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#### Shut down nearly decimated investor confidence in Mexican export industry—

Paterson 10-11-13 Kent Paterson, Frontera NorteSur // October 11, 2013 // Business & Technology “U.S. crisis unsettles Mexico” [http://newspapertree.com/articles/2013/10/11/us-crisis-unsettles-mexico] [MG]

The partial shutdown of the U.S. government is unsettling the Mexican economy. As the crisis took shape last week, the Mexican peso dipped to 13.34 units per dollar, an amount which represented the second largest depreciation in 2013. The pending October 17 showdown over the U.S. debt limit is likewise contributing to the jitters, said Gabriela Siller, an analyst for Mexico-based Banco Base. In the Mexico-U.S. border region, Mexican business leaders expressed worry that the political gridlock on the Potomac could deepen and trigger devastating consequences on the assembly-for-export, or maquiladora, industry. In Ciudad Juarez and other border cities, the foreign-owned maquiladora sector constitutes a dominant or major part of the economy. Longer export times, reduced market demand and idled assembly lines are among the concerns voiced by Ciudad Juarez business representatives. “The economy is flowing at the moment, but we don’t know how it is going to behave at the end of the year,” said Rodolfo Martinez Garza, president of the Association of Customs Agents in Ciudad Juarez. Martinez added that the last quarter of the year is the biggest season of import-export activity, and that unstable economic circumstances could result in stagnation. “There is a lot of uncertainty for investment and this is very negative for Ciudad Juarez,” Martinez said. According to Mexico’s National Council of the Maquiladora Industry and Export Manufacturing, any effects of the U.S. shutdown should be measurable in industrial production after October 20. Thomas Fullerton, economist for the University of Texas at El Paso, said the impacts of the U.S. government shutdown on the maquildora industry – which also supports thousands of jobs in his city – could be worse than the previous one in 1995-96 because of the still-incomplete recovery from the 2008 economic crash. The U.S. crisis comes at a time when worries already exist over the state of the Mexican economy and the tax reform looming in the Mexican Congress, including a possible hike in the border region sales tax from its current 11 percent to 16 percent. In Ciudad Juarez, many business, community and political leaders oppose the sales tax hike and warn of an outflow of pesos to neighboring Texas and New Mexico, where sales taxes are much lower, if the Mexican Congress increases the tax this fall under the proposal advanced by the Pena Nieto administration. This week, a coalition of popular organizations, tire and used car industry groups delivered at petition with 12,733 signatures against the sales tax hike to Congresswoman Martha Beatriz Cordoba. A member of the Citizen Movement party, Corboba has emerged as a leader against a higher tax. The political turmoil and debates in both Washington and Mexico City occur at a moment when indicators reveal some adverse trends in the Mexican economy. On October 8, the International Monetary Fund projected that Mexico’s 2013 growth rate would be a mere 1.2 percent – far less than the growth in the 3 percent range widely predicted earlier in the year. In the Latin American and Caribbean group of nations, Mexico’s growth performance puts it in the same general camp this year as Brazil, Venezuela and Jamaica. Agustin de la Torre, chief economist for the World Bank, was surprised by the weak Mexican growth report. “We do not have an easy explanation on why Mexico did not recuperate,” de la Torre said. “Without a doubt, there is an enormous contrast between the perception that investors have of Mexico in light of structural reforms on the one hand and the low growth this year on the other.”

#### Neito tax reform uniquely places sustainability at risk—

Replogle 9-20-13 Jill Replogle, Fronteras Reporter, KPBS “Mexico Fiscal Reform Could Be Bad For Maquiladoras” [<http://www.kpbs.org/news/2013/sep/20/mexico-fiscal-reform-could-be-bad-maquiladoras/>] [MG]

The maquiladora export industry that’s a key component of the U.S.-Mexico border economy could face major changes under proposed reforms to Mexico’s tax system. Mexico currently collects fewer taxes from its citizens and companies than almost any other developed country. Mexico relies heavily on revenues from its state-run oil industry, which is in decline. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto wants to change this. One way he wants to do it is by tightening control over the country’s vast maquiladora export industry. Factories that make and export goods to the U.S. and other foreign markets currently don’t pay taxes on their raw materials and machinery. But that would change under the proposed reform. Maquiladoras would have to pay the normal 16 percent sales tax on their raw materials and then request a refund of that money when they export the final product. That would require exporters to invest a lot more cash up front, said Héctor Vega, a tax partner with Deloitte Mexico. It could erase some of the advantage Mexico has over its manufacturing competitors, Vega said. “Because we are very close to the U.S., it’s very natural doing business,” he said. “However, this 16 percent will impact a lot and maybe determinate where you put your investment, either in China, either in Vietnam, either in Malaysia or keep it in Mexico.” Still, Vega is hopeful that the tax change affecting maquiladoras will ultimately be stripped from the final fiscal reform bill.

#### Collapse threatens national security—altering engagement policy is critical to sustain it

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011 [MG]

The Mexican maquiladora industry is rapidly losing market share to Asian competitors that dramatically undercut them in terms of labor cost. The decline of these assembly-for-export factories will result in instability along the U.S.-Mexico border and will prove to be a serious national security issue for the United States. This paper leverages Design theory to frame the problems surrounding Mexico’s maquiladora industry in order to develop an understanding of this complex adaptive system. It examines the wide range of actors involved in the system, focusing on their goals, motivations and conflicting tendencies. Finally, the paper recommends courses of action for U.S. and Mexican leaders that will mitigate the resulting instability in the Mexican northern border states. The economic stability of Mexico will always be a national security priority for the United States. The two nations share a border of nearly 2,000 miles, and trade between them is worth billions of dollars. To take advantage of this relationship, the Mexican government created a series of customs and trade policies specifically designed to enhance its economic ties to the U.S. For decades, such policies greatly benefited Mexico’s maquiladoras, factories that import raw materials, rapidly combine them into finished products, and export them to the American market. Unfortunately for Mexico, the strong advantages in low-cost labor and speedy delivery are gradually being eroded by similar programs in China and Southeast Asia. As U.S. companies look to Asia for more profitable business relationships, the Mexican government has done little to alter its customs and trade policies in response. A severe economic blow to the maquiladoras along the U.S. border would have dramatic effects on the stability of the area, affecting both Mexican and American national security interests. The governments of Mexico and the United States should therefore take preemptive measures to mitigate the instability that is arising as the maquiladoras lose their viability under new global economic pressures. These measures include altering customs and trade policies, providing economic incentives in order to transform the Mexican export industry, and creating labor opportunities for Mexicans within the United States. In order to support this thesis, the following paper will leverage Design Theory to examine the current situation in the Mexican maquiladora industry, identify problems in terms of potential impacts to U.S. national security, and propose possible courses of action for both American and Mexican decision-makers.

#### This threatens the entire relationship and causes industries to shift toward China—

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011

The Problem Frame highlights the issues that must be addressed in order to transform current conditions into the desired end state.25 In this case, the desired end state is a more stable economy in the northern Mexican states, free from the current stress brought about by the decline in the maquiladora industry. Since 60% of Mexican maquiladoras operate in the border states, this end state is a key factor in the stability of the border area for both the United States and Mexico.26 Additionally, 80% of all Mexican exports are to the United States, making this relationship extremely important.27 It is in the best interest of these nations to take action to reach this end state. In order to develop future courses of action that create conditions conducive for the desired end state, the current challenges that currently exist in this system must be examined. The three major challenges to reaching the desired end state are connected to flaws in the Mexican export industry, specifically its inability to respond to global competition, its overreliance on the American market, and its lack of complexity. A fourth challenge is connected to the free flow of labor in this region. These challenges are obstacles in the path to a stable and secure northern Mexico. First of all, Mexico’s response to increased competition for its maquiladoras has been completely inadequate. Over the past decade, China has presented an attractive alternative to Mexican maquiladoras in terms of labor costs. In 2008, Chinese hourly manufacturing wages were estimated nearly 75% cheaper than those in Mexico.28 For over a decade, Chinese factories have been able to assemble goods of equal quality as the maquiladoras, but now they can provide greater quality control and better physical infrastructure.29 As drug violence continues in Mexico, security has become a greater decision point for businesses as well, and many are concerned that investing in Mexico is a risk.30 Mexico’s two main responses to this situation have been extremely inadequate and have not improved the overall situation. The Mexican government’s first response was to escalate anti-Chinese rhetoric, even working to delay China’s entry into the World Trade Organization.31 This merely delayed the inevitable and resolved nothing. Later, driven by the need to compete with China, Mexican factories laid off personnel and cut worker salaries in order to reduce labor costs.32 Considering the weak global economy, this unfortunate move added pressure to an already-stressed workforce. The resultant increases in unemployment and underemployment, combined with reduced salaries, will increase instability in the region as people are driven to crime, either as victims or participants.33

#### US reliance on Chinese technology for military purposes undermines its capability and allows for Chinese espionage

Snyder 5/29/13 – (Michael, “Why The Next War With China Could Go Very Badly For The United States”, http://www.infowars.com/why-the-next-war-with-china-could-go-very-badly-for-the-united-states/)//javi

Another way that China is gaining a strategic advantage over the U.S. is by getting the U.S. military to become increasingly dependent upon them. According to Forbes, now the U.S. military is even leasing a Chinese satellite for communications purposes… American dependence on China grows by the day. The latestnews is that the United States has been reduced to leasing a Chinese satellite to handle communications with U.S. military bases in Africa. Surprising, isn’t it? The nation that launched the world’s first communications satellite (I remember it well – it was called Telstar) has so lost its manufacturing mojo that it has to rely on its most formidable military adversary to provide the hardware for some of its most sensitive communications. This at a time when underlying unemployment rates among U.S. manufacturing workers remain at near-depression levels. Isn’t that crazy? And a recent Senate report discovered that many of our most advanced weapons systems are absolutely riddled with counterfeit Chinese parts… A recent Senate report, titled Inquiry Into Counterfeit Electronic Parts In The Department Of Defense Supply Chain, “uncovered overwhelming evidence of large numbers of counterfeit parts making their way into critical defense systems.” The investigation found 1,800 cases of counterfeit electronic parts involving over one million suspect parts in 2009-10 alone, thereby exposing “a defense supply chain that relies on hundreds of unveiled independent distributors to supply electronic parts for some of our most sensitive systems.” The report concluded, among other things, that China is the “dominant source” of counterfeit products that enter the DoD supply chain, that the Chinese government does little to stop it and that the DoD doesn’t know the “scope and impact” of these parts on critical defense systems. Who in the world would be stupid enough to allow one of their greatest strategic enemies to supply large numbers of parts for key weapons systems? Apparently we are that stupid. Things are particularly bad when it comes to semiconductors… Senator John McCain commented: “We can’t tolerate the risk of a ballistic missile interceptor failing to hit its target, a helicopter pilot unable to fire his missiles, or any other mission failure because of a counterfeit part.” Calling the issue “a ticking time bomb,” Brian Toohey, president of the Semiconductor Industry Association, commented: “The catastrophic failure risk inherently found in counterfeit semiconductors places our citizens and military personnel in unreasonable peril.” It would be bad enough if we just had to worry about counterfeit parts failing. But what if China has a way to shut some of those parts down in the event of a conflict? What if some of those parts contain “Trojan Horse” computer chips or malware? That may sound crazy, but unfortunately Trojan Horse chips can be extremely difficult to detect. The following is from a recent Forbes article… As the Defense Science Board pointed out, Trojan Horse circuitry is almost impossible to detect even with the most rigorous analysis. This is particularly so if a saboteur can accomplish matching subversions in both software and relevant hardware.

#### Chinese espionage is the biggest internal link to Chinese military modernization

U.S.-China ESRC 7 – U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission[Report to Congress-The Commission was made up of members of the 110th Congress, 1st Session, November, <http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2007/report_to_congress.pdf>The pace and success of China’s military modernization continue to exceed U.S. government estimates**.** Indeed, on occasion the U.S. defense and intelligence communities have been taken by surprise, 7 as in the case of the launching of the Jin class submarine by the navy of the People’s Liberation Army. China’s defense industry is producing new generations of weapon platforms with impressive speed and quality, and these advancements are duein partto the highly effective manner in which Chinese defense companies are integrating commercial technologies into military systems. Additionally, industrial espionage provides Chinese companies an added source of new technology without the necessity of investing time or money to perform research. Chinese espionage in the United States, which now comprises the single greatest threat to U.S. technology, is straining the U.S. counterintelligence establishment. This illicit activity significantly contributes to China’s military modernization and acquisition of new capabilities.

#### US can no longer win the war due to Chinese tech advancement through espionage

Snyder 5/29/13 – (Michael, “Why The Next War With China Could Go Very Badly For The United States”, http://www.infowars.com/why-the-next-war-with-china-could-go-very-badly-for-the-united-states/)//javi

Most Americans assume that the U.S. military is so vastly superior to everyone else that no other nation would ever dream of fighting a full-scale war against us. Unfortunately, that assumption is dead wrong. In recent years, the once mammoth technological gap between the U.S. military and the Chinese military has been closing at a frightening pace. China has been accomplishing this by brazenly stealing our technology and hacking into our computer systems. The Pentagon and the Obama administration know all about this, but they don’t do anything about it. Perhaps the fact that China owns about a trillion dollars of our national debt has something to do with that. In any event, today China has the largest military in the world and the second largest military budget in the world. They have stolen plans for our most advanced jets, helicopters, ships and missile systems. It is estimated that stealing our technology has saved China about 25 years of research and development. In addition, China is rapidly developing a new generation of strategic weapons that could potentially enable it to actually win a future war against the United States. At one time such a notion would have been unthinkable, but as you will see below, the next war with China could go very badly for the United States.

#### Chinese military modernization causes nuclear war

Twomey 9, co-directs the Center for Contemporary Conflict and is an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, both @ the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, 9 [Christopher, Arms Control Association, “Chinese-U.S. Strategic Affairs: Dangerous Dynamism, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009\_01-02/china\_us\_dangerous\_dynamism#Twomey]

China and the United States are not in a strategic weapons arms race. Nonetheless, their modernization and sizing decisions increasingly are framed with the other in mind. Nuclear weapons are at the core of this interlocking pattern of development. In particular, China is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council expanding its arsenal; it is also enhancing its arsenal. The basic facts of Chinese strategic modernization are well known, if the details remain frustratingly opaque. China is deploying road-mobile, solid-fueled missiles, giving it a heighted degree of security in its second-strike capability. It is beginning to deploy ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). It is researching a wide range of warhead and delivery systems technologies that will lead to increased accuracy and, more pointedly, increased penetration against ballistic missile defenses. The size of China's deliverable arsenal against the United States will undoubtedly increase beyond the few dozen that it possessed recently.[1] The pace of growth thus far has been moderate, although China has only recently developed reliable, survivable delivery systems. The final endpoint remains mired in opacity and uncertainty, although several score of deliverable warheads seems likely for the near term. These developments on the strategic side are coupled with elements of conventional modernization that impinge on the strategic balance.[2] The relevant issue, however, is not simply an evaluation of the Chinese modernization program, but rather an evaluation of the interaction of that modernization with U.S. capabilities and interests. U.S. capabilities are also changing. Under the provisions of START and SORT, the United States has continued to engage in quantitative reductions of its operational nuclear arsenal. At the same, there is ongoing updating of warhead guidance and fusing systems. Ballistic missile defense systems of a variety of footprints are being deployed. The U.S. SSBN force now leans more toward the Pacific than the Atlantic, reversing the Cold War deployment. Guam's capacity to support heavy bombers and attack submarines has been enhanced. Furthermore, advances in U.S. conventional weaponry have been so substantial that they too promise strategic effects: prompt global strike holds out the promise of a U.S. weapon on target anywhere in the world in less than an hour and B-2s with highly accurate weapons can sustain strategic effects over a campaign. What are the concerns posed by these two programs of dynamic strategic arsenals? Most centrally, the development of the strategic forces detailed above has increasingly assumed an interlocked form. The U.S. revolution in precision guided munitions was followed by an emphasis on mobility in the Chinese missile force. U.S. missile defense systems have clearly spurred an emphasis on countermeasures in China's ICBM force and quantitative buildups in its regional missile arsenals.[3] Beijing's new submarine-based forces further enhance the security of China's second-strike capability in the face of a potential U.S. strike but are likely to lead to increased attention to anti-submarine warfare in the United States. China's recent anti-satellite test provoked a U.S. demonstration of similar capabilities. Such reciprocal responses have the potential to move toward a tightly coupled arms race and certainly have already worsened threat perceptions on each side. The potential for conflict is not simply that of inadvertent escalation; there are conflicts of interests between the two. Heightening threat perceptions in that context greatly complicates diplomacy. Further, the dangers of inadvertent escalation have been exacerbated by some of these moves. Chinese SSBN deployment will stress an untested command-and-control system. Similar dangers in the Cold War were mitigated, although not entirely overcome, over a period of decades of development of personnel and technical solutions. China appears to have few such controls in place today. U.S. deployment of highly accurate nuclear warheads is consistent with a first-strike doctrine and seems sized for threats larger than "rogue" nations. These too would undermine stability in an intense crisis.

#### New Reports Demonstrate Strategic Intent For Nuclear Strikes on Both Coasts

By Miles Yu Thursday, 10/31, 2013 Inside China: Nuclear submarines capable of widespread attack on U.S.

: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/31/inside-china-nuclear-submarines-capable-of-widespr/#ixzz2jR2ln3EC

Chinese state-run media revealed for the first time this week that Beijing’s nuclear submarines can attack American cities as a means to counterbalance U.S. nuclear deterrence in the Pacific.¶ On Monday, leading media outlets including China Central TV, the People’s Daily, the Global Times, the PLA Daily, the China Youth Daily and the Guangmin Daily ran identical, top-headlined reports about the “awesomeness” of the People's Liberation Army navy’s strategic submarine force.¶ PHOTOS: Take that, China — check out the U.S. Navy's nuclear submarines¶ “This is the first time in 42 years since the establishment of our navy’s strategic submarine force that we reveal on such a large scale the secrets of our first-generation underwater nuclear force,” the Global Times said in a lengthy article titled “China for the First Time Possesses Effective Underwater Nuclear Deterrence against the United States.”¶ The article features 30 photos and graphics detailing, among other things, damage projections for Seattle and Los Angeles after being hit by Chinese nuclear warheads and the deadly radiation that would spread all the way to Chicago.¶ China’s sub fleet is reportedly the world’s second-largest, with about 70 vessels. About 10 are nuclear-powered, and four or more of those are nuclear ballistic submarines capable of launching missiles.¶ Heavily influenced by Soviet naval models that stressed underwater forces, China’s nuclear submarine development began with the reverse-engineering of a Soviet Golf-class conventional-powered sub in the 1950s.¶ In the 1980s, China developed its first ballistic missile sub, the Type 092 Xia-class, which has 12 launch tubes for the Julang (Giant Wave)-1 missiles. The JL-1 had a limited range and failed multiple test launches.¶ In 2010, a new class of missile sub, the Type 094 Jin class, entered the service. It is capable of launching 12 to 16 JL-2 missiles with a range of about 8,700 miles, covering much of the continental U.S. with single or multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicle warheads.¶ PHOTOS: See the Navy's biggest, baddest, destroyer¶ Chinese calculations for nuclear attacks on the U.S. are chillingly macabre.¶ “Because the Midwest states of the U.S. are sparsely populated, in order to increase the lethality, [our] nuclear attacks should mainly target the key cities on the West Coast of the United States, such as Seattle, Los Angeles, San Francisco and San Diego,” the Global Times said.¶ “The 12 JL-2 nuclear warheads carried by one single Type 094 SSBN can kill and wound 5 million to 12 million Americans,” the Global Times reported.¶ China also has developed land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles — notably the DF-31A, which has a range of 7,000 to 7,500 miles.¶ “If we launch our DF 31A ICBMs over the North Pole, we can easily destroy a whole list of metropolises on the East Coast and the New England region of the U.S., including Annapolis, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Portland, Baltimore and Norfolk, whose population accounts for about one-eighth of America’s total residents,” the Global Times said.¶ All the state-run press reports stressed the point that the PLA’s missile submarines are now on routine strategic patrol, “which means that China for the first time has acquired the strategic deterrence and second strike capability against the United States.”¶ “Our JL-2 SLBMs have become the fourth type of Chinese nuclear missiles that threaten the continental United States, after our DF-31A, DF-5A and DF-5B ICBMs,” said the Global Times.

### 1ac – plan

#### The United States federal government ought to offer financial assistance toward the assembly-for-export industry in Mexico.

### 1ac – manufacturing

#### Foreign investment is key to evolve factories technologically—

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011

A third challenge associated with this system concerns the lack of complexity of the production performed by the maquiladoras. The vast majority of maquiladoras conduct simple assembly, so the factories involved are tooled for basic production, and the employees only have basic skills. This drastically limits the ability of both the factories and their employees to adjust to new forms of production as the maquiladoras fall to foreign competitors. This industry is so tightly tied to specific customers in the U.S. that a transition to some other form of production would require massive changes in structure and labor. The Mexican government understands this as a problem and seeks to drive the evolution of so-called “first generation” maquiladoras to second and third generation models. The first generation maquiladoras are the least complex and simply assemble raw materials. Foreign investment brings with it technology, and, with this technology, the maquiladoras evolve into more complex factories that eventually focus less on labor intensity and more on more sophisticated products, R&D and even product design.39 Unfortunately, there are few examples of this trend, and many critics complain that the entire concept of the maquiladora “traps developing countries into the deadend role of providing cheap labor for low value-added assembly operations.”40

#### US financial assistance is key for manufacturing

Villarreal 8/9/12 – (M. Angeles, “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications”, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf)//javi

Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an integral part of the economic relationship between the United States and Mexico since NAFTA implementation. FDI consists of investments in real estate, manufacturing plants, and retail facilities, in which the foreign investor owns 10% or more of the entity. The United States is the largest source of FDI in Mexico. The stock of U.S. FDI increased from $17.0 billion in 1994 to $91.4 billion in 2011, a 440% increase (see Table 4). Mexican FDI in the United States is much lower than U.S. investment in Mexico, with levels of Mexican FDI fluctuating over the last 10 years. In 2010, Mexican FDI in the United States totaled $12.6 billion (see Table 4). The sharp rise in U.S. investment in Mexico since NAFTA is also a result of the liberalization of Mexico’s restrictions on foreign investment in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Prior to the mid-1980s, Mexico had a very protective policy that restricted foreign investment and controlled the exchange rate to encourage domestic growth, affecting the entire industrial sector. Mexico’s trade liberalization measures and economic reform in the late 1980s represented a sharp shift in policy and helped bring in a steady increase of FDI flows into Mexico. NAFTA provisions on foreign investment helped to lock in the reforms and increase investor confidence. Under NAFTA, Mexico gave U.S. and Canadian investors nondiscriminatory treatment of their investments as well as investor protection. NAFTA may have encouraged U.S. FDI in Mexico by increasing investor confidence, but much of the growth may have occurred anyway because Mexico likely would have continued to liberalize its foreign investment laws with or without the agreement. Nearly half of total FDI investment in Mexico is in the manufacturing industry, of which the maquiladora industry forms a major part. (See “Mexico’s Export-Oriented Assembly Plants” below.) In Mexico, the industry has helped attract investment from countries such as the United States that have a relatively large amount of capital. For the United States, the industry is important because U.S. companies are able to locate their labor-intensive operations in Mexico and lower their labor costs in the overall production process.

#### Investment is critical for relations —Key to solve border security, trafficking, and the economy

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011 [MG]

The relevant policy drivers for the United States government are preserving stability along its border, curbing illegal immigration, maintaining a strong domestic economy, and building productive relationships with Mexico.20 It should be immediately noted that these goals can come into conflict with one another. For example, although maintaining a thriving economy entails ensuring that U.S. businesses have the opportunity to engage in deals that are the most lucrative, abandoning current relationships with Mexican factories could negatively affect relations between the two countries. Current initiatives to secure the Southern border and curb illegal immigration might also affect how the U.S. interacts with Mexico in the economic or anti-drug arenas. Mexico’s goals are extremely similar to those of the United States. Security and stability along its border, a strong domestic economy, and building strong relations with the U.S. are all high priorities for the Mexican government. Illegal immigration, although a contentious issue for the United States, is not bothersome for Mexico.21 Although nearly identical on the surface, the Mexican goals involve different priorities than those of the U.S. For example, a strong domestic economy for Mexico means a continuance of the large amount of remittances from Mexicans in the United States.22 It also concerns focusing its industry on the production of goods for domestic consumption and focusing on high-tech indigenous models.23 For Mexico, “building strong relations” with the United States involves the receipt of assistance, whereas for the U.S., such relations mean increased cooperation on terrorism and illegal immigration.24 The differences in tendencies and goals for the actors in this system will become the center of analysis during the Problem Frame.

#### Mexican manufacturing is critical to address challenges facing the U.S. – picks up the slack for U.S. manufacturing

Bañuelos et al 12 (Carlos Guzmán Bofill, Ana María Rivas Llamas, Carlos Casas Guerrero, Juan Ángel Vargas Plata, Juan Carlos Téllez Girón Barrón, Luis Anthony Olivé Hawley, Sebastián Escalante Bañuelos, Natalia Herrero Martínez, Izael Mijangos González, June, http://www.promexico.gob.mx/work/models/promexico/Resource/1985/1/images/Aerospace\_CHIHUAHUA\_ENG.pdf)

In the last decade, Mexico has proven that it has the capabilities and talent in advanced manufacturing to supply the international market of the aerospace industry. The integration of design and advanced manufacturing capabilities on a national level prove that the Mexican industry has included high technology and engineering in its processes. Through the projects identified in this Road Map, which involves the efforts of academia, industry and government, Chihuahua will become the leading A+D cluster in Latin America in precision manufacturing for the high-tech industry and dual-use goods. This exercise identified projects and factors that will promote Chihuahua’s ability to attract future high technology investments for the aerospace and defense sector by as well as creating the capabilities to optimize the sector’s industrial competitiveness in the region, such as: the creation of a talent management platform; reducing dependency on the importation of molds, dyes and tooling in the sector; and making better use of future investments that have been encouraged by Mexico’s acceptance in the WA. Chihuahua has been able to determine the right path to reach its maximum potential and become one of Mexico´s most competitive regions in the aerospace sector with a medium- and long-term vision. The road to success has been forged, and the coming years will be bursting with opportunities and new challenges for Chihuahua.

#### Mexico is key – the US can’t solve

Bañuelos et al 12 (Carlos Guzmán Bofill, Ana María Rivas Llamas, Carlos Casas Guerrero, Juan Ángel Vargas Plata, Juan Carlos Téllez Girón Barrón, Luis Anthony Olivé Hawley, Sebastián Escalante Bañuelos, Natalia Herrero Martínez, Izael Mijangos González, June, http://www.promexico.gob.mx/work/models/promexico/Resource/1985/1/images/Aerospace\_CHIHUAHUA\_ENG.pdf)

The United States our major commercial partner is going through a talent crisis due to a lack of engineering graduates, added to constant cuts in defense spending, which complicates the upkeep of its current abilities to research, develop and produce defense and high-tech dual-use items. Mexico has more engineering graduates per capita than the United States and skilled and engineering labor costs are more competitive in Mexico; the technological sophistication of its manufactured goods is above that of BRIC countries such as India and Brazil. These three factors make Mexico the best answer to the issues that affect the United States. The creation of the SCE and Mexico’s acceptance into the WA have laid the foundation to guarantee national surveillance during the export of restricted and dual-use technologies and goods. According to conservative estimates, the WA will enable the national industry to access a potential high-technology export market of close to an additional 11.3 billion dollars per year, added to the potential creation of between 30 and 40 thousand highly paid jobs in the next five years.7 Chihuahua’s advanced manufacturing vocation (landing gears, fuselages, engines, harnesses and precision machining) make it the ideal destination for projects in the A+D cluster. Furthermore, the Federal Government is in negotiations with the US Department of Defense to develop a regional aerospace and defense manufacturing block focused on Buy NAFTA. This could be completed with the signing of a MoU between the US Department of State and the Ministry of National Defense (SEDENA)

#### Manufacturing drives innovation and pharmaceuticals

Swezey 11 (Devon Swezey, Project Director for Breakthrough Institute where he works as an energy and climate policy analyst and Ryan McConaghy, pg online @ <http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/BTI_Third_Way_Idea_Brief_-_Manufacturing_Growth_.pdf>)

New manufacturing thrives on and drives innovation. Manufacturing is a core component of the nation’s innovation ecosystem. Firms engaged in manufacturing re-invest a significant portion of revenues in research and development (R&D). Overall, the manufacturing sector comprises two-thirds 9 of industry investment in R&D and employs nearly 64% of the country’s scientists and engineers. 10 Manufacturers also have unique opportunities to apply new technologies for specialized functions and achieve economies of scale at the plant or firm, 11 making the return on manufacturing R&D significant. The transition to advanced manufacturing will enhance the sector’s role in fostering innovation and developing and commercializing new technologies. Advanced manufacturing industries, including semiconductors, computers, pharmaceuticals, clean energy technologies, and nanotechnology, play an outsized role in generating the new technologies, products, and processes that drive economic growth. Advanced manufacturing is also characterized by the rapid transfer of science and technology into manufacturing processes and products, which in and of itself drives innovation. The research-to-manufacturing process is cyclical, with multiple feedbacks between basic R&D, pre-competitive research, prototyping, product development, and manufacturing. This opens new possibilities for product development and manufacturing. 12

#### Tech innovation solves extinction

Zhong 07, CEO at Jade Bird Dashing, 7-31-7 (Roger, “The Effects and Influences of Technology on Society and Humyn Kind,” http://scienceray.com/technology/applied-science/the-effects-and-influences-of-technology-on-society-and-humyn-kind/”)

The question that persists however, is, “Is technology in fact harming our society as a whole?” Albeit the fact that this is a remarkably intricate question of sorts, it can be answered with a simple answer. The actuality of this situation remains that technology is by no means detrimental to our society here in the United States, civilization throughout the world, or to the greater humynity of the humyn race; instead, it is vital to its survival. Nuclear Technology To illustrate this point, let us first examine an exceedingly significant technological advance of our time, nuclear technology. Nuclear technology is research that involves the reactions of atomic nuclei. It has many vital applications in modern society, the most prominent of which are nuclear weapons, nuclear medicine, and nuclear power. The most controversial of these is, without a doubt, nuclear weapons. First created by the United States in 1945 during World War II, they were developed out of the fear that Nazi Germany would first develop them. A weapon of incredible power, a single nuclear weapon has to potential to decimate, level, and destroy an entire city. The first and only times a nuclear weapon has been used are in World War II, when the United States bombed the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the “Little Boy” and “Fat Myn” bombs, respectively. The usage of these bombs allowed for the near instantaneous end to the destructive World War II. Although two cities were leveled and many lives were lost, the situation involving the usage of these nuclear weapons is not nearly as negative as one may perceive. Had the bombs not been dropped, Japan would not have surrendered, and it would have without a doubt prolonged the war for months or even years. This would have forced an Allied Forces ground invasion of Japan in an effort to end the war, which would have resulted in the loss of many more people than caused by the deployment of the two nuclear weapons. When you look at the usage of nuclear technology, you must look at the situation from the viewpoint of humyn society as a whole, and not from a standpoint of an individual. While the nuclear bombs destroyed two cities and killed many, they ended a horrific World War II and prevented the loss of many other lives. Today, in more modern terms, nuclear weapons play a huge role in our lives. As citizens of the United States, it is common knowledge that we are guaranteed many degrees of freedoms and rights, but have you ever considered who enforces our right to these freedoms in the world? The military might of the United States is the key to us retaining our democratic freedoms. Being in possession of nuclear weapons is not only a positive thing, it allows for us to be free. By holding an arsenal of nuclear weapons, we have a nuclear deterrent. In this sense, we prevent wars and conflicts from escalating into another World War by instituting world order. By having nuclear technology, we are ensuring the well-being, longevity, and freedoms of the humyn race. Internet Technology Another prominent technological innovation that well represents our society today is the Internet. The Internet is the worldwide, publicly accessible network of interconnected computer networks that transmit data between themselves. It is an extremely large network that consists of countless smaller networks. The World Wide Web is accessible only through this Internet infrastructure which allows us our access to websites, email, file sharing, downloads, and media. As well as being an important provider for us common citizens who wish to access the World Wide Web, the internet serves a much greater purpose. It allows for the sharing of information almost instantaneously between scholars, researchers, and others. It allows for information to be shared from the United States to China in less than a second. Before the times of the internet, the other alternatives to transmit information were not nearly as efficient or effective. The Internet allows for us to, in some ways make the world smaller. In the days of today’s stock markets, financial infrastructure, global news organizations, powerful militarizes, strong governments and big corporations, instantaneous communication is an asset we can not afford to lose. The Internet allows for our society in modern day times to interconnect and promote globalization and information sharing. Medical Technology Perhaps one of the most vital technological advances in our society today is in the field of humyn medicine and health sciences. This field deals with the maintenance, prolongment, and restoration of humyn health through the study, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disease and injury. Medicine is an area where knowledge is obtained, then applied to treatment. It has been around at least as far as the beginning of recorded history, perhaps even farther. Today, modern medicine is practiced within a well-developed framework of health-care infrastructure. Research in the field of medicine has allowed for the development of many new treatments, drugs, medicines, and solutions that have allowed for the dramatic prolongment of the humyn lifespan. Today, with the influence of medicine, the lifespan of the average humyn is only increasing. Medicine in today’s world provides the most vital of all services; it ensures the survival of the humyn race as a whole. Review Now, let us review the implications of technology on our civilization here on Earth as a whole. Could the notion of technology possibly have any basis? Simply put, it does not have any credibility of any sort. Technology itself does not signify any concrete object or thing; instead it collectively portrays humyn kind’s achievements as a whole. Any advancements, abilities, creations, undertakings, views, or knowledge of us as humyns are in essence technology. This definition alone refutes the argument that technology is detrimental. Take for instance the three significant technological advances of the humyn race covered in this article: nuclear technology, the internet, and medicine. Nuclear technology, an important advancement for our society, creates a world order, protects the inhabitants of the world, and ensures the longevity, freedoms, and well-being of the entire humyn race. Also, the internet allows for our society to inter-connect and progress further into enlightenment. Perhaps most important of all, medicine, allows for us to ensure our own survival on this planet. These three technologies well represent technology as a whole, and clearly show that technology is extremely beneficial to our society. Only by advocating and advancing technology, can we as humyns, and as humynity, succeed.

#### Mexican pharmaceuticals are key

NAPS 4/11/13 (North American Production Sharing Incorporated, <http://www.napsintl.com/news/index.php/2013/04/11/the-medical-device-industry-manufacturing-in-mexico-has-a-clean-bill-of-health/>)

[Medical device](http://www.napsintl.com/medicaldevice.php) companies manufacturing in Mexico continue to exhibit steady growth with no sign of a slow down in sight. As costs in the United States and Eastern Europe continue to rise, especially with the implementation of “Obamacare” and its direct impact on medical device companies, more organizations are considering [manufacturing in Mexico](http://www.napsintl.com/manufacturinginmexico.php) as a viable solution. No other place in Mexico is this more evident than in Tijuana, where they now claim the largest concentration of medical device companies in all of North America. The ability to provide both timely deliveries and consistently high quality products are a few reasons why medical device manufacturers are choosing Mexico. Also, there is a tremendous base of talented labor with experience in medical device, [automotive](http://www.napsintl.com/auto.php), electronics, aerospace and other sophisticated industries to support the growth of manufacturing in Mexico. Furthermore, the labor laws in Mexico provide companies much more flexibility in terms of compensation, scheduling and seasonality, which plays an important roll on profitability. Another factor drawing medical device manufacturers to Mexico is the government’s enforcement, and employee’s respect, for intellectual property. Unlike many other low-cost manufacturing countries, Mexico is known for its low piracy rates, which cost companies billions of dollars a year. One of the challenges facing these companies is understanding the business landscape and culture in Mexico, which is why many of these firms are choosing to outsource their administration and compliance management to shelter companies. A good shelter company will handle 100% of the administration, including Humyn Resources in Mexico, Payroll in Mexico, Accounting in Mexico, Import/Export in Mexico and Environmental, Health & Safety in Mexico, allowing the manufacturer to focus on production and quality control. “We are receiving a record number of inquires from medical device manufacturers around the world who want to explore Mexico as a competitive solution,” said Scott Stanley, Sr. Vice President of North American Production Sharing, Inc. (NAPS), Tijuana’s largest and most sophisticated shelter service provider. “NAPS guides these companies through the process of feasibility by providing all the facts and figures about expanding into Mexico so sound business decisions can be made. Thereafter, we essentially become partners and typically work together for many years.” With an increase in demand for medical device products, not only in the United States but also within Mexico’s public health sector, Mexico will continue to be the primary choice for medical device manufacturing.

#### Pharmaceuticals is key to the development of DOD non-lethal chemical weapons

The Sunshine Project 03 (“Pentagon Perverts Pharma with New Weapons”, http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/pr/pr110203.html)

The conventional view is that pharmaceutical research develops new ways to treat disease and reduce humyn suffering; but the Pentagon disagrees. Military weapons developers see the pharmaceutical industry as central to a new generation of anti-personnel weapons. Although it denied such research as recently as the aftermath of the October theater tragedy in Moscow, a Pentagon program has recently released more information that confirms that it wants to make pharmaceutical weapons. And on February 5th, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld went a big step further. Rumsfeld, himself a former pharmaceutical industry CEO (1), announced that the US is making plans for the use of such incapacitating biochemical weapons in an invasion of Iraq (see News Release, 7 February 2003). The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) and the US Army's Soldier Biological Chemical Commynd (SBCCOM) are leading the research. Of interest to the military are drugs that target the brain's regulation of many aspects of cognition, such as sense of pain, consciousness, and emotions like anxiety and fear. JNLWD is preparing a database of pharmaceutical weapons candidates, many of them off-the-shelf products, and indexing them by manufacturer. It will choose drugs from this database for further work and, according to Rumsfeld, if President Bush signs a waiver of existing US policy, they can be used in Iraq. Delivery devices already exist or are in advanced development. These include munitions for an unmynned aerial vehicle or loitering missile, and a new 81mm (bio)chemical mortar round. Many of the Pentagon’s so-called "nonlethal" (bio)chemical weapons candidates are pharmaceuticals. Different names are used for these weapons ("calmatives", "disabling chemicals", "nonlethal chemicals", etc.). Used as weapons, all minimally aim to incapacitate their victims. They belong to the same broad category of agents as the incapacitating chemical that killed more than 120 hostages in the Moscow theater. That agent was reported to be based on fentanyl, an opiate that is also among the weapons being assessed by JNLWD. In the US, pharmaceutical fentanyl is sold by Johnson & Johnson’s subsidiary Janssen Pharmaceutica. Remifentanil, a closely related drug, is a GlaxoSmithKline product. US military contractors have identified a host of other agents manufactured by a Who's Who list of the pharmaceutical industry. In 2001 weapons researchers at the Applied Research Laboratory of Pennsylvania State University assessed the anesthetic drugs isoflurane and sevoflurane, produced by Syngenta and Abbott Laboratories, respectively. The same Penn State team recommended other drugs for "immediate consideration," some of which are in the chart below. The Pentagon is also interested in industry’s new ways to apply (bio)chemicals through the skin and mucous membranes, which could bring previously impractical drug weapons closer to reality by overcoming technical hurdles related to delivery of certain agents.

#### Those are good – prevent collateral damage

Alexander 99, Retired U.S. Army colonel, an author, and a consultant to various U.S. government agencies. He spearheaded the research on nonlethal weapons at Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1999 (John B., Oct 1st, “Nonlethal Weapons: When Deadly Force Is Not Enough”, The Futurist, L/N)

The military and law enforcement situations mentioned so far are fairly clear cut and a logical extension of current practices. However, the future of nonlethal weapons lies in far more important areas. Many of the potential enemies of the future are nontraditional. In the past few years the impact of terrorism and organized crime has been felt around the world. In most cases, response by means of conventional force is unsuitable or inadequate. When the enemy commingles with an innocent civilian population, it is not appropriate, and often counterproductive, to use bombs or missiles to attack them. As was seen earlier this year in Yugoslavia, even precision weapons can occasionally go astray and hit an unintended target. Without the development of advanced nonlethal weapons, the options available to political leaders and military commynders are too limited. It is under circumstances in which lethal weapons could lead to much broader engagements that nonlethal weapons take on strategic importance. An example of a situation that seems to have gone tragically wrong is the 1998 U.S. cruise missile attack on a pharmaceutical company in Sudan. This attack was undertaken based on a belief that the factory was supporting Osama bin Laden, a terrorist who had allegedly instigated and coordinated bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. The factory, located near the Sudanese capital city of Khartoum, was hit by cruise missiles at night in hopes that civilian casualties would be minimal. It was later learned that the factory was targeted on erroneous information and that people did die in the attack. This incident highlights the limitations of conventional weapons. In the future we need to have weapons that can degrade or destroy such facilities without the collateral damage caused by high explosives. Very few of these weapons are being thoroughly researched. However, with some effort more weapons can be developed to make long-range, nonlethal strikes against terrorist infrastructures.

#### That prevents a world war

Close 98, Arab affairs specialist for the CIA for twenty-six years & an independent consultant on the region, 1998 (Raymond, “The Only Effective Defense Against Terrorism is To Rebuild America's Reputation For Fairness,” The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November)

Despite U.S. government claims to the contrary, there is, in my opinion, a serious question whether our action in bombing alleged terrorist sites in Afghanistan and Sudan was a justifiable violation of the accepted and respected norms of international law. The attacks were on the sovereign territory of another legally recognized state with which we are technically at peace. We can attempt to justify this action by quoting Osama bin Laden's "declaration of war" on the American government and the American people, without distinction between them. But that is to claim, is it not, that the government of Afghanistan and the government of the Sudan abetted, and therefore share complicity in, acts of war against the United States? In fact, all that Afghanistan seems to have done was to provide Bin Laden with the sanctuary where the acts against us were planned. (Not the location where they were carried out.) We must now be ready to accept the full implications of this interpretation of our international rights. This means, it seems to me, that we are declaring one of two conditions to be true: A. That the United States makes the rules by which it acts in the world community. We are a law unto ourselves. Do we really want to say that? B. Or, that if one state believes it has enemies who are being granted refuge in another country, it is permissible to launch bombing attacks against those elements without the knowledge or permission of the legitimate host government. Is setting that precedent always going to redound to our benefit? Have we thought about that carefully? Most of us accept the premise that terrorism is a phenomenon that cannot be defeated by brute force, but only by ideas, by persuasion, by the amelioration of its causes -- whether real or imagined. Terrorism has only one real asset, in the final analysis -- the passion and commitment of its adherents. Are humyn passions capable of being altered by cruise missiles? Having accepted that premise intellectually as reasonable and civilized, we now have to live with the fact that in other international situations in the future, others may emulate our resort to violence, taking the law into their own hands to launch attacks against other members of the international community if they feel their national interests are similarly threatened. **This is how world wars start.**

#### Mexican manufacturing key to US aerospace

Mecham 7/16 (Michael is apace writer for Gannett News, California Bureau Chief and correspondent for Congress, Aviation Week, 7/16/13, “Mexico’s Welcome Mat Attracts Aerospace Manufacturers”, <http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_04_01_2013_p44-562383.xml>\)

The aerospace influx has not happened overnight. Its roots date to the mid-1970s when U.S. companies, a mix of multinationals and lower-tier suppliers, began sending basic parts manufacturing and assembly tasks across the border, mostly to border towns like Tijuana and Mexicali but also deeper into the country to cities like Monterrey. Service operations followed, as did company research activities. However, it has been in the past decade that Mexico's aerospace manufacturing growth has mushroomed. Political reform led it to pursue a global free trade agenda vigorously and its 1994 signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) benefitted Mexico greatly. Still, it took about a decade for the aerospace sector to take off. Until 2004, growth was scattered, says Queretaro state Gov. Jose Calzada. Not anymore. “We've seen incredible changes in just the last five years,” he says The boom times are a testament to Mexico's geography, its embrace of free trade and adoption of legal mechanisms that provide a “soft landing” for foreign-owned factories. Local leaders clear red tape and amaze U.S. and European executives at how quickly they can put up factories. A typical response comes from Peter Huij, a senior Fokker Aerostructures executive in Chihuahua, about how quickly the company went from bare earth in May 2011 to a completed 75,000-sq.-ft. factory in November: “It would be impossible in Europe.” Behind all of this is Mexico's Maquiladora factory system for supporting foreign companies, which allows them to control their own destiny, importing raw materials such as aerospace-quality alloys, or wiring and then exporting the finished product tax-free. Foreign manufacturers commonly turn to a large service provider—Intermex and American Industries Group are leaders for the aerospace sector—that lease buildings to their clients and handle their human resources, tax and other business needs under Mexican law. About 80% of the aerospace companies in Mexico use such services. Of the 36 Maquiladoras registered by the Mexican government last year, six were in aerospace, including a GKN Aerospace plant in Mexicali, Latecoere in Hermosillo, coatings specialist Ellison Surface Technologies and Rolls-Royce turbine supplier JJ Churchill in Guaymas and a fourth division for Zodiac in Chihuahua. Under the Maquiladora system, Mexico allows resident foreign companies to control 100% of their businesses. They do not face the “local partner” rules so common elsewhere that limit foreigners to a maximum 49% share “They make it easy for you to do business down here,” says John Gardner, strategic program manager at Kaman Aerostructures, another newcomer in Chihuahua. “They provide a 'soft landing,' to get a quick startup—a good startup. We got a lot of support up front and afterward.”

#### Aerospace key to hegemony

Lexington Institute 13

[Public policy think tank, “America Is A Superpower Because It Is An Air Power”, 1/24, <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/142016/air-power-makes-america-a-superpower.html>] \*we don’t defend the gendered discourse of this evidence

There is no question that the United States has the best military in the world. The United States is unique in its ability to project military power to multiple regions of the world simultaneously, conduct multiple major combined and joint operations at a time and both defend the homeland and provide ongoing support to civil agencies. Europe, which spends about sixty percent of the U.S. defense budget and actually has more man and woman in uniform, was unable without significant U.S. support to conduct a single, modest campaign in Libya. The U.S. military continues to set the world standard with respect to most major military systems: nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, large deck amphibious warfare ships, nuclear attack submarines, strategic bombers, fifth-generation fighters, air and missile defenses, tanks and armored fighting vehicles and space and airborne ISR. Even though we don’t talk much about it the military’s cyber warfare capabilities are truly impressive. While the U.S. has the best ground, naval and amphibious forces in the world, one thing makes it a 21st Century superpower: its dominance as an air power. The United States alone is capable of deploying its aerial assets anywhere in the world. U.S. air power can hold at risk any target set in any country and can do so from multiple directions. The U.S. Air Force is the only one capable of delivering specially-designed conventional bombs large enough to destroy deeply buried and hardened structures.  Over the past two decades, the U.S. military has repeatedly demonstrated that it can destroy an adversary’s air force and air defenses in a matter of weeks. After that, hostile ground units were toast. The ability to rapidly seize control of the air means that no soldier has died in an air attack since 1953. Over a decade of wars, American air power from the land and sea provided continual responsive fire support for tactical units on the ground. Other nations have fighters and bombers, although America’s are the best. The U.S. also has the largest and most capable fleets of air transports, refueling aircraft and airborne ISR assets in the world. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force flew soldiers and heavy armor deep into Iraq to seize a critical target, the Haditha Dam. Since 2001, the Air Force has maintained a continuous air bridge to Afghanistan, more than 8,000 miles from CONUS. U.S. C-17 transports are today flying French troops and equipment into Mali. The U.S. Navy has a fleet of fixed wing transports, the C-2 Greyhounds, specifically for the purpose of moving parts and people to and from its aircraft carriers. The United States has crafted an ISR and strategic warning capability based on a sophisticated array of satellites, manned platforms and unmanned aerial systems.  Dominant air power is about much more than just platforms and weapons. It requires also the trained people and processes to plan and manage air operations, process, exploit and disseminate intelligence, identify targets and plan attacks, move supplies and route transports and repair and maintain complex systems. The U.S. had to send hundreds of targeteers to NATO to support the Libyan operation. Over decades, the U.S. military has developed an unequalled training establishment and set of ranges that ensure the highest quality pilots and other personnel. Finally, the U.S. is the dominant air power in the world because of its aerospace industrial base. Whether it is designing and producing fifth-generation fighters such as the F-22 and F-35, providing an advanced tanker like the new KC-46 or inventing high-flying unmanned aerial systems like the Global Hawk, the U.S. aerospace industry continues to set the bar. In addition, the private and public parts of the aerospace industrial base, often working together based on collaborative arrangements such as performance-based logistics contracts, is able to move aircraft, weapons and systems through the nationwide system of depots, Air Logistics Centers and other facilities at a rate unmatched by any other nation. The ability to rapidly repair or overhaul aircraft is itself a force multiplier, providing more aircraft on the flight line to support the warfighters. The U.S. military can go where it is ordered, respond rapidly to the crisis of the moment, move men, equipment and supplies around the world and dominate any place on the face of the earth as long as it desires because it is dominant in the air. As the Pentagon, Congress and the White House struggle with budget issues that could well require deep cuts to the military, they would be well advised to remember that it is air dominance that enables this country to remain a superpower.

#### The pursuit of hegemony is inevitable, sustainable, and prevents great power war

**Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth 13** – \*Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, \*\*John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, \*\*William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College (“Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement”, January/February 2013, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138468/stephen-g-brooks-g-john-ikenberry-and-william-c-wohlforth/lean-forward)

Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.

## 2ac

### 2ac – china

#### China is a threat –

#### Spy Boats Off Hawaii prove intent

Paul Joseph Watson Infowars.com 10/31, 2013 China Moves Spy Ship to Hawaiian Waters in “Retaliation” Against U.S. http://www.infowars.com/china-moves-spy-ship-to-hawaiian-waters-in-retaliation-against-u-s/

China has sent a surveillance ship to Hawaiian waters for the very first time in an unprecedented move which is being described as a provocative retaliation to the U.S. naval presence in the East China Sea.¶ According to a report by GoldSea.com, a news outlet aimed at Asian-Americans, a 4,000 ton People’s Liberation Army electronic reconnaissance ship was recently spotted near Hawaii within the U.S. 200-nautical mile EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone).¶ The report was also picked up by the Honolulu Star-Advertiser, which ran an article entitled China moves spy ship near isles, Asian media say.¶ The ship “is equipped with various electronic gear for eavesdropping on radio communications and tracking ships and aircraft. It is also believed to have jamming equipment to interfere with the radio communications of other ships,” according to the report.¶ The development is unprecedented because China has never sent a ship within the U.S. EEZ, although the U.S. has entered the Chinese EEZ on numerous occasions for decades. It is not known whether the ship violated the territorial waters of the United States, which extend to 12 nautical miles under the 1982 UN convention on the Law of the Sea.¶ The fact that the ship got within 2,400 miles of San Francisco represents “a potential for offensive actions against the US by the Chinese military,” according to the report.¶ The development is apparently part of China’s growing military confidence, which was also exemplified with the country’s recent declassification of its nuclear-armed Xia-class submarine fleet, which according to state media represents an “assassin’s mace that would make adversaries tremble.”¶ China’s increasing aggressiveness in the East China Sea and its challenge to Japanese control of the Senkaku Islands has sparked tensions, with Japan repeatedly scrambling fighter jets earlier this week in response to Chinese military aircraft flying near Okinawa.¶ Back in September, China also reportedly sent warships to the coast of Syria to “observe” the actions of US and Russian vessels in the region.¶ “The recent deployment of a PLAN surveillance ship into Hawaiian waters is seen as Beijing’s message to the US and the rest of the world that China can now contest the waters of the western Pacific and that the US Navy no longer has a free pass in the region. It is also seen as a form of retaliation for what Beijing considers the provocative naval exercises the US recently conducted in the Yellow Sea jointly with the navies of South Korea and Japan’s Self-Defense Force,” states the report.¶ Watch a video demonstration of China’s recently declassified Xia-class submarine fleet below.

#### China continues to challenge American influence by counterbalancing

Halper 11 – Director, American Studies Program University of Cambridge (Stefan, “The China Threat”, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/the\_china\_threat)//javi

Joseph S. Nye Jr.'s optimism is laudable ("China's Rise Doesn't Mean War…," January/February 2011). That said, John Mearsheimer was right to say that there are few, if any, examples of preeminent global powers like the United States going quietly into the night. That is particularly true when an ascending power, such as China, advances diplomatic, political, and economic values antithetical to those that have informed the status quo global architecture. It is nonsense to suggest that "America's peaceful overtaking of Britain at the end of the 19th century" -- in which one democratic, Christian, English-speaking, Anglo-Saxon country stood aside for another -- provides a blueprint for China's rise. That's not to say that World War III is necessarily in the offing. China's military bluster, including the recent high-profile rollout of its new stealth fighter jet and its incipient aircraft carrier, should be taken seriously, but it can be managed. China remains a decade behind the United States in military force projection, battlefield management, and blue-water and space warfare capabilities. Similarly, China's dramatic economic growth and mercantilist trade policies make commercial relations difficult, but not impossible. Even China's large U.S. dollar holdings are less a U.S. liability than a mutual liability, as Beijing would suffer if the dollar lost value. Indeed, the scenario of Washington and Beijing peacefully cooperating too easily assumes that China's rise will be smooth. In truth, China's constant struggle against chaos renders it inward-looking and unpredictable. It must deal with internal ethnic pressures, uneven development, an outmoded communist ideology that no longer defines national values or civil society, a ruling party in transition, and a widespread and potentially virulent nationalism. Beijing's growth requirements force it to impose predatory trade practices on others; its need for energy and natural resources leads it to threaten its neighbors as well as regions further afield, such as Africa. Most importantly, China's example, though not threatening today's democracies, is admired by most of the authoritarian world beyond the West. By legitimizing authoritarianism with its economic successes, China has made it more difficult for other countries to claim a democratic future. In short, China remains an existential challenge, not a partner or a friend, to America and the idea of the West.

#### China has the technological capabilities to take out the US

Lake 3/10/11 – (Eli, “China deemed biggest threat to U.S.”, Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/10/china-deemed-biggest-threat-to-us/?page=all)//javi

China’s nuclear arsenal poses the most serious “mortal threat” to the United States among nation states, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told the Senate on Thursday. In candid testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mr. Clapper said he considered China the most significant threat among nation states, with Russia posing the second-greatest threat. He later clarified the comments by saying he did not assess that China or Russia had the intention to launch an attack on the United States. The testimony contrasts with statements by Obama administration officials who have sought to highlight the dangers of Iran and North Korea while paying less attention to China and Russia. Mr. Clapper said he does not assess that North Korea and Iran pose greater strategic threats because they lack the forces that Russia and China have that could deliver a nuclear attack on the United States. North Korea has tested at least twice a multistaged long-range missile capable of hitting the United States. On Tuesday, Sen. James M. Inhofe, Oklahoma Republican, told a conference in Washington that analysts estimate that Iran would be able to deliver a payload by missile to the U.S. East Coast by 2015. Asked by Sen. Joe Manchin III, West Virginia Democrat, what country he viewed as the greatest adversary of the United States, Mr. Clapper said: “Probably China, if the question is pick one nation state.” He added, “We have a treaty, the New START treaty, with the Russians. I guess I would rank them a little lower because we don’t have such a treaty with the Chinese.” China, according to successive Pentagon reports to Congress, is building up its strategic nuclear forces and has spurned offers from the administration to begin talks on nuclear arms, missile defenses, space and cyberweapons, as well as an international agreement to limit the production of fissile material.

#### Has the intent to challenge the US

Lake 3/10/11 – (Eli, “China deemed biggest threat to U.S.”, Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/10/china-deemed-biggest-threat-to-us/?page=all)//javi

Defense officials have acknowledged that U.S. intelligence agencies have underestimated China's military capabilities. But the intelligence community is beginning to express more concerns about China's military buildup, which has been carried out largely in secret. Army Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess Jr., the Defense Intelligence Agency director, appeared with Mr. Clapper and agreed that China’s power projection is growing. “While remaining focused on Taiwan as a primary mission, China will, by 2020, lay the foundation for a force able to accomplish broader and regional global objectives,” he said. Gen. Burgess said China's military “continues to face deficiencies in interservice cooperation and actual experience in joint exercises and combat operations.” “China’s leaders continue to stress asymmetric strategies to leverage China’s advantage while exploiting potential opponents’ perceived vulnerabilities,” the general said. One asymmetric strategy China is pursuing is the use of computer-based cyberprobes into U.S. classified computer networks. Mr. Clapper said the cyber-activity is a “formidable concern.” “The Chinese have made a substantial investment in this area, they have a very large organization devoted to it and they’re pretty aggressive,” Mr. Clapper said. “This is just another way in which they glean information about us and collect on us for technology purposes, so it’s a very formidable concern.”

### 2ac – manufacturing

#### Heg is sustainable and high — their authors misunderstand geopolitics — no challengers.

Kagan 12 [Robert, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe Brookings, “New Year, Old Foreign Policy Problems,” <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0105_international_relations_kagan>]

Meanwhile, the much-discussed “rise of the rest” has been overhyped. U.S. business leaders, and their pals in the punditocracy, have been mesmerized by these emerging markets. But emerging markets do not equate to emerging great powers. Russia is no longer “rising.” Brazil’s role in the world is underwhelming. Turkey’s impact has yet to be demonstrated. India has not decided what it wants to be. Even China, though unquestionably a major player, has not yet taken on a great power’s role. For the United States, Europe remains the key ally in shoring up the norms and principles of a liberal world order. Should Europe fall, the blow to U.S. interests would be staggering. America matters: Reports of U.S. decline are extraordinarily premature. The country remains the central player in all regions of the world. Washington may not be able to have its way on all issues or provide solutions for all the world’s problems. But, then, it never could. Many today have nostalgia for an era of U.S. predominance that never existed. But in the coming months, whether the issue is Iran, Syria or Asian security, regional players will continue to look to the United States. No other nation or group of nations comes close to enjoying America’s global web of alliances. None wields more political influence in international forums. And unless and until the United States renders itself weak by unnecessary defense budget cuts, there will be no substitute for it as a provider of security and defender of an open political and economic order. Perhaps 2012 will be the year Americans gain a renewed understanding of that enduring reality.

#### No retrenchment

Gray 09 (Jan. 2009, Colin S. Gray, PhD, Professor of IR and strategic studies, University of Reading, England, “After Iraq: The Search for a Sustainable National Security Strategy,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=902)

The “lone wolf” America that elects to withdraw from active global security engagement would discover that its attempt to be disinterested in the extra-American world was damaging to the country’s interests. Also, such an American policy could not long endure because it would be rejected culturally by many Americans. Although American culture favors limited liability abroad, it still demands to be spread so as to colonize a world that stubbornly remains backward. Almost regardless of material considerations, too many Americans want to improve the outside world for wholehearted security withdrawal to be sustainable.

**Concedes heg is key to solve great power war**

**Monteiro 11** \*Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University [<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064>, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful”]

In addition, Wohlforth claims that wars among major powers are unlikely, because the unipole will prevent conflict from erupting among important states. He writes, “The sole pole’s power advantages matter only to the degree that it is engaged, and it is most likely to be engaged in politics among the other major powers. 44 **I agree** that if the unipole were to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance, major power wars would be unlikely. Yet, there is no compelling reason to expect that it will always follow such a course. Should the unipole decide to disengage, as Wohlforth implies, **major power wars would be possible**

**Monteiro uses bad data**

**Busby 12**

Josh Busby, is an Assistant Professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas-Austin, The Duck of Minerva (don't worry - it's legit), January 3, 2012, "Get Real! Chicago IR guys out in force", http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/2012/01/get-real-chicago-ir-guys-out-in-force.html

Monteiro's piece “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful” basically takes issue with Bill Wohlforth's earlier work on unipolarity and tries to ask a slightly different question. Rather than assess whether unipolarity is stable, he tries to evaluate whether it is peaceful. And his answer is that unipolarity is not at all peaceful and much less peaceful than other periods and then seeks to explain why. Is Unipolarity Peaceful? As evidence, Monteiro provides metrics of the number of years during which great powers have been at war. For the unipolar era since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been at war 13 of those 22 years or 59% (see his Table 2 below). Now, I've been following some of the discussion by and about Steven Pinker and Joshua Goldstein's work that suggests the world is becoming more peaceful with interstate wars and intrastate wars becoming more rare. I was struck by the graphic that Pinker used in a Wall Street Journal piece back in September that drew on the Uppsala Conflict Data, which shows a steep decline in the number of deaths per 100,000 people. How do we square this account by Monteiro of a unipolar world that is not peaceful (with the U.S. at war during this period in Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Kosovo) and Pinker's account which suggests declining violence in the contemporary period? Where Pinker is focused on systemic outcomes, Monteiro's measure merely reflect years during which the great powers are at war. Under unipolarity, there is only one great power so the measure is partial and not systemic. However, Monteiro's theory aims to be systemic rather than partial. In critiquing Wohlforth's early work on unipolarity stability, Monteiro notes: Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter (17). So presumably, a more adequate test of the peacefulness or not of unipolarity (at least for Monteiro) is not the number of years the great power has been at war but whether the system as a whole is becoming more peaceful under unipolarity compared to previous eras, including wars between major and minor powers or wars between minor powers and whether the wars that do happen are as violent as the ones that came before. Now, as Ross Douthat pointed out, Pinker's argument isn't based on a logic of benign hegemony. It could be that even if the present era is more peaceful, unipolarity has nothing to do with it. Moreover, Pinker may be wrong. Maybe the world isn't all that peaceful. I keep thinking about the places I don't want to go to anymore because they are violent (Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.) As Tyler Cowen noted, the measure Pinker uses to suggest violence is a per capita one, which doesn't get at the absolute level of violence perpetrated in an era of a greater world population. But, if my read of other reports based on Uppsala data is right, war is becoming more rare and less deadly (though later data suggests lower level armed conflict may be increasing again since the mid-2000s). The apparent violence of the contemporary era may be something of a presentist bias and reflect our own lived experience and the ubiquity of news media. Even if the U.S. has been at war for the better part of unipolarity, the deadliness is declining, even compared with Vietnam, let alone World War II.

**Monteiro concludes that multipolarity and bipolarity lead to conflict**

**Monteiro 12** (Nuno P. Monteiro, Professor of Political Science at Yale University, Winter 2012, “Unrest Assured”, Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx\_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx\_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr\_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft\_val\_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Unrest+Assured%3A+Why+Unipolarity+Is+Not+Peaceful&rft.jtitle=International+Security&rft.au=Nuno+P+Monteiro&rft.date=2011-01-01&rft.pub=MIT+Press+Journals&rft.issn=0162-2889&rft.volume=36&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=9&rft.externalDocID=2570831251)

The remaining regions will be either bipolar or multipolar. No consensus exists on their comparative peacefulness.103 In fact, there are plausible causal mechanisms accounting for conflict in both types of system**. One can therefore expect that both bipolar and multipolar regions will feature significant levels of conflict**—involving minor and major powers—when left on their own. Specifically, the literature notes two causes of conflict in bipolar systems. Each can be adapted to bipolar regions. First, with only two regional powers, there are no opportunities for regional external balancing, making deterrence less likely to succeed in case of a regional imbalance of power. Second, major powers in bipolar regions are focused on each other, which increases tensions and the odds of conflict. Both are good reasons to expect conflict in bipolar regions left alone by the unipole. The literature also discusses four causes of conflict in multipolarity. Each can be adapted to a multipolar region. First, with three or more regional powers, there is a high likelihood of competition that can eventually lead to conflict. Second, the regional distribution of power is less likely to be balanced before alliances are made. Imbalances of power are more likely to generate predatory conflicts, with two or more states ganging up on another. Third, regional multipolarity increases the potential for miscalculations about relative power, which, in turn, raise the odds of conflict. Finally, multipolar regions present ample opportunities for buck-passing, making balancing more difficult.

**Monteiro’s wrong**

**Busby 12**, Josh, assistant professor of public affairs at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs [“Josh Busby on Unipolarity and International Relations,” January 6th, http://www.strausscenter.org/strauss-news/josh-busby-on-unipolarity-and-international-relations.html]

Strauss Scholar, Joshua Busby, wrote a three-part piece on the blog The Duck of Minerva, responding to two articles published by University of Chicago scholars Nuno Monteiro, and Sebastian Rosato and John Schuessler. The articles, and Busby’s response, focus on international relations, unipolarity and the realist approach to foreign policy. Busby’s first post critiques Nuno Monteiro’s article, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful” published in International Security. Monteiro argued that unipolarity has been less peaceful than other time periods. Busby disagrees with this argument, citing the contemporary era may create a “presentist bias” due to the overemphasis of our own lived experience and the omnipresence of the news media. Finally Busby addressed Moneiro’s argument that unipolarity drives conflict. Busby argues that **domestic-level factors in** both the United States and **potential adversaries, rather than U.S. power** alone, help explain recent conflicts.

### 2ac – cp

#### The plan is key to re-shoring production

Wilson 13 — Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where he develops the Institute’s research and programming on regional economic integration and U.S.-Mexico border affairs. He is the author of Working Together: Economic Ties between the United States and Mexico (Wilson Center, 2011), and an editor and author of the Institute’s forthcoming State of the Border Report (Christopher E. Wilson, *Wilson Center — Mexico Institute*, January 2013, “New Ideas for a New Era: Policy Options for the Next Stage in U.S.-Mexico Relations”, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new_ideas_us_mexico_relations.pdf>, Accessed 07-22-2013 | AK)

Driven by a series of global developments and technological advances, a manufacturing renaissance is taking hold in the United States and Mexico that is increasing the competitiveness of regional industry and the volume of U.S.-Mexico trade. After many companies moved their factories to Asia in search of cheap wages over the past two decades, new trends are pulling production facilities back to North America. While manufacturing wages in China were four times less than Mexico in 2000, they are now nearly equal and are expected to be 25 percent higher than Mexican labor costs by 2015.1 The simple math of wage differentials drove the past decade’s movement of factories from the U.S. and Mexico to China, but companies are taking an increasingly holistic approach in deciding where to locate factories, considering transportation costs and shipping times; exchange rate and political risks; language, culture, and time zone differences; contract and intellectual property law enforcement; security; production flexibility; the supply and cost of materials and energy; and the availability of skilled and educated workers. In most of these categories, Mexico is gaining ground or maintains a distinct advantage over other regions of the world, particularly in terms of serving markets throughout the Americas. For example, between 2007 and December 2012, the value of the Mexican Peso fell by 17 percent compared to the U.S. Dollar and by a full 33 percent compared to the Chinese Yuan, improving the competitiveness of regional exports vis-à-vis Chinese goods.2 Crude oil prices rose 231 percent between 2002 and 2012, thus raising shipping costs and incentivizing the use of shorter, regional rather than longer, transcontinental supply chains.3 New drilling techniques, however, are changing the outlook for oil and especially natural gas, opening access to new reserves, increasing production, and therefore lowering some energy costs. While this may eventually lower long-range shipping costs, the more immediate effect is proving to be a major decline in natural gas prices, which has already lowered electricity costs in some parts of the United States and has the potential to do so throughout both the region. Such a decline in prices provides a major boost to energy intensive industries, such as steel, and petrochemical producers. The United States is on the forefront of the technological advances in the energy industry and stands to gain the most from them, but Mexico could reap the benefits as well should it either reform its energy industry to take advantage of its significant shale gas reserves or develop the pipeline infrastructure to support increased gas imports from the United States. Technological advances and improvements in the manufacturing process and logistics are revolutionizing industrial production in ways that significantly change cost structures, further incentivizing those that had offshored to China to consider near-shoring in Mexico or re-shoring their production back to the United States. Robots and the high-tech sensors that allow them to function with precision are allowing many of the simple, repetitive jobs that traditionally made up factory work obsolete. The need for large numbers of relatively unskilled laborers is on the decline, and the need for high skilled technicians who can program and maintain the complex machines and robots of today’s factories is on the rise. As a result, labor costs are a shrinking portion of total production costs, as evidenced by a recent study that found only 5.3% of the price of an iPhone goes to offshore manufacturing wages.4 This shift opens an opportunity for advanced economies like the U.S. to recoup some of their share of global manufacturing, especially if the complementary nature of high-tech design and production in the U.S. is complemented with lower cost manufacturing in Mexico for the portions of production that still require a higher degree of manual labor. The widespread implementation of lean manufacturing principles has improved the efficiency and agility of factories around the world. One important area in which fat has been cut from the manufacturing process is in warehousing. Just-in-time supply chain management has minimized the costly storage of parts and products, thus fueling the trend of regionalization in manufacturing by increasing the importance of a robust network of nearby suppliers. It is also greatly increasing the need for short and predictable wait times at the U.S. land borders since an unexpected delay has the potential to shut down production until the needed parts arrive at their destination.

#### North American near-shoring focuses Chinese manufacturing on the domestic market and growing Asian economies

Sirkin et al. 11 — Harold L. Sirkin, senior partner and managing director in the Chicago office of The Boston Consulting Group and the author of GLOBALITY: Competing with Everyone from Everywhere for Everything, and Michael Zinser, partner and managing director in the firm’s Chicago office, and Douglas Hohner, partner and managing director in BCG’s Chicago office (Harold L. Sirkin, Michael Zinser, Douglas Hohner, *The Boston Consulting Group*, “Made in America, Again: Why Manufacturing Will Return to the U.S.”, August 2011, <http://www.bcg.com/documents/file84471.pdf>, Accessed 07-22-2013 | AK)

The reallocation of production is still in its early stages, but we believe it will accelerate in the years ahead. The impact of the changing cost equation will vary from industry to industry. Products in which labor accounts for a small portion of total costs and in which volumes are modest, such as auto parts, construction equipment, and appliances, will be among those that companies reevaluate in terms of their options for supplying the North American market. But the manufacture of goods with relatively higher labor content that are produced in high volumes will likely remain in China. Finally, companies that make mass-produced, labor-intensive products, like apparel and shoes, may move production from China to other low-cost nations. (We will assess the implications of the new manufacturing math for specific industries in the second report in this series.) These trends do not suggest that Chinese manufacturing will decline or that multinational companies will shut their mainland plants. More Chinese production capacity will be devoted to supplying the country’s enormous domestic market, which is gaining millions of new middle-class households each year, as well as other growing economies in Asia. In addition, China will continue to remain a low-cost supplier to Western Europe. And China will remain competitive in industries that have developed strong “clusters of excellence” and that have an immense installed base of production capacity and component and material suppliers. This means that when it comes to building new production capacity, companies will likely choose to explore alternatives instead of automatically opting for China. Over the next five years, we believe that the U.S. will be the optimal choice for many manufacturing investments aimed at serving the North American market.

#### US-Mexico relations are key to solve cyber-security threats – engagement is key

Downie, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University, 11

(Dr. Richard, deputy director and fellow with the CSIS Africa Program, master’s degree in international public policy from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “Critical Strategic Decisions in Mexico: the Future of US/Mexican Defense Relations,” July 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/chds/docuploaded/Dr\_Downie\_OCP\_2011.pdf, ara)

2). Impact on US/Mexico Defense Relationship. The “stay the course” option would potentially offer an additional “sexenio” during which the US and Mexican militaries could expand and mature in the conduct of shared missions. If so, the growing relationship could potentially lead to a network or infrastructure of activities and agreements. Military forces from both countries would continue to exchange intelligence and sensitive information and share operational experiences while working toward a common purpose and objectives. Perhaps eventually, the United States and Mexico could engage in exercises as well as combined operations that would permit the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures that align their efforts not only in the fight against the TCOs, but also in other functional areas such as disaster or humanitarian relief operations, cooperative responses to terrorism, or proliferation of WMDs. Beyond mere confidencebuilding measures, this process could ideally lead to the establishment of protocols or standard operating procedures through which the forces of the two countries could operate in a common framework and ultimately achieve a level of functional interoperability. Although the US/Mexican defense relationship has advanced significantly in the past few years— certainly more quickly than any analyst would have predicted—the relationship is still not mature, stable, or consolidated. The strong US/Canada defense relationship offers a useful example of how military-to-military relations can mitigate the long-term impact of political decisions made on the basis of short-term disagreements between nations. The defense relationship with Canada, for example, involves a rich tradition of agreements and joint commissions, including a bi-national command, such as the US/Canada Permanent Joint Board on Defense, established in 1948; the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), since 1945; and the North America Aerospace Defense Command, based in Colorado Springs, Colorado, which is literally a two-nation command. While cooperative US/Mexican military-to-military initiatives seem to increase almost monthly, there is a long way to go before the United States and Mexico can achieve the kind of mature defense partnership that characterizes the US/Canada relationship. The US/Mexico defense relationship is not yet at a point in which institutional factors can help mitigate political tensions between the two countries. Time is the key element in advancing toward a more institutionalized structure of bilateral or even trilateral cooperation. At a minimum, a sustained process is needed for the US and Mexican militaries to continually enhance their relationship in a manner that benefits both countries. Continuing on the present course would probably entail more and more intrusive U.S. cooperation, both for equipment and training of Mexican law enforcement personnel, as well as for intelligence and other tactical support. The lofty, ultimate goal of such a process from a US viewpoint could be the establishment of a bi-national or even tri-national command in Mexico, addressing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as protection of critical infrastructure intelligence sharing, cyber security, counterterrorism, and perhaps support for counter-TCO efforts. Ideally, this multinational security organization could be under the leadership of a Mexican military or civilian official.36 While international military organizations such as NATO or even NORAD could serve as models, even in the most optimistic of scenarios that level of US/Mexican, and potentially Canadian, cooperation would require many years—even decades—of sustained effort and interaction. As increasing numbers of Mexican military personnel work closely with their US counterparts for longer periods of time, there could be a corresponding reduction in the stigma and barriers to a closer US/Mexico defense relationship arising from our past history.

#### Retaliation to cyber-attack escalates to global nuclear war

Lawson 9 (Sean - assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah, Cross-Domain Response to Cyber Attacks and the Threat of Conflict, , 5/13/2009, http://www.seanlawson.net/?p=477 )

At a time when it seems impossible to avoid the seemingly growing hysteria over the threat of cyber war,[1] network security expert Marcus Ranum delivered a refreshing talk recently, “The Problem with Cyber War,” that took a critical look at a number of the assumptions underlying contemporary cybersecurity discourse in the United States. He addressed one issue in partiuclar that I would like to riff on here, the issue of conflict escalation–i.e. the possibility that offensive use of cyber attacks could escalate to the use of physical force. As I will show, his concerns are entirely legitimate as current U.S. military cyber doctrine assumes the possibility of what I call “cross-domain responses” to cyberattacks. Backing Your Adversary (Mentally) into a Corner Based on the premise that completely blinding a potential adversary is a good indicator to that adversary that an attack is iminent, Ranum has argued that “The best thing that you could possibly do if you want to start World War III is launch a cyber attack. [...] When people talk about cyber war like it’s a practical thing, what they’re really doing is messing with the OK button for starting World War III. We need to get them to sit the f-k down and shut the f-k up.” [2] He is making a point similar to one that I have made in the past: Taking away an adversary’s ability to make rational decisions could backfire. [3] For example, Gregory Witol cautions that “attacking the decision maker’s ability to perform rational calculations may cause more problems than it hopes to resolveÃ¢â‚¬Â¦ Removing the capacity for rational action may result in completely unforeseen consequences, including longer and bloodier battles than may otherwise have been.” [4] Ã¯Â»Â¿Cross-Domain Response So, from a theoretical standpoint, I think his concerns are well founded. But the current state of U.S. policy may be cause for even greater concern. It’s not just worrisome that a hypothetical blinding attack via cyberspace could send a signal of imminent attack and therefore trigger an irrational response from the adversary. What is also cause for concern is that current U.S. policy indicates that “kinetic attacks” (i.e. physical use of force) are seen as potentially legitimate responses to cyber attacks. Most worrisome is that current U.S. policy implies that a nuclear response is possible, something that policy makers have not denied in recent press reports. The reason, in part, is that the U.S. defense community has increasingly come to see cyberspace as a “domain of warfare” equivalent to air, land, sea, and space. The definition of cyberspace as its own domain of warfare helps in its own right to blur the online/offline, physical-space/cyberspace boundary. But thinking logically about the potential consequences of this framing leads to some disconcerting conclusions. If cyberspace is a domain of warfare, then it becomes possible to define “cyber attacks” (whatever those may be said to entail) as acts of war. But what happens if the U.S. is attacked in any of the other domains? It retaliates. But it usually does not respond only within the domain in which it was attacked. Rather, responses are typically “cross-domain responses”–i.e. a massive bombing on U.S. soil or vital U.S. interests abroad (e.g. think 9/11 or Pearl Harbor) might lead to air strikes against the attacker. Even more likely given a U.S. military “way of warfare” that emphasizes multidimensional, “joint” operations is a massive conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) response against the attacker in all domains (air, land, sea, space), simultaneously. The possibility of “kinetic action” in response to cyber attack, or as part of offensive U.S. cyber operations, is part of the current (2006) National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations [5]: (U) Kinetic Actions. DOD will conduct kinetic missions to preserve freedom of action and strategic advantage in cyberspace. Kinetic actions can be either offensive or defensive and used in conjunction with other mission areas to achieve optimal military effects. Of course, the possibility that a cyber attack on the U.S. could lead to a U.S. nuclear reply constitutes possibly the ultimate in “cross-domain response.” And while this may seem far fetched, it has not been ruled out by U.S. defense policy makers and is, in fact, implied in current U.S. defense policy documents. From the National Military Strategy of the United States (2004): “The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities that pose potentially devastating impacts. WMD/E includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive weapons as well as other, more asymmetrical ‘weapons’. They may rely more on disruptive impact than destructive kinetic effects. For example, cyber attacks on US commercial information systems or attacks against transportation networks may have a greater economic or psychological effect than a relatively small release of a lethal agent.” [6] The authors of a 2009 National Academies of Science report on cyberwarfare respond to this by saying, “Coupled with the declaratory policy on nuclear weapons described earlier, this statement implies that the United States will regard certain kinds of cyberattacks against the United States as being in the same category as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and thus that a nuclear response to certain kinds of cyberattacks (namely, cyberattacks with devastating impacts) may be possible. It also sets a relevant scale–a cyberattack that has an impact larger than that associated with a relatively small release of a lethal agent is regarded with the same or greater seriousness.” [7]

#### Mexico is key to the navy – copper nickel tubing

General Adams, 13 – Brigadier General for the U.S. Army (Retired) (John, “REMAKING AMERICAN SECURITY: SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES & NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS ACROSS THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE” http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/RemakingAmericanSecurityMay2013.pdf)

In addition to these domestic companies, the European conglomerate KME and several companies in Mexico also produce Cu-Ni tubing for the U.S. Navy. However, other than Ansonia Brass & Copper, KME is the only company capable of producing this larger diameter tubing according to U.S. military specifications. As a result, the U.S. domestic production capability of Cu-Ni tubing is at risk, potentially leaving the U.S. Navy solely dependent on foreign manufacturers for this important supply chain.

#### Robust naval power key to US-Indian relations

Cropsey 06, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, deputy undersecretary of the Navy in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations, (Seth, Dec, “The Global Trident”, Armed Forces Journal, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/12/2307414>)

The geographic pivot of the Muslim littoral is democratic India — with its minority population of 140 million Muslims. Their participation in an increasingly prosperous and successful democratic state would be persuasive far beyond the subcontinent in establishing the compatibility of Islam with democracy. A key element of U.S. maritime strategy’s focus on the Muslim littoral should be to draw India closer to the U.S. through increased military-to-military exercises, ship visits and cooperation with Indian authorities in civil assistance.India is equally important in assuring the success of democracy in Asia. India’s long-standing enmity toward China represents a physical point of intersection between the maritime strategy’s focus on the western Pacific and its role in preventing the further spread of radical Islam. The two prongs of this strategy are complemented by the third, the U.S.’s unchanging requirement to demonstrate its willingness and capability to remain a global superpower. The most convincing demonstration of American will and reach is a navy large, powerful and flexible enough to apply effective force where U.S. interests are endangered.

### 2ac – gender

#### The Role of the Ballot is to simulate the enactment of the plan—effective choices regarding Latin American foreign policy require the ability to test the real world outcomes of our scholarship and advocacies.

Baxter 10 (Jorge, Education Specialist, Department of Education and Culture in the Organization of American States, Former Coordinator of the Inter-American Program on Education for Democratic Values and Practices at the OAS, PHD in International Comparative Education and Policy from University of Maryland College Park, “Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Inter-American Journal of Education for Democracy, 3(2), 224-254, <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/ried/article/viewFile/1016/1307>, Accessed: 7/30/13)OG

In the context of international¶ education cooperation and international¶ development in Latin America, where¶ there are great asymmetries in power and¶ resources, it seems that this critique could¶ have some validity. However, rather than¶ concluding that deliberation and participation¶ should be reduced, one could conclude (as¶ is argued in this paper) that they should¶ be enhanced and expanded. Those that¶ advocate for a “thicker” democratization in¶ the region would likely advocate for a more¶ substantive approach to deliberation in policy¶ which establishes certain parameters such¶ as “education is an intrinsic human right,”¶ and which would place an emphasis on¶ achieving quality education outcomes¶ for all as the goal. This does not mean that¶ they would not advocate for deliberation but¶ rather would set parameters for deliberation¶ in order to ensure that the outcomes do not¶ lead to “unjust” policy (e.g., a policy that¶ might promote more inequity in education).¶ Those that advocate for a “thinner” approach¶ to democratization would tend to advocate¶ for a procedural approach to deliberation in¶ education policy and would most likely place¶ emphasis on equal opportunity of access¶ to quality education.¶ Instability critique: Education in Latin¶ America suffers from too much instability and¶ is too politicized. Increasing participation and¶ deliberation would only further politicize the¶ situation and polarize those who advocate for¶ educational reform and those who block it.¶ The average term of a minister of education¶ is one-and-a-half years; each time a new¶ minister comes to office, new policies are¶ passed which, according to deliberative¶ democratic theory, would need to be reasoned¶ and debated with citizens. Deliberation in this¶ context would promote even more instability¶ and would lead to further politicization of¶ education reform.¶ Response: Political instability and¶ lack of continuity in policy reform are serious¶ limitations that to some degree are inherent¶ in democratic institutions and processes. The¶ reality is that if any education reform is to¶ succeed in the long term, it needs more than¶ the efforts of governments or international¶ organizations. It needs the sustained support¶ of stakeholders across sectors (public,¶ private, and civil society) and over time. It¶ has been argued that the main problem in¶ basic education in Latin America is the lack¶ of a broad social consensus, recognizing¶ that there is a problem of equity and quality¶ in the provision of education (Schiefelbein,¶ 1997). This lack of broad social consensus¶ is especially challenging where there is, as¶ noted in the critique, a lack of continuity¶ in education reform. Reform in education¶ takes time, sometimes decades. Ensuring¶ continuity in education reform policies is¶ therefore crucial, and this requires public¶ consensus. Deliberative forums convening¶ government, private sector, and civil society¶ groups can contribute to developing this public¶ consensus and to providing more continuity¶ in policy. Deliberative forums combined¶ with collaborative projects can help promote¶ learning, distribute institutional memory,¶ support capacity-building efforts, and bring¶ more resources to bear on the education¶ reform process. Creating a space for citizens¶ to deliberate on the role of education is¶ fundamental for promoting broad social¶ consensus around education reforms. In Latin¶ America, the most innovative and successful¶ reforms have all created multiple and¶ continuous opportunities for diverse groups¶ across the education sector and society to¶ provide input and to have opportunities for¶ meaningful collaborative action. International¶ organizations, leveraging their regional and¶ international position, can contribute by¶ promoting policy dialogue and collaborative¶ actions among ministries and also with key¶ stakeholders across sectors. The challenge¶ is to develop a better understanding of how¶ deliberation can be used to promote more¶ collaborative as opposed to more adversarial¶ and partisan forms of politics. This is perhaps¶ one area which deliberative theorists need to¶ explore more.¶ 5. Power critique: The final critique relates¶ the possibility that increasing deliberation¶ and participation can lead to increased¶ inequality. Fung and Wright (2003) note¶ that deliberation can turn into domination¶ in a context where “participants in these¶ processes usually face each other from¶ unequal positions of power.” Every reform¶ in education creates winners and losers, and¶ very few create “win-win” situations. Those¶ in power would have to submit to the rules of¶ deliberation and relinquish “control” over the¶ various dimensions of democratic decisionmaking.¶ This is naïve and not politically¶ feasible.¶ Response: This is a valid critique¶ worth considering. Structural inequalities¶ and asymmetries of power in governments¶ and international institutions in Latin America¶ have facilitated domination by elites in terms¶ of authority, power, and control in politics.¶ Asymmetries of power in international¶ cooperation in education are also clear,¶ especially when powerful financial (World¶ Bank, IDB, IMF) or political (OAS, UNESCO)¶ organizations engage with local stakeholders¶ and condition policy options with funding¶ or political support. What this paper has¶ argued is relevant again here: that instead of¶ rejecting further democratization in the face¶ of these challenges, including the challenge¶ of elite “domination,” what is needed is more¶ and better democracy, defined in terms of its¶ breadth, depth, range, and control. Finally,¶ dealing with elite domination in international¶ deliberative forums will require conscious and¶ skilled facilitation on the part of international¶ organizations, which themselves are often¶ elitist and hegemonic.¶ Final Thoughts: So What?¶ Perhaps the most critical question¶ that emerges in the argument for increased¶ democratization and deliberation is simply:¶ So what? Does increased democratization and¶ deliberation actually lead to better outcomes¶ in education? More empirical research on this¶ critical question is needed. However, experiments¶ in deliberative democracy in education reform¶ in Brazil through the UNESCO and Ministry of¶ Education Coordinated Action Plan and Porto¶ Alegre‘s Citizen School, and also to some degree¶ at the international level with the OAS pilot¶ experiment in developing a more democratic¶ model of international cooperation from 2001-¶ 2005, have shown that deliberative processes¶ can enhance learning on the part of those¶ participating. Fung and Wright (2003) refer to¶ these experiments in deliberation as “schools¶ of democracy” because participants exercise¶ their capacities of argument, planning, and¶ evaluation. Deliberation promotes joint reflection¶ and consideration of others’ views. Citizens¶ who participate in deliberative forums develop¶ competencies that are important not only for¶ active citizenship (listening, communication,¶ problem-solving, conflict resolution, selfregulation skills) but also crucial for managing¶ change and school reform. Many of the same¶ skills that are developed through citizen¶ deliberation and participation are also essential¶ for transforming school cultures, promoting¶ “learning organizations” (Senge, 2000), fostering¶ communities of reflective practitioners (Schon,¶ 1991) and developing communities of practice¶ (Wenger, 2001). There is evidence from some¶ research that democratic interactions can create¶ knowledge that is more rigorous, precise, and¶ relevant than that produced in authoritarian¶ environments (Jaramillo, 2005). Another¶ important aspect of enhancing deliberative¶ democracy and democratization is that it moves¶ from a focus on individuals and their own¶ preferences towards more collective forms of¶ learning and collaboration.¶ Up to now, international organizations¶ have endorsed a “thin” version of democratization¶ that is content with formal and centralized¶ mechanisms of “representation” and “policy¶ dialogue.” If a new, more deliberative and¶ democratic model of cooperation in education in¶ the region were to emerge, what would it look¶ like?¶ First of all, a more deliberative and¶ democratic model of international cooperation in¶ education would involve more direct and deeper¶ forms of participation from everyday citizens,¶ including teachers, school directors, families,¶ school communities, students, and mesolevel¶ actors such as civil society organizations.¶ This participation would move beyond simple¶ consultation to more authentic forms of joint¶ decision-making and deliberation. The model¶ would involve more accountability on the¶ part of international organizations in terms¶ of transparency, and would require injecting¶ ethical reasoning into policies and programming.¶ In addition, a new more democratic model of¶ international cooperation would expand the¶ range of policy options available to countries¶ through devolution of authority, power, and¶ control, combined with oversight and horizontal¶ accountability mechanisms. A more democratic¶ model of international cooperation would stress¶ valuing, systematizing, and disseminating¶ local knowledge and innovation. Finally,¶ democratization and deliberation in international¶ cooperation in education would lead to enhanced¶ learning and agency on the part of participating¶ countries, groups, and individuals, and thus¶ contribute to better outcomes in terms of quality¶ and equity in education at national and local¶ levels.

#### Methodology is sound – weighs the effects of losing integral parts to the military – justifies securitization in this instance

Adams 13 – Brigadier General for the U.S. Army (Retired) (John, “Remaking American Security: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities & National Security Risks Across the U.S. Defense Industrial Base”, Alliance for American Manufacturing, <http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/RemakingAmericanSecurityMay2013.pdf)//javi>

\*altered to discourage use of ableist language

Based on the specific defense purpose or purposes of each commodity, resource, or technology, each node’s risk of supply chain disruption is paired with an assessment of its threat to U.S. defense capabilities. The first question of the uniqueness of each node’s function is whether there is a suitable and available substitute, capable of being seamlessly introduced to overcome the shortage. If there is a readily available substitute, a shortage will have little or no real impact on defense readiness, suggesting only a marginal impact on U.S. capabilities. If a node lacks a suitable and cost-effective substitute, the impact of supply shortages must be evaluated according to the military capabilities no longer available. The impact of a non-substitutable product or commodity is determined by the scope or breadth of its usage in conjunction with the specific function it performs. An isolated impact is one in which the non-availability of a commodity, resource, or technology will have a minor impact on military operations. Examples include the substitution of an item with an adequate but not ideal alternative, or when non-availability affects a very narrow range of operations. This category is reserved primarily for capabilities that are force multipliers rather than enablers: without these products, operations could be conducted but with reduced efficiency due to the lack of a tactical advantage or at higher risk to the warfighter. When the non-availability of a product or commodity begins to take options off the table, it can be said to have a significant impact on national defense capabilities. For example, product non-availability restricts the use of mission-critical capabilities. In contrast to an isolated impact, which reduces the effectiveness of military platforms or operations, a significant impact would render a given capability unavailable. In these situations, substitutes may exist, but would be restrictive in cost or result in significant performance loss. An incapacitating impact is one in which a broad segment of U.S. military capabilities effectively would be ~~crippled~~ ineffective. This classification is reserved for commodities, components, or end-items needed to produce and sustain military capabilities for which the U.S. military has widespread use. Examples include products critical to the construction of important aircraft and naval vessels. In the event of a shortage or loss of supply, substitutes would be altogether unavailable and national security severely compromised.

#### The affirmative solves – a focus on technology and creating activism for said technology is necessary

**Karlsson 12** – (Nov. 2012, Rasmus, PhD, lecturer at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, South Korea, “Individual Guilt or Collective Progressive Action? Challenging the Strategic Potential of Environmental Citizenship Theory,” Environmental Values 21 (2012): 459–474, ingenta)

In terms of its performative content, environmental citizenship theory tends to overlook the fundamental difference between individual and collective action. While an individual can presumably stop doing a particular activity (like driving), it nearly always takes a collective effort to **provide a meaningful alternative** (like public transportation). This difference seems to be especially pronounced when considering more radical strategies for sustainability like the difference between the individual action of not eating meat (because of its environmental impact) and the collective action of launching a new ‘Manhattan-project’ to develop artificial meat (Edelman et al. 2005) as a humane, safe and environmentally beneficial alternative to traditional meat production (Datar and Betti 2010). Thinking further about this difference, one could argue that environmental citizenship theory provides a deceptively simple answer to a complex question when it holds that justice primarily requires us to reduce our own individual ecological footprint. This line of criticism becomes especially powerful if we have reason to believe that there are indeed accelerating technological paths to sustainability on a global level but that these paths are dependent on **radical political action** and a serious commitment to investment in the present (Mandle 2008). Under such circumstances, the environmental movement’s resistance to an innovation-driven future (Cohen 2006) becomes **ethically problematic** since it is precisely those activists that are needed to not only persuade mainstream politicians about the urgency of the ecological crisis but also to build public support for radical **investments in breakthrough technologies.** Recent paleoclimatological evidence suggests that in order to avoid reaching the tipping level for catastrophic climatic effects, the CO2 level in the atmosphere will need to be reduced from its current 385 ppm to at most 350 ppm, but likely even less than that (Hansen et al. 2008). However, with both India and China on a carbon-intensive path of rapid industrialisation with hundreds of new coal-fired plants currently under construction (Fairley 2007; Peng 2010), even optimistic calculations will see the atmospheric CO2 level approach 550 ppm in the coming decades (Sheehan et al. 2008). To achieve the reductions needed for climate stability will require a Herculean effort. With this in mind, it seems as if the **foremost duty of people in rich countries would be to develop the kind of new energy technology** that would make this industrial rise possible without causing irreversible environmental damage. Only if such technologies are substantially ‘faster, cleaner, and cheaper’ (Shellenberger et al. 2008) can we expect them to be implemented on a sufficient scale. By **individualising the site of political change, we risk losing the collective force** necessary to pursue such Herculean projects. Instead of offering a progressive vision of universal affluence that can bring together diverse (national) interests, the future becomes **marked by scarcity** and dependent on individual moral betterment. If we are right to assume that many people will be unable to meet the stringent demands of its moral code, then we can expect environmental citizenship theory to be more likely to feed **defeatism and resignation than meaningful action** (Butler 2010: 183). While some may hope for the market economy to autonomously provide the kind of technologies needed for global sustainability (Beckerman 1995), others, and even once staunch ‘deniers’ like Bjørn Lomborg, are now calling for political intervention and radical investments to meet the challenges of environmental change (Lomborg 2010).

#### The alt fails – taking an ethical stance against patriarchal exploitation does nothing to alter material realities

Bina Agarwal 98, Professor of Economics, Institute of Economic Growth, University of Delhi, “Environmental management, equity and ecofeminism: Debating India's experience”, Journal of Peasant Studies, 25:4, 55-95

How does the ecofeminist formulation hold up in the light of women's experiences in the emergent community institutions? To begin with, these experiences call to question the claim that the women's movement and the environment movement both stand for egalitarian, non-hierarchical systems. As this experience shows, an agenda for 'greening' need not include one for transforming gender relations; indeed efforts at greening by male-biased institutions might sharpen gender inequalities and (as noted) even bring threats of violence upon women. Second, in relation to the ecofeminist claim that women have a special stake in environmental protection and regeneration, it is clear that women alone do not have such a stake. Both women and men whose livelihoods are threatened by the degradation of forests and commons are found to be interested in conservation and regeneration, but from different (and at times conflicting) concerns, stemming from differences in their respective responsibilities and the nature of their dependence on these resources. Men's interests can be traced mainly to the threat to their livelihood systems, their dependence on the local forests for supplementary income, and/or their need for small timber for house repairs and agricultural tools, which are their responsibility. Women's interests are linked more to the availability of fuel, fodder, and non-timber products, for which they are more directly responsible, and the depletion of which has meant everlengthening journeys. In other words, there is clearly a link between the gender division of labour and the gendered nature of the stakes. The women I interviewed from some Gujarat villages were unambiguous about this: Q: On what issues do men and women differ in forest protection committee meetings? A: Men can afford to wait for a while because their main concern is timber. But women need fuelwood daily. Third, women's concerns, even if pressing, do not necessarily translate into effective environmental action by the community or by women themselves. Case studies of several autonomous forest-management initiatives in Orissa (east India) highlight both the gendered motivation for forest protection and the unequal distribution of power which has enabled men's interests to supersede women's: In most of the cases protection efforts started only when the forest had degraded and communities faced shortage of small timber for construction of houses and agricultural implements. Although there was a scarcity of fuelwood, it hardly served as an initiating factor [ISO/Swedforest, 1993: 46]. Although firewood is a household necessity and not just a women-specific one, since it is women's unpaid labour that goes into providing it, any additional cost in terms of women's time and energy remains invisible or of insufficient importance to generate a community response. Women's own responses too are far from automatic. The experience of an NGO in Rajasthan, working on the regeneration of village commons, as described by Sarin and Sharma [1993: 122], illustrates this well: [TJhere is nothing 'automatic' in the extent of women's active participation in the development of village common lands, no matter how acute their hardship of searching for fuel and fodder. Even in the villages where women took the initiative and played a leadership role, this was preceded by enabling them to interact with other women's groups ... Continuous interaction with [the NGO's] women staff has been another crucial input for facilitating women's genuine participation. It is notable that even in the Chipko movement, the specific incident which served as catalyst was the conflict between a sports goods manufacturer who was granted government permission to cut a tract of oak forest and the village co-operative which was refused permission to cut even a few trees for agricultural implements. The growing firewood and fodder shortage that was causing women enormous hardship, did not elicit the same kind of response from the community or from the women.37 These experiences are in keeping with the alternative theoretical perspective to ecofeminism which I had spelt out elsewhere under the formulation, feminist environmentalism [Agarwal, 1992]. As I had argued then, and as the above discussion also indicates, people's relationship with nature, their interest in protecting it, and their ability to do so effectively, are significantly shaped by their material reality, their everyday dependence on nature for survival, and the social, economic and political tools at their command for furthering their concerns. Ideological constructions of gender, of nature, and of the relationship between the two, would impinge on how people respond to the environmental crisis, but cannot be seen as the central determinants of their response, as emphasised in ecofeminist discourse.38

### 2ac – cir

#### US-India relations resilient- CIR not enough to spillover

Desai 12 Fellow, Truman National Security Project (Ronak. “US-India Relations under the 2nd obama administration.” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ronak-d-desai/usindia-relations-under-t\_b\_2115396.html)

 What's ahead for US-India relations now that President Obama has won reelection? With ties between Washington and New Delhi continuing to flourish over the past four years, the US-India bilateral partnership will likely be characterized by continuity and growth during a second Obama term. The fundamental pillars underlying President Obama's foreign policy towards India--strengthening security and military cooperation, boosting trade, and encouraging New Delhi's collaboration on various regional and global issues--will remain largely intact.¶The US-India strategic partnership has thrived during Obama's first administration. Initial concerns from some Indian officials that the newly elected president would "re-hyphenate" relations with New Delhi, prioritize ties with China, insert the US in the Kashmir dispute, and view India exclusively through an Af/Pak lens proved unfounded. On the contrary, President Obama quickly established himself a reliable champion of the bilateral relationship which witnessed Washington and New Delhi expand their engagement in a number of substantive areas.¶ On the security front, cooperation reached unprecedented levels under Obama's first term. The United States now conducts more military exercises with India than with any other country in the world, while counter-terrorism and intelligence collaboration between the two has increased dramatically following the infamous November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. President Obama has also taken significant steps to relax export-controls to India to allow New Delhi greater access to advanced US technology. Additionally, since 2008, the Obama Administration has approved the sale of more than $8 billion in military equipment from US defense suppliers to New Delhi. Administration officials have described India as the "linchpin" of its strategic rebalancing towards Asia and are relying on New Delhi to play a greater role stabilizing Afghanistan once the US begins its military withdrawal there.¶ Economically, trade with India is on track to cross the $100 billion mark for the first time, US investment in the country has skyrocketed compared to just a decade ago, and the two sides have worked to conclude a US-India Bilateral Investment Treaty that would further bolster their economic relationship.¶These positive trends will likely continue during a second Obama administration. Although the basic contours of US-India ties remain unchanged, reflecting the potent durability of the bilateral relationship, this is not to say that the two countries are in perfect harmony with one another on every issue.¶ As President Obama embarks on a second term, Washington will want New Delhi to continue reducing its dependence on Iranian oil, implement significant economic reforms that eliminate barriers to foreign investment, and modify liability legislation enacted by the Indian parliament that has precluded the United States and India from realizing the full benefits of the landmark US-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement. President George W. Bush signed the historic accord with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2005 and President Obama moved to quickly implement the deal by concluding a reprocessing agreement with India shortly after taking office.¶ New Delhi, for its part, will want Washington to resolve the Iran question exclusively through non-military means, resist entering into any formal security pact with the United States that would appear to compromise its inviolable strategic autonomy, and press Washington to make it easier for Indian tech workers to obtain visas to come to the United States.¶ Yet none of these issues--or any other differences that may remain between the two sides--is capable of arresting the overall upward trajectory of US-India relations. Areas of convergence far exceed areas of disagreement, indicating that earlier misgivings by some observers that bilateral ties had been oversold have been misguided.¶ President Obama has established himself as an able and effective custodian of the US-India strategic partnership. Although the bipartisan consensus that has emerged in Washington around the importance of deepening ties with India would suggest that US engagement with New Delhi would have continued regardless of whether he had won reelection, President Obama is uniquely well positioned to strengthen the US-India relationship during his second-term. His enduring popularity within India, close relationship with Manmohan Singh, and widespread support amongst the Indian-American community are just some of the distinctive factors that will help ensure ties with New Delhi remain robust and continue to grow over the next four years. If the past is any indicator of what's on the horizon, the future looks bright for US-India relations.

#### Won’t pass

**Ball 11-22** (“What Happened to Immigration Reform?”, <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/11/what-happened-to-immigration-reform/281705/>)

Just a few hours later, Boehner, now wearing a suit, [addressed reporters](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/us/politics/boehner-rules-out-push-on-immigration.html) in the Capitol. On immigration, his tone was rather less encouraging. “The idea that we’re going to take up a 1,300-page bill that no one had ever read, which is what the Senate did, is not going to happen in the House,” he said. “And frankly, I’ll make clear we have no intention of ever going to conference on the Senate bill.” “We can’t force them to get to yes, but we can make them pay a price for getting to no. If this Congress isn’t going to pass immigration reform, let’s elect a Congress that will.” For the broad, well-organized coalition of immigration-reform activists, that statement was a stunning blow. If Boehner keeps that pledge, he will have rendered moot the months of wheeling and dealing it took to get a massive, bipartisan bill through the Senate in June, forcing the upper chamber to start from scratch even if the House manages to get its act together and pass its own bill or group of bills—a prospect that **appears increasingly unlikely.** That Boehner could make encouraging noises when confronted by activists, then pour cold water on immigration's legislative prospects, neatly summarized the plight of the reformers, many of whom are coming to grips with the possibility that their efforts, despite politicians' apparent receptiveness, have come to naught. The reformers' official line remains one of optimism that the House will act, perhaps even before the end of 2013. But many activists have already begun to take a more aggressive tack, arguing that lobbying is over—it’s time for revenge.

**CIR creates a backlog – impossible to solve**

David **North 10**, former Assistant to the U.S. Secretary of Labor and Center for Immigration Studies Fellow, April 7, 2010, “Would Legalization Backlogs Delay Other USCIS Applications? Probably,” Center for Immigration Studies, http://cis.org/north/legalization-backlogs

An interesting question has arisen as a result of a congressional hearing: would a massive legalization program, as many advocates want, slow the processing of applications filed routinely by citizens and legal aliens wanting immigration benefits? The numbers are daunting. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) currently faces six million applications a year according to one news story. The estimates of the number of illegal aliens in the nation runs to 11 or 12 million. Could USCIS handle both these multi-million caseloads with its current paper-based systems? There are many complaints that the backlogs are currently too long on the normal collection of six million cases a year. The government's expert on such things, Frank W. Deffer, Assistant Inspector General for Information Technology in the Department of Homeland Security, told a congressional committee on March 23: "adding 12 million more people to the system would be the **mother of all backlogs**. Clearly to us the systems **could not handle it** now."\

#### PC was squandered on healthcare—Obama’s done

Fournier 11-20-13

Ron Fournier , National Journal “Why Obamacare May Be Obama's Katrina, Iraq,” [http://www.nationaljournal.com/white-house/why-obamacare-may-be-obama-s-katrina-iraq-20131120][MG]

In a well-argued analysis last week, Michael Shear of The New York Times wrote: "The disastrous rollout of his health care law not only threatens the rest of his agenda but also raises questions about his competence in the same way that the Bush administration's botched response to Hurricane Katrina undermined any semblance of Republican efficiency." Many others have made the same point (including me here and here). "There's a qualitative difference between people dying in New Orleans and people not able to get health care," said former Bush strategist and pollster Matthew Dowd on ABC's This Week. "But from a political standpoint, it's eerily similar to President Bush in the fall of 2005." Dowd makes two important points. First, there is obviously no ("qualitative") comparison between the crises. Hurricane Katrina killed at least 1,833 people and damaged more than $80 billion worth of property. It was an act of God, not a result of government incompetence toward the noble goal of expanding health insurance. The Iraq War claimed as many as 500,000 lives and cost hundreds of billions of dollars. It was fought under false pretenses: the Bush's administration's claims that Saddam Hussein harbored weapons of mass destruction. Second, there are inescapable similarities in the ways that Bush and Obama handled their crises, and those actions changed the public's view of their presidencies. Specifically: Their mismanagement raised questions about competence, compounded by deceptive and tone-deaf responses that undermined their credibility. The crises came after a series of unrelated events that had already caused doubt among voters about the presidents. To borrow a cliché, Katrina was the last straw. Their personal and job-approval ratings tanked. Their dwindling political capital was squandered by defensive, insular advisers who refused to recognize the dangers. They both ran reelection campaigns without a positive forward-looking message and made the races primarily about their opponent. That left them little political capital going into their second term. Bush never recovered. Obama might still have time to learn history's hard lessons. In a book I cowrote with Dowd and Democratic consultant Doug Sosnik, we argued: "This we learned from President Bush in 2005: When a politician loses his credibility, voters start to question his other values and eventually start looking at his policies differently. In politics, this can be doom." Sound familiar? So too will these opening paragraphs from stories I wrote for the Associated Press during the Bush presidency: Sept. 2, 2005: WASHINGTON (AP) -- The Iraqi insurgency is in its last throes. The economy is booming. Anybody who leaks a CIA agent's identity will be fired. Add another piece of White House rhetoric that doesn't match the public's view of reality: Help is on the way, Gulf Coast. Sept. 12, 2005: WASHINGTON (AP) -- The fatally slow response to Hurricane Katrina unleashed a wave of anger that could transform people's expectations of government, the qualities they seek in political leaders and their views of America's class and racial divides. It's a huge opportunity that neither party seems poised to exploit. Nov. 9, 2005: WASHINGTON (AP) -- Iraq, Katrina, CIA leak, Harriet Miers. Things couldn't possibly get any worse for President Bush. Wait, they just did. March 3, 2006: WASHINGTON (AP) -- President Bush vowed, "We are fully prepared." Mike Brown barked orders. Weather experts warned of a killer storm. The behind-the-scenes drama, captured on videotape as Hurricane Katrina roared ashore, confirmed Americans' suspicions of government leaders: They can run a good meeting, but little else. Or this one from January 2007 after I had left AP: "President Bush has lost the greatest commodity a president can possess: The public's trust. Scattered with Katrina's winds and buried in the bloody battlefields of Iraq, his credibility is likely gone forever, which means there will be no political comeback for Bush. His die is cast." The Bush White House angrily objected to these and other stories that pounced on his failures and consequences. Most conservative writers and some media critics objected to the stories, which were part of the AP's attempt to move away from false-equivalence analyses to edgy pieces of "accountability journalism." The Obama White House is angry and, like the Bush team in 2005, mocking and punishing reporters who dare to question their tactics or their boss. Obama has his own hosanna chorus in the media to ridicule any comparisons—just as Bush did. Once again, a man twice elected to change the culture of Washington is a captive of it. Wait ... you could say the same of Bush.

#### Political capital doesn’t exist and isn’t key to their DA- more likely winners win

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On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”¶ ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ¶ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.) And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country. Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it. The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea,” as the party suffers in the polls.¶ THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER¶ Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said. Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington. Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories. In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction. Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. If he can get some early wins—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.” Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the falsity of the political-capital concept. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a “post-partisan” president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all people. So Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-term restructuring plan that would “lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.” The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal. Had he understood better that the country was digging in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly was—a giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measure—he might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. But by laying on ambitious programs, and following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet socialist. After that, Obama’s public posturing provoked automatic opposition from the GOP, no matter what he said. If the president put his personal imprimatur on any plan—from deficit reduction, to health care, to immigration reform—Republicans were virtually guaranteed to come out against it. But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOP’s newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different. He seemed to understand that the Republicans needed to reclaim immigration reform as their own issue, and he was willing to let them have some credit. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans don’t have to listen to what I say anymore. And don’t worry about who’s got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where I’m saying this: in a state you were supposed to have won but lost because of the rising Hispanic vote. Obama was cleverly pointing the GOP toward conclusions that he knows it is already reaching on its own: If you, the Republicans, want to have any kind of a future in a vastly changed electoral map, you have no choice but to move. It’s your choice.

#### Political capital theory isn’t true – gun control proves and their empirics are the exception rather than the rule

1. arm twisting fails
2. horse-trading isn’t real
3. Obama perceives it as such
4. He doesn’t try to use it

Kumar 5/24/13 (Anita, White House Correspondent for McClatchy Washington Bureau, Formerly worked for the Washington Post, "After Failing on Gun Legislation Obama Learning Limits of His Power")

The cheering crowds that helped vault him into a second term in the White House mean little, if anything, back in Washington. A close look at his most recent defeat – a series of proposals intended to curb gun violence – shows that election popularity does not automatically translate into legislative success. Nor do campaign-like efforts to win a vote in Congress. Obama put more effort into the proposals than he has most issues, but he still suffered one of his biggest legislative defeats.¶ The defeat illustrates a key truth – for all their power, presidents rarely succeed in manipulating votes on Capitol Hill. If anything, their abilities to twist arms have grown even more limited in recent years. Strained budgets leave them no extra money or pet projects to offer lawmakers in return for votes. And Obama’s detached personality and short history in Washington make him even less likely to wheel and deal with lawmakers.¶ “There’s not much presidents can do to change votes. It’s mostly a myth,” said George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “It’s never been that way and it’s less so now.”¶ His own election victory still fresh in his mind, Obama thought he had a clear path to bend Congress to his will after the horror of a mass shooting at an elementary school in Newtown, Conn., in December. His goal: the first significant new controls on guns in a generation.¶ He tapped Vice President Joe Biden to lead a task force to examine gun laws. Biden spent a month speaking to more than 200 organizations on all sides of the issue, from crime victims to religious leaders, law enforcement organizations to gun manufacturers.¶ Obama unveiled his sweeping package of executive actions and proposed legislation in January. He immediately began trying to sell it.¶ By the standards of a campaign, he did everything right.¶ Obama and Biden gave more than 30 speeches, interviews and online chats, oftentimes with families of gun victims at their side.¶ First lady Michelle Obama made a rare foray into the debate by delivering an emotional speech in her hometown of Chicago.¶ Obama’s political organization, Organizing for Action, held dozens of events, including candlelight vigils, rallies and meetings across the nation pushing the legislation.¶ Obama flew Newtown families to Washington to lobby senators and turned over his radio address for the first time to the parents of a slain child.¶ He did not win support for a proposal to renew a ban on assault weapons or to limit ammunition in clips. But support for greater background checks for gun purchases topped 90 percent in the polls. If it were an election with voters choosing whether to pass background checks, Obama would have won a landslide.¶ But it was not an either-or choice. Congress could choose to do nothing.¶ In March and April, Obama and Biden spoke to nearly 30 senators in 45 meetings or phone calls, according to the White House. The president stressed gun control proposals at a pair of dinners with Republican senators. In the final days before the vote, Obama’s chief of staff, Denis McDonough, visited an undecided Democratic senator, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, but failed to convince her to vote for the background check legislation.¶ New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, founder of Mayors Against Illegal Guns and one of the nation’s most prominent gun control advocates, said he and Biden divvied up a list of senators to call in the hopes of convincing them that backing the legislation would not hurt them in their next election.¶ “I’m thoroughly convinced that he and the president and this whole administration are committed as they could possibly be to help end the scourge of gun violence,” Bloomberg said.¶ It wasn’t enough.¶ Last month, the Democratic-controlled Senate defeated all significant gun proposals sought by Obama after some lawmakers bristled at being pushed by Obama.¶ Obama, along with gun control advocates, insist they’ll try again, at least for the proposal to expand background checks to private and Internet sales. But the initial defeat underscored the limits of presidential power and suggested Obama faces major challenges for the duration of his presidency.¶ “We actually thought he and the vice president handled this perfectly. They handled this quite deftly,” said Matt Bennett, co-founder of Third Way, a think tank, who served in the Clinton White House. “The gun issues are about as hard as it gets.”¶ “The president worked really hard on this issue,” said Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y. “He put political capital on the line. He made it one of his centerpieces of his State of the Union address and he went all around the country to try and rally support.”¶ So what happened?¶ For one, Obama and his allies often staged events in states that had been sites of mass shootings such as Illinois, Connecticut or Virginia, instead of states where senators were wavering on the issue.¶ For another, his high-profile push may have cost as many votes as it won, given how polarizing modern presidents have become.¶ Sen. John McCain of Arizona, one of four Republicans who voted for expanded background checks, said a better model of leadership would be Obama’s role on the proposed rewrite of the nation’s immigration laws. On that, Obama has expressed support but stayed out of the way to let members of Congress negotiate among themselves. “I think his role has been very appropriate, exactly appropriate,” he said of Obama’s approach on immigration.¶ Finally, Obama might have relied more on personal talks with senators and less on the bully pulpit, presidential scholars said.¶ “As soon as Obama jumps in, it makes it hard for Republicans to get behind it,” said Robert Spitzer, a political scientist at State University of New York at Cortland who has written extensively on gun control. “Obama could have done more on the inside game.”¶ But Dan Gross, president of the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, said the importance of public speeches is misunderstood. They aren’t, he said, designed to convince more Americans to favor proposals backed by Obama, but rather to convince them to lobby Congress.¶ If the use of presidential rhetoric is misunderstood, the power of the presidency itself is often overstated.¶ Even Lyndon B. Johnson, whose domineering personality and negotiating skills helped fuel his reputation for helping push through major legislation, benefitted from large Democratic majorities in Congress and broad popular support in the wake of John F. Kennedy’s assassination.¶ There have been instances where presidents have helped get legislation passed, though they are the exception, not the rule.¶ Bill Clinton offered to support Republicans who voted for the North American Free Trade Agreement. George W. Bush pushed through prescription drug coverage in a rare middle-of-the-night vote in the House of Representatives by making last-minute phone calls to lawmakers.¶ But Obama’s effort to lobby or socialize with lawmakers has been sporadic, and some of his recent dinners came after the gun votes were all but locked up.¶ Also, he has little to offer the lawmakers.¶ While Washington was once a place where lawmakers openly traded votes with goodies from the White House – a president’s attendance at an event or a project in their home state – it’s not like that anymore.¶ The practice of offering so-called earmarks – pet projects for lawmakers tucked into appropriations bills – fell out of favor following years of criticism by watchdog groups, constituents and even some lawmakers themselves. And even if it hadn’t, the money for many of those projects has dried up as the economy took a downturn and the government slashed budgets.¶ “There’s not a lot he can give,” said John Burke, a political science professor at the University of Vermont who studies the presidency.¶ Still, some say, Obama should have offered senators appointments to boards or behind-the-scenes assistance with fundraising – items that even senators from conservative states who want to keep their distance from the president might want.¶ But in a recent wide-ranging news conference, Obama pushed back on the notion that he could get Congress to – as he called it – “behave.”¶ “I can urge them to,” he said. “I can put pressure on them. I can, you know, rally the American people. . . . But ultimately they themselves are going to have to say, we want to do the right thing.”

## 1ar

### 1ar – manufacturing

#### America needs a maritime strategy with Carriers to operationalize an offshore balancing strategy and avoid the impacts associated with a major ground-forces redeployments

**Schmitt 07**

PhD Schmitt, resident scholar and director of strategic studies at AEI, earned PhD at the University of Chicago, former professor at Johns Hopkins University, former Fellow at the Brookings Institution, 6-22-07 (Gary J., “To Be, or Not to Be . . . an Empire,” American Enterprise Institute, National Security Outlook, Short Publications)

Layne's argument is that there is, in fact, a realist alternative to the endless pursuit of primacy: a strategy of "offshore balancing" that amounts to a quasi-isolationist policy of selective diplomatic and military engagement. Indeed, the "offensive" realist argument for primacy rests, Layne suggests, on paying too much attention to the lessons supposedly learned from the security problems and strategies for dealing with them that arose from centuries of competition among the powers of continental Europe. Given America's geography and weak neighbors, the security model far more relevant to our situation is the one adopted by maritime Britain: a small army, a big fleet, and a willingness to find new allies quickly and dump old ones when necessary. Today's primacy advocates couple it with a policy of democracy promotion, believing that the world is safer when there are more democracies, not fewer--a thesis Layne calls the most "over-hyped and under-supported 'theory' ever to be concocted by American academics."[3] According to Layne, the advantage of his alternative grand strategy is that it avoids stimulating great power rivalries, eliminates the economically disastrous consequences of "imperial overstretch," and precludes the necessity of a "national security state" in which our rights and civic culture are put at risk. Finally, it avoids the messes of democracy promotion and nation-building (e.g., Somalia and Iraq). Problems and Prospects International security specialists will quibble that Thayer's and Layne's two grand strategies are not the sum total of strategies available to the "American empire." Nor will they be satisfied with the authors' loose use of the term "empire." That Thayer and Layne both admit the United States is not an empire in the traditional sense seems to suggest that the country is not, in fact, an empire. Hegemony and empire are not one and the same, although their attributes can at times overlap. That said, the book provides plenty of fodder for debate and thought. Its biggest problem, however, lies in Layne's dyspeptic analysis of current policy opponents. Rather than taking the opposing argument as seriously as Thayer takes his, Layne resorts to unsubstantiated claims about "neocons," White House lies, and cabals (the "Blue Team") trying to foment a "preventive" war with China.[4] Similarly, his dismissal of the democratic peace theory is equally over-the-top. Even if one thinks that the theory is at times oversold, to claim that it has absolutely no merit leaves readers with the sense that there is as much anger as argument in Layne's case. An additional problem, perhaps tied to the way the book is structured, is that Layne spends the majority of his time criticizing the argument for primacy without giving the reader much of a handle on the particulars of his own preferred strategy. As a result, we do not know whether his model of "offshore balancing" is more British in style--that is, fairly active in playing the decisive power broker among the other competing states--or more passive in content, such as the United States in the 1920s and 1930s. If the former, a key problem with the strategy is that it requires a far more calculating style of statecraft than the United States has ever had. And even if we had Henry Kissinger upon Henry Kissinger to carry it out, would the American people really let their government play this particular game of international politics, shifting partners based on power relations rather than on the character of the states themselves? The disappearance of the United States as a security guarantor is likely to lead to more competition among states and to the creation of a more chaotic and fluid international environment. Britain had a hard enough time playing this role in its day, finding itself in numerous conflicts regardless. If the latter, the passive offshore balancing approach leads to the question of whether such a strategy results in putting off a security challenge until it may be far more difficult to deal with. Layne's bet, at least in the case of Iran and China today, is that if the United States would only get out of the way, other powers would naturally begin to meet the challenge. It is possible, but doing so might create even more destabilizing competition among other regional powers or lead those same powers to acquiesce to China or Iran's new hegemony, fueling their ambitions rather than lessening them. The history of international relations suggests that most great crises result from neglecting to address more minor ones early on. As Thayer argues, it is probably less costly to nip these threats in the bud to than wait for them to become full-blown security crises. And speaking of money, Layne's argument about looming imperial overstretch is itself a stretch. Even with all the problems in Iraq, a war in Afghanistan, and an emerging hedging strategy vis-à-vis China, the defense burden is still barely over 4 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product. The United States has had far higher defense burdens in the past while still retaining its status as the world's economic juggernaut. There may be plenty of reasons to worry about the U.S. economy, but "guns over butter" is not one of them. Moreover, while pulling back from a forward-leaning defense strategy would undoubtedly save money, offshore balancing would still require the United States to have a major military establishment in reserve if it wanted to be capable of being a decisive player in a game of great power balancing. Is the $100 billion or so saved--or, rather, spent by Congress on "bridges to nowhere"--really worth the loss in global influence that comes from adopting Layne's strategy?

### 1ar – gender

#### No Risk of Solvency – Academia Proves That Others Will Be Highly Resistant or Ignore the Demand for Change Unless It is Framed in the Context of War

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In North American political science and history, male war scholars’ interest in the puzzle of gendered war roles has been minimal. The topic has not attracted the funding or publications among male scholars as, for example, the similarly intriguing regularity known as the “democratic peace” (democracies rarely fight each other). Feminist political scientists and historians – nearly all women – pay attention to gender in war, but others relegate gender to the dark margins beyond their (various) theoretical frameworks for studying war. Feminist literatures about war and peace of the last 15 years have made little impact as yet on the discussions and empirical research taking place in the predominantly male mainstream of political science or military history. This omission is measurable by counting the number of headings and subheadings in a book’s index on topics relating to gender. The typical political science and history books about war – the “big” books about war’s origins and history – score zero.56

Doyle’s recent and comprehensive survey of scholarship on war and peace contains six gender–related index entries but devotes only about one–tenth of 1 percent of its space to gender. All the gender references concern women; men still do not have gender. Similarly, when gender occasionally shows up in other mainstream war studies, it does so gratuitously, as a passing note – something that could be interesting, but plays no substantive role in any of the main competing theories about war. By contrast, anthropology – in North America and since decades ago – gives serious attention to gender–related subjects in studying war. Margaret Mead’s conclusion in the first major anthropological symposium on war (1967) called for paying “particular attention…to the need of young males to validate their strength and courage, and to…the conspicuous unwillingness of most human societies to arm women.” Anthropological thinking that connects war and gender is not limited to one ideological perspective, nor just to female scholars. Also, anthropology engages gender even though women are poorly represented among anthropologists studying war. Similarly, independent scholars outside of anthropology, political science, or history – such as Gwynne Dyer (a man) and Barbara Ehrenreich – have engaged both the mainstream war studies literatures and feminist theories of gender in war. And in 1929, sociologist Maurice Davie devoted two whole chapters of his book on war to gender.58 The gender blinders in mainstream war studies carry over to the foreign policy establishment. For example, a recent mainstream foreign policy book about “contending paradigms in international relations” – which sounds promising for the inclusion of gender – lacks any reference to gender in its 19 chapters, all written by men. The influential monthly Foreign Affairs did not carry a single article about gender issues in 1990–96. In 1998, an article on gender appeared, written by a man and arguing that biological gender differences make women more peaceful, so the “feminization of world politics” over the last century (since the suffrage movement) has created today’s “democratic zone of peace.” Foreign Affairs treated the article as a novelty, retitling it “What if Women Ran the World?” on the cover and illustrating it with bizarre century–old cartoons and photos of women in poses dominating men (e.g., with boxing gloves).59 The gender blinders also extend to male postmodern international relations scholars. Each of several recent edited volumes in postmodern international relations contains a requisite chapter about gender, written by a woman, and typically no mention of gender at all in the chapters written by men. In fact, the author’s gender is a highly significant predictor of whether the chapter includes or omits gender (see Table 1.2). Thus, even in postmodern international relations, gender is ghettoized.60

#### The Link is Reverse Causal – The Potential for War is Inescapable and is the Root Construction of Gender Norms

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In understanding gendered war roles, the potential for war matters more than the outbreak of particular wars. As Hobbes put it, war “consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.” Kant similarly distinguished between peace as it had been known in modern Europe through the eighteenth century – merely a lull or cease–fire – and what he called “permanent peace.” From 1815 to 1914, great–power wars largely disappeared, and some people thought warfare itself was withering away. But when conditions changed, the latent potential for warfare in the great–power system emerged again, with a vengeance, in the twentieth century. Thus, like a patient with cancer in remission, a society that is only temporarily peaceful still lives under the shadow of war.3 Plan of the book Chapter 1 describes a puzzle: despite the diversity of gender and of war separately, gender roles in war are very consistent across all known human societies. Furthermore, virtually all human cultures to date have faced the possibility, and frequently the actual experience, of war (although I do not think this generalization will last far into the future). In every known case, past and present, cultures have met this challenge in a gender–based way, by assembling groups of fighters who were primarily, and usually exclusively, male. The empirical evidence for these generalizations, reviewed in the chapter, shows the scope and depth of the puzzle. The chapter then reviews three strands of feminist theory that offer a variety of possible answers to the puzzle. From these approaches, I extract 20 hypotheses amenable to assessment based on empirical evidence (see Table 1.1). The results fill Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. All three feminist approaches turn out to contribute in different ways to understanding the puzzle of gendered war roles. Chapter 2 considers the numerous historical cases in which women for various reasons participated in military operations including combat. This historical record shows that women are capable of performing successfully in war. Thus, the near–total exclusion of women from combat roles does not seem to be explained by women’s inherent lack of ability. This evidence deepens the puzzle of gendered war roles. Many societies have lived by war or perished by war, but very few have mobilized women to fight. Why? Chapter 3 tests five explanations for the gendering of war based on gender differences in individual biology: (1) men’s genes program them for violence; (2) testosterone makes men more aggressive than women; (3) men are bigger and stronger than women; (4) men’s brains are adapted for long–distance mobility and for aggression; and (5) women are biologically adapted for caregiving roles that preclude participation in war. Each of these hypotheses except genetics finds some support from empirical evidence, but only in terms of average differences between genders, not the categorical divisions that mark gendered war roles. Chapter 4 explores dynamics within and between groups, drawing on animal behavior and human psychology. Several potential explanations come from this perspective: (1) “male bonding” is important to the conduct of war; (2) men operate better than women in hierarchies, including armies; (3) men see intergroup relations, as between the two sides in a war, differently from women; and (4) childhood gender segregation leads to later segregation in combat forces. The strongest empirical evidence emerges for childhood segregation, but that segregation does not explain the nearly total exclusion of women as combatants. Chapter 5 discusses how constructions of masculinity motivate soldiers to fight, across a variety of cultures and belief systems. Norms of masculinity contribute to men’s exclusive status as warriors, and preparation for war is frequently a central component of masculinity. I explore several aspects: (1) war becomes a “test of manhood,” helping overcome men’s natural aversion to participating in combat, and cultures mold hardened men suitable for this test by toughening up young boys; (2) masculine war roles depend on feminine roles in the war system, including mothers, wives, and sweethearts; and (3) women actively oppose wars. The last two of these contradict each other, but I argue that even women peace activists can reinforce masculine war roles (by feminizing peace and thus masculinizing war), creating a dilemma for the women’s peace movement. Overall, masculinity does contribute to motivating soldiers’ participation in war, and might do so less effectively with women present in the ranks. Chapter 6 asks whether, beyond their identities as tough men who can endure hardship, soldiers are also motivated by less heroic qualities. Misogyny and domination of women, according to some feminists, underlie male soldiers’ participation in war (thus explaining women’s rare participation as combatants). The chapter explores several diverse possibilities: (1) men’s sexual energies play a role in aggression; (2) women symbolize for male soldiers a dominated group and thus cannot be included in the armed ranks of dominators; and (3) women’s labor is exploited more in wartime than in peace, so patriarchal societies keep women in civilian positions. Chapter 6 explores both the men’s roles in these dynamics, and the corresponding women’s roles as prostitutes, victims, war support workers, and replacement labor for men at war. Chapter 7 concludes that the gendering of war appears to result from a combination of factors, with two main causes finding robust empirical support: (1) small, innate biological gender differences in average size, strength, and roughness; and (2) cultural molding of tough, brave men, who feminize enemies in dominating them. The gendering of war thus results from the combination of culturally constructed gender roles with real but modest biological differences. Neither alone would solve the puzzle. Causality runs both ways between war and gender. Gender roles adapt individuals for war roles, and war roles provide the context within which individuals are socialized into gender roles. For the war system to change fundamentally, or for war to end, might require profound changes in gender relations. But the transformation of gender roles may depend on deep changes in the war system. Multiple pathways of causality and feedback loops are common in biology, acting as stabilizing mechanisms in a dynamic system, and come to the fore at several points in this book. Although I focus mainly on gender’s effects on war, the reverse causality proves surprisingly strong. The socialization of children into gender roles helps reproduce the war system. War shadows every gendered relationship, and affects families, couples, and individuals in surprising ways. The diversity of war and of gender The cross–cultural consistency of gendered war roles, which this chapter will explore, is set against a backdrop of great diversity of cultural forms of both war and gender roles considered separately. Apart from war and a few biological necessities (gestation and lactation), gender roles show great diversity across cultures and through history. Human beings have created many forms of marriage, sexuality, and division of labor in household work and child care. Marriage patterns differ widely across cultures. Some societies practice monogamy and some polygamy (and some preach monogamy but practice nonmonogamy). Of the polygamous cultures, most are predominantly polygynous (one man, several wives) but some are predominantly polyandrous (one woman, several husbands). Regarding ownership of property and lines of descent, a majority of societies are patrilocal; women move to their husbands’ households. A substantial number are matrilocal, however, with husbands moving to their wives’ households. Most societies are patrilineal – tracing descent (and passing property) on the father’s side – but more than a few are matrilineal. Norms regarding sexuality also vary greatly across cultures. Some societies are puritanical, others open about sex. Some work hard to enforce fidelity – for example, by condoning killings of adulterers – whereas others accept multiple sexual relationships as normal. Attitudes towards homosexuality also differ across time and place, from relative acceptance to intolerance. Today, some countries officially prohibit discrimination against gay men and lesbians, while other countries officially punish homosexuality with death. Gender roles also vary across cultures when it comes to household and child care responsibilities. Different societies divide economic work differently by gender (except hunting). Political leadership, while never dominated by women and often dominated by men, shows a range of possibilities in different cultures, from near–exclusion to near–equality for women. Even child care (except pregnancy and nursing) shows considerable variation in the roles assigned to men and women. The areas where gender roles tend to be most constant across societies – political leadership, hunting, and certain coming–of–age rituals – are those most closely connected with war. Thus, overall, gender roles outside war vary greatly. Similarly, forms of war vary greatly, except for their gendered character. Different cultures fight in very different ways. The Aztecs overpowered and captured warriors from neighboring societies, then used them for torture, human sacrifice, and food. A central rack contained over 100,000 skulls of their victims. The Dahomey also warred for captives, but to sell into slavery to European traders. The Yanomamö declare that their wars are about the capture of women. The ancient Chinese states of the warring–states period sought to conquer their neighbors’ territories and populations intact in order to augment their own power. For the Mundurucú of Brazil, the word for enemy referred to any non–Mundurucú group, and war had no apparent instrumental purpose beyond being an “unquestioned part of their way of life.” The civil war in Lebanon had “no clear causes, no stable enemy… The chaos penetrated every aspect of daily life so that everyone participated always.”4 Some wars more than pay for themselves; others are economic disasters. The economic benefit of cheap oil was arguably greater than the cost of the Gulf War, for Western powers that chipped in to pay for the war. Similarly, the nomadic peoples of the Eurasian steppes who invented warfare on horseback found profit in raiding. But the Vietnam War bankrupted the “Great Society” in the United States, and incessant wars between France and Spain drove both into bankruptcy in 1557. The Thirty Years War so devastated central Europe’s economy that the mercenary soldier was described as “a man who had to die so as to have something to live on.”5 Some wars seem almost symbolic because they absorb great effort but produce few casualties. Among the Dani of New Guinea, formalistic battles across set front lines – fought with spears, sticks, and bow and arrows – lasted from midmorning until nightfall or rain, with a rest period at midday, and with noncombatants watching from the sidelines. A different form of ritualistic war occupied the two superpowers of the Cold War era, whose nuclear weapons were built, deployed, and maintained on alert, but never used. Other wars, such as the Napoleonic Wars, the US Civil War, and the World Wars, were all–too–real spectacles of pain and misery that defy comprehension. A quarter of the Aztecs’ central skull rack could be filled by a single day’s deaths, 26,000 people, at the battle of Antietam.6 Some wars take place far from home, when armies travel on expeditions to distant lands. In the Crusades, European armies pillaged Muslim and Jewish communities for the glory of a Christian God. Later, European armies occupied colonies worldwide. Americans fought in the World Wars “over there” (Europe). Cuban soldiers in the 1980s fought in Angola. For traveling soldiers, home was a long way away, and for their home societies, war was distant. For most European peasants of the sixteenth century, war seldom impinged on daily life except through taxation. Other wars, however, hit extremely close to home. In recent decades, civil wars often have put civilians and everyday life right in the firing line. The World Wars made entire societies into war machines and therefore into targets. In such cases the “home front” and the “war front” become intimately connected. Sometimes soldiers kill enemies that they have never met, who look different from them and speak languages they do not understand. The Incas of Peru assumed the incomprehensible Spanish invaders to be gods. By contrast, in some wars neighbors kill neighbors, as in the 1992 Serbian campaign of terror in Bosnia. Soldiers sometimes kill at great distances, as with over–the–horizon air and ship missiles. At other times, they kill at close quarters, as with bayonets. Some, like the soldiers who planted land mines in Cambodia and Angola in the 1980s, have no idea whom they killed. Others, such as snipers in any war, can see exactly whom they kill. Combatants react in many different ways. Many soldiers in battle lose the ability to function, because of psychological trauma. But some soldiers feel energized in battle, and some look back to their military service as the best time of their lives. They found meaning, community, and the thrill of surviving danger. In many societies, veterans of battle receive special status and privilege afterwards. Sometimes, however, returning soldiers are treated as pariahs. Some soldiers fight with dogged determination, and willingly die and kill when they could have run away. In other cases, entire armies simply crumble because they lack a will to fight, as happened to the well–armed government forces in Africa’s third largest country, Zaire (Democratic Congo), in 1997. The puzzle. War, then, is a tremendously diverse enterprise, operating in many contexts with many purposes, rules, and meanings.

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Gender norms outside war show similar diversity. The puzzle, which this chapter fleshes out and the remaining chapters try to answer, is why this diversity disappears when it comes to the connection of war with gender. That connection is more stable, across cultures and through time, than are either gender roles outside of war or the forms and frequency of war itself. The answer in a nutshell is that killing in war does not come naturally for either gender, yet the potential for war has been universal in human societies. To help overcome soldiers’ reluctance to fight, cultures develop gender roles that equate “manhood” with toughness under fire. Across cultures and through time, the selection of men as potential combatants (and of women for feminine war support roles) has helped shape the war system. In turn, the pervasiveness of war in history has influenced gender profoundly – especially gender norms in child–rearing.