consistency of gendered war roles, which this chapter will explore, is set against a backdrop of great diversity of cultural forms of both war and gender roles considered separately. Apart from war and a few biological necessities (gestation and lactation), gender roles show great diversity across cultures and through history. Human beings have created many forms of marriage, sexuality, and division of labor in household work and child care. Marriage patterns differ widely across cultures. Some societies practice monogamy and some polygamy (and some preach monogamy but practice nonmonogamy). Of the polygamous cultures, most are predominantly polygynous (one man, several wives) but some are predominantly polyandrous (one woman, several husbands). Regarding ownership of property and lines of descent, a majority of societies are patrilocal; women move to their husbands’ households. A substantial number are matrilocal, however, with husbands moving to their wives’ households. Most societies are patrilineal – tracing descent (and passing property) on the father’s side – but more than a few are matrilineal. Norms regarding sexuality also vary greatly across cultures. Some societies are puritanical, others open about sex. Some work hard to enforce fidelity – for example, by condoning killings of adulterers – whereas others accept multiple sexual relationships as normal. Attitudes towards homosexuality also differ across time and place, from relative acceptance to intolerance. Today, some countries officially prohibit discrimination against gay men and lesbians, while other countries officially punish homosexuality with death. Gender roles also vary across cultures when it comes to household and child care responsibilities. Different societies divide economic work differently by gender (except hunting). Political leadership, while never dominated by women and often dominated by men, shows a range of possibilities in different cultures, from near–exclusion to near–equality for women. Even child care (except pregnancy and nursing) shows considerable variation in the roles assigned to men and women. The areas where gender roles tend to be most constant across societies – political leadership, hunting, and certain coming–of–age rituals – are those most closely connected with war. Thus, overall, gender roles outside war vary greatly. Similarly, forms of war vary greatly, except for their gendered character. Different cultures fight in very different ways. The Aztecs overpowered and captured warriors from neighboring societies, then used them for torture, human sacrifice, and food. A central rack contained over 100,000 skulls of their victims. The Dahomey also warred for captives, but to sell into slavery to European traders. The Yanomamö declare that their wars are about the capture of women. The ancient Chinese states of the warring–states period sought to conquer their neighbors’ territories and populations intact in order to augment their own power. For the Mundurucú of Brazil, the word for enemy referred to any non–Mundurucú group, and war had no apparent instrumental purpose beyond being an “unquestioned part of their way of life.” The civil war in Lebanon had “no clear causes, no stable enemy… The chaos penetrated every aspect of daily life so that everyone participated always.”4 Some wars more than pay for themselves; others are economic disasters. The economic benefit of cheap oil was arguably greater than the cost of the Gulf War, for Western powers that chipped in to pay for the war. Similarly, the nomadic peoples of the Eurasian steppes who invented warfare on horseback found profit in raiding. But the Vietnam War bankrupted the “Great Society” in the United States, and incessant wars between France and Spain drove both into bankruptcy in 1557. The Thirty Years War so devastated central Europe’s economy that the mercenary soldier was described as “a man who had to die so as to have something to live on.”5 Some wars seem almost symbolic because they absorb great effort but produce few casualties. Among the Dani of New Guinea, formalistic battles across set front lines – fought with spears, sticks, and bow and arrows – lasted from midmorning until nightfall or rain, with a rest period at midday, and with noncombatants watching from the sidelines. A different form of ritualistic war occupied the two superpowers of the Cold War era, whose nuclear weapons were built, deployed, and maintained on alert, but never used. Other wars, such as the Napoleonic Wars, the US Civil War, and the World Wars, were all–too–real spectacles of pain and misery that defy comprehension. A quarter of the Aztecs’ central skull rack could be filled by a single day’s deaths, 26,000 people, at the battle of Antietam.6 Some wars take place far from home, when armies travel on expeditions to distant lands. In the Crusades, European armies pillaged Muslim and Jewish communities for the glory of a Christian God. Later, European armies occupied colonies worldwide. Americans fought in the World Wars “over there” (Europe). Cuban soldiers in the 1980s fought in Angola. For traveling soldiers, home was a long way away, and for their home societies, war was distant. For most European peasants of the sixteenth century, war seldom impinged on daily life except through taxation. Other wars, however, hit extremely close to home. In recent decades, civil wars often have put civilians and everyday life right in the firing line. The World Wars made entire societies into war machines and therefore into targets. In such cases the “home front” and the “war front” become intimately connected. Sometimes soldiers kill enemies that they have never met, who look different from them and speak languages they do not understand. The Incas of Peru assumed the incomprehensible Spanish invaders to be gods. By contrast, in some wars neighbors kill neighbors, as in the 1992 Serbian campaign of terror in Bosnia. Soldiers sometimes kill at great distances, as with over–the–horizon air and ship missiles. At other times, they kill at close quarters, as with bayonets. Some, like the soldiers who planted land mines in Cambodia and Angola in the 1980s, have no idea whom they killed. Others, such as snipers in any war, can see exactly whom they kill. Combatants react in many different ways. Many soldiers in battle lose the ability to function, because of psychological trauma. But some soldiers feel energized in battle, and some look back to their military service as the best time of their lives. They found meaning, community, and the thrill of surviving danger. In many societies, veterans of battle receive special status and privilege afterwards. Sometimes, however, returning soldiers are treated as pariahs. Some soldiers fight with dogged determination, and willingly die and kill when they could have run away. In other cases, entire armies simply crumble because they lack a will to fight, as happened to the well–armed government forces in Africa’s third largest country, Zaire (Democratic Congo), in 1997. The puzzle. War, then, is a tremendously diverse enterprise, operating in many contexts with many purposes, rules, and meanings. Gender norms outside war show similar diversity. The puzzle, which this chapter fleshes out and the remaining chapters try to answer, is why this diversity disappears when it comes to the connection of war with gender. That connection is more stable, across cultures and through time, than are either gender roles outside of war or the forms and frequency of war itself. The answer in a nutshell is that killing in war does not come naturally for either gender, yet the potential for war has been universal in human societies. To help overcome soldiers’ reluctance to fight, cultures develop gender roles that equate “manhood” with toughness under fire. Across cultures and through time, the selection of men as potential combatants (and of women for feminine war support roles) has helped shape the war system. In turn, the pervasiveness of war in history has influenced gender profoundly – especially gender norms in child–rearing.

Ignoring The Causality Between War and Gender Makes Violence Inevitable – We Must Recognize the Social Conventions Created by Systems of War in Order to Deconstruct Gender Relations

Goldstein, Professor of IR @ American U, 01

Joshua Goldstein Professor of IR @ American U 2001 War and Gender

The persistent strength of “reverse causality” from war to gender pervades this study. The war system influences the socialization of children into all their gender roles – a feedback loop that strengthens and stabilizes gendered war roles. War’s influence shadows all of tour lives. Betty Reardon writes: “Once the actuality or possibility of war becomes the context within which we live, men and women are forced into set roles.” Gender serves as a medium or vector, as it were, for war’s presence in our most intimate social settings. Unfortunately, the spot for war on the bookstore’s gender shelf is nearly (though not quite) as empty as the spot for gender on the war shelf. For example, British feminist scholar Lynee Segal’s book on men and masculinity bypases war and the military, and treats “male violence” as meaning violence against women, keeping inter-male violence out of view. Mary Roth Walsh’s recent edited volume, covering the spectrum of gender topics, also omits war. So do many other works on gender. Denial may best explain these omissions. Social conventions keep war silent in our everyday lives because it represents trauma. Psychologist Judith Herman emphasizes the gulf between war and daily life: “The war story is closely kept among men of a particular era, disconnected from the broader society that includes two sexes and many generations. Thus the fixation on the trauma – the sense of a moment frozen in time – may be perpetuated by social customs that foster the segregation of warriors from the rest of society.” Historian John Keegan calls war “a world apart” from politics and diplomacy, “a very ancient world, which exists in parallel with the everyday world but does not belong to it.” (Jean Elshtain considers this seperation a European bourgeois phenomenon, however.) The single main lesson of this book for those interested in gender is to pay attention to war. To end denial and face war’s influence on gender is, I believe, an important step in changing both sexism and the war system.

### Util

#### Discrimination is necessary in responsible ethics – their ethics supposes that you should lay your life down for the other – that disregards all the people or the “other others” that depend on you – this makes their ethical system bankrupt – that’s Hagglund

#### Moral absolutism is the ultimate act of complicity with violence – as long as you weren’t directly tied to that injustice your hands are clean – that thought process also kills political effectiveness because you never take action for fear that it wont be a pure action – that’s Isaac

#### Moral purity is complicity with evil and violence – the only way to combat terrorism is to dirty our hands – their ethics allow thousands to die

A – sometimes we have to do imooral things as a response i.e. to a tyrant

B – The aff is tantamount to not responding or taking action after 9/11

Isaac, 02 - professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University (Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” Dissent, Spring)

Second, it would mean frankly acknowledging something well understood, often too eagerly embraced, by the twentieth century Marxist left—that it is often politically necessary to employ morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends. A just or even a better society can only be realized *in and through political practice;* in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won’t work. In such situations our choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is between the wrong that confronts us and the means—perhaps the dangerous means—we have to employ in order to oppose it. In such situations there is a danger that “realism” can become a rationale for the Machiavellian worship of power. But equally great is the danger of a righteousness that translates, in effect, into a refusal to act in the face of wrong. What is one to do? Proceed with caution. Avoid casting oneself as the incarnation of pure goodness locked in a Manichean struggle with evil. Be wary of violence. Look for alternative means when they are available, and support the development of such means when they are not. And never sacrifice democratic freedoms and open debate. Above all, ask the hard questions about the situation at hand, the means available, and the likely effectiveness of different strategies. Most striking about the campus left’s response to September 11 was its refusal to ask these questions. Its appeals to “international law” were naïve. It exaggerated the likely negative consequences of a military response, but failed to consider the consequences of failing to act decisively against terrorism. In the best of all imaginable worlds, it might be possible to defeat al-Qaeda without using force and without dealing with corrupt regimes and political forces like the Northern Alliance. But in this world it is not possible. And this, alas, is the only world that exists. To be politically responsible is to engage this world and to consider the choices that it presents. To refuse to do this is to evade responsibility. Such a stance may indicate a sincere refusal of unsavory choices. But it should never be mistaken for a serious political commitment.

#### Nuclear war leads to escalation – causes extinction – this outweighs all ethical principles because you can’t come back – that’s Kateb

#### Nuclear war outweighs ethics – potential for escalation means it must be averted

A – nuclear war means that the principles of a just war would no longer apply

B – nuclear war destroys the environment which we all depend on

Shaper, 82 - associate chaplain @ Yale University, (Donna, “The Nuclear Reality: Beyond Niebuhr and the Just West”, <http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=1344/>)

The nuclear reality not only takes us beyond Niebuhr and real politics; it also takes us beyond the “just war” as a justification or rationalization for the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear warfare is indicted, not vindicated, by the limiting categories of just-war criteria such as due proportion, just means, just intentions and reasonable possibility of success. The burden of proof is on those who would say otherwise. A limited nuclear “just” war can be theoretically conceived of in a textbook scenario, but is it possible in the real world? War is confusion, chaos and hell, not predictable sequences. Even if nuclear weapons were to be used as counterforce, and even assuming that noncombatants could be protected, the question of escalation would remain unanswered -- not to mention long-term environmental or genetic damage. How can we know that any use of nuclear weapons will not result in catastrophic escalation?

#### Nuclear war makes motives irrelevant – there’s no difference between doing and letting happen when it comes to nukes

A – nuclear war precedes rights and virtues

B – nuclear war causes extinction so letting it happen is also not ethical

Callahan, 73 - Sr. Fellow @ Harvard Medical School (Daniel, “The Tyranny of Survival” p. 59)

Motives and means are only two dimensions of moral reasoning. Consequences are the third, and many philosophers as well as practical politicians believe that the consequences are the most important criterion by which the morality of nuclear policies should be judged. When the potential consequences are so enormous, “otherwise honorable concerns with perfection, virtues, rights, and the doctrine of double effect simply give way. The difference between letting humanity or some large part of it be immolated and causing it to be immolated is a moral difference that pales into insignificance.”106

# 1nr

## 2NC Overview

**Seita proves global free trade is key to generating cooperation between every country in the world which allows us to solve any global problem – solving anything is impossible if no one will cooperate which turns the entirety of the aff**

**It also solves nuclear war which causes extinction – extinction outweighs because you can’t come back from it, you have a moral obligation to future generations to give them the chance to live, and you can resolve structural problems later with reforms**

**Seita also proves it increases understanding between people and makes us more accepting of everyone else because we view ourselves as one global community instead of being separated which solves the aff’s harms because we won’t try to exclude anyone anymore**

## 2NC Generic Link Wall

**RSPB proves the aff ushers in democratic engagement by mobilizing people and introducing them into politics, their focus on social justice forces the government to factor in the social and environmental costs of economic development which causes us to privilege social and environmental concerns over economic concerns**

**Social and environmental movements will combine to strengthen one another which will be used as an excuse to implement a system of green protectionism to both protect vulnerable domestic industries by putting carbon tariffs on China**

**We’re an impact turn to their solvency claims, if they win no link to the disad, then they don’t solve any of their impact claims and you vote neg on presumption**

#### Independently, The way they go about recapturing public space for critique establishes a powerful movement that undermines free trade

#### Giroux 10, Chair in Communications at McMaster University, 7-12-10 (Henry, “The Disappearing Intellectual in the Age of Economic Darwinism,” http://www.truth-out.org/the-disappearing-intellectual-age-economic-darwinism61287)

In my view, academics have not only a moral and pedagogical responsibility to unsettle and oppose all orthodoxies, to make problematic the commonsense assumptions that often shape students' lives and their understanding of the world, but also to energize them to come to terms with their own power as individual and social agents. Higher education, in this instance, as Pierre Bourdieu, Paulo Freire, Stanley Aronowitz, and other intellectuals have reminded us, cannot be removed from the hard realities of those political, economic and social forces that both support it and consistently, though in diverse ways, attempt to shape its sense of mission and purpose.[20] Politics is not alien to higher education, but central to comprehending the institutional, economic, ideological and social forces that give it meaning and direction. Politics also references the outgrowth of historical conflicts that mark higher education as an important site of struggle. Rather than the scourge of either education or academic research, politics is a primary register of their complex relation to matters of power, ideology, freedom, justice and democracy. Talking heads who proclaim that politics have no place in the classroom can as Jacques Ranciere points out "look forward to the time when politics will be over and they can at last get on with political business undisturbed," especially as it pertains to the political landscape of the university.[21] In this discourse, education as a fundamental basis for engaged citizenship, like politics itself, becomes a temporary irritant to be quickly removed from the hallowed halls of academia. In this stillborn conception of academic labor, faculty and students are scrubbed clean of any illusions about connecting what they learn to a world "strewn with ruin, waste and human suffering."[22] As considerations of power, politics, critique and social responsibility are removed from the university, balanced judgment becomes code, as the famous sociologist C. Wright. Mills points out, for "surface views which rest upon the homogeneous absence of imagination and the passive avoidance of reflection. A ... vague point of equilibrium between platitudes."[23] Under such circumstances, the university and the intellectuals that inhabit it disassociate higher education from larger public issues, remove themselves from the task of translating private troubles into social problems and undermine the production of those public values that nourish a democracy. Needless to say, pedagogy is always political by virtue of the ways in which power is used to shape various elements of classroom identities, desires, values and social relations, but that is different from being an act of indoctrination. Writing about the role of the social sciences, Mills had a lot to say about public intellectuals in the academy and, in fact, directly addressed the argument that such intellectuals had no right to try to save the world. He writes: I do not believe that social science will 'save the world' although I see nothing at all wrong with 'trying to save the -world' - a phrase which I take here to mean the avoidance of war and the re-arrangement of human affairs in accordance with the ideals of human freedom and reason. Such knowledge as I have leads me to embrace rather pessimistic estimates of the chances. But even if that is where we now stand, still we must ask: if there are any ways out of the crises of our period by means of intellect, is it not up to the social scientist to state them? ... It is on the level of human awareness that virtually all solutions to the great problems must now lie.[24] A large number of faculty exist in specialized academic bubbles cut off from both the larger public and the important issues that impact society. While extending the boundaries of specialized scholarship is important, it is no excuse for faculty to become complicit in the transformation of the university into an adjunct of corporate and military power. Too many academics have become incapable of defending higher education as a vital public sphere and unwilling to challenge those spheres of induced mass cultural illiteracy and firewalls of jargon that doom critically engaged thought, complex ideas and serious writing for the public to extinction. Without their intervention as engaged intellectuals, the university defaults on its role as a democratic public sphere capable of educating an informed public, a culture of questioning and the development of a critical formative culture connected to the need, as Cornelius Castoriadis puts it, "to create citizens who are critical thinkers capable of putting existing institutions into question so that democracy again becomes society's movement."[25] For education to be civic, critical and democratic rather than privatized, militarized and commodified, educators must take seriously John Dewey's notion that democracy is a "way of life" that must be constantly nurtured and defended.[26] Democracy is not a marketable commodity[27] and neither are the political, economic and social conditions that make it possible. If academics believe that the university is a space for and about democracy, they need to profess more, not less, about eliminating inequality in the university, supporting academic freedom, preventing the exploitation of faculty, supporting shared modes of governance, rejecting modes of research that devalue the public good and refuse to treat students as merely consumers. Academics have a distinct and unique obligation, if not political and ethical responsibility, to make learning relevant to the imperatives of a discipline, scholarly method, or research specialization. But more importantly, academics as engaged scholars can further the activation of knowledge, passion, values and hope in the service of forms of agency that are crucial to sustaining a democracy in which higher education plays an important civic, critical and pedagogical role. If democracy is a way of life that demands a formative culture, educators can play a pivotal role in creating forms of pedagogy and research that enable young people to think critically, exercise judgment, engage in spirited debate and create those public spaces that constitute "the very essence of political life."[28] Economic Darwinism shapes more than economies; it also produces ideas, values, power, morality and regimes of truth. Most importantly, regardless of its arrogance, it has to legitimate its power and theater of cruelty. Challenging its modes of legitimation and misrepresentations at the point of production is precisely an important task and mode of politics that should be addressed by critical intellectuals. Central ideological issues pushed by the advocates of neoliberalism extending from the myth of free markets, free trade, the limitless power of individual responsibility, the evils of the welfare state, the necessity of low taxes, the economic benefits of a permanent war economy, deregulation, privatization and commodification, along with the danger of giving the government any sense of public responsibility should be challenged head on in numerous venues by critical intellectuals. As David Harvey points out, academics have a "crucial role to play in trying to resist the neoliberalization of the academy, which is largely about organizing within the academy ... creating spaces within the academy, where things could be said, written, discussed and ideas promulgated. Right now those spaces are more under threat then they have been in many years."[29] All the more reason for academics to view the academy as a viable sphere worth struggling over. Intellectuals outside of the academy can also work to use their specific skills at various points of production to raise consciousness and the level of intellectual discourse in the spirit of creating agents capable of challenging and seeing beyond the existing neoliberal mode of economic Darwinism. Such actions not only help intellectuals to engage in self-critical reflection, play a viable role in creating the conditions for emergent critical public spheres, but they also contribute to a formative culture of change that enables the development of a **broad anti-capitalist movement**. What Harvey is rightfully suggesting is that academics can do more than "teach the conflicts" and provide the conditions that enable young people to speak truth to power. They can also organize within the academy to prevent the ongoing militarization and neoliberalization of higher education. They can work together with staff, students, part-time faculty, and other interested parties to form unions, embrace a notion of democratic governance and help to position the university as public sphere that can become a vital resource in which people can think, engage in critical dialog, organize and connect to a broader public and movements eager for economic and social transformation. Academics can work to develop diverse intellectual institutes, sites and organizations both within and outside of North America to contest the right-wing media machine and its army of anti-public intellectuals. Intellectuals trade in ideas, help to raise consciousness and are crucial to offering new coordinates for how to think about freedom, justice, equality, sustainability and the elimination of human suffering. Jacques Ranciere is informative here in his call for intellectuals to engage in a form of dissensus, which he defines as an attempt to modify the coordinates of the visible and ways of perceiving experience. Dissensus is an attempt "to loosen the bonds that enclose spectacles within a form of visibility.... within the machine that makes the "state of things" seem evident, unquestionable."[30] Ideas matter not only because they can promote self-reflection, but because they can reconstitute our sense of agency, imagination, hope and possibility. And it is precisely in their ability to extend the reach and understanding of how ideas, power and politics work not simply in the interest of domination, but also critical hope and collective struggle that the importance of ideas and the role of intellectuals matter in such dark times. As the commercial machinery and repressive apparatuses run by the neoliberal and right-wing zombies undermine public space and condemn more and more people to the status of disposable populations, **it is** all the more **crucial that academics**, artists, and other intellectuals **mobilize** their resources in order to fight the loss of vision and the exhaustion of politics that has paralyzed American society for decades. As stated in the manifesto from "Left Turn," the key here is to "link struggles that have for decades been seen as discrete, with a **broad anti-capitalist project** whose objective is the radical transformation of economic, political, personal and social relations."[31] It is precisely over the creation of alternative democratic public spheres that such a struggle against neoliberal, economic Darwinism can and should be waged by academics, intellectuals, artists, and other cultural workers. Higher education, labor unions, the alternative media and progressive social movements offer important sites for academics and other intellectuals to form alliances, reach out to a broader public and align with larger social movements. Critical intellectuals must do whatever they can to nurture formative critical cultures and social movements that can dream beyond the "mad-agency that is power in a new form, death-in-life."[32] At the same time, they must challenge all aspects of the neoliberal disciplinary apparatus - from its institutions of power to its pedagogical modes of rationality - in order to make its politics, pedagogy and hidden registers of power visible. Only then will the struggle for the renewal of peace and justice become possible.

#### Their ev proves the link

Mingle 13 (Jonathan Mingle is a writer at the Harvard University Center for the Environment. “Fighting for the Future” Environment at Harvard .Volume 5 Issue 1. June 2013.)

Still, if climate campaigners are to build a truly broad coalition that can compete with the political clout of the fossil fuel industry, he acknowledges that no amount of Tweeting can take the place of the patient, painstaking work of outreach to grassroots organizations: “Working with partners across the progressive spectrum always takes lots of talk, and lots of respect in all directions.” Meanwhile, the Keystone protests gathered diverse support, from college students to Nebraska ranchers to Appalachians opposed to mountaintop-removal coal mining. McKibben compares this burgeoning movement to Occupy Wall Street: they are more interested in creating a national groundswell than in counting votes in the Senate or getting engaged in specific policy fights. “Before we have any real chance,” McKibben says, “we have to change the mood around this issue, building a real movement.”ThedaSkocpol, Thomas professor of government and sociology, has been studying political and social movements for much of her career. She recently conducted a thorough post-mortem on the failed push for cap-and-trade legislation in Congress in 2009 and 2010. Her analysis concludes that mainstream environmental organizations were overly focused on making an “insider deal” with business interests, with little grassroots support.“To build leverage on Congress,” she writes, “and to push back effectively against elite and populist anti-environmental forces, global warming reformers must mobilize broad, popularly rooted support for carbon-capping measures that have something concrete to offer not just to big corporate players, but also to ordinary American citizens and to local and state groups.”Skocpol is focused on what can shift lawmakers’ thinking on the costs and benefits of climate action. Her answer: strong constituencies for change. “I’m asking people to think not about the science or the urgency of the moral crisis, but the politics,” she said in an interview. “And that’s not easyto separate.” “I don’t think people are clear-eyed about any of this,” she continued, referring to “bipartisan fantasies” that the big environmental groups brought to negotiations. “There is romanticism on the far left, too, that all you have to have is some demonstrations, the Occupy Wall Street fantasy”—one which McKibben seems to embrace. In preparation for the next round of battles over carbon-pricing or -capping legislation, Skocpol sees potential in persuading both Republican and Democratic moderates that this can be a winning issue for them. “You do need to go well beyond the network of organizations that already think of themselves as environmentalists,” she says. “Environmentalism remains a very upper middle class, coastal movement.” Skocpol advocates better-organized outreach to church groups, labor unions, community organizations and groups like the League of Women’s Voters. “I think one has to cast a wide net and prepare to be surprised.” She further argues that any successful alliance pushing climate legislation will have to be built around specific policy proposals that do not impose undue economic burdens on the public. “People have to realize that policy directions and coalitions go together,” she says. “My research shows that the bottom four-fifths of Americans have not seen real income growth, and that creates a real dilemma any time you’re doing something that raises costs. And frankly, it will raise costs.”

**The aff builds momentum for policies to solve warming**

#### Giroux 06, Chair English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, 9-1-6 (Henry, “The Politics of Disposability,” Dissident Voice, http://www.henryagiroux.com/online\_articles/Pol\_Disposibility.htm)

As we observe the first anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, citizens in the United States and globally are still struggling to draw the correct conclusions and learn the right lessons from that horrific catastrophe. Initially, we were led to believe that Katrina was the result of a fateful combination of a natural disaster and government incompetence, a perfect storm of bad luck that provided one more example of the general inability of the Bush administration to actually govern, let alone protect its citizenry. Yet, with some distance and sober reflection, this assessment seems a bit shortsighted, a little too localized. In truth, Katrina offers a number of relevant lessons not only for U.S. citizens but also for Canadians and people all over the world who must grapple with the global advance of what I call a politics of disposability. First, Katrina is symptomatic of a form of negative globalization that is as evident in Ottawa, Paris and London as it is in Washington, D.C., or New Orleans, or any other city throughout the world. As capital, goods, trade, and information flow all over the globe, material and symbolic resources are increasingly being invested in the "free market" while the social state pays a terrible price. As safety nets and social services are being hollowed out and communities crumble and give way to individualized, one-man archipelagos, it is increasingly difficult to struggle as a collectivity, to act in concert against a state that fails to meet the basic needs of citizens or to maintain the social investments that provide life-sustaining services. As nations fall under the sway of the principal philosophy of the times, which insists on the end of "big government" in favor of unencumbered individualism and the all-encompassing logic of the market, it is difficult to resurrect a language of social investment, protection, and accountability. Second, as Katrina made perfectly clear, the challenges of a global world, especially its growing ecological challenges, are collective and not simply private. This suggests that citizens in New Orleans as well as in Vancouver, Halifax and Toronto -- coastal and inland -- must protect those principles of the social contract that offer collective solutions to foster and maintain both ecological sustainability and human survival. Canadians have done much to ensure environmental protections, especially in comparison with their neighbors to the south, but there is more that has to be done to curtail the threat of global warming and numerous ecological disasters.

#### And, Green protectionism is less likely to face criticism which means its exactly what would get enacted as a result of the plan

#### Korea Times 09 (7-30-9, “Trade Protection Disguised as 'Green'”)

The ministry pointed out that the governments around the world, which are being pressured to protect local industry and jobs amid global recession, are turning to green protection as it is less likely to face criticism "Green protection for the cause of environmental protection has less possibility of facing criticism or sanctions by the WTO compared with other means of protectionism," it explained. The ministry said that developed economies such as the United States and EU are using it to pressure developing countries like China and India to join the move to cut gas emissions. "The Obama administration, unlike its predecessor, is actively participating in climate change talks," the ministry said. Developed countries claim levying a carbon tariff is justifiable for fair competition.

#### The type of democratic engagement they create undermines global free trade

#### Giroux 04, Chair English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, 8-7-4 (Henry, “Neoliberalism and the Demise of Democracy: Resurrecting Hope in Dark Times,” Dissident Voice, http://dissidentvoice.org/Aug04/Giroux0807.htm)

Neoliberalism has become one of the most pervasive, if not, dangerous ideologies of the 21st century. Its pervasiveness is evident not only by its unparalleled influence on the global economy, but also by its power to redefine the very nature of politics itself. Free market fundamentalism rather than democratic idealism is now the driving force of economics and politics in most of the world, and it is a market ideology driven not just by profits but by an ability to reproduce itself with such success that, to paraphrase Fred Jameson, it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of neoliberal capitalism. Wedded to the belief that the market should be the organizing principle for all political, social, and economic decisions, neoliberalism wages an incessant attack on democracy, public goods, the welfare state, and non-commodified values. Under neoliberalism everything either is for sale or is plundered for profit. Public lands are looted by logging companies and corporate ranchers; politicians willingly hand the public�s airwaves over to powerful broadcasters and large corporate interests without a dime going into the public trust; Halliburton gives war profiteering a new meaning as it is granted corporate contracts without any competitive bidding and then bilks the U.S. government for millions; the environment is polluted and despoiled in the name of profit-making just as the government passes legislation to make it easier for corporations to do so; public services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of major corporations; schools more closely resemble either malls or jails, and teachers are forced to get revenue for their school by hawking everything from hamburgers to pizza parties. As markets are touted as the driving force of everyday life, big government is disparaged as either incompetent or threatening to individual freedom, suggesting that power should reside in markets and corporations rather than in governments (except for their support for corporate interests and national security) and citizens. Under neoliberalism, the state now makes a grim alignment with corporate capital and transnational corporations. Gone are the days when the state �assumed responsibility for a range of social needs.� [1] Instead, agencies of government now pursues a wide range of ��deregulations,� privatizations, and abdications of responsibility to the market and private philanthropy.� [2] Deregulation, in turn, promotes �widespread, systematic disinvestment in the nation�s basic productive capacity.� [3] Flexible production encourages wage slavery and disposable populations at home. And the search for ever greater profits leads to outsourcing which accentuates the flight of capital and jobs abroad. Neoliberalism has now become the prevailing logic in the United States, and according to Stanley Aronowitz �...the neoliberal economic doctrine proclaiming the superiority of free markets over public ownership, or even public regulation of private economic activities, has become the conventional wisdom, not only among conservatives but among social progressives.� [4] The ideology and power of neoliberalism also cuts across national boundaries. Throughout the globe, the forces of neoliberalism are on the march, dismantling the historically guaranteed social provisions provided by the welfare state, defining profit-making as the essence of democracy, and equating freedom with the unrestricted ability of markets to �govern economic relations free of government regulation.� [5] Transnational in scope, neoliberalism now imposes its economic regime and market values on developing and weaker nations through structural adjustment policies enforced by powerful financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Secure in its dystopian vision that there are no alternatives, as England�s former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once put it, neoliberalism obviates issues of contingency, struggle, and social agency by celebrating the inevitability of economic laws in which the ethical ideal of intervening in the world gives way to the idea that we �have no choice but to adapt both our hopes and our abilities to the new global market.� [6] Coupled with a new culture of fear, market freedoms seem securely grounded in a defense of national security, capital, and property rights. When coupled with a media driven culture of fear and the everyday reality of insecurity, public space becomes increasingly militarized as state governments invest more in prison construction than in education. Prison guards and security personnel in public schools are two of the fastest growing professions. In its capacity to dehistoricize and depoliticize society, as well as in its aggressive attempts to destroy all of the public spheres necessary for the defense of a genuine democracy, neoliberalism reproduces the conditions for unleashing the most brutalizing forces of capitalism. Social Darwinism has been resurrected from the ashes of the 19th century sweatshops and can now be seen in full bloom in most reality TV programs and in the unfettered self-interests that now drives popular culture. As narcissism is replaced by unadulterated materialism, public concerns collapse into utterly private considerations and where public space does exist it is mainly used as a confessional for private woes, a cut throat game of winner take all, or a advertisement for consumerism. Neoliberal policies dominate the discourse of politics and use the breathless rhetoric of the global victory of free-market rationality to cut public expenditures and undermine those non-commodified public spheres that serve as the repository for critical education, language, and public intervention. Spewed forth by the mass media, right-wing intellectuals, religious fanatics, and politicians, neoliberal ideology, with its ongoing emphasis on deregulation and privatization, has found its material expression in an all-out attack on democratic values and on the very notion of the public sphere. Within the discourse of neoliberalism, the notion of the public good is devalued and, where possible, eliminated as part of a wider rationale for a handful of private interests to control as much of social life as possible in order to maximize their personal profit. Public services such as health care, child care, public assistance, education, and transportation are now subject to the rules of the market. Construing the public good as a private good and the needs of the corporate and private sector as the only source of investment, neoliberal ideology produces, legitimates, and exacerbates the existence of persistent poverty, inadequate health care, racial apartheid in the inner cities, and the growing inequalities between the rich and the poor. [7] As Stanley Aronowitz points out, the Bush administration has made neoliberal ideology the cornerstone of its program and has been in the forefront in actively supporting and implementing the following policies: [D]eregulation of business at all levels of enterprises and trade; tax reduction for wealthy individuals and corporations; the revival of the near-dormant nuclear energy industry; limitations and abrogation of labor�s right to organize and bargain collectively; a land policy favoring commercial and industrial development at the expense of conservation and other pro environment policies; elimination of income support to the chronically unemployed; reduced federal aid to education and health; privatization of the main federal pension programs, Social Security; limitation on the right of aggrieved individuals to sue employers and corporations who provide services; in addition, as social programs are reduced, [Republicans] are joined by the Democrats in favoring increases in the repressive functions of the state, expressed in the dubious drug wars in the name of fighting crime, more funds for surveillance of ordinary citizens, and the expansion of the federal and local police forces. [8] Central to both neoliberal ideology and its implementation by the Bush administration is the ongoing attempts by free-market fundamentalists and right wing politicians to view government as the enemy of freedom (except when it aids big business) and discount it as a guardian of the public interest. The call to eliminate big government is neoliberalism�s great unifying idea and has broad popular appeal in the United States because it is a principle deeply ¶ embedded in the country�s history and tangled up with its notion of political freedom. And yet, the right wing appropriation of this tradition is racked with contradictions in terms of neoliberal policies. The advocates of neoliberalism have attacked what they call big government when it has provided essential services such as crucial safety nets for the less fortunate, but they have no qualms about using the government to bailout the airline industry after the economic nosedive that followed the 2000 election of George W. Bush and the events of 9/11. Nor are there any expressions of outrage from the cheerleaders of neoliberalism when the state engages in promoting various forms of corporate welfare by providing billions of dollars in direct and indirect subsidies to multinational corporations. In short, government bears no obligation for either the poor and dispossessed or for the collective future of young people. As the laws of the market take precedence over the laws of the state as guardians of the public good, the government increasingly offers little help in mediating the interface between the advance of capital and its rapacious commercial interests. Neither does it aid non-commodified interests and non-market spheres that create the political, economic, and social spaces and discursive conditions vital for critical citizenship and democratic public life. Within the discourse of neoliberalism, it becomes difficult for the average citizen to speak about political or social transformation, or to even challenge, outside of a grudging nod toward rampant corruption, the ruthless downsizing, the ongoing liquidation of job security, or the elimination of benefits for people now hired on part-time. The liberal democratic vocabulary of rights, entitlements, social provisions, community, social responsibility, living wage, job security, equality, and justice seem oddly out of place in a country where the promise of democracy has been replaced by casino capitalism, a winner-take-all philosophy, suited to lotto players and day traders alike. As corporate culture extends even deeper into the basic institutions of civil and political society, buttressed daily by a culture industry largely in the hands of concentrated capital, it is reinforced even further by the pervasive fear and insecurity of the public that the future holds nothing beyond a watered down version of the present. As the prevailing discourse of neoliberalism seizes the public imagination, there is no vocabulary for progressive social change, democratically inspired visions, or critical notions of social agency to expand the meaning and purpose of democratic public life. Against the reality of low wage jobs, the erosion of social provisions for a growing number of people and the expanding war against young people of color at home and empire-building abroad, the market-driven juggernaut of neoliberalism continues to mobilize desires in the interest of producing market identities and market relationships that ultimately sever the link between education and social change while reducing agency to the obligations of consumerism. As neoliberal ideology and corporate culture extend even deeper into the basic institutions of civil and political society, there is a simultaneous diminishing of non-commodified public spheres �those institutions such as public schools, independent bookstores, churches, noncommercial public broadcasting stations, libraries, trade unions and various voluntary institutions engaged in dialogue, education, and learning�that address the relationship of the individual to public life and foster social responsibility and provide a robust vehicle for public participation and democratic citizenship. In the vacuum left by diminishing democracy, religious zealotry, cultural chauvinism, xenophobia, and racism have become the dominant tropes of neoconservatives and other extremist groups eager to take advantage of the growing insecurity, fear, and anxiety that result from increased joblessness, the war on terror, and the unraveling of communities. As a result of the consolidated corporate attack on public life, the maintenance of democratic public spheres from which to launch a moral vision or to engage in a viable struggle over politics loses all credibility�not to mention monetary support. As the alleged objectivity of neoliberal ideology remains largely unchallenged within dominant public spheres, individual critique and collective political struggles become more difficult. [9] It gets worse. Dominated by extremists, the Bush administration is driven by an arrogance of power and inflated sense of moral righteousness mediated largely by a false sense of certitude and never ending posture of triumphalism. As George Soros points out this rigid ideology and inflexible sense of mission allows the Bush administration to believe that �because we are stronger than others, we must know better and we must have right on our side. This is where religious fundamentalism comes together with market fundamentalism to form the ideology of American supremacy.� [10] As public space is increasingly commodified and the state becomes more closely aligned with capital, politics is defined largely by its policing functions rather than an agency for peace and social reform. As the state abandons its social investments in health, education, and the public welfare. It increasingly takes on the functions of an enhanced police or security state, the signs of which are most visible in the increasing use of the state apparatus to spy on and arrests its subjects, the incarceration of individuals coincided disposable (primarily people of color), and the ongoing criminalization of social policies. Examples of the latter include anti-begging ordinances and anti-loitering that fine or punish homeless people for sitting or lying down too long in public places. [11] An even more despicable example of the barbaric nature of neoliberalism with its emphasis on profits over people and its willingness to punish rather than serve the poor and disenfranchised can be seen in the growing tendency of many hospitals across the country to have patients arrested and jailed if they cannot pay their medical bills. The policy, right out of the pages of George Orwell�s 1984, represents a return to debtors prisons, which is now chillingly called �body attachment,� and is � basically a warrant for... the patient�s arrest.� [12] Neoliberalism is not simply an economic policy designed to cut government spending, pursue free trade policies, and free market forces from government regulations; it is also a political philosophy and ideology that effects every dimension of social life. Neoliberalism has heralded a radical economic, political, and experiential shift that now largely defines the citizen as a consumer, disbands the social contract in the interests of privatized considerations, and separates capital from the context of place. Under such circumstances, neoliberalism portends the death of politics as we know it, strips the social of its democratic values, and reconstructs agency in terms that are utterly privatized and provides the conditions for an emerging form of proto-fascism that must be resisted at all costs. Neoliberalism not only enshrines unbridled individualism, it also destroys any vestige of democratic society by undercutting its �moral, material, and regulatory moorings,� [13] and in doing so it offers no language for understanding how the future might be grasped outside of the narrow logic of the market. But there is even more at stake here than the obliteration of public concerns, the death of the social, the emergence of a market-based fundamentalism that undercuts the ability of people to understand how to translate the privately experienced misery into collective action, and the elimination of the gains of the welfare state. There is also the growing threat of displacing �political sovereignty with the sovereignty of the market, as if the latter has a mind and morality of its own.� [14] As democracy becomes a burden under the reign of neoliberalism, civic discourse disappears and the reign of unfettered social Darwinism with its survival-of-the-slickest philosophy emerges as the template for a new form of proto-fascism. None of this will happen in the face of sufficient resistance, nor is the increasing move toward proto-fascism inevitable, but the conditions exist for democracy to lose all semblance of meaning in the United States.. Educators, parents, activists, workers, and others can address this challenge by building local and global alliances and engaging in struggles that acknowledge and transcend national boundaries, but also engage in modes of politics that connect with people’s everyday lives. Democratic struggles cannot under emphasize the special responsibility of intellectuals to shatter the conventional wisdom and myths of neoliberalism with its stunted definition of freedom and its depoliticized and dehistoricized definition of its own alleged universality. As the late Pierre Bourdieu argued, any viable politics that challenges neoliberalism must refigure the role of the state in limiting the excesses of capital and providing important social provisions. [15] At the same time, social movements must address the crucial issue of education as it develops throughout the cultural sphere because the �power of the dominant order is not just economic, but intellectual�lying in the realm of beliefs,� and it is precisely within the domain of ideas that a sense of utopian possibility can be restored to the public realm. [16] Most specifically, democracy necessitates forms of education that provide a new ethic of freedom and a reassertion of collective identity as central preoccupations of a vibrant democratic culture and society. Such a task, in part, suggests that intellectuals, artists, unions, and other progressive movements create teach-ins all over the country in order to name, critique, and connect the forces of market fundamentalism to the war at home and abroad, the shameful tax cuts for the rich, the dismantling of the welfare state, the attack on unions, the erosion of civil liberties, the incarceration of a generation of young black and brown men, the attack on public schools, and the growing militarization of public life. As Bush�s credibility crisis is growing, the time has come to link the matters of economics with the crisis of political culture, and to connect the latter to the crisis of democracy itself. We need a new language for politics, for analyzing where it can take place, and what it means to mobilize alliances of workers, intellectuals, academics, journalists, youth groups, and others to reclaim, as Cornel West has aptly put it, hope in dark times.

### AT Threats

#### They’ve misinterpreted our argument. We are not saying there are “threats” in the world that need to be dealt with. Our argument is that trade encourages peace by increasing contacts between different people. Trade is the only way to encourage people to see the world as the sum total of its individual parts. The protectionism they cause is the very thing that causes misunderstandings, miscalculation, and the construction of threats. Trade creates the basis for cooperation to solve a host of problems including the prevention of nuclear war.

#### Our impact is a straight turn to the criticism. They assume that we view the rest of the world as a static and monolithic entity. Our argument, however, is that the world is constantly changing – their interest change and the perceptions of the United States change – and that being able to communicate and work with the rest of the world openly and freely, instead of erecting artificial and ineffective barriers between nations through protectionism, is the only way we can understand how the rest of the world’s political reality changes from day to day. Our impact is a way to better understand and realize how the interests of the rest of the world coincide with ours. Voting AFF locks us into a world where we view the rest of the world statically and as a threat to our interests. It’s impossible to have a better understanding of the world that gets past static identities and threat construction if we never take the time to talk to and work with the rest of the world through free trade.

#### Complexity theory is not grounded in science and lacks theoretical foundation

A – there is no clear definition of it

B – it conflates pseudoscience and science, their studies use pseudoscience

C – pseudoscience is not nearly as credible as science because it doesn’t have supporting evidence and didn’t pass the scientific method

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The need for a special issue of Emergence on the question¶ “What is complexity science?” is disturbing on several levels. At one level, one could be forgiven for thinking that the**¶** voluminous literature generated in recent years on chaos and complexity theory must contain a clear exposition of the definition,**¶** mission, and scope of complexity science. That this exposition has not been forthcoming, or is the subject of controversy, is disconcerting. On¶ another level, the inability to differentiate science clearly from pseudoscience in complexity studies is also problematic. Allowing pseudoscience to penetrate a field of study lowers the credibility of that field**¶** with mainstream scientists and hinders the flow of resources for future**¶** development.¶ It is my contention that much of the work in complexity theory has¶ indeed been pseudo-science, that is, many writers in this field have used**¶** the symbols and methods of complexity science (either erroneously or¶ deliberately) to give the illusion of science even though they lack supporting evidence and plausibility (Shermer, 1997). This proliferation of**¶** pseudo-science has, in turn, obscured the meaning and agenda of the**¶** science of complexity. The purpose of this article is twofold: to provide a¶ working definition of complexity science; and to use this definition to differentiate complexity science from complexity pseudo-science. This is a play in three acts. In the first section, I will undertake an examination of¶ science and the factors differentiating science from nonscience. In the¶ second section, I examine the relationship between complexity and¶ science, leading to a definition of complexity science. In the final section,¶ I offer a test for distinguishing between science and pseudo-science in¶ complexity studies and provide several examples of the latter. I also¶ describe why it is important for scientists working in the area vigorously¶ to reject pseudo-scientific theories.¶

#### Their approach lacks empirical data and denies the benefits of strategizing

A – the idea of complexity means that the world is dangerous if we don’t do anything just as much as if we continue to take adaptive responses

B – this has been empirically disproven and it negates the idea of strategy that American national security uses

C – focus on complexity trades-off with the need to strategize

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We live in a world of unprecedented complexity, or so we are told. President Obama’s words above echo an increasingly common narrative in the American foreign policy and national security establishments: the forces of globalization, rising nonstate actors, irregular conflict, and proliferating destructive technologies have made crafting sound national security strategy more elusive than ever before. 2 If “strategy is the art of creating power” by specifying the relationship among ends, ways, and means, 3 then the existence of unprecedented complexity would seem to make this art not only uniquely difficult today but also downright dangerous, inasmuch as choosing any particular course of action would preclude infinitely adaptive responses in the future. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates memorably described, the pre-9/11 challenges to American national security were “amateur night compared to the world today.” 4 And as former State Department Director of Policy Planning Anne-Marie Slaughter recently stated, there is a “universal awareness that we are living through a time of rapid and universal change,” one in which the assumptions of the twentieth century make little sense. 5 The “Mr. Y” article that occasioned her comments argued that, in contrast to the “closed system” of the twentieth century that could be controlled by mankind, we now live in an “open system” defined by its supremely complex and protean nature. 6 Unparalleled complexity, it seems, is the hallmark of our strategic age.¶ These invocations of complexity permeate today’s American national security documents and inform Washington’s post-Cold War and -9/11 strategic culture. The latest Quadrennial Defense Review begins its analysis with a description of the “complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate. Not since the fall of the Soviet Union or the end of World War II has the international terrain been affected by such farreaching and consequential shifts.” 7 In a similar vein, the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025 argues that the international system is trending towards greater degrees of complexity as power is diffused and actors multiply. 8 The Director of National Intelligence’s Vision 2015 terms our time the “Era of Uncertainty,” one “in which the pace, scope, and complexity of change are increasing.” 9 Disturbingly, the younger generation of foreign policy and national security professionals seems to accept and embrace these statements declaiming a fundamental change in our world and our capacity to cope with it. The orientation for the multi-thousand-member group of Young Professionals in Foreign Policy calls “conquering complexity” the fundamental challenge for the millennial generation. Complexity, it appears, is all the rage. ¶ We challenge these declarations and assumptions—not simply because they are empirically unfounded but, far more importantly, because they negate the very art of strategy and make the realization of the American national interest impossible. We begin by showing the rather unsavory consequences of the current trend toward worshipping at complexity’s altar and thus becoming a member of the “Cult of Complexity.” Next, we question whether the world was ever quite as simple as today’s avowers of complexity suggest, thus revealing the notion of today’s unprecedented complexity to be descriptively false. We then underscore that this idea is dangerous, given the consequences of an addiction to complexity. Finally, we offer an escape from the complexity trap, with an emphasis on the need for prioritization in today’s admittedly distinctive international security environment. Throughout, we hope to underscore that today’s obsession with complexity results in a dangerous denial of the need to strategize.