# Blake---Round 4

# 1AC

## 1AC—Updated

### 1AC—Zapatismo—Blake

#### Before we can talk about the embargo in Cuba, or the oil in Mexico, or the cocaine cartels in Venezuela, we need to talk about why we’re debating this topic in the first place. The resolution calls us to affirm a legacy of violence towards Latin America – the projection of Western values throughout the globe and the instrumentalization of the topic countries for the gain of the US.

James Petras, Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University, New York, 12-30-11, “Imperialism and the “Anti-Imperialism of the Fools,”  
 <http://petras.lahaine.org/?p=1886>

There is a long history of imperialist “anti-imperialism”, officially sponsored condemnation, exposés and moral indignation directed exclusively against rival imperialists, emerging powers or simply competitors, who in some cases are simply following in the footsteps of the established imperial powers. English imperialists in their heyday justified their world-wide plunder of three continents by perpetuating the “Black Legend”, of Spanish empire’s “exceptional cruelty” toward indigenous people of Latin America, while engaging in the biggest and most lucrative African slave trade. While the Spanish colonists enslaved the indigenous people, the Anglo-american settlers exterminated [indigenous people]….. In the run-up to World War II, European and US imperial powers, while exploiting their Asian colonies condemned Japanese imperial powers’ invasion and colonization of China. Japan, in turn claimed it was leading Asia’s forces fighting against Western imperialism and projected a post-colonial “co-prosperity” sphere of equal Asian partners. The imperialist use of “anti-imperialist” moral rhetoric was designed to weaken rivals and was directed to several audiences. In fact, at no point did the anti-imperialist rhetoric serve to “liberate” any of the colonized people. In almost all cases the victorious imperial power only substituted one form colonial or neo-colonial rule for another. The “anti-imperialism” of the imperialists is directed at the nationalist movements of the colonized countries and at their domestic public. British imperialists fomented uprisings among the agro-mining elites in Latin America promising “free trade” against Spanish mercantilist rule ;they backed the “self-determination” of the slaveholding cotton plantation owners in the US South against the Union;they supported the territorial claims of the Iroquois tribal leaders against the US anti-colonial revolutionaries … exploiting legitimate grievances for imperial ends. During World War II, the Japanese imperialists supported a sector of the nationalist anti-colonial movement in India against the British Empire. The US condemned Spanish colonial rule in Cuba and the Philippines and went to war to “liberate” the oppressed peoples from tyranny….and remained to impose a reign of terror, exploitation and colonial rule… The imperial powers sought to divide the anti-colonial movements and create future “client rulers” when and if they succeeded. The use of anti-imperialist rhetoric was designed to attract two sets of groups. A conservative group with common political and economic interests with the imperial power, which shared their hostility to revolutionary nationalists and which sought to accrue greater advantage by tying their fortunes to a rising imperial power. A radical sector of the movement tactically allied itself with the rising imperial power, with the idea of using the imperial power to secure resources (arms, propaganda, vehicles and financial aid) and, once securing power, to discard them. More often than not, in this game of mutual manipulation between empire and nationalists, the former won out … as is the case then and now. The imperialist “anti-imperialist” rhetoric was equally directed at the domestic public, especially in countries like the US which prized its 18th anti-colonial heritage. The purpose was to broaden the base of empire building beyond the hard line empire loyalists, militarists and corporate beneficiaries. Their appeal sought to include liberals, humanitarians, progressive intellectuals, religious and secular moralists and other “opinion-makers” who had a certain cachet with thelarger public, the ones who would have to pay with their lives and tax money for the inter-imperial and colonial wars. The official spokespeople of empire publicize real and fabricated atrocities of their imperial rivals, and highlight the plight of the colonized victims. The corporate elite and the hardline militarists demand military action to protect property, or to seize strategic resources; the humanitarians and progressives denounce the “crimes against humanity” and echo the calls “to do something concrete” to save the victims from genocide. Sectors of the Left join the chorus, finding a sector of victims who fit in with their abstract ideology, and plead for the imperial powers to “arm the people to liberate themselves” (sic). By lending moral support and a veneer of respectability to the imperial war, by swallowing the propaganda of “war to save victims” the progressives become the prototype of the “anti-imperialism of the fools”. Having secured broad public support on the bases of “anti-imperialism”, the imperialist powers feel free to sacrifice citizens’ lives and the public treasury ,to pursue war, fueled by the moral fervor of a righteous cause. As the butchery drags on and the casualties mount, and the public wearies of war and its cost, progressive and leftist enthusiasm turns to silence or worse, moral hypocrisy with claims that “the nature of the war changed” or “that this isn’t the kind of war that we had in mind …”. As if the war makers ever intended to consult the progressives and left on how and why they should engage in imperial wars.! In the contemporary period the imperial “anti-imperialist wars” and aggression have been greatly aided and abetted by well-funded “grass roots” so-called “non-governmental organizations” which act to mobilize popular movements which can “invite” imperial aggression. Over the past four decades US imperialism has fomented at least two dozen “grass roots” movements which have destroyed democratic governments, or decimated collectivist welfare states or provoked major damage to the economy of targeted countries. In Chile throughout 1972-73 under the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende, the CIA financed and provided major support – via the AFL-CIO–to private truck owners to paralyze the flow of goods and services .They also funded a strike by a sector of the copper workers union (at the El Tenient mine) to undermine copper production and exports, in the lead up to the coup. After the military took power several “grass roots” Christian Democratic union officials participated in the purge of elected leftist union activists. Needless to say in short order the truck owners and copper workers ended the strike, dropped their demands and subsequently lost all bargaining rights! In the 1980’s the CIA via Vatican channels transferred millions of dollars to sustain the “Solidarity Union” in Poland, making a hero of the Gdansk shipyards worker-leader Lech Walesa, who spearheaded the general strike to topple the Communist regime. With the overthrow of Communism so also went guaranteed employment, social security and trade union militancy: the neo-liberal regimes reduced the workforce at Gdansk by fifty percent and eventually closed it, giving the boot to the entire workforce.. Walesa retired with a magnificent Presidential pension, while his former workmates walked the streets and the new “independent” Polish rulers provided NATO with military bases and mercenaries for imperial wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2002 the White House, the CIA , the AFL-CIO and NGOs, backed a Venezuelan military-business – trade union bureaucrat led “grass roots” coup that overthrew democratically elected President Chavez. In 48 hours a million strong authentic grass roots mobilization of the urban poor backed by constitutionalist military forces defeated the US backed dictators and restored Chavez to power .Subsequently oil executives directed a lockout backed by several US financed NGOs. They were defeated by the workers’ takeover of the oil industry. The unsuccessful coup and lockout cost the Venezuelan economy billions of dollars in lost income and caused a double digit decline in GNP. The US backed “grass roots” armed jihadists to liberated “Bosnia” and armed the“grass roots” terrorist Kosova Liberation Army to break-up Yugoslavia.Almost the entire Western Left cheered as, the US bombed Belgrade, degraded the economy and claimed it was “responding to genocide”. Kosova “free and independent” became a huge market for white slavers, housed the biggest US military base in Europe, with the highest per-capita out migration of any country in Europe. The imperial “grass roots” strategy combines humanitarian, democratic and anti-imperialist rhetoric and paid and trained local NGO’s, with mass media blitzes to mobilize Western public opinion and especially “prestigious leftist moral critics” behind their power grabs. The Consequence of Imperial Promoted “Anti-Imperialist” Movements: Who Wins and Who Loses? The historic record of imperialist promoted “anti-imperialist” and “pro-democracy” “grass roots movements” is uniformly negative. Let us briefly summarize the results. In Chile ‘grass roots’ truck owners strike led to the brutal military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet and nearly two decades of torture, murder, jailing and forced exile of hundreds of thousands, the imposition of brutal “free market policies” and subordination to US imperial policies. In summary the US multi-national copper corporations and the Chilean oligarchy were the big winners and the mass of the working class and urban and rural poor the biggest losers. The US backed “grass roots uprisings” in Eastern Europe against Soviet domination, exchanged Russian for US domination; subordination to NATO instead of the Warsaw Pact; the massive transfer of national public enterprises, banks and media to Western multi-nationals. Privatization of national enterprises led to unprecedented levels of double-digit unemployment, skyrocketing rents and the growth of pensioner poverty.The crises induced the flight of millions of the most educated and skilled workers and the elimination of free public health, higher education and worker vacation resorts. Throughout the now capitalist Eastern Europe and USSR highly organized criminal gangs developed large scale prostitution and drug rings; foreign and local gangster ‘entrepeneurs’ seized lucrative public enterprises and formed a new class of super-rich oligarchs Electoral party politicians, local business people and professionals linked to Western ‘partners’ were the socio-economic winners. Pensioners, workers, collective farmers, the unemployed youth were the big losers along with the formerly subsidized cultural artists. Military bases in Eastern Europe became the empire’s first line of military attack of Russia and the target of any counter-attack. If we measure the consequences of the shift in imperial power, it is clear that the Eastern Europe countries have become even more subservient under the US and the EU than under Russia. Western induced financial crises have devastated their economies; Eastern European troops have served in more imperial wars under NATO than under Soviet rule; the cultural media are under Western commercial control. Most of all, the degree of imperial control over all economic sectors far exceeds anything that existed under the Soviets. The Eastern European ‘grass roots’ movement succeeded in deepening and extending the US Empire; the advocates of peace, social justice, national independence, a cultural renaissance and social welfare with democracy were the big losers. Western liberals, progressives and leftists who fell in love with imperialist promoted “anti-imperialism” are also big losers. Their support for the NATO attack on Yugoslavia led to the break-up of a multi-national state and the creation of huge NATO military bases and a white slavers paradise in Kosova. Their blind support for the imperial promoted “liberation” of Eastern Europe devastated the welfare state, eliminating the pressure on Western regimes’ need to compete in providing welfare provisions. The main beneficiaries of Western imperial advances via ‘grass roots’ uprisings were the multi-national corporations, the Pentagon and the rightwing free market neo-liberals. As the entire political spectrum moved to the right a sector of the left and progressives eventually jumped on the bandwagon. The Left moralists lost credibility and support, their peace movements dwindled, their “moral critiques” lost resonance. The left and progressives who tail-ended the imperial backed “grass roots movements”, whether in the name of “anti-stalinism”, “pro-democracy” or “anti-imperialism” have never engaged in any critical reflection; no effort to analyze the long-term negative consequences of their positions in terms of the losses in social welfare, national independence or personal dignity. The long history of imperialist manipulation of “anti-imperialist” narratives has found virulent expression in the present day. The New Cold War launched by Obama against China and Russia, the hot war brewing in the Gulf over Iran’s alleged military threat, the interventionist threat against Venezuela’s “drug-networks”,and Syria’s “bloodbath” are part and parcel of the use and abuse of “anti-imperialism” to prop up a declining empire. Hopefully, the progressive and leftist writers and scribes will learn from the ideological pitfalls of the past and resist the temptation to access the mass media by providing a ‘progressive cover’ to imperial dubbed “rebels”. It is time to distinguish between genuine anti-imperialism and pro-democracy movements and those promoted by Washington, NATO and the mass media.

#### We understand the topic, not through the resolution’s violent call to “economic engagement,” but through the lens of Zapatismo. Debate should be a world in which many worlds are possible. Rejecting the colonizing interpretation of the topic mandated by the resolution allows for a multifaceted understanding of Latin America, creating the conditions for counter-hegemony.

David Solnit, writer and activist organizer who helped take a part in the 1999 Seattle WTO protests, 2003, “Globalize Liberation: How to Uproot the System and Build a Better World”

Throughout the struggle, the Zapatistas have punctuated their statements, especially those circulated through the communiques, with calls for democracy, liberty and justice. These concepts, taken together, may be the most difficult, and the most crucial to engage. In new political spaces, all voices, all proposals must be responded to with respect. New political relationships must not be limited by institutions, organizations, or ideologies that seek to contain moments of resistance or rebellion. The new relationships must speak to the collectively defined obligations of a community in a dialogue based on respect. Political projects and proposals need to emerge organically, not be imposed by an individual or a cabal. The provocation suggested by this principle implies a reliance on our collective talents and abilities for self-governance that transcends systems of representative democracy. The Zapatistas have insisted that the marginalized, forgotten and faceless are agents of history, and that they cannot be fully included by adding in such a manner that does not alter the political relations that maintains their marginalization by elites. A “radical” or participatory democracy requires a system that seeks and respect the contribution of everyone, each sharing their own word. “Perhaps,” Subcomandante Marcos declares, “the new political morality is constructed in a new space that is not the taking or retention of power, but serves as the counterweight and opposition that contains it and obliges it to, for example, ‘lead by obeying.’” The Zapatistas demonstrated that it is possible to organize collective action based on a communitywide dialogue, consensus and commitment. Given that in any local context there is not simply one single, homogenous community, how do we determine who leads and who obeys? *Mandar obedeciendo*, or “lead by obeying,” suggests going beyond a system of hierarchy and rank where elites are conferred the duty and the right to direct. The leadership of a community, the process from which it emerges and is articulated, requires clarification, such that *mandar obedeciendo* is not an excise for a small coterie to direct, either out of cynicism or ambition. *Mandar obedeciendo* requires humility and a commitment to listening, neither of which can be take for granted. It is an invitation to a profound transformation, collective and individual. Transformation is both a necessary and integral struggle as we provoke, incite, facilitate, inspire, listen and work with one another with humility. The emergence of the EZLN as a people’s army is a narrative of transformation. The small group of urban revolutionaries who traveled to Chiapas expecting to become a revolutionary vanguard abandoned their concepts once they were “contaminated by and subordinated to the communities.” In another move the community itself became armed. The Zapatistas emerged from a context of a variety of ethnic groups, political organizations, and economic interests. Early in the struggle, during the critical movement of the original EZLN’s transformation from a vanguardist guerrilla to a community in arms, the Zapatistas reflected not one single indigenous identity, but the interests of Tzeltal, Tolojobal, Tzotzil, Chol and Mam people, to name a few. The political imperatives of mandar obedeciendo also challenge many of the assumptions and previously unexamined strategies of organizing associated with “solidarity” efforts that often rely on a singular model, plan, or program fostering paternalism and elitism. Solidarity campaigns too often focus on a single issue, developing networks of short-lived and fragile coalitions that can be resistant to crucial modifications and slow to adapt to shifting contexts. More importantly, solidarity projects that represent, define and speak for the struggle(s) of others presuppose the progress or development of those being aided and not the transformation of those providing the aid. Unfortunately, they are too ill-prepared to acknowledge the transformations already taking place in targeted communities. In an effort to go beyond solidarity, mandar obedeciendo begins with the premise that communities made up of diverse constituencies begins with the premise that communities made up of diverse constituencies are, to varying and complex degrees, already organized. Taking our cues from the EZLN, we can imagine, in a place of solidarity work, a politics of refusal, listening and community-building in which people become part of “the struggle” in their own way, at their own pace, and without being measured by an specific model of “conscientization” or a political program specified by “the organization.” We must operate from the premise that a given community possesses the resources for its own transformation and has the collective genius to marshal those resources for political action. *Encuentro* as a model of political work presupposes individual and collective transformation that results from dialogue, and it allows for the possibility of individual and collective transformation into a community with purpose. Thus, the Zapatistas provide an important example of the possibilities for an unarmed guerrilla operating in sites of privilege, a resistance that makes direct action and disciplined formations central elements of their political practice without abandoning dialogue. Todo para todos, nada para nosotros, “everything for everything, nothing for ourselves,” underscores the commitment to define struggle not by taking state power, but imagining a new world, “a world where many worlds fit." Forsaking the desire to replace one elite with another, todo para todos, nada para nosotros invites us not to submit to individual needs but to elaborate collective ones. More important, it asserts that communities are driven by collectively articulated obligations, not by the competing interests of individual needs. Zapatista political proposals and strategy posit a "collective subject," demanding the fundamental rights that emerge from collective identities and communal needs. Caminamos preguntando, or "we walk asking," challenges us to travel in dialogue with one another, always with a view of a shared horizon. We are often schooled to repress the fundamental impulse to question. A commitment to inquiry allows us to transcend the facade of ideology and the oppression of rigid institutions in favor of discovery. It contests a process in which we have been "educated" to accept being left out or rendered invisible to everyone, including ourselves. The violence of cultural homogenization produced through social fictions and the ideological maneuvers of a "democratic" system attempt to force us to deny ourselves as we deny the uniqueness and diversity of others. Processes of exclusion target specific communities, especially those groups who have chosen to resist, such as the communities who have taken up arms in Chiapas. Other groups, such as youth, women, communities of color, constituencies who craft diverse, often seemingly less obvious strategies of resistance, have also been marginalized as well and are threatened by relentless progresses of homogenization. Such exclusions could also be exerted in revolutionary movements, a history the Zapatistas have struggled not to repeat. Violence was not a means to dominate, or even convince others of the virtues of a Zapatista vision or program. Ideas asserted through the force of arms are always suspect, and as Marcos admits, "the task of an armed movement should be to present the problem, and then step aside." Able to pursue and develop a "model of peace," their change in strategy corresponds to Gandhi's often misunderstood explanation of nonviolence as being an appropriate strategy of the strong, not the weak. They have not abandoned the "model of war" altogether, but have held it in abeyance, the two possibilities working in conjunction to expand their political project for Mexico and beyond. Zapatista strength derives not only from their mobilizations but from the way in which people have rallied to their banner, confident in their commitment not to take state power and impose themselves as a revolutionary vanguard. "For us it would be a failure. What would be a success for the politico-military organizations of the sixties or seventies which emerged with the national liberation movements would be a fiasco for us," claims Marcos. Nunca jamas un mundo sin nosotros, “never again a world without us,” seeks to reverse the history of marginalization in which communities have been systematically silenced. The nunca jamas is a declaration that recognizes that processes of marginalization and homogenization portent the extinction of a people, suggesting the necessity for action that must include cultural renewal. It proclaims the possibilities of a reimagined world, a world in which those in rebellion have responsibilities and have obligations to one another. As a statement against elitism it reminds us that the struggle is not limited to the Zapatistas or those in the south, but must be reimagined to include multiple struggles in numerous sites. Zapatismo offers a strategy of struggle on a variety of fronts, including cultural ones. Fundamental to the Zapatistas’ struggle to make themselves visible has been the claim that they narrate their own history and speak their own truths. The “not forgetting” reminds us to recover our past while we document our struggle. In asserting critical elements of a vibrant Mayan culture, the Zapatistas have successfully resisted market forces that seek to homogenize all people. Their struggle has been successful primarily because it has been rooted locally, a deliberate effort to maintain their commons by reclaiming their history, culture and community. We must also reclaim our histories and cultures as we reclaim our commons. In sites of privilege such as those found in the "the west," a consumer culture fosters values, attitudes, and practices peculiar to a disposable, individualistic, and competitive society. If we begin with a definition of community that stresses sharing knowledge of what works locally between generations and fulfilling collectively determined obligations with one another, then we must ask ourselves how do we collectively define obligations and acknowledge local wisdom in the face of cultural homegenization? *Notes in Conclusion* The Zapatistast commitment to difference rather than identity, dialogue over command, and autonomy in opposition to state or market control has revealed a radical new practice, a commitment to theoretical reflection and direct action that does not subordinate local struggles (issues in particular contexts), prioritize actions (strategies of resistance), or alternative practices (strategies for living outside of state and market forces) to any specific political formation, program, or ideology. The Zapatistas have refused to do battle within a framework of old organizational structures. Thus, they have insisted that they will not fall back into the past that, as Marcos suggests, was defined by the battle over ideologies. During the March for Indigenous Dignity the Zapatistas made it clear they were not trying to turn back the clock to a bucolic past of native harmony. "No," proclaimed Marcos, "we Indian peoples have come in order to wind the clock and to thus ensure that the inclusive, tolerant, and plural tomorrow which is, incidentally, the only tomorrow possible, will arrive. In order to do that, in order for our march to make the clock of humanity march, we Indian peoples have resorted to the art of reading what has not yet been written. Because that is the dream which animates us as indigenous, as Mexicans and, above all, as human beings. With our struggle, we are reading the future which has already been sown yesterday, which is being cultivated today, and which can only be reaped if one fights, if, that is, one dreams.

#### The resolution’s Eurocentric mode of knowledge production needs to be questioned – the politics of “economic engagement” relies on a matrix of domination which valorizes and values the white heterosexual male at the expense of indigenous and black bodies. Pluralistic politics is necessary to decolonize debate and invert the status quo geopolitics of knowledge which makes death inevitable—as Indian and Chinese people in positions of privilege, this is something we needa confront.

Catherine Walsh, 2012 (Estudios Culturales Latinoamericanos de la Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, “The Politics of Naming” Cultural Studies 26:1 p. 117-122 :)

To think with knowledges produced in Latin America and the Caribbean (as well as in other ‘Souths’, including those located in the North) and by intellectuals who come not only from academia, but also from other projects, communities and social movements are, for us, a necessary and essential step, both in de-colonization and in creating other conditions of knowledge and understanding. Our project, thus, concerns itself with the work of inverting the geopolitics of knowledge, with placing attention on the historically subjugated and negated plurality of knowledge, logics and rationalities, and with the political-intellectual effort to create relationships, articulations and convergences between them. The de-colonial element is intimately related to the two preceding points. Here our interest is, on one hand, to make evident the thoughts, practices and experiences that both in the past and in the present have endeavoured to challenge the colonial matrix of power and domination, and to exist in spite of it, in its exterior and interior. By colonial matrix, we refer to the hierarchical system of racial civilizational classification that has operated and operates at different levels of life, including social identities (the superiority of white, heterosexual males), ontological-existential contexts (the dehumanization of indigenous and black peoples), epistemic contexts (the positioning of Euro-centrism as the only perspective of knowledge, thereby disregarding other epistemic rationalities), and cosmological (the control and/or negation of the ancestral-spiritual-territorial-existential bases that govern the life-systems of ancestral peoples, most especially those of African Diaspora and of Abya Yala) (see Quijano 1999). At the centre or the heart of this matrix is capitalism as the only possible model of civilization; the imposed social classification, the idea of ‘humanity’, the perspective of knowledge and the prototype life-system that goes with it defines itself through this capitalistic civilizational lens. As Quijano argues, by defending the interests of social domination and the exploitation of work under the hegemony of capital, ‘the ‘‘racialization’’ and the ‘‘capitalization’’ of social relationships of these models of power, and the ‘‘eurocentralization’’ of its control, are in the very roots of our present problems of identity,’ in Latin America as countries, ‘nations’ and States (Quijano 2006). It is precisely because of this that we consider the de-colonial to be a fundamental perspective. Within our project, the de-colonial does not seek to establish a new paradigm or line of thought but a critically-conscious understanding of the past and present that opens up and suggests questions, perspectives and paths to explore. As such, and on the other hand, we are interested in stimulating methodologies and pedagogies that, in the words of Jacqui Alexander (2005), cross the fictitious boundaries of exclusion and marginalization to contribute to the configuration of new ways of being and knowing rooted not in alterity itself, but in the principles of relation, complement and commitment. It is also to encourage other ways of reading, investigating and researching, of seeing, knowing, feeling, hearing and being, that challenge the singular reasoning of western modernity, make tense our own disciplinary frameworks of ‘study’ and interpretation, and persuade a questioning from and with radically distinct rationalities, knowledge, practices and civilizational-life-systems. It is through these three pillars of the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial that we attempt to understand the processes, experiences and struggles that are occurring in Latin America and elsewhere. But it is also here that we endeavour to contribute to and learn from the complex relationships between culture-politics-economics, knowledge and power in the world today; to unlearn to relearn from and with perspectives otherwise. Practices, experiences and challenges In this last section, my interest is to share some of the particularities of our doctorate programme/project, now in its third cycle; its achievements and advancements; and the challenges that it faces in an academic context, increasingly characterized regionally and internationally, by disciplinarity, depolitization, de-subjectivation, apathy, competitive individualism and nonintervention. Without a doubt, one of the unique characteristics of the programme/ project is its students: all mid-career professionals mainly from the Andean region and from such diverse fields as the social sciences, humanities, the arts, philosophy, communication, education and law. The connection that the majority of the students have with social and cultural movements and/or processes, along with their dedication to teaching or similar work, helps to contribute to dynamic debate and discussion not always seen in academia and post-graduate programmes. Similarly, the faculty of the programme stand out for being internationally renowned intellectuals, and, the majority, for their commitment to struggles of social transformation, critical thinking and the project of the doctorate itself. The curriculum offering is based on courses and seminars that seek to foment thinking from Latin American and with its intellectuals in all of their diversity comprehend, confront and affect the problems and realities of the region, which are not only local but global. The pedagogical methodological perspective aforementioned works to stimulate processes of collective thought and allow the participants to think from related formations, experiences and research topics and to think with the differences disciplinary, geographical, epistemic and subjective thereby fracturing individualism by dialoguing, transgressing and inter-crossing boundaries. Trans-disciplinarity, as such, is a fundamental position and process in our project. The fact that the graduate students come from an array of different backgrounds provides a plurality in which the methodological pedagogical practice becomes the challenge of collectively thinking, crossing disciplinary backgrounds and creating new positions and perspectives, conceived and formed in a trans-disciplinary way. The majority of courses, seminars and professors, also assume that this is a necessary challenge in today’s world when no single discipline and no single intellectual is capable alone of analyzing, comprehending or transforming social reality. Nevertheless, trans-disciplinary gains continue to be a point of criticism and contention, especially given the present trend to re-discipline the Latin American university. As Edgardo Lander has argued (2000a), this tendency reflects the neo-liberalization of higher education, as well as the increasing conservatism of intellectuals, including those that previously identified as or to continue to identify themselves as progressives and/or leftists. To establish oneself in a discipline or presume truth through a discipline, a common practice today, is to reinstall the geopolitics of knowing. This, in turn, strengthens Euro-USA-centrism as ‘the place’ of theory and knowledge. As such, the subject of dispute is not simply the trans-disciplinary aspect of Cultural Studies but also its ‘indisciplinary’ nature, that is, the effort central to our project to include points of view that come from Latin America and thinkers who are not always connected to academia (see Walsh et al. 2002). Our interest is not, as some claim, to facilitate the agendas or cultural agency of subaltern groups or social movements, promote activism or simply include other knowledge forms, but instead to build a different political-intellectual project a political-intellectual project otherwise. Such project gives centrality to the need to learn to think from, together and with Latin American reality and its actors, thereby stimulating convergences, articulations and inter-culturalizations that aim at creating an academia that is committed to life itself. Such a perspective does not eliminate or deny knowledge conceived in Europe or North America usually named as ‘universal’ or its proponents and thinkers. Instead, it incorporates such knowledge as part of a broader canon and worldview that seeks pluriversality, recognizing the importance of places and loci of enunciation. For our project, all of this serves to highlight the doubly complicated situation that is still in flux. On one hand, there is the negative association with trans-disciplinarity and the academic suppositions that accompany it, particularly in the area of research; this requires that our theses be doubly rigorous. And, on the other hand, there is the geopolitical limitation not only of disciplines but also of academic disciplining. To argue, as we do, that knowledge and thought are also produced outside of universities and, in dialogue with Hall, that political movements also produce and provoke theoretic moments and movements, is to question and challenge the academic logic and the authority of a universal and singular reasoning and science. We will, through such questioning and challenges, always be marginalized, placed on the fringe, under a microscope, criticized and disputed. Because of this, the challenges that we have encountered have been many. On one hand, there are those challenges that many face in the Latin-American academic context: the real difficulties of financing, infrastructure and research support. On the other hand, are the challenges that come with the traditional academic disciplinary structure, its de-politization and de-subjectification. Here the challenge is to transgress the established norms of neutrality, distance and objectivity. It is also to confront the standards that give little relevance to historically subjugated groups, practices and knowledges, and to the interlinking of race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality with the structures and models of power and knowledge. It is to make evident past and present struggles that give real meaning to the arguments of heterogeneity, decoloniality and inter-culturality. Here the criticism and dispute comes from many sides: from those who describe these efforts as too politicized (and, as such, supposedly less ‘academic’), uni-paradigmatic (supposedly limited to only one ‘line of thought’), fundamentalist (supposedly exclusionary of those subjects not marked by the colonial wound) and as obsessed with conflict (and therefore far from the tradition of ‘culture’, its letters and object of study). These challenges together with the tensions, criticisms and disputes that they mark often times make the path more difficult. Still, and at the same time, they allow us to clarify the distinctive and unique aspects of our project and its motivations to continue with its course of construction, insurgence and struggle. Our concern here is not so much with the institutionalizing of Cultural Studies. Better yet, and in a much broader fashion, we are concerned with epistemic inter-culturalization, with the de-colonialization and pluriversalization of the ‘university’, and with a thinking from the South(s). To place these concerns, as argued here, within a perspective and a politics of naming: ‘(inter)Cultural Studies in de-colonial code,’ is to open, not close, paths. Conclusion In concluding the reflections I have presented here, it is useful to return to a fundamental point touched by Stuart Hall: ‘intervention’. In particular and with Hall, I refer to the will to intervene in and transform the world, an intervention that does not simply relate to social and political contexts and fields, but also to epistemology and theory. That is to an intervention and transformation in and a de-colonization of the frameworks and logics of our thinking, knowing and comprehending. To commit oneself in mind, body and spirit as Frantz Fanon argued. To consider Cultural Studies today a project of political vocation and intervention is to position and at the same time build our work on the borders of and the boundaries between university and society. It is to seriously reflect on whom we read and with whom we want and/or need to dialogue and think, to understand the very limits or our knowledge. And precisely because of this, it is to act on our own situation, establishing contacts and exchanges of different kinds in a pedagogicalmethodological zeal to think from and think with, in what I have elsewhere called a critical inter-culturality and de-colonial pedagogy (Walsh 2009). In universities and societies that are increasingly characterized by nonintervention, auto-complacency, individualism and apathy, intervention represents, suggests and promotes a position and practice of involvement, action and complicity. To take on such a position and practice and to make it an integral part of our political-intellectual project is to find not only ethical meaning in work on culture and power, but also to give this work some heart. That is to say, to focus on the ever-greater need and urgency of life. To call these Cultural Studies or critical (inter)Cultural Studies is only one of our options, and part of the politics of naming.

#### The topic hails us to understand Latin America instrumentally—they are useful insofar only as they are beneficial to the American nation building project. This westernizing lens makes it impossible to imagine Latin America outside of a Eurocentric understanding of the world – the resolution affirms the expansion of empire and the extermination of the barbarian, primitive, black, native, savage racialized other who “has nothing to contribute to society.”

Edgardo Lander, 2000 (Prof. of Sociology and Latin American studies at the Venezuelan Central University in Caracas , Nepantla: Views from South Volume 1, Issue 3, 2000, “Eurocentrism and Colonialism in Latin American Social Thought”, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/nepantla/summary/v001/1.3lander.html :)

Political and social thought regarding Latin America has been historically characterized by a tension between the search for its specific attributes and an external view that has seen these lands from the narrow perspective of European experience. There has also been an opposition between the challenge of the rich potentialities of this New World and distress over its difference, which stands in contrast with the ideal represented by European culture and racial composition. Nonetheless, external colonial views and regrets because of the difference have been widely hegemonic. A brief revision of the texts of the first republican constitutions is enough to illustrate how liberals, in their attempt to transplant and install a replica of their understanding of the European or North American experience, almost completely ignore the specific cultural and historical conditions of the societies about which they legislate. When these conditions are considered, it is with the express purpose of doing away with them. The affliction because of the difference—the awkwardness of living in a continent that is not white, urban, cosmopolitan, and civilized—finds its best expression in positivism. Sharing the main assumptions and prejudices of nineteenth-century European thought (scientific racism, patriarchy, the idea of progress), positivism reaffirms the colonial discourse. The continent is imagined from a single voice, with a single subject: white, masculine, urban, cosmopolitan. The rest, the majority, is the “other,” barbarian, primitive, black, Indian, who has nothing to contribute to the future of these societies. It would be imperative to whiten, westernize, or exterminate that majority.

#### The topic cannot be separated from the way we debate it – the purpose of this year’s resolution is clear, and it’s to teach us to be better imperialists. This understanding of Latin America, the topic and the debate space destroys education and turns us into the agents of Empire.

Shanara Reid-Brinkley, 2008 (Shanara Rose Reid-Brinkley, Assistant Professor of African American Studies and Communications, Director of Debate @ University of Pittsburgh, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE”, http://www.comm.pitt.edu/faculty/documents/reid-brinkley\_shanara\_r\_200805\_phd.pdf :)

Mitchell observes that the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture.”115 In other words, its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks…the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated every day in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” (emphasis in original).116 The “objective” stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona. The policymaker relies upon “acceptable” forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters’ note, such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression. In other words, the discursive practices of policy oriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony. So, rather than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves in debate, violating the more “objective” stance of the “policymaker” and require their opponents to do the same.

#### The academy has been colonized – debate goes from round to round, pretending like the topic we’ve been given is value-neutral while ignoring its drive to Westernize. Our affirmation of Zapatismo politics re-ignites the revolutionary potential of the debate space by allowing us to link up with other movements in order to move beyond the oppositional politics of the status quo.

El Kilombo Intergaláctico, 07 “BEYOND RESISTANCE: EVERYTHING,” <http://libcom.org/files/beyondresistance.pdf>

The Fourth World War continues unabated and the result has been a near total devastation of the earth and the misery of the grand majority of its inhabitants. Given this situation and the sense of despair it brings, it would be easy to lose a sense of purpose, to raise our hands in defeat and utter those words that have been drilled into us for the past thirty years: "there is in fact no alternative." Despite the new contours of the Fourth World War and the sense of social dizziness that it has created, it is important for us to realize that this war shares one fundamental con­stant with all other wars in the modern era: it has been foisted upon us in order to maintain a division (an inequality) between those who rule and those who are ruled. Since the attempted conquest of the "New World" and the conse­quent establishment of the modern state-form, we have so internalized this division that it seems nearly impossible to imagine, let alone act on, any social organization without it. It is this very act of radical practice and imagination that the Zapatistas believe is necessary to fight back in the era of total war. But how might this alternative take shape? In order to begin to address this question, the Zapatistas implore us to relieve ourselves of the positions of "observers" who insist on their own neutrality and distance; this position may be adequate for the microscope-wielding academic or the "precision-guided" TV audience of the latest bombings over Baghdad, but they are completely insufficient for those who are seeking change. The Zapatistas insist we throw away our microscopes and our televisions, and instead they demand that we equip our "ships" with an "inverted peri­scope.' According to what the Zapatistas have stated, one can never ascertain a belief in or vision of the future by looking at a situation from the position of "neutrality" provided for you by the existing relations of power. These methods will only allow you to see what already is, what the balance of the relations of forces are in your field of inquiry. In other words, such methods allow you to see that field only from the perspective of those who rule at any given moment. In contrast, if one learns to harness the power of the periscope not by honing in on what is happen­ing "above" in the halls of the self-important, but by placing it deep below the earth, below even the very bottom of society, one finds that there are struggles and memories of struggles that allow us to identify not "what is" but more importantly "what will be." By harnessing the transformative capacity of social movement, as well as the memories of past struggles that drive it, the Zapatistas are able to identify the future and act on it today. It is a paradoxical temporal insight that was perhaps best summarized by "El Clandestino" himself, Nlanu Chao, when he proclaimed that, "the future happened a long time ago!" Given this insight afforded by adopting the methodology of the inverted periscope, we are able to shatter the mirror of power, to show that power does not belong to those who rule. Instead, we see that there are two completely different and opposed forms of power in any society: that which emerges from above and is exercised own people (Power with a capital "P"), and that which is born below and is able to act with and through people (power with a lower case "p"). One is SCE on maintaining that which is (Power), while the other is premised on transformation (power). These are not only not the same thing; they are (literally) worlds apart. According to the Zapatistas, once we have broken the mirror of Power by identifying an alternative source of social organization, we can then see it for what it is—a purely negative capacity to isolate us and make us believe that we are powerless. But once we have broken that mirror-spell, we can also see that power does not come from above, horn chose "In power," and therefore that it is possible to exercise power without taking it—that is, without simply changing places with those who rule. In this regard, it is important to quote in its entirety the famous Zapatista motto that has been circulated in abbreviated form among movements throughout the world: "What we seek, what we need and want is for all chose people without a party or an organization to make agreements about what they don't want and what they do want and organize themselves in order to achieve it (preferably through civil and peaceful means), not to take power, but to exercise it."" Only now can we understand the full significance of this statement's challenge. It is important to note how this insight sets the Zapatistas apart from much of the polemics that has domi­nated the Left, be it in "socialist" or "anarchist" camps, throughout the 20th century. Although each of these camps has within itself notable historical precedents that strongly resemble the insights of Zapatismo (the original Soviets of the Russian revolution and the anarchist collectives of the Spanish Civil War come most immediately to mind), we must be clear that on the level of theoretical frameworks and explicit aims, both of these traditions remain (perhaps despite themselves) entangled in the mirror of Power. That is, both are able *to* identify power only as that which comes from above (as Power), and define their varying positions accordingly. Socialists have thus most frequently defined their project as the organization of a social force that seeks *to* "take [Plower.' Anarchism, accepting the very same presupposition, can see itself acting in a purely negative fashion as that which searches *to* eliminate or disrupt Power—anarchist action as defenestration, throwing Power out the window. IS Thus, for each, Power is a given and the only organizationally active agent. From this perspective, we can see that despite the fact that Zapatismo contains within itself elements of both of these traditions, it has been able to break with the mirror of Power. It reveals that Power is but one particular arrangement of social force, and that below that arrangement lies a second—that of power which is never a given but which must always be the project of daily construction. In sum, according to the Zapatistas, through the construction of this second form of power it is possible to overcome the notion and the practice which sustains it that society is possible only through conquest, the idea that social organization necessitates the division between rulers and ruled. Through the empowerment of power, it is pos­sible to organize a society of "mandar obedeciendo*"* (rule by obeying),19 a society that would delegate particular functions while ensuring that those who are commissioned to enact them answer to the direct voice of the social body, and not vice-versa. In other words, our choices now exceed those previously present; we are not faced with the choice of a rule from above (we would call this Sovereignty), or no rule at all (the literal meaning of Anarchy). The Zapatistas force us to face the imminent reality that all can rule—democracy (as in "Democracy, Liberty, and justice)? 4. THE PRACTICE OF DEMOCRACY When democracy is wrenched from the clenched fist of idealism, and is instead understood as the cultiva­tion of habits and institutions necessary for a society to *"mandar obedetientio,"* a whole new continent of revolutionary praxis opens before us. That is, having been able to identify the autonomous and antagonistic relation *that* "exercising power" (a conduct of power) has to "taking power" Ca conduct of Power), the Zapatistas have been unique in their capacity to move beyond the street protest and rhetorical denunciation that have seemed to dominate much of the rest of the anti-globalization movement in recent years. In fact, it seems that in the same way that the Zapatistas were an inspiration for the recovery of the spirit of resistance that has characterized the movements of the past decade, their vision will continue to be a key inspiration as these same movements struggle with the necessity of moving "beyond resistance.

#### The current strategies of oppositional politics fail because they rest on a fixed identity or solidarity activism – Zapatismo ruptures the fixed dialectic between sovereignty and rebellion, allowing resistance to take on new meaning and potential. Attempts to contain our politics deprive it of its revolutionary potential and make the debate space static and meaningless.

Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri, 2011 (Michael Hardt is a Professor of Literature and Italian at Duke University. Antonio Negri is an independent researcher and writer. He has been a Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Paris and a Professor of Political Science at the University of Padua., “common wealth”, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press :)

The Zapatista campaigns for indigenous rights in Mexico provide a clear political example of this altermodernity. The Zapatistas do not pursue either of the conventional strategies that link rights to identity: they neither demand the legal recognition of indigenous identities equal to other identities nor do they claim the sovereignty of traditional indigenous power structures and authorities with respect to the state (according to natural law). For most Zapatistas, in fact, the process of becoming politicized already involves both a conflict with the Mexican state and a refusal of the traditional authority structures of indigenous communities. Autonomy and self-determination are thus the principles that guided the Zapatista strategy in negotiating the constitutional reforms in the 1996 San Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture with the government of Ernesto Zedillo. When the government failed to honor the agreement, however, the Zapatistas began a series of projects to put its principles into action by instituting autonomous regional administrative seats (caracoles) and “good government councils” (juntas de buen gobierno). Even though the members of Zapatista communities are predominantly indigenous, then, and even though they struggle consistently and powerfully against racism, their politics does not rest on a fixed identity. They demand the right not “to be who we are” but rather “to become what we want.” Such principles of movement and self-transformation allow the Zapatistas to avoid getting stuck in antimodernity and move on to the terrain of altermodernity.66 Altermodernity thus involves not only insertion in the long history of antimodern struggles but also rupture with any fixed dialectic between modern sovereignty and antimodern resistance. In the passage from antimodernity to altermodernity, just as tradition and identity are transformed, so too resistance takes on a new meaning, dedicated now to the constitution of alternatives. The freedom that forms the base of resistance, as we explained earlier, comes to the fore and constitutes an event to announce a new political project. This conception of altermodernity gives us a preliminary way to pose the distinction between socialism and communism: whereas socialism ambivalently straddles modernity and antimodernity, communism must break with both of these by presenting a direct relation to the common to develop the paths of altermodernity.

#### The monocultural and hegemonic understanding of debate, the topic and Latin America imposed by the resolution makes the debate space socially useless.

Cynthia Valdivia-Sutherland, Professor and Director of Forensics at Buttle Community College, 1998, “Celebrating Differences: Successfully Diversifying Forensics Programs,” <http://www.phirhopi.org/phi-rho-pi/spts/spkrpts05.2/sutherland.htm>

Although the foundation of forensics events may have been grounded in the ancient rhetoric of Greece and Rome, the globalization of American culture calls for a more diverse rhetorical competency. One of the ways such competency can be developed is by reviewing different multicultural communicative styles. To accomplish this we will briefly examine some features of Asian culture as an exemplar of multicultural differences affecting forensic participation. Although this perusal is limited, it should offer insight into potential multicultural impacts. Perhaps the single most important feature affecting communicative styles within some Asian cultures centers around Confucianism, a philosophy encouraging both reciprocity and group harmony -- empathetic understanding of the other, and self-sacrifice for the good of the community. Consequently, cultures upholding Confucianism as their dominant paradigm place high value on group conformity and relational ethics, resulting in communication patterns designed to "initiate, develop, and maintain social relationships" (Yum, 1988, p. 384) Subsequently, such cultures are more interested in the process by which communication occurs rather than its outcome, most often utilizing indirect communication as a primary tool of the communication event. The impact of Confucianism on the communicative styles of its proponents is profound. First, communication is designed to induce cooperation among group members, and second, to promote relationships rather than individual goal attainments. In the world of forensic competitions, such commitment to the group disallows satisfaction in individualized success, while at the same time creating an environment fraught with face-losing potential. Imagine the shame evident in the one team member who does not advance to awards, or that debate team who drops in the final round. Such face-losing occurrences are common in current forensic practices, and may account for the small number of known debate societies within collectivist societies. Equally relevant to this examination of multicultural differences is nonverbal communication. Culturally bound, nonverbal communication is an area in which misunderstanding between cultures has the potential to flourish. For example, Japanese display rules prohibit negative facial expressions; consequently, it is common for the Japanese to smile even when angry (Argyle, 1982, p. 63). Consider the confusion during an interpretation of literature in which an angry or distraught character smiles in what is perceived an inappropriate moment. The same would hold true if this competitor was attempting to persuade the audience concerning some grave or life-threatening matter. Given Western cultural nonverbal norms, forensic critics would assess the smiling competitor negatively, and the competitor would suffer the impact on the ballot. It is not unlikely such negative attribution would result in the competitor not advancing into the final round, and thus, the competitor would not have opportunity to contribute to the overall success of the team through acquisition of sweepstakes points. Again, such an outcome would constitute loss of face for the competitor, a serious offense in many Asian cultures. Beyond facial expression, noted cultural differences in nonverbal communication range from amount and frequency of eye contact to arrangements of time and space, as well as appropriateness of gestures. Any of these holds the potential for negative impact within a forensics tournament, either in a round of competition, or during social interaction between rounds. The consequences of such misunderstandings may be that multicultural students, feeling uncomfortable in the Westernized cultural realm of forensics, will leave the activity in order to maintain their own cultural perspectives. From this brief overview of some of the inherent differences within multicultural approaches to communicative style, it is evident that the current underlying philosophy of forensic competitions needs to expand if accommodation of cultural dissimilarities is to take place. The question remains: How? Toward Pluralism in Forensics It has been argued that forensics is (or should be) primarily an educational enterprise, rooted in pedagogy, rhetoric, and research. If this is so, then in advancing into the 21st century, an era in which societies will increasingly become multicultural, it makes sense to adopt Albert and Triandis' (1985) objective of effectuating intercultural education within a multicultural society. The aim of this objective is "to prepare individuals to function effectively in both their culture of origin and in their new culture" (p. 391). Implementing this objective in forensics will not be easy. Change never is. However, while human beings do not automatically embrace the unknown, inability to move beyond a state of stasis equates to stagnation in human development. Within the world of forensics, coaches, critics, and competitors must continually adapt, evolving in their interactions with an ever-changing environment, or risk extinction. The possibility for forensic multicultural evolution can be strengthened in several ways. First, those of us involved in the activity must hone our self-diagnostic skills; in other words, we must consistently and honestly examine what we are doing, why, and with what effect. Are we "doing the greatest good for the greatest number?" If not, why not? Second, we must recognize the potential for educational gain when we expose ourselves and our students to multicultural awareness, knowledge, and acceptance. Not only will our learning experience be enriched, but we may also be led to explore identities and to question cultural domination, thereby increasing acceptance of differences. Finally, we must begin to begin. We cannot advance beyond our current state until we initiate action. This can be accomplished in many different ways. Here are a few: a. Recruitment of forensics competitors through on campus multicultural clubs and organizations. b. Development of non-traditional forensics programs. For example: a one-unit non-traveling team that exposes students to and educates them about forensics and/or the use of intramural competitions. c. Adoption of debate topics centered on global rather than national concerns. d. Expository speeches geared to inform about other cultures. e. Interpretive programs adopted from another culture's canons of literature. f. Creation of new events or a return to old ones (such as oratorical speeches which harmonize with African speaking styles). g. Experiential activities designed to expose individuals in forensics to other cultural views. h. Research assessing current forensic multiculturalism. Summary Returning to the question, "Is it possible for pluralism, 'a process by which both minority and majority cultural members adopt some norms of the other group' to thrive within the context of the competitive speech and debate arena?," the answer is yes, but a qualified yes. The reason for this response comes from the understanding of what a process is: a state of evolution, a passage from one place to another. From this understanding, it is easy to see that process implies ongoingness, a continuous going forth from one point to the next. Consequently, in investigating its status quo, questioning its pedagogies, and attempting to initiate change, forensic professionals concerned with multiculturalism are already involved in such a process. Ultimately, as gaps in cultural knowledge decrease, norms will shift. At such a time, we will begin to co-opt certain cultural elements from outside our own -- in turn, sharing what has been exclusively ours with others. Arguably, this is not pluralism in its purest form, but it is a move toward pluralism that constitutes participation in the process of pluralism. As such, it is a move toward multiculturalism in what has traditionally been the monocultural world of forensics. So you still want to increase diversity within your forensics program? Good for you, and for us. Now, let the celebration of differences begin!

# 2AC

## Framework

### 2AC C/I – Discussion of Rez

#### Resolved is to reduce through mental analysis

Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary (<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved?s=ts>)

to reduce by mental analysis (often followed by into).

#### Government is the people

Jeff Oakes, Freelance writer who has published 6 books, No Date “What IS the Intent of the Constitution?” <http://criminaljusticelaw.us/issues/gun-control/chapter-4-intent-constitution/>

The very first principle forms the foundation for the new government, namely a Representative Democracy with the words, “WE the People.”  We hear this so often that we tend to forget the basic principle here is that this nation, the government, is the people not the representatives in Congress, nor the President, nor [the Supreme Court](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_court).  Our government is “WE,” so if we have a problem with our government, we have a problem with ourselves.  If we do not like the job done by those we send to represent us, we can fire them.  Strangely enough, many claim to not be pleased, yet the same folks continually get elected for the most part, thus negating that claim.  But this is a principle we really need to take to heart—WE are the Government.  Not them.

#### “Should” makes something certain – we are certain that the aff is good

The Collins English Dictionary, 12-31-2011, the Collins English Dictionary, a printed and online dictionary of English, “English Dictionary – definition of “should”,” <http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/should?showCookiePolicy=true>

should Definitions verb the past tense of shall: used as an auxiliary verb to indicate that an action is considered by the speaker to be obligatory ( you should go) or to form the subjunctive mood with I or we ( I should like to see you; if I should be late, go without me) See also shall Should has, as its most common meaning in modern English, the sense ought as in I should go to the graduation, but I don't see how I can. However, the older sense of the subjunctive of shall is often used with I or we to indicate a more polite form than would: I should like to go, but I can't. In much speech and writing, should has been replaced by would in contexts of this kind, but it remains in formal English when a conditional subjunctive is used: should he choose to remain, he would be granted asylum Word Origin Old English sceold; see shall shall Definitions verb Word forms: past tense should takes an infinitive without to or an implied infinitive esp with I or we as subject used as an auxiliary to make the future tense ⇒ we shall see you tomorrow Compare will1 (sense 1) with you, he, she, it, they, or a noun as subject used as an auxiliary to indicate determination on the part of the speaker, as in issuing a threat ⇒ you shall pay for this! used as an auxiliary to indicate compulsion, now esp in official documents ⇒ the Tenant shall return the keys to the Landlord used as an auxiliary to indicate certainty or inevitability ⇒ our day shall come

### 2AC AT: F/W

#### Claims of fairness, objectivity, predictability are ways to marginalize the out group and retrench power structures

Delgado, Law Prof at U. of Colorado, 1992 [Richard, “Shadowboxing: An Essay On Power,” In Cornell Law Review, May]

We have cleverly built power's view of the appropriate standard of conduct into the very term fair. Thus, the stronger party is able to have his/her way and see her/himself as principled at the same time. Imagine, for example, a man's likely reaction to the suggestion that subjective considerations -- a woman's mood, her sense of pressure or intimidation, how she felt about the man, her unexpressed fear of reprisals if she did not go ahead-- ought to play a part in determining whether the man is guilty of rape. Most men find this suggestion offensive; it requires them to do something they are not accustomed to doing. "Why," they say, "I'd have to be a mind reader before I could have sex with anybody?" "Who knows, anyway, what internal inhibitions the woman might have been harboring?" And "what if the woman simply changed her mind later and charged me with rape?" What we never notice is that women can "read" men's minds perfectly well. The male perspective is right out there in the world, plain as day, inscribed in culture, song, and myth -- in all the prevailing narratives. These narratives tell us that men want and are entitled  [\*820]  to sex, that it is a prime function of women to give it to them, and that unless something unusual happens, the act of sex is ordinary and blameless. We believe these things because that is the way we have constructed women, men, and "normal" sexual intercourse. Yet society and law accept only this latter message (or something like it), and not the former, more nuanced ones, to mean refusal. Why? The "objective" approach is not inherently better or more fair. Rather, it is accepted because it embodies the sense of the stronger party, who centuries ago found himself in a position to dictate what permission meant. Allowing ourselves to be drawn into reflexive, predictable arguments about administrability, fairness, stability, and ease of determination points us away from what  [\*821]  really counts: the way in which stronger parties have managed to inscribe their views and interests into "external" culture, so that we are now enamored with that way of judging action. First, we read our values and preferences into the culture; then we pretend to consult that culture meekly and humbly in order to judge our own acts.

### 2AC AT: Switch Side Good

#### Switch side leads to American exceptionalism

Ronald Walter Greene, fmr debater and communication professor at U of Minnesota, and Dennis Hicks, fmr debater and communication professor, 2005 “LOST CONVICTIONS; Debating both sides and the ethical self-fashioning of liberal citizens,” <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=ronaldwaltergreene>

In the hands of Dennis Day, the goal of debate was to reassign the convictions of students to the process of debate as a democratic form of decision-making. In this way debate training was no longer simply a mechanism for developing critical thinking or advocacy skills, but instead, debate was now a performance technique that made possible the self-fashioning of a new form of liberal citizen. The citizen’s commitments were to be redirected to the process of debate. This redirection entails a procedural notion of liberal citizenship that asks the student to invest in debate as a method of deliberation. Our argument here rests on Day’s attempt to ethically defend debating both sides by linking the pedagogical rationale of debate to a public ethic, in this case, full and free expression. We are not claiming that debate actually creates a situation in which students who participate in the activity abandon their convictions and commitments on the issues of the day nor are we claiming that debate asks students to embrace an ungrounded relativism. For us, what is important here is that when faced with an ethical criticism of debating both sides, Day sets out a deliberative-oriented vision of democracy whereby the liberal citizen materializes by divorcing his/her speech from the sincerity principle. To embody one’s commitment to the democratic norm of free and full expression required students to argumentatively perform positions they might personally oppose in order to instantiate the circulation of free and full expression and to secure a commitment toward debate as a democratic form of decision-making. Thus, the debate over debate was a struggle over the ethical attributes required for liberal citizenship. The argument that we will develop in this section begins with the premise that a key element of Cold War liberalism was the attempt to re-position the United States as the leader of the Free World (Greene 1999). One way Cold War liberalism made possible the emergence of US world leadership was by pulling together a national and international commitment to ‘American exceptionalism’. According to Nikhil Pal Singh (1998), American exceptionalism is a product of the attempt to conceptualize the United States as a concrete representative of the universal norms of democracy. In so doing, the US is granted a status and history that is deemed unique from other nations at the same time as that uniqueness qualifies the US to be the leader and judge of democratic attributes, characteristics and norms. In the aftermath of World War II, the proliferation of free speech as a characteristic of the US helped to warrant Cold War liberal claims to American exceptionalism. As Paul Passavant (1996) suggests, the ‘Millian paradigm’ of free speech has been appropriated by U.S. constitutional theorists to grant ‘America’ the status of a nation whereby ‘one legitimately claims the right to free speech’ (pp. 301/2). For Passavant, the process by which the US emerged as a nation whereby citizens claim the right to free speech creates a moral geography in which other nations are not granted the ‘maturity’ necessary for free speech and/or simultaneously must conform to the U.S. vision of free speech. It is our argument that during the cold war, the debate-free speech assemblage helped to make possible the emergence of ‘America’s’ status as an exemplar of democracy.

### 2AC Reform

#### We control uniqueness – status quo politics make white supremacy invisible – only a risk that the aff disrupts that kind of logic

Charles Mills, 1997, The Racial Contract, p. 1-3

White supremacy is the unnamed political system that has made the modern world what it is today. You will not find this term in introductory, or even advanced, texts in political theory. A standard undergraduate philosophy course will start off with Plato and Aristotle, perhaps say something about Augustine, Aquinas, and Machiavelli, move on to Hobbes, Locke, Mill, and Marx, and then wind up with Rawls and Nozick. It will introduce you to notions of aristocracy, democracy, absolutism, liberalism, representative government, socialism, welfare capitalism, and libertarianism. But though it covers more than two thousand years of Western political thought and runs the ostensible gamut of political systems, there will be no mention of the basic political system that has shaped the world for the past several hundred years. And this omission is not accidental. Rather, it reflects the fact that standard textbooks and courses have for the most part been written and designed by whites, who take their racial privilege so much for granted that they do not even see it as political, as a form of domination. Ironically, the most important political system of recent global history—the system of domination by which white people have historically ruled over and, in certain important ways, continue to rule over nonwhite people—is not seen as a political system at all. It is just taken for granted; it is the background against which other systems, which we are to see as political, are highlighted. This book is an attempt to redirect your vision, to make you see what, in a sense, has been there all along. / Philosophy bias remained remarkably untouched by the debates over multiculturalism, canon reform, and ethnic diversity racking the academy; both demographically and conceptually, it is one of the "whitest" of the humanities. Blacks, for example, constitute only about 1 percent of philosophers in North American universities—a hundred or so people out of more than ten thousand—and there are even fewer Latino, Asian American, and Native American philosophers.1 Surely this underrepresentation itself stands in need of an explanation, and in my opinion it can be traced in part to a conceptual array and a standard repertoire of concerns whose abstractness typically elides, rather than genuinely includes, the experience of racial minorities. Since (white) women have the demographic advantage of numbers, there are of course far more female philosophers in the profession than nonwhite philosophers (though still not proportionate to women's percentage of the population), and they have made far greater progress in developing alternative conceptualizations. Those African American philosophers who do work in moral and political theory tend cither to produce general work indistinguishable from that of their white peers or to focus on local issues (affirmative action, the black "underclass") or historical figures (W. E. B. Du Bois, Alain Locke) in a way that does not aggressively engage the broader debate. / What is needed is a global theoretical framework for situating discussions of race and while racism, and thereby challenging the assumptions of white political philosophy, which would correspond to feminist theorists' articulation of the centrality of gender, patriarchy, and sexism to traditional moral and political theory. What is needed, in other words, is a recognition that racism (or, as I will argue, global white supremacy) is itself a political system, a particular power structure of formal or informal rule, socioeconomic privilege, and norms for the differential distribution of material wealth and opportunities, benefits and burdens, rights and duties. The notion of the Racial Contract is, 1 suggest, one possible way of making this connection with mainstream theory, since it uses the vocabulary and apparatus already developed for contractarianism to map this unacknowledged system. Contract talk is, after all, the political lingua franca of our times.

#### We don’t need to roleplay as the KKK to know about it – we can make change just like the LBS movement

Dana Roe Polson, former debate coach and Co-Director, teacher, and founder of ConneXions Community Leadership Academy, 2012 “Longing for Theory:” Performance Debate in Action,” <http://gradworks.umi.com/3516242.pdf>

I think the Talented Tenth is actually the wrong metaphor for leadership in the performance debate community. Du Bois, later in his life, sharply criticized and disavowed a reliance on the Black elite to lead, believing that they were more preoccupied with individual gain than with group struggle, and willing to work within current structures rather than calling for radical change. They were becoming Americanized, Du Bois believed, and deradicalized. This deradicalization “occurs when more privileged African Americans (re) align themselves to function as a middle class interested in individual group gain rather than race leadership for mass development” (James, 1997, p. 24). Instead of his youthful belief in the Black elite, “Gradually, black working-class activists surpassed elites in Du Bois’s estimation of political integrity and progressive agency. He democratized his concept of race leaders through the inclusion of the radicalism of nonelites” (James, 1997, p. 21). The young people who have emerged as leaders in the performance debate community were definitely not those Du Bois would have identified as the Talented Tenth in 1903. Du Bois was talking to and about the Black elite, the educated middle class. Earlier in Du Bois’s life, he assumed that those people, college-educated, were the natural leaders. My participants who might be seen as potential leaders do not come from such backgrounds. Many do end up going to college and becoming potential leaders, but they are privileged through this process rather than prior to it. In addition, their focus is most definitely political as opposed to cultural. Nowhere in my research did I hear a Bill Cosby-esque injunction for Black people to shape up and work harder. Instead, the critique is focused on “uplift as group struggle” for continued liberation. Finally, these young leaders are most definitely radicalized as opposed to interested in incremental change that rocks no boats. From CRT and their open critique of white supremacy to their willingness to call for change openly in debate rounds, these young leaders are contentious and bold. Two of my participants, and many of their former debate peers, are involved with a Baltimore group called Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle (LBS). The website of the LBS establishes their identity: We are a dedicated group of Baltimore citizens who want to change the city through governmental policy action. Our purpose is to provide tangible, concrete solutions to Baltimore’s problems and to analyze the ways that external forces have contributed to the overall decline of our city. (“Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle,” n.d.) As we see in this statement of identity, then, LBS as one model of leadership is focused on the political and on an analysis of external influences; this focus is very different from a racial uplift position, and their model of leadership very different from the Talented Tenth. LBS has developed platforms regarding jobs, education, incarceration, and many other issues facing Black people in the city. They hold monthly forums for discussion of these topics, inviting guests and discussing the topics themselves. Further, one of the LBS members ran for City Council this year. He lost, but plans to run again. The training my participants discuss, therefore, is not in the abstract: it is training for the real world, for their own empowerment and that of their communities. This work is extending into local high schools, as well, and Paul Robeson High School now has students involved in LBS. They attend events and meetings not only to help out but as a form of leadership training.

## Hegemony Good K

### AT: Heg Good

#### That outweighs – their framing of war as an event that starts and stops formulates a crisis-politics that ignores structural violence.

Chris J. Cuomo, Fall 1996, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, “War is not just an event,” Hypatia 11.4, proquest

Philosophical attention to war has typically appeared in the form of justifications for entering into war, and over appropriate activities within war. The spatial metaphors used to refer to war as a separate, bounded sphere indicate assumptions that war is a realm of human activity vastly removed from normal life, or a sort of happening that is appropriately conceived apart from everyday events in peaceful times. Not surprisingly, most discussions of the political and ethical dimensions of war discuss war solely as an event -- an occurrence, or collection of occurrences, having clear beginnings and endings that are typically marked by formal, institutional declarations. As happenings, wars and military activities can be seen as motivated by identifiable, if complex, intentions, and directly enacted by individual and collective decision-makers and agents of states. But many of the questions about war that are of interest to feminists -- including how large-scale, state-sponsored violence affects women and members of other oppressed groups; how military violence shapes gendered, raced, and nationalistic political realities and moral imaginations; what such violence consists of and why it persists; how it is related to other oppressive and violent institutions and hegemonies -- cannot be adequately pursued by focusing on events. These issues are not merely a matter of good or bad intentions and identifiable decisions. / In "Gender and `Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an event-based conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.(1) / Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. / Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. / Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns.

#### White supremacy is a global system of oppression that normalizes genocidal modalities of violence and domination.

Rodriguez ‘07 [Dylan, PhD in Ethnic Studies Program of the University of California Berkeley and Associate Proffessor of Ethnic Studies at University of California Riverside, “American Globality And the US Prison regime: State Violence And White Supremacy from Abu Ghraib to Stockton to bagong diwa”, Ateneo de Manila University, 2007, Kritika Kultura 9 (2007): 022-048]

For the theoretical purposes of this essay, white supremacy may be understood as a logic of social organization that produces regimented, institutionalized, and militarized conceptions of hierarchized “human” difference, enforced through coercions and violences that are structured by genocidal possibility (including physical extermination and curtailment of people’s collective capacities to socially, culturally, or biologically reproduce). As a historical vernacular and philosophical apparatus of domination, white supremacy is simultaneously premised on and consistently innovating universalized conceptions of the white (european and euroamerican) “human” vis-à-vis the rigorous production, penal discipline, and frequent social, political, and biological neutralization or extermination of the (non-white) sub- or non-human. to consider white supremacy as essential to American social formation (rather than a freakish or extremist deviation from it) facilitates a discussion of the modalities through which this material logic of violence overdetermines the social, political, economic, and cultural structures that compose American globality and constitute the common sense that is organic to its ordering. While the US prison industrial complex constitutes a statecraft of perpetual domestic crisis that emerges from this social logic of white supremacy, the US prison regime is becoming profoundly undomesticated in a twofold sense: the technologies of carceral racial domination have distended into localities beyond the US proper (they are extra-domestic), while the focused and mundane (though no less severe) bodily violence of the prison’s operative functions have constituted a microwarfare apparatus, accessing and penetrating captive bodies with an unprecedented depth and complexity (the regime is in this sense defined by an unhinged, undomesticated violence). In this context, the (racial) formations of punishment and death inscribed on the various surfaces of the US prison regime—from the nearby to the far away—are in fact generally unremarkable. It cannot be overemphasized that this carceral formation produces a normal and trite violence, a naturalized facet of American social intercourse across scales and geographies, forming the underside of a civil society that is historically unimaginable outside its modalities of formal exclusion and civil/ social neutralization. Yet, it is precisely as this prison regime rearranges, remobilizes, and redeploys its normalized structure of white supremacist bodily violence into geographies beyond the American everyday that it momentarily surfaces as a spectacle of public consumption and even a critical public discourse, in such moments as the photographic revelation of the uS military’s torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. While the “national” scope of the US prison industrial complex constitutes a profound social and political crisis of epochal scale, it also composes an institutional symbiosis that has yielded an authentic conjunctural articulation of state violence that is both organic to the domestic US carceral and capable of rearticulation, appropriation, and mobilization across global geographies. Thus, to understand the prison as a regime is to focus conceptually, theoretically, and politically on the prison as a pliable module or mobilized vessel through which the state generates particular practices of legitimated violence and bodily immobilization. “Prison regime” is a conceptual and theoretical (not a discretely “institutional”) phrase that refers to a modality through which the state organizes, rationalizes, and deploys specific technologies of violence, domination, and subjection—technologies that are otherwise reserved for deployment in sites of declared war or martial law: in this usage, “prison regime” differentiates both the scale and object of analysis from the more typical macro- scale institutional categories of “the prison,” “the prison system,” and, for that matter, “the prison industrial complex.” the conceptual scope of this term similarly exceeds the analytical scope of prison management, prison policy, and “the prison (or prisoner’s) experience,” categories that most often take textual form through discrete case studies, institutional reform initiatives, prison ethnographies, and empirical criminological surveys. Rather, the notion of a prison regime invokes a “meso” (middle, or mediating) dimension of processes, structures, and vernaculars that compose the state’s modalities of self-articulation and self-conceptualization, institutional crafting, and “rule” across the macro and micro scales. It is within this meso range of fluctuating articulations of power that the prison is inscribed as both a localization and constitutive logic of the state’s production of juridical, spatial, and militarized dominion. A genealogy of the prison regime foregrounds the essential instability—the unnaturalness—of its object of discussion, suggesting a process of historical analysis and theorization that methodologically extends beyond 1.) the particular and mystified institutionality of the discrete and narrowly bounded entity we know as the Prison; and 2.) the juridical and institutional formalities of the state’s supposed “ownership” of and orderly proctorship over the Prison as it is conventionally conceived.

#### **Championing freedom and stability of heg marginalizes queer and female identities too**

Winnubst 06 (Shannon, Phd, Associate Professor of Women’s Studies at Ohio State University, *Queering Freedom*, pg. 43-45)

Across the Atlantic and roughly two centuries after Locke’s writing of his Second Treatise, the post-bellum United States entered into some of the nastiest parts of U.S. history. **The operative nexus of racial and sexual difference surfaced with great clarity: black men were lynched on false allegations of raping white women.** These allegations, rarely if ever pursued, sufficed as ample cause for castration, dismemberment, burning at the stake, hanging. This horrific violence set the scene for two dynamics to emerge explicitly and continue with great force into the early twenty-first-century United States psyche: **the sexualizing of racial difference and the racializing of sexual difference.**18 The propertied Christian white male (straight) body19 alone **remained unmarked**, positioned not only as the politically and economically superior subject, but also as the rational, benevolent patriarch in whose hands the security of all bodies rested. Women and non-white men were accordingly positioned below him, most often pitted against one an other through the fear of alleged aggression and manipulation, as a great deal of twentieth-century African American literature shows all too graphically. 20 **The brutal and ugly underbelly of modernity thus surfaced**. A period that emerged philosophically as the triumph of rationality and politically as the victory of representative democracy and its liberal individual, modernity was also the period of the birth of global capitalism and its counterparts of colonialism and slavery.21 Many of the modern categories that we see at work in Locke’s texts emerged in the post-bellum United States with a defensive tenacity that bred political, cultural, psychic, and physical violence. For example, as political categories such as freedom and individualism began to be broadened through the emancipation of slaves, other structures of modernity asserted themselves to shape the exact contours and limits of the kinds of emergent freedoms and rights that would develop. Namely, as the battles around the Fifteenth Amendment and suffragist movements showed, racial and sexual difference emerged as primary fields of signification through which entry to the precious categories of freedom and individual rights had to be negotiated. **The categories of race and gender were being forged in the explicit terms of legal and political documents**. If one was raced or sexed, one had to fight—against other marked (raced, sexed) bodies—for one’s entry into these categories. But the fight turned on evidence of a specific form of rationality. Or, to put it in the language of race and sexual difference, it turned on one’s ability to approximate maleness or whiteness, the two social categories that govern the epistemological category of ‘proper rationality’ and, dialectically, the social category of property ownership. The disjunction of approximating either maleness or whiteness ensured that no set of marked bodies would achieve ‘true’ freedom or individuality: only the white male occupied both positions of power, maleness and whiteness.22 The seduction of freedom thereby became the seduction of **phallicized whiteness**. Consequently, raced and sexed bodies found themselves fighting against one another in a battle that neither of them could ultimately win: the terms were set by an external ‘overseer.’ This historical scene almost perfectly enacts the logic of power that both Nietzsche and Foucault diagnose so clearly: as the structures of modernity began to be contested philosophically (by Hegel and post-Hegelians, particularly Marx) and politically (by Emancipation), the less codified social and political structures emerged with greater clarity and rigidity to control the kinds of political subjectivities that could emerge.23 As freedom and individual rights, which had been acclaimed as universal, began to be exposed as small section of society, the broader and more vaguely articulated structures of racism and sexism began their slow processes of codification. And the singular standard for the legibility of that emergent political subjectivity of individual freedom remained the same: a propertied Christian white (straight) man, the singular subject position that inhabits both maleness and whiteness—and proper rationality. Broad cultural structures of race and sexual difference thus surface as a complicated nexus of power relations in post-bellum practices such as miscegenation, the one-drop rule, and lynching. In these practices, the intersections of race and sex produce a **confusing conflation of values that serve as smoke screens to *obfuscate* the protected, *unmarked subject position of the white man***. Values such as purity, virginity, and passivity are written on the female body as inherent qualities. In what should appear as an obvious contraposition, values such as bestiality, aggression, and uncivilized nature are written on the black body. The black female body, left in the wreckage of embodying these contradictory ‘natural’ traits, becomes a general aberration that is treated with confusion and fear. And the white male body emerges as the unmarked, normative mode of subjectivity. Or, to put this in the terms above, the white male body solidifies his position as the modern man—the rational, transcendental man in control of both nature and history. The mode of rationality that defines high modernity—namely, as instrumental, transcendental, and detached from history—expresses itself directly in **the mode of subjectivity inhabited by white propertied Christian (straight) men in the post-bellum United States. It is what** **enables and ensures their power over nature and the social field of relations, and their subsequent freedom**.

#### Kagan’s arguments are false and only furthers Bush-era violent policy

Kupchan 12 (Charles A., Professor International Affairs at Georgetown, Former Director for European Affairs on the National Security Council, B.A. from Harvard and M.Phil. and D.Phil from Oxford, National Journal, 3/17, p4-4, 1p, 1 Graph, “Is American Primacy Really Diminishing?”)

Although it sounds reassuring, Kagan's argument is, broadly, wrong. It's true that economic strength and military superiority will preserve U.S. influence over global affairs for decades to come, but power is undeniably flowing away from the West to developing nations. If history is any guide, the arrival of a world in which power is more widely distributed will mean a new round of jockeying for position and primacy. While it still enjoys the top rank, the United States should do its best to ensure that this transition occurs peacefully and productively. The worst thing to do is to pretend it's not happening. By overselling the durability of U.S. primacy, Kagan's analysis breeds an illusory strategic complacency: There is no need to debate the management of change when one denies it is taking place. Even worse, the neoconservative brain trust to which Kagan belongs chronically overestimates U.S. power and its ability to shape the world. The last time that like-minded thinkers ran the show--George W. Bush's first term as president--they did much more to undermine American strength than to bolster it. Neoconservative thinking produced an assertive unilateralism that set the rest of the world on edge; led to an unnecessary and debilitating war in Iraq, the main results of which have been sectarian violence and regional instability; and encouraged fiscal profligacy that continues to threaten American solvency. Kagan would have us fritter away the nation's resources in pursuit of a hollow hegemony.

#### Heg doesn’t solve war – empirics prove

Christopher Fettweis, Assistant professor IR @ Tulane, 2010, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy” pg 59-82

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible ‘peace dividend’ endangered both national and global security. ‘No serious analyst of American military capabilities’, argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, ‘doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace’.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilising presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

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## Hegemony Good K

### No Solve War

#### No causation—hegemony is not an effective conflict deterrent

Charles L. Glaser 11, professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at the George Washington University and the director of the Elliott School’s Institute for Security and Conﬂict Studies, June 2011, “Why unipolarity doesn’t matter (much),” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 135-147

A still different type of argument holds that unipolar powers tend to adopt expanded interests and associated goals that unipolarity then enables them to achieve. To the extent that these goals are actually in the unipole’s true interest, unipolarity is good for the unipole. In broad terms, this argument follows the claim that states’ interests and goals grow with their power. 19¶ These expanded goals can be attributed to three different types of factors. 20 The ﬁrst is a permissive structure, which allows the state to pursue more ambitious goals. The state’s interests do not change, but its increased ability to pursue them results in a redeﬁnition of its goals. A state could have goals that were previously unachievable at acceptable cost; by lowering the costs, unipolarity places these goals within reach, enabling the state to make itself better off. A unipole’s desire for a higher degree of security can be an example of this type of expanded goal, reﬂecting the means that it can wield. Second, the state can acquire new interests, which are generated by the unipole’s greater territorial and institutional reach. For example, a state that controls more territory may face new threats and, as a result, conclude that it needs to control still more territory, acquire still more power, and/or restructure international institutions to further protect its interests. Third, the unipole’s goals can be inﬂuenced by what is commonly described as human nature and by psychology. A unipolar state will be inclined to lose track of how secure it is and consequently pursue inappropriate policies that are designed to increase its security but turn out to be too costly and/or to have a high probability of backﬁring. One variant of this type of argument expects unipolar powers to conclude that they need to spread their type of governance or political ideology to be secure. These dangers can be reinforced by a tendency for a unipolar power to see its new interests, which are optional, as necessary ones. The ﬁrst two types of expanded interests and goals can make the unipole better off. The question here is whether the interests the United States might ﬁnd within its reach due to its unipolar position are very valuable. With respect to security, the answer is ‘no’.

For the reasons summarized above, the United States can be very secure in bipolarity, and unipolarity is important only in an extreme and unlikely case. Other US goals, for example, spreading democracy and free markets, do not depend on unipolarity, at least not its military dimension. Instead, whether these liberal systems spread will depend most heavily on their own effectiveness. Regarding the down side, there does not appear to be an overwhelming reason that the United States cannot avoid the dangers of unipolar overreach. The Bush administration certainly proved itself vulnerable to these dangers and the United States is continuing to pay for its ﬂawed judgments. Arguably, strands of overreach can be traced back to the Clinton administration’s emphasis on democratic enlargement, although the means that it chose were much more in line with US interests. 21 And the Obama administration’s decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan may well be an example of striving for too much security. Nevertheless, none of the basic arguments about unipolarity explain why these errors are unavoidable. The overreach claim is more an observation about the past than a well-supported prediction about the future. We do not have strong reasons for concluding that the United States will be unable to beneﬁt from analyses of its grand strategy options, learning to both appreciate how very secure it is and at the same time to respect the limits of its power. In sum, then, under current conditions, unipolarity does little to enable the United States to increase its security. Given the limited beneﬁts of unipolarity and the not insigniﬁcant dangers of unipolar overreach, the United States will have to choose its policies wisely if it is going to be better off in a unipolar world than a bipolar one.