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#### Darnell Moore writes

Moore 11 (Darnell L., writer and activist whose work is informed by anti-racist, feminist, queer of color, and anti-colonial thought and advocacy. Darnell's essays, social commentary, poetry, and interviews have appeared in various national and international media venues, including the Feminist Wire, Ebony magazine, and The Huffington Post, "On Location: The “I” in the Intersection," http://thefeministwire.com/2011/12/on-location-the-i-in-the-intersection/)

The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression and see as our particular ask the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking. The synthesis of these oppressions creates the conditions of our lives. As black women we see black feminism as the logical political movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face. -The Combahee River Collective in A Black Feminist Statement¶ Many radical movement builders are well-versed in the theory of intersectionality. Feminists, queer theorists and activists, critical race scholars, progressive activists, and the like owe much to our Black feminist sisters, like The Combahee River Collective, who introduced us to the reality of simultaneity–as a framework for assessing the multitude of interlocking oppressions that impact the lives of women of color–in A Black Feminist Statement (1978). Their voices and politics presaged Kimberlé Crenshaw’s very useful theoretical contribution of “intersectionality” to the feminist toolkit of political interventions in 1989.¶ Since its inception, many have referenced the term—sometimes without attribution to the black feminist intellectual [genealogy](http://thefeministwire.com/2011/12/on-location-the-i-in-the-intersection/) from which it emerged—as a form of en vogue progressive parlance. In fact, it seems to be the case that it is often referenced in progressive circles as a counterfeit license (as in, “I understand the ways that race, sexuality, class, and gender coalesce. I get it. I really do.”) to enter resistance work even if the person who declares to have a deep “understanding” of the connectedness of systemic matrices of oppression, themselves, have yet to discern and address their own complicity in the maintenance of the very oppressions they seek to name and demolish. I am certain that I am not the only person who has heard a person use language embedded with race, class, gender, or ability privilege follow-up with a reference to “intersectionality.”¶ My concern, then, has everything to do with the way that the fashioning of intersectionality as a political framework can lead toward the good work of analyzing ideological and material systems of oppression—as they function “out there”—and away from the great work of critical analyses of the ways in which we, ourselves, can function as actants in the narratives of counter-resistance that we rehearse. In other words, we might be missing the opportunity to read our complicities, our privileges, our accesses, our excesses, our excuses, our modes of oppressing—located “in here”—as they occupy each of us.¶ Crenshaw’s theorization has provided us with a useful lens to assess the problematics of the interrelated, interlocking apparatuses of power and privilege and their resulting epiphenomena of powerlessness and subjugation. Many have focused on the external dimensions of oppression and their material results manifested in the lives of the marginalized, but might our times be asking of us to deeply consider our own “stuff” that might instigate such oppressions?¶ What if we extended Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality by invoking what we might name “intralocality”? Borrowing from sociologists, the term “social location,” which broadly speaks to one’s context, highlights one’s standpoint(s)—the social spaces where s/he is positioned (i.e. race, class, gender, geographical, etc.). Intralocality, then, is concerned with the social locations that foreground our knowing and experiencing of our world and our relationships to the systems and people within our world. Intralocality is a call to theorize the self in relation to power and privilege, powerlessness and subjugation. It is work that requires the locating of the “I” in the intersection. And while it could be argued that such work is highly individualistic, I contend that it is at the very level of self-in-relation-to-community where communal transformation is made possible.¶ Might it be time to travel into the deep of our contexts? Might it be time for us—theorists/activists—to do the work of intersectionality (macro/system-analysis) in concert with the intra-local (micro/self-focused analysis)?¶ Intersectionality as an analysis, rightly, asks of us to examine systemic oppressions, but in these times of radical and spontaneous insurgencies—times when we should reflect on our need to unoccupy those sites of privilege (where they exist) in our own lives even as we occupy some other sites of domination—work must be done at the level of the self-in-community. We cannot—as a progressive community—rally around notions of “progression” and, yet, be complicit in the very homo/transphobias, racisms, sexisms, ableisms, etc. that violently terrorize the lives of so many others. If a more loving and just community is to be imagined and advanced, it seems to me that we would need to start at a different location than we might’ve expected: self.

Smith 9 (Andrea - intellectual, feminist, and anti-violence activist, Founder of INCITE - A National Activist Organization of radical feminists of color, "Heteropatriarchy and the Three Pillars of White Supremacy: Rethinking Women of Color Organizing," http://www.iamsocialjustice.com/images/Color\_of\_Violence.pdf)

This framework has proven to be limited for women of color and people of color organizing. First, it tends to presume that our communities have been impacted by white supremacy in the same way. Consequently, we often assume that all of our communities will share similar strategies for liberation. In fact, however, our strategies often run into conflict. For example, one strategy that many people in US-born communities of color adopt, in order to advance economically out of impoverished communities, is to join the military. We then become complicit in oppressing and colonizing communities from other countries. Meanwhile, people from other countries often adopt the strategy of moving to the United States to advance economically, without considering their complicity in settling on the lands of indigenous peoples that are being colonized by the United States. Consequently, it may be more helpful to adopt an alternative framework for women of color and people of color organizing. I call one such framework the "Three Pillars of White Supremacy." This framework does not assume that racism and white supremacy is enacted in a singular fashion; rather, white supremacy is constituted by separate and distinct, but still interrelated, logics. Envision three pillars, one labeled Slavery/Capitalism, another labeled Genocide/Capitalism, and the last one labeled Orientalism/War, as well as arrows connecting each of the together. Slavery/Capitalism One pillar of white supremacy is the logic of slavery. As Sora Han, Jared Sexton, and Angela P. Harris note, this logic renders Black people as inherently slave- able-as nothing more than property.' That is, in this logic of white supremacy, Blackness becomes equated with slaveability. The forms of slavery may change- whether it is through the formal system of slavery, sharecropping, or through the current prison-industrial complex-but the logic itself has remained consistent. This logic is the anchor of capitalism, that is, the capitalist system ultimately commodifies all workers-one's own person becomes a commodity that one must sell in the labor market while the profits of one's work are taken by someone else. To keep this capitalist system in place-which ultimately commodifies most people-the logic of slavery applies a racial hierarchy to this system. This racial hierarchy tells people that as long as you are not Black, you have the opportunity to escape the commodification of capitalism. This helps people who are not Black to ' accept their lot in life, because they can feel that at least they are not at the very bottom of the racial hierarchy-at least they are nor property; at least they are not slaveable. The logic of slavery can be seen clearly in the current prison industrial complex (PIC). While the PIC generally incarcerates communities of color, it seems to be structured primarily on an anti-Black racism. That is, prior to the Civil War, most people in prison where white. However, after the thirteenth amendment was passed-which banned slavery, except for those in prison-Black people previously enslaved through the slavery system were reenslaved through the prison system. Black people who had been the property of slave owners became state property, through the conflict leasing system. Thus, we can actually look at the criminalization of Blackness as a logical extension of Blackness as property. Genocide/Colonialism A second pillar of white supremacy is the logic of genocide. This logic holds that indigenous peoples must disappear. In fact, they must always be disappearing, in order to allow non-indigenous peoples rightful claim over this land. Through this logic of genocide, non-Native peoples then become the rightful inheritors of all that was indigenous-land, resources, indigenous spirituality, or culture. As Kate Shanley notes, Native peoples are a permanent "present absence" in the US colonial imagination, an "absence" that reinforces, at every turn, the conviction that Native peoples are indeed vanishing and that the conquest of Native lands is justified. Ella Shoat and Robert Stam describe this absence as "an ambivalently repressive mechanism [which] dispels the anxiety in the face of the Indian, whose very presence is a reminder of the initially precarious grounding of the American nation-state itself.. .. In a temporal paradox, living Indians were induced to 'play dead,' as it were, in order to perform a narrative of manifest destiny in which their role, ultimately, was to dissappear." Rayna Green further elaborates that the current Indian "wannabe" phenomenon is based on a logic of genocide: non-Native peoples imagine themselves as the rightful inheritors of all that previously belonged to "vanished" Indians, thus entitling them to ownership of this land. "The living performance of 'playing Indian' by non-Indian peoples depends upon the physical and psychological removal, even the death, of real Indians. In that sense, the performance, purportedly often done out of a stated and implicit love for Indians, is really the obverse of another well- known cultural phenomenon, 'Indian hating,' as most often expressed in another, deadly performance genre called 'genocide."'~ After all, why would non-Native peoples need to play Indian- which often includes acts of spiritual appropriation and land theft-if they thought Indians were still alive and perfectly capable of being Indian themselves? The pillar of genocide serves as the anchor for colonialism-it is what allows non-Native peoples to feel they can rightfully own indigenous peoples' land. It is okay to take land from indigenous peoples, because indigenous peoples have disappeared. Orientalism/War A third pillar of white supremacy is the logic of Orientalism. Orient; s defined by Edward Said as the process of the West defining itself as a superior civilization by constructing itself in opposition to an "exotic" but inferior "Orient." (Here I am using the term "Orientalism" more broadly than to solely signify what has been historically named as the Orient or Asia.) The logic of Orientalism marks certain peoples or nations as inferior and as posing a constant threat to the well-being of empire. These peoples are still seen as "civilizations"-they are not property or "disappeared"-however, they will always be imaged as permanent foreign threats to empire. This logic is evident in the anti-immigration movements within the United States that target immigrants of color. It does not matter holy long immigrants of color reside in the United States, they generally become targeted as foreign threats, particularly during war time. Consequently, orientalism serves as the anchor for war, because it allows the United States to justify being in a constant state of war to protect itself from its enemies. For example, the United States feels entitled to use Orientalist logic to justify racial profiling of Arab Americans so that it can be strong enough to fight the "war on terror." Orientalism also allows the United States to defend the logics of slavery and genocide, as these practices enable the United States to stay "strong enough" to fight these constant wars. What becomes clear then is what Sora Han states- the United States is not at war; the United States is war.4 For the system of white supremacy to stay in place, the United States must always be at war. Because we are situated within different logics of white supremacy, we may misunderstand a racial dynamic if we simplistically try to explain one logic of white supremacy with another logic. For instance, think about the first scenario that opens this essay: if we simply dismiss Latinos or Arab peoples as "white," we fail to understand how a racial logic of Orientalism is in operation. That is, Latinos and Arabs are often situated in a racial hierarchy that privileges them over Black people. However, while Orientalist logic may bestow them some racial privilege, they are still cast as inferior yet threatening "civilizations" in the United States. Their privilege is not a signal that they will be assimilated, but that they will be marked as perpetual foreign threats to the US world order. Organizing Implications Under the old but still potent and dominant model, people of color organizing was based on the notion of organizing around shared victimhood. In this model, how- ever, we see that we are victims of white supremacy, but complicit in it as well. Our survival strategies and resistance to white supremacy are set by the system of white supremacy itself. What keeps us trapped within our particular pillars of white supremacy is that we are seduced with the prospect of being able to participate in the other pillars. For example, all non-Native peoples are promised the ability to join in the colonial project of settling indigenous lands. All non-Black peoples are promised that if they comply, they will not be at the bottom of the racial hierarchy. And Black, Native, Latino, and Asian peoples are promised that they will economically and politically advance if they join US wars to spread "democracy." Thus, people of color organizing must be premised on making strategic alliances with each other, based on where we are situated within the larger political economy. Thus, for example, Native peoples who are organizing against the colonial and genocidal practices committed by the US government will be more effective in their struggle if they also organize against US militarism, particularly the military recruitment of indigenous peoples to support US imperial wars. If we try to end US colonial practices at home, but support US empire by joining the military, we are strengthening the state's ability to carry out genocidal policies against people of color here and all over the world. This way, our alliances would not be solely based on shared victimization, but where we are complicit in the victimization of others. These approaches might help us to develop resistance strategies that do not inadvertently keep the system in place for all of us, and keep all of us accountable. In all of these cases, **we would check our aspirations** against the aspirations of other communities to ensure that our model of liberation does not become the model of oppression for others. These practices require us to be more vigilant in how we may have internalized some of these logics in our own organizing practice. For instance, much racial justice organizing within the United States has rested on a civil rights framework that fights for equality under the law. An assumption behind this organizing is that the United States is a democracy with some flaws, but is otherwise admirable. Despite the fact that it rendered slaves three-fifths of a person, the US Constitution is presented as the model document from which to build a flourishing democracy. However, as Luana Ross notes, it has never been against US law to commit genocide against indigenous peoples-in fact, genocide is the law of the country. [The United States could not exist without it. In the United States, democracy is actually the alibi for genocide-it is the practice that covers up United States colonial control over indigenous lands. Our organizing can also reflect anti-Black racism. Recently, with the out- growth of "multiculturalism" there have been calls to "go beyond the black/white binary" and include other communities of color in our analysis, as presented in the third scenario. There are a number of flaws with this analysis. First, it replaces an analysis of white supremacy with a politics of multicultural representation; if we just include more people, then our practice will be less racist. Not true. This model does not address the nuanced structure of white supremacy, such as through these distinct logics of slavery, genocide, and Orientalism. Second, it obscures the centrality of the slavery logic in the system of white supremacy, which is based on a black/white binary. The black/white binary is not the only binary which characterizes white supremacy, but it is still a central one that we cannot "go beyond" in our racial justice organizing efforts. If we do not look at how the logic of slaveability inflects our society and our thinking, it will be evident in our work as well. For example, other communities of color often appropriate the cultural work and organizing strategies of African American civil rights or Black Power movements without corresponding assumptions that we should also be in solidarity with Black communities. We assume that this work is the common "property of all oppressed groups, and we can appropriate it without being accountable. Angela P. Harris and Juan Perea debate the usefulness of the black/white binary in the book, Critical Race Theory. Perea complains that the black/white binary fails to include the experiences of other people of color. However, he fails to identify alternative racializing logics to the black/white paradigm. Meanwhile, Angela P. Harris argues that "the story of 'race' itself is that of the construction of Blackness and whiteness. In this story, Indians, Asian Americans, and Latinos do exist. But their roles are subsidiary to the fundamental binary national drama. As a political claim, Black exceptionalism exposes the deep mistrust and tensions among American ethnic groups racialized as nonwhite."~ Let's examine these statements in conversation with each other. Simply saying we need to move beyond the black/white binary (or perhaps, the "black/non- black" binary) in US racism obfuscates the racializing logic of slavery, and prevents us from seeing that this binary constitutes Blackness as the bottom of a color hierarchy. However, this is not the only binary that fundamentally constitutes white supremacy. There is also an indigenous/settler binary, where Native genocide is central to the logic of white supremacy and other non-indigenous people of color also form "a subsidiary" role. We also face another Orientalist logic that fundamentally constitutes Asians, Arabs, and Latinos as foreign threats, requiring the United States to be at permanent war with these peoples. In this construction, Black and Narive peoples play subsidiary roles. Clearly the black/white binary is central to racial and political thought and practice in the United States, and any understanding of white supremacy must take it into consideration. However, if we look at only this binary, we may misread the dynamics of white supremacy in different contexts. For example, critical race theorist Cheryl Harris's analysis of whiteness as property reveals this weakness. In Critical Race Theory, Harris contends that whites have a property interest in the preservation of whiteness, and seek to deprive those who are "tainted" by Black or Indian blood from these same white property interests. Harris simply assumes that the positions of African Americans and American Indians are the same, failing to consider US policies of forced assimilation and forced whiteness on American Indians. These policies have become so entrenched that when Native peoples make political claims, they have been accused of being white. When Andrew Jackson removed the Cherokee along the Trail of Tears, he argued that those who did not want removal were really white.7 In contemporary times, when I was a non-violent witness for the Chippewa spearfishers in the late 1980s, one of the more frequent slurs whites hurled when the Chippewa attempted to exercise their treaty-protected right to fish was that they had white parents, or they were really white. Status differences between Blacks and Natives are informed by the different economic positions African Americans and American Indians have in US society. & African Americans have been traditionally valued for their labor, hence it is in the interest of the dominant society to have as many people marked "Black," as possible, thereby maintaining a cheap labor pool; by contrast, American Indians have been valued for the land base they occupy, so it is in the interest of dominant society to have as few people marked "Indian" as possible, facilitating access to Native lands. "Whiteness" operates differently under a logic of genocide than it does from logic of slavery. Another failure of US-based people of color in organizing is that we often fall back on a "US-centricism," believing that what is happening "over there" is less important than what is happening here. We fail to see how the United States maintains the system of oppression here precisely by tying our allegiances to the interests of US empire "over there." Heteropatriarchy and White Supremacy Heteropatriarchy is the building block of US empire. In fact, it is the building block of the nation-state form of governance. Christian Right authors make these links in their analysis of imperialism and empire. For example, Christian Right activist and founder of Prison Fellowship Charles Colson makes the connection between homosexuality and the nation-state in his analysis of the war on terror, explaining that one of the causes of terrorism is same-sex marriage: Marriage is the traditional building block of human society, intended both to unite couples and bring children into the world . . . There is a natural moral order for the family . . . the family, led by a married mother and father, is the best available structure for both child- rearing and cultural health. Marriage is not a private institution designed solely for the individual gratification of its participants. If we fail to enact a Federal Marriage Amendment, we can expect not just more family breakdown, but also more criminals behind bars and more chaos in our streets." Colson is linking the well-being of US empire to the well-being of the heteropatriarchal family. He continues: When radical Islamists see American women abusing Muslim men, as they did in the Abu Ghraib prison, and when they see news coverage of same-sex couples being "married" in US towns, we make this kind of freedom abhorrent-the kind they see as a blot on Allah's creation. We must preserve traditional marriage in order to protect the United States from those who would use our depravity to destroy us? As Ann Burlein argues in Lift High the Cross, it may be a mistake to argue that the goal of Christian Right politics is to create a theocracy in the United States. Rather, Christian Right politics work through the private family (which is coded as white, patriarchal, and middle class) to create a "Christian America." She notes that the investment in the private family makes it difficult for people to invest in more public forms of social connection. In addition, investment in the suburban private family serves to mask the public disinvestment in urban areas that makes the suburban lifestyle possible. The social decay in urban areas that results from this disinvestment is then construed as the result of deviance from the Christian family ideal rather than as the result of political and economic forces. As former head of the Christian Coalition, Ralph Reed, states: "'The only true solution to crime is to restore the family,"10 and "Family break-up causes poverty."" Concludes Burlein, "'The family' is no mere metaphor but a crucial technology by which modern power is produced and exercised."'\* As I have argued elsewhere, in order to colonize peoples whose societies are nor based on social hierarchy, colonizers must first naturalize hierarchy through instituting patriarchy.13 In turn, patriarchy rests on a gender binary system in which only two genders exist, one dominating the other. Consequently, Charles Colson is correct when he says that the colonial world order depends on heteronormativity. Just as the patriarchs rule the family, the elites of the nation-state rule their citizens. Any liberation struggle that does not challenge heteronormativity cannot substantially challenge colonialism or white supremacy. Rather, as Cathy Cohen contends, such struggles will maintain colonialism based on a politics of secondary marginalization where the most elite class of these groups will further their aspirations on the backs of those most marginalized within the community. Through this process of secondary marginalization, the national or racial justice struggle takes on either implicitly or explicitly a nation-state model as the end point of its struggle-a model of governance in which the elites govern the rest through violence and domination, as well as exclude those who are not members of "the nation." Thus, national liberation politics become less vulnerable to being coopted by the Right when we base them on a model of liberation that fundamentally challenges right-wing conceptions of nation. We need a model based on community relationships and on mutual respect.

#### Collins says

Collins 90 (Patricia Hill Collins, Distinguished University Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland, College Park, Former head of the Department of African American Studies at the University of Cincinnati, and the past President of the American Sociological Association Council, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment, p. 62-65)

A second component of the ethic of caring concerns the appropriateness of emotions in dialogues. Emotion indicates that a speaker believes in the validity of an argument. Consider Ntozake Shange’s description of one of the goals of her work: "Our [Western] society allows people to be absolutely neurotic and totally out of touch with their feelings and everyone else’s feelings, and yet be very respectable. This, to me, is a travesty I’m trying to **change** the idea of seeing emotions and intellect as **distinct** faculties." The Black women’s blues tradition’s history of personal expressiveness heals this either/or dichotomous rift separating emotion and intellect. For example, in her rendition of "Strange Fruit," Billie Holiday’s lyrics blend seamlessly with the emotion of her delivery to render a trenchant social commentary on southern lynching. Without emotion, Aretha Franklin’s cry for "respect" would be virtually meaningless. A third component of the ethic of caring involves developing the capacity for empathy. Harriet Jones, a 16-year-old Black woman, explains to her interviewer why she chose to open up to him: "Some things in my life are so hard for me to bear, and it makes me feel better to know that you feel sorry about those things and would change them if you could." Without her belief in his empathy, she found it difficult to talk. Black women writers often explore the growth of empathy as part of an ethic of caring. For example, the growing respect that the Black slave woman Dessa and the white woman Rufel gain for one another in Sherley Anne William’s Dessa Rose stems from their increased understanding of each other’s positions. After watching Rufel fight off the advances of a white man, Dessa lay awake thinking: "The white woman was subject to the same ravishment as me; this the thought that kept me awake. I hadn’t knowed white mens could use a white woman like that, just take her by force same as they could with us." As a result of her newfound empathy, Dessa observed, "it was like we had a secret between us." These components of the ethic of caring: the value placed on individual expressiveness, the appropriateness of emotions, and the capacity for empathy-pervade African-American culture. One of the best examples of the interactive nature of the importance of dialogue and the ethic of caring in assessing knowledge claims occurs in the use of the call-and-response discourse mode in traditional Black church services. In such services both the minister and the congregation routinely use voice rhythm and vocal inflection to convey meaning. The sound of what is being said is just as important as the words themselves in what is, in a sense, a dialogue of reason and emotion. As a result it is nearly impossible to filter out the strictly linguistic-cognitive abstract meaning from the sociocultural psychoemotive meaning. While the ideas presented by a speaker must have validity (i.e., agree with the general body of knowledge shared by the Black congregation), the group also appraises the way knowledge claims are presented. There is growing evidence that the ethic of caring may be part of women’s experience as well. Certain dimensions of women’s ways of knowing bear striking resemblance to Afrocentric expressions of the ethic of caring. Belenky et al. point out that two contrasting epistemological orientations characterize knowing: one an epistemology of separation based on impersonal procedures for establishing truth and the other, an epistemology of connection in which truth emerges through care. While these ways of knowing are not gender specific, disproportionate numbers of women rely on connected knowing. The emphasis placed on expressiveness and emotion in African-American communities bears marked resemblance to feminist perspectives on the importance of personality in connected knowing. Separate knowers try to subtract the personality of an individual from his or her ideas because they see personality as biasing those ideas. In contrast, connected knowers see personality as adding to an individual’s ideas and feel that the personality of each group member enriches a group’s understanding. The significance of individual uniqueness, personal expressiveness, and empathy in African-American communities thus resembles the importance that some feminist analyses place on women’s "inner voice." The convergence of Afrocentric and feminist values in the ethic of caring seems particularly acute. White women may have access to a women’s tradition valuing emotion and expressiveness, but few Eurocentric institutions except the family validate this way of knowing. In contrast, Black women have long had the support of the Black church, an institution with deep roots in the African past and a philosophy that accepts and encourages expressiveness and an ethic of caring. Black men share in this Afrocentric tradition. But they must resolve the contradictions that confront them in searching for Afrocentric models of masculinity in the face of abstract, unemotional notions of masculinity imposed on them. The differences among race/gender groups thus hinge on differences in their access to institutional supports valuing one type of knowing over another. Although Black women may be denigrated within white-male-controlled academic institutions, other institutions, such as Black families and churches, which encourage the expression of Black female power, seem to do so, in part, by way of their support for an Afrocentric feminist epistemology. The Ethic of Personal Accountability An ethic of personal accountability is the final dimension of an alternative epistemology. Not only must individuals develop their knowledge claims through dialogue and present them in a style proving their concern for their ideas, but people are expected to be accountable for their knowledge claims. Zilpha Elaw’s description of slavery reflects this notion that every idea has an owner and that the owner’s identity matters: "Oh, the abominations of slavery! ... Every case of slavery, however lenient its infliction and mitigated its atrocities, indicates an oppressor, the oppressed, and oppression." For Elaw abstract definitions of slavery mesh with the concrete identities of its perpetrators and its victims. African-Americans consider it essential for individuals to have personal positions on issues and assume full responsibility for arguing their validity. Assessments of an individual’s knowledge claims simultaneously evaluate an individual’s character, values, and ethics. African-Americans reject **the Eurocentric, masculinist belief that probing into an individual’s personal viewpoint is** outside the boundaries of discussion. Rather, all views expressed and actions taken are thought to derive from a central set of core beliefs that cannot be other than personal. "Does Aretha really believe that Black women should get ‘respect, or is she just mouthing the words?" is a valid question in an Afrocentric feminist epistemology. Knowledge claims made by individuals respected for their moral and ethical connections to their ideas will carry more weight than those offered by less respected figures. An example drawn from an undergraduate course composed entirely of Black women which I taught might help to clarify the uniqueness of this portion of the knowledge validation process. During one class discussion I asked the students to evaluate a prominent Black male scholar’s analysis of Black feminism. Instead of severing the scholar from his context in order to dissect the rationality of his thesis, my students demanded facts about the author’s personal biography. They were especially interested in concrete details of his life, such as his relationships with Black women, his marital status, and his social class background. By requesting data on dimensions of his personal life routinely excluded in positivist approaches to knowledge validation, they invoked concrete experience as a criterion of meaning. They used this information to assess whether he really cared about his topic and drew on this ethic of caring in advancing their knowledge claims about his work. Furthermore, they refused to evaluate the rationality of his written ideas without some indication of his personal credibility as an ethical human being. The entire exchange could only have occurred as a dialogue among members of a class that had established a solid enough community to employ an alternative epistemology in assessing knowledge claims. The ethic of personal accountability is clearly an Afrocentric value, but is it feminist as well? While limited by its attention to middle-class, white women, Carol Gilligan’s work suggests that there is a female model for moral development whereby women are more inclined to link morality to responsibility, relationships, and the ability to maintain social ties. If this is the case, then African-American women again experience a convergence of values from Afrocentric and female institutions. The use of an Afrocentric feminist epistemology in traditional Black church services illustrates the interactive nature of all four dimensions and also serves as a metaphor for the distinguishing features of an Afrocentric feminist way of knowing. The services represent more than dialogues between the rationality used in examining bible texts and stories and the emotion inherent in the use of reason for this purpose. The rationale for such dialogues involves the task of examining concrete experiences for the presence of an ethic of caring. Neither emotion nor ethics is subordinated to reason. Instead, emotion, ethics, and reason are used as interconnected, essential components in assessing knowledge claims. In an Afrocentric feminist epistemology, values lie at the heart of the knowledge validation process such that inquiry always has an ethical aim. Alternative knowledge claims in and of themselves are rarely threatening to conventional knowledge. Such claims are routinely **ignored, discredited, or simply absorbed and marginalized in existing paradigms**, Much more threatening is the challenge that alternative epistemologies offer to he basic process used by the powerful to legitimate their knowledge claims. If the epistemology used to validate knowledge comes into question, then all prior knowledge claims validated under the dominant model become suspect. An alternative epistemology challenges all certified knowledge and opens up the question of whether what has been taken to be true can stand the test of alternative ways of validating truth. The existence of a self-defined Black women’s standpoint using an Afrocentric feminist epistemology calls into question the content of what currently passes as truth and simultaneously challenges the process of arriving at the truth.

Tony Perucci explains that

(Tony, Assistant Professor of Co mmunication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, "What the F uck is T hat? The Poetics of Ruptural Performance," Liminalities: A Journal of Performance Studies Vol. 5, No. 3, September 2009)

Recent years have seen a rise in the practice of political street performance. Often called “interventions” or “performance activism,” many of these actions exceed the transparent political messaging of traditional agit - prop performance. Rather, they mobilize the particular qualities of performance as embodied action — what I call “ruptural performance” — as a modality in opposition to the stultifying effects of the society of the sp ectacle. Drawing on Brechtian aesthetics and the Artaudian embodiment of “the poetic state” as well as the (a)logic of Dada and the materialism of Minimal Art, **ruptural performance enacts interruption, event, confrontation and bafflement as a form of direct action**. “ Every day, do something that won’t compute” — Wendell Berry, The Mad Farmer’s Manifesto 1 Much of today’s activism emerges out of an experience of the totality, of the intractability and intransigence of consumer culture, and of what Guy Deb ord once called “the society of the spectacle.” It is an aesthetic response to a political/cultural crisis, not to mention an ecological, psychic and economic one. This essay addresses what is particular to the performance of what are variously called “interventions” and “performance activism.” These actions’ characteristics as performance work in ways that are specific to their form and exceed any “message” or content that they might (or might not) seek to convey. The conditions of inequity and ecological disaster that are intrinsic to consumer culture are now an open secret – or not even a secret but an accepted fact of life. Perhaps this is even truer now in the face of what has been named “the current economic crisis,” which spurs the call to “drill baby drill” and sends Wal - Mart sales through the roof while the rest of the economy collapses. Ecological crisis and sweatshop labor are no longer concerns that we think we can afford to address in daily life. In the face of such conditions, Jacques Rancière points out the challenge of what he calls the dilemma of “critical art” thusly: “understanding alone can do little to transform consciousness and situations. The exploited have rarely had the need to have the laws of exploitation explained to them. Because it’s not a misunderstanding of the existing state of affairs that nurtures the submission of the oppressed, but a lack of confidence in their own capacity to transform it” (83). In what follows, I argue for and trace out the critical characteristics of this insurgent form of performance activism that I am calling “ruptural performance.” Ruptural performances are distinct less because of a communicated message of their content and more by their qualities as performance: they are interruptive, becoming - event, confrontational, and baffling. Understanding performance as rupture provides a significant way to think about and create interventionist and political performance that places the focus centrally on the act of performance. This emergent genre of performed activism pays a particular debt to the pranksterism of Abbie Hoffman, the d é tournement of the Situationists, and the absurd enactments of Dada performance. These performance interventions are best known today through the practice of culture jamming and by the staged performances of Reverend Billy and the Church of Stop Shopping, The Billionaires for Bush, and the Yes Men. Such interventions, as well as those by lesser - known artists (partly because their strangeness cannot be easily accommodated by media coverage, political activists and academic theorization), can be understood through the notion of “performance as rupture” (Perucci “Guilty” 315 - 329). Rupture itself is not a “new” element in culture, and it certainly has a long legacy in modernism as the bre ach, shift or break. But it has a particular resonance in current activist practices that are both freer and more delimited than previous such enactments. To define performance as rupture, we must articulate what it ruptures. At the risk of constructing a false binary, let me propose that the obverse of “performance as rupture” is Debord’s “spectacle.” Debord explains that while the society of the spectacle is indeed an “accumulation of spectacles ,” ( Society 12) he distinguishes that “The spectacle is not a collection of images; rather it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by images” ( Society 12). While he calls it a “weltanschauung” ( Society 13) it is more than an ideology or a veil of false consciousness. Rather it is “the very heart of society’s real unreality,” ( Society 13) and in that materiality extends the alienation of the production of the commodity to its consumption: the spectacle produces “isolation” through the shift from doing to “contemplation,” where “The spectator’s alienation from and submission to the contemplated object [...] works like this: the more he contemplates, the less he lives” ( Society 23). Ultimately, the spectacle as “social relationship” represents the triumph of the commodity - image, the “ruling order’s ... un interrupted monologue of self - praise” ( Society 19) where “the commodity completes its colonization of social life” ( Society 29). In understanding the spectacle as not merely spectacles, but a modality of experience, in which separation and contemplation fl atten the encounter with presence, Debord proposes “situations” specifically to intervene at the level of the experience. However, in his recent attempt to characterize the new activism, Dream: Re - imagining Progressive Politics in the Age of Fantasy , Steph en Duncombe proposes that spectacle is itself the basis for protest, and that the distinction of the spectacle and the situation is merely “semantic” (130). Instead, he proposes “the ethical spectacle”: **our spectacles will be participatory** , dreams the public can mold and shape themselves. They will be active : spectacles that work only if people help create them. They will be open - ended : setting stages to ask questions and leaving silences to formulate answers. And they will be transparent : dreams that one knows are dreams but which still have the power to attract and inspire. And finally, the spectacles we create will not cover over or replace reality and truth but perform and amplify it. (17, emphasis added) There is much to be gained from Duncombe’s schema tization here. And what I wish to do is revise and amplify it by challenging his dismissal of the distinctive character of “spectacle.” 2 As I have tried to show in my brief summary above, the spectacle is not just a thing to be seen, but is also a mode of performance . Interventionist performance, particularly that which seeks to challenge and disrupt the values and especially the experience of the society of the spectacle, is another modality of enactment rather than a variation of spectacle. While performa nce interventions share with spectacle the qualities of being dramatic and theatrical, what distinguishes them is that they disrupt the experience of daily life, a rupture of the living of social relations — what Reverend Billy of the Church of Stop Shopping calls “the necessary interruption” ( What Should I Do, xiii). The interruption, which Benjamin might call the “sudden start” or the “shock” (163), creates the space for and initiates the experience of a ruptural performance. While bearing in mind the promi sing schema laid out by Duncombe, but also taking into consideration the particular characteristics of the society of the spectacle upon which much “interventionist” work means to engage, I am calling for a proliferation of ruptural performances. Below is an attempt to trace out rupture as a “modality” of performance that means to disrupt, or at least, to fuck with the spectacle. Given Duncombe’s setting of “dreaming the impossible” (158) as a critical element of performance activism, I will introduce my sc hematic be means of an example from a fiction film. The 2004 film, Die Fetten Jahre Sind Vorbei ( The Fat Years are Over , released in the US as The Edukators , d. Weingartner) begins this way: an affluent German family returns to their home to discover a bre ak - in. Their first sign of trouble is a massive tower made of their dining room furniture. They gaze at the sculpture, frozen with bafflement. Nothing, however, has been stolen. But their many commodities have been humiliated: a porcelain bust is hanging f rom a noose, glass figurines are found stuffed in the toilet, the stereo is in the refrigerator, and finally a letter that says “Lesen!” (“Read! ” ). Inside reads the message from the anarchist group that reorganizes the possessions of wealthy residents: “Di e fetten Jarhre sind vorbei.” They stop and stare, confounded. 1. Ruptural performances are interruptive. In some way these performances halt, impede, or delay the habitual practices of daily life. They intervene at the level and in the midst of the quotidian. Such performances engage the “necessary interruption” which seeks to make conscious what is habitual so that it is available for critique. In this way it shares Debord’s notion of the con structed situation — “the concrete construction of temporary settings of life and their transformation into a higher, passionate nature” is inherently interruptive as it “asserts a non - continuous conception of life” (“Report” 48). They seek to destabilize wh at the Russian Formalist Viktor Shklovsky called the “automatism of perception” (13). For Shklovsky, the role of art is to undo “habitualization,” which he says, “devours works, clothes, furniture, one’s wife, and the fear of war” (12). Such a reclamation of perception Shklovsky calls “defamiliarization” (13), for which the Russian phrase is priem ostraneniye , and that translates literally as “making strange.” Brecht realized the political potential for this concept as the Verfremsdungeffekt , which is foundational in that it focuses on the experience of making the familiar strange as much as the transmission of a political message. In the speed - up of a contemporary life characterized by images and simulations, these performances engage what Walter Benjamin c alls the “interruption of happenings” that estranges the “conditions of life” (150). It is this interruption, Benjamin suggests, that allows performance to obtain the “special character [of] ... producing astonishment rather than empathy” (150). Interruptive performance, however, occurs not at the level of representation, but on the field of presence. It is achieved by “putting a frame” around experience (more in John Cage’s than Erving Goffman’s sense) that produces what Richard Bauman calls a “heightened in tensity” or “special enhancement of experience” (43). The Brazilian group, Opovoempé , 3 has performed their Guerrilha Magnética (Magnetic Guerilla) and other intervenções (interventions) throughout public spaces in São Paulo. In 2006, they composed and per formed Congelados (Frozen), a series of intervenções , throughout the city’s supermercados . The performances consisted of simple and improvised ensemble compositions constructed through the use of gesture, repetition, spatial relationship, and kinesthetic r esponse. 4 The piece, in its basic performance of the actions of shopping, defamiliarizes the activities of shopping. The “choreography” that constitutes the “dance and music of buying” only gr adually becomes evident, as the repetition of the banal gestures of shopping begins to mark their strangeness as performance (“Nos Supermercados” Esteves). 5 Though the content of the action is not overtly political (it does not scream its ideology), it ma kes the encounter with shopping, and especially its mindlessness and repetitiveness, seem strange. At its foundation, the pieces are rupture - producing machines : “ The interventions intend to cause rupture of communication barriers, revelation of humor and play, change in the use of public space, and the manifestation of latent contents or social tensions previously unnoticed” ( “What is” Esteves). That rupture is specifically political — particularly in mobilizing the poetic state of quotidian settings. Guerri lha Magnética performances are intended “to break apathy and indifference, to install a creative atmosphere of play and to reveal the poetic content of the city” ( “What is” Esteves). 2. Ruptural performanc es are becoming - events. That is, they do, as Dell Hymes suggests, “breakthrough into performance” (11). And while their boundaries are unstable and unfixed, it is the ruptural performances’ eventness, their status as singular in time and space, which enables the presencing that the spectacle confounds. Alain Baidou puts it this way: “This other time, whose materiality envelops the consequences of the event, deserves the name of a new present. The event is neither past nor future. It makes us present to the present” (39). And yet the instability of the boundaries of the event is equally significant. Ruptural performances tend to confound boundaries of the real and artificial. The actual event of performance is generated by means of artifice, in which audience s often don’t initially realize that they are in a performance. In ruptural performances, audiences often first suspect that something isn’t right, but are not sure if something is amiss. Ultimately, though, the “breakthrough” occurs that things aren’t nor mal, they are strange, and we are in the midst of an event. It is this eventness (and the anticipatory process of becoming event) that enlivens the occasion of the here and now. And that temporal immediacy is captured well by Benjamin’s invocation of Jetzt zeit or the “presence of the now” (261). One becoming - event that has been performed around the world is the “whirl.” The whirl consists of a group of fifteen or more people entering a sweatshop store a few at a time (most often a Wal - Mart, thus the someti mes - used moniker: “Whirl - Mart”) who move empty shopping carts throughout the store. Once all performers are inside and with carts, the participants create a single line of carts that snakes throughout the store, splitting and refiguring as the snake of car ts meets up with blocked aisles and shopping customers (which must look like a Busby Berkley dance sequence to the overhead security cameras). 6 During the hour or more of the performance, if asked by management, security, employees, or customers what they are doing, performers respond kindly with “I’m not shopping.” As performers make their rounds, it is the employees who first encounter the becoming - event, then the customers, then management (who begin manically communicat ing on walkie - talkies), and finally security. When security gets wise, it’s time to return the carts and exit the store. As ruptural performance, the whirl does not make any specific claim on protesting the many things one could advocate against — sweatshop labor, poor treatment of store employees, predatory business practices, etc. ad infinitum — given that all present could recite this litany of wrongs. Rather the whirl enacts the becoming - event of “not shopping,” which in itself can be read as an engagement against over - consumption, Wal - Mart’s imperialism, unfair labor practices, or ecological devastation. 7 3. Ruptural performances are confrontational. By this, I don’t necessarily mean aggressive, though they may be that. Rather, it is as Benjamin puts it, where a “stranger is confronted with the situation as with a startling picture” (151). Ruptural performance is thus distinguished from the “revelatory” performance that unmasks the hidden truths (though it may also do this). In our age, what Marx called the “secret of the commodity” — that its price masked the alienated labor that produced it — is now exposed. We know, for instance, that many of the products we buy are produced by sweatshop, child and slave labor; but we have developed what Adrian Piper calls “ways of averting one’s gaze” (“Ways” 167). Ruptural performance is thus less a critique of ideology or false consciousness, and is more about the experience of the encounter of returning one’s gaze to that which one avoids to maintain acceptance of the inequities of the contemporary social orders. As Husserl notes, “Things are simply there and just need to be seen.” Bruce Wilshire also gets at what I’m talking about when he describes phenomenology as a “systematic effort to unmask the obvious” (11). In fact, this quality is what Michael Fried complained about as the central quality minimal art: its “stage presence” or “theatricality” where “the work refuses, obstinately, to let him alone — which is to say, it refuses to stop confronting him” (140). And in this way, ruptural performance owes as much to Minimalism as it does to Dada. As such it enacts what Fred Moten suggests is not only an “excess of meaning” but also “the anti - interpretive nonreduction of nonmeaning” (197). Ruptural performances, like Minimal Ar t , are characterized by a “concrete thereness,” that Barbara Rose says is a “literal and emphatic assertion of their own existence” (216). As Rosalind Krauss says of Donald Judd’s work, we can say of Ruptural Performance: it “compels and gratifies immediat e sensual gratification” (211)

Endres says

Danielle Endres Assistant Professor of Communication @ Utah 2011 “Location Matters: The Rhetoric of Place in Protest” Quarterly Journal of Speech (97) (3) 2011 August/September

The rhetorical deployment of place is a common tactic for social movements. Calling on fond memories of or attachment to particular places, environmental social movements routinely ask their supporters to take action to “save” special places including Yosemite Valley, Glen Canyon, and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). Beyond referencing particular places in their arguments for social change, social movements have also relied on the rhetoricity of places themselves by holding protest events in particularly meaningful places or using protest events to create temporary fissures in the dominant meanings of places. The 1963 Civil Rights Movement's March on Washington culminated at the Lincoln Memorial in the Washington Mall in part because of the significance of that place: both its proximity to the center of Federal Government and Abraham Lincoln's role in freeing slaves. As Martin Luther King Jr. delivered his famous “I Have a Dream” speech, the place and the presence of hundreds of thousands of people congregating in that place also constituted the movement's goals. The 2003 anti-war (in Iraq) protesters who took to the streets—indeed, any protest that marches through city streets—not only sent a visual message of the strength of the movement through images of city streets brimming with people but also temporarily reconstructed city streets from places for transportation into places of protest. These are just a few examples of how place is rhetorically significant to social movement protest. “In short,” as Tim Cresswell notes, “the qualities of place that make them good strategic tools of power simultaneously make them ripe for resistance in highly visible and often outrageous ways.”1 (Re)constructing the meaning of place, even in temporary ways, can be a tactical act of resistance along with the tactics we traditionally associate with protest, such as speeches, marches, and signs. As we will demonstrate, place (re)constructions can function rhetorically to challenge dominant meanings and practices in a place. Place is a performer along with activists in making and unmaking the possibilities of protest. Although scholars in geography and sociology regularly attend to the implications of theories of place for social movements and activism,2 rhetoricians have yet to turn to place as a way to examine the rhetorical performances of social movement protest. This essay provides a foundation for such an examination by articulating the rhetorical force of place in protest. We argue that place can serve as a unique heuristic for rhetorical studies of social movements. Traditionally research on social movements has been focused on the actions of protesters through their words or use of bodies, our discussion of place in protest shifts attention to how embodied rhetorics of protest are always situated in particular places. In other words, studying bodies and words can reveal only part of the rhetorical tactics of protest. Studying how words and bodies interact in and with place allows us to see social movement rhetoric from a new perspective. Beyond this specific contribution, our heuristic also contributes to a general understanding of the rhetoricity of place by specifically attending to how bodies, words, and places all interact in rhetoric. Further, the concept of place in protest has implications for understanding how to study the rhetoric of place. We build our argument by pulling together threads of existing research on place to offer a critical lens—place in protest—with which to ask questions relevant to a more comprehensive analysis of how place functions along with other rhetorical performances in social movement discourse. Place in protest allows us to understand how social movements use both place-based arguments and place-as-rhetoric. Place-based arguments discursively invoke images or memories of a place to support an argument, such as summoning the melting of the arctic as a reason to stop global warming, and make salient that dominant place meanings are sometimes linked to systems of power that discourage protest. In addition to examining such indirect invocations of place, we are interested in how social movements construct and reconstruct places in line with their challenges to the status quo (e.g., gay pride celebrations taking over everyday city streets to temporarily queer them). Place-as-rhetoric is at the core of our contribution to the study of place in protest and place generally; it assumes that the very place in which a protest occurs is a rhetorical performance that is part of the message of the movement. We will further refine place-as-rhetoric by distinguishing three ways in which places act rhetorically. First, protesters may build on a pre-existing meaning of a place to help make their point, such as holding a protest event at a state capital so that protesters can direct their message to this symbol of government. Second, protests can temporarily reconstruct the meaning (and challenge the dominant meaning) of a particular place, such as Critical Mass's take-over of car lanes in downtown city streets to raise awareness about bicycles as a “legitimate” form of transportation. These temporary reconstructions of places create short-term fissures in the dominant meanings of places in productive ways. Third, repeated reconstructions over time can result in new place meanings, such as how the 1960s UC Berkeley Free Speech Movement's repeated use of the front steps of Sproul Hall (a building that at the time housed campus administration offices) for their protests eventually resulted in its being known as a place for protest on campus, even though the building now houses student services. In these three ways, places themselves—not discourse about places—are rhetorical tactics in movements toward social change.

## 2nc

Chun et. al 13 (Jennifer Jihye - Department of Sociology @ the U of Toronto Scarborough, George Lipsitz - Department of Sociology and Department of Black Studies @ UC Santa Barbara, Young Shin - Asian Immigrant Women Advocates, "Intersectionality as a Social Movement StrategyL Asian Immigrant Women Advocates," Signs, Vol. 38 No. 4, Intersectionality: Theorizing Power, Empowering Theory, (Summer 2013), pp. 917-940)

In both academics and activism, the concept of intersectionality can be used to clear up the confusions about sameness and difference that dominant ways of knowing both permit and promote. It can be a tool for refining understanding of the relationships that link individuals to social groups. No individual lives every aspect of his or her existence within a single identity category. Every person is a crowd, characterized by multiple identities, identifications, and allegiances. Yet the process of racial formation set in motion by dominant racial projects brings individuals together in particular groups with shared and linked fates ð Omi and Winant 1994 Þ . Collective political struggle requires the creation of strategic group positions adaptable to forging coalitions within and across identity groups. These positions are always partial, perspectival, and performative. They never encompass all dimensions of people’s identities. Yet as an analytic tool intersectionality can be used strategically to take inventory of differences, to identify potential contradictions and conflicts, and to recognize split and conflicting identities not as obstacles to solidarity but as valuable evidence about problems unsolved and as new coalitions that need to be formed. Group identities are vital for collective mobilizations for rights, resources, and recognition, yet every collective identity expressed through solidarities of sameness runs the risk of occluding differences within the group. In its most sophisticated articulations, intersectionality acknowledges both the plurality and diversity of identities that comprise any group and the common concerns that create aggregate identities. In Crenshaw’s deft formulation, the utility of intersectionality flows from its ability to mediate “the tension between assertions of multiple identity and the ongoing necessity of group politics” ð 1991, 1296 Þ . Without intersectionality, group unity threatens to degenerate into a compulsory uniformity that benefits some members of the group at the expense of others. For example, employment opportunities and promotions for Black workers do not necessarily provide justice for Black women. Anti- racist organizing can be uncritical about misogyny. Homophobia can seep into feminist and antiracist mobilizations alike, while race and class privilege can be unexamined within queer politics. Still, Crenshaw does not advocate the abandonment of identity categories and the embrace of a disembodied universalism. Instead, she recognizes that identities can contain situated knowledges with valuable vantage points on power. In the tradition of Aime ́ Cesaire, she rejects both parochial particularism and disembodied universalism. Instead, she argues for a “universal” that is contingent, provisional, and rich with particulars, that entails the dialogue of all, the autonomy of each, and the dictatorship of none ð Cesaire 2000, 25 – 26 Þ . Crenshaw’s intersectionality promotes struggles that are race-based but not race-bound, feminist but not essentialist, always pro-Black and pro-woman but never only pro-Black and pro-woman. Seeking unity without uniformity, mobilizing identities without demanding that people be identical, intersectionality matters from Crenshaw’s perspective because it is an indispensible tool for creating new democratic institutions, identities, and practices.

Collins 13 (Patricia Hill, Prof of Sociology @ University of Maryland at College Park, *On Intellectual Activism*)

Even though I realize that many in the current administration would not share this assumption, let us assume that the institutions of American society discriminate, whether by design or by accident. While many of us are familiar with how race, gender, and class operate separately to structure inequality, I want to focus on how these three systems interlock in structuring the institutional dimension of oppression. To get at the interlocking nature of race, class, and gender, I want you to think about the antebellum plantation as a guiding metaphor for a variety of American social¶ institutions. Even though slavery is typically analyzed as a racist institution, and occasionally as a class institution, I suggest that slavery was a race-, class-, and gender-specific institution. Removing any one piece from our analysis diminishes our understanding of the true nature of relations of domination and subordination under slavery. Slavery was a profoundly patriarchal institution. It rested on the dual tenets of White male authority and White male property, a joining of the political and the economic within the institution of the family. Heterosexism was assumed, and all Whites were expected to marry. Control over affluent White women's sexuality remained key to slavery's survival because property was to be passed on to the legitimate heirs of the slave owner. Ensuring affluent White women's virginity and chastity was deeply intertwined with maintenance of property relations. Under slavery, we see varying levels of institutional protection given to affluent White women, working-class and poor White women, and enslaved African women. Poor White women enjoyed few of the protections held out to their upper-class sisters. Moreover, the devalued status of Black women was key in keeping all White women in their assigned places. Controlling Black women's fertility was also vital to the continuation of slavery, for children born to slave mothers themselves were slaves. African American women shared the devalued status of chattel with their husbands, fathers, and sons. Racism stripped Blacks, as a group, of legal rights, education, and control over their own persons. African American women could be whipped, branded, sold, or killed, not because they were poor, or because they were women, but because they were Black. Racism ensured that Blacks would continue to serve Whites and suffer economic exploitation at the hands of all Whites. So we have a very interesting chain of command on the plantation-the affluent White master as the reigning patriarch; his¶ White wife helpmate to serve him, help him manage his property, and bring up his heirs; his faithful servants, whose production and reproduction were tied to the requirements of the capitalist political economy; and largely property-less, working-class White men and women watching from afar. In essence, the foundations for the contemporary roles of elite White women, poor Black women, working-class White men, and a series of other groups can be seen in stark relief in this fundamental American social institution. While Blacks experienced the harshest treatment under slavery, and thus made slavery clearly visible as a racist institution, race, class, and gender interlocked in structuring slavery's systemic organization of domination and subordination.

Chandler 9 (Daniel, Lecturer in Media Theory at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, Ph.D from the University of Wales,<http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/sem05.html>, Acc: 10/24/12, og)

Whereas syntagmatic analysis studies the 'surface structure' of a text, paradigmatic analysis seeks to identify the various paradigms(or pre-existing sets of signifiers) which underlie the manifest content of texts. This aspect of structural analysis involves aconsideration of the positive or negative connotations of each signifier (revealed through the use of one signifier rather than another), and the existence of 'underlying' thematic paradigms (e.g. binary oppositions such as public/private). 'Paradigmatic relations' are the oppositions and contrasts between the signifiers that belong to the same set from which those used in the text were drawn.¶Semioticians often focus on the issue of why a particular signifier rather than a workable alternative was used in a specific context: on what they often refer to as 'absences'. Saussure noted that a characteristic of what he called 'associative' relations - what would now be called paradigmatic relations - was that (in contrast to syntagmatic relations) such relations held 'in absentia' - in the absence from a specific text of alternative signifiers from the same paradigm (Saussure 1983, 122; Saussure 1974, 123). He also argued that signs take their value within the linguistic system from what they are not (Saussure 1983, 115; Saussure 1974, 117). We have popular sayings in English concerning two kinds of absences: we refer to 'what goes without saying' and 'what is conspicuous by its absence'.What 'goes without saying' reflects what it is assumed that you 'take for granted' as 'obvious'. In relation to the coverage of an issue (such as in 'factual' genres) this is a profoundly ideological absence which helps to 'position' the text's readers, the implication being that 'people like us already agree what we think about issues like that'. As for the second kind of absence, an item which is present in the text may flout conventional expectations, making the conventional item 'conspicuous by its absence' and the unexpected item 'a statement'. This applies no less to cultural practices. If a man wears a suit at his office it says very little other than that he is conforming to a norm. But if one day he arrives in jeans and a tee-shirt, this will be interpreted as 'making a statement'. Analysing textual absences can help to reveal whose interests are served by their omission. Such analysis pays particular attention to the issue of which questions are left unasked.

## 1nr

Moten and Harney 13 (Jack, Prof. English at USC, The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study, p. 28-30)

As Fredric Jameson reminds us, the university depends upon “Enlightenment-**¶** type critiques and demystification of belief and committed**¶** ideology, in order to clear the ground for unobstructed planning¶ and ‘development.’” This is the weakness of the university, the lapse in**¶** its homeland security. It needs labor power for this “enlightenment type**¶** critique,” but, somehow, labor always escapes. The premature subjects of the undercommons took the call seriously,**¶** or had to be serious about the call. They were not clear about planning,**¶** too mystical, too full of belief. And yet this labor force cannot**¶** reproduce itself, it must be reproduced. The university works for the¶ day when it will be able to rid itself, like capital in general, of the¶ trouble of labor. It will then be able to reproduce a labor force that**¶** understands itself as not only unnecessary but dangerous to the development**¶** of capitalism. Much pedagogy and scholarship is already¶ dedicated in this direction. Students must come to see themselves as¶ the problem, which, counter to the complaints of restorationist critics¶ of the university, is precisely what it means to be a customer, to take¶ on the burden of realisation and always necessarily be inadequate to¶ it. Later, these students will be able to see themselves properly as obstacles**¶** to society, or perhaps, with lifelong learning, students will return**¶** having successfully diagnosed themselves as the problem. Still, the dream of an undifferentiated labor that knows itself as superfluous**¶** is interrupted precisely by the labor of clearing away the burning**¶** roadblocks of ideology. While it is better that this police function¶ be in the hands of the few, it still raises labor as difference, labor as the**¶** development of other labor, and therefore labor as a source of wealth.**¶** And although the enlightenment-type critique, as we suggest below,**¶** informs on, kisses the cheek of, any autonomous development as a result**¶** of this difference in labor, there is a break in the wall here, a shallow**¶** place in the river, a place to land under the rocks. The university**¶** still needs this clandestine labor to prepare this undifferentiated labor**¶** force, whose increasing specialisation and managerialist tendencies,**¶** again contra the restorationists, represent precisely the successful integration**¶** of the division of labor with the universe of exchange that**¶** commands restorationist loyalty. Introducing this labor upon labor, and providing the space for its development,**¶** creates risks. Like the colonial police force recruited unwittingly¶ from guerrilla neighborhoods, university labor may harbor¶ refugees, fugitives, renegades, and castaways. But there are good reasons**¶** for the university to be confident that such elements will be exposed**¶** or forced underground. Precautions have been taken, book lists have been drawn up, teaching observations conducted, invitations to¶ contribute made. Yet against these precautions stands the immanence**¶** of transcendence, the necessary deregulation and the possibilities of¶ criminality and fugitivity that labor upon labor requires. Maroon¶ communities of composition teachers, mentorless graduate students,**¶** adjunct Marxist historians, out or queer management professors, state**¶** college ethnic studies departments, closed-down film programs, visaexpired**¶** Yemeni student newspaper editors, historically black college**¶** sociologists, and feminist engineers. And what will the university say**¶** of them? It will say they are unprofessional. This is not an arbitrary¶ charge. It is the charge against the more than professional. How do**¶** those who exceed the profession, who exceed and by exceeding escape,**¶** how do those maroons problematize themselves, problematize¶ the university, force the university to consider them a problem, a danger?¶ The undercommons is not, in short, the kind of fanciful communities¶ of whimsy invoked by Bill Readings at the end of his book.**¶** The undercommons, its maroons, are always at war, always in hiding. But surely if one can write something on the surface of the university,**¶** if one can write for instance in the university about singularities**¶** – those events that refuse either the abstract or individual category of**¶** the bourgeois subject – one cannot say that there is no space in the¶ university itself? Surely there is some space here for a theory, a conference,¶ a book, a school of thought? Surely the university also makes¶ thought possible? Is not the purpose of the university as Universitas,**¶** as liberal arts, to make the commons, make the public, make the nation¶ of democratic citizenry? Is it not therefore important to protect¶ this Universitas, whatever its impurities, from professionalization in**¶** the university? But we would ask what is already not possible in this**¶** talk in the hallways, among the buildings, in rooms of the university**¶** about possibility? How is the thought of the outside, as Gayatri Spivak**¶** means it, already not possible in this complaint? The maroons know something about possibility. They are the condition¶ of possibility of the production of knowledge in the university¶ – the singularities against the writers of singularity, the writers who**¶** write, publish, travel, and speak. It is not merely a matter of the secret**¶** labor upon which such space is lifted, though of course such space is**¶** lifted from collective labor and by it. It is rather that to be a critical¶ academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be¶ against the university is always to recognize it and be recognized by¶ it, and to institute the negligence of that internal outside, that unassimilated¶ underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must**¶** insist, the basis of the professions. And **this act of being against always already excludes the unrecognized modes of politics**, the beyond¶ of politics already in motion, the discredited criminal para-organization,**¶** what Robin Kelley might refer to as the infrapolitical field(and**¶** its music). It is not just the labor of the maroons but their prophetic**¶** organization that is negated by the idea of intellectual space in an**¶** organization called the university. This is why the negligence of the**¶** critical academic is always at the same time an assertion of bourgeois**¶** individualism.

**Brent Henze suggests**

Brent Henze, “Who Says Who Says?” Reclaiming Identity: Realist Theory and the Predicament of Postmodernism, Ed. Paula Moya¶ and Michael Hames-Garcia, 2000

Though I argue against efforts to speak for those otherwise able to produce and enact liberatory agendas for themselves,¶ **“starting off thought” from the lives of the oppressed is useful for grounding the knowledge of outsiders¶ seeking to understand their own complex relations to systems of oppression. Outsiders cannot simply¶ investigate the effects of oppressive power structures in their own lives; on the contrary, their relationships to¶ the oppressed require them to understand systems of oppression from the perspective of the oppressed,¶ producing a less partial awareness of matrices of power, as well as their specific relationships with those¶ matrices** (including the broader implications of their experiences of enablement). **Only by becoming conscious of the¶ experiences** of the garment worker **can I properly understand my contribution to the power structure** that¶ incongruously yields me a T-shirt and yields the laborer a penny on every dollar I spend. **Without working to¶ understand her perspective, my own partial perspective is ineffectual. But by supplementing my perspective¶ with hers, I am enabled to make better-informed choices about my own actions—actions that resist or¶ contribute to the oppression that I may only witness secondhand.** Hence the first result of this approach is a more¶ suitable platform from which to understand and manage the effects of our own actions as they feed into and are shaped by¶ systems of power that oppress others. Instead of seeing our activity simply as a kind of transaction between ourselves and¶ a system of power (which we may manipulate to our benefit), we may become better able to understand the effects of our¶ involvement in relation to the involvement of others. In other words, **the standpoint of the oppressed is necessary to¶ manage our own involvement with systems of oppression so as most effectively to combat oppression as a¶ systemic yet particular effect of power.7¶**

Winnubst 06 (Shannon, Associate Prof. of Race, Queer, and Feminist theory at Ohio State University, “Queering freedom pp. 45-47)

We have already encountered the ways that whiteness gains its hegemonic power through its disavowal of race, its own invisibility, and ultimately its own disembodiment. It is this invisibility that renders whiteness ubiquitous, the universal signifier—the same position that the phallus holds in Lacan’s account of the symbolic. Echoing Lacan’s phallus, whiteness functions through its remaining veiled. And a primary site of this veiling is its ontological denial of embodiment itself. The body becomes, just as it is in Lacan’s accounts of ego-formation in a phallic symbolic, an optical illusion. It is the body that recognizes itself as an optical illusion that can subsequently control the visual field, the field of optics.36 (And we wonder why modern philosophers were so enamored with the emergent field of optics.) Other bodies are ‘too real’—too fleshy to recognize that the field of appearances, which is the field of social power, is a game of optics. Other bodies’ ‘eyes’ have not inhabited the ‘proper’ space of the symbolic that renders this recognition of optical illusions possible. As Dyer draws this game of optics out in the specific register of representation, the ideal of white male heterosexuality emerges in the figure of Christ, who inhabits precisely the space of the symbolic that allows the recognition of optical illusions: the principle of incarnation is to be in the body but not of it. This tension between the flesh and the spirit, an exemplary Lacanian splitting, is what distinguishes whiteness, maleness, and heterosexuality from their oppositional counterparts in the phallicized binary symbolic. (And that only oppositional counterparts are considered itself indicates the power of the phallus in this symbolic field.) With several ironic twists of apparent embodiment and transcendence, **the white male heterosexual body disavows its own corporeality**—its own particularity and specificity— **so that it can function as the universal signifier** and appear as the controlled, contained body. It recognizes its body as nothing more than an optical illusion and, accordingly, **transcends** it **into a realm of mastery—of all bodies**. In this process of disembodiment, whiteness functions perfectly as the phallus. For whiteness, the appearance of bodies—both how they appear and that they are not ‘real’—ensures the continued mastery of the symbolic field. The white straight male body appears as the ‘normal’ body—without marking, without distinction, perfectly contained, and, subsequently, in power. The logic of space and embodiment that insists upon reading bodies as bound by skin not only puts the visual markings of race and sex fully into play, but also perpetuates the logic of containment in which whiteness itself, as that which is perfectly contained exactly because it is not a body, thrives. Controlling its optical illusion as the body that is perfectly contained, whiteness is never where it appears: it is somewhere else, veiled beyond capture.

Spade 13 (Dean, Associate Professor at Seattle University School of Law – teaches Administrative Law, Poverty Law, and Law and Social Movements, "Intersectional Resistance and Law Reform," Vol. 38, No. 4, Intersectionality: Theorizing Power, Empowering Theory (Summer 2013), pp. 1031-1055)

More than twenty years ago, Kimberle Williams Crenshaw coined the term “intersectionality” to describe a method of analysis that reveals the dynamics of subjection hidden by what she called single-axis analysis and to suggest avenues for intervention and resistance that are eclipsed by single-axis approaches. Crenshaw demonstrated that projects aimed at conceptualizing and remedying racial or gender subordination through a single vector end up implicitly positing the subject of that subordination as universally male, in the case of single-axis antiracist analysis, or as universally white, in the case of single-axis feminist analysis. The experiences of women of color become untellable ð Crenshaw 1991 Þ . Crenshaw’s articulation of intersectionality brought to legal theory a key set of insights from women-of-color feminism and other critical intellectual traditions about the limits of “equality” and added these understandings to the interrogations of the discrimination principle taken up in critical race theory. What does intersectional resistance look like on the ground, and what is its relationship to law? In this essay, I examine some of the key concepts and questions that contemporary anticolonial, antiracist, feminist resistance employs and argue that the demands emerging from it bring not only the United States but the nation-state form itself into crisis. Understanding intersectional harm necessitates an analysis of population-level state violence as opposed to individual discrimination that resistance movements sometimes articulate through the concept of population control. Social movements **frequently** splinter between those employing a single-axis analysis to demand civil rights and legal equality and those employing intersectional analysis to dismantle legal and administrative systems that perpetrate racialized-gendered violence. This essay seeks to draw connections between some of the key methodologies of resistance utilized by intersectional scholars and movements. I am interested in how these methodologies bring attention to the violences of legal and administrative systems that articulate themselves as race and gender neutral but are actually sites of the gendered racialization processes that produce the nation-state. Intersectional resistance practices aimed at dismantling population control take as their targets systems of legal and administrative governance such as criminal punishment, immigration enforcement, environmental regulation, child welfare, and public benefits. This resistance seeks out the root causes of despair and violence facing intersectionally targeted populations and in doing so engages with the law differently than rights-seeking projects do. Critically analyzing the promises of legal recognition and inclusion from systems that they understand as sources of state violence and technologies of population control, intersectional resisters are demanding the abolition of criminal punishment, immigration enforcement, and other functions and institutions that are central to the nation-state form. Such demands are profoundly perplexing to many scholars, even scholars interested in intersectionality. This essay examines how intersectional analysis leads to the production of such demands and discusses how law reform tactics shift, but do not disappear, when such demands emerge. In the first section of this essay, I briefly review some of the key critiques of legal equality offered by critical scholars, especially critical race theorists. Next, I introduce the concept of population control and highlight the importance of attention to population-level conditions and interventions in intersectional scholarship and activism. The reproductive justice movement illustrates how an intersectional critique of single-axis politics and its demands for legal rights leads to a focus on population-level systems that distribute harm and violence through gendered racialization processes. The reproductivejusticemovement’s critiques of white reproductive rights frameworks — particularly the assertion that reproductive justice for women of color requires interventions into criminalization, child welfare, environmental regulation, immigration, and other arenas of administrative violence — illustrate how intersectional critique and activism move away from individual rights and toward a focus on population control. Third, I take up the assertion from many critical traditions that legal equality or rights strategies not only fail to address the harms facing intersectionally targeted populations but also often shore up and expand systems of violence and control. They do this in at least three ways: by mobilizing narratives of deservingness and undeservingness, by participating in the logics and structures that undergird relations of domination, and by becoming sites for the expansion of harmful systems and institutions. Activists and scholars have argued that the use of criminalization to combat domestic violence and human trafficking constitutes a co-optation of feminist resistance that expands criminal enforcement systems that target and endanger women and queers of color. This analysis illustrates the danger that legal reforms can expand violent systems by mobilizing the rhetoric of saving women combined with frameworks of deservingness that reify racist, ableist, antipoor, and colonial relations. I further argue that equality and legal rights strategies can be divisive to social movements. I use three exam- ples of movement splits to illustrate this: the divide between reproductive rights and reproductive justice, the divide between disability rights and disability justice, and the divide between the gay and lesbian rights framework and the racial and economic justice – centered queer and trans resistance formations that have critiqued it and created alternatives. For each of these examples, I trace how rights strategies mobilize single-axis analyses that, their critics argue, both fail to meet the needs of constituents facing intersectional harm and reify harmful dynamics and systems. Fourth, I observe that these critical traditions strategically reject narratives that declare that the US legal system has broken from the founding violences of slavery, genocide, and heteropatriarchy. Critics refute the notion that such founding violences have been eradicated by legal equality. They instead trace the genealogies of purportedly neutral contemporary legal and administrative systems to these foundations, arguing that the state-making, racializing, and gendering functions of founding violences like enslavement and settler colonialism continue in new forms. This analytical move exposes the fact that declarations of legal equality do not resolve such violence and generates demands like prison abolition and an end to immigration enforcement that throw the US legal system and the nation-state form into crisis. Finally, I examine how such intersectional resistance engages with law reform demands. I suggest that rejecting legal equality and using a population- control framing leads to a strategy focused on dismantling the violent capacities of racialized-gendered systems that operate under the pretense of neutrality. I take as examples the involvement of gender- and sexuality- focused organizations in recent campaigns to stop gang injunctions in Oakland, California, and to stop local jurisdictions from participating in the Secure Communities immigration enforcement program. These campaigns have law reform targets yet resist many of the traps of legal equality arguments because they center on the material concerns of those who are perpetually cast as undeserving, because their demands aim to produce material change in terms of life chances rather than symbolic declarations of equality, and because they conceptualize gender and sexual justice and freedom through the experiences of those who are intersectionally targeted by purportedly race- and gender-neutral systems. Through these examples and arguments, I aim both to draw connections between key intersectional methods and to illustrate what forms intersectional resistance is taking in contemporary politics, what targets it identifies, and what demands it makes.