## Plan

#### Text: The United States federal government should normalize its trade relations with Cuba.

## Softpower

#### Contention 1: Soft Power

#### US credibility on the international stage is low now-increased engagement key

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Is U.S. influence in Latin America on the wane? It depends how you look at it.¶ As President Obama travels to Mexico and Costa Rica, it’s likely the pundits will once again underscore what some perceive to be the eroding influence of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Some will point to the decline in foreign aid or the absence of an overarching policy with an inspiring moniker like “Alliance for Progress” or “Enterprise Area of the Americas” as evidence that the United States is failing to embrace the opportunities of a region that is more important to this country than ever.¶ The reality is a lot more complicated. Forty-two percent of all U.S. exports flow to the Western Hemisphere. In many ways, U.S. engagement in the Americas is more pervasive than ever, even if more diffused. That is in part because the peoples of the Western Hemisphere are not waiting for governments to choreograph their interactions.¶ A more-nuanced assessment inevitably will highlight the complex, multidimensional ties between the United States and the rest of the hemisphere. In fact, it may be that we need to change the way we think and talk about the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. We also need to resist the temptation to embrace overly reductive yardsticks for judging our standing in the hemisphere.¶ As Moises Naim notes in his recent book, The End of Power, there has been an important change in power distribution in the world away from states toward an expanding and increasingly mobile set of actors that are dramatically shaping the nature and scope of global relationships. In Latin America, many of the most substantive and dynamic forms of engagement are occurring in a web of cross-national relationships involving small and large companies, people-to-people contact through student exchanges and social media, travel and migration.¶ Trade and investment remain the most enduring and measurable dimensions of U.S.

#### This decline is a reflection of the disjoint between interests and values – foreign policy based in values rather than interests changes the perception and function of soft power

The Economist 11/23/13 (“Soft power Making up,” http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21590109-bush-years-america-seemed-overmighty-it-now-pulling-back-making-up)//jax

FROM THE EARLIEST days America sought to stand apart from the vanities and machinations that had corrupted monarchies in Europe. In 1853 it asked its diplomats not to wear court dress: frippery was not worthy of a serious-minded young republic. Unfortunately, at royal receptions American diplomats in dark tailcoats were sometimes confused with butlers.¶ Long before anyone had heard of an “ethical foreign policy”, before the revolution even, America saw itself as a New Jerusalem that would be a model for a better world. Over the course of a century or two, the monarchies and dictatorships gradually caught up. Influence abroad increasingly stemmed not just from hard power but also from legitimacy.¶ Thanks to symbols ranging from Hollywood to NASA, America can draw on a rich store of soft power. Its statesmen generally do set out to make the world a better place. But, as with those butler-diplomats, the message can get scrambled.¶ After the devastating attacks of September 11th 2001, American foreign policy lost its compass. It was right to try to foster liberty and security, by attacking al-Qaeda and seeking to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Yet that effort somehow ended up looking to much of the world as if America was bent on imposing violent change by means of raw power. The country is still paying the price today.¶ As the world’s most powerful nation, America is bound to attract some criticism. When he spoke to the UN General Assembly about the Middle East in September, Barack Obama observed wryly that America is “chastised for meddling in the region…at the same time, the United States is blamed for failing to do enough to solve the region’s problems.”¶ Likewise, America is criticised by Russia and others who argue that today’s anarchic militia violence in Libya proves that it was wrong to remove Muammar Qaddafi from power. Yet America would have been condemned just as roundly from other quarters if it had stood by while Qaddafi carried out his threat to slaughter thousands in Benghazi.¶ Sometimes, too, America has interests that unavoidably cut across the agenda or sensibilities of another country. Leaks by Edward Snowden, a security contractor, show that the National Security Agency spies more broadly and more intrusively than many people thought. He has raised genuine questions about the legal supervision of the NSA within America. His revelations have also infuriated American allies in Germany, France, Brazil and Mexico, which are not protected by the federal courts.¶ Some of the anger is deeply felt, not least in Germany, where the tapping of the mobile phone of the chancellor, Angela Merkel, had overtones of the Stasi. More often, though, the outrage is slightly confected. France can boast its own history of successful spying, not all of it squeaky clean. Mexico is plagued by drugs syndicates, some of which have infiltrated national politics. America’s foreign spying comes down to questions of the accountability of the NSA and a case-by-case judgment about whether the information is worth the grief if found out.¶ George Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 was altogether different from the decisions to bomb Libya and to spy, because there was never a question of a trade-off. The removal of Saddam Hussein was meant to eradicate weapons of mass destruction, create a model democracy in the Middle East and demonstrate to rogue states that they could not defy the world’s only superpower. And yet this grand exercise in geopolitical engineering spectacularly failed to achieve its aims. Instead, Iraq was thrown into turmoil and America was weakened both militarily and morally. No other single foreign-policy decision in recent times has so harmed its standing in the world.¶ One flaw, says Dennis Ross of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, was to mistake the connections between interests and values. The people around Mr Bush reasoned that, as the only superpower in a unipolar world, the United States was able to impose its values and that this would necessarily serve its interests. In the real world, however, the use of force can create regional instability. That often harms American interests.¶ Another error was to subordinate means to ends. So convinced was Mr Bush of the justice of his cause that he sanctioned the torture of prisoners. Separately, he provided for the indefinite internment of prisoners in Guantánamo Bay without trial. As a president bent on a moral mission, Mr Bush looked as if he thought might meant right.¶ A third mistake was to sweep innumerable insurgencies and jihadist movements into one worldwide war on terror. This galvanised the American public into supporting the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. But, says Ms Flournoy, the former Pentagon official, it made local groups internationally relevant, helping them to gain funding and recruits.¶ Seizing the unipolar moment¶ Mr Bush’s fundamental error, though, was to misunderstand the significance of the “unipolar moment”. After the traumatic attacks of September 11th, Mr Bush’s vice-president, Dick Cheney, thought that America had to use its strength to re-establish deterrence and preserve its unrivalled power. If not, it would be asking for further attacks from terrorists, rogue states and even, some time in the future, China.¶ That is not how it seemed to much of the rest of world. Horrified by al-Qaeda’s assault, many countries stood behind America. But as time went on, Mr Bush’s behaviour began to look more like aggression than protection. When Mr Bush tried to impose American values through the invasion of Iraq, other countries wondered if they were safe. When he and his officials belittled international institutions like the UN and argued that the harsh treatment of prisoners was just, they feared that America would not be bound even by its own norms.¶ It seemed as if America had fallen into a trap that Charles de Gaulle, the French president, had pointed out 40 years earlier. The general told the American ambassador to Paris that all countries with overwhelming power mistakenly come to believe that force will solve everything.¶ This was Mr Obama’s inheritance. He spent much of his first term dealing with it, rebuilding relations, ending the campaign in Iraq, planning the withdrawal from Afghanistan and pursuing Osama bin Laden. One task is to persuade more countries that American primacy is helpful rather than threatening. For that, Mr Obama needs to redefine the role of values.¶ Foreign-policy “realists” urge that it should be minimal. Yet there is a balance to strike, because values have an essential part in establishing legitimacy. Before America led NATO to rescue Bosnia, the country burned; today its peoples are estranged but at peace. One of Mr Kissinger’s most successful acts, during the Ford years, was to sign the Helsinki accords, which became a charter for dissidents in Warsaw Pact countries. By contrast, the failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda, hardly a strategic priority for America, haunted the presidency of Bill Clinton. As a result, he later felt extra pressure to intervene elsewhere.¶ In his speeches Mr Obama has made a stab at setting a new balance. He starts by affirming democracy, human rights and open markets, insisting that they are not Western exports but fundamental values. He goes on to accept that these ideas cannot be imposed by force, which means that America will sometimes be accused of hypocrisy for working with undemocratic governments. But he also gives warning that some governments’ crimes will be so egregious that other nations must act. If they fail, they will be undermining the very norms and institutions that they claim to cherish.

#### The embargo undermines US soft power – plan solves

#### First, international support – UN vote proves

Havana Times 12 (“Cuba Embargo Blasted Again at UN 188-3”, Havana Times, November 13 2012, http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=82054, Accessed: 7/4/13, EH)

HAVANA TIMES (dpa) – The UN General Assembly on Tuesday renewed a demand that the United States lift the economic embargo imposed on Cuba since the 1960s.¶ **The** 193-nation **assembly voted 188-3** to adopt an annual resolution, for the 21st consecutive year, **calling for UN members to consider the** US **embargo** against **Cuba as illegal** and respect international law that reaffirms freedom of trade and navigation. Last year’s vote was 186-2.¶ The United States, Israel and Palau voted against the resolution, while the Marshall Islands and Micronesia abstained.¶ Washington has rejected the repeated UN demands to end the embargo. But it has also improved ties with Havana and allowed US citizens to travel to Cuba.¶ **The resolution**, like in previous ones, **asked all states that have been implementing the US embargo “to take the necessary steps to repeal** or invalidate **them as soon as possible** in accordance with their legal regime.”¶ The economic embargo against Cuba was strengthened by US President John F Kennedy in February 1962 following the failure of US-backed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.¶ The US embargo was further boosted in 1996 by the Helms-Burton Act with the US Congress demanding compliance by all companies with regard to trade and navigation with Cuba.¶

#### Second, looks petty giving the image of the overbearing hegemon

--harms Cuban people economically

--makes us look petty

--hurts nat. sec. interests can’t coop on crime and terror

Hansing 11— Katrin Hansing, Associate Professor of Black and Hispanic Studies at Baruch College (“10 Reasons to Oppose the Embargo”, Center for Democracy in the Americas, October 21 2011, http://www.democracyinamericas.org/blog-post/10-reasons-to-oppose-the-embargo/, Accessed: 6/28/13, EH)

In light of the UN Secretary-General’s report on the U.S. embargo of Cuba, and in advance of Tuesday’s vote against it, we offer a series of statements from a variety of sources–including a retired General, Ronald Reagan’s Agriculture Secretary, an environmentalist, a physician, an actor/human rights advocate, several scholars, and one of Washington’s leading voices on foreign policy–on why the U.S. should end the embargo. We hope you read them all.¶ **The embargo undermines U.S. foreign policy interests¶ “Failure of the U.S. to** finally **snuff out** the last vestiges of the Cold War in **the** U.S.-Cuba **embargo signals impotence in American strategic vision and capability**. Those who support the embargo undermine the empowerment of Cuban citizens, harming them economically and robbing them of choices that could evolve through greater engagement – exactly what we have seen in transitioning Communist countries like Vietnam and China. **The world is dismayed and rejects yet again America’s nonsensical embargo, which ultimately makes the U.S. look strategically muddled and petty rather than a leader committed to improving the global order.”¶** Steve Clemons, Washington Editor-at-Large, The Atlantic¶ Senior Fellow & Founder, American Strategy Program¶ New America Foundation¶ The embargo hurts U.S. national security interests¶ “**The U.S. embargo** against Cuba is a Cold War relic that **hurts America** and Cuba by preventing normal trade and travel between our two countries. **From the perspective of** U.S. **national security**, not only does the embargo prevent our cooperation with Cuba on common security issues such as crime and terrorism, **it hurts U.S. standing throughout the world by highlighting our aggression against a neighboring country that poses no threat**. The United States demeans itself by this futile and hypocritical policy. It is long past time to repeal the U.S. embargo against Cuba.”¶ John Adams, Brigadier General US Army (Retired)

#### **Third, shows a reflection of values**

--pro-democracy

--no threat to the US

--reflects open market ideology makes US seem more legit

Holmes 10- Michael G. Holmes, MA The School of Continuing Studies, Georgetown (“SEIZING THE MOMENT,” June 21, 2010, Georgetown, https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553334/holmesMichael.pdf?sequence=1-Accessed-7-2-13-RX]

From an image stand point repealing the sanctions and removing the embargo is symbolic. It shows Cuba and the world that although the United States is pro democracy, it does not wish to impose its values on other nations. The Cuba Democracy Act was an attempt to force democratic changes in Cuba.10 By repealing the act the United States, illustrates that it respects the sovereignty of nations. Considering that this Act did allow for the application of U.S. law in a foreign country11, repealing it not only sends the message about U.S. views on sovereignty but also shows that the administration is taking steps to ensure that sovereignty is actually respected.¶ Repealing the Helms-Burton Law will certainly stimulate foreign investment in Cuba as well. Many foreign countries were leery of investing in Cuba out of fear of being sued or losing property under the provisions established by the Helms-Burton Act.12 This return of foreign investment will further secure Cuba's place in the global marketplace. It also will help to silence skeptics who will question U.S. intentions. Since the sanctions against Cuba were unilateral U.S. actions, an unsolicited change in course will undoubtedly spark speculation. Allowing all countries to invest in Cuba again underscores the United States' position of desiring for all countries to participate in the global market place. It is difficult to imagine that the benefits of lifting the embargo will not be immediate and substantial in regards to the United States reputation in the world. Looking at the long-term benefits of removing the sanctions, the two benefits that stand out the most are trade and fuel.

#### Fourth, repairs foreign policy coherence

-- China worse abuser and larger security threat, yet is our third largest trading partner

-- Venezuela actively tries to undermine the US, but we buy their oil, let them invest in our energy sector and allow free travel to Venezuela

Griswold 05 (Daniel Griswold is director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, “Four Decades of Failure: The U.S. Embargo against Cuba”, 10/12, http://www.cato.org/publications/speeches/four-decades-failure-us-embargo-against-cuba)

Economic sanctions rarely work. Trade and investment sanctions against Burma, Iran, and North Korea have failed to change the behavior of any of those oppressive regimes; sanctions have only deepened the deprivation of the very people we are trying to help. Our research at the Cato Institute confirms that trade and globalization till the soil for democracy. Nations open to trade are more likely to be democracies where human rights are respected. Trade and the development it creates give people tools of communication-cell phones, satellite TV, fax machines, the Internet-that tend to undermine oppressive authority. Trade not only increases the flow of goods and services but also of people and ideas. Development also creates a larger middle class that is usually the backbone of democracy.¶ President Bush seems to understand this powerful connection between trade and democracy when he talks about China or the Middle East. In a speech on trade early in his first term, the president noted that trade was about more than raising incomes. “Trade creates the habits of freedom,” the president said, and those habits begin “to create the expectations of democracy and demands for better democratic institutions. Societies that open to commerce across their borders are more open to democracy within their borders. And for those of us who care about values and believe in values—not just American values, but universal values that promote human dignity—trade is a good way to do that.”¶ The president has rightly opposed efforts in Congress to impose trade sanctions against China because of its poor human rights record. In sheer numbers, the Chinese government has jailed and killed far more political and religious dissenters than has the Cuban government. And China is arguably more of a national security concern today than Castro’s pathetic little workers’ paradise. Yet China has become our third largest trading partner while we maintain a blanket embargo on commercial relations with Cuba. President Bush understands that economic engagement with China offers the best hope for encouraging human rights and political reforms in that country, yet he has failed to apply that same, sound thinking to Cuba.¶ In fact, the Venezuelan government of Hugo Chavez is doing more to undermine America’s national interest today than either Cuba or China. Chavez shares Castro’s hatred for democratic capitalism, but unlike Castro he has the resources and money to spread his influence in the hemisphere. Chavez is not only bankrolling Cuba with discounted oil but he is also supporting anti-Americans movements in Nicaragua and other countries in our neighborhood. Yet we buy billions of dollars of oil a year from Venezuela’s state oil company, we allow huge Venezuelan investments in our own energy sector, and Americans—last time I checked—can travel freely to Venezuela. The one big difference between Venezuela and Cuba is that we don’t have half a million politically active Venezuelan exiles living in a swing state like Ohio. This is not an argument for an embargo against Venezuela, but for greater coherence in U.S. foreign policy. In a world still inhabited by a number of unfriendly and oppressive regimes, there is simply nothing special about Cuba that warrants the drastic option of a total embargo.

#### US soft power key to solving a laundry list of international threats.

--empirically proven – couldn’t get turkey to coop because tanked rep

--economic competitiveness, terrorism, war, proliferation, disease, human trafficking, and drugs

--need china for NK negotiations

--failed with Iran

Kurlantzick 06**-** Joshua Kurlantzick visiting scholar in the Carnegie Endowment’s China Program and a fellow at the USC School of Public Diplomacy and the Pacific Council on International Policy; previously foreign editor at The New Republic, (The Decline of American Soft Power, carnegieendowment.org, 2006, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Kurlantzick.pdf, Accessed: July 10, 2013, KH)

A broad decline in soft power has many practical implications. These include the drain in foreign talent coming to the United States, the potential backlash against American companies, the growing attractiveness of China and Europe, and the possibility that anti-US sentiment will make it easier for terrorist groups to recruit. In addition, with **a decline in soft power, Washington is simply less able to persuade others. In the run-up to the Iraq War**, the **Bush** administration **could not convince Turkey, a longtime US ally, to play a major staging role, in part because America's image in Turkey was so poor. During the war itself, the United States has failed to obtain significant participation from all** but a handful of **major nations**, again in part **because of America's negative image in countries** ranging from India to Germany. **In attempts to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons, Washington has had to allow China to play a central role, partly because few Asian states view the United States as a neutral, legitimate broker in the talks.** Instead, Washington must increasingly resort to the other ¶ option Nye discusses-force, or the threat of force. **With foreign governments and publics suspicious of American policy, the White House has been unable to lead a multinational effort to halt Iran's nuclear program,** and instead has had to resort to threatening sanctions at the United Nations or even the possibility of strikes against Iran. **With America's image declining in nations like Thailand and Pakistan, it is harder for leaders in these countries to openly embrace counterterrorism cooperation with the United States**, so Washington resorts to quiet arm-twisting and blandishments to obtain counterterror concessions. Force is not a long-term solution. **Newer, nontraditional security threats such as disease, human trafficking, and drug trafficking can only be managed through forms of multilateral cooperation that depend on America's ability to persuade other nations. Terrorism itself cannot be defeated by force alone**, a fact that even the White House recognizes. **The** 2002 **National security Strategy emphasizes that winning the war on terror requires the United States to lead a battle of ideas ¶ against the ideological roots of terrorism**, in addition to rooting out and destroying individual militant cells.

#### On its own hard power fails – causes backlash.

Bakircioglua 09(Department of Law, Queen's University Belfast, Onder “The Future of Preventive Wars: the case of Iraq” Third World Quarterly, Volume 30, Issue 7 October 2009 , pages 1355-1356)

It has now become obvious that the **preventive war waged against Iraq has been established to be unlawful as well as devastating in terms of humanitarian consequences**. Indeed, during the Bush presidency**, practices of illicit detentions, arbitrary killings, spiriting prisoners away to the cia's ghost prisons, kidnapping terror suspects to other countries for purposes of interrogation, the denial of fair trial rights, torture, and other exceptional methods of 'combating global terrorism' became widespread.**97 Naturally this not only undermined the rhetoric of the 'nation-building' or 'liberation' process in Iraq, but it also seriously impaired US credibility—which the current Obama administration is seeking to repair through the repudiation of such indefensible practices.98 Ironically, during the Bush era, **despite the systematic use of such extralegal practices and heightened international co-operation to combat terrorism, world-wide acts of terror have continuously increased.**99 **The US invasion also brought about an unprecedented economic and human cost, creating millions of refugees and internally displaced people because of increased sectarian violence, terrorism and mismanagement**.100 Furthermore**, the regimes in Iran and North Korea**, also referred to as the 'axis of evil' by the Bush administration**, rushed to acquire more nuclear material as they realised the danger of lacking wmd in the face of a hegemonic nuclear power with its vague 'preventive' war strategy**.101 Given the potential of a strike-back from these states with nuclear capabilities, **the USA is now forced to rely on multilateral efforts to pressure Iran into giving up its nuclear ambitions and to convince North Korea to disarm.102**

#### Soft Power solves Heg

#### First, builds credibility

--china and india rise = result of soft power

--us will lose out to them bc of perception of overbearing hegemon

--need to renounce bush administration characterization.

Layne, 09 Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”,  International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009)

In The Post-American World, **Fareed Zakaria argues that both China and India are rising great powers and are destined to emerge as the number two and three economies in the world during the next several decades** (p. 21). But, in an odd formulation, he says that his book is “not about the decline of America but rather about the rise of everyone else” (p. 1).22 Indeed, Zakaria’s view of the United States’ power trajectory is remarkably sanguine. **Instead of mounting traditional geopolitical challenges, he argues, China and India are focusing on soft power challenges to U.S. primacy. Thus, China has adopted an “asymmetric” strategy comprising skillful diplomacy and economic statecraft**, and highlighting its own model of political and economic development, **to make itself “an attractive partner, especially in a world in which the United States is seen as an overbearing hegemon”** (p. 127).23 Although his book’s title is provocative, **Zakaria** engages in the literary equivalent of bait and switch, because he **concludes that U.S. relative power, in fact, is not declining significantly.** Although paying lip service to the notion that the post-1991 unipolar order is waning, **Zakaria maintains that the United States can retain most of its international political dominance. Such decline as the United States is experiencing, he says, is economic—not geopolitical—and shallow, not steep** (pp. 42–45).24 Zakaria argues, moreover, that **the problems besetting the U.S. economy—overconsumption, low savings, current account and budget deficits, and reliance on foreign creditors—could be fixed** except that a dysfunctional U.S. political system is incapable of undertaking needed reforms (pp. 210–214). When Zakaria looks at U.S. “decline,” he sees a glass still nearly full rather than one half-empty and leaking. **The world, he says, is moving America’s way with respect to modernization, globalization, human rights, and democracy [End Page 155]** (p. 218).**The United States has the opportunity to “remain the pivotal player in a richer, more dynamic, more exciting world”**(p. 219). **All it must do is to renounce the unilateralism and blunderbuss diplomacy that characterized the George W. Bush administration, and revert to its tradition of working through multilateral institutions and relying on diplomacy and persuasion. Zakaria argues that the United States can remain at the center of the international system for a long time to come because there is “still a strong market for American power, for both geopolitical and economic reasons.** But even more centrally, **there remains a strong ideological demand for it”** (p. 234). **The United States can remain the pivot of international politics by assuaging the need of rising powers for validation of their status; avoiding the imposition of its preferences on the rest of the world; and engaging in “consultation, cooperation, and even compromise”** (p. 233).25 For the United States, **Zakaria argues, the way to retain preeminence in the emerging international system is through soft power, not hard power.**

#### Second, media control – legitimizes reputation.

Nye, 08 (Joseph S. Nye Jr. - Distinguished Service Professor and former Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, co-founder of neoliberalist theory in IR, former Deputy to the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, former chair of the National Security Council Group on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, former chair of the National Intelligence Council, and former chair of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 616 Number 1, p. 94-109, CM)

**Politics has become a contest of competitive credibility. The world of traditional power politics is typically about whose military or economy wins. Politics in an information age “may ultimately be about whose story wins**” (Arquila and Ronfeldt 1999). **Governments compete with each other and with other organizations to enhance their own credibility and weaken that of their opponents**. Witness **the struggle between Serbia and NATO to frame the interpretation of events in Kosovo in 1999** and the events in Serbia a year later. Prior to the demonstrations that led to the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic in October 2000, **45 percent of Serb adults were tuned to Radio Free Europe and VOA**. In contrast, **only 31 percent listened to the state-controlled radio station, Radio Belgrade** (Kaufman 2003). Moreover, **the domestic alternative radio station, B92, provided access to Western news, and when the government tried to shut it down, it continued to provide such news on the Internet. Reputation has always mattered in world politics, but the role of credibility becomes an even more important power resource because of the “paradox of plenty.” Information that appears to be propaganda** may not only be scorned, but it **may** also **turn out to be counterproductive if it undermines a country’s reputation for credibility. Exaggerated claims about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction** and ties to Al Qaeda may have **helped mobilize domestic support** for the Iraq war**, but the subsequent disclosure of the exaggeration dealt a costly blow to American credibility.** Similarly, **the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo** in a manner inconsistent with American values **led to perceptions of hypocrisy** that could not be reversed by broadcasting pictures of Muslims living well in America. In fact, the slick production values of the new American satellite television station Alhurra did not make it competitive in the Middle East, where it was widely regarded as an instrument of government propaganda. **Under the new conditions of the information age, more than ever, the soft sell may prove more effective than the hard sell. Without underlying national credibility, the instruments of public diplomacy cannot translate cultural resources into the soft power of attraction. The effectiveness of public diplomacy is measured by minds changed** (as shown in interviews or polls), **not dollars spent or slick production packages.**

**The pursuit of hegemony is inevitable, sustainable, and prevents great power war**

**Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth 13** – \*Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, \*\*John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, \*\*William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College (“Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement”, January/February 2013, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138468/stephen-g-brooks-g-john-ikenberry-and-william-c-wohlforth/lean-forward)

**Since the end of World War II, the U**nited **S**tates **has pursued a single grand strategy: deep engagement. In an effort to protect its security and prosperity, the country has promoted a liberal economic order and established close defense ties with partners in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Its military bases cover the map**, its ships patrol transit routes across the globe, and tens of thousands of its troops stand guard in allied countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea.¶ The **details of U.S. foreign policy have differed from administration to administration, including the emphasis placed on democracy promotion and humanitarian goals, but for over 60 years, every president has agreed on the fundamental decision to remain deeply engaged in the world, even as the rationale for that strategy has shifted**. During the Cold War, the United States' security commitments to Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East served primarily to prevent Soviet encroachment into the world's wealthiest and most resource-rich regions. **Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the aim has become to make these same regions more secure, and thus less threatening to the United States, and to use these security partnerships to foster** the **cooperation necessary for a stable and open international order**.¶ Now, more than ever, Washington might be tempted to abandon this grand strategy and pull back from the world. The rise of China is chipping away at the United States' preponderance of power, a budget crisis has put defense spending on the chopping block, and two long wars have left the U.S. military and public exhausted. Indeed, even as most politicians continue to assert their commitment to global leadership, a very different view has taken hold among scholars of international relations over the past decade: that the United States should minimize its overseas military presence, shed its security ties, and give up its efforts to lead the liberal international order.¶ **Proponents of retrenchment argue that a globally engaged grand strategy wastes money** by subsidizing the defense of well-off allies **and generates resentment** among foreign populations and governments. **A more modest posture, they contend, would put an end to allies' free-riding and defuse anti-American sentiment**. Even if allies did not take over every mission the United States now performs, most of these roles have nothing to do with U.S. security and only risk entrapping the United States in unnecessary wars. In short, those in this camp maintain that pulling back would not only save blood and treasure but also make the United States more secure.¶ **They are wrong. In making their case, advocates of retrenchment overstate the costs of the current grand strategy and understate its benefits**. In fact, **the budgetary savings of lowering the U**nited **S**tates' **international profile are debatable**, and **there is little evidence to suggest that an internationally engaged America provokes other countries to balance against it, becomes overextended, or gets dragged into unnecessary wars**.¶ **The benefits of deep engagement, on the other hand, are legion. U.S. security commitments reduce competition in key regions and act as a check against potential rivals. They** help **maintain an open world economy and give Washington leverage in economic negotiations**. And **they make it easier for the U**nited **S**tates **to secure cooperation for combating a wide range of global threats. Were the U**nited **S**tates **to cede its global leadership role, it would forgo these proven upsides while exposing itself to the unprecedented downsides of a world in which the country was less secure, prosperous, and influential**.¶ AN AFFORDABLE STRATEGY¶ Many **advocates of retrenchment consider the U**nited **S**tates' **assertive global posture** simply **too expensive**. The international relations scholar Christopher **Layne, for example**, has warned of the country's "ballooning budget deficits" and argued that "its strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them." **Calculating the savings of switching grand strategies, however, is not so simple, because it depends on the expenditures the current strategy demands and the amount required for its replacement – numbers that are hard to pin down**.¶ If the United States revoked all its security guarantees, brought home all its troops, shrank every branch of the military, and slashed its nuclear arsenal, it would save around $900 billion over ten years, according to Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan of the Cato Institute. But few advocates of retrenchment endorse such a radical reduction; instead, most call for "restraint," an "offshore balancing" strategy, or an "over the horizon" military posture. The savings these approaches would yield are less clear, since they depend on which security commitments Washington would abandon outright and how much it would cost to keep the remaining ones. **If retrenchment simply meant shipping foreign-based U.S. forces back to the United States, then the savings would be modest at best, since the countries hosting U.S. forces usually cover a large portion of the basing costs**. And **if it meant maintaining a major expeditionary capacity, then any savings would again be small, since the Pentagon would still have to pay for the expensive weaponry and equipment required for projecting power abroad**.¶ The other side of the cost equation, the price of continued engagement, is also in flux. Although the fat defense budgets of the past decade make an easy target for advocates of retrenchment, such **high levels of spending aren't needed to maintain an engaged global posture**. Spending skyrocketed after 9/11, but it has already begun to fall back to earth as the United States winds down its two costly wars and trims its base level of nonwar spending. As of the fall of 2012, the Defense Department was planning for cuts of just under $500 billion over the next five years, which it maintains will not compromise national security. These reductions would lower military spending to a little less than three percent of GDP by 2017, from its current level of 4.5 percent. The Pentagon could save even more with no ill effects by reforming its procurement practices and compensation policies.¶ **Even without major budget cuts**, however, **the country can afford the costs of its ambitious grand strategy**. The significant increases in military spending proposed by Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate, during the 2012 presidential campaign would still have kept military spending below its current share of GDP, since spending on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would still have gone down and Romney's proposed nonwar spending levels would not have kept pace with economic growth. Small wonder, then, that the case for pulling back rests more on the nonmonetary costs that the current strategy supposedly incurs.¶ UNBALANCED¶ **One** such **alleged cost of the current grand strategy is that, in the words of** the political scientist Barry **Posen, it "prompts states to balance against U.S. power** however they can." Yet **there is no evidence that countries have banded together in anti-American alliances or tried to match the United States' military capacity on their own – or that they will do so in the future**.¶ Indeed, **it's hard to see how the current grand strategy could generate true counterbalancing. Unlike past hegemons, the U**nited **S**tates **is geographically isolated, which means that it is far less threatening to other major states and** that it **faces no contiguous great-power rivals that could step up to the task of balancing against it**. Moreover, **any competitor would have a hard time matching the U.S. military. Not only is the U**nited **S**tates **so far ahead militarily in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but its security guarantees also give it the leverage to prevent allies from giving military technology to potential U.S. rivals. Because the United States dominates the high-end defense industry, it can trade access to its defense market for allies' agreement not to transfer key military technologies to its competitors**. The embargo that the United States has convinced the EU to maintain on military sales to China since 1989 is a case in point.¶ **If U.S. global leadership were prompting balancing, then one would expect actual examples of pushback – especially during the administration of** George W. **Bush, who pursued a foreign policy that seemed particularly unilateral**. Yet **since the Soviet Union collapsed, no major powers have tried to balance against the U**nited **S**tates by seeking to match its military might or by assembling a formidable alliance; **the prospect is simply too daunting**. Instead, they have resorted to what scholars call "soft balancing," using international institutions and norms to constrain Washington. Setting aside the fact that **soft balancing is a slippery concept and difficult to distinguish** from everyday diplomatic competition, it is wrong to say that the practice only harms the United States. Arguably, **as the global leader, the U**nited **S**tates **benefits from employing soft-balancing-style leverage more than any other country**. After all, today's rules and institutions came about under its auspices and largely reflect its interests, and so they are in fact tailor-made for soft balancing by the United States itself. In 2011, for example, Washington coordinated action with several Southeast Asian states to oppose Beijing's claims in the South China Sea by pointing to established international law and norms.¶ **Another argument for retrenchment holds that the U**nited **S**tates **will fall prey to the same fate as past hegemons and accelerate its own decline**. In order to keep its ambitious strategy in place, **the logic goes, the country will have to divert resources away from more productive purposes – infrastructure, education, scientific research, and so on – that are necessary to keep its economy competitive**. Allies, meanwhile, can get away with lower military expenditures and grow faster than they otherwise would.¶ **The historical evidence for this phenomenon is thin**; for the most **part, past superpowers lost their leadership not because they pursued hegemony but because other major powers balanced against them – a prospect that is not in the cards today**. (If anything, **leading states can use their position to stave off their decline**.) A bigger problem with the warnings against "imperial overstretch" is that **there is no reason to believe that the pursuit of global leadership saps economic growth**. Instead, **most studies by economists find no clear relationship between military expenditures and economic decline**.¶ To be sure, if the United States were a dramatic outlier and spent around a quarter of its GDP on defense, as the Soviet Union did in its last decades, its growth and competitiveness would suffer. But in 2012, even as it fought a war in Afghanistan and conducted counterterrorism operations around the globe, Washington spent just 4.5 percent of GDP on defense – a relatively small fraction, historically speaking. (From 1950 to 1990, that figure averaged 7.6 percent.) Recent economic difficulties might prompt Washington to reevaluate its defense budgets and international commitments, but that does not mean that those policies caused the downturn. And any money freed up from dropping global commitments would not necessarily be spent in ways that would help the U.S. economy.¶ Likewise, U.S. allies' economic growth rates have nothing to do with any security subsidies they receive from Washington. The contention that lower military expenditures facilitated the rise of Japan, West Germany, and other countries dependent on U.S. defense guarantees may have seemed plausible during the last bout of declinist anxiety, in the 1980s. But these states eventually stopped climbing up the global economic ranks as their per capita wealth approached U.S. levels -- just as standard models of economic growth would predict. Over the past 20 years, the United States has maintained its lead in per capita GDP over its European allies and Japan, even as those countries' defense efforts have fallen further behind. Their failure to modernize their militaries has only served to entrench the United States' dominance.¶ LED NOT INTO TEMPTATION¶ The costs of U.S. foreign policy that matter most, of course, are human lives, and **critics of** an **expansive grand strategy worry that the United States might get dragged into unnecessary wars**. Securing smaller allies, they argue, emboldens those states to take risks they would not otherwise accept, pulling the superpower sponsor into costly conflicts -- a classic moral hazard problem. Concerned about the reputational costs of failing to honor the country's alliance commitments, U.S. leaders might go to war even when no national interests are at stake.¶ **History shows, however, that great powers anticipate the danger of entrapment and structure their agreements to protect themselves from it. It is** nearly **impossible to find a clear case of a smaller power luring a reluctant great power into war. For decades, World War I served as the canonical example of entangling alliances supposedly drawing great powers into a fight, but an outpouring of new historical research has overturned the conventional wisdom, revealing that the war was more the result of a conscious decision on Germany's part to try to dominate Europe than a case of alliance entrapment**.¶ If anything, **alliances reduce the risk of getting pulled into a conflict**. In East Asia, the regional security agreements that Washington struck after World War II were designed, in the words of the political scientist Victor Cha, to "constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behavior against adversaries that could entrap the United States in an unwanted larger war." The same logic is now at play in the U.S.-Taiwanese relationship. After cross-strait tensions flared in the 1990s and the first decade of this century, U.S. officials grew concerned that their ambiguous support for Taiwan might expose them to the risk of entrapment. So the Bush administration adjusted its policy, clarifying that its goal was to not only deter China from an unprovoked attack but also deter Taiwan from unilateral moves toward independence.¶ For many advocates of retrenchment, the problem is that the mere possession of globe-girdling military capabilities supposedly inflates policymakers' conception of the national interest, so much so that every foreign problem begins to look like America's to solve. **Critics** also **argue that the country's military superiority causes it to seek total solutions to security problems**, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, that could be dealt with in less costly ways. Only a country that possessed such awesome military power and faced no serious geopolitical rival would fail to be satisfied with partial fixes, such as containment, and instead embark on wild schemes of democracy building, the argument goes.¶ Furthermore, **they contend, the U**nited **S**tates' **outsized military creates a sense of obligation to do something** with it even when no U.S. interests are at stake. As Madeleine Albright, then the U.S. ambassador to the un, famously asked Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when debating intervention in Bosnia in 1993, "What's the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if we can't use it?"¶ If the U.S. military scrapped its forces and shuttered its bases, then the country would no doubt eliminate the risk of entering needless wars, having tied itself to the mast like Ulysses. But if it instead merely moved its forces over the horizon, as is more commonly proposed by advocates of retrenchment, whatever temptations there were to intervene would not disappear. The bigger problem with the idea that a forward posture distorts conceptions of the national interest, however, is that it rests on just one case: Iraq. That war is an outlier in terms of both its high costs (it accounts for some two-thirds of the casualties and budget costs of all U.S. wars since 1990) and the degree to which the United States shouldered them alone. In the Persian Gulf War and the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, U.S. allies bore more of the burden, controlling for the size of their economies and populations.¶ Besides, **the Iraq war was not an inevitable consequence of pursuing the U**nited **S**tates' **existing grand strategy**; many scholars and policymakers who prefer an engaged America strongly opposed the war. Likewise, **continuing the current grand strategy in no way condemns the United States to more wars like it**. Consider how the country, after it lost in Vietnam, waged the rest of the Cold War with proxies and highly limited interventions. Iraq has generated a similar reluctance to undertake large expeditionary operations -- what the political scientist John Mueller has dubbed "the Iraq syndrome." **Those contending that the United States' grand strategy ineluctably leads the country into temptation need to present much more evidence before their case can be convincing**.¶ KEEPING THE PEACE¶ Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. **The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The U**nited **S**tates' **security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states**.¶ **Skeptics** discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They **maintain** that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, **major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity** without the American pacifier.¶ But **that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China**. It's worth noting that **during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the U**nited **S**tates, **which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington – notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia – might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas**.¶ There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers.¶ Given how easily **a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition**, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East – but at what cost? **Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and** perhaps even **start regional proxy wars**, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow.¶ **Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals**. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. **As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up**.¶ The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. **By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world's key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers**: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as a percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals is by many measures growing.¶ On top of all this, **the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons**. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony -- China -- and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing.¶ MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE¶ Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet **the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership**. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, **its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open**.¶ **A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests.** During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred -- convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship."¶ More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States.¶ **The U**nited **S**tates' **geopolitical dominance** also **helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money**. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU's dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk.¶ CREATING COOPERATION¶ What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. **In order to counter** transnational threats, such as **terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together** and take collective action. But **cooperation does not come about effortlessly**, especially **when national interests diverge. The U**nited **S**tates' **military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests**. After all, **cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns**, and **it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability**.¶ **U.S. alliances** are about security first, but they also **provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues**. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. **Thanks to conduits** such as this, **the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others**.¶ **The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism**. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region.¶ **The U**nited **S**tates' **global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place**. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds."¶ THE DEVIL WE KNOW¶ Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes -- a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. **There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture**. Nor is **the current strategy** self-defeating: it **has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the U**nited **S**tates **to foolhardy wars in the future**. What **the strategy does** do is help **prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier**. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits.¶ This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world.¶ **A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now**. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. **Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could** well **be disastrous**.

#### **Disregard their generic defense we cite specific scenarios for conflict**

Brzezinski 12 [Zbignbiew Brzezinski, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, January/February 2012, “8 Geopolitically Endangered Species”, Foreign Policy, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/8_geopolitically_endangered_species?page=full>, DMintz]

**With the decline of America's** global **preeminence, weaker countries will be more susceptible to the assertive influence of major regional powers**. India and China are rising, Russia is increasingly imperially minded, and the Middle East is growing ever more unstable. **The potential for regional conflict in the absenceof an internationally active America is real. Get ready for** a global reality characterized by the **survival of the strongest**. 1. GEORGIA **American decline would leave** this tiny **Caucas**ian state **vulnerable to Russian political intimidation and military aggression**. The United States has provided Georgia with $3 billion in aid since 1991 -- $1 billion of that since its 2008 war with Russia. **America's decline would put** new **limitations on U.S. capabilities, and** could by itself**stir** **Russian desires to reclaim its** old **sphere of influence.** What's more, once-and-future Russian President Vladimir**Putin** **harbors an intense personal hatred toward Georgian President** Mikheil Saakashvili. **At stake: Russian domination of the southern energy corridor to Europe**, possibly **leading to more pressure on Europe to accommodate** **Moscow's political agenda**; a domino effect on Azerbaijan.  2. TAIWAN Since 1972, the United States has formally accepted the mainland's "one China" formula while maintaining that neither side shall alter the status quo by force. **Beijing**,however, **reserves the right to use force, which allows Washington to justify** its continued **arms sales to Taiwan.** In recent years, Taiwan and China have been improving their relationship. **America's decline**, however, **would increase Taiwan's vulnerability, leaving decision-makers** in Taipei more **susceptible to** direct **Chinese pressure and the** sheer **attraction of an economically successful China. That**, at the least, **could speed upthe timetable for cross-strait reunification**, but on unequal terms favoring the mainland. **At** stake**: Risk of a seriouscollision with China**.  3. SOUTH KOREA **The United States has been the guarantor of South Korea's securitysince** it was attacked in **1950** by North Korea, with Soviet and Chinese collusion. Seoul's remarkable economic takeoff and democratic political system testify to the success of U.S. engagement. Over the years, however, **North Korea has staged a number ofprovocations against South Korea**, ranging from assassinations of its cabinet members to the 2010 sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan. So **America's decline would confront South Korea with**painful choices: **either acceptChinese regional dominance** and further reliance on China to rein in the nuclear-armed North, **or seek a** much stronger, though historically **unpopular, relationship with Japan** out of shared democratic values **and fear of aggression from Pyongyang and Beijing**. At stake: Military and economic security on the Korean Peninsula; a general crisis of confidence in Japan and South Korea regarding the reliability of existing American commitments.  4. BELARUS **Twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Europe's last dictatorship remains** politically and economically **dependent on Russia**. One-third of its exports go to Russia, on which it is almost entirely reliant for its energy needs. At the same time, President Aleksandr Lukashenko's 17-year dictatorship has stood in the way of any meaningful relations with the West. Consequently, **a marked American decline would give Russia a** virtually **risk-free opportunity to reabsorb Belarus**. At stake: The security of neighboring Baltic states, especially Latvia.  5. UKRAINE **Kiev's relationship with Moscow has been as prone to tension** as its relationship with the West has been prone to indecision. In 2005, 2007, and 2009, Russia either threatened to or did stop oil and natural gas from flowing to Ukraine. More recently, President Viktor Yanukovych was pressured to extend Russia's lease of a naval base at the Ukrainian Black Sea port of Sevastopol for another 25 years in exchange for preferential pricing of Russian energy deliveries to Ukraine. The Kremlin continues to press Ukraine to join a "common economic space" with Russia, while gradually stripping Ukraine of direct control over its major industrial assets through mergers and takeovers by Russian firms. **With America in decline, Europe would be less willing and able to reach out and incorporate Ukraine into an expanding Western community,leaving Ukraine more vulnerable to Russian designs. At stake: The renewal of Russian imperial ambitions.**  6. AFGHANISTAN **Devastated by** nine years of brutal **war**fare waged by the Soviet Union, ignored by the West for a decade after the Soviet withdrawal, mismanaged by the medieval Taliban, and let down by 10 years of halfhearted U.S. military operations and sporadic economic assistance, **Afghanistan is in shambles**. With 40 percent unemployment and ranking 215th globally in per capita GDP, **it has little economic output beyond its illegal narcotics trade. A rapid U.S. troopdisengagement brought on by** war fatigue or the early effects of **American decline would** most likely **result in internal disintegration and** an **external power play** among nearby states for influence in Afghanistan. In the absence of an effective, stable government in Kabul, **the country would be dominated by rival warlords. Pakistan and India** **would**more assertively **compete for influence** in Afghanistan -- **with Iran** also probably involved. At stake: **The re-emergence of the Taliban; a proxy war between India and Pakistan; a haven for international terrorism.** 7. PAKISTAN  **Although Islamabad is armed with** 21st-century **nuclear weapons** and held together by a professional late 20th-century army, **the majority of Pakistan is** still pre-modern, rural, and largely **defined by** regional and **tribal** **identities**. Conflict with India defines Pakistan's sense of national identity, while the forcible division of Kashmir sustains a shared and profound antipathy.**Pakistan's political instability is its greatest vulnerability, and a decline in U.S. power would reduce America's ability to aid Pakistan**'s consolidation and development. **Pakistan could then transform into a state run by the military**, a radical Islamic state, a state **that combined both military and Islamic rule**, or a "state" with no centralized government at all. At stake: **Nuclear warlordism**; a militant Islamic, anti-Western, nuclear-armed government similar to Iran's; **regional instability in Central Asia, with violence** potentially **spreading to China, India, and Russia**. 8. ISRAEL and the GREATER MIDDLE EAST **America's decline would set in motion** tectonic **shifts undermining the political stability of the** entire **Middle East. All states in the region remain vulnerable to** varying degrees of**internal populist pressures**, social unrest, and religious fundamentalism, as seen by the events of early 2011. **If America's decline were to occur** with **the Israeli-Palestinian conflict** still unresolved, the failure to implement a mutually acceptable two-state solution **would further inflame the region's political atmosphere. Regional hostility to Israel would**then **intensify**. Perceived Am**erican weakness would** at some point **tempt** the more powerful states in the region, notably**Iran** **or Israel, to preempt anticipated dangers**. And jockeying for tactical advantage could precipitate eruptions by Hamas or Hezbollah, **which could then escalate into wider and bloodier military encounters. Weak entities** such as Lebanon and Palestine **would pay an especially high price in civilian deaths**. Even worse, **such conflicts could rise to** truly **horrific levels through strikes and counterstrikes between Iran and Israel.** At stake: Direct Israeli or U.S. confrontation with Iran; a rising tide of Islamic radicalism and extremism; a **worldwide energy crisis;** vulnerability of America's Persian Gulf allies.

## Transition

#### Contention 2: Transition

#### **Cuba’s economy is going to collapse – several reasons**

#### **First - current reforms fail**

Shifter et al 10/15 (Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue. Matthew Aho is a consultant in the corporate practice group of Akerman Senterfitt in New York. Collin Laverty is the founder and president of Cuba Educational Travel. Kirby Jones is the president of Alamar Associates in Arizona. Carmelo Mesa-Lago is a professor emeritus of economics and Latin American studies at the University of Pittsburgh. Archibald Ritter is a distinguished research professor emeritus of economics and international affairs at Carleton University, “Are Raul Castro’s Reforms Helping Cuba’s Economy, 10/15/13, Latin America Adviser, pdf, \*This card is from pages 1,3, and 4 of the pdf. Page two contains a wholly different article)

In late September, Cuba's government¶ announced the legalization¶ of 18 new categories of private¶ employment, including real¶ estate agents, bringing the total number of¶ approved types of independent employment¶ to 199. While Raúl Castro's government¶ has issued more than 430,000 private¶ employment licenses since 2010, the latest¶ employment legalization effort also¶ included bans on certain economic activities,¶ including the reselling of imported¶ goods. Are Cuba's newest economic¶ reforms likely to bear fruit? How much has¶ the state ceded control of the economy to¶ market forces in recent years? What surprises¶ might lie in store for Cuba's economy¶ and its business climate?¶ AMatthew Aho, consultant in the¶ corporate practice group of¶ Akerman Senterfitt in New York:¶ "The decision to legalize new categories¶ of private employment is yet¶ another incremental step that—combined¶ with other changes since 2010—clearly¶ indicates a shift away from total state control¶ and toward a 21st-century mixed market¶ economy. Other recent examples¶ include the September publication of new¶ rules governing foreign investment at the¶ Mariel Export Processing Zone and the¶ Oct. 9 decision to allow state tourism agencies¶ to do business with private enterprises,¶ such as bed and breakfasts and restaurants.¶ The Cuban state will remain the economy's¶ dominant player, but the space it has yielded¶ so far was inconceivable five years ago.¶ And it's paying off: visitors to Havana¶ report a never-before-seen economic¶ vibrancy transforming the urban landscape,¶ as black-market businesses leave the¶ shadows and new, remittance-fueled ventures¶ arise. What's more, the recent loosening¶ of migration restrictions and the passage¶ (likely in 2014) of new foreign investment¶ laws signal that policymakers are¶ preparing for infusions of foreign investment¶ and remittance capital in the medium-¶ to-long terms. There is a bevy of potential surprises, foreign and domestic.¶ At home, the recent ban on reselling¶ imported goods met swift and unusually¶ vocal opposition from entrepreneurs¶ vowing to disobey the rules. In the¶ months ahead, the government must¶ decide how to engage 430,000 private¶ economic actors (and those dependent¶ on them) as a rising political force on the¶ island. Abroad, President Obama will¶ decide whether to support the Cuban people in their pursuit of greater economic¶ self-determination through¶ proactive policies or do nothing—thereby¶ clinging to decades of failed sanctions—¶ because he sees no political¶ upside. 2014 could be a real tipping¶ point in U.S.–Cuba relations, but only if¶ both sides seize the moment. That,¶ unfortunately, would be the biggest surprise¶ of all."¶ ACollin Laverty, founder and¶ president of Cuba Educational¶ Travel: "Time will tell how far¶ and how fast the reforms go,¶ which will determine their economic,¶ political and social impact. Up until now,¶ the government has been very cautious—¶ prioritizing stability while also¶ making drastic changes within the context¶ of the last five decades of communist¶ rule. Legalizing small-scale enterprise,¶ expanding cooperatives and creating a¶ housing market are important steps,¶ affecting the psychology of Cubans and¶ how they see and operate in the market.¶ However, these important reforms will¶ not result in significant improvements in¶ the overall performance of the economy.¶ Larger, more controversial and difficult¶ reforms will need to be implemented in¶ order to fundamentally change the¶ makeup and output of the economy,¶ such as currency reform, increased foreign¶ investment, legalization of more¶ private enterprises, including those of¶ medium-scale, the organic creation of¶ cooperatives, an end to excessive subsidies¶ to inefficient state-owned enterprises¶ and increased access to telecommunications.¶ The government's decision in late September to expand private enterprise but simultaneously restrict the sale of imported goods shows contradictions¶ in the process. Official discourse is to¶ remove the state from non-essential¶ areas of the economy, but the forces that be are unwilling to relinquish their monopoly in the retail sector. A better¶ approach would be to remove luxury¶ taxes on goods sold at dollar stores and¶ focus on currency reform and economywide¶ pricing adjustments, which would¶ allow it to compete with the private sector.¶ Albeit slowly, the process continues¶ to be two steps forward, a half step backwards,¶ and demographics and economic¶ necessity should keep it that way."¶ AKirby Jones, president of¶ Alamar Associates in Arizona:¶ "The numbers speak for themselves:¶ the reforms in Cuba are¶ real, will continue and have already¶ changed the face of Cuba. If you had¶ asked me just a few years ago whether I¶ would expect what is going on in Cuba¶ today, I would say a resounding no. But¶ the reforms have already borne fruit.¶ The Batistianos like Rep. Ileana Ros-¶ Lehtinen and Sen. Robert Menendez can¶ question the reforms all they want, but¶ their criticisms do not change the reality¶ on the ground. And now we hear of pilot¶ projects with only one currency. Facts¶ speak for themselves. And through all of¶ this, the United States is on the outside¶ clinging to a policy rooted in the last¶ century. The Cuban government has¶ ceded some control on economic matters,¶ and true market forces are at work.¶ Is that not what the United States wants? These reforms are like toothpaste that¶ cannot be put back into the tube. There¶ will be problems as well as starts and¶ stops along the way. The United States¶ could be helping this process instead of¶ trying to stop it. Meanwhile Brazil,¶ China and many others are part of the¶ change, realize that it is real, are investing¶ in Cuba and are making money in¶ the process. The United States should do¶ the same." Carmelo Mesa-Lago, professor¶ emeritus of economics and¶ Latin American studies at the¶ University of Pittsburgh: "The¶ re-authorization/extension of selfemployment¶ is a key of Raúl's reform to¶ enlarge the private sector and dismiss 1.8¶ million workers unneeded in the state sector.¶ Currently, 22 percent of the labor¶ force is in the non-state sector. It should¶ jump to around 40 percent by 2015 and¶ account for a rising percentage of GDP.¶ But self-employment is obstructed by several¶ constraints: 1.) The large majority of¶ occupations are unskilled or require little¶ skills, whereas most of the state employees to be fired are professionals or skilled¶ workers. 2.) University graduates (badly¶ needed in the private sector, such as managers,¶ engineers and architects) can't practice as self-employed, hence they may¶ work as taxi drivers or food sellers but not¶ in their professions. 3.) Taxes are quite a burden. For instance, the tax rates on the¶ labor force gradually increase with the¶ number of employees hired, therefore¶ penalizing those self-employed that hire¶ more employees, which is a disincentive¶ for the self-employed and counterproductive¶ in the state quest to get rid of surplus¶ labor. 4.) The government sends contradictory signals, such as raids to shut down self-employed Cubans who have stands¶ under Havana porches, or the government¶ first taxes and then bans the sale of¶ imported goods. Currently the reforms are insufficient to solve the many economic and social problems accumulated under half a century of centralized, inefficient socialism. There is a wide consensus¶ inside and outside Cuba that they must be deepened and accelerated to accomplish¶ that task, but Raúl has little time left to do¶ so before he retires in 2018."¶ AArchibald Ritter, distinguished¶ research professor emeritus of¶ economics and international¶ affairs at Carleton University:¶ "Major changes have been implemented¶ already, and further reforms are in the¶ works or on the horizon. The reforms will¶ continue to orient economic policy and¶ lead to substantial improvements in the¶ Cuban economy and in citizens' living¶ standards. The market-oriented component¶ of the Cuban economy has expanded¶ and now includes about 27.5 percent¶ of the employed labor force. It will¶ expand dramatically if the pseudo-cooperative¶ state farms and non-agricultural¶ state enterprises become authentic cooperatives.¶ Registered micro-enterprises¶ now include 430,000 people, 8.6 percent¶ of the employed labor force. The marketoriented¶ joint foreign/state enterprises¶ employ about 1 percent of the labor¶ force. The market-oriented underground¶ economy provides full- or part-time first¶ or second jobs for maybe 10 percent of¶ the labor force. Under September 2012¶ legislation, the Unidades Básicas de¶ Producción Cooperativa should become¶ real cooperatives, increasing the mainly¶ private sector in agriculture to approximately¶ 11.6 percent of the labor force.¶ Non-agricultural cooperatives in time¶ should include most of the goods- and¶ services-producing state sector. They are¶ to be worker-managed and under the¶ forces of supply and demand. The new¶ Mariel Export Processing Zone may¶ attract major investments, especially¶ from China and Brazil, and provide a¶ strong market-propelled stimulus. The transformation of state enterprises into authentic market-oriented cooperatives would constitute a change and improvement of historic dimension. Cuba could¶ become a country of 'worker ownership¶ and management' and continue to be¶ unique in the world. In contrast to the¶ ideology-based policy impetuosity and¶ vacillation of President Fidel Castro over¶ 47 years, the approach of President Raúl¶ Castro has been cautious, gradual, pragmatic,¶ stable and 'evidence-based.' There¶ are downside risks. Bureaucratic footdragging¶ may slow the reforms. The 'special¶ relationship' with Venezuela may falter¶ with political change and changed¶ economic priorities in that country. But¶ the economic surprises are more likely to¶ be positive, and there may even be some¶ positive political surprises—I never cease¶ to hope. A most welcome surprise would¶ be a normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations¶ during the presidency of Barack Obama."

#### Structural failures

--dependency on Venezuela

--lack of emergency financing

--inflationary pressure

Morris 11 (Emily, London Metropolitan University UK, FORECASTING CUBA’S ECONOMY: 2, 5, AND 20 YEARS, Presented at the international symposium “Cuba Futures: Past and Present,” organized by The Cuba Project Bildner Center for Western Hemisphere Studies at The Graduate Center/CUNY, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/cuba/cubaforecasting.pdf)

**Risks in the short term** Political risks arise from the process of transferring leadership from the old guard to a new generation. Evidently conscious of the **hazards, the old guard are seeking to closely manage the generational handover, but their control will diminish.** So far signs of dissent within the government have been rare and weak, but in 2011 the situation will begin to change radically. At the special conference of the PCC that will take place after the sixth PCC congress in April 2011, it seems likely that a new set of leaders will take up their posts. None of them will have the authority of the Castro brothers, and so for the first time for fifty years there is a possibility of the emergence of factionalism. In the TABLE 5. Two year forecast 2010 2011 2012 Real GDP (% growth) 2.1 3.5 4.2 Inflation (year-end, %)a a. This inflation figure is based on an estimated average household cost of living index that takes into account a reduction in the amount of basic goods available at heavily subsidised prices on the ration. The impact of the shift from subsidised consumption to market prices will vary widely between households, with the percentage rise in the cost of living being greater for those at the lower end of the income scale, who spend a higher proportion of their income on basic goods. 6.3 7.2 5.5 Average labour productivity (% growth) 4.2 5.9 4.5 Government spending/GDP ratio (%) 66.5 63.8 60.4 Investment/GDP ratio (%) 10.5 11.1 12.5Forecasting Cuba’s Economy: 2, 5, and 20 Years 13 context of the rapid changes taking place in the economic sphere, 2012 is likely to be a testing year. **Despite its efforts to dampen expectations, there is a sense** among **the Cuban public** that they **should see material benefits from the economic reforms. If these hopes are dashed, the government could face a serious crisis** of public confidence. **In the economic sphere, there are many hazards arising from the process of transformation.** There are risks **that monetary growth will outstrip that of supply so that inflationary pressures could build, at a time when the government is losing its power** to directly control prices. The extent to which the government will be able to manage the fiscal challenge it has set itself—to achieve sufficient savings and raise sufficient tax revenue to maintain welfare provision whilst phasing out the existing apparatus of social protection—will depend on its ability to respond quickly to difficulties as they arise**. A major fiscal crisis would jeopardise the reform process, and hamper the government's ability to respond to social pressures** created by the extensive realignment of relative incomes that will result from the changes. **External risks are heightened by Cuba’s lack of access to emergency financing** in the case of unanticipated shocks. **The largest single risk comes from Cuba’s high degree of dependency on Venezuela, and** in particular on earnings from the **export of professional services. Hugo Chávez, on whom the relationship rests, does not face re-election until 2012 but if anything were to befall him before then, the Cuban economy would suffer.** The high degree of uncertainty about the global economy also presents risks, with the recovery in OECD countries fragile and signs of strain within the economies of the growth leaders, China and India. 14 C

#### **Third - Micro-enterprises**

CP 12/27/13 (“Lack of Customers Affects New Cuban Micro-enterprises,” Canadian Press, http://thecubaneconomy.com/articles/2013/12/lack-of-customers-affects-new-cuban-micro-enterprises/)//jax

HAVANA – The dented metal pizza trays are packed away, so too the old blender that never worked when it was needed. Gone is the sweet smell of rising dough that infused Julio Cesar Hidalgo’s Havana apartment when he and his girlfriend were in business for themselves, churning out cheesy pies for hungry costumers. Two years on the front lines of Cuba’s experiment with limited free market capitalism has left Hidalgo broke, out of work and facing a possible crushing fine. But the 33-year-old known for his wide smile and sunny disposition says the biggest loss is harder to define.¶ “I feel frustrated and let down,” Hidalgo said, slumped in a rocking chair one recent December afternoon, shrugging his shoulders as he described the pizzeria’s collapse. “The business didn’t turn out as I had hoped.”¶ The Associated Press recently checked in with nine small business owners whose fortunes it first reported on in 2011 as they set up shop amid the excitement of President Raul Castro’s surprising embrace of some free enterprise. Among them were restaurant and cafeteria owners, a seamstress and taekwondo instructor, a vendor of bootleg DVDs and a woman renting her rooms out to well-heeled tourists. Their fates tell a story of divided fortunes.¶ Of the six ventures that relied on revenue from cash-strapped islanders, four are now out of business, their owners in more dire financial straits than when they started. But the three enterprises that cater to well-heeled foreigners, and to the minority of well-paid Cubans who work for foreign businesses, are still going and in some cases thriving. While the sample size is small, the numbers point to a basic problem that economists who follow Cuba have noted from the start: There simply isn’t enough money to support a thriving private sector on an island where salaries average $20 a month.¶ “Clearly, there is a macroeconomic environment that does not favour the private sector or the expansion of demand that the private sector requires,” said Pavel Vidal, a former Cuban Central Bank economist.¶ Vidal has long called on Communist authorities to adopt a huge stimulus package or more aggressively seek capital from foreign investors. Now a professor at Colombia’s Javeriana University, he says one has only to look at the trends since 2011 to see the private sector economy is nearly tapped out. After a surge of enthusiasm, the number of islanders working for themselves has stalled for the past two years at about 444,000 — or 9 per cent of the workforce.¶ Even in developed countries where entrepreneurs have access to capital, loans and a wide pool of paying customers, startups are risky ventures. According to the U.S. Small Business Administration, about half of all new establishments in America close within five years, and two-thirds are gone within a decade. The failure rate of Cuban entrepreneurs followed by AP was 44 per cent in less than two years, and worse if one considers only those that relied primarily on Cuban customers.¶ “There’s not enough money circulating in the economy in the hands of everyday people,” said Ted Henken, a professor of Latin American studies at Baruch College in New York and author of an upcoming book on private enterprise in Cuba. “You’re all competing for the same customers, most of whom are poor and have very limited disposable income.”¶ Economists have criticized the Cuban government for a series of measures to crack down on what it sees as illegal activities — including banning private movie cinemas, taxing the import of hard-to-get products in travellers’ luggage, and banning the sale of imported clothing. But on Saturday, Castro came down firmly in favour of increased regulation, sternly warning entrepreneurs that “those pressuring us to move faster are moving us toward failure.”¶ Henken and Vidal said Cuba must find a way to raise state salaries, expand state-funded microcredits and create a functional wholesale market to service the new businesses. They also noted that for a relatively well-educated society like Cuba’s, there are remarkably few white collar jobs on the list of nearly 200 activities that have been legalized.¶ Still, not every entrepreneur is struggling. High-end bars and glamorous new restaurants have become common in Havana, with shiny state tour buses disgorging photo-snapping travellers to sample lobster tail and filet mignon at upward of $20 a plate. Private rooms and homes that rent to foreigners can go for $25-$100 a night, less than most tourist hotels. Cubans with the means, and the business sense, to tap into the gravy train can do very well.¶ Chef-owner Javier Acosta sank more than $30,000 into Parthenon, a private restaurant catering to tourists and diplomats. He struggled at first, telling the AP back in 2011 that there were nights when nobody came in and he and his four waiters just sat around. But the restaurant slowly gained a reputation, in part because Acosta makes a potent Cuban mojito and offers a special suckling pig that can feed up to five people for $50.¶ These days, Acosta is expanding. He recently added tables in a new room decked out with mosaic tiles and faux Greek pillars, and plans to build a roof deck. He even has started advertising, paying $300 a year to have his establishment included in a tourist magazine. “I haven’t yet managed to recover my initial investment and the other money we’ve put into the place,” the 40-year-old said. “But in two or three more years maybe I can.”¶ Even more humble operations can do well, as long as they have some access to foreign money. One woman who rents an apartment to foreigners for $25 a night in the upscale Vedado neighbourhood says her business provides a stable income that supports her and allows her to help her son and granddaughter.¶ Two women who sell $1.25 box lunches to Cubans and foreigners in a building in Old Havana with many international firms and consular offices have managed to stay afloat despite a sharp drop in customers following the departure of several companies, and what they say has been a steady rise in prices of key ingredients like black beans, rice, cooking oil and pork. “This has become difficult,” said Odalis Lozano, 48. “But we’re still here, because we can always make some money.”¶ For those without access to that foreign cash line, the results have been grim. Besides, the failed pizzeria, a DVD salesman, seamstress and street-side cafe owner who allowed the AP to tell their stories shut down after less than a year in business, citing high monthly taxes, a lack of customers and limited resources and business sense.

#### Fourth – Currency reform

Cuba News 11/11/13 (“Uncertainties loom over Cuba’s plans to eliminate its dual-currency system,” http://www.cubanews.com/sections/uncertainties-loom-over-cubas-plans-to-eliminate-its-dual-currency-system)//jax

It’s tricky business to unify two currencies, and in attempting to do so, Cuba risks everything from sparking high inflation to social dislocation to bigger government deficits.¶ Experts say the key to success will be linking the currency changes to broader economic reforms, so that the money can sustain its value over time and hopefully strengthen with an improving economy.¶ The Cuban government declared Oct. 22 that it would move toward a single currency ending an unwieldy dual system that includes a convertible, dollar-like peso unit (known as the peso convertible, or CUC) and a local peso, the CUP.¶ Cuban state-run money exchanges now change 25 local pesos for one CUC. Many stores and hotels do business only in CUC, though most workers receive their wages in the form of relatively worthless local pesos.¶ The government has yet to provide details of its unification plan. But the transition will be gradual, likely in steps and taking various years in line with the timetable for broader moves toward a more market-oriented economy.¶ “If in Vietnam, where reforms were quicker and there was smaller gap between currencies, unification took years, then in Cuba, it could take longer,” predicted Carmelo Mesa-Lago, a respected Cuba analyst and professor emeritus of economics at the University of Pittsburgh.¶ Cuba recognizes that the current dual system has created massive distortions.¶ For example, many professionals now prefer to work in tourism-related jobs where they can get paid in higher-valued CUC, because salaries paid by the state in local pesos are low. The average salary for state employees works out to about $20 a month at current exchange rates.¶ Furthermore, government accounting is messy, since many state entities keep their books under an outdated system that uses the local peso and dollar interchangeably.¶ But analysts say untangling the currency knots might create new problems.¶ For example, they warn that if the government were to simply split the difference and revalue the local peso to 12 per dollar, eliminating the CUC, then those people holding CUC would lose half the value of their money.¶ That could hurt many foreign companies working with the Cuban government in tourism and international trade.¶ Yet if people with local pesos saw their purchasing power rise 12-fold overnight, they might quickly buy more imports and leave the government facing an even greater shortage of dollars. Eventually, that pressure could force the value of the local peso to fall and inflation to spike, say economists.¶ HOW UNIFICATION MIGHT WORK¶ The government already has given some signals how it might handle the currency shift at least for state enterprises. That’s according to Pavel Vidal Alejandro, an ex-official at Cuba’s Central Bank who now teaches at Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Colombia.¶ For instance, Cuba last year let farm cooperatives sell crops to hotels and restaurants at an exchange rate of 7 local pesos per dollar. It set that rate at 10 pesos per dollar this year.¶ Certain state enterprises also were allowed to keep their accounting at a rate of 10 local pesos per dollar, while transport coops also can buy supplies at a 10 pesos per dollar rate, Vidal said an interview published on the Catholic Church-affiliated website Espacio Laical.¶ Any change in exchange rates will create winners and losers. The losers likely would include those state enterprises that now keep their books in pesos interchangeable with dollars but owe lots more money in dollars.¶ Their local income would be worth relatively less and their dollar debts would become harder to pay off.¶ “The main benefits of the devaluation would go to exporters, who would see their profitability and competitiveness increase,” as the dollars they receive no longer would be counted at a 1:1 exchange rate but instead bring in more in peso terms, Vidal told the website.¶ WILL SINGLE CURRENCY WORSEN DEFICITS?¶ One big problem will be how to deal with the government’s huge deficits. The scope of shortfalls now are masked in part by accounting at the unrealistic 1:1 peso-dollar exchange rate, said Rafael Romeu, a Washington economist and ex-president of the nonprofit Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy.¶ If government workers, who now earn 450 Cuban pesos a month, or nearly $20 monthly, instead were to earn the equivalent of $45 per month, where will that extra cash come from?¶ The government will need to slash some of its subsidies, boost taxes and shut some money-losing enterprises to close that larger financial gap, Romeu told CubaNews.¶ “Unifying the currency should be a byproduct of reforming the public sector,” not an initial step in the process, said Romeu. He contends the real value of the currency reflects the strength of government finances and the economy, and should not be artificial.¶ Yet with deficits so large, Cuba isn’t expected to adopt a single, flexible exchange rate for its new unified currency, economists say.¶ Instead, the government is more likely to set multiple rates for different purposes, just as socialist Venezuela now does. That system might make it cheaper to buy dollars for milk and other basics but more expensive to buy dollars for fancy cars and luxuries¶ But multiple exchange rate systems are complex to administer and often mired in corruption and influence-peddling, experts say.¶ “I’ve never seen a country that has been able to handle multiple exchange rates effectively,” said Cuban-born economist Manuel Lasaga, who runs consulting firm StratInfo in Miami. “In Venezuela, it hasn’t worked. It’s led to massive capital flight.”¶ Uncertainty over the future currency system could give rise to speculation, warns Emilio Morales, former director of marketing for CIMEX SA, Cuba’s largest company in the retail and wholesale business.¶ “We anticipate an immediate and sharp rise in the black-market dollar; perhaps two or three times for what the dollar will officially sell at the state-run Cadeca money-exchange houses,” Morales now president of Miami-based Havana Consulting Group wrote in a recent report on the unification plan.¶ FOREIGN FIRMS LIKELY TO DELAY INVESTMENT¶ The government could curb some speculation by cutting the exchange rate early to perhaps 18 local pesos per CUC. That would raise “workers’ purchasing power, if prices set in dollars in state stores remain unchanged,” Morales said. The government has some cushion to absorb that change because of its high markups on goods sold in state stores.¶ In announcing the unification, Cuba has pledged a switch that will avert shocks and that ensure that “the confidence of people who have maintained their savings in Cuban banks, in CUC, in other international currencies and CUP, will remain intact.¶ Still, foreign companies are likely to slow or defer investment in Cuba until the currency process shakes out, Morales predicts. He hopes the needed transition to a single means of exhange can work and “does not become a huge disaster.”

#### Fortunately plan solves

--financing and technical assistance

--US market resources

--empowers the Cuban people

Piccone 13 (Joseph, Brookings Institute Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Foreign Policy, Opening to Havana, 1/17/13, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/opening-to-havana)

Under **Raul Castro**, the Cuban government **has continued** to undertake a number of **important reforms to modernize its economy, lessen its dependence on** Hugo **Chavez**’s Venezuela, **and allow citizens to make** their own **decisions** **about their economic futures.** The process of **reform**, however, **is gradual**, highly controlled **and short on** yielding game-changing **results that would ignite the economy. Failure to tap new offshore oil and gas fields and agricultural damage** from Hurricane Sandy **dealt further setbacks**. Independent civil society remains confined, repressed and harassed, and strict media and internet controls severely restrict the flow of information. **The Castro generation is slowly handing power over to the next generation of** party and military **leaders** who will determine the pace and scope of the reform process. **These trends suggest** that **an inflection point is approaching and that now is the time to try a new paradigm for de-icing the frozen conflict. The embargo** — the most complex and strictest embargo against any country in the world — has **handcuffed the U**nited **S**tates **and has prevented it from having any positive influence** on the island’s developments. It will serve American interests better to learn how to work with the emerging Cuban leaders while simultaneously ramping up direct U.S. outreach to the Cuban people. I recommend that your administration, led by a special envoy appointed by you and reporting to the secretary of state and the national security advisor, open a discreet dialogue with Havana on a wide range of issues, without preconditions. **The aim of the direct bilateral talks would be to resolve** outstanding issues around **migration, travel,** counterterrorism and counternarcotics, the environment, and **trade and investment** that are **important to** protecting **U.S. national interests. Outcomes** of these talks **could include provisions that normalize migration flows**, strengthen border security, break down the walls of communication **that hinder U.S. ability to understand how Cuba is changing, and help U.S. businesses create new jobs.** In the context of such talks your special envoy would be authorized to signal your administration’s willingness to remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, pointing to its assistance to the Colombian peace talks as fresh evidence for the decision. **This would remove a major irritant in U.S.-Cuba relations, allow a greater share of U.S.-sourced components and services in products that enter Cuban commerce, and free up resources to tackle serious threats** to the homeland from other sources like Iran. We should also consider **authorizing payments for exports to Cuba** through financing issued by U.S. banks and granting a general license to allow vessels that have entered Cuban ports to enter U.S. ports without having to wait six months. You **can also facilitate technical assistance on market-oriented reforms from international financial institutions** by signaling your intent to drop outright opposition to such moves. Under this chapeau of direct talks, your administration can seek a negotiated solution to the thorny issue of U.S. and Cuban citizens serving long prison sentences, **thereby catalyzing progress toward removing a major obstacle to improving bilateral relations.** You should, in parallel, also take unilateral steps **to expand direct contacts** with the Cuban people **by: • authorizing financial and technical assistance to** the burgeoning class of **small businesses and cooperatives and permitting** Americans to donate and **trade** in goods and services with those that are certified as independent entrepreneurs, artists, farmers, professionals and craftspeople; • **adding new categories for general licensed travel to Cuba for Americans engaged in** services to **the** independent **economic sector**, e.g., law, real estate, insurance, accounting, financial services; • **granting general licenses for** other **travelers** currently authorized only **under specific licenses**, such as freelance journalists, professional researchers, athletes, and representatives of humanitarian organizations and private foundations; • **increasing or eliminating the cap on cash and gifts** that non- Cuban Americans can send to individuals, independent businesses and families in Cuba; • **eliminating the daily expenditure cap for U.S. citizens visiting Cuba and removing the prohibition on the use of U.S. credit and bank cards in Cuba**; • authorizing the reestablishment of ferry services to Cuba; • expanding the list of exports licensed for sale to Cuba, including items like school and art supplies, athletic equipment, water and food preparation systems, retail business machines, and telecommunications equipment (currently allowed only as donations). **The steps recommended above would give** your **administration the tools to have a constructive dialogue with the Cuban government** based on a set of measures **that 1) would engage Cuban leaders in high-level, face-to-face negotiations on matters that directly serve U.S. interests** in a secure, stable, prosperous and free Cuba; and **2) allow you to assert executive authority to take unilateral steps that would increase U.S. support** to the Cuban people, as mandated by Congress. To take this step, you will have to contend with negative reactions from a vocal, well-organized minority of members of Congress who increasingly are out of step with their constituents on this issue. Your initiative should be presented as a set of concrete measures to assist the Cuban people, which is well within current congressional mandates, and as a way to break the stalemate in resolving the case of U.S. citizen Alan Gross (his wife is calling for direct negotiations). Those are winnable arguments. But you will need to be prepared for some unhelpful criticism along the way. Conclusion: **Current U.S. policy** long ago outlived its usefulness and is counterproductive to advancing the goal of helping the Cuban people. Instead it **gives Cuban officials the ability to demonize the U**nited **S**tates in the eyes of Cubans, other Latin Americans and the rest of the world, which annually condemns the embargo at the United Nations. At this rate, given hardening attitudes in the region against U.S. policy, the Cuba problem may even torpedo your next presidential Summit of the Americas in Panama in 2015. **It is time for a new approach: an initiative** to test the willingness of the Cuban government **to engage constructively** alongside an effort **to empower the Cuban people.**

#### US financing is key to solve inflation

--reform -> inflation

--gives access to multinational and US finances

Morris 11 (Emily, London Metropolitan University UK, FORECASTING CUBA’S ECONOMY: 2, 5, AND 20 YEARS, Presented at the international symposium “Cuba Futures: Past and Present,” organized by The Cuba Project Bildner Center for Western Hemisphere Studies at The Graduate Center/CUNY, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/cuba/cubaforecasting.pdf)

**Risks in the medium term** Five years is a very long time in politics, and with the near certainty of both a generational transition and a deep and disruptive overhaul of the system of economic management and structure of relative prices, forecasting is particularly hazardous. **The one-party political system will be severely tested.** If the government were to collapse, the range of possible scenarios would be huge: **the economy might collapse in to chaos and hyperinflation amidst violent conflict, or enjoy a US financed boom, depending on the circumstances**. However, It is worth noting that, as ever, the probability of government collapse remains smaller than is estimated by those hoping for a political transition. If it were not, the exercise of forecasting a survival scenario would perhaps be a futile one. Forecasting Cuba’s Economy: 2, 5, and 20 Years 21 **Even in the absence of political collapse, there remain substantial risks of economic instability and weakness. The reform process**, which includes the removal of subsidies and extensive realignment of relative prices and incomes, **will create inflationary pressures that will be hard to contain.** The forecast of a steady rise in average productivity is derived from an expectation that the positive impact of the introduction of market signals and improvement in incentives will outweigh the disruption costs. The **slow** rate of average real **income growth would imply continued pressure on the government** to maintain subsidies for basic goods and extend welfare provision to households struggling to adapt to the new conditions, draining fiscal resources and increasing the temptation to raise taxes on productive activity to levels that discourage innovation and enterprise, or push activity back from the formal economy to the informal sector. If Cuba’s reform wave were to coincide with deteriorating external conditions, rather than the relatively benign scenario presented in the EIU’s global assumptions, the political and economic risks would be greater. The danger of upsets in the global economy remains heightened by concerns about high debt levels and sluggish growth in the EU and Europe, and inflated asset prices among the rapidly-growing economies of the developing world. A deterioration in global conditions might feed through to Cuban economic performance through collapse in the nickel price or surge in oil or food prices, or a sudden contraction in tourist arrivals. The single event that would have the greatest negative impact on Cuba’s economic prospects, however, would be the replacement of Hugo Chávez with a hostile regime in Venezuela, particularly if this were to coincide with high international oil prices. **A** similar degree of **shock**, but **on the positive side, would arise from the lifting of the US travel ban, opening of the US market to Cuban exports or removal of restrictions on US and multilateral financial flows to Cuba.**

#### No turns -- reforms have been rapid since 2008

--active labor force

--proliferated small businesses

**Barcia, 12** – Senior Lecturer in Latin American Studies at the School of Modern Languages and Cultures, as well as Deputy Director at the Institute for Colonial and Postcolonial Studies at the University of Leeds (Michael, “Cuba's slow path to the future”, Aljazeera, 1/11/12, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/01/20121883342630706.html)//EX

Leeds, United Kingdom - When the Cuban parliament met in Havana's Palacio de las Convenciones just before last Christmas, the main issue in the agenda was the plan of reforms launched in 2009 with the aim of renovating the economy of the island. The reforms, if limited, still constitute a way of opening up to the private initiative while finding a way around the US embargo that continues to linger over the island's destiny. Fifty-two years after John F Kennedy's administration put the embargo in place, Cuba is still dealing with a world in which US institutions are, for the most part, unreachable. The IMF and the World Bank, for example, are no-go places. Having to depend on short-term loans with high interest rates has transformed the island into an international credit pariah, intensifying the deterioration of Cuba's economy. In recent years, as Cuba has gradually emerged from the Special Period - the economic tribulations that followed the disappearance of the Socialist markets and Soviet subsidies on which Cuba depended - new measures have been taken to steer the ship in the right direction. After Fidel Castro resigned in 2008 and his brother Raul became head of state, the process of economic reform stepped up a gear. With a well-educated, active labour force of almost five million people, most of whom were until recently on the government's books, Raul Castro began to privatise parts of the economy to foster growth. Suddenly Cubans had new possibilities that, although restricted, gave them some respite. First, the new administration allowed all citizens who could afford them to have mobile phones and to buy and sell small private property (houses, vehicles, etc). Then came the proliferation of small businesses, the distribution of unused land among farmers and more recently start-up credits were approved in order to stimulate the creation of even more new businesses.

**Raul wants economic engagement with the US**

LeoGrande, 13- professor in the Department of Government, School of Public Affairs at American University in Washington, D.C. (William, “The Danger of Dependence: Cuba's Foreign Policy After Chavez” World Politics Review, 4/2, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12840/the-danger-of-dependence-cubas-foreign-policy-after-chavez)

In Cuba, **Raúl Castro's historic economic reforms are** moving the island toward a mixed socialist economy, and incipient political decompression is allowing more space for open debate. These changes, undertaken in response to domestic necessity rather than U.S. demands, are nevertheless **moving Cuba in directions long cited by Washington as necessary for better relations**. To exert any positive influence on the trajectory of Cuba's evolution, however, Washington has to engage not just with Cuban society but with Cuba's government. ¶ **Eager to put Cuba on a more solid footing** before passing the torch to the next generation of leaders, **Raúl** Castro **seems genuinely interested in opening talks with Washington. Unlike his older brother, Raúl did not make his political career by mobilizing nationalist sentiment against the U**nited **S**tates. **He has a strong incentive to settle this conflict so he can focus on renovating the Cuban economy and open it up to U.S. trade and investment**.¶

#### Cuban collapse destroys effective counter-terror policy – makes conflicts in hotspots around the globe more likely – specifically Taiwan, Africa, the Caucusus, and North Korea

Gorrell, 5 **-** Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted for the USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT (Tim, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074>

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.¶ Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

#### Those all escalate to global nuclear war

David Bosco (a senior editor at Foreign Policy magazine) July 2006 “Forum: Keeping an eye peeled for World War III” <http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06211/709477-109.stm_>

¶ The understanding that small but violent acts can spark global conflagration is etched into the world's consciousness. The reverberations from Princip's shots in the summer of 1914 ultimately took the lives of more than 10 million people, shattered four empires and dragged more than two dozen countries into war. ¶ This hot summer, as the world watches the violence in the Middle East, the awareness of peace's fragility is particularly acute. The bloodshed in Lebanon appears to be part of a broader upsurge in unrest. Iraq is suffering through one of its bloodiest months since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Taliban militants are burning schools and attacking villages in southern Afghanistan as the United States and NATO struggle to defend that country's fragile government. Nuclear-armed India is still cleaning up the wreckage from a large terrorist attack in which it suspects militants from rival Pakistan. The world is awash in weapons, North Korea and Iran are developing nuclear capabilities, and long-range missile technology is spreading like a virus. ¶ Some see the start of a global conflict. "We're in the early stages of what I would describe as the Third World War," former House Speaker Newt Gingrich said recently. Certain religious Web sites are abuzz with talk of Armageddon. There may be as much hyperbole as prophecy in the forecasts for world war. But it's not hard to conjure ways that today's hot spots could ignite. ¶ Consider the following scenarios: ¶ Targeting Iran: As Israeli troops seek out and destroy Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon, intelligence officials spot a shipment of longer-range Iranian missiles heading for Lebanon. The Israeli government decides to strike the convoy and Iranian nuclear facilities simultaneously. After Iran has recovered from the shock, Revolutionary Guards surging across the border into Iraq, bent on striking Israel's American allies. Governments in Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia face violent street protests demanding retribution against Israel -- and they eventually yield, triggering a major regional war. ¶ Missiles away: With the world's eyes on the Middle East, North Korea's Kim Jong Il decides to continue the fireworks show he began earlier this month. But this time his brinksmanship pushes events over the brink. A missile designed to fall into the sea near Japan goes astray and hits Tokyo, killing a dozen civilians. Incensed, the United States, Japan's treaty ally, bombs North Korean missile and nuclear sites. North Korean artillery batteries fire on Seoul, and South Korean and U.S. troops respond. Meanwhile, Chinese troops cross the border from the north to stem the flow of desperate refugees just as U.S. troops advance from the south. Suddenly, the world's superpower and the newest great power are nose to nose. ¶ Loose nukes: Al-Qaida has had Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in its sights for years, and the organization finally gets its man. Pakistan descends into chaos as militants roam the streets and the army struggles to restore order. India decides to exploit the vacuum and punish the Kashmir-based militants it blames for the recent Mumbai railway bombings. Meanwhile, U.S. special operations forces sent to secure Pakistani nuclear facilities face off against an angry mob. ¶ The empire strikes back: Pressure for democratic reform erupts in autocratic Belarus. As protesters mass outside the parliament in Minsk, president Alexander Lukashenko requests Russian support. After protesters are beaten and killed, they appeal for help, and neighboring Poland -- a NATO member with bitter memories of Soviet repression -- launches a humanitarian mission to shelter the regime's opponents. Polish and Russian troops clash, and a confrontation with NATO looms. ¶ As in the run-up to other wars, there is today more than enough tinder lying around to spark a great power conflict. The question is how effective the major powers have become at managing regional conflicts and preventing them from escalating. After two world wars and the decades-long Cold War, what has the world learned about managing conflict? ¶ The end of the Cold War had the salutary effect of dialing down many regional conflicts. In the 1960s and 1970s, every crisis in the Middle East had the potential to draw in the superpowers in defense of their respective client states. The rest of the world was also part of the Cold War chessboard. Compare the almost invisible U.N. peacekeeping mission in Congo today to the deeply controversial mission there in the early 1960s. (The Soviets were convinced that the U.N. mission was supporting a U.S. puppet, and Russian diplomats stormed out of several Security Council meetings in protest.) From Angola to Afghanistan, nearly every Cold War conflict was a proxy war. Now, many local crises can be handed off to the humanitarians or simply ignored.¶ But the end of the bipolar world has a downside. In the old days, the two competing superpowers sometimes reined in bellicose client states out of fear that regional conflicts would escalate. Which of the major powers today can claim to have such influence over Tehran or Pyongyang?¶ Today's world has one great advantage: None of the leading powers appears determined to reorder international affairs as Germany was before both world wars and as Japan was in the years before World War II.¶ True, China is a rapidly rising power -- an often destabilizing phenomenon in international relations -- but it appears inclined to focus on economic growth rather than military conquest (with the possible exception of Taiwan). Russia is resentful about its fall from superpower status, but it also seems reconciled to U.S. military dominance and more interested in tapping its massive oil and gas reserves than in rebuilding its decrepit military.¶ Indeed, U.S. military superiority seems to be a key to global stability. Some theories of international relations predict that other major powers will eventually band together to challenge American might, but it's hard to find much evidence of such behavior. The United States, after all, invaded Iraq without U.N. approval and yet there was not even a hint that France, Russia or China would respond militarily.

#### **Increased terrorist activity in the region will lead to a bioterror attack**

Bryan 01**,** director of the North-South Center’s Caribbean Program (Anthony, “Terrorism, Porous Borders, and Homeland Security: The Case for U.S.-Caribbean Cooperation,” October 21 2001, Online:  
http://www.cfr.org/publication/4844/terrorism\_porous\_borders\_and%20\_homeland\_%20security.html)

**Terrorist acts can take place anywhere. The Caribbean is no exception. Already the linkages between drug trafficking and terrorism are clear** in countries like Colombia and Peru, and such connections have similar potential **in the Caribbean**. The security of major industrial complexes in some Caribbean countries is vital. Petroleum refineries and major industrial estates in Trinidad, which host more than 100 companies that produce the majority of the world’s methanol, ammonium sulphate, and 40 percent of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), are vulnerable targets. Unfortunately, as experience has shown in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, **terrorists are likely to strike at U.S. and European interests in Caribbean countries. Security issues become even more critical when one considers the possible use of Caribbean countries by terrorists as bases from which to attack the United States**. **An airliner hijacked after departure from an airport in the northern Caribbean or the Bahamas can be flying over South Florida in less than an hour. Terrorists can sabotage or seize control of a cruise ship after the vessel leaves a Caribbean port**. Moreover, **terrorists with false passports and visas issued in the Caribbean may be able to move easily through passport controls in Canada or the United States.** (To help counter this possibility, some countries have suspended "economic citizenship" programs to ensure that known terrorists have not been inadvertently granted such citizenship.) Again, **Caribbean countries are as vulnerable** as anywhere else **to the clandestine manufacture and deployment of biological weapons within national borders**.

#### Cuba has the facilities and tech to produce bioweapons now

Robles 07 (Miami Herald, Ex-insider: Cuba has bioweapons, Feb 28 2007, Robles is news reporter, and Miami Herald is a newspaper in Miami, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/cuba/sfrc060502.pdf)

The former chief of Cuba's military medical services is calling for international weapons inspections of a secret underground lab near Havana, where he says the government is creating biological warfare agents like the plague, botulism and yellow fever. Roberto Ortega, a former army colonel who ran the military's medical services from 1984 to 1994, defected in 2003 and now lives in South Florida. After living here quietly for four years, this week Ortega went on the Spanish-language media circuit to denounce what he claims is an advanced offensive biological warfare weapons program. He spoke Tuesday night at the University of Miami's Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies where one angry heckler stormed out accusing him of deliberately sowing fear among Cuban exiles. ''They can develop viruses and bacteria and dangerous sicknesses that are currently unknown and difficult to diagnose,'' Ortega told The Miami Herald. ``They don't need missiles or troops. They need four agents, like the people from al Qaeda or the Taliban, who contaminate water, air conditioning or heating systems.'' He said Cuba was ready to use the biological agents ''to blackmail the United States in case of an international incident'' such as the threat of a U.S. invasion. The Cuban government has denied such programs exist, but if Ortega's allegations are true Washington could face the prospect of an enemy nation 90 miles away with the capability of launching germ attacks. UNDERGROUND LAB Ortega said he told the CIA nearly two years ago about an underground Cuban facility southwest of Havana. The maximum security lab dubbed ''Labor One'' has an above-ground civilian cover and employs dozens of scientists, he said. But in the underground facility, scientists reproduced and stockpiled deadly germs and bacterias collected in Africa, he added. He visited the lab in 1992 when he accompanied a high-level Russian military delegation, he said. ''I saw it,'' Ortega said. ``I lived it.'' Ortega is believed to be the first defector with details of such an alleged biological warfare facility, said University of Miami professor Manuel Cereijo, who studies Cuba's biotechnology and terrorism issues. Ortega said he has come forward now because he did not see the CIA taking public action on his information. The CIA and the U.S. State Department declined to comment. ''He talks about a place I never heard about,'' Cereijo said. ``There are many other places where there exists the capacity to develop bioweapons. That doesn't mean they are doing that. Only a person like him would know.'' ADVANCES KNOWN Cuba's advanced biotechnology industry is well-known, having produced vaccines for hepatitis and meningitis B and exported them to dozens of countries around the world. In 2002, John Bolton, then a top U.S. State Department official for arms control, said Cuba ``has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort.'' In a report last year, the State Department acknowledged analysts were divided on the issue of whether Cuba has such a program. Experts also argue that the U.S. government is unlikely to have high-level spies in Cuba feeding it ¶ information on what must be, if it exists, a highly secret program

#### **A recent influenza strain causes extinction if bio terrorists obtain the information – this is comparatively the biggest impact**

Prado 12 (Mark Evan, a physicist in the Washington, D.C. region working for the Pentagon in advanced planning in the space program, citing: The Office of Biological Activities (OSB), a division of the US government's National Institute of Health (NIH) which promotes science, safety, and ethics in biotechnology, “Human Extinction by Biotechnology and Nanotechnology”, http://www.permanent.com/human-extinction-biotechnology-nano.html)

As biotechnology has advanced, so has the power of the individual. **In the past century, it took a country or rogue organization, a lot of money, and special skills to create a** weapon of mass destruction (**WMD**). **Now, it takes just one person, the internet, and a small cheap lab**.¶ Instead of "Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)", **we are faced with "Weapons of Mass Extinction** (WME)".¶ For example, in 2011, in a surprise address to the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated: "**Less than a year ago, al Qaeda** in the Arabian Peninsula **made a call to arms for,** and I quote, **'brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry to develop a weapon of mass destruction**.'"Clinton-UN¶ She also officially acknowledged the generally accepted situation that "**A crude but effective terrorist weapon can be made by using a small sample of any number of widely available pathogens, inexpensive equipment, and college-level chemistry and biology**" and noted that "**it is not possible**, in our opinion, **to create a verification regime" for preventing biological weapons.¶ This came just a few months after two independent developments -- a scientist in the Netherlands, and a team led by a Japanese scientist at the University of Wisconsin -- both announced that they had created viruses in the laboratory which are far more virulent than anything which had occurred naturally, potentially the most deadly virus ever faced by humans**. Both were **created by modifying the H5N1 Bird Flu virus in the laboratory. These scientists were apparently planning to publish their research openly soon after Clinton's address.¶ The US government's National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), a division of the National Institute of Health (NIH) requested they not publish the details. The NSABB has no legal authority, and is only an advisory organization**. The authors disagreed with the decision but agreed to adhere to it. All the authors had already received funding from the NIH and it might be presumed they would continue to receive funding... unless they did not follow the request.¶ After also being contacted by the NSABB, the two scientific journals, Nature and Science (two highly established journals), still planned to publish the two papers minus some of the details. The journal Science stated it would agree with the NSABB to refrain from publishing the details only if the government created a system whereby scientists worldwide could access the details if they had a legitimate need to know the information. However, **at least one of the scientists had already presented his work at a major conference.SciAm-Albert**¶ Indeed, the editor of Science Magazine said "“**This finding shows it’s much easier to evolve this virus to an extremely dangerous state where it can be transmitted in aerosols [i.e., by coughing or sneezing] than anybody had recognized.**” [NYTimes-1220](http://www.permanent.com/human-extinction-biotechnology-nano.html#NYTimes-1220)¶ In 2011, folks. Imagine, as this news spreads around, and as technology advances even further, what the world will be like in 2020. **Scientists are already saying it's not a matter of "if" but one of "when".¶ These kinds of things cannot be kept secret**. They will spread. Indeed, such news announcements stimulate interest. **You can be sure that the news media will broadcast such gains very prominently, because it sells their service and makes them money, and can selfishly rationalize away the greater interests of our species**.¶ Keeping this kind of research secret is difficult**.¶ Pharmaceutical companies pay scientists for information and cooperation all the time. Others can pay scientists as well. There are still many scientists who rationalize their research as "not that dangerous" and/or is important for "defensive" purposes** (kind've like other arms races) **in order to promote their paid work, and when money is offered, many people can rationalize even more**. It may not matter whether the money is offered by a pharmaceutical company or just a visiting consultant.¶ It could even be an undercover agents posing as pharmaceutical company staff, either a front company or faked, or even a plant into a legitimate company, university, computer center, or other organization. Indeed, what percentage of people really verify an identity on a business card, and check with the boss of the person**?¶ Beyond that, people just talk, out of ego, curiosity, open scientific dialogue, or soliciting work**. Graduate students and other young people often brag about their knowledge in casual conversations, or job interviews. **It's easy to find out what research people are doing, and people and places can be targeted undercover.¶ University laboratories, offices, and homes are often not locked or secured well. If necessary, most locks can be picked easily by somebody trained in standard locksmith skills**. Most trash isn't shredded. **Hired thieves don't even need to know what they're stealing and can be told a ruse, but money talks.** **And many victim companies and laboratories would cover up a break-in or leak, out of fear** it would tarnish their reputation and reduce funding, as well as threaten individual jobs and well being. **This kind of espionage has been going on for decades by professionals, normally undetected. It's just becoming much more deadly and easier for an individual or a small group to do on a shoestring budget.**¶ This is not news, but has been known for decades by a tiny percentage of people. **What is lacking is broader recognition, acceptance, and interest in bioweapons.¶ PERMANENT was created in 1985 while I was working for the Pentagon in advanced planning in space "defense" systems**. From also reviewing "nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)" weapons and other things at that time and before, **it was abundantly clear to many of us that a much greater threat to the world, actually to our species, was biological weapons**. In one way, **it was good that nations were wasting their money and focus on nuclear, robotic, and more conventional weapons, which do not create existential risks, rather than on biological weapons**.¶ While it was good experience to be working on advanced planning in the space program, there was very little interest in top government circles in space colonization, mainly just interest in the next money contracts, and overblown fear of the Soviets at that time was a successful formula for getting funding. Fear mongering and demonizing sells (and the secrecy and unknowns surrounding weapons programs only enhanced "what if" fears, regardless of how dysfunction the opponent really is, information which was not leaked publicly). If you talked about mining the moon or asteroids near Earth, most people would be disinterested and many would laugh and brush it aside.¶ **It was difficult enough to get serious attention to PERMANENT concepts, and arguing that we have a rush deadline of doing so before we biological weapons make us extinct** -- before our own technological advances destroy us -- usually got a reinforced brushoff and often snide remarks. I mainly stuck to the engineering and scientific studies relevant to PERMANENT, with a general theme of space industrialization for sustainable profits, and space colonization following that.¶ The hottest topics were related to space tourism whereby we could go to space for selfish reasons for a vacation, such as private earth launchers. Advocates of private earth launch stated that we needed to get the cost of launch down via their private projects before space resources would become economical. (Baloney, as I discuss elsewhere on this website.)¶ When writing the PERMANENT book, I buried the biotechnology / supervirus / extinction threats in the Introduction (see, for example, page iii, under the section title Why. (That was published in 1998.)¶ At the turn of the millenium, I was actually out of money, due to spending my savings to write the PERMANENT book and website for outreach, as well as the expenses of ordering scientific publications and other important basic items, plus mailing copies of the book to wealthy people (at our expense, and we had to find them first) ... all while forgoing many opportunities to go out and make money instead for myself. While the website attracted huge numbers of visitors and a whole lot of traffic, not many people were willing to make any financial donation, and the overall support was very disappointing. My dot com bubble burst.¶ So, hardly able to survive, many years of working on PERMANENT website ground to a crawl, and the rest of PERMANENT was frozen for the most part, except for Sam Fraser's volunteer artistic overhaul in 2001. I had to go out and make money in the usual ordinary ways in the world.¶ Some time before this, in the year 2000, I moved the extinction risk and the responsibility of our generation up to the very top of the home page. "In all geologic time, our generation will be the one to get mankind off our lonely planetary cradle. It is a race against time, before biotechnology makes mankind extinct, or nanotechnology destroys Earth's biosphere, suddenly."¶ You can see a year 2000 version of this (before Sam's artistic overhaul) on the Way Back Machine's archival page on PERMANENT.¶ Then came the year 2001.

#### The plan sends a clear signal to improve Latin American relations

White, 13-Senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and former U.S. ambassador to Paraguay and El Salvador (Robert, “After Chávez, a Chance to Rethink Relations With Cuba”, New York Times, 3/7/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/after-chavez-hope-for-good-neighbors-in-latin-america.html?pagewanted=all)//TL

**FOR most of our history, the United States assumed that its security was inextricably linked to a partnership with Latin America.** This legacy dates from the Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1823, through the Rio pact, the postwar treaty that pledged the United States to come to the defense of its allies in Central and South America.¶ **Yet for a half-century, our policies toward our southern neighbors have alternated between intervention and neglect**, inappropriate meddling and missed opportunities. **The death** this week **of** President Hugo **Chávez** of Venezuela — who along with Fidel Castro of Cuba was perhaps the most vociferous critic of the United States among the political leaders of the Western Hemisphere in recent decades — **offers an opportunity to restore bonds with potential allies who share the American goal of prosperity.¶** Throughout his career, the autocratic Mr. Chávez used our embargo as a wedge with which to antagonize the United States and alienate its supporters. His fuel helped prop up the rule of Mr. Castro and his brother Raúl, Cuba’s current president. **The embargo no longer serves any useful purpose (if it ever did at all); President Obama should end** it, though it would mean overcoming powerful opposition from Cuban-American lawmakers in Congress.¶ **An end to the Cuba embargo would send a powerful signal to all of Latin America that the United States wants a new, warmer relationship** with democratic forces seeking social change throughout the Americas.¶ I joined the State Department as a Foreign Service officer in the 1950s and chose to serve in Latin America in the 1960s. I was inspired by President John F. Kennedy’s creative response to the revolutionary fervor then sweeping Latin America. The 1959 Cuban revolution, led by the charismatic Fidel Castro, had inspired revolts against the cruel dictatorships and corrupt pseudodemocracies that had dominated the region since the end of Spanish and Portuguese rule in the 19th century.¶ Kennedy had a charisma of his own, and it captured the imaginations of leaders who wanted democratic change, not violent revolution. Kennedy reacted to the threat of continental insurrection by creating the Alliance for Progress, a kind of Marshall Plan for the hemisphere that was calculated to achieve the same kind of results that saved Western Europe from Communism. He pledged billions of dollars to this effort. In hindsight, it may have been overly ambitious, even naïve, but Kennedy’s focus on Latin America rekindled the promise of the Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt and transformed the whole concept of inter-American relations.¶ Tragically, after Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, the ideal of the Alliance for Progress crumbled and “la noche mas larga” — “the longest night” — began for the proponents of Latin American democracy. Military regimes flourished, democratic governments withered, moderate political and civil leaders were labeled Communists, rights of free speech and assembly were curtailed and human dignity crushed, largely because the United States abandoned all standards save that of anti-Communism.¶ During my Foreign Service career, I did what I could to oppose policies that supported dictators and closed off democratic alternatives. In 1981, as the ambassador to El Salvador, I refused a demand by the secretary of state, Alexander M. Haig Jr., that I use official channels to cover up the Salvadoran military’s responsibility for the murders of four American churchwomen. I was fired and forced out of the Foreign Service.¶ The Reagan administration, under the illusion that Cuba was the power driving the Salvadoran revolution, turned its policy over to the Pentagon and C.I.A., with predictable results. During the 1980s the United States helped expand the Salvadoran military, which was dominated by uniformed assassins. We armed them, trained them and covered up their crimes.¶ After our counterrevolutionary efforts failed to end the Salvadoran conflict, the Defense Department asked its research institute, the RAND Corporation, what had gone wrong. RAND analysts found that United States policy makers had refused to accept the obvious truth that the insurgents were rebelling against social injustice and state terror. As a result, “we pursued a policy unsettling to ourselves, for ends humiliating to the Salvadorans and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional conception of the national interest.”¶ Over the subsequent quarter-century, a series of profound political, social and economic changes have undermined the traditional power bases in Latin America and, with them, longstanding regional institutions like the Organization of American States. The organization, which is headquartered in Washington and which excluded Cuba in 1962, was seen as irrelevant by Mr. Chávez. He promoted the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States — which excludes the United States and Canada — as an alternative.¶ At a regional meeting that included Cuba and excluded the United States, Mr. Chávez said that “the most positive thing for the independence of our continent is that we meet alone without the hegemony of empire.”¶ Mr. Chávez was masterful at manipulating America’s antagonism toward Fidel Castro as a rhetorical stick with which to attack the United States as an imperialist aggressor, an enemy of progressive change, interested mainly in treating Latin America as a vassal continent, a source of cheap commodities and labor.¶ Like its predecessors, the Obama administration has given few signs that it has grasped the magnitude of these changes or cares about their consequences. After President Obama took office in 2009, Latin America’s leading statesman at the time, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, then the president of Brazil, urged Mr. Obama to normalize relations with Cuba.¶ Lula, as he is universally known, correctly identified our Cuba policy as the chief stumbling block to renewed ties with Latin America, as it had been since the very early years of the Castro regime.¶ After the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington set out to accomplish by stealth and economic strangulation what it had failed to do by frontal attack. But the clumsy mix of covert action and porous boycott succeeded primarily in bringing shame on the United States and turning Mr. Castro into a folk hero.¶ And even now, despite the relaxing of travel restrictions and Raúl Castro’s announcement that he will retire in 2018, the implacable hatred of many within the Cuban exile community continues. The fact that two of the three Cuban-American members of the Senate — Marco Rubio of Florida and Ted Cruz of Texas — are rising stars in the Republican Party complicates further the potential for a recalibration of Cuban-American relations. (The third member, Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, is the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but his power has been weakened by a continuing ethics controversy.)¶ Are there any other examples in the history of diplomacy where the leaders of a small, weak nation can prevent a great power from acting in its own best interest merely by staying alive?¶ The re-election of President Obama, and the death of Mr. Chávez, give America a chance to reassess the irrational hold on our imaginations that Fidel Castro has exerted for five decades. The president and his new secretary of state, John Kerry, should quietly reach out to Latin American leaders like President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia and José Miguel Insulza, secretary general of the Organization of American States. The message should be simple: The president is prepared to show some flexibility on Cuba and asks your help.¶ Such a simple request could transform the Cuban issue from a bilateral problem into a multilateral challenge. It would then be up to Latin Americans to devise a policy that would help Cuba achieve a sufficient measure of democratic change to justify its reintegration into a hemisphere composed entirely of elected governments.¶ If, however, our present policy paralysis continues, we will soon see the emergence of two rival camps, the United States versus Latin America. While Washington would continue to enjoy friendly relations with individual countries like Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, the vision of Roosevelt and Kennedy of a hemisphere of partners cooperating in matters of common concern would be reduced to a historical footnote.

#### Latin American cooperation key to economic growth

--narcotrafficking, organized crime, anti-americanism barriers

--untapped market

--valuable resources and business opps

Noriega 2012 **–** visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute [Roger, “Latin America is crucial to US competitiveness”, October 22, <http://www.aei-ideas.org/2012/10/latin-america-is-crucial-to-us-competitiveness/>/cc]

A stable and prosperous Americas is indispensable to US economic success and security. However, the US economic and fiscal crises and preoccupation with two controversial wars distracted policy makers in Washington and undermined US leadership in the region. Although access to the US market, investment, technology, and other economic benefits is valued in most countries in the region, the United States is not the only partner to choose from– with China’s influence growing.¶ The United States must recover its own credibility by making bold decisions to restore fiscal responsibility, aggressive trade promotion, energy interdependence, and economic growth.¶ The security challenges in the Americas are very real and growing more complicated every day. Illegal narcotics trafficking, transnational organized crime, and radical populism fueled by Venezuela’s petrodollars and allied with dangerous extra-regional forces pose a daunting set of challenges. Alongside a positive economic engagement, assessing and addressing threats is an indispensable obligation to US security and regional leadership.¶ Expanding Regional Economic Cooperation and Trade Integration¶ An aggressive trade promotion and foreign investment strategy in today’s hypercompetitive globalized economy are imperatives.¶ Mexico, Chile, Peru, Brazil, and Colombia have been at the forefront in modernizing their economies, liberalizing trade, opening their economies to investment, and becoming more competitive overall. Since 2003, an estimated 73 million Latin Americans have risen out of poverty. Moreover, between then and 2010, the average Latin American income increased by more than 30 percent, meaning that today nearly one-third of the region’s one-billion population is considered middle class. And in just the next five years, regional economies are projected to expand by one-third. That macroeconomic stability generates even greater opportunities for US business.¶ Already the Western Hemisphere supplies one-quarter of the world’s crude oil, one-third of the world’s natural gas, nearly one-fourth of its coal, and more than a third of global electricity, while offering tremendous potential for the development of renewable energy technologies. Three of the United States’ top four foreign sources of energy are in the Americas.¶ The US administration must recognize this reality and act to take full advantage of the opportunities.

#### Economic growth provides a magnitude filter to all transnational conflicts

--nationalism, ethnic religious hate

--undermine attemtps to solve pollution, drugs, crime, sickness, famine, plagues

--key to regional security

Silk 93 — Leonard Silk, Distinguished Professor of Economics at Pace University, Senior Research Fellow at the Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, and former Economics Columnist with the *New York Times*, 1993 (“Dangers of Slow Growth,” *Foreign Affairs*, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

Like the Great Depression, the current economic slump has fanned the firs of nationalist, ethnic and religious hatred around the world. Economic hardship is not the only cause of these social and political pathologies, but it aggravates all of them, and in turn they feed back on economic development. They also undermine efforts to deal with such global problems as environmental pollution, the production and trafficking of drugs, crime, sickness, famine, AIDS and other plagues. Growth will not solve all those problems by itself. But economic growth – and growth alone – creates the additional resources that make it possible to achieve such fundamental goals as higher living standards, national and collective security, a healthier environment, and more liberal and open economies and societies.