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### Mexican Manufacturing

#### Contention 1 is Mexican Manufacturing

#### TTIP agreement talks between the US and EU are coming

EC 7/12/13 – (“EU and US conclude first round of TTIP negotiations in Washington”, European Commission, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=941)//javi

The first week-long round of talks for an EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) comes to a closure today in Washington. “It’s been a very productive week”, said EU Chief Negotiator Ignacio Garcia-Bercero coming out of the talks. “We have been striving already for many months to prepare the ground for an ambitious trade and investment deal that will boost the transatlantic economy, delivering jobs and growth for both European and Americans. This week we have been able to take this negotiation to the next step. The main objective has been met: we had a substantive round of talks on the full range of topics that we intend to cover in this agreement. This paves the way to for a good second round of negotiations in Brussels in October.” Working throughout the week, the negotiating groups have set out respective approaches and ambitions in as much as twenty various areas that the TTIP - the biggest bilateral trade and investment negotiation ever undertaken - is set to cover. They included: market access for agricultural and industrial goods, government procurement, investment, energy and raw materials, regulatory issues, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, services, intellectual property rights, sustainable development, small- and medium-sized enterprises, dispute settlement, competition, customs/trade facilitation, and state-owned enterprises. Negotiators identified certain areas of convergence across various components of the negotiation and - in areas of divergence – begun to explore possibilities to bridge the gaps. The talks have been based on a thorough review of the stakeholders views expressed to date. The negotiators met also in the middle of the week with approximately 350 stakeholders from academia, trade unions, the private sector, and non-governmental organisations to listen to formal presentations and answer questions related to the proposed agreement.

#### Mexico needs to be included – expands trade and development of common standards

Negroponte 5/2/13 – Diana Negroponte is a nonresident senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative under Foreign Policy at Brookings. She focuses on Latin America and researches and writes about the New Left, populism and the relationship between criminal gangs and state institutions. Negroponte is editor of The End of Nostalgia: Mexico Confronts the Challenges of Global Competition Ph.D., Georgetown University J.D., American University B.S. Econ, London School of Economics & Political Science (Diana Villiers, “Obama’s Mexico Trip: Putting Trade and Investment at the Top of the Agenda”, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/05/02-obama-mexico-trip-trade-investment-negroponte)//javi

Investment flows are also mutually beneficial. According to the U.S. Trade Representative’s office, sales of services in Mexico by majority U.S. owned affiliates were $34.4 billion in 2010. Sales of services in the United States by majority Mexico-owned firms were $4.8 billion. According to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, the United States currently provides 41 percent of all foreign direct investment in Mexico, benefiting more than 21,139 companies. Beyond the numbers, the reality of trade and investment is that the United States and Mexico compete together in the global economy. Production and supply chains in North America are deeply integrated with the U.S. content of Mexico exports to the United States estimated at 40 cents on the dollar. This compares to 25 cents for Canadian exports to the United States and 4 cents for China and 2 cents for the European Union, according to a Wilson Center report. In short, there exists a growing integrated manufacturing platform that takes advantage of geography, time zones and cultural affinity. The challenge ahead is how to build on that integration for the forthcoming Trans Atlantic Trade and Investment talks with the European Union. The development of common standards and regulations will impact both Mexican and Canadian industry. Therefore, they need to be either at the table, or close to the negotiations. How close will the consultations with the Mexican trade delegation be? Ideally, the Mexicans would like to be at the negotiating table, but that is improbable. More likely is a commitment from President Obama to consult closely with the Mexican delegation. This could include both pre-talks and post-talk briefings, reinforcing Obama’s call “to maintain the economic dialogue over a long period of time.” On the European side, Turkey wishes to have a close consultative arrangement with the EU negotiators. This creates a balanced need for consultations with immediate trading partners.

#### Trade declines if Mexico is not included

Felbermayr et. al. 13 – (“Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Who benefits from a free trade deal?”, GED, http://www.ged-shorts.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Study-TTIP\_final\_ENG.pdf)//javi

Table 7 examines the changes in trade in North America and between the USA and the BRICS. A few important insights are striking. First, TTIP leads to trade diversion effects within the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) between USA, Mexico and Canada. In the comprehensive liberalization scenario, both exports and imports decline for NAFTA partner countries within the region. The two NAFTA countries whose position is not improved by TTIP, Mexico and Canada, intensify their trade. That is an impressive example of trade diversion effects between countries not directly affected in anyway by TTIP: The access of these countries especially to the US market becomes less attractive due to increased competition from the EU, leading to a substantial rise in trade between them. What makes this effect so strong is that the trade barriers, as we know, between Mexico and Canada have already been eliminated. Interestingly, TTIP leads to an expansion of trade between the EU and Canada. Geographic circumstances are decisive for this result. Because of its closeness to the USA, Canada is especially affected by trade diversion effects involving the USA. This effect leads to creating trade with the EU countries that are geographically farther away, so that transport costs are lower, and the change in the relative cost structures leads to replacement of the American market with the EU. This circumstance means that finalization of an agreement between the EU and Canada, currently under negotiation, would strengthen the trade of the countries involved with each other but not eliminate the negative trade diversion effects.

#### Exclusion of Mexico hurts trade partnership

BFNA 6/17/13 – (“US, EU Benefit Significantly From TTIP”, Bertelsmynn Foundation, http://www.bfna.org/article/us-eu-benefit-significantly-from-ttip)//javi

WASHINGTON, DC/GUETERSLOH, GERMANY (June 17, 2013) - The US and all EU member countries would benefit significantly from a comprehensive trade pact, according to "Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Who benefits from a free trade deal?", an ifo Institute study commissioned by the Bertelsmynn Foundation. A TTIP that eliminates non-tariff trade barriers and tariffs would boost per capita GDP and employment on both sides of the Atlantic but impose losses on much of the rest of the world. The US would achieve the greatest growth from a TTIP, with long-term per capita GDP climbing 13.4 percent. EU member states would, on average, see five-percent growth in long-term per capita GDP. The United Kingdom would be Europe’s biggest beneficiary; its long-term per capita GDP would rise 9.7 percent. Other EU member countries that would profit more than average from a far-reaching liberalization of trade include small export-oriented economies, such as those of the Baltic states, and crisis-ridden southern European countries. The large economies of Germany and France would benefit less than the EU average from a comprehensive free-trade agreement. Long-term Germyn per capita GDP would increase 4.7 percent; the comparative French figure is 2.6 percent. Intensified trade relations between the US and the EU would decrease their imports from the rest of the world. As a result, long-term per capital GDP would drop 9.5 percent in Canada and 7.2 percent in Mexico. Japan would also see a fall, of 5.9 percent. Additional losers would include developing countries, especially those in Africa and central Asia.

#### US-Mexico trade key to resolve Mexican instability and manufacturing sector

O’Neill 3/18/13 – (Shannon, “Mexico and the United States are linked closer than ever through trade”, Voxxi, http://www.voxxi.com/mexico-united-states-linked-trade/)//javi

When it comes to Mexico, people usually think about the security issue, and that’s what much of the news coverage has been. But underneath that, behind the headlines, we have seen a transformation of Mexico’s economy over the last couple of decades: It has moved from a very closed, inward-looking economy, one whose exports were dominated by oil, to an economy that is one of the most open and increasingly competitive in the world. In measures like trade to GDP, Mexico outpaces not just the United States or places like Brazil, but it outpaces China. It is quite an open and competitive economy now. A big part of that is due to its deepening ties to the United States. Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) was signed almost 20 years ago, we have seen the creation of regional supply chains for a myriad of different types of industries and companies. For every product that is imported from Mexico in the US, on average 40 percent of it would actually have been made in the U.S. It has become a very symbiotic relationship, and it has become an integrated economy in many ways and in many sectors, particularly in manufacturing. There, we see almost seamless integration in some companies, where production happens on both sides of the border. What it means is these economies, companies and industries are now not only intimately tied, but permynently tied at this point. Mexico’s positive future tied to the United States Mexico’s positive future is closely tied to the United States, in part because of this integration of production. If it does extend beyond the United States, it would most likely be through an expansion of what is already this North American production platform, through agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would expand Nafta beyond Canada and Mexico, to include other Latin American countries and many Asia Pacific countries. It is quite a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement, and one could see it expanding in production chains in many other countries that are participants, and sales would be going up. The U.S., for all of its hiccups in recent years, is still the largest market in the world, so being tied to the U.S. is not a bad thing at all. Recently, talk about a mega-agreement on trade between the world’s biggest trading bloc—the European Union—and the United States has surfaced. But it is not clear at all that this would hurt Mexico; it already has its own trade agreement with the EU and, on the other hand, there may be incentives to extend the EU-U.S. trade agreement to include other countries.

#### US is an integral part of Mexican manufacturing industry

Villarreal 8/9/12 – (M. Angeles, “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications”, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf)//javi

Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an integral part of the economic relationship between the United States and Mexico since NAFTA implementation. FDI consists of investments in real estate, manufacturing plants, and retail facilities, in which the foreign investor owns 10% or more of the entity. The United States is the largest source of FDI in Mexico. The stock of U.S. FDI increased from $17.0 billion in 1994 to $91.4 billion in 2011, a 440% increase (see Table 4). Mexican FDI in the United States is much lower than U.S. investment in Mexico, with levels of Mexican FDI fluctuating over the last 10 years. In 2010, Mexican FDI in the United States totaled $12.6 billion (see Table 4). The sharp rise in U.S. investment in Mexico since NAFTA is also a result of the liberalization of Mexico’s restrictions on foreign investment in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Prior to the mid-1980s, Mexico had a very protective policy that restricted foreign investment and controlled the exchange rate to encourage domestic growth, affecting the entire industrial sector. Mexico’s trade liberalization measures and economic reform in the late 1980s represented a sharp shift in policy and helped bring in a steady increase of FDI flows into Mexico. NAFTA provisions on foreign investment helped to lock in the reforms and increase investor confidence. Under NAFTA, Mexico gave U.S. and Canadian investors nondiscriminatory treatment of their investments as well as investor protection. NAFTA may have encouraged U.S. FDI in Mexico by increasing investor confidence, but much of the growth may have occurred anyway because Mexico likely would have continued to liberalize its foreign investment laws with or without the agreement. Nearly half of total FDI investment in Mexico is in the manufacturing industry, of which the maquiladora industry forms a major part. (See “Mexico’s Export-Oriented Assembly Plants” below.) In Mexico, the industry has helped attract investment from countries such as the United States that have a relatively large amount of capital. For the United States, the industry is important because U.S. companies are able to locate their labor-intensive operations in Mexico and lower their labor costs in the overall production process.

#### Mexican manufacturing key to US aerospace

Mecham 7/16 (Michael is apace writer for Gannett News, California Bureau Chief and correspondent for Congress, Aviation Week, 7/16/13, “Mexico’s Welcome Mat Attracts Aerospace Manufacturers”, <http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_04_01_2013_p44-562383.xml>\)

The aerospace influx has not happened overnight. Its roots date to the mid-1970s when U.S. companies, a mix of multinationals and lower-tier suppliers, began sending basic parts manufacturing and assembly tasks across the border, mostly to border towns like Tijuana and Mexicali but also deeper into the country to cities like Monterrey. Service operations followed, as did company research activities. However, it has been in the past decade that Mexico's aerospace manufacturing growth has mushroomed. Political reform led it to pursue a global free trade agenda vigorously and its 1994 signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) benefitted Mexico greatly. Still, it took about a decade for the aerospace sector to take off. Until 2004, growth was scattered, says Queretaro state Gov. Jose Calzada. Not anymore. “We've seen incredible changes in just the last five years,” he says The boom times are a testament to Mexico's geography, its embrace of free trade and adoption of legal mechanisms that provide a “soft landing” for foreign-owned factories. Local leaders clear red tape and amaze U.S. and European executives at how quickly they can put up factories. A typical response comes from Peter Huij, a senior Fokker Aerostructures executive in Chihuahua, about how quickly the company went from bare earth in May 2011 to a completed 75,000-sq.-ft. factory in November: “It would be impossible in Europe.” Behind all of this is Mexico's Maquiladora factory system for supporting foreign companies, which allows them to control their own destiny, importing raw materials such as aerospace-quality alloys, or wiring and then exporting the finished product tax-free. Foreign manufacturers commonly turn to a large service provider—Intermex and American Industries Group are leaders for the aerospace sector—that lease buildings to their clients and handle their humyn resources, tax and other business needs under Mexican law. About 80% of the aerospace companies in Mexico use such services. Of the 36 Maquiladoras registered by the Mexican government last year, six were in aerospace, including a GKN Aerospace plant in Mexicali, Latecoere in Hermosillo, coatings specialist Ellison Surface Technologies and Rolls-Royce turbine supplier JJ Churchill in Guaymas and a fourth division for Zodiac in Chihuahua. Under the Maquiladora system, Mexico allows resident foreign companies to control 100% of their businesses. They do not face the “local partner” rules so common elsewhere that limit foreigners to a maximum 49% share “They make it easy for you to do business down here,” says John Gardner, strategic program manager at Kamyn Aerostructures, another newcomer in Chihuahua. “They provide a 'soft landing,' to get a quick startup—a good startup. We got a lot of support up front and afterward.”

#### US free trade is key to Mexican manufacturing and aerospace

Ryder 10 – (“Mexico Takes Flight”, Inbound Logistics, June 2010, http://www.ryder.com/en/supply-chain/solutions-by-industry/~/media/Ryder/Files/KnowledgeCenter/WhitePapers/RSC345Mexico%20Takes%20FlightIBLLowResEprintsingle.pdf)//javi

Among the many attractions that draw aerospace companies to Mexico, the cost of labor is a major factor. Highly skilled workers in Mexico’s aerospace industry earn from $5.80 to $7.80 an hour. Mexico is the lowest-cost choice for U.S. companies that outsource manufacturing abroad, surpassing India, China, and Vietnam, according to a report released this year by AlixPartners. Companies can easily ship products and components to Mexico from their plants in the United States or Canada for final assembly, or ship finished products to customers throughout North America. “You’re talking hours and days, rather than weeks, for transit to the United States,” says Jim Moore, vice president of sales for the aerospace, automotive and industrials vertical at Ryder Supply Chain Solutions. “You can ship on Thursday morning by truck and deliver on Monday.” Having targeted aerospace as a strategic growth industry, the Mexican government is doing its best to make the country an attractive environment for this sector. One of the most important incentives is the maquila system, which has prompted many North American manufacturers, in a variety of industries, to “nearshore” their production in Mexico. Maquilas are factories that operate in free trade zones. Companies import materials and equipment to those locations without paying taxes or duties, then reexport the finished products. Often, the manufactured goods are components that are shipped to factories outside Mexico for final assembly in products such as aircraft, automobiles, and computers. But even outside the maquila zones, parts and materials for use in aerospace manufacturing enjoy special tariff treatment, entering the country duty-free, says Ricardo Alvarez, director of business development for the aerospace, automotive and industrials vertical at Ryder Supply Chain Solutions. “Also, the value-added tax (VAT) is refundable after five days of the import process,” he notes. Mexico’s federal and state governments have established a variety of other tax incentives for the aerospace industry. In fact, from 2006 to 2008–a time when Mexico had eliminated incentives for many manufacturing sectors–it retained its incentives for aerospace. These included capital equipment grants, help with infrastructure, real estate grants, and the establishment of an Aerospace Training Center in Querétaro. FEMIA, an association of 48 aerospace manufacturers operating in Mexico, works with the federal and state governments to promote the interests of the industry. One of FEMIA’s goals is to develop a National Strategic Aerospace Plan.

#### Mexican aerospace is key to US aerospace investments

Taylor 13 (Guy, “Aerospace: An Emerging Mexican Industry”, Americas Quarterly, Winter, http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/aerospace-emerging-mexican-industry)

What began as an initial push into Mexico by U.S. manufacturers such as General Electric during the years following the 1994 enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement has now emerged as one of the nation’s most vibrant sectors. With 30,000 Mexicans now employed in aerospace factories across 16 of the nation’s 31 states, Mexican government investment in the sector is also growing—most measurably through the establishment of training schools and new university programs aimed at delivering a future crop of homegrown aerospace workers, plant managers and possibly even designers. The nation graduated more engineers per capita than Germany in 2012. While the states of Querétaro and Baja California make up the majority of aerospace production in Mexico, recent developments in Chihuahua City deserve a closer look. Ford Motor Company opened a factory in 1983 and has since built nearly 7 million truck engines. Thirty-six aerospace parts factories have opened in Chihuahua City over the past five years. A recent reporting trip there revealed that the vast majority of the factories are not Mexican-owned—which makes Mexico’s aerospace market unique in the hemisphere. The downside of this is that the country may be used increasingly for its cheap labor by profit-hungry companies from more established markets. But the upside finds Mexico emerging as a new center of globalization. A variety of international companies have recently opened new plants in Chihuahua City: U.S.-based supplier Nordam, which makes everything from airplane windows to cockpit doors; France-based Mynior Aerospace, which cuts shiny precision-shaped steel discs that end up on Boeing commercial jets; and Netherlands-based Fokker Technologies.

#### Aerospace decline causes global instability and great power war

Pfaltzgraff 10 – Robert L, Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, et al., Final Report of the IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy, “Air, Space, & Cyberspace Power in the 21st-Century”, p. xiii-9

Deterrence Strategy In stark contrast to the bipolar Cold War nuclear setting, today’s security environment includes multiple, independent nuclear actors. Some of these independent nuclear weapons states are potential adversaries, some are rivals, and some are friends, but the initial decision for action by any one of them may lie beyond U.S. control. The United States may need to influence, signal, and restrain enemies, and it may need to continue to provide security guarantees to non-nuclear friends and allies. America may also face catalytic warfare, where, for example, a U.S. ally such as Israel or a third party such as China could initiate action that might escalate to a nuclear exchange. Although the United States would not be a party to the nuclear escalation decision process, it could be drawn into the conflict. Compared to a bipolar world, very little is known about strategic nuclear interaction and escalation in a multipolar world. The U.S. nuclear deterrent must restrain a wider variety of actors today than during the Cold War. This requires a range of capabilities and the capacity to address specific challenges. The deterrent must provide security guarantees and assurance sufficient to prevent the initiation of catalytic warfare by an ally, while deterring an adversary from resorting to nuclear escalation. America may also need simultaneously to deter more than one other nuclear state. Deterrence requirements include four critical elements: early warning, C2, delivery systems, and weapons. The Air Force plays an indispensable role in furnishing the U.S. early warning system in its entirety through satellites and radar networks. In commynd and control, infrastructure is provided by the Air Force, including Milstar satellites and, in the future, advanced extremely high frequency (AEHF) satellites. In the area of delivery systems and weapons, two-thirds of the strategic triad – intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers – is furnished by the Air Force and its Global Strike Commynd. U.S. Overseas Basing and the Anti-Access/Area-Denial Threat The increased availability of anti-access/area-denial assets coupled with growing threats to the sea, air, space, and cyberspace commons are challenging the power projection capabilities of the United States. These threats, in the form of aircraft and long-range missiles carrying conventional or nuclear munitions, present problems for our overseas bases. States such as North Korea, China, and Iran jeopardize the notion that forward-deployed U.S. forces and bases will be safe from enemy attack. Consequently, the United States must create a more flexible basing structure encompassing a passive and active defense posture that includes these features: dispersal, hardening, increased warning time of attack, and air defenses. Simultaneously, the United States must continue to develop long-range, offensive systems such as low-observable mynned and remotely piloted strike aircraft, precision missiles, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms to penetrate heavily defended A2/AD environments. This approach will increase the survivability of U.S. forward-deployed assets and power projection capabilities and thus bolster deterrence and U.S. guarantees to America’s allies and friends. Asymmetric Challenges The increasing number of actors gaining access to advanced and dual-use technologies augments the potential for asymmetric attacks against the United States and its allies by those who are unable to match U.S. military capabilities. Those actors pose increasing challenges to the ability of the United States to project power through the global commons. Such attacks could target specific U.S. vulnerabilities, ranging from space assets to the financial, transportation, communications, and/or energy infrastructures, and to the food and water supply, to mention only the most obvious. Asymmetric attacks denying access to critical networks and capabilities may be the most cost-effective approach to circumventing traditional U.S. force advantages. The USAF and DoD must develop systems and technologies that can offset and defend against asymmetric capabilities. This will require a robust R&D program and enhanced USAF cooperation with its sister services and international partners and allies. Space Dominance Space is increasingly a contested domain where U.S. dominance is no longer assured given the growing number of actors in space and the potential for kinetic and non-kinetic attacks, including ASAT weapons, EMP, and jamming. As a result, the United States must protect vital space-based platforms and networks by reducing their vulnerability to attack or disruption and increasing the country’s resilience if an attack does occur. Required steps include hardening and incorporating stealth into next generation space systems and developing rapid replenishment capacity (including micro-satellite technologies and systems and new launch capabilities). At the same time, America must reduce its dependence on space capabilities with air-based substitutes such as high altitude, long endurance, and penetrating ISR platforms. Increased cooperation among the services and with U.S. allies to develop such capabilities will also be paramount. Cyber Security Cyber operations are vital to conducting USAF and joint land, sea, air, and space missions. Given the significance of the cyber threat (private, public, and DoD cyber and information networks are routinely under attack), the United States is attempting to construct a layered and robust capability to detect and mitigate cyber intrusions and attacks. The USAF’s cyber operations must be capable of operating in a contested cyber domain to support vital land, sea, air, and space missions. USAF cyberspace priorities include developing capabilities to protect essential military cyber systems and to speed their recovery if an attack does occur; enhancing the Air Force’s capacity to provide USAF personnel with the resolution of technical questions; and training/recruitment of personnel with cyber skills. In addition, the USAF and DoD need to develop technologies that quickly and precisely attribute attacks in cyberspace. Cyber attacks can spread quickly among networks, making it extremely difficult to attribute their perpetrator, and therefore to develop a deterrence strategy based on retaliation. In addition, some cyber issues are in the legal arena, including questions about civil liberties. It is likely that the trend of increased military support to civil authorities (for example, in disaster relief operations) will develop in the cyber arena as well. These efforts will entail greater service, interagency, international, and private-sector collaboration. Organizational Change and Joint Force Operations To address growing national security challenges and increasing fiscal constraints, and to become more effective, the joint force needs to adapt its organizations and processes to the exigencies of the information age and the security setting of the second decade of the twenty-first century. This entails developing a strategy that places increased emphasis on joint operations in which each service acts in greater concert with the others, leverages capacities across the services (two land services, three naval services, and five air services) without duplicating efforts, and encourages interoperability. This would provide combatant commynders (CCDRs) with a greater range of capabilities, allowing heightened flexibility to use force. A good example of this approach is the Air-Sea Battle concept being developed jointly by the Air Force and Navy, which envisions heightened cooperation between the two services and potentially with allies and coalition partners. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Capabilities There is an increasing demand for ISR capabilities able to access and persist in contested airspace in order to track a range of high-value mobile and hard-to-find targets, such as missile launchers and underground bunkers. This increases the need for stealthy, survivable systems and the development of next-generation unmynned platforms. The USAF must continue to emphasize precision targeting, both for strike and close-air-support missions. High-fidelity target identification and discrimination enabled by advanced radars and directed-energy systems, including the ability to find, track, and target individuals within a crowd, will provide battlefield commynders with improved options and new opportunities for leveraging joint assets. Engagement and International Security Cooperation Allies and coalition partners bring important capabilities from which the USAF and other services have long benefited. For example, allies and coalition partners can provide enhanced situational awareness and early warning of impending crises as well as assist in understanding the interests, motivations, traditions, and cultures of potential adversaries and prospective coalition partners. Moreover, foreign partner engagement and outreach are an avenue to influence partner and adversary perspectives, thus shaping the environment in ways favorable to U.S. national security interests. Engagement also may be a key to realizing another Air Force and joint priority: to sustain or gain access to forward operating bases and logistical infrastructure. This is particularly important given the growing availability of A2/AD assets and their ability to impede U.S. power projection capabilities. Procurement Choices and Affordability The USAF needs to field capabilities to support current operations and pressing missions while at the same time pursuing promising technologies to build the force of the future. Affordability, effectiveness, time urgency, and industrial base issues inevitably shape procurement choices and reform. The Air Force must maintain today’s critical assets while also allocating resources to meet future needs. Given the long lifespan anticipated for many weapon systems, planners need to make the most reliable cost estimates and identify problems at the outset of a weapons system’s development phase so that they can be corrected as early and cost-effectively as possible. Support to Civil Authorities As evidenced in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquakes in Haiti and Chile (the Chile earthquake hit after this conference), the USAF has a vital role to play in the U.S. response to international relief operations and support to civil authorities. In Haiti, the USAF reopened the airport and deployed contingency response elements, while also providing ISR support for the joint forces in the theater. In Chile, USAF satellite communication capabilities were critical to the recovery and relief efforts. USAF civil support roles are likely to grow to include greater use of the Reserve Components. Consequently, USAF planners should reassess the active and reserve component mix of forces and capabilities to identify potential mobilization and requirement shortfalls. CLOSING CONFERENCE THOUGHTS A recurring conference theme was the need for the USAF to continue to examine specific issues of opportunity and vulnerability more closely. For example, a future initiative could include focused working groups that would examine such questions and issues as: • How can air, space, and cyberspace capabilities best support deterrence, preserve U.S. freedom of action, and support national objectives? • How should the USAF leadership reconceptualize its vision, institutional identity, and force posture to align as closely as possible with the future national security setting? • What is the appropriate balance between high-end and low-end air and space capabilities that will maximize military options for national decision makers, given emerging threats and fiscal constraints? • What are the opportunities, options, and tradeoffs for investment and divestment in science and technology, infrastructure, and programmed capabilities? • What are additional interdependent concepts, similar to Air-Sea Battle, that leverage cross-service investments to identify and foster the development of new joint capabilities? • What are alternative approaches to officer accessions and development to support shifting and emerging Air Force missions, operations, and force structure, including cyber warfare? • How can the USAF best interact with Congress to help preserve or refocus the defense-industrial base as well as to minimize myndates and restrictions that weigh on future Air Force investments? Finally, the USAF must continue to be an organization that views debate, as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force put it in his opening conference address, “…as the whetstone upon which we sharpen our strategic thinking.” This debate must also be used in pursuit of political support and to ensure that the USAF maintains and develops critical capabilities to support U.S. national security priorities. The 38th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy was conceived as a contribution to that debate. Almost a century has passed since the advent of airpower and Billy Mitchell’s demonstration of its operational potential with the sinking of the Ostfriesland on July 21, 1921. For most of that time, the United States has benefitted from the rapid development of air and space power projection capabilities, and, as a result, it has prevailed in successive conflicts, contributed to war deterrence and crisis management, and provided essential humynitarian relief to allies and friends around the world. As we move into the second decade of the twenty-first century, the U.S. Air Force (USAF), like its service counterparts, is re-assessing strategies, operational concepts, and force structure. Across the conflict spectrum, security challenges are evolving, and potential adversaries–state and non-state actors–are developing anti-access and other asymmetric capabilities, and irregular warfare challenges are becoming more prevalent. The potential exists for “hybrid” warfare in which state adversaries and/or non-state actors use a mix of conventional and unconventional capabilities against the United States, a possibility made more feasible by the diffusion of such capabilities to a larger number of actors. Furthermore, twenty-first-century security challenges and threats may emynate from highly adaptive adversaries who ignore the Geneva Conventions of war and use military and/or civilian technologies to offset our military superiority. As it develops strategy and force structure in this global setting, the Air Force confronts constraints that will have important implications for budget and procurement programs, basic research and development (R&D), and the maintenance of critical skills, as well as recruitment, education, training, and retention. Given the dynamic nature of the security setting and looming defense budget constraints, questions of where to assume risk will demand bold, innovative, and decisive leadership. The imperative for joint operations and U.S. military-civilian partnerships is clear, underscoring the need for a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach that encompasses international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). THE UNITED STATES AS AN AEROSPACE NATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES In his address opening the conference, General Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), pointed out how, with its inherent characteristics of speed, range, and flexibility, airpower has forever changed warfare. Its advent rendered land and maritime forces vulnerable from the air, thus adding an important new dimension to warfare. Control of the air has become indispensable to national security because it allows the United States and friendly forces to maneuver and operate free from enemy air attack. With control of the air the United States can leverage the advantages of air and space as well as cyberspace. In these interdependent domains the Air Force possesses unique capabilities for ensuring global mobility, long-range strike, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The benefits of airpower extend beyond the air domain, and operations among the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains are increasingly interdependent. General Schwartz stated that the Air Force’s challenge is to succeed in a protracted struggle against elements of violent extremism and irreconcilable actors while confronting peer and near-peer rivals. The Air Force must be able to operate with great precision and lethality across a broad spectrum of conflict that has high and low ends but that defies an orderly taxonomy. Warfare in the twenty-first century takes on a hybrid complexity, with regular and irregular elements using myriad tools and tactics. Technology can be an enabler but can also create weaknesses: adversaries with increased access to space and cyberspace can use emerging technologies against the United States and/or its allies. In addition, the United States faces the prospect of the proliferation of precision weapons, including ballistic and cruise missiles as well as increasingly accurate mortars, rockets, and artillery, which will put U.S. and allied/coalition forces at risk. In response to mounting irregular warfare challenges American leaders have to adopt innovative and creative strategies. For its part, the USAF must develop airmyn who have the creativity to anticipate and plan for this challenging environment. Leadership, intellectual creativity, capacity, and ingenuity, together with innovative technology, will be crucial to addressing these challenges in a constrained fiscal environment. System Versatility In meeting the broad range of contingencies – high, low, regular, irregular, and hybrid – the Air Force must maintain and develop systems that are versatile, both functionally (including strike or ISR) and in terms of various employment modes, such as mynned versus remotely piloted, and penetrating versus stand-off systems. General Schwartz emphasized the need to be able to operate in conflict settings where there will be demands for persistent ISR systems able to gain access to, and then loiter in, contested or denied airspace. The targets to be identified and tracked may be mobile or deeply buried, of high value, and difficult to locate without penetrating systems. General Schwartz also called attention to the need for what he described as a “family of systems” that could be deployed in multiple ways with maximum versatility depending on requirements. Few systems will remain inherently single purpose. Indeed, he emphasized that the Air Force must purposefully design versatility into its new systems, with the majority of future systems being able to operate in various threat environments. As part of this effort further joint integration and inter-service cooperation to achieve greater air-land and air-sea interoperability will continue to be a strategic necessity. Space Access and Control Space access, control, and situational awareness remain essential to U.S. national security. As potential rivals develop their own space programs, the United States faces challenges to its unrestricted access to space. Ensuring continuing access to the four global commons – maritime, air, space, and cyberspace – will be a major challenge in which the USAF has a key role. The Air Force has long recognized the importance of space and is endeavoring to make certain that U.S. requirements in and for space are met and anticipated. Space situational awareness is vital to America’s ability to help evaluate and attribute attacks. Attribution, of course, is essential to deterrence. The USAF is exploring options to reduce U.S. dependence on the Global Positioning System (GPS), which could become vulnerable to jamming. Promising new technologies, such as “cold atoms,” pseudolites, and imaging inertial navigation systems that use laser radar are being investigated as means to reduce our vulnerability. Cyber Capabilities The USAF continues to develop cyber capabilities to address opportunities and challenges. Cyber threats present challenges to homeland security and other national security interests. Key civilian and military networks are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Preparing for cyber warfare and refining critical infrastructure protection and consequence management will require new capabilities, focused training, and greater interagency, international, and private sector collaboration. Challenges for the Air Force General Schwartz set forth a series of challenges for the Air Force, which he urged conference participants to address. They included: • How can the Air Force better address the growing demand for real-time ISR from remotely piloted systems, which are providing unprecedented and unmatched situational awareness? • How can the USAF better guarantee the credibility and viability of the nation’s nuclear forces for the complex and uncertain security environment of this century? • What is the way ahead for the next generation of long-range strike and ISR platforms? What trade-offs, especially between mynned and unmynned platforms, should the USAF consider? How can the USAF improve acquisition of such systems? How can the USAF better exploit the advantage of low-observables? • How can the Air Force better prepare itself to operate in an opposed network environment in which communications and data links will be challenged, including how to assure commynd and control (C2) in bandwidth-constrained environments? • In counter-land operations, how can the USAF achieve improved target discrimination in high collateral damage situations? • How should the USAF posture its overseas forces to ensure access? What basing structure, logistical considerations, andprotection measures are required to mitigate emerging anti-access threats? • How can the Air Force reduce its reliance on GPS to ensure operations in a GPS-denied environment? • How can the USAF lessen its vulnerability to petroleum shortages, rising energy prices, and resulting logistical and operational challenges? • How can the Air Force enhance partnerships with its sister services and the interagency community? How can it better collaborate with allies and coalition partners to improve support of national security interests? These issues were addressed in subsequent conference sessions. The opening session focused on the multidimensional and dynamic security setting in which the Air Force will operate in the years ahead. The session included a discussion of the need to prioritize necessary capabilities and to gauge “acceptable risks.” Previous Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) rested on the basic assumption that the United States would be able to support operations simultaneously or nearly simultaneously in two major regional contingencies, with the additional capacity to respond to smaller disaster-relief and/or stability operations missions. However, while the 2010 QDR1 maintains the need for U.S. forces to operate in two nearly simultaneous major wars, it places far greater emphasis on the need to address irregular warfare challenges. Its focus is maintaining and rebalancing U.S. force structure to fight the wars in which the United States is engaged today while looking ahead to the emerging security setting. The QDR further seeks to develop flexible and tailored capabilities to confront an array of smaller-scale contingencies, including natural disasters, perhaps simultaneously, as was the case with the war in Afghanistan, stability operations in Iraq, and the Haiti relief effort. The 2010 QDR highlights important trends in the global security environment, especially unconventional threats and asymmetric challenges. It suggests that a conflict with a near-peer competitor such as China, or a conflict with Iran, would involve a mix, or hybrid, of capabilities that would test U.S. forces in very different ways. Although predicting the future security setting is a very difficult if not an impossible exercise, the 2010 QDR outlines major challenges for the United States and its allies, including technology proliferation and diffusion; anti-access threats and the shrinking global basing infrastructure; the possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) use against the U.S. homeland and/or against U.S. forces abroad; critical infrastructure protection and the massed effects of a cyber or space attack; unconventional warfare and irregular challenges; and the emergence of new issue areas such as Arctic security, U.S. energy dependence, demographic shifts and urbanization, the potential for resource wars (particularly over access to water), and the erosion or collapse of governance in weak or failing states. TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION Technology proliferation is accelerating. Compounding the problem is the reality that existing multilateral and/or international export regimes and controls have not kept pace with technology, and efforts to constrain access are complicated by dual-use technologies and chemical/biological agents. The battlefields of the future are likely to be more lethal as combatants take advantage of commercially based navigation aids for precision guidance and advanced weapons systems and as global and theater boundaries disappear with longer-range missile systems becoming more common in enemy arsenals. Non-state entities such as Hezbollah have already used more advanced missile systems to target state adversaries. The proliferation of precision technologies and longer-range delivery platforms puts the United States and its partners increasingly at risk. This proliferation also is likely to affect U.S. operations from forward operating locations, placing additional constraints on American force deployments within the territories of allies. Moreover, as longer-range ballistic and cruise missiles become more widespread, U.S. forces will find it increasingly difficult to operate in conflicts ranging from irregular warfare to high-intensity combat. As highlighted throughout the conference, this will require that the United States develop and field new-generation low-observable penetration assets and related capabilities to operate in non-permissive environments. PROLIFERATION TRENDS The twenty-first-century security setting features several proliferation trends that were discussed in the opening session. These trends, six of which were outlined by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, framed subsequent discussions. First, the number of actors–states and armed non-state groups–is growing, together with strategies and capabilities based on more widely available technologies, including WMD and conventional weapons. This is leading to a blurring of categories of warfare that may include state and non-state actors and encompass intra-state, trans-state, and inter-state armed conflict as well as hybrid threats. Second, some of these actors subscribe to ideologies and goals that welcome martyrdom. This raises many questions about dissuasion and deterrence and the need to think of twenty-first-century deterrence based on offensive and defensive strategies and capabilities. Third, given the sheer numbers of actors capable of challenging the United States and their unprecedented capabilities, the opportunity for asymmetric operations against the United States and its allies will grow. The United States will need to work to reduce key areas of vulnerability, including its financial systems, transportation, communications, and energy infrastructures, its food and water supply, and its space assets. Fourth, the twenty-first-century world contains flashpoints for state-to-state conflict. This includes North Korea, which possesses nuclear weapons, and Iran, which is developing them. In addition, China is developing an impressive array of weaponry which, as the Commynder of U.S. Pacific Commynd stated in congressional testimony, appears “designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region and, if necessary, enforce China’s influence over its neighbors – including our regional allies and partners’ weaponry.”2 These threats include ballistic missiles, aircraft, naval forces, cyber capabilities, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, and other power-projection capabilities. The global paradigm of the twenty-first century is further complicated by state actors who may supply advanced arms to non-state actors and terrorist organizations. Fifth, the potential for irregular warfare is rising dramatically with the growth of armed non-state actors. The proliferation of more lethal capabilities, including WMD, to armed non-state actors is a logical projection of present trends. Substantial numbers of fractured, unstable, and ungoverned states serve as breeding grounds of armed non-state actors who will resort to various forms of violence and coercion based on irregular tactics and formations and who will increasingly have the capabilities to do so. Sixth, the twenty-first-century security setting contains yet another obvious dimension: the permeability of the frontiers of the nation state, rendering domestic populations highly vulnerable to destruction not only by states that can launch missiles but also by terrorists and other transnational groups. As we have seen in recent years, these entities can attack U.S. information systems, creating the possibility of a digital Pearl Harbor. Taken together, these trends show an unprecedented proliferation of actors and advanced capabilities confronting the United States; the resulting need to prepare for high-end and low-end conflict; and the requirement to think of a seamless web of threats and other security challenges extending from overseas to domestic locales. Another way to think about the twenty-first-century security setting, Dr. Pfaltzgraff pointed out, is to develop scenarios such as the following, which are more illustrative than comprehensive: • A nuclear Iran that engages in or supports terrorist operations in a more assertive foreign policy • An unstable Pakistan that loses control of its nuclear weapons, which fall into the hands of extremists • A Taiwan Straits crisis that escalates to war • A nuclear North Korea that escalates tensions on the Korean peninsula

What all of these have in common is the indispensable role that airpower would play in U.S. strategy and crisis management.

#### Aerospace key to hegemony

Lexington Institute 13

[Public policy think tank, “America Is A Superpower Because It Is An Air Power”, 1/24, <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/142016/air-power-makes-america-a-superpower.html>] \*we don’t defend the gendered discourse of this evidence

There is no question that the United States has the best military in the world. The United States is unique in its ability to project military power to multiple regions of the world simultaneously, conduct multiple major combined and joint operations at a time and both defend the homeland and provide ongoing support to civil agencies. Europe, which spends about sixty percent of the U.S. defense budget and actually has more myn and womyn in uniform, was unable without significant U.S. support to conduct a single, modest campaign in Libya. The U.S. military continues to set the world standard with respect to most major military systems: nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, large deck amphibious warfare ships, nuclear attack submarines, strategic bombers, fifth-generation fighters, air and missile defenses, tanks and armored fighting vehicles and space and airborne ISR. Even though we don’t talk much about it the military’s cyber warfare capabilities are truly impressive. While the U.S. has the best ground, naval and amphibious forces in the world, one thing makes it a 21st Century superpower: its dominance as an air power. The United States alone is capable of deploying its aerial assets anywhere in the world. U.S. air power can hold at risk any target set in any country and can do so from multiple directions. The U.S. Air Force is the only one capable of delivering specially-designed conventional bombs large enough to destroy deeply buried and hardened structures.  Over the past two decades, the U.S. military has repeatedly demonstrated that it can destroy an adversary’s air force and air defenses in a matter of weeks. After that, hostile ground units were toast. The ability to rapidly seize control of the air means that no soldier has died in an air attack since 1953. Over a decade of wars, American air power from the land and sea provided continual responsive fire support for tactical units on the ground. Other nations have fighters and bombers, although America’s are the best. The U.S. also has the largest and most capable fleets of air transports, refueling aircraft and airborne ISR assets in the world. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force flew soldiers and heavy armor deep into Iraq to seize a critical target, the Haditha Dam. Since 2001, the Air Force has maintained a continuous air bridge to Afghanistan, more than 8,000 miles from CONUS. U.S. C-17 transports are today flying French troops and equipment into Mali. The U.S. Navy has a fleet of fixed wing transports, the C-2 Greyhounds, specifically for the purpose of moving parts and people to and from its aircraft carriers. The United States has crafted an ISR and strategic warning capability based on a sophisticated array of satellites, mynned platforms and unmynned aerial systems.  Dominant air power is about much more than just platforms and weapons. It requires also the trained people and processes to plan and manage air operations, process, exploit and disseminate intelligence, identify targets and plan attacks, move supplies and route transports and repair and maintain complex systems. The U.S. had to send hundreds of targeteers to NATO to support the Libyan operation. Over decades, the U.S. military has developed an unequalled training establishment and set of ranges that ensure the highest quality pilots and other personnel. Finally, the U.S. is the dominant air power in the world because of its aerospace industrial base. Whether it is designing and producing fifth-generation fighters such as the F-22 and F-35, providing an advanced tanker like the new KC-46 or inventing high-flying unmynned aerial systems like the Global Hawk, the U.S. aerospace industry continues to set the bar. In addition, the private and public parts of the aerospace industrial base, often working together based on collaborative arrangements such as performynce-based logistics contracts, is able to move aircraft, weapons and systems through the nationwide system of depots, Air Logistics Centers and other facilities at a rate unmatched by any other nation. The ability to rapidly repair or overhaul aircraft is itself a force multiplier, providing more aircraft on the flight line to support the warfighters. The U.S. military can go where it is ordered, respond rapidly to the crisis of the moment, move men, equipment and supplies around the world and dominate any place on the face of the earth as long as it desires because it is dominant in the air. As the Pentagon, Congress and the White House struggle with budget issues that could well require deep cuts to the military, they would be well advised to remember that it is air dominance that enables this country to remain a superpower.

#### The pursuit of hegemony is inevitable, sustainable, and prevents great power war

**Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth 13** – \*Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, \*\*John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, \*\*William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College (“Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement”, January/February 2013, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138468/stephen-g-brooks-g-john-ikenberry-and-william-c-wohlforth/lean-forward)

Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.

#### Mexican economic collapse causes instability

**Barnes 11** – (4/29/11, Joe, Bonner Means Baker Fellow James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Rice University, “Oil and U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Relations,” <http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-BarnesBilateral-04292011.pdf>)

There is already a short- to medium-term risk of substantial instability in Mexico.  As noted, the country is enduring extremely high levels of drug-related violence.  Even if the Mexican government eventually succeeds in its efforts to suppress this violence, the process is likely to be expensive, bloody, and corrosive in terms of humyn rights.  A period of feeble economic growth, combined with a fiscal crisis associated with a drop in revenues from Pemex, could create a “perfect storm” south of the border.   If this were to occur, Washington would have no choice but to respond.  In the longer-term, the United States has a clear interest in robust economic growth and fiscal sustainability in Mexico.  There is at least one major example of the U.S. coming to Mexico’s aid in an economic emergency.  In 1994, the United States extended US$20 billion in loan guarantees to Mexico when the peso collapsed, in large part to make U.S. creditors whole.  Not least, a healthy Mexican economy would reduce the flow of illegal immigration to the United States.  To the extent that prospects for such growth and sustainability are enhanced by reform of Pemex, the United States should be supportive.  It might be best, in terms of U.S. economic and commercial interests, were Pemex to be fully privatized, but even partial reforms would be welcome.  Not all national oil companies are created equal: Pemex’s development into something like Norway’s Statol would mark an important improvement.

#### That tanks the global economy

**Rangel 95**, Enrique Rangel, fellow at the Monterrey Bureau, “Pressure on the Peso,” November 28th, 1995, from The Dallas Morning News, lexis

All year long, thousands of foreign investors have nervously watched Mexico’s volatile financial markets as the Clinton administration and congressional leaders debated the pros and cons of bailing out a battered currency. With the exception of 1982 - when Mexico defaulted on its foreign debt and a handful of giant New York banks worried they would lose billions of dollars in loans - few people abroad ever cared about a weak peso. But now it’s different, experts say. This time, the world is keeping a close eye on Mexico’s unfolding financial crisis for one simple reason: Mexico is a major international player. If its economy were to collapse, it would drag down a few other countries and thousands of foreign investors. If recovery is prolonged, the world economy will feel the slowdown. “It took a peso devaluation so that other countries could notice the key role that Mexico plays in today’s global economy,” said economist Victor Lopez Villafane of the Monterrey Institute of Technology. “I hate to say it, but if Mexico were to default on its debts, that would trigger an international financial collapse” not seen since the Great Depression, said Dr. Lopez, who has conducted comparative studies of the Mexican economy and the economies of some Asian and Latin American countries. “That’s why it’s in the best interests of the United States and the industrialized world to help Mexico weather its economic crisis,” he said. The crisis began last December when the Mexican government devalued the currency. Last March, after weeks of debate, President Clinton, the International Monetary Fund and a handful of other countries and international agencies put together a $ 53 billion rescue package for Mexico. But despite the help - $ 20 billion in guarantee loans from the United States - Mexico’s financial markets have been volatile for most of the year. The peso is now trading at about 7.70 to the dollar, after falling to an all-time low of 8.30 to the dollar Nov. 9. The road has been bumpy, and that has made many - particularly U.S. investors - nervous. No country understands better the importance of Mexico to the global economy than the United States, said Jorge Gonzalez Davila, an economist at Trinity University in San Antonio. “Despite the rhetoric that you hear in Washington, I think that most people agree - even those who oppose any aid to Mexico - that when Mexico sneezes, everybody catches a cold,” Mr. Gonzalez said. “That’s why nowadays any talk of aid to Mexico or trade with Mexico gets a lot of attention,” he said. Most economists, analysts and business leaders on both sides of the border agree that the biggest impact abroad of a prolonged Mexican fiscal crisis may be on the U.S. economy, especially in Texas and in cities bordering Mexico.

#### Global economic decline causes nuclear war

Auslin ‘9

(Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

### EU Relations

#### Contention 2 is EU Relations

#### Negotiations with Mexico are necessary to the success of TTIP

Knigge 2/26/13 – (Michael, “EU-US trade deal is 'unique opportunity'”, DW, http://www.dw.de/eu-us-trade-deal-is-unique-opportunity/a-16584523?maca=en-rss-en-top-1022-rdf)//javi

Experts are skeptical as to whether such an agreement can ever be reached. They point to similar visions of free, transatlantic trade from the past that fizzled out in the political chambers of Washington and Brussels. After the multi-year and ultimately fruitless worldwide trade deal called the Doha Development Agenda failed in 2008, Washington is also tired of endless discussion. In order to gauge the seriousness of Europeans on the matter, the Obama administration has recently been anxious for a clear signal from Brussels. Yet even if the EU and US begin negotiations in the coming months, success is anything but assured. Negotiators from both the US government and the EU Commission will not be free to negotiate as they please. Without the ultimate approval of US Congress and the EU Parliament, there will be no agreement. Other countries, such as Turkey, which has a customs agreement with the EU, or Canada and Mexico, which are linked to US trade through NAFTA, will at the very least have to play an informal role in future negotiations.

#### TTIP failure hurts US-EU trade ties and relations

Llana 7/8/13 – (Sara Miller, “Will US-EU trade talks spur growth - or show globalization's limits?”, CSM, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2013/0708/Will-US-EU-trade-talks-spur-growth-or-show-globalization-s-limits)//javi

Yet even if it fails – and there are plenty who think that the obstacles such as agriculture and, most recently, data privacy are insurmountable – a failure would be pivotal, showing that tariffs can be dropped but non-tariff barriers, which are often more cultural in nature, remain stubborn. A failure, says Fredrik Erixon, the director of the European Center for International Political Economy (ECIPE) in Brussels, “could lead to a larger standstill in efforts to address 21st century trade barriers.” Long-standing obstacles Tariffs between the US and EU are already relatively low, but because of the sheer size of trade between the two – representing half of global economic output – advocates say it would be a major booster of growth and jobs, especially in debt-stricken Europe that has seen record high unemployment at 12.2 percent. The two already invest nearly $4 trillion in each other’s economies, according to US statistics, which translates into 7 million jobs. It’s the non-tariff barriers, however, that most are watching in TTIP talks. Today, if a product is made in France, for example, it goes through the various regulatory hurdles to bring it to the marketplace; it then has to go through another set of strenuous – and often redundant – hurdles to reach the US market. Under the TTIP, both sides could agree to mutually recognize the others’ systems. When it comes to car safety, reducing red tape may be an easy compromise. But other issues on the table have long vexed negotiators. That includes French subsidies for its film industry, European resistance to genetically modified foods (GMOs), or data privacy laws – especially in the wake of the information released by former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden revealing the US systematically spies on its own citizens, as well as European institutions. “One of the sleeper issues in the deal is how to deal with privacy,” says Bruce Stokes, the director of the Global Economic Attitudes program at the Pew Research Center. Europeans, particularly Germyns, are far more sensitive than Americans when it comes to data privacy. “There is a disconnect between Europeans and Americans about this new digital economy,” Mr. Stokes says. And even if the Snowden case is about government, not industry, it bolsters European assumptions that Americans don’t care about privacy, he says. Supporters of the agreement know these talks will be arduous, but at a time of economic weakness, they might have the political will to push forward. “Europe is stuck, and the US is also stuck, although not quite as bad,” says Thomas Wright, a fellow in the Mynaging Global Order project at the Brookings Institution. “This offers a way that leaders can be proactive and generate growth. I think that resonates with people, particularly in Europe.” Mr. Erixon also says that regulators in specific industries have more of an incentive to find solutions now, because their refusal to compromise would influence every other industry included in the talks. On the issue of the US using chlorine when washing chicken, for example, compromise has been impossible because the context was always too small. “Regulators were trying to defend their position, with no interest at all in participating in negotiations with other countries,” he says. “If you play filibuster now, the cost is higher.” 'Cultural exceptions' – and similarities So far TTIP has not generated widespread controversy in the US. That might be because it’s still early days. But it’s also because of the nature of the deal, says Charles Kupchan, a transatlantic expert at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. “Since trade is relatively free and since [the US] and the EU are at similar stages of development, this is not a deal that is going to cause major dislocation,” he says. “This is an easier sell politically.” Opposition might be stronger on the European side. Already the French sought to invoke the so-called “cultural exception” in the talks, as a way to protect its movie industry from an incursion from Hollywood. France ultimately agreed to allow media to be included in talks so that they could officially launch, but it will be among the most difficult issues to negotiate. “It’s not a little issue. It’s the cultural meat of a nation,” says Josef Braml, transatlantic expert at the Germyn Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin, who has little hope that a deal is attainable – above all, he says, because of the weakness of President Obama. But the “cultural exception” debate could be a harbinger of sentiments that develop as the trade talks get underway. Guillaume Xavier-Bender of the Germyn Marshall Fund of the US in Brussels says that in many ways the talks will show how similar regulations between Europe and the US are. “There are more things in common between Europeans and Americans than there are differences,” he says. But on the politically most sensitive issues, claims that TTIP is merely an American instrument to change European values could be made. “It is possible in Europe you see anti-globalization and anti-liberalization movements evolve into anti-Americanism,” he says. If an agreement becomes impossible to forge, it may ultimately illustrate more than transatlantic differences. Mr. Stokes says that global economies have continuously become more closely integrated over time. But if in the TTIP it’s possible to get rid of tariffs yet not non-tariff barriers, he says it will be telling for the future of trade agreements globally – a sign, he says, that “we may be encountering the edges of the limits of globalization.”

#### EU says yes

COG 3/3/08 – (Bob Thiel, “A Combined EU & North American Trade Block Coming?”, Church of God News, http://www.cogwriter.com/news/prophecy/a-combined-eu-north-american-trade-block-coming/)//javi

Fifty-five U.S. Senators and Congressmyn currently serve as advisors to a “working group” for the Transatlantic Common Market between the U.S. and the European Union. “An economist from the World Bank has argued in print that the formation of the Transatlantic Common Market is designed to follow the blueprint of Jean Monet, a key intellectual architect of the European Union, recognizing that economic integration must inevitably lead to political integration.” The idea of this union came to light in April 2007, when President Bush, Germyn Chancellor Merkel, and European Commission President Barroso launched the Transatlantic Economic Council. Efforts are already underway to create a North American Community, including the U.S., Mexico and Canada. This community is to be based on security and economic issues and is intended to be in place by 2010 (WorldNetDaily.com, July 20, 2005; September 25, 2006). The Transatlantic Common Market is intended to combine the North American Community with the EU, creating the world’s most formidable trade bloc—a trade bloc that would be so large that its trading policies would automatically become policies for the world. Plans for this new “common market” are proceeding and are intended to pass through in a “treaty” form, much like the most recent EU Treaty, in order to avoid the scrutiny and debate that often come with more “formal” agreements (January 16, 2008). Revelation 18 warns of a future Beast, known as Babylon the Great, through which “the merchants of the earth have become rich through the abundance of her luxury” (v. 3). I have been expecting such a development for some time. And today, I would like to explain what I have believed for over 20 years will most likely happen with the above proposed trade block. Negotiations will continue and some type of loose agreements will happen. In the spirit of accommodation and personal interest, many of the “standards” of the European Union will be adopted by the USA, Canada and Mexico, as well as by nearly all of the countries of the world. The Arab nations will most likely agree with many of the standards as they seem to be destined to form a brief end-time alliance with the Europeans (The Arab World In the Bible, History, and Prophecy).

#### Decline in US-EU relations causes Protectionism

C. Fred Bergsten 99, Director, Institute for International Economics, “America and Europe: Clash of the Titans?” FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 78 n. 2, March/April 1999, p. 20+, LN.

Both sides now run the risk of drift and even paralysis in transatlantic trade policy -- with potentially severe repercussions for the rest of the world. A slide into protectionism or even a failure to continue opening new markets would have a major impact on the global trading system. Could we then expect Asian economies, who depend on expanded exports to emerge from their deep recessions, to keep their own markets open? Would the transition economies in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Asia stick to their liberalization strategies? With the backlash against globalization already evident everywhere, the ominous inward-looking protectionist and nationalistic policies that the world has rejected so decisively could reemerge once again. A failure of transatlantic leadership would make such policy reversals particularly likely. The United States and the EU are the only economic superpowers and the only two regions enjoying reasonable economic growth. They created the GATT system and, more recently, the WTO. Despite their own occasional transgressions, they have nurtured and defended the system throughout its evolution over the past 50 years. While Japan has been important on a few issues and the developing countries played an encouraging role in the Uruguay Round, the Atlantic powers built and sustained the world trade order. Their failure to maintain that commitment would devastate the entire regime.

#### Causes large scale military confrontations

Panzer 8 (Michael J., Faculty – New York Institute of Finance, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138)

The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of humyn instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

#### US-EU relations key to allowing negotiations with Iran about its nuclear program

Kerr 5 – (Paul, "Iran-EU Nuclear Negotiations Begin", Arms Control Today, January/February, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005\_01-02/Iran\_EU)

Washington has repeatedly pushed for resolutions that take a harder line on Iran at past board meetings but has failed to persuade the other board members to agree. The United States also continues to express concern that Iran is pursuing covert nuclear activities. U.S. Ambassador Jackie Sanders told the IAEA board Nov. 29 that Washington wants Iran “immediately” to provide access to Iran’s Parchin military complex, which U.S. officials believe might have facilities that could be used to test conventional high explosives for use in an implosion-type nuclear weapon. The IAEA has not yet received permission to visit, the State Department official said Dec. 16. (See ACT, October 2004.) Washington failed to persuade the board to adopt language giving the IAEA expanded authority to inspect Iranian facilities. Instead, the November resolution requests that Iran “provide any access deemed necessary by the Agency” in accordance with Iran’s additional protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Safeguards agreements require states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to allow the IAEA to monitor their declared civilian nuclear activities to ensure that they are not diverted to military use. Additional protocols augment the agency’s authority to detect clandestine nuclear activities, but there are limits to the agency’s ability to inspect military facilities. Tehran has signed an additional protocol and has agreed to abide by its provisions until Iran’s parliament ratifies the agreement. On the trade front, Washington’s lack of enthusiasm for engagement with Iran could also complicate the negotiations. The suspension agreement states that the Europeans “will actively support the opening of Iranian accession negotiations” at the World Trade Organization (WTO). A State Department official told Arms Control Today Dec. 20 that the Europeans wanted a WTO General Council meeting earlier in the month to call for negotiations to begin, but the U.S. delegation said that Washington is not ready to move forward on the matter. U.S. support is necessary because the WTO makes decisions by consensus.

#### A nuclear Iran results in instability and results in ineffective deterrence

Kroenig and McNally ’13— Matthew, assistant professor and international relations field chair in the department of government at Georgetown University, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Robert, served as Senior Director for International Energy at the U.S. National Security Council and Special Assistant to the President at the U.S. National Economic Council, March 2013 (Matthew and Robert, “Iranian Nukes and Global Oil,” The American Interest, Vol. 8, No. 4.)djm

But the impact of sanctions on future Iranian production pales in comparison to the other geo-economic implications of nuclear weapons in Iran. A nuclear Iran will likely increase the frequency and scope of geopolitical conflict in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East. While policy analysts continue to debate how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, most agree a nuclear-armed Iran would have grave repercussions for the region. In March 2012 President Obama stated that U.S. policy was to prevent—not contain—a nuclear-armed Iran, and he explained why: “The risks of an Iranian nuclear weapon falling into the hands of terrorist organizations are profound. It is almost certain that other players in the region would feel it necessary to get their own nuclear weapons. So now you have the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the world, one that is rife with unstable governments and sectarian tensions. And it would also provide Iran the additional capability to sponsor and protect its proxies in carrying out terrorist attacks, because they are less fearful of retaliation.”10 President Obama’s fears are well-founded. Iran harbors ambitious geopolitical goals. After national survival, Iran’s primary objective is to become the most dominant state in the Middle East. In terms of international relations theory, Iran is a revisionist power. Its master national-historical narrative holds that Iran is a glorious nation with a storied past, and that it has been cheated out of its rightful place as a leading nation: Like pre-World War I Germany and China today, it is determined to reclaim its place in the sun. Currently, Iran restrains its hegemonic ambitions because it is wary of U.S. or Israeli military responses—particularly the former. But if Iran obtained nuclear weapons, its adversaries would be forced to treat it with deference if not kid gloves, even in the face of provocative acts. Iran would achieve a degree of “inverted deterrence” against stronger states by inherently raising the stakes of any military conflict against it to the nuclear level.11 As such, nuclear weapons would provide Iran with a cover under which to implement its regional ambitions with diminished fear of a U.S. military reprisal. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up its support for terrorist and proxy groups attacking Israeli, Saudi and U.S. interests in the greater Middle East and around the world; increase the harassment of and attacks against naval and commercial vessels in and near the Persian Gulf; and be more aggressive in its coercive diplomacy, possibly brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to intimidate adversaries and harmless, weaker neighbors alike. In short, a nuclear-armed Iran would exacerbate current conflicts in the Middle East, and this likely bears jarring consequences for global oil prices. Because of the heightened threat to global oil supply that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose, market participants would certainly add a large “risk premium” to oil prices. Oil prices reflect perceived risk in addition to information on actual events or conditions in the market. Recent history shows that even without nuclear weapons, Iran-related events in the Middle East have affected oil prices on fears they could spark a regional war. Traders bid up oil prices in January 2006 when the IAEA referred Iran to the UN Security Council. In subsequent months, news reports about heated Iranian rhetoric and military exercises helped to drive crude prices up further. The surprise outbreak of the Israel-Hizballah war in 2006, not entirely unrelated to concerns about Iran, triggered a $4 per barrel spike on contagion fears. The Iran risk premium subsided after 2007, but a roughly $10–$15 per barrel (10 percent) risk premium returned in early 2012 after the United States and the European Union put in place unusually tough sanctions and hawkish rhetoric on both sides heated up. A survey of nearly two dozen traders and analysts conducted by the Rapidan Group found that a protracted conventional conflict between the United States and Iran that resulted in a three-week closure of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz would lead to a $25 per barrel rise in oil prices, despite the use of strategic petroleum reserves.12 Were Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons, the risk premium would greatly exceed the $4–$15 per barrel (roughly 4–15 percent at current prices) already caused by a non-nuclear Iran.13 We expect a belligerent, nuclear-armed Iran would likely embed a risk premium of at least $20–$30 per barrel and spikes of $30–$100 per barrel in the event of actual conflict. Such price increases would be extremely harmful to economic growth and employment. The challenges a nuclear-armed Iran would pose for the oil market are exacerbated by a prospective diminished U.S. ability to act as guarantor of stability in the Gulf. U.S. military presence and intervention has been critical to resolving past threats or geopolitical crises in the region. It has also calmed oil markets in the past. Examples include escorting oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War, the destruction of much of Iran’s surface fleet in response to Iran’s mining the Gulf in 1988 and leading a coalition to repel Saddam Hussein’s short-lived invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Currently, the United States can use and threaten to use force against Iran without fear that Iran will retaliate with nuclear weapons. When Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in the past, for example, the United States has announced that it would reopen the Strait if Iran went through with it, confident that the U.S. military could quickly prevail in any conventional conflict with Iran while running very little risk of retaliation. If Iran had nuclear weapons, however, U.S. military options would be constrained by inverted deterrence. U.S. threats to use force to reopen the Strait could be countered by Iranian threats to use devastatingly deadly force against U.S. allies, bases or forces in the region. Such threats might not be entirely credible since the U.S. military would control any imaginable escalation ladder up to and including the nuclear threshold, but it wouldn’t be entirely incredible, either, given the risk of accident or inadvertent nuclear use in a high-stakes crisis. If, further, Iran develops ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States—and the annual report of the U.S. Department of Defense estimates this could happen as soon as 2015—Iran could also threaten nuclear strikes against the U.S. homeland in retaliation for the use of conventional forces in the region. Any U.S. President would have to think long and hard about using force against Iran if it entailed a risk of nuclear war, even a nuclear war that the United States would win. Most worrisome, an unstable, poly-nuclear Middle East will mean that nuclear weapons will be ever-present factors in most, if not all, future regional conflicts. As President Obama noted in the remarks excerpted above, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and other states might follow suit. Nuclear weapons in these states would further complicate the nuclear balance in the region and potentially extend the boundaries of any nuclear exchange. Even if Iran’s leaders are less reckless and suicidal than their rhetoric would suggest, international politics, crises and miscalculation do not end when countries acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear powers still challenge nuclear-armed adversaries. As the early decades of the Cold War remind us, nuclear-armed states do sometimes resort to nuclear brinkmanship that can lead to high-stakes nuclear standoffs. We were lucky to survive the Cold War without suffering a massive nuclear exchange; President Kennedy estimated that the probability of nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis alone was as high as 50 percent.14 The reference to the early days of the Cold War is not merely decorative here. Nearly all of the conditions that helped us avoid nuclear war during the latter half of the Cold War are absent from the Iran-Israel-U.S. nuclear balance. Then, there were only two players, both with secure, second-strike capabilities and strategic depth; relatively long flight times for ballistic missiles between states, enabling all sides to eschew launch-on-warning postures; clear lines of communication between capitals; and more. In a high-stakes nuclear crisis with Iran and its adversaries, there is a real risk that things could spiral out of control and result in nuclear war**.**

### Plan

#### Thus the plan, the United States federal government ought to include the United Mexican States in the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

### Solvency

#### US should invite Mexico to EU-US partnership

Siekierski 3/15/13 – (BJ, “Is Mexico looking for NAFTA-EU trade talks?”, iPolitics, <http://www.ipolitics.ca/2013/03/15/is-mexico-looking-for-nafta-eu-trade-talks/>)//javi

“It seems really logical to us that this be a trilateral negotiation and that Mexico join,” Minister Guajardo was quoted as saying, in Spanish, by a prominent Mexican business newspaper, El Financiero, Wednesday. Though Mexico already has an agreement with the European Union — which came into force in 2000 — the El Financiero article says Mexican and European authorities have agreed to strengthen it. Rather than negotiate simultaneously with the Americans, therefore, the idea would be to bring both negotiations under one roof. And since Canada is a fellow NAFTA partner, common sense would dictate Canadian involvement as well. With the EU and U.S. aiming to begin their Transatlantic talks in June, Guajardo indicated that Mexico would be “formally petitioning” the EU President and Barack Obama to make it a NAFTA-EU negotiation, El Financiero reported.

**The plan solves by including Mexico and they would say yes**

**Meacham 7/25**/13 – director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Tania Miranda, intern scholar with the CSIS Americas Program, provided research assistance (Carl, “The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Mexico Wants In—Why Not?”, CSIS, http://csis.org/publication/trans-atlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-mexico-wants-why-not)//javi

Under this broad umbrella, there has been one question increasingly posed by policymakers in the Western Hemisphere and the private sector alike: why isn’t Mexico part of the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations?—and the ambassador affirmed Mexico’s firm support for the country’s inclusion. The negotiations for the TTIP, the long awaited free trade agreement (FTA) between the United States and the European Union (EU), launched two weeks ago. Though the start of the talks were initially marred by intense political tensions caused by the recent revelations of U.S. global espionage operations, both parties decided to move forward, given how much both stand to benefit from the agreement. The agreement aims to remove existing trade barriers on a variety of economic sectors between the EU and the United States in order to promote investment flows, facilitate commerce, and boost economic growth and job creation on both sides of the Atlantic. If the negotiations are successful, the TTIP will be the biggest trade agreement in history, encompassing 40 percent of global output. Yet, while Mexico is a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), remains among the United States' top three trade partners, and already has an FTA with the European Union to build upon, it remains on the negotiating sidelines. And in recent talks at CSIS, including by the National Security Council’s Latin America head as well as the EU’s manager for the Americas, there does not appear to be much interest in including Mexico in talks that are, admittedly, already complex. But if both the United States and the EU are looking to foster economic growth and employment through trade liberalization, why not transform these EU-U.S. talks into an EU-U.S.-Mexico agreement? Q1: What does the Mexican economy look like today? What free trade agreements does the country already belong to? A1: While much of the focus on Mexico from the United States remains on security and immigration, it is the country's increasing competitiveness and economic liberalization that merit attention. Mexico, Latin America's second largest economy, is currently a member of 12 different FTAs involving 44 other nations, making it among the most open of the world's leading economies. In 2011, a full third of Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) was comprised of exports and imports. In contrast, just 15 percent of U.S. GDP was derived from the same. Mexico's extensive network of FTAs includes most of the Western Hemisphere, Israel, and Japan. It also belongs to an economic partnership with the European Union (enacted in 2000) and to NAFTA—the world's largest FTA to date, with a combined GDP of $17 trillion linking 450 million people. Last year, Mexico joined the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, a high-standard FTA among a number of Pacific Rim countries that remains in the works. It is also a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), and the emerging Pacific Alliance, a free trade and integration effort that hopes to become the commercial bridge between the Americas and the Asia Pacific region. Mexico alone is a bigger market for the United States than all the BRIC economies combined, and growing opportunities for trade and investment in the economy solidify this status moving forward. Q2: Why has Mexico been excluded from TTIP negotiations to date? A2: While Mexico's recent economic growth has proven impressive, entering the TTIP would provide a meaningful surge for the Mexican economy, potentially propelling it into the proverbial big leagues. **Mexico's interest in being included in the agreement is no secret**, but both the United States and the European Union have ignored the petition, claiming inopportune political circumstances. The reasoning here is twofold. First, given the years of encouragement that preceded the formal start of EU-U.S. negotiations, neither party wishes to jeopardize what could be the biggest FTA in history by bringing more participants on board--regardless of the value their inclusion adds. Leaders from both the United States and the EU think this would bring a long and burdensome political process that could prove detrimental for the negotiations. And though both have shied away from anything that might complicate the process of reaching an initial agreement, neither has rejected the idea of accepting more members down the road, once the agreement is consolidated. The second argument is more of a corollary to the first. At his talk with the Americas Program last week, Christian Leffler, the EU’s managing director for the Americas, explained that because Mexico already shares FTAs with the United States and the EU, including Mexico in the TTIP can be seen as superfluous—at least for now. Particularly given the drag additional parties could put on negotiations, the benefits of including Mexico, so the argument goes, fail to outweigh the potential costs. Q3: Why should Mexico be included in the ongoing TTIP negotiations? A3: In simplest terms, all three parties stand to gain from including Mexico in the TTIP negotiations. While Mexico does have standing trade agreements with the United States and the European Union, both are seen as outdated. EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht called for the modernization of the current Mexico-EU agreement last November, and NAFTA modernization including the energy and telecommunications sectors, both of which were excluded when the agreement entered into force nearly 20 years ago, would greatly advance the political and economic interests of the United States. Mexico's stake in being included the agreement is straightforward. The sheer size of the proposed market, coupled with the added competitiveness **Mexico would lose out** on **should it remain excluded,** together provide a compelling rationale for why TTIP membership is in Mexico's interests. It is important for the United States and the EU to remember that Mexico brings a lot to the negotiating table. First, Europe, in dire need of economic reinvigoration and expanded employment, has much to gain from Mexico's liberalized trade with the rest of the world--and its need for foreign direct investment. Second, the U.S.-Mexican economic interdependence implies that indirectly, the more Mexico enhances its global trade relationships, the better off the United States is as well. Finally, because Mexican supply chains are already closely linked to the rest of Latin America and the Asia Pacific region, both the United States and the European Union stand to gain from increased access to those markets as well, and that access could come by means of Mexico's inclusion in the TTIP, given its membership in both the TPP and the Pacific Alliance. Just as NAFTA transformed the relationship between the United States and Mexico, a TTIP that brought our southern neighbor on board could do the same for transatlantic relations. Given its global commercial links, and growing economy and productivity, it makes more sense than ever to bring in one of our biggest economic partners to the TTIP. Conclusion: Mexico is reemerging as a leading destination for foreign investment given the country's low production costs, proximity to the U.S. market, recent sweeping reforms in key economic sectors (and more expected to come), and emerging economies of scale in high-skilled industries. Engaging in the dynamic free trade opportunities the TTIP offers will spur North American and transatlantic economic cooperation alike--and strengthen all parties' competitiveness globally. True, including Mexico will likely make negotiations more difficult. But if the United States and European Union think a little more boldly, the economic results would speak for themselves.

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#### “Engagement” requires direct talks with the target government

Crocker 9 – Chester Crocker, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, “Terms of Engagement”, New York Times, 9-13, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/opinion/14crocker.html?\_r=0

PRESIDENT OBAMA will have a hard time achieving his foreign policy goals until he masters some key terms and better manages the expectations they convey. Given the furor that will surround the news of America’s readiness to hold talks with Iran, he could start with “engagement” — one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon.

The Obama administration has used this term to contrast its approach with its predecessor’s resistance to talking with adversaries and troublemakers. His critics show that they misunderstand the concept of engagement when they ridicule it as making nice with nasty or hostile regimes.

Let’s get a few things straight. Engagement in statecraft is not about sweet talk. Nor is it based on the illusion that our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only we would talk to them. Engagement is not normalization, and its goal is not improved relations. It is not akin to détente, working for rapprochement, or appeasement.

So how do you define an engagement strategy? It does require direct talks. There is simply no better way to convey authoritative statements of position or to hear responses. But establishing talks is just a first step. The goal of engagement is to change the other country’s perception of its own interests and realistic options and, hence, to modify its policies and its behavior.

#### Either is topical

Haass 00 – Richard N. Haass, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, “Engaging Problem Countries”, Brookings Policy Brief, No. 61, June,

<http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/18245/1/Engaging%20Problem%20Countries.pdf>?1

Engagement as a policy is not merely the antithesis of isolation. Rather, it involves the use of economic, political, or cultural incentives to influence problem countries to alter their behavior in one or more realms. Such a strategy can take a variety of forms. *Conditional* engagement is a government-to-government affair in which the United States offers inducements to a target regime in exchange for specified changes in behavior. This was the approach favored in 1994 when the United States and North Korea entered into a framework agreement under which Pyongyang pledged to curtail its nuclear weapons development in exchange for shipments of fuel, construction of a new generation of nuclear power-generating reactors, and a degree of diplomatic normalization. In contrast, *unconditional* engagement is less contractual, with incentives being extended without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Unconditional engagement makes the most sense in promoting civil society in hopes of creating an environment more conducive to reform.

### Critique

#### Trade inevitable – only variable is the effectiveness of rules to govern it

Chanda, Director of Publications at the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, ‘8 (Nayan, May, “Runaway Globalization Without Governance” Global Governance, Vol 14, p 119-125)

Globalization has been with us since the dawn of history, but the notion of trying to govern the interconnections that it has produced is a more recent phenomenon. Governance has thus developed slowly, lagging far behind the trade, travel, and interaction wrought by globalization. Al­though the gap between globalization and governance has caused problems and resulted in conflict, it was less serious a problem than it is now. As the world has become intimately integrated, the failure of globalization's major players, especially the United States, to develop global rules risks turning globalization in a harmful direction. In a longue duree historical perspective, globalization has been grow­ing ever since homo sapiens settled into sedentary cultures in river valleys. Connections that began as short forays for trading, exploration, evangelism, and imperial expansion have accelerated over the millennia. As I argue in my book Bound Together, traders, preachers, adventurers, and warriors have continually connected dispersed human communities and civilizations, gradually creating the interconnected society we now label globalized. The rules and regulations governing these communities have evolved over the millennia of interaction. But the rules always lagged behind the growing connections across continents. Traders from different lands devel­oped rules of transaction as trade expanded. Rulers and warriors introduced taxes to earn revenue from commercial transactions and forbade certain products to protect their own. To protect the exclusivity of their valuable trading goods, countries often barred the export of certain seeds or eggs. Those rules and regulations spread as empires expanded and covered ever widening territories. Preachers and adventurers (including immigrants) walked the earth and were subjected to local rules and traditions as diverse as the lands they encountered. In some places, preachers were welcomed, but in others they were put to death. Travelers and immigrants too faced varying receptions on different shores. Warriors made their own rules as they trampled on other territories, killing and subjugating those who resis­ted. Although rules of behavior in war between countries have existed in some fashion for a long time, it was not until the nineteenth century that the first body of written rules appeared. However, that did not help diminish the butchery of the two world wars. In the thousands of years that humans have been leaving home to con­nect with fellow humans in distant lands, the basic impetus has not changed, though the means of transaction have. So too have the consequences of large-scale exchanges. The major factor motivating traders, preachers, adventurers, and warriors to traverse rivers, mountains, deserts, and oceans was the desire for a more secure, fulfilling, and enriching life. The same motivations are driving those actors' modern counterparts, now much vaster in number. In­dividual traders have been joined by 63,000 multinationals trying to pro­cure goods and services globally and merchandise them worldwide. Preach­ers have been joined by missionaries of all sorts, including human rights and environmental activists. Though the empires of yore withered away, tens of thousands of soldiers are stationed away from their homes fighting terrorists, stemming civil wars, and protecting their nations' ideology. The ranks of adventurers have been swelled by hundreds of millions of tourists and hundreds of thousands of refugees and emigrants who seek new homes or new adventures. A powerful new actor, the consumer, has joined the traders of old in their drive to find better-quality goods at cheaper prices. The accelerated activities of all these actors have expanded trade and travel to an unprecedented level, creating environmental and health problems. They have encouraged migration, empowered terrorists, incentivized crim­inals, and increased the risks of nuclear proliferation. All these global prob­lems require the attention of a global community. Governance involves regulating people over a finite space. It began with warriors taking charge of a territory, establishing control over people and resources, collecting taxes, and recruiting citizens into the army. Sar-gon, king of ancient Mesopotamia, whose empire extended from the Medi­terranean to the Persian Gulf, proclaimed himself ruler of the world. Alex­ander of Macedon extended his imperial control for a brief period from the Mediterranean to the Indus River in India. The nature and extent of their governance was limited by the resources available—manpower as well as transportation and communication. In 533, The Roman emperor Justinian promulgated his Digest, which listed items that were subject to duty upon entry into Alexandria. Ever since, the imposition of tariffs (derived from the Arabic word for information, inventory) by different rulers, and opposition to them by interested parties, have been a regular feature of policy discourse. The first attempt to create a global structure was not made until after the massive expansion of trade in the twentieth century. Even then, it took nearly fifty years for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to wrap up the first global trading agreement and set up the World Trade Organization (WTO) to deal with the burgeoning trade.

#### Public policy debates about the merits of capitalism and globalization creates a clearer view of the reality of these system

Bhagwati, Professor of Economics and Law at Columbia University and Senior Fellow for International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, ‘2 (Jagdish, January/February, “Coping with Anti-Globalization” Foreign Affairs)

Confronting Anti-Globalization But that does raise the broader question: will anti-globalization then collapse? Do not count on it. It cannot be done unless we engage the anti-globalizers on many fronts. Let me sketch some of the principal ways we must do this. 1. At the outset, we need to use reason and knowledge, in the public policy arena, to controvert the many false and damning assumptions about capitalism, globalization and corporations that I have only sketched and which cannot be allowed to fester and turn to gangrene. It is truly astonishing how widespread is the ready assumption (that is endemic by now even in some international institutions) that if capitalism has prospered and if economic globalization has increased while some social ill has worsened as well, then the former phenomena must have caused the latter! It has almost gotten to a farcical level where if your girl friend walks out on you, it must be due to globalization --- after all, she may have left for Buenos Aires! Perhaps the chief task before those who consider globalization favourably is then to confront the notion, implicit in varying ways in many of the intellectual and other reasons for the growth of anti-globalization sentiments, that while globalization may be economically benign (in the sense of increasing the pie), it is socially malign (i.e. in terms of its impact on poverty, literacy, gender questions, cultural autonomy and diversity et. al.). That globalization is often not the enemy of social agendas but their friend is not that difficult to argue, once we get down to thinking about the matter deeply and empirically. Take the corporations again. Have they hurt women, as some claim? I would say: far from it. Consider three examples: two from the North, the other from the South. Japanese multinationals, as they spread through the world during the years of Japanese prosperity, took the men with them but the men brought their wives with them to New York, Paris, London, cities where the Japanese housewives saw for themselves how women could lead a better life. That, among other channels of diffusion of ideas and values, has turned them into feminist agents of change. Then again, the economists Elizabeth Brainerd and Sandra Black have shown how wage differentials against women have reduced faster in internationally competing industries since they can least afford to indulge their biases in favour of men. Women in the poor countries also benefit when they find jobs in the globalized industries in export processing zones. Some feminists complain that young girls are exploited and sent back to where they came from as soon as they are ready for marriage: that they therefore pick up no skills, for instance. But ask these very girls and one finds the ability to get away for work from home a liberating experience and the money they earn to give them the "empowerment" that will not come from being confined to the home. Indeed, the jaundiced view of corporations prevents an appreciation of their often beneficial role: familiarity breeds contempt but contempt does not breed familiarity. Thus, the young campus activists against sweatshops accuse the corporations of exploitation of foreign workers. But the available empirical evidence for some developing countries, in studies such as by Ann Harrison of Columbia School of Business, shows that, in their own factories (as distinct from subcontractors or suppliers of components and parts who probably pay the going wage instead) the multinationals tend to pay what the economics literature calls a "wage premium" of the order of 10% over the going wage. Is this exploitation? Yes, but only if you are smart enough to know that the English dictionary defines exploiting labour as either using or abusing it! In fact, even as we continue to teach in the classroom about the nefarious activities of ITT in destroying Salvador Allende's elected Chilean regime or the sordid story of Union Meuniere in Katanga, we must come to terms with the fact that these examples, and even lesser atrocities, have become less likely in a world where democracy --- admittedly not always liberal or otherwise pleasing --- has broken out in several developing nations and where again civil society and the media make retribution for misdeeds more likely.

#### Reforming trade doesn’t legitimize it – pragmatic change is best

Bhagwati, Professor of Economics and Law at Columbia University and Senior Fellow for International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, ‘2 (Jagdish, January/February, “Coping with Anti-Globalization” Foreign Affairs)

5. Overlaying the entire scene of course is the general presumption that defines many recent assertions by intellectuals that somehow the proponents of capitalism, and of its recent manifestations in regard to economic reforms such as the moves to privatization and to market liberalization (including trade liberalization), are engaged, as Edward Said's claims, in a "dominant discourse [whose goal] is to fashion the merciless logic of corporate profit-making and political power into a normal state of affairs" [The Nation, September 17/24, 2001, p.32]. Following Pierre Bourdieu, Said endorses the view that "Clinton-Blair neoliberalism, which built on the conservative dismantling of the great social achievements in health, education, labor and security) of the welfare state during the Thatcher-Reagan period, has constructed a paradoxical doxa, a symbolic counterrevolution". In Bourdieu's own words, this is: "conservative but presents itself as progressive; it seeks the restoration of the past order in some of its most archaic aspects (especially as regards economic relations), yet it passes off regressions, reversals, surrenders, as forward-looking reforms or revolutions leading to a whole new age of abundance and liberty)." But, frankly, this view stands reality on its head. Of course, we have known since Orwell that words do matter; and the smart duellists in the controversies over public policy will often seize the high ground by appropriating to themselves, before their adversaries do, beguiling words such as "progressive" for their own causes. Thus, believe it or not, protectionists in trade have been known to ask for "tariff reform"; today, they ask for "fair trade" which no one can deny except for the informed few who see that it is used in truth to justify unfair trade practices. Phrases such as "corporate profit-making" and "trickle down" policies do the same for the friends of Bourdieu, creating and fostering a pejorative perception of the market-using policy changes that they reject. It is therefore not surprising that today's reformers turn to the same linguistic weapons as the anti-capitalist forces of yesterday. But let us also ask: is it "conservative" or "radical" to seek to correct, in light of decades of experience and in teeth of entrenched forces, the mistakes and the excesses of past policies, no matter how well motivated? In fact, as reformers know only too well, it takes courage and elan to challenge orthodoxies, especially those that are conventionally associated with "progressive" forces. As for the policies themselves, the fierce binary contrast drawn by Bourdieu is an abstraction that misses the central issues today. The debate is really not about conservative counterrevolution and the enlightened past order. It is rather about shifting the center of gravity in public action, more towards the use of markets and less towards dirigisme. It is not about "whether markets"; it is about where the "limits to markets" must be drawn. The present-day turn towards reforms in the developing countries is also prompted by excessive and knee-jerk dirigisme. As I often say, the problem with many of these countries was that Adam Smith's Invisible Hand was nowhere to be seen! Their turn to economic reforms is to be attributed, not to the rise of "conservatism", but to a pragmatic reaction of many to the failure of what many of us considered once to be "progressive" policies that would lift us out of poverty, illiteracy and many other ills. As John Kenneth Galbraith once said about Milton Friedman, and here I take only the witticism and not sides, "Milton's misfortune is that his policies have been tried"!

#### Trade eliminates the only rational incentives for war—proves sustainability

Gartzke 11 Erik Gartzke is an associate Professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego PhD from Iowa and B.A. from UCSF "SECURITY IN AN INSECURE WORLD" www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/09/erik-gartzke/security-in-an-insecure-world/

Almost as informative as the decline in warfare has been where this decline is occurring. Traditionally, nations were constrained by opportunity. Most nations did not fight most others because they could not physically do so. Powerful nations, in contrast, tended to fight more often, and particularly to fight with other powerful states. Modern “zones of peace” are dominated by powerful, militarily capable countries. These countries could fight each other, but are not inclined to do so. At the same time, weaker developing nations that continue to exercise force in traditional ways are incapable of projecting power against the developed world, with the exception of unconventional methods, such as terrorism. The world is thus divided between those who could use force but prefer not to (at least not against each other) and those who would be willing to fight but lack the material means to fight far from home. Warfare in the modern world has thus become an activity involving weak (usually neighboring) nations, with intervention by powerful (geographically distant) states in a policing capacity. So, the riddle of peace boils down to why capable nations are not fighting each other. There are several explanations, as Mack has pointed out. The easiest, and I think the best, explanation has to do with an absence of motive. Modern states find little incentive to bicker over tangible property, since armies are expensive and the goods that can be looted are no longer of considerable value. Ironically, this is exactly the explanation that Norman Angell famously supplied before the World Wars. Yet, today the evidence is abundant that the most prosperous, capable nations prefer to buy rather than take. Decolonization, for example, divested European powers of territories that were increasingly expensive to administer and which contained tangible assets of limited value. Of comparable importance is the move to substantial consensus among powerful nations about how international affairs should be conducted. The great rivalries of the twentieth century were ideological rather than territorial. These have been substantially resolved, as Francis Fukuyama has pointed out. The fact that remaining differences are moderate, while the benefits of acting in concert are large (due to economic interdependence in particular) means that nations prefer to deliberate rather than fight. Differences remain, but for the most part the capable countries of the world have been in consensus, while the disgruntled developing world is incapable of acting on respective nations’ dissatisfaction. While this version of events explains the partial peace bestowed on the developed world, it also poses challenges in terms of the future. The rising nations of Asia in particular have not been equal beneficiaries in the world political system. These nations have benefited from economic integration, and this has proved sufficient in the past to pacify them. The question for the future is whether the benefits of tangible resources through markets are sufficient to compensate the rising powers for their lack of influence in the policy sphere. The danger is that established powers may be slow to accommodate or give way to the demands of rising powers from Asia and elsewhere, leading to divisions over the intangible domain of policy and politics. Optimists argue that at the same time that these nations are rising in power, their domestic situations are evolving in a way that makes their interests more similar to the West. Consumerism, democracy, and a market orientation all help to draw the rising powers in as fellow travelers in an expanding zone of peace among the developed nations. Pessimists argue instead that capabilities among the rising powers are growing faster than their affinity for western values, or even that fundamental differences exist among the interests of first- and second-wave powers that cannot be bridged by the presence of market mechanisms or McDonald’s restaurants. If the peace observed among western, developed nations is to prove durable, it must be because warfare proves futile as nations transition to prosperity. Whether this will happen depends on the rate of change in interests and capabilities, a difficult thing to judge. We must hope that the optimistic view is correct, that what ended war in Europe can be exported globally. Prosperity has made war expensive, while the fruits of conflict, both in terms of tangible and intangible spoils have declined in value. These forces are not guaranteed to prevail indefinitely. Already, research on robotic warfare promises to lower the cost of conquest. If in addition, fundamental differences among capable communities arise, then warfare over ideology or policy can also be resurrected. We must all hope that the consolidating forces of prosperity prevail, that war becomes a durable anachronism.

#### They don’t have a concrete alternative – kills activism

Bryant ‘12

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I must be in a mood today– half irritated, half amused –because I find myself ranting. Of course, that’s not entirely unusual. So this afternoon I came across a post by a friend quoting something discussing the environmental movement that pushed all the right button. As the post read,¶ For mainstream environmentalism– conservationism, green consumerism, and resource management –humans are conceptually separated out of nature and mythically placed in privileged positions of authority and control over ecological communities and their nonhuman constituents. What emerges is the fiction of a marketplace of ‘raw materials’ and ‘resources’ through which human-centered wants, constructed as needs, might be satisfied. The mainstream narratives are replete with such metaphors [carbon trading!]. Natural complexity,, mutuality, and diversity are rendered virtually meaningless given discursive parameters that reduce nature to discrete units of exchange measuring extractive capacities. Jeff Shantz, “Green Syndicalism”¶ While finding elements this description perplexing– I can’t say that I see many environmentalists treating nature and culture as distinct or suggesting that we’re sovereigns of nature –I do agree that we conceive much of our relationship to the natural world in economic terms (not a surprise that capitalism is today a universal). This, however, is not what bothers me about this passage.¶ What I wonder is just what we’re supposed to do *even if* all of this is true? What, given existing conditions, are we to do if all of this is right? At least green consumerism, conservation, resource management, and things like carbon trading are engaging in activities that are making real differences. From this passage– and maybe the entire text would disabuse me of this conclusion –it sounds like we are to reject all of these interventions because they remain tied to a capitalist model of production that the author (and myself) find abhorrent. The idea seems to be that if we endorse these things we are tainting our hands and would therefore do well to reject them altogether.¶ The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:¶ The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶ Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶ Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows:¶ Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶ Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?¶ But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, *and when we do*, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation.¶ “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

#### Globalization is necessary to uphold American primacy

Lindsay et. al. 3 (“The Globalization of Politics: American Foreign Policy for a New Century”, Council on Foreign Relations, Winter 2003, http://www.cfr.org/world/globalization-politics-american-foreign-policy-new-century/p6330)

And the United States does differ from other countries. Unique among past hegemons in not seeking to expand its power through territorial gains, it is also unique among its contemporaries. Its primacy and global interests prompt others both to seek its assistance in addressing their problems and to resent it for meddling in their affairs. The ambivalence the world feels about American engagement— as well as the unique nature of that engagement— makes it imperative that the United States not mistake the conduct of foreign policy for a popularity contest. Doing the right thing may not always be popular— but it is vitally important nevertheless. But Globalists are right that while America is powerful, it is not omnipotent. Far more able than most countries to protect itself against the pernicious consequences of globalization, it is by no means invulnerable. Some crucial problems do defy unilateral solutions. Global warming is perhaps the most obvious case, but others include stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction and fighting global terrorism. In other cases, such as protecting the American homeland from terrorist attack, unilateral action can reduce but not eliminate risks. Similarly, unilateral American power may not be enough to sustain the benefits of globalization. Globalization is not irreversible. World War I, the Russian Revolution, and the Great Depression combined to strangle the economic and social interactions that emerged early in the 20th century. Economic globalization today rests on an intricate web of international trade and financial institutions. Extending, developing, and improving these institutions requires the cooperation of others. Without it, the benefits of globalization, which help to underwrite American power, could erode. Globalization has greatly broadened America's foreign policy agenda. Infectious diseases, poverty, and poor governance not only offend our moral sensibilities but also represent potential new security threats. Failed and failing states endanger not just their own citizens but Americans as well. If the United States cannot find ways to encourage prosperity and good governance, it runs the risk of seeing threats to its security multiply. It could eventually find itself harmed not by bears in the woods but by swarms of tiny pests. Finally, cooperation can extend the life of American primacy. Working with others can spread the costs of action over a wider array of actors, enabling the United States to do more with less. By creating international regimes and organizations Washington can imbed its interests and values in institutions that will shape and constrain countries for decades, regardless of the vicissitudes of American power. And cooperation can build bonds with other countries, lessening the chances of cultural and political tactics that can over the years sap U.S. power.

#### Capitalism is key to the formation of successful space programs

Martin 10 (Robert, Amerika, June 21, <http://www.amerika.org/politics/centrifuge-capitalism/>, accessed: 3 July 2011)

Centralization and capitalism are necessary for any intelligent civilization, yet in excess drains the base population of any sustenance whatsoever, leaving them unemployed, homeless and starving at worst. The answer to this event is not a swing on the pendulum all the way onto total equality fisted socialism out on a plate for everyone who isn’t rich, that would be devastating for organization, but is a more natural ecosystem type of financing of a near-barter economics with different values and currencies for localized entities and more buoyant monetary for inter-localities – only monetizing where absolutely necessary. Without the higher economics that goes beyond small barter communities, there could be no space programs, or planetary defences providing the technology or the organization necessary to survive extinction events or fund a military etc, it’s critical for the structure of the superorganism – yet too much and some individuals inside of it become so padded from outside reality that they completely ignore the world around them.

### CP

#### EU can’t get Mexico on board

EA 5/27/13 – (“EU-US trade deal seen with concern in Mexico”, EurActiv, http://www.euractiv.com/development-policy/eu-trans-atlantic-deal-seen-conc-news-520010)//javi

Mexico, which sees itself as a privileged US partner, is concerned about the possible consequences of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), Spanish MEP Ricardo Cortés Lastra told EurActiv in an interview. Cortés Lastra, who is the author of the report on the basis of which the European Parliament Resolution “On defining a new development cooperation policy with Latin America” was adopted in June 2012, shared his impression from his recent visit to Mexico, where he held talks with his counterparts. The Sociliast and Democrat MEP said that his Mexican colleagues were worried that the EU-US trade deal could have as a result that the EU would become a more important to the US at the expense of Mexico. “Logically Mexico, which has the US as great business partner and has a little diversified market, watches with some concern what kind of consequence these agreements might have,” he said. The ideas expressed by Cortés Lastra reflect the state of mind reported in other developing countries, especially in Africa. Both the EU and the US give trade preferences to some African nations, but their benefit schemes differ. Therefore the expected policy harmonisation is raises the question on the negative consequences for some of the countries. Cortés Lastra also said that the EU needed to put in place a new bilateral agreement, the current one, called Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement, dating to 1997. Criticism at the Commission The Spanish MEP blasted the Commission for scaling down its development activities in Latin America. He said that the European Parliament wanted to send a message that Latin America remains, and will remain important to Europe, but that the Commission was “issuing the opposite message”. Even though some Latin American countries have progressed economically, “enormous pockets of poverty” remained, and the EU “should not allow itself” to stop its aid, he insisted.

#### The EU can’t effectively include Mexico into a large trade agreement – lack of integration

Schott and Oegg 1 – Senior Fellow; Research Associate (Jeffrey J. Schott and Barbara Oegg, “Europe and the Americas: Toward a TAFTA-South?”, World Economy, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/schott0601.pdf)

To be sure, the European Union itself has not proposed a broad free trade pact with Latin America similar to the “Free Trade Area of the Americas” under negotiation between the United States and 33 other countries in the Western Hemisphere (see Schott and Hufbauer 1999). Given the diversity in size and level of economic development of Europe’s trading partners in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin, a TAFTA-South agreement would be a daunting task. In some respects, it is comparable to, though much less well defined than, the pursuit of an FTAA among Western Hemisphere countries. Indeed, like the United States, the European Union has started the process by taking small steps with individual countries and regional groups; unlike the United States, it has not yet integrated those initiatives into a single negotiation that over time could create a super-regional free trade zone.

### Debt Ceiling

#### No impact to cyber war

Rid 12 (Thomas, writer for Foreign Policy, “Think Again: Cyberwar,” March, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar)

Time for a reality check: Cyberwar is still more hype than hazard. Consider the definition of an act of war: It has to be potentially violent, it has to be purposeful, and it has to be political. The cyberattacks we've seen so far, from Estonia to the Stuxnet virus, simply don't meet these criteria. Take the dubious story of a Soviet pipeline explosion back in 1982, much cited by cyberwar's true believers as the most destructive cyberattack ever. The account goes like this: In June 1982, a Siberian pipeline that the CIA had virtually booby-trapped with a so-called "logic bomb" exploded in a monumental fireball that could be seen from space. The U.S. Air Force estimated the explosion at 3 kilotons, equivalent to a small nuclear device. Targeting a Soviet pipeline linking gas fields in Siberia to European markets, the operation sabotaged the pipeline's control systems with software from a Canadian firm that the CIA had doctored with malicious code. No one died, according to Thomas Reed, a U.S. National Security Council aide at the time who revealed the incident in his 2004 book, [At the Abyss](http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0891418377/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&tag=fopo-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0891418377); the only harm came to the Soviet economy. But did it really happen? After Reed's account came out, Vasily Pchelintsev, a former KGB head of the Tyumen region, where the alleged explosion supposedly took place, denied the story. There are also no media reports from 1982 that confirm such an explosion, though accidents and pipeline explosions in the Soviet Union were regularly reported in the early 1980s. Something likely did happen, but Reed's book is the only public mention of the incident and his account relied on a single document. Even after the CIA declassified a redacted version of Reed's source, a note on the so-called Farewell Dossier that describes the effort to provide the Soviet Union with defective technology, the agency did not confirm that such an explosion occurred. The available evidence on the Siberian pipeline blast is so thin that it shouldn't be counted as a proven case of a successful cyberattack. Most other commonly cited cases of cyberwar are even less remarkable. Take the attacks on Estonia in April 2007, which came in response to the controversial relocation of a Soviet war memorial, the Bronze Soldier. The well-wired country found itself at the receiving end of a massive distributed denial-of-service attack that emanated from up to 85,000 hijacked computers and lasted three weeks. The attacks reached a peak on May 9, when 58 Estonian websites were attacked at once and the online services of Estonia's largest bank were taken down. "[What's the difference](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2011.608939) between a blockade of harbors or airports of sovereign states and the blockade of government institutions and newspaper websites?" [asked](http://www.vedomosti.ru/smartmoney/article/2007/05/28/3004) Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip. Despite his analogies, the attack was no act of war. It was certainly a nuisance and an emotional strike on the country, but the bank's actual network was not even penetrated; it went down for 90 minutes one day and two hours the next. The attack was not violent, it wasn't purposefully aimed at changing Estonia's behavior, and no political entity took credit for it. The same is true for the vast majority of cyberattacks on record. Indeed, there is no known cyberattack that has caused the loss of human life. No cyberoffense has ever injured a person or damaged a building. And if an act is not at least potentially violent, it's not an act of war. Separating war from physical violence makes it a metaphorical notion; it would mean that there is no way to distinguish between World War II, say, and the "wars" on obesity and cancer. Yet those ailments, unlike past examples of cyber "war," actually do kill people. "A Digital Pearl Harbor Is Only a Matter of Time." Keep waiting. U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta delivered a stark warning last summer: "We could face a cyberattack that could be the equivalent of Pearl Harbor." Such alarmist predictions have been ricocheting inside the Beltway for the past two decades, and some scaremongers have even upped the ante by raising the alarm about a cyber 9/11. In his 2010 book, Cyber War, former White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke invokes the specter of nationwide power blackouts, planes falling out of the sky, trains derailing, refineries burning, pipelines exploding, poisonous gas clouds wafting, and satellites spinning out of orbit -- events that would make the 2001 attacks pale in comparison. But the empirical record is less hair-raising, even by the standards of the most drastic example available. Gen. Keith Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command (established in 2010 and now boasting a budget of more than $3 billion), shared his worst fears in an April 2011 speech at the University of Rhode Island: "What I'm concerned about are destructive attacks," Alexander said, "those that are coming." He then invoked a remarkable accident at Russia's Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric plant to highlight the kind of damage a cyberattack might be able to cause. Shortly after midnight on Aug. 17, 2009, a 900-ton turbine was ripped out of its seat by a so-called "water hammer," a sudden surge in water pressure that then caused a transformer explosion. The turbine's unusually high vibrations had worn down the bolts that kept its cover in place, and an offline sensor failed to detect the malfunction. Seventy-five people died in the accident, energy prices in Russia rose, and rebuilding the plant is slated to cost $1.3 billion. Tough luck for the Russians, but here's what the head of Cyber Command didn't say: The ill-fated turbine had been malfunctioning for some time, and the plant's management was notoriously poor. On top of that, the key event that ultimately triggered the catastrophe seems to have been a fire at Bratsk power station, about 500 miles away. Because the energy supply from Bratsk dropped, authorities remotely increased the burden on the Sayano-Shushenskaya plant. The sudden spike overwhelmed the turbine, which was two months shy of reaching the end of its 30-year life cycle, sparking the catastrophe. If anything, the Sayano-Shushenskaya incident highlights how difficult a devastating attack would be to mount. The plant's washout was an accident at the end of a complicated and unique chain of events. Anticipating such vulnerabilities in advance is extraordinarily difficult even for insiders; creating comparable coincidences from cyberspace would be a daunting challenge at best for outsiders. If this is the most drastic incident Cyber Command can conjure up, perhaps it's time for everyone to take a deep breath.

**Won’t pass- momentum, conclusive, no GOP support**

**MSNBC, 9-13**-2013 <http://maddowblog.msnbc.com/_news/2013/09/13/20477384-congress-on-crazy-pills?lite>

What do Boehner and GOP leaders intend to do? In a way, that's the funny part -- with very little time remaining, **they haven't the foggiest idea.**¶ Consider this amazing behind-the-scenes tidbit.¶ In a bipartisan meeting Thursday among House and Senate leaders, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D., Nev.) asked Mr. Boehner what other concession could be made to satisfy conservatives, other than defunding the health-care law. The speaker said there was none, according to Republican and Democratic aides briefed on the meeting.¶ "Boehner said nothing will appease them but defunding Obamacare," one aide said.¶ **The one thing they want is the one thing they can't have.**¶ Also, the public-private dichotomy is bordering on hilarious. When talking to reporters after bipartisan, bicameral talks yesterday morning, Boehner inexplicably said, "It's time for the president's party to show the courage to work with us to solve this problem," apparently working under the assumption that we're idiots. When talking to policymakers behind closed doors, though, Boehner is desperate, hoping someone will help him clean up his caucus' mess.¶ Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) conceded yesterday, "I like John Boehner. I do feel sorry for him."¶ Reid added, when asked about the likelihood of Republicans shutting down the government in two weeks, "I'm really frightened."¶ That's understandable. In fact, I imagine the vast majority of Americans aren't giving this much thought, but it's probably time they start. It's unpleasant, but radicalized Republican lawmakers really are prepared to deliberately shut down the government, force a debt-ceiling crisis, jeopardize the full faith and credit of the United States, and do untold damage to the economy -- and all of this is going to play out in the coming weeks, not months.¶ From where I sit, there are only four ways forward:¶ 1. A paralyzed House does nothing: Boehner can't put together 218 votes for his stop-gap plan, won't work with Democrats on a more moderate compromise, so the process implodes and the government shuts down on Sept. 30 at midnight.¶ 2. Boehner jettisons the extremists: GOP leaders may soon realize that the radicals can't be reasoned with, but Democrats can be. Boehner can scale back the needlessly stupid sequestration cuts, pick up plenty of Democratic votes, pass a continuing resolution, prevent a shutdown, and win broad praise for bipartisan governing.¶ 3. Boehner caves to the radicals: Unwilling to strike a deal with Democrats, Boehner can pass a spending measure that defunds the Affordable Care Act for real. The Senate and the White House will balk, and the government will shut down.¶ 4. Democrats cave: Boehner probably only needs about 20 to 30 House Democrats to vote for his conservative plan that includes the sequester, and if Dems go along, they'll save his butt and prevent a shutdown.¶ The one thing that I can say with confidence won't happen is that the right winning on health care defunding. There is simply no way Democrats will agree to the right-wing demands on this. As best as I can tell, for Dems, this isn't on the table; it's not open to discussion; and it's not negotiable at any level. Period. Full stop.¶ That said, what happens next is entirely unclear, though next week is bound to be interesting. I'd say **the likelihood of a shutdown at this point is about 65% and climbing.**

**Budget, farm bill, Syria, energy and immigration thump**

**WP, 9-16**-2013 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/09/16/the-congressional-fight-over-obamacare-part-341/>

Will the House pass a short-term budget this week? Maybe. Will the Senate pass its energy-efficiency bill? Wait and see. But this much we know: Congress will once again be **embroiled in disagreements** over Obamacare.¶ Here are a few other things to monitor this week on Capitol Hill:¶ 1. Syria: Lawmakers in both parties responded tepidly over the weekend to the news that the United States and Russia reached an agreement to seize and destroy chemical weapons in Syria — and **nobody seemed** entirely **happy**. Members of the House and the Senate are expected to watch whether Syria meets a Friday deadline to provide an inventory of its chemical weapons but have otherwise shelved plans to authorize U.S. military force.¶ 2. Farm bill: The House passed a scaled-down version of the farm bill in July and Republican leaders plan to hold a vote as early as this week on a measure that would fund food stamps, formally known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. Details of the legislation could come as early as Monday, but supporters hope to strip out about $40 billion in SNAP funding over the next decade, a figure 10 times more than the Senate approved. Congressional Democrats say they will oppose the GOP proposal. The current farm bill is set to expire on Sept. 30 and if a new measure isn’t passed by then, American farmers in January will fall back to a 1949 law governing the industry.¶ 3. Immigration reform: If fights over the budget and the federal debt limit can be sorted out by late October and the situation in Syria subsides — both incredibly big “ifs” — then the House might begin voting on immigration legislation by late October, House aides said. The process would begin with votes on a bipartisan bill to revamp security along the U.S.-Mexican border. House Democrats pushing for votes on immigration legislation are scheduled to meet this week with House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.) to gauge whether there is any hope for the issue in coming weeks.

**PC low and fails for fiscal fights**

Greg **Sargent 9-12**, September 12th, 2013, "The Morning Plum: Senate conservatives stick the knife in House GOP leaders," Washington Post, factiva

All of this underscores a basic fact about this fall's fiscal fights: Far and away **the dominant factor** shaping how they play out will be the divisions among Republicans. There's a great deal of chatter (see Senator Bob Corker for one of the most absurd examples yet) to the effect that **Obama's mishandling of Syria has diminished his standing on Capitol Hill and will weaken him in coming fights**. But those battles at bottom will be about whether the Republican Party can resolve its **internal differences**. Obama's "standing" with Republicans -- if it even could sink any lower -- is **utterly irrelevant to that question**.¶ The bottom line is that, when it comes to how aggressively to prosecute the war against Obamacare, **internal GOP differences may be unbridgeable**. Conservatives have adopted a deliberate strategy of deceiving untold numbers of base voters into believing Obamacare will be stopped outside normal electoral channels. Central to maintaining this fantasy is the idea that any Republican leader who breaks with this sacred mission can only be doing so because he or she is too weak and cowardly to endure the slings and arrows that persevering against the law must entail. GOP leaders, having themselves spent years feeding the base all sorts of lies and distortions about the law, are now desperately trying to inject a does of reality into the debate by pointing out that the defund-Obamacare crusade is, in political and practical terms alike, insane. But it may be too late. The time for injecting reality into the debate has long since passed.

**Obama not pushing- won’t even picnic**

**ABC News, 9-15**-2013 <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/09/obama-calls-gop-debt-ceiling-demands-an-assault-on-us-constitutional-structure/>

On the eve of another fiscal showdown with congressional Republicans, President Obama is **outright refusing to negotiate** over an increase to the nation’s debt limit, saying doing so would alter “the constitutional structure of this government entirely.”¶ “What I haven’t been willing to negotiate, and I will not negotiate, is on the debt ceiling,” Obama told ABC News’ George Stephanopoulos in an exclusive interview on “This Week.”¶ “If we continue to set a precedent in which a president … is in a situation in which each time the United States is called upon to pay its bills, the other party can simply sit there and say, ‘Well, we’re not going to put — pay the bills unless you give us … what we want,’ that changes the constitutional structure of this government entirely,” Obama said.¶ Obama Rejects Criticism of Shifting Syria Policy: ‘I’m Less Concerned About Style Points’¶ House Republicans, seeking to defund and delay implementation of the president’s signature health care law, have sought to use the upcoming debt ceiling and government funding fights to extract concessions from the White House.¶ Obama says he is drawing a line in the sand.¶ “What has never happened in the past was the notion that in exchange for fulfilling the full faith and credit of the United States, that we are wiping away let’s say major legislation like the health care bill,” he told Stephanopoulos.¶ “Never in history have we used just making sure that the U.S. government is paying its bills as a lever to radically cut government at the kind of scale that they’re talking about,” he added.¶ The president said he believes there are areas of common ground between the parties on reforms to entitlement programs and the elimination of corporate tax loopholes. But, he said, an obstinate “faction” of the GOP is standing in the way of compromise.¶ Will Obama Stay Neutral in 2016?¶ “All I can do when it comes to that group of members of Congress is to continue to talk to ‘em and say, ‘Let’s put aside our differences. Let’s stay focused on the American people,’” Obama said. “If we do that, we can get things done.”¶ ABC barack obama this week 2 jt 130914 16x9 608 Obama Calls GOP Debt Ceiling Demands an Assault on US Constitutional Structure¶ ABC News¶ In the past three weeks, Obama and his top aides have been in direct contact with more than 450 members of Congress on the situation in Syria, holding private dinners, conference calls, small group briefings and visits to the White House.¶ Obama’s personal outreach to members on fiscal debates has been **historically less robust**. The White House cancellation of the annual congressional picnic this month will likely not help bolster positive relations heading into the fall.

#### Obama announced the plan

Feldman 8/9/13 – (Elliot, “United States: TPP, TTIP, And Congress: The Elephant In The Room”, Mondaq, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/257058/international+trade+investment/TPP+TTIP+And+Congress+The+Elephant+In+The+Room)

The Washington trade policy community is buzzing over the two largest international trade negotiations since the effective collapse of the Doha multilateral trade round. The buzz may be even louder in foreign capitals. The Obama Administration, in mid-July, was still promising to complete the Trans Pacific Partnership ("TPP") negotiations by year-end, while starting up the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership ("TTIP") negotiations with similar speedy objectives. For both deals there is engagement and enthusiasm. Inside U.S. Trade, the trade community's weekly Bible, devoted over thirty pages, all but one article in a recent edition, to these negotiations.

#### No link – trade doesn’t face opposition

Llana 7/8/13 – (Sara Miller, “Will US-EU trade talks spur growth - or show globalization's limits?”, CSM, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2013/0708/Will-US-EU-trade-talks-spur-growth-or-show-globalization-s-limits)//javi

So far TTIP has not generated widespread controversy in the US. That might be because it’s still early days. But it’s also because of the nature of the deal, says Charles Kupchan, a transatlantic expert at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. “Since trade is relatively free

and since [the US] and the EU are at similar stages of development, this is not a deal that is going to cause major dislocation,” he says. “This is an easier sell politically.” Opposition might be stronger on the European side. Already the French sought to invoke the so-called “cultural exception” in the talks, as a way to protect its movie industry from an incursion from Hollywood. France ultimately agreed to allow media to be included in talks so that they could officially launch, but it will be among the most difficult issues to negotiate.

## 1ar

### Critique

#### Capitalism not the root cause of war and the alt doesn’t solve

Martin 90 Brian Martin, Department of Science and Technology Studies, University of Wollongong, Australia, Uprooting War, 1990 edition http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw13.html

The discussion so far concerns capitalist firms within a particular state. The wider question is, what role does the world capitalist system play in the war system? When examining particular wars, the immediate role of profit and accumulation are often minimal. Examples are World War Two, the Indochinese War and the many Middle East wars. Even in many colonial empires, immediate economic advantages for the capitalist class have played a minor role compared to issues of expansion and maintenance of state power. The role of capitalism mainly entered through its structuring of economic relations which are supervised separately and jointly by capitalist states. The main military service of the state to capitalists in the international system is to oppose movements which threaten the viability of capitalist economic relations. This includes state socialism and all movements for self-management. At the same time, the way this state intervention operates, namely through separate and potentially competing state apparatuses, can conflict with the security of capitalism. Wars and military expenditures can hurt national economies, as in the case of US government expenditures for fighting in Vietnam. Only some struggles against capitalism have potential for challenging the war system. Efforts to oppose capital by mobilising the power of the state do little in this direction. In particular, promotion of state socialism (the destruction of capitalism within a state mode, with the maintenance of bureaucratic control and military power) does little to address the problem of war. The trouble here is that much of the socialist left sees capitalism as the sole source of evil in the world. This approach is blind to the roots of social problems that do not primarily grow out of class domination,

including racism, sexism, environmental degradation and war. Because of this blindness, even the struggle against capitalism is weakened, since attention is not paid to systems of power such as patriarchy and bureaucracy which are mobilised to support capitalism as well as other interests.

#### Only our framework can change economics – they re-entrench the current system

**Scott, 04** – Allen J., Department of Geography, University of California–Los Angeles (“A perspective of economic geography,” Journal of Economic Geography, vol. 4, 2004, http://ecamp.usach.cl/Portales/digeo/asignaturas/geografia\_economica/GE\_8.pdf)

A prospective economic geography capable of dealing with the contemporary world must hew closely, it seems to me, to the following programmatic goals if it is to achieve a powerful purchase on both scientific insight and progressive political strategy. 1. To begin at the beginning: economic geography needs to work out a theoretical re-description of capitalism as a structure of production and consumption and as an engine of accumulation, taking into account the dramatic **changes** that have occurred in recent decades in such phenomena as technology, forms of industrial and corporate organization, financial systems, labor markets, and so on. This theoretical re-description must be sensitive to the generic or quasi-generic forms of capitalist development that occur in different times in different places, which, in turn, entails attention to the kinds of issues that regulation theorists have￼identified under the general rubric of regimes of accumulation (Aglietta, 1976; Lipietz, 1986). 2. In addition to these economic concerns, we must recognize that contemporary capitalism is intertwined with enormously heterogeneous forms of social and cultural life, and that **no one element** of this conjoint field **is** necessarily **reducible to the other.** Directions of causality and influence across this field are a matter of empirical investigation, not of theoretical pre-judgment. Note that in this formulation, class becomes only one possible dimension of social existence out of a multiplicity of other actual and possible dimensions. 3. This nexus of economic, social, and cultural relationships constitutes a creative field or environment within which complex processes of entrepreneurship, learning, and innovation occur. Geographers have a special interest in deciphering the spatial logic of this field and in demonstrating how it helps to shape locational dynamics. 4. In combination with these modalities of economic and social reality, we need to reserve a specific analytical and descriptive space for collective action and institutional order at many different levels of spatial and **organizational scale** (the firm, the local labor market, the region, **the nation**, etc.), together with a due sense of the political tensions and rivalries that run throughout this sphere of human development. By the same token, a vibrant economic geography will always not only be openly policy-relevant (Markusen, 1999), but also politically engaged. A key question in this context is how to build local institutional frameworks that promote both economic success and social justice. 5. We must recognize that social and economic relations are often extremely durable, and that they have a propensity to become independent in varying degree of the individuals caught up within them. This means that any normative account of social transformation and political strategy, must deal seriously with the idea that there are likely to be stubborn resistances to change rooted in these same relations. The solutions to this problem proposed by sociologists like Bourdieu (1972) and Giddens (1979) strike me as providing reasonable bases for pushing forward in this respect, for they explicitly recognize the inertia of social structures while simultaneously insisting on the integrity of individual human volition. Unfortunately, these solutions (most especially the structure-agency formulation of Giddens) have been much diluted in recent years by reinterpretations that lean increasingly heavily on the agency side of the equation, partly as a reflection of the cultural turn, partly out of a misplaced fear of falling into the pit of determinism.5 Invocations of unmediated agency (or, for that matter, neoclassical utility) as an explanatory variable in social science are often little more than confessions of ignorance, in the sense that when we are unable to account for certain kinds of relationships or events, we are often tempted to fall back on the reassuring notion that things are thus and so for no other reason than because that’s the way we want them to be, irrespective of any underlying structural conditions. 6. A corollary of the structured organization and sunk costs of social life is that economic relationships (especially when they are locationally interrelated, as in the case of a regional production system) are likely to be path-dependent. This observation suggests at once that an evolutionary perspective is well 0suited to capture important elements of the dynamics of the economic landscape (cf. Nelson and Winter, 1982; Boschma and Lambooy, 1999). It follows that any attempt to describe the economic landscape in terms of instantaneous adjustment and readjustment to a neoclassical optimum optimorum is intrinsically irrelevant. 7. All of these moments of economic and social reality occur in a world in which geography has not yet been—and cannot yet be—abolished (Leamer and Storper, 2001). The dynamics of accumulation shape geographic space, and equally importantly, geographic space shapes the dynamics of accumulation. This means, too, that capitalism is differentiated at varying levels of spatial resolution, from the local to the global, and that sharp differences occur in forms of life from place to place. Indeed, as globalization now begins to run its course, geographic space becomes more important, not less important, because it presents ever-widening possibilities for finely-grained locational specialization and differentiation. Critical analysis of these possibilities must be one of modern economic geography’s principal concerns. 8. Finally, I want to enter a plea for methodological variety and openness. One corollary of this plea is that economic geographers need to recover the lost skills of quantitative analysis, not out of some atavistic impulse to reinstate the economic geography of the 1960s, but because of the proven value of these skills in the investigation of economic data. The steady erosion of geographers’ capabilities in this regard over the last couple of decades is surely a net loss to the discipline.

#### Trade solves conflict—best studies prove.

Hegre et al 10 – Havard Hegre, Dept PoliSci U Ohio, John Oneal, Dept PoliSci U Alabama, Bruce Russet, Dept PoliSci Yale, “Trade does promote peace: New simultaneous estimates of the reciprocal effects of trade and conflict”, Journal of Peace Research 2010 47: 763

Liberals expect economically important trade to reduce conflict because interstate violence adversely affects commerce, prospectively or contemporaneously. Keshk, Pollins & Reuveny (2004) and Kim & Rousseau (2005) report on the basis of simultaneous analyses of these reciprocal relations that conflict impedes trade but trade does not deter conflict. **Using refined** **measures of** geographic **proximity and size** – the key elements in the gravity model of international interactions – re-**establishes support for the liberal peace**, however. **Without careful specification, trade becomes a proxy for** these fundamental **exogenous factors,** which are also important influences on dyadic conflict. KPR’s and KR’s results are spurious. Large, proximate states fight more and trade more. Our re-analyses show that, as liberals would expect, commerce reduces the risk of interstate conflict when proximity and size are properly modeled in both the conflict and trade equations. **We provided new simultaneous estimates of liberal theory** using Oneal & Russett’s (2005) data and conflict equation and a trade model derived from Long (2008). **These tests confirm the** **pacific benefit of trade**. Trade reduces the likelihood of a fatal militarized dispute, 1950–2000 in our most comprehensive analysis, as it does in the years 1984–97 when additional measures of traders’ expectations of domestic and interstate conflict are incorporated (Long, 2008) and in the period 1885–2000. This strong support for liberal theory is consistent with Oneal, Russett & Berbaum’s (2003) Grangerstyle causality tests and simultaneous estimates by Kim (1998), Robst, Polachek & Chang (2007), and Goenner (2010). Reuveny & Kang (1998) report mixed results. It is particularly encouraging that, when simultaneously estimated, the coefficient of trade in the conflict equation is larger in absolute value than the corresponding value in a simple probit analysis. Thus, the dozens of published articles that have addressed the endogeneity of trade by controlling for the years of peace – as virtually all have done since 1999 – have not overstated the benefit of interdependence. Admittedly, our instrumental variables are not optimal. In some cases, for example, in violation of the identification rule, the creation or end of a PTA may be a casus belli. More importantly, neither of our instruments explains a large amount of variance. Thus, future research should be directed to identifying better instruments. Our confidence in the commercial peace does not depend entirely on the empirical evidence, however; it also rests on the logic of liberal theory. Our new simultaneous estimates – as well as our re-analyses of KPR and KR – indicate that fatal disputes reduce trade. Even with extensive controls for on-going domestic conflict, militarized disputes with third parties, and expert estimates of the risks of such violence, interstate conflict has an adverse contemporaneous effect on bilateral trade. This is hardly surprising (Anderton & Carter, 2001; Reuveny, 2001; Li & Sacko, 2002; Oneal, Russett & Berbaum, 2003; Glick & Taylor, 2005; Kastner, 2007; Long, 2008; Findlay & O’Rourke, 2007; cf. Barbieri & Levy, 1999; Blomberg & Hess, 2006; and Ward & Hoff, 2007). If conflict did not impede trade, economic agents would be indifferent to risk and the maximization of profit. **Because conflict is costly, trade should** **reduce interstate violence**.

Otherwise, national leaders would be insensitive to economic loss and the preferences of powerful domestic actors. Whether paid prospectively or contemporaneously, the **economic cost of conflict should reduce** the **likelihood** of military conflict, ceteris paribus, **if** national **leaders are rational**.

### Politics

#### Cyber attacks have been tried and none have ever had an impact – this card has a chart you should see

**Lewis, 03** (James, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Technology and Public Policy Program, “Cyber terror: Missing in action,” Knowledge, Technology, & policy, Summer)

The absence of cyber terror also does not reflect inactivity on the part of hackers. Carnegie Mellon’s Computer Emergency Response Team has collected statistics showing that since 1996, there have been 217,394 computer security incidents reported.5 This number is probably an underestimate, given the reluctance of companies and organizations to report embarrassing hacks. None of these 217,394 security incidents created panic or terror, damaged U.S. infrastructure, caused casualties, or affected U.S. military operations. A large number of cyber events did occur during the conflict in Iraq. Arab news sites reported hundreds of hacking incidents and a leading Arab news site found its English-language website replaced with a large American flag.6 Large numbers of anti-war or pro-Saddam hackers also defaced a number of U.S. and British websites. Some unclassified U.S. military networks reported “slower download times” because of the attacks. A small number of computer viruses were released as anti-war gestures, but there have not been any reports of significant disruption as a result (one security firm noted that the virus “Ganda,” thought to be Iraq-related, “seems to be a protest against the Swedish school system rather than an anti-war protest”).7 U.S. military doctrine has been amended to include attacks on opponents’ computer networks,8but there are no reports of cyber attacks by U.S. forces against Iraq. This could simply be an absence of reporting on the use of secret cyber weapons or it may reflect the fact that Iraq had practically no computer network infrastructure. Iraq was an uninviting target for cyber attack, but it is not alone in this regard. One dilemma for the United States is that the countries where it has deployed military forces in the last few years—Iraq, Serbia, Somalia, Haiti—are not advanced economies and do not use computer networks for critical functions, making U.S. cyber weapons of limited utility. Another dilemma for future conflicts with against more advanced opponents is that the United States might gain more from penetrating hostile computer networks and unobtrusively observing them while they continue to operate than it would get from disrupting them. The contrast between the thousands of terrorist attacks, tens of thousands of computer hacking incidents, and an absence of cyber terror or cyber attacks on infrastructure, is striking and suggestive. It suggests that, as so many commentators have noted, that cyber terror or cyber attacks on infrastructure are an unlikely threat to the security of the United States. 1  
996-2003   
Computer Security Incidents 217,394  
Terrorist Attacks 1,813  
Cyber Terror Incidents 0

#### Obama will use 14th amendment authority to prevent impact

Kuttner 13 Robert Kuttner is co-founder and co-editor of The American Prospect, as well as a distinguished senior fellow of the think tank Demos. He was a longtime columnist for Business Week and continues to write columns in The Boston Globe. “The Endless Cliff,” 2013, http://prospect.org/article/endless-cliff

What can we expect going forward?¶ President Obama, having discovered that toughness works better than premature conciliation, took a very hard line last night on the issue of the debt ceiling. Coming into the White House briefing room shortly after the House vote, he declared, “While I will negotiate over many things, I will not have another debate with Congress over whether they should pay the bills they’ve already racked up … .”¶ This, presumably, means that Obama, if necessary, will invoke his authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, which declares that debts of the United States shall not be questioned. It was not until the World War I era that the ritual of approving a debt ceiling was even asserted by Congress. This is a position long urged on Obama by Bill Clinton

#### Capital has zero impact

Evan Soltas, Washington Post, 4/17/13, Wonkbook: Obama isn’t leading on immigration, and that’s a good thing, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/04/17/wonkbook-obama-isnt-leading-on-immigration-and-thats-a-good-thing/

A common trope in Washington is that to achieve any particular end, the president must “lead.” If the end in question is not being achieved, then it is because the president is not doing enough leading.¶ At the outset, immigration was also considered a simple question of presidential leadership.”On an issue this big, the president has to lead,” said House Speaker John Boehner.¶ The president hasn’t been leading. Or, if he’s been leading, he’s been leading from behind, permitting Sens. Chuck Schumer and John McCain and Marco Rubio to spearhead the effort. And it’s been the exact right move.¶ Presidential leadership is a polarizing force. Political scientist Frances Lee has shown that when presidents take public positions on even non-controversial subjects, the chances of a party-line vote skyrocket. By campaigning for an idea, the president associates its success with his success. Because the president’s success typically decides his party’s success in the next election, his success is the other party’s failure. And so the minority party, which understandably does not want to fail, has little reason to cooperate.¶ This creates an almost comically vicious cycle wherein presidential leadership pushes the minority party away from a bill, the minority party’s opposition throws the bill’s prospects into doubt, and so the commentariat fills with more calls for the president to lead harder and more aggressively — which only adds further fuel to the process of presidential polarization.¶ President Obama has correctly scrambled these incentives on immigration. Today, the success of immigration reform is considered the success of the Gang of Eight, not of Obama. The potential presidential candidate with the most to gain is Sen. Marco Rubio, a Republican. The immigration bill came out of Sen. Chuck Schumer’s office, not the White House.¶ This will be even more important if and when immigration reaches the House. Speaker John Boehner and his members might see real political upside in helping Sen. Marco Rubio secure a massive achievement and proving that the Republican Party is not opposed to a humane immigration system. They would not see much political upside in helping President Obama fulfill a campaign promise and prove that if you want to get immigration reform done, vote for a Democratic president.¶ Sometimes, the most effective form of presidential leadership is for the president to let someone else take the lead.