## 1ac

### 1ac – plan

#### The United States federal government should provide financial assistance to small farmers in Mexico.

### 1ac – environmental justice

#### Status quo trade policies have run roughshod over Mexican society perpetuating an ideology that normalizes all forms of suffering—

Watt in 2010, Lecturer in Hispanic Studies at the University of Sheffield, UK, in ‘10

[Peter, “NAFTA 15 Years on: The Strange Fruits of Neoliberalism”, State of Nature, http://www.stateofnature.org/?p=6369#sthash.7JzbMAGf.dpuf, Winter]

Proponents of free trade and its incarnation in NAFTA justified neoliberal policies by claiming that after an initial ‘shock’ to the economy, life for the majority would soon improve. ‘NAFTA’, claimed Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, ‘really is a beautiful thing’, noting that its principal benefits were due to the low wages received by Mexican workers. [5] Like many arguments presented in favour of free-trade, it was, as Edward Herman comments, ‘immune to evidence’ and disregarded ‘conditions or effects’ on the lives of millions of Mexicans. [6]¶ The human costs of neoliberalism in Mexico were what economists refer to as an ‘externality’. Within the logic of the market, the social costs of a particular business deal are external to the concerns of those trading, unless they affect profit margins. [7] Thus, if corn, bean or coffee farmers can no longer scrape together a living as a result of a policy into which they never had any input, that’s not free-trade’s problem.¶ There being no alternative – at least in the orthodox thought of what Herman dubs ‘Marketspeak’ – GATT, the WTO and NAFTA were introduced to the world as solutions to poverty, rather than its exacerbators. ‘Future historians’, Mark Weisbrot observes,¶ will certainly marvel at how trade, originally a means to obtain what could not be produced locally, became an end in itself. In our age it has become a measure of economic and social progress more important even than the well-being of the people who produce or consume the traded goods. [8]¶ As free-market ideology contrasted with peoples’ lived experience, only a constant barrage of information and commentary on the wonders of the new socio-economic model would ensure that those with stakes in maintaining it would be immune to challenge. For journalist and author Carlos Monsiváis, the role of the Mexican media is to ‘persuade and dissuade Public Opinion, to neutralise “unorthodox inclinations”, to parody expressions of free thought and to convince of the inexistence of alternatives’. [9]¶ Trade agreements such as NAFTA were pushed through by underlining a sense of inevitability, ‘the inexistence of alternatives’ and although the public had no say, free-trade was soon to become a reality whether Mexicans wished it or not. If businesses and farmers failed or ran into debts as a result, this was explained as their failure to modernise, to adapt to the new realities of the global market.¶ Countering this sense of inevitability is a major challenge, because it is this sense that allows for the unthinkable to become acceptable, or at least tolerable. On this, journalist John Gibler comments that,¶ Ideology serves to normalise horrid social relations. With the magic of a well-placed word or two, duly impregnated with ideology, the most absurd and unacceptable of situations are made to seem natural. Ideology tells us that when the Mexican police routinely kill and torture, well, it is part of the rule of law; if twenty million Mexicans live in hunger, their children dying of diarrhoea, well, that is the sad reality of poverty; as nearly half a million Mexicans cross the border into the United States every year seeking their own labour exploitation just to keep their families alive, they are looking for a better life, hence they migrate; if Mexico’s twelve million indigenous people live on the margin of the state, constantly subject to massacres, everyday racism, and the ravage of hunger, well, the indigenous were always like that, even before the Spanish came, that’s the indigenous past. [10]

#### The almost 20 year old NAFTA agreement – has traded away the humanity of workers.

#### Current maquiladora employees in Mexico suffer from a fatal indifference – where corporations care more about rapid production of goods. Workers are become insignificant cogs trapped in the wheels of production.

Arriola - visited several border towns and met privately with mostly female workers - 7 Elvia R., Professor of Law - NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, Seattle Journal for Social Justice, Vo. 5, Issue 2, Spring/Summer

Claudia Ivette-González might still be alive if her employers had not turned her away. The 20-year-old resident of Ciudad Juárez-the Mexican city abutting El Paso, Texas-arrived at her assembly plant job four minutes late one day in October 2001. After management refused to let her into the factory, she started home on foot. A month later, her corpse was discovered buried in a field near a busy Juárez intersection. Next to her lay the bodies of seven other young women. In less than a decade, a city that once had very low homicide statistics now reports that at least 300-400 women and girls were killed between 1994 and 2000. Along with an increase in murder rates, the rates of domestic violence have increased as the border town of Ciudad Juarez has experienced heavy industrialization since the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Some murders have fallen into a bizarre serial killer pattern while others have been suspiciously linked to illegal trafficking gangs with money. Others clearly involve abductions of young, female maquiladora workers who never made it to or from work and whose bodies were later found dumped in Lomas de Poleo, the desert that surrounds Ciudad Juárez. Many of the murdered women have been raped, beaten, or mutilated. In Mexico, the maquiladora worker is someone typically without much education or property and is often a migrant from an even poorer region of the country. Thousands of workers in these factories eke out sad lives in shantytowns without water, electricity, or public lighting. Dozens of families may stake out plots of land near public utilities or the industrial parks. There they camp out for years, pirating essential public services and building by hand or hiring itinerant laborers to build a shack out of sticks, cardboard, rags or discarded constructor's platforms. Some make home next to trash dumps. They walk on unpaved stretches of land that flood during storms. Although news of the murders has generated much public discourse about the injustices taking place in Ciudad Juarez, an important factor is constantly overlooked in the discourse. What about the environment allowed the violence to take place? What about the fact that the government is in a cozy relationship with the CEOs of major corporations who come in to Mexico, lease large plots of land, set up factories with 24/7 operating schedules, pay no taxes, do little to make sure the workers they employ will have a roof over their head, a bed to sleep in and enough money to feed their families? What about the fact that the very girl whose body was found mutilated and dumped had worked hard, very hard, for one of those factories trying to improve her lot and that of her family? What of the fact that the same attitude about the murders - we are not responsible - is reflected in the policies of employment that encourage indifference to the workers needs or human rights whether in or out of the factories? This paper argues that the Juarez murders are an extreme manifestation of the systemic patterns of abuse, harassment and violence against women who work in the maquiladoras, whose treatment derives from privileges enjoyed by the investors who employ them pursuant to the North American Free Trade Agreement. I begin by acknowledging that there is a critical relationship between women, gender violence and free trade as noted by Professor Weissman and others, but I also seek to understand how the absence of regulation to benefit workers in standard free trade law and policy perpetuates the degradation of maquiladora workers and produces environments hostile to working women's lives, including discrimination, toxicity in the workplace and threats of fatal assault. The unquestioned right to exploit the mostly female working poor incites gender violence while it makes Mexico a major player in global economic politics, even if rapid industrialization is encouraging more domestic violence and occasional incidents of female murder. I. BEAUTY AND PAIN: GLOBALIZATION AND THE WOMEN OF THE MAQUILADORAS A. Gender and Globalization at the Mexican Border: before and after NAFTA. Globalization today has its fans and its critics. To some, like Thomas Friedman, it is the happy way of the future where people of different nations and cultures will interconnect easily through the Internet, where markets and democracy will flourish and all things stodgy, inefficient and dictatorial (e.g., Communism, Sadam Hussein) will fade. Others are more cautious, calling for better regulatory insight by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other financial players in the politics of free trade. Still others see a deadly combination for nations that make too quick a transition to market economies and democracy. Most contemporary discourse surrounding globalization focuses on the economic theories supporting or rejecting the trend; those who view gender and global trade as crucially related are still in the minority in academic discourse. After observation of the relationship between gender and the operation of the maquiladoras at the Mexican border it is easy to see how gender based attitudes, affect everything from recruitment and hiring (nearly 100% female for workers) to treatment of women in the workplace. When American electrical, television, and stereo component companies such as GE, Sony, and Panasonic, began relocating to Mexico, women were blatantly preferred for the job. Women were seen as better fits; with smaller hands and fingers, they could better assemble tiny parts of export goods such as light bulbs, cassette tapes, and recorders. The ideal maquiladora worker thus emerged as a hybrid of stereotyped images based on sex, race and class - she was not only more docile and passive than Mexican men, but submissive, easily trainable and unlikely to pose problems with union organizing. B. Where the Violence Leading to Murder Begins - The Voices of Experience from Inside the Maquiladoras Over several years I visited several border towns and began to meet privately with mostly female workers and heard about their experiences. I sometimes met workers in their homes, which were uniformly tiny and clean but quite often without flooring, plumbing or more electricity than a single light bulb. "Fatal indifference" is the best way to describe the totality of circumstances suffered by maquiladora workers - a systematic structural disregard by corporations and their agents for the humanity of the laborer. Amparo was 38 and raising two teenage boys. She was desperately trying to keep the older boy in school so that he might avoid the destiny of the working poor - to start working at age 15 in the factories that average 10 hour workdays and little pay. Amparo had been fired for being outspoken about the bad worker treatment at Dimmit Industries, which is now defunct. Amparo was hired at Dimmit to work sitting down for long hours sewing on the waistband to a minimum 1200 pairs of expensive dress slacks per day in order to receive the base weekly wage of 300 pesos and 200 pesos in bonus (about 35 dollars per week). To have a more livable take home paycheck she pushed herself to produce at 150% of the expected quota or about 1800 slacks per day. Everyday Amparo walked out with a blackened face full of lint and dust that escaped the poor ventilation system in the plant. She remembered the terrible coughs she endured almost all of the time as a result of the fibers distinctly visible in the surrounding air that settled on her skin and in her lungs. Then she had to endure the exhaustion of the typical 10-12 hour shift with only a half hour break for lunch and a ten minute break in the morning. Amparo was one of five workers who filed an unfair labor practice charge after she was fired for complaining about the piece work policy that keeps the wages so low. Amparo knew she was in for a long haul by filing a claim, but she said, it was worth it because "I've tolerated them for 8 years." 2. Miserly Wages in Return for exposure to Toxicity. Maria Elena pointed to dark scarred tissue mostly on the upper side of her feet: old scratch marks and evidence of once-ruptured skin, from a year-long period when her feet had first developed an unexplainable fungus infection that had broken and rotted the skin so badly "that my own brothers and sisters would tell me to stay away from them because of the awful smell." The doctors concluded that the condition was so bad that if she did not find a remedy and did not stop working in the environment that had obviously contributed to the infection, she would lose her feet to gangrene. Her mother told her, "although I appreciate the help from your working I don't want you to lose your feet." Maria Elena quit the job where she had been assembling one section of seatbelts over and over for two years, during which she was exposed to fine chemical dust particles in the fabric of the seatbelt that caused a condition without a permanent cure. Maria Elena's condition is only one of a variety of illness and conditions, including back problems, carpel tunnel syndrome, asthma and disabling allergic reactions which typically accompany the privilege of working in a maquiladora. 3. NAFTA: Setting an Agenda for the Global Factories of the World The maquiladoras thrive on the structure of a work week designed to produce the highest levels of output. In the United States, the average work week is 38 to 40 hours. However, in the maquiladoras, the average is 5 to 10 hours longer. Maquiladora workers average 48 hours per week, sometimes 10- and 12-hour shifts, no overtime pay, and, in some factories, only one day off per week. One worker named "Angela," who had arrived from Veracruz seven years earlier, earned 750 pesos per week (about $75.00) and felt grateful not to have to work weekends. She said that her daughter was earning much more, about 950 pesos per week, (about $95.00) but to do this she had to work 12 hour shifts, 6 days per week. As one worker stated: "It's really unreasonable because we work from 7 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday. To arrive on time, I have to get up at 5 a.m., and at that hour you really don't feel like eating. At 9:30 they give us 10 minutes for breakfast, and half an hour for lunch at 1 p.m." Global employment then, whether in Mexico or elsewhere, falls into a familiar pattern - one where the policies of worker treatment emphasize rapid production, not worker health and safety or improved living conditions. As some critics note, the new wealth that comes with free trade often benefits a tiny privileged minority not the general population of the poorer country. To care about the workers would entail caring about things that don't factor well in a business driven by commitment to the bottom line, or cost-benefit analysis. The disciplinary methods, the production quotas at any cost, the speed-ups and injuries, punishments for using the bathroom during work time, the exposure to danger instruments or chemicals, all flow directly from the signal by company owners and their agents to supervisors and managers that: Workers' lives are less important than production schedules; and Safety of the workers is another cost that disturbs the projected return from investment. Therefore, adequate safety gear for employees who must work with toxic chemicals, lighting around the factory, security for the workers -- all of these things are not as important as making sure workers do their tasks, supervisors meet the production schedule, and goods are exported and released into the stream of commerce that generates the consumption and the profits that will ultimately line the pockets of the owners and shareholders. These are the consequences of privilege and rights enjoyed by employers under free trade law and policy. It is a policy that doesn't give a damn about workers. The workers, after all, are only an insignificant cog in the wheel of production.

**Specifically, The North American Free Trade Agreement’s promotion of cheap American corn has impoverished small farmers and lead to large-scale agricultural operations that destroy soil, contaminate drinking water and expose people to toxic chemicals.**  
Gonzalez in 2011, Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law, ’11 [Carmen G., “AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CRITIQUE OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TRADE POLICY, AND THE MEXICAN NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORMS”, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 32 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 723, Spring]  
In order to draw lessons from the Mexican experience with agricultural trade liberalization, it is important to assess who wins and who loses as a consequence of this economic reform. In the United States, the main beneficiaries of trade liberalization in the corn sector are large agricultural enterprises that receive generous agricultural subsidies as well as corn exporters, such as Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland, that undercut Mexican producers by selling corn on world markets at artificially depressed prices. n163 [\*756] Between 1997 and 2005, for example, U.S. agro-exporters dumped corn on Mexican markets at an average of nineteen percent below the cost of production. n164 These exporters also benefit from the U.S. government's provision of export credits to Mexican importers of U.S. corn in order to increase U.S. market share and help U.S. companies compete against foreign producers. n165 In Mexico, the primary beneficiaries are the importers of U.S. corn, particularly large livestock enterprises (who use the corn for animal feed) and processors of soft drinks (who use corn syrup). n166 The two Mexican firms that dominate tortilla production also benefit from depressed corn prices because their market power has enabled them to raise tortilla prices rather than pass on the lower corn prices to consumers. n167 Indeed, public outcry over soaring tortilla prices and over the hoarding of corn flour by the giant tortilla companies in order to drive prices even higher prompted Mexican President Felipe Calderon to impose price controls on tortillas in early 2007. n168¶ The primary losers from trade liberalization are small farmers and consumers in Mexico, particularly traditional and indigenous [\*757] farmers whose livelihoods have been destroyed by the elimination of tariffs and by U.S. agricultural subsidies. However, human health and the environment in both the United States and Mexico have suffered under this arrangement in ways that are not immediately obvious due to the fact that social and environmental externalities (positive and negative) are not reflected in corn prices.¶ Corn production in the United States is more chemical-intensive than the production of other commodities (such as wheat or soybeans) and it is increasingly expanding into dry areas where irrigation is necessary. n169 As corn production expands to meet Mexican demand, U.S. surface and groundwater supplies are increasingly contaminated by agricultural runoff. n170 The contamination of surface waters by nitrogen-containing fertilizers promotes algae blooms that reduce dissolved oxygen in the water, thereby killing fish and other wildlife. n171 The great quantities of nitrogen carried from the nation's agricultural heartland by the Mississippi River have already produced a "dead zone" in the Gulf of Mexico, where marine life cannot survive. n172 Likewise, atrazine, the most common herbicide used on corn, disrupts the endocrine system and is known to cause cancer in rats. n173 Exposure to atrazine poses serious risks for farm workers (many of whom are Mexican immigrants), consumers of corn products, and people who use groundwater downstream from fields where corn is cultivated. n174 Chlorpyrifos, the most common insecticide used in corn production, is a neurotoxin that is particularly dangerous to children who are exposed to it at high levels. n175 Finally, the expansion of corn cultivation into Nebraska, Kansas, Texas, and Colorado to meet growing Mexican demand has necessitated the pumping of additional groundwater for irrigation, resulting in [\*758] unsustainable rates of withdrawal from the Ogallala Aquifer and conflicts over water rights. n176¶ In Mexico, the most significant social externality resulting from the drop in corn prices is growing rural poverty, which has increased rural-to-urban migration and threatens the integrity of indigenous and local farming communities. n177 The most significant environmental externality is the threat to agrobiodiversity posed by the out-migration of the farmers who cultivate Mexico's diverse corn varieties. n178¶ The market price for U.S. corn understates the true social cost of production because it neglects to internalize the human health and environmental costs discussed above. Conversely, the market price for Mexican corn fails to take into account the social and environmental benefits of traditional corn cultivation, including the well-being of indigenous communities and the importance for these communities and for the world's food supply of conserving Mexico's diverse corn varieties.¶ As a consequence of trade liberalization, market failures in the United States interface with market failures in Mexico to create a price structure that misidentifies the United States as the most efficient corn producer, thereby increasing harm to human health and the environment in the United States, undermining the sustainable livelihoods of indigenous communities in Mexico, and jeopardizing Mexico's genetic diversity. n179 Economist James Boyce has referred to this phenomenon as the "globalization of market failure." n180¶ [\*759]

#### U.S. agricultural dominance has decimated the rural variety of maize seeds, leading to unsustainable monocultures. This devastates the environment and the quality of public health.

Gonzalez in 2011 , Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law, ‘11

[Carmen G., “AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CRITIQUE OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TRADE POLICY, AND THE MEXICAN NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORMS”, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 32 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 723, Spring]

5.3. The Conflict between Agro-Export Specialization and Agro-Biodiversity¶ The theory of comparative advantage promotes economic specialization in goods that a country produces relatively more efficiently. For countries well-suited to agricultural production, the theory of comparative advantage would counsel specialization in several primary agricultural commodities and importation of manufactured goods.¶ One of the lessons of the Mexican case study is that extending the principle of specialization from industry to agriculture is fundamentally inconsistent with the agrobiodiversity necessary to protect the integrity of the world's food supply. Cultivating different varieties of corn designed to resist different environmental conditions enables local farmers to diversify their risk in the event of crop failure. This genetic diversity is also essential to the world's plant breeders as they seek to develop new varieties to address the food security challenges of the 21st century, including climate change.¶ The lessons of the Mexican case study are broadly applicable to other crops. One of the great risks posed to small farmers in developing countries and to the resilience of the world's food supply is the pressure to abandon traditional, biodiverse cultivation techniques in favor of uniform seeds, chemical fertilizers, and synthetic pesticides. n221 Indeed, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization reports that seventy-five percent of the world's food crop diversity was lost in the 20th century. n222 Although thousands of food crops have been cultivated since the beginning of agriculture, four crops (corn, wheat, potato, and rice) currently supply sixty percent of the world's dietary energy from [\*769] plants. n223 Furthermore, the genetic base of these crops is alarmingly narrow. Genetically uniform, high-yielding varieties have displaced traditional varieties for 70 percent of the world's corn; 50 percent of the wheat in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; and 75 percent of Asian rice. n224 The replacement of biodiverse agroecosystems by monocultures is destroying the reservoir of genetic diversity necessary to enable local farmers and the global food supply to recover from serious environmental disturbances - including the floods, droughts, and other dislocations associated with climate change. n225¶ The cultivation of uniform crop varieties also increases vulnerability to pest and disease infestation (because different crops and different genetic strains of a particular crop may be more resistant to certain pests), depletes the soil of vital nutrients, requires the use of environmentally harmful chemical fertilizers and pesticides, and impairs human nutrition by reducing the varieties of foods consumed. n226 The expansion of export monocultures as a consequence of agro-export led development strategies promoted by the IMF and the World Bank has imposed severe environmental costs on a wide range of developing countries. These costs include deforestation, unsustainable uses of freshwater resources, agrochemical contamination of groundwater and surface waters, and greater pesticide-related illnesses. n227

#### Corporate rule at the expense of ordinary working people paying the price is the logic that creates poverty, misery and ecological destruction to destroy the planet

Lendman 07 (Stephen L, *The Racist War on Immigrants*, 3/29)

No welcome sign is out for the unwanted poor and desperate. At best, they're ignored to subsist on their own. At worst, they're scorned and abused, exploited and discarded like trash or labeled "terrorists" in a post-9/11 world of mass witch-hunt roundups aimed at Muslims because of their faith or country of origin and Latinos coming north to survive the fallout from NAFTA's destructive effects on their lives. Immigrants of color, the wrong faith or from the wrong parts of the world are never greeted warmly in "America the Beautiful" that's only for the privileged and no one else. They're not wanted except to harvest our crops or do the hard, low-pay, no-benefit labor few others will do. The ground rules to come were set straight away in our original Nationalization Act of 1790 establishing the first path to citizenship. It wasn't friendly to the wrong types as permanent status was limited to foreign-born "free white persons" of "good moral character," meaning people like most of us - our culture, countries of origin, religion and skin color. Left out were indentured servants, slaves, free blacks, native Americans being exterminated, and later Asians and Latinos whose "appearance" wasn't as acceptable as the whiteness of English-speaking European Christian settlers and the mix of others from Western European countries like Holland, Germany and Scandinavia. The law scarcely changed for 162 years until the 1870 15th amendment loosened it enough to include blacks by 1875, no longer slaves but hardly free and in 1940 gave Latin Americans the same right. After the war in 1945 it extended it further to Filipinos and Asian Indians. Original native Americans, whose land this was for thousands of years, only were enfranchised and given the right of citizenship in their own land when Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act in 1924 after most of them were exterminated in a genocidal process still ongoing, never mentioned in the mainstream, and for which no redress was ever made or likely will be. The 1952 Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act (INA) only grudgingly did what no law before it allowed. For the first time it made individuals of all races eligible for citizenship but imposed strict quotas for those from the Eastern Hemisphere with different standards for Caucasians from the West. But nothing is ever simple and straightforward in "America the Beautiful." In the early Cold War atmosphere of Joe McCarthy's communist witch-hunts, anyone accused of leftist sympathies could be targeted, and any alien so-tagged could be deported, and like today no evidence was needed. From the INA to the present, immigration laws kept changing for better or worse, but one thing was constant. White Christian Western Europeans are welcomed. Others, especially people of color or the wrong religion, get in grudgingly in lesser numbers and receive unequal or harsh treatment when they arrive. The 1996 Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) and Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)proved it showing Democrat presidents can be as mean and nasty as Republicans, especially with help from a Republican-controlled Congress. The 1996 acts were ugly and repressive ignoring the rights of due process and judicial fairness. They allowed Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents to detain legal immigrants without bond, deport them without discretionary relief, restrict their access to counsel, bar them from appealing to the courts, and can be applied for even minor offenses little more than youthful indiscretions. These laws under a Democrat president "feel(ing) our pain" showed no more compassion or equity than later ones under George Bush in force today. They allow no second chances and deny targeted legal immigrants their day in court. Their harshness tears apart families unjustly made to suffer by a nation hardening its stance to the wrong kinds of immigrants. They're sent an unwelcome message now much worse in the age of George Bush with his permanent wars on the world and homeland "terrorists" meaning anyone called that on his say alone. It started post-9/11 with the 2001 USA Patriot Act even harsher in its updated Patriot Act II version. Enacted to combat "terrorism," it's done on the border with more guards to spot, detain, arrest and incarcerate Latinos entering the country for a way to survive. For being undocumented and on the pretext of being suspected "terrorists," they may be indefinitely detained or deported the way it works under any despotic national security police state. It's even worse for Muslims, 5000 of whom were rounded up and held early on with only three of them ever being charged with an offense. And it got far worse for them after that still ongoing. Today, federal immigration courts can hold secret hearings for anyone here illegally or charged with a law violation, no matter how minor. Those convicted can then be incarcerated or deported to their country of origin often to face arrest and torture. It's now open season on anyone targeted with legal protection no longer shielding innocent victims Justice Department (DOJ) or Department of Homeland Security (DHS) go after. They includes poor and desperate mostly undocumented Latinos from Mexico and Central America coming el norte because NAFTA, CAFTA and other neoliberal unfair trade agreements called "free" destroyed their ability to earn a living at home leaving them no other choice but come north or perish. It shouldn't be that way, and promises were made early on that "free trade" lifted all boats with higher wages and more jobs. Instead millions of jobs were lost while real wages fell under the effects of a globalized market system crafted for investor elites to profit at the expense of ordinary working people paying the price. They've been devastated since by a sustained massive wealth transfer to the top of the economic pyramid that in the US alone has been a generational process of well over $1 trillion annually to corporations and the richest 1%. For the past 13 years, NAFTA and the rest of globalized trade provided cover for imperialism on the march for power and profit. It prospers from economic and shooting wars of conquest with an engineered race to the bottom driven by giant predatory corporations allied with friendly governments in their service at the expense of ordinary working people paying the price. The result - **mass and growing poverty, human misery, and ecological destruction great enough to threaten the ability of the planet to sustain life.**

**This form of environmental injustice outweighs any impact on probability and magnitude-we have an obligation to change our decision-making process.**  
Verchick in 1996 [Robert, Assistant Professor, University of Missouri -- Kansas City School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1989, “IN A GREENER VOICE: FEMINIST THEORY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE” 19 Harv. Women's L.J. 23]

Because risk assessment is based on statistical measures of risk, policymakers view it as an accurate and objective tool in establishing environmental standards. n275 The scientific process used to assess risk purports to focus single-mindedly on only one feature of a potential injury: the objective probability of its occurrence. n276 Risk assessors, who consider most value judgments irrelevant in determining statistical risk, seek to banish them at every stage. n277 As a result, the language of risk assessment -- and of related environmental safety standards -- often carry an air of irrebuttable precision and certainty. The EPA, for example, defines the standard acceptable level of risk under Superfund as "10<-6>" -- that is, the probability that one person in a million would develop cancer due to exposure to site contamination. n278 [\*76] Feminism challenges this model of scientific risk assessment on at least three levels. First, feminism questions the assumption that scientific inquiry is value-neutral, that is, free of societal bias or prejudice. n279 Indeed, as many have pointed out, one's perspective unavoidably influences the practice of science. n280 Western science may be infused with its own ideology, perpetuating, in the view of the ecofeminists, cycles of discrimination, domination, and exploitation. n281 Second, even if scientific inquiry by itself were value-neutral, environmental regulation based on such inquiry would still contain subjective elements. Environmental regulation, like any other product of democracy, inevitably reflects elements of subjectivity, compromise, and self-interest. The technocratic language of regulation serves only to "mask, not eliminate, political and social considerations." n282 We have already seen how the subjective decision to prefer white men as subjects for epidemiological study can skew risk assessments against the interests of women and people of color. The focus of many assessments on the risk of cancer deaths, but not, say, the risks of birth defects or miscarriages, is yet another example of how a policymaker's subjective decision of what to look for can influence what is ultimately seen. n283 Once risk data are collected and placed in a statistical form, the ultimate translation of that information into rules and standards of conduct once again reflects value judgments. A safety threshold of one in a million or a preference for "best conventional technology" does not spring from the periodic table, but rather evolves from the application [\*77] of human experience and judgment to scientific information. Whose experience? Whose judgment? Which information? These are the questions that feminism prompts, and they will be discussed shortly. Finally, feminists would argue that questions involving the risk of death and disease should not even aspire to value neutrality. Such decisions -- which affect not only today's generations, but those of the future -- should be made with all related political and moral considerations plainly on the table. n284 In addition, policymakers should look to all perspectives, especially those of society's most vulnerable members, to develop as complete a picture of the moral issues as possible. Debates about scientific risk assessment and public values often appear as a tug of war between the "technicians," who would apply only value-neutral criteria to set regulatory standards, and the "public," who demand that psychological perceptions and contextual factors also be considered. n285 Environmental justice advocates, strongly concerned with the practical experiences of threatened communities, argue convincingly for the latter position. n286 A feminist critique of the issue, however, suggests that the debate is much richer and more complicated than a bipolar view allows. For feminists, the notion of value neutrality simply does not exist. The debate between technicians and the public, according to feminists, is not merely a contest between science and feelings, but a broader discussion about the sets of methods, values, and attitudes to which each group subscribes. Furthermore, feminists might argue, the parties to this discussion divide into more than two categories. Because one's world view is premised on many things, including personal experience, one might expect that subgroups within either category might differ in significant ways from other subgroups. Therefore, feminists would anticipate a broad spectrum of views concerning scientific risk assessment and public values. Intuitively, this makes sense. Certainly scientists disagree among themselves about the hazards of nuclear waste, ozone depletion, and global warming. n287 Many critics have argued that scientists, despite their allegiance [\*78] to rational method, are nonetheless influenced by personal and political views. n288 Similarly, members of the public are a widely divergent group. One would not be surprised to see politicians, land developers, and blue-collar workers disagreeing about environmental standards for essentially non-scientific reasons. Politicians and bureaucrats are two sets of the non-scientific community that affect environmental standards in fundamental ways. Their adherence to vocal, though not always broadly representative, constituencies may lead them to disfavor less advantaged socioeconomic groups when addressing environmental concerns. n289 In order to understand a diversity of risk perception and to see how attitudes and social status affect the risk assessment process, we must return to the feminist inquiry that explores the relationship between attitudes and identity. 1. The Diversity of Risk Perception A recent national survey, conducted by James Flynn, Paul Slovic, and C.K. Mertz, measured the risk perceptions of a group of 1512 people that included numbers of men, women, whites, and non-whites proportional to their ratios in society. n290 Respondents answered questions about the health risks of twenty-five environmental, technological, and "life-style" hazards, including such hazards as ozone depletion, chemical waste, and cigarette smoking. n291 The researchers asked them to rate each hazard as posing "almost no health risk," a "slight health risk," a "moderate health risk," or a "high health risk." The researchers then analyzed [\*79] the responses to determine whether the randomly selected groups of white men, white women, non-white men, and non-white women differed in any way. The researchers found that perceptions of risk generally differed on the lines of gender and race. Women, for instance, perceived greater risk from most hazards than did men. n292 Furthermore, non-whites as a group perceived greater risk from most hazards than did whites. n293 Yet the most striking results appeared when the researchers considered differences in gender and race together. They found that "white males tended to differ from everyone else in their attitudes and perceptions -- on average, they perceived risks as much smaller and much more acceptable than did other people." n294 Indeed, without exception, the pool of white men perceived each of the twenty-five hazards as less risky than did non-white men, white women, or non-white women. n295 Wary that other factors associated with gender or race could be influencing their findings, the researchers later conducted several multiple regression analyses to correct for differences in income, education, political orientation, the presence of children in the home, and age, among others. Yet even after all corrections, "gender, race, and 'white male' [status] remained highly significant predictors" of perceptions of risk. n296 2. Explaining the Diversity From a feminist perspective, these findings are important because they suggest that risk assessors, politicians, and bureaucrats -- the large majority of whom are white men n297 -- may be acting on attitudes about security and risk that women and people of color do not widely share. If this is so, white men, as the "measurers of all things," have crafted a system of environmental protection that is biased toward their subjective understandings of the world. n298 [\*80] Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz speculate that white men's perceptions of risk may differ from those of others because in many ways women and people of color are "more vulnerable, because they benefit less from many of [society's] technologies and institutions, and because they have less power and control." n299 Although Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz are careful to acknowledge that they have not yet tested this hypothesis empirically, their explanation appears consistent with the life experiences of less empowered groups and comports with previous understandings about the roles of control and risk perception. n300 Women and people of color, for instance, are more vulnerable to environmental threat in several ways. Such groups are sometimes more biologically vulnerable than are white men. n301 People of color are more likely to live near hazardous waste sites, to breathe dirty air in urban communities, and to be otherwise exposed to environmental harm. n302 Women, because of their traditional role as primary caretakers, are more likely to be aware of the vulnerabilities of their children. n303 It makes sense that such vulnerabilities would give rise to increased fear about risk. It is also very likely that women and people of color believe they benefit less from the technical institutions that create toxic byproducts. n304 Further, people may be more likely to discount risk if they feel somehow compensated for the activity. n305 For this reason, Americans worry relatively little about driving automobiles, an activity with enormous advantages in our large country but one that claims tens of thousands of lives per year. The researchers' final hypothesis -- that differences in perception can be explained by the lack of "power and control" exercised by women and people of color -- suggests the importance that such factors as voluntariness and control over risk play in shaping perceptions. [\*81] Risk perception research frequently emphasizes the significance of voluntariness in evaluating risk. Thus, a person may view water-skiing as less risky than breathing polluted air because the former is accepted voluntarily. n306 Voluntary risks are viewed as more acceptable in part because they are products of autonomous choice. n307 A risk accepted voluntarily is also one from which a person is more likely to derive an individual benefit and one over which a person is more likely to retain some kind of control. n308 Some studies have found that people prefer voluntary risks to involuntary risks by a factor of 1000 to 1. n309 Although environmental risks are generally viewed as involuntary risks to a certain degree, choice plays a role in assuming risks. White men are still more likely to exercise some degree of choice in assuming environmental risks than other groups. Communities of color face greater difficulty in avoiding the placement of hazardous facilities in their neighborhoods and are more likely to live in areas with polluted air and lead contamination. n310 Families of color wishing to buy their way out of such polluted neighborhoods often find their mobility limited by housing discrimination, redlining by banks, and residential segregation. n311 The workplace similarly presents workers exposed to toxic hazards (a disproportionate number of whom are minorities) n312 with impossible choices between health and work, or between sterilization and demotion. n313 Just as marginalized groups have less choice in determining the degree of risk they will assume, they may feel less control over the risks they face. "Whether or not the risk is assumed voluntarily, people have greater [\*82] fear of activities with risks that appear to be outside their individual control." n314 For this reason, people often fear flying in an airplane more than driving a car, even though flying is statistically safer. n315 If white men are more complacent about public risks, it is perhaps because they are more likely to have their hands on the steering wheel when such risks are imposed. White men still control the major political and business institutions in this country. n316 They also dominate the sciences n317 and make up the vast majority of management staff at environmental agencies. n318 Women and people of color see this disparity and often lament their back-seat role in shaping environmental policy. n319 Thus, many people of color in the environmental justice movement believe that environmental laws work to their disadvantage by design. n320 [\*83] The toxic rivers of Mississippi's "Cancer Alley," n321 the extensive poisoning of rural Indian land, n322 and the mismanaged cleanup of the weapons manufacturing site in Hanford, Washington n323 only promote the feeling that environmental policy in the United States sacrifices the weak for the benefit of the strong. In addition, the catastrophic potential that groups other than white men associate with a risk may explain the perception gap between those groups and white males. Studies of risk perception show that, in general, individuals harbor particularly great fears of catastrophe. n324 For this reason, earthquakes, terrorist bombings, and other disasters in which high concentrations of people are killed or injured prove particularly disturbing to the lay public. Local environmental threats involving toxic dumps, aging smelters, or poisoned wells also produce high concentrations of localized harm that can appear catastrophic to those involved. n325 Some commentators contend that the catastrophic potential of a risk should influence risk assessment in only minimal ways. n326 Considering public fear of catastrophes, they argue, will irrationally lead policymakers to battle more dramatic but statistically less threatening hazards, while accepting more harmful but more mundane hazards. n327 [\*84] At least two reasons explain why the catastrophic potential of environmental hazards must be given weight in risk assessment. First, concentrated and localized environmental hazards do not simply harm individuals, they erode family ties and community relationships. An onslaught of miscarriages or birth defects in a neighborhood, for instance, will create community-wide stress that will debilitate the neighborhood in emotional, sociological, and economic ways. n328 To ignore this communal harm is to underestimate severely the true risk involved. n329 Second, because concentrated and localized environmental hazards tend to be unevenly distributed on the basis of race and income level, any resulting mass injury to a threatened population takes on profound moral character. For this reason, Native Americans often characterize the military's poisoning of Indian land as genocide. n330 [\*85] 3.

### 1ac – solvency

#### United States aid to Mexican small farmers can address rural poverty and dispossession—The plan represents a radical shift in the foreign policy toward Mexico.

Wainer in 11 immigration policy analyst for Bread for the World Institute, in ‘11

[Andrew, “Development and Migration In Rural Mexico”, Bread for the World Institute, Brief No. 11, January]

Mexico’s countryside is one of the most promising¶ environments to invest in rural development¶ to reduce migration pressures. Mexico has the¶ 14th largest economy in the world, but it is also¶ extraordinarily unequal.22 Depending on the measure,¶ between one third and half of Mexicans are¶ considered poor and up to 18 percent live in extreme poverty,¶ unable to meet their basic food needs.23¶ Reducing migration pressures will require development¶ and job creation throughout Mexico, but poverty and international¶ migration are particularly concentrated in the¶ countryside. Although about a quarter of all Mexicans live¶ in rural areas, 60 percent of Mexico’s extreme poor are rural¶ and 44 percent of all of Mexico’s international migration¶ originates in rural communities (see Figure 2).24¶ This means that more than half of rural Mexicans live¶ in poverty and 25 percent live in extreme poverty.25 As one¶ expert states, “Rural poverty is one … of the principal “pushfactors”¶ in Mexican migration to the United States” and thus¶ should be the primary focus of development efforts aimed at¶ reducing migration pressures.26¶ After decades of declining support among international¶ assistance agencies,27 agriculture and rural development is¶ now re-emerging as a vital development focus. The World¶ Bank’s 2008 World Development Report states, “Agriculture¶ continues to be a fundamental instrument for sustainable¶ development and poverty reduction.”28 Research has also¶ found that agriculture is one of the best returns on investment¶ in terms of poverty-reduction spending.29 For example,¶ each 1 percent increase in crop productivity in Asia reduces¶ the number of poor people by half a percent. This correlation¶ also holds for middle-income countries such as Mexico.30¶ Among the options for agricultural development, support¶ for smallholder farmers is the most promising path for poverty¶ reduction. The World Bank states, “Improving the productivity,¶ profitability, and sustainability of smallholder farming¶ is the main pathway out of poverty in using agriculture for¶ development.”31 And smallholder farmers in Mexico are¶ especially in need of assistance. After decades of declining¶ support from the Mexican government and increased competition¶ from subsidized U.S. producers under the North¶ American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), small-Mexican¶ farmers have found it increasingly difficult to make a living.¶ NAFTA and Mexican Small Farmers¶ After defaulting on its foreign debt in August 1982, the¶ Mexican government began a major shift in its development¶ strategy from a protectionist, state-run model that nurtured¶ domestic consumption and industrialization to a more market-¶ based model focused on cutting government spending¶ and encouraging exports, all with the aim of reducing debt,¶ inflation, and currency instability.32 Although the reforms of¶ the 1980s were aimed at stabilizing the economy, the shift¶ in economic model was wrenching for Mexicans. The 1980s¶ saw falling wages, a decline in living standards, job displacement,¶ and lowered prospects for economic mobility¶ The impact on small farmers was particularly harmful. In¶ addition to a reduction in state support, small and mediumsized¶ producers faced the cumulative impact of long-term¶ drought, multiple economic crises, increased competition¶ from U.S. producers, falling agricultural commodity prices¶ and increases in the price of agricultural inputs, and reduced¶ access to credit. Mexico’s rural population decreased from¶ 58 percent in 1950 to 25 percent in 2005. While many of the¶ rural poor migrated to Mexico’s overcrowded cities, others¶ opted for the United States.33¶ The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)¶ was the culmination of the economic liberalization that¶ began in the 1980s. NAFTA was touted as a Mexican job-creation program that would slow immigration. But NAFTA’s¶ policies reinforced support for large, export-oriented producers¶ at the cost of small farmers, and rural employment continued¶ to diminish. Between 1991 and 2007 Mexico lost 20¶ percent (2.1 million) of its agricultural jobs. The loss of rural¶ jobs and the inability to generate income impacted family¶ farms in particular: non-salaried agricultural family employment¶ declined 58 percent between 1991 and 2007. Many of¶ these displaced farmers ended up in the United States, sometimes¶ working in U.S. agriculture as field laborers.34¶ After NAFTA, the operation of the Mexican small family¶ farm became the vocation of older Mexicans, while youth¶ migrated to the cities or the United States. Almost a quarter¶ of rural Mexicans ages 15-24 in 1990 had left by 2000.¶ Throughout 30 years of increasing emigration, the Mexican¶ government also has done little to slow the exodus. Its leading¶ program for small agricultural producers—PROCAMPO—¶ does not target areas of high migration.35¶ Although the Mexican government is primarily responsible¶ for addressing the country’s rural poverty, the United¶ States can provide critical support for programs that address¶ migration pressures at their source. Because of its potential¶ for long-term impact, such a strategy requires commensurate,¶ sustained policy attention and resources. Furthermore,¶ by supporting economic development projects with rural¶ Mexican organizations, Mexican government agencies—particularly¶ at the local and regional levels—can be drawn into¶ development projects that reduce migration pressures.¶ A comprehensive, smallholder-based approach to development¶ would by its very nature generate rural employment.¶ Without support for Mexico’s small and medium farmers,¶ the country’s rural economy will continue to be increasingly dependent on migration and remittances. While the link¶ between supporting smallholder farmers and poverty reduction¶ is proven, the next logical step with respect to its impact¶ on migration pressures is less recognized.36

#### Current policies are focused purely on maintaining smooth flows of trade. This locks in conditions of economic and social instability in Mexico—The plan is key to overcome the factors that cause FORCED migration and change the decision process.

Wainer in 2011, immigration policy analyst for Bread for the World Institute, in ‘11

[Andrew, “Development and Migration In Rural Mexico”, Bread for the World Institute, Brief No. 11, January]

As the source of 60 percent of all unauthorized immigration¶ to the United States, Mexico is unrivaled¶ as in its importance to U.S. immigration policy¶ (see Figure 1).1 Recognizing this, the U.S. government’s primary¶ response has been reinforcing the country’s 1,969-mile¶ border with its southern neighbor. While this is popular with¶ the public, it hasn’t stopped unauthorized immigration.2¶ Although unauthorized immigration has decreased in recent¶ years, most experts attribute that primarily to the loss¶ of available jobs in the United States rather than increased¶ spending on border enforcement.3¶ U.S. spending on immigration enforcement increased¶ from $1 billion to $15 billion between 1990 and 2009. During¶ this time the U.S. unauthorized immigrant population increased¶ from 3 million to almost 12 million.4 Experts recognize¶ that given the pull of higher wages in the United States,¶ it would take unrealistic amounts of personnel and funding–¶ not to mention the use of lethal force–to stop unauthorized¶ immigration through Mexico.5¶ The enforcement-only approach to migration is ineffective¶ because it ignores some of the principal causes of unauthorized¶ migration to the United States: poverty and inequality¶ in Latin America, particularly in Mexico.6 Although¶ every migrant has his or her own story, most of those stories¶ include the inability to find work or earn enough money in¶ their homeland.¶ In a 2010 case study of an immigrant-sending community¶ in Mexico, 61 percent of male migrants reported that¶ economic opportunities–higher wages and more jobs–were¶ the primary motivating factor for migration to the United¶ States.7 As the 2009 United Nations Human Development¶ Report stated, migration “largely reflects people’s need to¶ improve their livelihoods.”8¶ In order to address immigration pressures directly, the¶ United States must consider a more balanced development¶ agenda toward Mexico and other migrant-sending countries¶ in Latin America. This includes elevating the importance¶ of poverty reduction and job-creation projects targeted to¶ migrant-sending communities—particularly in rural Mexico,¶ where poverty and migration are concentrated.9¶ Building sustainable livelihoods in migrant-sending communities¶ not only has the potential to reduce a major cause¶ of immigration to the United States but could also contribute¶ to the fight against violence and lawlessness in Mexico.¶ While the reasons for the violence are complex, poverty and¶ a lack of economic opportunity for Mexican youth certainly¶ facilitate involvement in illicit activity along with out-migration.¶ 10¶ The U.S. government and multilateral organizations such¶ as the United Nations are expressing increased interest in¶ the nexus of development and migration. The U.S. Agency¶ for International Development (USAID) in particular is supporting¶ research on the role that the diaspora can play in¶ their home countries’ development.11¶ In November 2010, U.S. State Department Assistant Secretary¶ Eric P. Schwartz said, “Governments and international¶ organizations must also better anticipate the impact of development¶ programs on the movement of people.”12 These¶ are a promising signs. But policymakers lack models and a¶ process for converting this increased interest into concrete¶ policies and projects that seek to reduce migration pressures¶ in Latin America in general and in Mexico in particular.¶ U.S. Foreign Assistance to Mexico and the¶ Mérida Initiative¶ The U.S. embassy in Mexico City states on its website,¶ “The lack of opportunities to earn a living wage spurs migration—¶ both internal and international.”13 But the U.S. government’s¶ foreign policy response to the causes of immigration¶ matches its domestic policy: an overwhelming focus on security¶ and law enforcement.14¶ Within the U.S. government’s Latin America assistance¶ portfolio, Mexico has traditionally been a low-priority country¶ because of its status as a middle-income nation. Until¶ 2008, Mexico and Central America received 16.2 percent¶ of foreign assistance funds directed toward Latin America.¶ This typically amounted to $60-70 million per year for Mexico,¶ with more than half of that directed to assist Mexico’s¶ fight against international drug trafficking. Mexico received¶ about $27 million per year in foreign assistance for all nonsecurity¶ programs prior to 2008.15¶ In an effort to combat Mexico’s narcotic trafficking organizations,¶ U.S. assistance was dramatically increased in¶ 2008 through the Mérida Initiative, a multi-year $1.8 billion¶ program focused on law enforcement assistance to¶ Mexican (and, to a lesser extent, Central American)¶ security agencies. Through this program, U.S.¶ assistance to Mexico increased from $65 million¶ in fiscal year 2007 to almost $406 million in fiscal¶ year 2008.16 In 2009, total State Department assistance¶ to Mexico was $786.8 million. Of this total¶ assistance package, $753.8 million—96 percent of¶ U.S. funds to Mexico—was directed toward military¶ and drug enforcement assistance. Although¶ it’s dwarfed by the $10 billion annual border enforcement¶ budget, the Mérida Initiative dominates¶ U.S. foreign assistance to Mexico.17¶ In 2009, U.S. development assistance that could¶ be directed toward job-creation projects that reduce¶ migration pressures totaled $11.2 million,¶ or .01 percent of total U.S. assistance (see Table¶ 1 on next page). The Mérida Initiative increased¶ total U.S. assistance to Mexico but decreased the¶ importance of economic development in the overall¶ Mexican foreign assistance agenda.18 There are¶ U.S. government agencies other than the United¶ States Agency for International Development¶ (USAID) and the State Department that focus¶ on poverty reduction and rural development in¶ Latin America, but within the entirety of U.S. foreign¶ assistance to Mexico, poverty reduction and¶ economic development remain a low priority.19¶ USAID’s lack of emphasis on supporting rural¶ Mexico—where poverty and migration are concentrated—¶ is part of a global foreign assistance trend¶ beginning in the 1980s that de-emphasized agricultural¶ development.20¶ In spite of the growing interest, discussion¶ among U.S. policymakers and practitioners on¶ migration and development has largely been theoretical.¶ Other than remittance projects, there are¶ few models of how to design and implement development¶ projects that seek to reduce migration¶ pressures. In order to translate conceptual discussions¶ into practice, policymakers and practitioners¶ need to know what works in terms of development¶ in migrant-sending communities.21

#### Now is a key time for the movement in order to prevent the introduction of genetically modified monocultures. There is energy now.

Mensing ‘13, Alternet Reporter, 5-31-13[Alex, Thousands in Mexico Protest Monsanto by Throwing a Carnival of Corn”, http://www.alternet.org/activism/thousands-mexico-protest-monsanto-throwing-carnival-corn?paging=off]

On May 25, an estimated two million people across 50 countries participated in the global March Against Monsanto. Organizers estimate that these protests against the U.S.-based transnational biotech corporation were one of the largest days of coordinated action in history. Yet, despite the high level of coordination, the local actions were not all orchestrated by professional organizers — and nor were the resulting actions all traditional marches.¶ On Saturday, about 2,000 participants gathered in Mexico City for the Carnaval del Maíz, a “Carnival of Corn” to celebrate Mexico’s rich diversity of native corn, threatened by Monsanto’s plans to introduce a genetically modified variety of the crop. The fact that Mexico’s manifestation of the global March Against Monsanto took the form of a carnival is no coincidence. The current generation of Mexican activists is looking for new strategies to fight for social justice, and the March Against Monsanto provided an opportunity to fuse tradition and innovation into the building blocks for a global food revolution.¶ The beginnings of the action came from an unlikely source: a novice Mexico City activist named Thalía Güido. In early March, Güido found the “March Against Monsanto” Facebook page and learned there was to be a global protest on May 25.¶ “I started to see [actions] in Africa, in Boston, and I said to myself, how can it be that Mexico isn’t listed?” she remembered thinking. After the organizers confirmed that there was nothing yet planned for Mexico, she decided it was time to start planning.¶ She started by contacting student-activists who had belonged to her university’s chapter of Yo Soy 132, a movement that opposes Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto and the nation’s corporate media conglomerate. They liked the idea, so she began reaching out to other organizations.¶ “I started sending emails like crazy,” said Güido.¶ The momentum began building. At the first meeting, there were four participants; by the fourth, the group barely fit in the room. By the week before the event, more than 40 different organizations, as well as independent activists, were involved in the organizing efforts — although no one wore name tags identifying what institution they were coming from. Güido attributes the rapid growth of the planning meetings to the horizontal and citizen-oriented structure of the group, as well as to the carnivalesque nature of the event.¶ “The truth is I don’t want to be an ‘official organizer,’” Güido often told the others. “I want this to grow as a citizen initiative.”¶ Celebrating subversion¶ Another reason the event attracted so much participation is because the target — Monsanto — is one of the largest and most reviled corporations in the world. The global scale of last Saturday’s event reflects the far-reaching influence of and animosity toward Monsanto, which is embroiled in controversies around patent litigation, health concerns, environmental destruction and small farmer oppression.¶ Yet, the corporation’s presence is particularly threatening in Mexico, where much of the rural culture centers on corn production. “It affects everything because our culture revolves around corn,” said farmer and activist Héctor Mendoza Rosas. “And with GMOs what you would have to do is, you wouldn’t be selecting seed, you would be buying it. You wouldn’t be saving seed. You’d have to by all of their stuff.” ¶ This threat to Mexico’s rural agricultural economy and sustainability isn’t new. Since the North American Free Trade Agreement went into effect in 1994, cheap corn from the United States has undercut small Mexican farmers’ ability to make a living while maintaining the traditional practices that preserve Mexico’s cultural and biological diversity. But today’s plans to introduce a genetically modified crop threatens the very global future of the crop’s genetic diversity because Mexico is, organizers explained, “the center of origin and diversification of corn.”¶ Monsanto’s presence in Mexico is also seen as an attack, particularly on the nation’s pre-Hispanic cultural values. “There is a very strong nationalism in Mexico based on a mythology,” explained carnival organizer Paula, who chose to share only her first name. “It has always been said that in one way or another, Mexicans come from corn.”¶ The idea for a carnival stemmed from the organizers’ understanding of this pre-Hispanic culture, known as indigenismo, in which these festivals represent challenges to the ruling power.¶ “The carnival in Mexico is subversive,” said Carlos Ventura Callejas. He explained that in the aftermath of the Spanish conquest, indigenous communities used the carnival as a way to preserve traditional religious cultures in the face of imposed Catholicism.¶ “Carnival time is a time to go out and think things that the system doesn’t allow you to think,” said Ventura.¶ So, organizers thought: What better way to go to battle against Monsanto than by having a Carnival of Corn?¶ A break from marches¶ The idea of organizing a carnival instead of a traditional political march was also a strategic decision.¶ “Something I’ve realized since getting more involved in Yo Soy 132 is that protest is now seen as something obsolete,” explained Güido. “So it really has to do with a redefinition, with a change in concept. We’re going to put on a march, but we’re going to do it with a playful theme instead of making it combative… We’re going to have creative spaces for artists.”¶ The strategic emphasis on creating a playful and festive space was, in part, a reaction to the ugly street scene on the day of Enrique Peña Nieto’s inauguration, when thousands massed to protest the presidential imposition. Many of the people involved in organizing the Carnival for Corn remember the bitterness that exploded that day, and both Güido and Ventura saw it as a reason to organize a joyous carnival — especially since the government subsequently rewrote the police protocol for demonstrations, resulting in what Güido described as “an impressive criminalization of protest.”¶ The organizations and individuals involved in the planning sessions set about filling the day’s itinerary with theater, workshops, music and art, permeating the day’s scheduled march and speeches with carnivalesque activities. The organizers also deployed social media and their own livestream channel to spread the word. The message focused on the global aspect of the day of action.¶ At the Carnival of Corn’s press conference two days before the event, Paula began by declaring that the carnival would allow Mexico to “unite our voices” with those in more than 400 cities around the world. Then, on Saturday, the livestream group 5oymexico.org began broadcasting hours before the event in Mexico City began so that they could share video, images and audio from anti-Monsanto actions in places where the protests had already begun.¶ The carnival begins¶ The Carnival of Corn was, at its core, a celebration of Mexican agricultural heritage. Children made seed bombs, known in Spanish as bolitas de vida, out of clay, soil and amaranth seeds.¶ Hundreds participated in a play written by a local playwright that showcased the importance of corn in Mexico and drew a parallel between traditional mythological characters and modern-day actors. Organizers distributed masks and audience-members-turned-actors assumed the role of either Olmecs, an ancient indigenous people from southern Mexico, or the minions of Tlaltecuhtli, pre-Hispanic god of the dead. A figure playing Monsanto used the death-minions to steal native corn from the Olmecs, but in the end the community organized to defeat him.¶ Throughout the day, artists used performance and creativity to inform the carnival’s estimated 2,000 participants about Monsanto. A theater troupe from nearby San Miguel de Allende performed a show illustrating the dangers of Monsanto’s genetically modified crops and the corporation’s business practices. As performer Diana Hoogesteger explained, “Theater is a way to get people to notice you. Once they see you, they listen, and then they can be informed in an entertaining way of the things that are happening in the world.”¶ The carnival attracted both city residents and small farmers from nearby rural communities who saw Monsanto’s presence as a threat to their very livelihood. One participant, Delfino Santillán Castillo, traveled from Zupango, a region about an hour outside of Mexico City. He lamented that he now has trouble selling the native corn seed that he saves every year. He wife also expressed fear, particularly over Monsanto’s exclusive patents.¶ “If a Monsanto seed ends up on our land… they will sue us and take away everything we have,” she said.¶ The two heard about the action through a community radio program that had interviewed one of the Carnival’s organizers. Castillo explained that they prefer the radio over corporate news stations. “The television doesn’t tell the truth,” he said. “It just speaks in favor of the government and nothing else interests it.”¶ The day also attracted people from activist organizations, such as Guillermo Rizo Ornelas, who works with Ecos del Buen Vivir, an organization dedicated to environmental justice, human rights, education and health issues. He called on the government to practice the precautionary principle — the idea that precautionary measures should be taken with potentially harmful activities even if the harmful effects have not yet been clearly proven.¶ After marching to the Monument to the Revolution in downtown Mexico City, the local Food Not Bombs chapters collaborated to nourish the hungry protesters, who continued talking, laughing and performing as they shared what the March Against Monsanto is finally all about: a meal. Presentations by various organizations followed, as well as music by artists including Roco, from one of Mexico City’s most famous urban bands, Maldita Vecindad.¶ At the end of the day, Thalía Güido’s speech echoed what she had expressed throughout the planning process.¶ “This isn’t just a crossroads here in Mexico,” she told journalists. “We’ve created a worldwide network of communication between movements, organizations, people — between everyone who is in favor of the freedom of food and food sovereignty. So we believe that this is really part of a food revolution.”¶ Organizers have not yet planned their next action, but they have their eyes on even more symbolic date: September 29, Mexico’s National Day of Corn.

## 2ac

### 2ac – black femininity

#### The Role of the Ballot is to simulate the enactment of the plan—effective choices regarding Latin American foreign policy require the ability to test the real world outcomes of our scholarship and advocacies. Reform is possible—inserting ethics into decision making is key—

Baxter 10 (Jorge, Education Specialist, Department of Education and Culture in the Organization of American States, Former Coordinator of the Inter-American Program on Education for Democratic Values and Practices at the OAS, PHD in International Comparative Education and Policy from University of Maryland College Park, “Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Inter-American Journal of Education for Democracy, 3(2), 224-254, <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/ried/article/viewFile/1016/1307>, Accessed: 7/30/13)OG

In the context of international¶ education cooperation and international¶ development in Latin America, where¶ there are great asymmetries in power and¶ resources, it seems that this critique could¶ have some validity. However, rather than¶ concluding that deliberation and participation¶ should be reduced, one could conclude (as¶ is argued in this paper) that they should¶ be enhanced and expanded. Those that¶ advocate for a “thicker” democratization in¶ the region would likely advocate for a more¶ substantive approach to deliberation in policy¶ which establishes certain parameters such¶ as “education is an intrinsic human right,”¶ and which would place an emphasis on¶ achieving quality education outcomes¶ for all as the goal. This does not mean that¶ they would not advocate for deliberation but¶ rather would set parameters for deliberation¶ in order to ensure that the outcomes do not¶ lead to “unjust” policy (e.g., a policy that¶ might promote more inequity in education).¶ Those that advocate for a “thinner” approach¶ to democratization would tend to advocate¶ for a procedural approach to deliberation in¶ education policy and would most likely place¶ emphasis on equal opportunity of access¶ to quality education.¶ Instability critique: Education in Latin¶ America suffers from too much instability and¶ is too politicized. Increasing participation and¶ deliberation would only further politicize the¶ situation and polarize those who advocate for¶ educational reform and those who block it.¶ The average term of a minister of education¶ is one-and-a-half years; each time a new¶ minister comes to office, new policies are¶ passed which, according to deliberative¶ democratic theory, would need to be reasoned¶ and debated with citizens. Deliberation in this¶ context would promote even more instability¶ and would lead to further politicization of¶ education reform.¶ Response: Political instability and¶ lack of continuity in policy reform are serious¶ limitations that to some degree are inherent¶ in democratic institutions and processes. The¶ reality is that if any education reform is to¶ succeed in the long term, it needs more than¶ the efforts of governments or international¶ organizations. It needs the sustained support¶ of stakeholders across sectors (public,¶ private, and civil society) and over time. It¶ has been argued that the main problem in¶ basic education in Latin America is the lack¶ of a broad social consensus, recognizing¶ that there is a problem of equity and quality¶ in the provision of education (Schiefelbein,¶ 1997). This lack of broad social consensus¶ is especially challenging where there is, as¶ noted in the critique, a lack of continuity¶ in education reform. Reform in education¶ takes time, sometimes decades. Ensuring¶ continuity in education reform policies is¶ therefore crucial, and this requires public¶ consensus. Deliberative forums convening¶ government, private sector, and civil society¶ groups can contribute to developing this public¶ consensus and to providing more continuity¶ in policy. Deliberative forums combined¶ with collaborative projects can help promote¶ learning, distribute institutional memory,¶ support capacity-building efforts, and bring¶ more resources to bear on the education¶ reform process. Creating a space for citizens¶ to deliberate on the role of education is¶ fundamental for promoting broad social¶ consensus around education reforms. In Latin¶ America, the most innovative and successful¶ reforms have all created multiple and¶ continuous opportunities for diverse groups¶ across the education sector and society to¶ provide input and to have opportunities for¶ meaningful collaborative action. International¶ organizations, leveraging their regional and¶ international position, can contribute by¶ promoting policy dialogue and collaborative¶ actions among ministries and also with key¶ stakeholders across sectors. The challenge¶ is to develop a better understanding of how¶ deliberation can be used to promote more¶ collaborative as opposed to more adversarial¶ and partisan forms of politics. This is perhaps¶ one area which deliberative theorists need to¶ explore more.¶ 5. Power critique: The final critique relates¶ the possibility that increasing deliberation¶ and participation can lead to increased¶ inequality. Fung and Wright (2003) note¶ that deliberation can turn into domination¶ in a context where “participants in these¶ processes usually face each other from¶ unequal positions of power.” Every reform¶ in education creates winners and losers, and¶ very few create “win-win” situations. Those¶ in power would have to submit to the rules of¶ deliberation and relinquish “control” over the¶ various dimensions of democratic decisionmaking.¶ This is naïve and not politically¶ feasible.¶ Response: This is a valid critique¶ worth considering. Structural inequalities¶ and asymmetries of power in governments¶ and international institutions in Latin America¶ have facilitated domination by elites in terms¶ of authority, power, and control in politics.¶ Asymmetries of power in international¶ cooperation in education are also clear,¶ especially when powerful financial (World¶ Bank, IDB, IMF) or political (OAS, UNESCO)¶ organizations engage with local stakeholders¶ and condition policy options with funding¶ or political support. What this paper has¶ argued is relevant again here: that instead of¶ rejecting further democratization in the face¶ of these challenges, including the challenge¶ of elite “domination,” what is needed is more¶ and better democracy, defined in terms of its¶ breadth, depth, range, and control. Finally,¶ dealing with elite domination in international¶ deliberative forums will require conscious and¶ skilled facilitation on the part of international¶ organizations, which themselves are often¶ elitist and hegemonic.¶ Final Thoughts: So What?¶ Perhaps the most critical question¶ that emerges in the argument for increased¶ democratization and deliberation is simply:¶ So what? Does increased democratization and¶ deliberation actually lead to better outcomes¶ in education? More empirical research on this¶ critical question is needed. However, experiments¶ in deliberative democracy in education reform¶ in Brazil through the UNESCO and Ministry of¶ Education Coordinated Action Plan and Porto¶ Alegre‘s Citizen School, and also to some degree¶ at the international level with the OAS pilot¶ experiment in developing a more democratic¶ model of international cooperation from 2001-¶ 2005, have shown that deliberative processes¶ can enhance learning on the part of those¶ participating. Fung and Wright (2003) refer to¶ these experiments in deliberation as “schools¶ of democracy” because participants exercise¶ their capacities of argument, planning, and¶ evaluation. Deliberation promotes joint reflection¶ and consideration of others’ views. Citizens¶ who participate in deliberative forums develop¶ competencies that are important not only for¶ active citizenship (listening, communication,¶ problem-solving, conflict resolution, selfregulation skills) but also crucial for managing¶ change and school reform. Many of the same¶ skills that are developed through citizen¶ deliberation and participation are also essential¶ for transforming school cultures, promoting¶ “learning organizations” (Senge, 2000), fostering¶ communities of reflective practitioners (Schon,¶ 1991) and developing communities of practice¶ (Wenger, 2001). There is evidence from some¶ research that democratic interactions can create¶ knowledge that is more rigorous, precise, and¶ relevant than that produced in authoritarian¶ environments (Jaramillo, 2005). Another¶ important aspect of enhancing deliberative¶ democracy and democratization is that it moves¶ from a focus on individuals and their own¶ preferences towards more collective forms of¶ learning and collaboration.¶ Up to now, international organizations¶ have endorsed a “thin” version of democratization¶ that is content with formal and centralized¶ mechanisms of “representation” and “policy¶ dialogue.” If a new, more deliberative and¶ democratic model of cooperation in education in¶ the region were to emerge, what would it look¶ like?¶ First of all, a more deliberative and¶ democratic model of international cooperation in¶ education would involve more direct and deeper¶ forms of participation from everyday citizens,¶ including teachers, school directors, families,¶ school communities, students, and mesolevel¶ actors such as civil society organizations.¶ This participation would move beyond simple¶ consultation to more authentic forms of joint¶ decision-making and deliberation. The model¶ would involve more accountability on the¶ part of international organizations in terms¶ of transparency, and would require injecting¶ ethical reasoning into policies and programming.¶ In addition, a new more democratic model of¶ international cooperation would expand the¶ range of policy options available to countries¶ through devolution of authority, power, and¶ control, combined with oversight and horizontal¶ accountability mechanisms. A more democratic¶ model of international cooperation would stress¶ valuing, systematizing, and disseminating¶ local knowledge and innovation. Finally,¶ democratization and deliberation in international¶ cooperation in education would lead to enhanced¶ learning and agency on the part of participating¶ countries, groups, and individuals, and thus¶ contribute to better outcomes in terms of quality¶ and equity in education at national and local¶ levels.

#### Only practical political solutions can solve the epistemology critique

Gordon 4 (Lewis, Professor of Philosophy at University of Connecticut, Fanon and Development: A Philosophical Look, http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/4-3.pdf) Democracy and Development: Irene Gendzier Although Sylvia Wynter qualified her conclusions by reminding us that we should work through epistemological categories and ‘not merely economic’ ones, her dis- cussion so focuses on the question of conceptual conditions that it is difficult to determine how those economic considerations configure in the analysis. Irene Gendzier, author of one of the early studies of Fanon’s life and thought, took on this task, in addition to elaborating its political dimensions as well, in her 1995 history of the field of development studies, Development against Democracy: Manipulating Political Change in the Third World. Gendzier first points out that development studies emerged in elite, First World universities as an attempt to offer their vision of modernisation over the Marxist ones of the U.S.S.R., Communist China, and Cuba. Their model was resolute: A capitalist economy and elite (oligarchical) democracy. We see here the normative telos writ large: The United States. Although Gendzier does not present this as a theodicean argument, those elements are unmistakable. The initial phase of development studies granted the United States the status of utopia, which means that both its contradictions and those that emerge from its application abroad must be functions of the limitations of the people who manifest them. In effect, Gendzier’s study is an empirical validation of much of Wynter’s and Fanon’s arguments. The record of those development policies is universally bad, although there seems to be no example that could meet any test of falsification that would convince, say, mem- bers of the Council for Foreign Relations, many of whom are from the neoliberal and conservative wings of the North American academic elite. Gendzier uses an apt term to describe the work such policies have done: maldevelopment. Here is her assessment of their record:¶ For many, terms like Development and Modernization have lost their meaning. They have become code words. They refer to policies pursued by governments and international agencies that enrich ruling elites and technocrats, while the masses are told to await the benefits of the ‘trickle down’ effect. For many, Development and Modernization are terms that refer to a politics of reform designed to preserve the status quo while promising to alter it. And for many social scientists, those who have rationalized the interests of governments committed to such policies are accom- plices in deception (Gendzier 1995:2).¶ North American and European development studies set the foundations for U.S. policies that supported antidemocratic regimes for the sake of preserving the eco- nomic hegemony of American business elites, and the supposed dilemma emerged, in many countries under the yoke of First World developmental dictates, of whether to reduce social inequalities, which often led to economic decline on the one hand, or increase economic prosperity, which often led to social inequalities on the other. The problem, of course, is that this is a false dilemma since no nation attempts either pole in a vacuum. How other countries respond to a nation’s social and eco- nomic policy will impact its outcome. It is not, in other words, as though any nation truly functions as a self-supporting island anymore. A good example is the small Caribbean island of Antigua. To ‘normalise’ relations with the United States, that island was forced to create immigration laws that would stimulate the formation of an underclass, which U.S. advisors claimed would create a cheap labour base to stimulate economic investment and an increase in production and prosperity. There is now such a class in Antigua, but there has, in fact, been a decline in prosperity. The reason is obvious: There was not an infrastructure of capital in need of such a labour force in the first place. The island of Antigua has a good education base, which makes the type of labour suitable for its economy to be one of a trained profes- sional class linked in with the tourist economy and other high-leveled service-ori- ented professions such as banking and trade, all of which, save tourism, the United States does not associate within a predominantly black country. The creation of an underclass without an education or social-welfare system to provide training and economic relief, conjoined with an absence of investments from abroad, has cre- ated a politically and economically noxious situation, and the quality of life in Anti- gua now faces decline.8 This story is no doubt a familiar one in nations with very modest prosperity as in Africa.¶ There has been a set of critical responses to development theory, the most influential of which has been those by theorists of dependency.9 The obvious situa- tion of epistemological dependence emerges from the United States as the standard of development, both economic and cultural. The economic consequence is a func- tion of the international institutions that form usury relationships with countries that are structurally in a condition of serfdom, where they depend on loans that it is no longer possible to believe they can even pay back. Fanon would add, however, that we should bear in mind that in the case of many African countries who re- ceived such loans, the situation might have been different had those funds been spent on infrastructural resources instead of as a source of wealth for neocolonial elites. That European and American banks hold accounts for leaders who have, in effect, robbed their countries and have left their citizens in near perpetual debt to the World Bank reveals the gravity of Fanon’s warnings of forty years past. An additional Fanonian warning has also been updated by sociologist Paget Henry, who warns us that the epistemological struggle also includes fighting ‘to save the sciences from extreme commodification and instrumentalisation’ (Henry 2002–2003:51).¶ To these criticisms, Gendzier poses the following consideration. The critics of development have pointed out what is wrong with development studies, particularly its project of modernisation, but their shortcoming is that many of them have not presented alternative conceptions of how to respond to the problems that plague most of Africa and much of the Third World. Think, for example, of Wynter’s call for a new epistemic order. Calling for it is not identical with creating it. This is one of the ironic aspects of the epistemological project. Although it is a necessary reflec- tion, it is an impractical call for a practical response.

#### Our advocacy is crucial to widen movements to a global scale and connect across geographical and ideological divides

Escobar 8 (Arturo, Kenan Distinguished Professor at UNC Chapel Hill, Ph.D, University of Calfornia, Berkeley, May 27. Third World Quarterly. Beyond the Third World: imperial¶ globality, global coloniality and antiglobalisation social movements. Third World Quarterly, Vol 25, No 1, pp 207–230)

But this also means that there is a dire need for what Santos has called a¶ theory of translation—one that propitiates mutual understanding and intelligibility among movements brought together into networks but with worldviews, life¶ worlds and conceptions that are often different and at odds with each other, if¶ not plainly incommensurable.54 How can mutual learning and transformation¶ among subaltern practices be promoted? This is increasingly recognised as an¶ important element for advancing counter-hegemonic globalisation (for instance,¶ by the world network of social movements that emerged from the World Social¶ Forum process). If it is true that many of the subaltern movements of today are¶ movements of knowledges that have been marginalised and excluded, does this¶ not amount in some fashion to a situation of ‘transnational third worlds of¶ peoples and knowledges’,55 whose articulation might usher in new types of¶ counter-hegemonic agency? No longer conceived as a classiﬁcatory feature¶ within the modern epistemic order, these ‘third worlds of peoples and knowledges’ could function as the basis for a theory of translation that, while¶ respecting the diversity and multiplicity of movements (albeit questioning their¶ particular identities), would enable increasing intelligibility of experiences¶ among existing worlds and knowleges, thus making possible a higher level of¶ articulation of ‘worlds and knowledges otherwise’. As Santos put it:¶ such a process includes articulating struggles and resistances, as well as promoting¶ ever more comprehensive and consistent alternatives … an enormous effort of¶ mutual recognition, dialogue, and debate will be required to carry out the¶ task … Such a task entails a wide exercise in translation to enlarge reciprocal¶ intelligibility without destroying the identity of what is translated. The point is to¶ create, in every movement or NGO, in every practice or strategy, in every discourse¶ or knowledge, a contact zone that may render it porous and hence permeable to¶ other NGOs, practices, strategies, discourses and knowledges. The exercise of¶ translation aims to identify and potentiate what is common in the diversity of the¶ counter-hegemonic drive.56¶

#### Reforms like the plan are key to institutional change and getting others to sign on—

Erik Olin Wright 7, Vilas Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, “Guidelines for Envisioning Real Utopias”, Soundings, April, www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf

5. Waystations The final guideline for discussions of envisioning real utopias concerns the importance of waystations. The central problem of envisioning real utopias concerns the viability of institutional alternatives that embody emancipatory values**,** but the practical achievability of such institutional designs often depends upon the existence of smaller steps, intermediate institutional innovations that move us in the right direction but only partially embody these values**.** Institutional proposals which have an all-or-nothing quality to them are both less likely to be adopted in the first place, and may pose more difficult transition-cost problems if implemented**.** The catastrophic experience of Russia in the “shock therapy” approach to market reform is historical testimony to this problem. Waystations are a difficult theoretical and practical problem because there are many instances in which partial reforms may have very different consequences than full- bodied changes. Consider the example of unconditional basic income. Suppose that a very limited, below-subsistence basic income was instituted: not enough to survive on, but a grant of income unconditionally given to everyone. One possibility is that this kind of basic income would act mainly as a subsidy to employers who pay very low wages, since now they could attract more workers even if they offered below poverty level earnings. There may be good reasons to institute such wage subsidies, but they would not generate the positive effects of a UBI, and therefore might not function as a stepping stone. What we ideally want**, therefore,** are intermediate reforms that have two main properties: **first,** they concretely demonstrate the virtues of the fuller program of transformation, so they contribute to the ideological battle of convincing people that the alternative is credible and desirable; **and second,** they enhance the capacity for action of people, increasing their ability to push further in the future. Waystations that increase popular participation and bring people together in problem-solving deliberations for collective purposes are particularly salient in this regard**.** This is what in the 1970s was called “nonreformist reforms”**:** reforms that are possible within existing institutions and that pragmatically solve real problems while at the same time empowering people in ways which enlarge their scope of action in the future.

#### Turn – direct AID from the US undermines farmers reliance on the state – making them less apt to participate in state institutions

Kelly, Lecturer in Philosophy at Middlesex University, in ‘10

[M.G.E., “International Biopolitics Foucault, Globalisation and Imperialism”, Theoria, June]

If, on the other hand, as is increasingly the case, donors bypass governments and deal directly with civil society, this leads to the irrelevance and atrophy of the state, in favour of organisations that do not perform the coordinating functions required for biopolitics, and, moreover, like the government that receives aid, are as a result less likely to be profoundly concerned about the people in their care. As Mark Duffield has argued, the fashionable model of ‘sustainable development’ in fact makes people, rather than states, responsible for their own biopolitics, thus ruling out the development of the complex governmental biopolitics of developed nations (2006). Aid directly administered by Western governments or NGOs, on the other hand, means that people have a relation to those organisations, not to their own state, or even their own civil society: they have less reason to care about their own state, to engage with it politically, to pay taxes, since their limited biopolitical provision comes from elsewhere, but of course they cannot enter into the same sorts of relationship of political involvement with foreign states or NGOs as they can with local stakeholders, since these states and NGOs do not get funds directly from aid recipients. Direct aid thus effectively undermines biopolitics. Clearly, we cannot address the empirical case for aid here in the required detail: this work remains to be done; what we say here amounts only to a hypothesis about the relation of aid to biopolitical society. We hence cannot state that aid is an utterly decisive factor in biopolitical development, such that aid will always prevent such development, or in the absence of aid such development will always occur. We cannot thus simply point to examples of countries that have or have not developed as conclusive cases: only detailed studies on the operation of aid in specific cases can shed light here. We moreover cannot assert that it is impossible to give aid that strengthens biopolities as such: a possible example of such aid is the Marshall Plan by which the U.S. funded European reconstruction after World War II. Reasons for any success of this plan in contrast with aid include: the achievement of a careful administration of funds (funds were managed by joint committees of representatives of the donor, local governments, and civil society, and used to buy either consumables or to invest in industry); the fact that the aid was not ongoing, so did not allow for the development of patterns of dependency or corruption; and the fact that it was in response to a specific situation of devastation (caused by the war) which was not itself a stable, ongoing state of affairs. One type of payment that might be implemented similarly are reparations for past injustices. Duffield suggests there has been a retrograde shift, from the Cold War situation in which Third World nations were built up by either side, as in the Marshall Plan, to a situation in which states are not built up at all, only civil society—Duffield sees this as a return to the colonial policy of Native Administration, albeit within a different and more diffuse institutional framework (Duffield, 2005). Certainly, aid policy today is very similar in key respects to the colonial policy: colonialism was the same as aid in biopolitical terms, casting itself as philanthropic, while having consequences that are rather different. The pure building up of states though is of dubious merit: many states supported by either side during the Cold War were disastrously unsuccessful; as we have indicated, the supply of aid to states is a powerful corrupting force that might enable the rulers to buy support, or might build resentment against them, but either way is unlikely to lead by itself to development per se. What is clearly the case is that aid is sometimes given explicitly with the aim of undermining government, as in the case of USAID’s budget of $15 million for 2006, designated specifically for undermining the Cuban government by building up civil society.15 What is astonishing indeed is that where the United States government gives aid to Cubans precisely to undermine their government, it gives it elsewhere apparently oblivious to its potential to do exactly the same thing. It is not that philanthropy and government assistance in general cleave the state and population apart: when they originate within the same polity, philanthropy and welfare are elements of a biopolitical whole, which incorporates both governmental and non-governmental organisations. It is true that domestic philanthropy may assuage the development of demands for the state intervention necessary to constitute a biopolitics, but once a coherent control of population has developed, philanthropy slots in as an adjunct.

#### The permutation solves the criticism—

#### We believe a love for all people, revolutionaries, AND reformists, is the only way to deconstruct colonialism. Decolonial love calls us to a higher place, outside the guise of colonialism.

Willsea 12 [JEN WILLSEA, Member, Board of Advisors at [Resource Generation](http://www.linkedin.com/company/resource-generation?trk=ppro_cprof)Senior Associate at [Interaction Institute for Social Change](http://www.linkedin.com/company/interaction-institute-for-social-change?trk=ppro_cprof), Member, Board of Directors at RESIST, Inc., Individual Giving Officer at [Facing History and Ourselves](http://www.linkedin.com/company/facing-history-and-ourselves?trk=ppro_cprof), Grassroots Fundraiser at Peace Action West, Searching for DeColonial Love, <http://interactioninstitute.org/blog/2012/12/07/searching-for-decolonial-love/>,]

The conquistador’s mind is a permanent feature of how we think about ourselves and others, Díaz says. It explains why folks of color often see their own group as human, but are not so sure about other folks of color. It explains why so many people in the U.S. are suspicious that Obama isn’t really American. I’m reminded of [john powell’s argument in *Racing to Justice*](http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?products_id=806639)that the “problematic and isolated white self” is the lens through which we see and is preventing us from living into a truly inclusive America. This is NOT to say that white people themselves are the problem, but that this conquistador’s mind is the frame operating within each of us (and in our institutions and structures). I think Díaz and powell would agree that we must see that colonial idea of self and others, name it, and find another way, all of us, to become more dynamically interconnected. Díaz says that cultivating decolonial love will get us there.¶ *How can we cultivate decolonial love?* Díaz says that there is no telling which practices will prove liberatory for the future, so we must proliferate strategies to see what works. Here are a few Díaz calls out:¶ Cultivate the Martí Mind, named for [José Martí](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_Mart%C3%AD). As progressives we judge each other’s authenticity all the time. This is so *not* helpful. We must stop seeing each other through the conquistador’s mind and instead, have as much love for other groups as we have for our own.¶ Practice “racial anarchist calisthenics.” Drawing on [James Scott’s concept of “anarchist calisthenics,”](http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9816.html) we must practice breaking the little rules of society and exercise the muscles of resistance – because we are practicing society’s rules all the time without thinking about it.¶ [Say white](http://www.bostonreview.net/BR37.4/junot_diaz_paula_moya_drown_race.php). White supremacy is the great silence of our world, and in it is embedded much of what ails us as a planet. White supremacy’s greatest trick is that it has convinced people that, if it exists at all, it exists always in other people, never in us. We must practice saying white.¶ Study and emulate the 3rd world feminist writers of the 1980s, including [Cherríe Moraga](http://www.cherriemoraga.com/), [Audre Lorde](http://alp.org/about/audre) and [Octavia Butler](http://octaviabutler.org/). They write/wrote brilliantly about how power and oppression work and there are threads of hope in their work we should look to. Without knowing it, each of us nurses a head of the many-headed hydra of power. Even if we chop all the heads off and raze the structures of oppression, the hydra lives within us. We must realize that we are fundamentally comprised of the oppressions we resist, understand how that has shaped us and how we love*.*¶ BAM! Díaz drove the point home that we progressives are too often too quick to act from our conquistador’s mind. I could not agree more. We should take to heart Díaz’s advice that we learn to tolerate other people’s contradictions*and* our own, and that we embrace *simultaneity* as a value. Because practicing decolonial love calls us all to a higher and harder place – loving ourselves, loving those we love to judge, and cultivating a way of being and loving that is not rooted in colonialism, but freedom.

#### Multiple modernities exist within Latin America. There’s a stark difference between the violence towards the Andean nations and the violence towards countries of the Southern Cone. Their focus on the ROOT of it all doesn’t take into account unique cultural difference.

Salvatore 10 [Ricardo D. Salvatore, History professor, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, The Postcolonial in Latin America and the Concept of Coloniality: A Historian’s Point of View, Vol. 8, No. 1, Fall 2010, 332-348, [www.ncsu.edu/project/acontracorriente](http://www.ncsu.edu/project/acontracorriente), Pgs. 341-342]

Similar types of modernity could be observed at the time in ¶ certain cities and regions of southern Brazil and the central valley of ¶ Chile, but not in Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia, where changes in land ¶ tenure, race relations, and political culture were slower to develop and ¶ more limited in scope. One must acknowledge, though, that among ¶ these effects there was a cultural amnesia about indigenous peoples and ¶ a marginalization of Creole subjects. The peoples inhabiting the interior ¶ or the backlands of these modern nations were racialized and construed ¶ as incapable of self-government and civilized sociability. Nonetheless, it ¶ would not be inaccurate to argue that the colonial was less evident in ¶ the terrain of the social and in cultural forms in Argentina than it was in ¶ Bolivia, Peru, or Ecuador. In the first decades of the 20th century, as ¶ foreign observers (business prospectors, scholars, missionaries, and ¶ tourists) pointed out, the Andean nations had retained more visible ¶ marks of “coloniality” than the countries of the Southern Cone. The ¶ persistence of aristocratic privilege, landlord despotism, labor servitude, ¶ and open forms of racism in the highlands of Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador ¶ were a constant and sad reminder that these places had been the ¶ experimental workshops of Spanish colonialism. It was in these ¶ territories where foreign observers found that the wars of ¶ independence, liberalism, and later positivism had produced almost no ¶ change in the condition, life style, and self-awareness of indigenous peoples. ¶ Thus, from a historical point of view, the term “coloniality” appears as describing an undifferentiated continuity of forms of ¶ governmentality, subalternity, and marginalization of native knowledges proper of Spanish and Portuguese colonization in the ¶ Americas. (Many historians have referred to this persistence of the colonial past in the present with the term “the colonial heritage.”) We need to challenge this homogeneization of a long-term persistence of ¶ the colonial. It is better to speak of different degrees of coloniality, in ¶ order to take into account the profound transformations experienced by ¶ certain regions and cities within the most progressive republics of South ¶ America. At the time of the first Centenary of independence, South ¶ America appeared as highly differentiated in terms of economic ¶ achievement, democratic sociability, political stability, and educational ¶ progress. Maybe in the Argentine northwest (Salta, Jujuy, Tucuman, ¶ Santiago del Estero, Catamarca), the degree of residual coloniality was ¶ similar or comparable to that of regions in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia, ¶ but this was certainly not the case for the Argentine Litoral (Buenos ¶ Aires, Santa Fe, Entre Ríos, and southern Córdoba)

#### Decolonial love is the only way to eliminate the monolithic ideology of the West

**Maldonado-Torres 2K7** [Nelson, Professor in Latino and Hispanic Caribbean Studies at Rutgers, 'ON THE COLONIALITY OF BEING', Cultural Studies, 21:2, 240]

Decolonization and ‘des-gener-accio´n’, different from authenticity, are not¶ based on the anticipation of death, but on the aperture of one’s self to the¶ racialized other to the point of substitution.¶ 67¶ Substitution occurs when one’s¶ identity is teleologically suspended and when one offers one’s life to the task of¶ achieving decolonial justice: that is, a justice oriented by the trans-ontological¶ dimension of the human. Decolonial justice opposes the preferential option for¶ imperial Man by the preferential option for the damne´ or condemned of the¶ earth. Such justice is inspired by a form of love which is also decolonial.¶ ‘Decolonial love’ ! a concept coined and developed by the Chicana theorist¶ Chela Sandoval ! gives priority to the trans-ontological over the claims of¶ ontology.¶ 68¶ Decolonization and ‘des-gener-accio´n’ are the active products of¶ decolonial love and justice. They aim to restore the logics of the gift through a¶ decolonial politics of receptive generosity.¶ 69¶ In order to be consistent, the discourse of decolonization and ‘des-generaccio´n’ would have to be understood according to the very logics that they open. They cannot take the form of a new imperial universal. Decolonization¶ itself, the whole discourse around it, is a gift itself, an invitation to engage in¶ dialogue. For decolonization, concepts need to be conceived as invitations to¶ dialogue and not as impositions. They are expressions of the availability of the¶ subject to engage in dialogue and the desire for exchange. Decolonization in¶ this respect aspires to break with monologic modernity. It aims to foment¶ transmodernity, a concept which also becomes an invitation that has to be¶ understood in relation to the decolonial paradox of giving and receiving.¶ 70¶ Transmodernity is an invitation to think modernity/coloniality critically from¶ different epistemic positions and according to the manifold experiences of¶ subjects who suffer different dimensions of the coloniality of Being.¶ Transmodernity involves radical dialogical ethics ! to initiate a dialogue¶ between humans and those considered subhumans ! and the formulation of a¶ decolonial and critical cosmopolitanism.¶ 71¶

#### White supremacy isn’t a monolithic root cause---proximate causes determined through empirics are more likely---and their arg shuts off productive debate over solutions

**Shelby 07** – Tommie Shelby, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Philosophy at Harvard, 2007, We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity

Others might challenge the distinction between ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage, on the grounds that we are rarely, if ever, able to so neatly separate these factors, an epistemic situation that is only made worse by the fact that these causes interact in complex ways with behavioral factors. These distinctions, while perhaps straightforward in the abstract, are difficult to employ in practice. For example, it would be difficult, if not **impossible**, for the members of a poor black community to determine **with any accuracy** whether their impoverished condition is due **primarily to institutional racism**, the impact of past racial injustice, the increasing technological basis of the economy, shrinking state budgets, the vicissitudes of **world trade**, the ascendancy of **conservative ideology**, poorly funded schools, lack of personal initiative, a violent drug trade that deters business investment, some combination of these factors, **or some other explanation altogether**. Moreover, it is notoriously difficult to determine when the formulation of putatively race-neutral policies has been motivated by racism or when such policies are unfairly applied by racially biased public officials.

There are very real **empirical difficulties** in determining the **specific causal significance** of the factors that create and perpetuate black disadvantage; nonetheless, it is clear that these factors exist and that justice will demand different practical remedies according to **each factor's relative impact** on blacks' life chances. **We must acknowledge that our social world is complicated** and not immediately transparent to common sense, and thus that **systematic empirical inquiry**, historical studies, and rigorous social analysis are required to reveal its systemic structure and sociocultural dynamics. There is, moreover, no mechanical or infallible procedure for determining which analyses are the soundest ones. In addition, given the inevitable bias that attends social inquiry, legislators and those they represent cannot simply defer to social-scientific experts. We must instead rely on **open public debate**—among politicians, scholars, policy makers, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens—with the aim of garnering **rationally motivated** and informed **consensus**. And even if our practical decision procedures rest on critical deliberative discourse and thus live up to our highest democratic ideals, some trial and error through actual practice is unavoidable.

These difficulties and complications notwithstanding, a general recognition of the distinctions among the ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage could help blacks refocus their political energies and self-help strategies. Attention to these distinctions might help **expose the superficiality of theories** that seek to **reduce all the social obstacles that blacks face to** contemporary forms of racism or **white supremacy**. A more penetrating, **subtle, and empirically grounded** **analysis** is needed to **comprehend the causes of racial inequality and black disadvantage**. Indeed, these distinctions highlight the necessity to probe deeper to find the causes of contemporary forms of racism, as some racial conflict may be a symptom of broader problems or recent social developments **(**such as immigration policyor reduced federal funding for higher education).

#### Claiming “State’s always racist” is a turn. Over-privileges hopelessness – makes actual remedies impossible

Farber ‘98

Daniel A. Farber is the Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty at the University of Minnesota Law School where he has taught constitutional law, environmental law, civil procedure, and legislation since 1987. He was a visiting professor at the Harvard Law School during the spring of 1998 and has also taught at Stanford and the University of Illinois. Thomas M. Cooley Law Review – 1998 – 15 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 361 – lexis, lawrev

And finally, what I fear the most is the response that seemed to be implied by one of the audience questions earlier. If it is true that American society is inherently racist, doesn't that mean that it is essentially hopeless? Now this conclusion does not logically follow from that premise, any more than it logically follows that if certain character traits have a genetic basis then it is hopeless to do anything about them. But nevertheless, we all recognize that when we are talking about individuals and biology, these genetic theories tend to discourage the idea of reform, and tend to reinforce, as a matter of social reality, the view that any bad behavior that we see is just inherent. I think we can expect to see the same kind of thing when we are dealing with the sociological equivalent involving the claim that there is this inherent genetic flaw in American society. You can see this most clearly in Derrick Bell's writings, which are redolent of despair and which, in that respect, curiously resemble Robert Bork's writings, who is similarly convinced that the genetic flaws of American society will prevent it from ever achieving his vision of justice. It is true that we cannot afford to forget our history. It is true that much of that history is unfortunate, if not worse. But it is also true that if we remain totally obsessed with the flaws of the past, fixated on their inevitability, we are unlikely to be able to move past them and move forward. And in particular, it seems to me that if we approach today's problems primarily as an issue in finger-pointing, in blaming somebody or another, or in finding the culprit, then we are not likely to be able to unite our society in a quest toward attacking those serious problems.

#### It also kills coalitions – making *forthcoming* solutions worse.

Farber ‘98

Daniel A. Farber is the Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty at the University of Minnesota Law School where he has taught constitutional law, environmental law, civil procedure, and legislation since 1987. He was a visiting professor at the Harvard Law School during the spring of 1998 and has also taught at Stanford and the University of Illinois. Thomas M. Cooley Law Review – 1998 – 15 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 361 – lexis, lawrev

Finally, and I think perhaps this is the most significant practical problem, the inherent racism approach is not a step toward bringing us to seriously confront the problems that our society has. In fact, I think it is taking us down a false path. The dynamics of the concept of inherent racism has several unfortunate effects. First of all, among even its adherents, it leads to a kind of "witch hunt" mentality, in which people are constantly searching for more and more subtle forms of racism among themselves, among their opponents in the legal system generally, and so forth. As a result, people invest their time combing the Internal Revenue Code for deductions that might seem [\*378] more favorable to one group than another group, rather than looking at what is the stark and overwhelming problem-not how people's income is taxed but who is earning how much and why. So we become more and more obsessed with looking for more and more subtle flaws. Furthermore, at least in the hands of some of the practitioners or adherents to this position, it leads to a breakdown in debate, even both among people who are essentially on the liberal side of the spectrum and indisputes with their opponents. For example, consider the attacks on liberals like Randy Kennedy, a black professor on the Harvard Law School faculty. We see how people, who are in some sense fundamentally allies, who all support affirmative action and think racial problems are very important, find it impossible to hold a discussion because of this search for motives, hidden agendas, and biases. We see the same thing within critical legal studies in which two figures in the movement, Mark Tushnet and Gary Peller, bludgeoned each other in the pages of the Georgetown Law Journal n25 about their motivations and potential racism, etc. I do not think that is the way we can move forward.

#### Their argument elevates white supremacy to an all-pervasive force—this conceptual expansion hides the actual practice of racism and makes breaking it down more difficult

**\*\*\*Andersen 03** – Margaret L. Andersen, Professor of Sociology and Women's Studies and Vice Provost for Academic Affairs at the University of Delaware, 2003, “Whitewashing Race: A Critical Perspective on Whiteness,” in White Out: The Continuing Significance of Racism, ed Doane & Bonilla-Silva, p. 28

Conceptually, one of the major problems in the whiteness literature is the **reification of whiteness as a concept**, as an experience, and as an identity. This practice not only leads to **conceptual obfuscation** but also **impedes the possibility for empirical analysis**. In this literature, "whiteness" comes to mean just about **everything associated with racial domination.** As such, whiteness becomes a **slippery and elusive concept**. Whiteness is presented as any or all of the following: identity, self-understanding, social practices, group beliefs, ideology, and a system of domination. As one critic writes, "If historical actors are said to have behaved the way they did **mainly because they were white**, then there's **little room left for more nuanced analysis of their motives and meanings**" (Stowe 1996:77). And Alastair Bonnett points out that whiteness "emerges from this critique as an **omnipresent and all-powerful historical force**. Whiteness is seen to be responsible for the failure of socialism to develop in America, for racism, **for the impoverishment of humanity**. With the 'blame' comes a new kind of centering: Whiteness, and White people, are turned into the key agents of historical change, the shapers of contemporary America" (1996b:153).

**Despite** noting that there is differentiation among whites and warning against using whiteness as a **monolithic category**, **most of the literature still proceeds to do** **so**, revealing a reductionist tendency. Even claiming to show its multiple forms, **most writers essentialize and reify whiteness as something that directs most of Western history** (Gallagher 2000). Hence while trying to "deconstruct” whiteness and see the ubiquitousness of whiteness, **the literature at the same time reasserts and reinstates it** (Stowe 1996:77).

For example, Michael Eric Dyson suggests that whiteness is identity, ideology, and institution (Dyson, quoted in Chennault 1998:300). **But if it is all these things, it becomes an analytically useless concept**. Christine Clark and James O'Donnell write: "to reference it reifies it, to refrain from referencing it obscures the persistent, pervasive, and seemingly permanent reality of racism" (1999:2). Empirical investigation requires being able to **identify and measure a concept**— or at the very least to have a clear definition—but since whiteness has come to mean just about everything, **it ends up meaning hardly anything**.