# Round 3---Harvard

# 2AC

## Case

### Yancy

#### They are a view from nowhere because they didn’t talk about their social location – reason to reject them

Yancy ‘5 [George, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University, “Whiteness and the Return of the Black Body,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 19(4), p. 215-216]

I write out of a personal existential context. This context is a profound source of knowledge connected to my "raced" body. Hence, I write from a place of lived embodied experience, a site of exposure. In philosophy, the only thing that we are taught to "expose" is a weak argument, a fallacy, or someone's "inferior" reasoning power. The embodied self is bracketed and deemed irrelevant to theory, superfluous and cumbersome in one's search for truth. It is best, or so we are told, to reason from nowhere. Hence, the white philosopher/author presumes to speak for all of "us" without the slightest mention of his or her "raced" identity. Self-consciously writing as a white male philosopher, Crispin Sartwell observes: Left to my own devices, I disappear as an author. That is the "whiteness" of my authorship. This whiteness of authorship is, for us, a form of authority; to speak (apparently) from nowhere, for everyone, is empowering, though one wields power here only by becoming lost to oneself. But such an authorship and authority is also pleasurable: it yields the pleasure of self-forgetting or [End Page 215] apparent transcendence of the mundane and the particular, and the pleasure of power expressed in the "comprehension" of a range of materials.

## Dialectical Materialism

### AT: Dialectic Materialism

#### Perm solves in context of their kritik – Zapatismo links up with other anti-capitalist movements

Richard Stahler-Sholk, Last Cited in 2k, Department of Political Science @ Eastern Michigan University, “A WORLD IN WHICH MANY WORLDS FIT: ZAPATISTA RESPONSES TO GLOBALIZATION,” <http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/lasa2000/stahler-sholk.pdf>

Community Control vs. the Logic of Global Capital Another way in which the Zapatista movement can be seen as a form of resistance against the neoliberal model of globalization, is in the struggle for community control of natural resource development. The neoliberal drive for privatization and opening to foreign investment would privilege global market forces over local priorities. Among the potential resources of great market potential in the conflicted region of Las Cañadas in Chiapas are (1) oil reserves perhaps even greater than publicly acknowledged in the Ocosingo field, (2) the tremendous hydroelectric potential of the Usumacinta River system, and (3) biodiversity in the Montes Azules biological reserve and surrounding Lacandón Jungle (Ceceña & Barreda 1998:44-9). In 1999/2000, the Mexican government began planning with a consortium of domestic and international investors and World Bank financing for a major integrated development scheme in the Lacandón region, not surprisingly coordinated with counterinsurgency strategies (Henríquez 1999, Pérez 2000). The road construction and population displacement involved in a project of this scale go hand in hand with the heavy militarization of the region since the 1994 rebellion. The events surrounding the Chase Manhattan Bank memorandum of 1995 had previously illustrated how the Zapatista movement was seen as problematical for the investment climate preferred by transnational capital. The leaked memo from one of Mexico’s largest creditor banks to its corporate investors suggested that the government would have to “eliminate the Zapatistas,” and “carefully consider whether or not to allow opposition victories if fairly won at the ballot box” (Roett 1995). This warning, at a time when the Zapatistas had declared 38 municipalities in Chiapas to be autonomous, was immediately followed by the government’s February 1995 military offensive which violated the ceasefire in an unsuccessful attempt to capture the Zapatista leadership. Since then, the government expanded militarization of the state along with its “low intensity warfare” strategy of promoting paramilitary repression, while the Zapatista communities continued efforts to advance autonomy in the midst of this counterinsurgency environment (Stahler-Sholk 1998a, 1998b). The Zapatista movement is much more than just a battle over oil and forest resources, but the struggle for control over strategies of development does highlight one way in which the Zapatista model of autonomy is in contention with forces of globalization. The proposed World Bank project for the Lacandón laments that “...the youth have in their aspirations the goal of reproducing themselves as peasants, which leads to strong pressure on the land, at the same time accumulating strong social explosiveness” (Henríquez 1999). The neoliberal model would turn those stubborn peasants into interchangeable workers in a global economy, free to be relocated from valuable land and other marketable commodities. Under the logic of time-space compression that defines globalization, the accidents of geography and history are irrelevant to the strictly market-determined use of resources in the most profitable combinations. Thus biodiversity is seen as a natural resource, and the rights to exploit it are considered the property of those who have the necessary concentration of capital. Transnational corporations can appropriate, modify, and patent genetic forms, without regard for the non-marketed custodianship of native peoples of Chiapas or the Amazon or India, nor for the local preferences of European consumers to be free of genetically modified foods. In this sense, the Zapatista insistence on autonomy can be seen as linked to the Seattle protests against the WTO and other acts of resistance against globalization.

#### Singularity disad – they paper over the ways oppression constitutes itself in different ways than just capitalism – dooms their movement to failure

Simon Tormey, Head of the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Sydney, 2006, ‘Not in my Name’: Deleuze, Zapatismo and the Critique of Representation”

Thinking more generally about the socio-political ideology of Zapatismo, what becomes evident is the reluctance to commit themselves to a ‘vision’ or blueprint of how the world should be transformed, or indeed how even the Chiapas should be transformed. This again is a source of irritation for otherwise sympathetic onlookers who would like to see in the Zapatistas the vanguard of an attempt to construct a viable ‘counter- empire’ of the kind influentially discussed by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their controversial work Empire. Surely it is asked, there must be some notion of what the world should look like in order to mobilise people against the world as it is now? Again, the notion that ‘resistance against’ can only make sense when seen as the antonym of a ‘resistance for’, in this case in favour of a distinct political system or space is one that is challenged both implicitly and explicitly by Zapatista practice. As Marcos insists: Zapatismo is not an ideology, it is not bought and paid for by a doctrine. It is … an intuition. Something so open and flexible that it really occurs in all places. Zapatismo poses the question: ‘What is it that excluded me?’‘What is that has isolated me?’ In each place the response is different. Zapatismo simply states the question and stipulates that the response is plural, that the response is inclusive … 29 In attempting to elaborate what Zapatismo is, communiqués articulate the idea of ‘a political force’ that operates in negation to that which is, as opposed to the embodiment of something that has yet to be created. In this sense they directly eschew the idea of a government or system ‘in waiting’ as per the classic ‘putschist’ rhetoric of traditional revolutionary movements. As has often been noted, they have yet to articulate a response to the ‘land question’, which is the very issue that caused the Zapatistas to come into being in the first place. Zapatismo is ‘silent’ on this and all the other matters that have animated left radicals over the past two centuries, that have nurtured them in the ‘hard times’, and helped to maintain their faith that history is on their side. But the ‘silence’ is surely telling in positive ways. As we noted at the outset, this is a political force that prefers not to ‘speak’, but rather to ‘listen’ and provide what Marcos terms an ‘echo’ of what it ‘hears’. As Marcos notes, this would be: An echo that recognises the existence of the other and does not overpower or attempt to silence it. An echo that takes its place and speaks its own voice, yet speaks with the voice of the other. An echo that reproduces its own sound, yet opens itself to the sound of the other. An echo […] transforming itself and renewing itself in other voices. An echo that turns itself into many voices, into a network of voices that, before Power’s deafness, opts to speak to itself, knowing itself to be one and many, acknowledging itself to be equal in its desire to listen and be listened to, to recognising itself as diverse in the tones and levels of voices forming it.30 To Marcos this is a different kind of political practice. It is one that insists that there are no a priori truths that can be handed down to ‘The People’; there is no doctrine that has to be learned or spelled out; there is only ‘lived experience’. Zapatismo is a political force that is concerned with the means by which people can be ‘present’ as opposed to being represented, whether it be by political parties, ideologies, or the other familiar devices and strategies that have prevented voices being heard. To quote Marcos, what they are struggling for is a world in which ‘all worlds are possible’. Similarly In The Second Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle, Marcos declares (on behalf of the Zapatistas) that: ‘we aren’t proposing a new world, but something preceding a new world; an antechamber looking into the new Mexico. In this sense, this revolution will not end in a new class, faction of a class, or group in power. It will end in a free and democratic space for political struggle’.30 Their struggle is one to permit other conceptions of the world to come into being. Of course this is punctuated by a view of what it is that such spaces require: the obliteration of party machines, of the bloated and antique structures of representation that clog Mexico’s political system; but the point is such strictures are regarded as the basis upon which a genuine political process can take place. What is left out is any ‘final’ account of justice, equality or democracy. Contrast Zapatismo in other words, with traditional revolutionary rhetoric and more particularly with the communist struggles of the past with their tightly knit, disciplined hierarchies built on a thorough going utilitarianism that is prepared, as Trotsky once bluntly put it, ‘to break eggs to make an omelette’. In Zapatismo we find on the contrary a sentiment that insists that all the ‘eggs’ are of value. It is ‘dignity’ and ‘respect’ for the singular voice that animates this struggle against representation, not a desire to fulfil the historical or foreordained destiny to which all voices are or will be subject. In this sense as in the other senses discussed here, it seems to me that this is a very Deleuzian kind of struggle, and Deleuze (and Guattari) anticipate on the plane of high theory the kinds of demands being articulated by Marcos and the Zapatistas. This is also to say that the search for a post-representational form of political practice should not be read as necessarily ‘nihilistic’ (as Laclau insists) or as one that inevitably pits the aristocratic ‘one’ against the many. Or if it is, then it is a nihilism that, as per Deleuze’s reading of ‘eternal return’, isa struggle in which being and difference are constantly affirmed. It is an affirmation of difference itself, of the singular voice, and of the possibility of and necessity for ‘spaces’ in which those voices can be heard. In the terms offered by Deleuze and Guattari this would be ‘smooth’ space as opposed to the ‘striated’ space of representational systems. It would be a ‘deterritorialised’ space of combination and recombination in accordance with differentiated, disaggregated desires; not the territorialised space of hierarchy, fixed and known roles that define ‘identity’. In terms of Zapatismo, this is a space in which ‘all worlds are possible’and in which it is the constant combination and recombination of the indigenous peoples that determines what ‘happens’.

### Marx Racist

#### Marx was super racist

Walter Williams, WND Commentator, 2006, “MARX'S RACISM,” <http://www.wnd.com/2006/06/36692/>

Karl Marx is the hero of some labor union leaders and civil-rights organizations, including those who organized the recent protest against proposed immigration legislation. It’s easy to be a Marxist if you haven’t read his writings. Most people agree that Marx’s predictions about capitalism turned out to be dead wrong. What most people don’t know is that Marx was an out and out racist and anti-Semite. He didn’t think much of Mexicans. Concerning the annexation of California after the Mexican-American War, Marx wrote: “Without violence, nothing is ever accomplished in history.” Then he asks, “Is it a misfortune that magnificent California was seized from the lazy Mexicans who did not know what to do with it?” Friedrich Engels, Marx’s co-author of the “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” added, “In America, we have witnessed the conquest of Mexico and have rejoiced at it. It is to the interest of its own development that Mexico will be placed under the tutelage of the United States.” Much of Marx’s ideas can be found in a book written by former communist Nathaniel Weyl, titled “Karl Marx, Racist” (1979). In a July 1862 letter to Engels, in reference to his socialist political competitor, Ferdinand Lassalle, Marx wrote, “… it is now completely clear to me that he, as is proved by his cranial formation and his hair, descends from the Negroes from Egypt, assuming that his mother or grandmother had not interbred with a n[egro]. Now this union of Judaism and Germanism with a basic Negro substance must produce a peculiar product. The obtrusiveness of the fellow is also n[egro]-like.” Engels shared much of Marx’s racial philosophy. In 1887, Paul Lafargue, who was Marx’s son-in-law, was a candidate for a council seat in a Paris district that contained a zoo. Engels claimed that Paul had “one-eighth or one-twelfth n[egro] blood.” In an April 1887 letter to Paul’s wife, Engels wrote, “Being in his quality as a n[egro], a degree nearer to the rest of the animal kingdom than the rest of us, he is undoubtedly the most appropriate representative of that district.” Though few claim him as their own, such as leftists claim Karl Marx, Thomas Carlyle is another unappreciated historical figure. Carlyle is best-known for giving economics the derogatory name “dismal science,” an inversion of the phrase “gay science,” which at the time (1849) referred to life-enhancing knowledge. Most people have incorrectly learned that the term “dismal science” had its origins in reference to Thomas Malthus’ gloomy predictions that the global population would grow faster than food supplies, condemning mankind to perpetual poverty and starvation. My George Mason University colleague, professor Davy Levy, and his co-author, Sandra Peart, tell the true story in their 2001 book, “The Secret History of the Dismal Science: Economics, Religion and Race in the 19th Century.” Carlyle first used the term “dismal science” in his 1849 pamphlet entitled “An Occasional Discourse on the N[egro] Question.” He attacked the ideas of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and other free market, limited-government economists for their belief in the fundamental equality of man and their anti-slavery positions. The fact that economics assumes that people are all the same and are equally deserving of liberty was offensive to Carlyle and led him to call economics the dismal science. Carlyle argued that blacks were subhuman, “two-legged cattle,” who needed the tutelage of whites wielding the “beneficent whip” if they were to contribute to the good of society. Carlyle was by no means alone in denouncing economics for its anti-slavery and pro-equality position. No less a historical figure and a Christmastime favorite, Charles Dickens, author of “A Christmas Carol,” shared Carlyle’s positions on slavery and blacks as subhuman. Marx, Engels, Carlyle and Dickens all share one belief prevalent throughout mankind’s history down to today: the belief that some people are endowed with superior intelligence and wisdom, and they’ve been ordained to forcibly impose that wisdom on the masses.

#### Issues of race prefigure issues of class

Charles Mills, 1997, The Racial Contract, p. 31-40

The classic social contract, as I have detailed, is primarily moral/political in nature. But it is also economic in the background sense that the point of leaving the state of nature is in part to secure a stable environment for the industrious appropriation of the world. (After all, one famous definition of politics is that it is about who gets what and why.) Thus even in Locke's moralized state of nature, where people generally do obey natural law, he is concerned about the safety of private property, indeed proclaiming that "the great and chief end therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property."42 And in Hobbes's famously amoral and unsafe state of nature, we are told that "there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth."43 So part of the point of bringing society into existence, with its laws and enforcers of the law, is to protect what you have accumulated. / What, then, is the nature of the economic system of the new society? The general contract does not itself prescribe a particular model or particular schedule of property rights, requiring only that the "equality" in the prepolitical state be somehow preserved. This provision may be variously interpreted as a self-interested surrender to an absolutist Hobbesian government that itself determines property rights, or a Lockean insistence that private property accumulated in the moralized state of nature be respected by the constitutionalist government. Or more radical political theorists, such as socialists and feminists, might argue that state-of-nature equality actually mandates class or gender economic egalitarianism in society. So, different political interpretations of the initial moral egalitarianism can be advanced, but the general background idea is that the equality of human beings in the state of nature is somehow (whether as equality of opportunity or as equality of outcome) supposed to carry over into the economy of the created sociopolitical order, leading to a system of voluntary human intercourse and exchange in which exploitation is precluded. / By contrast, the economic dimension of the Racial Contract is the most salient, foreground rather than background, since the Racial Contract is calculatedly aimed at economic exploitation. The whole point of establishing a moral hierarchy and juridically partitioning the polity according to race is to secure and legitimate the privileging of those individuals designated as white/persons and the exploitation of those individuals designated as nonwhite/subpersons. There are other benefits accruing from the Racial Contract—far greater political influence, cultural hegemony, the psychic payoff that comes from knowing one is a member of the Herrenvolk (what W. E. B. Du Bois once called "the wages of whiteness")44—but the bottom line is material advantage. Globally, the Racial Contract creates Europe as the continent that dominates the world; locally, within Europe and the other continents, it designates Europeans as the privileged race. / The challenge of explaining what has been called "the European miracle"—the rise of Europe to global domination—has long exercised both academic and lay opinion.45 How is it that a formerly peripheral region on the outskirts of the Asian land mass, at the far edge of the trade routes, remote from the great civilizations of Islam and the East, was able in a century or two to achieve global political and economic dominance? The explanations historically given by Europeans themselves have varied tremendously, from the straightforwardly racist and geographically determinist to the more subtly environmentalist and culturalist. But what they have all had in common, even those influenced by Marxism, is their tendency to depict this development as essentially autochthonous, their tendency to privilege some set of internal variables and correspondingly-downplay or ignore altogether the role of colonial conquest and African slavery. Europe made it on its own, it is said, because of the peculiar characteristics of Europe and Europeans. / Thus whereas no reputable historian today would espouse the frankly biologistic theories of the past, which made Europeans (in both pre- and post-Darwinian accounts) inherently the most advanced race, as contrasted with the backward/less-evolved races elsewhere, the thesis of European specialness and exceptionalism is still presupposed. It is still assumed that rationalism and science, innovativeness and inventiveness found their special home here, as against the intellectual stagnation and traditionalism of the rest of the world, so that Europe was therefore destined in advance to occupy the special position in global history it has. James Blaut calls this the theory, or "super-theory" (an umbrella covering many different versions: theological, cultural, biologistic, geographical, technological, etc.), of "Eurocentric diffusionism," according to which European progress is seen as "natural" and asymmetrically determinant of the fate of non-Europe." Similarly, Sandra Harding, in her anthology on the "racial" economy of science, cites "the assumption that Europe functions autonomously from other parts of the world; that Europe is its own origin, final end, and agent; and that Europe and people of European descent in the Americas and elsewhere owe nothing to the rest of the world."47 / Unsurprisingly, black and Third World theorists have traditionally dissented from this notion of happy divine or natural European dispensation. They have claimed, quite to the contrary, that there is a crucial causal connection between European advance and the unhappy fate of the rest of the world. One classic example of such scholarship from a half century ago was the Caribbean historian Eric Williams's Capitalism and Slavery, which argued that the profits from African slavery helped to make the industrial revolution possible, so that internalist accounts were fundamentally mistaken.48 And in recent years, with decolonization, the rise of the New Left in the United States, and the entry of more alternative voices into the academy, this challenge has deepened and broadened. There are variations in the authors' positions—for example, Walter Rodney, Samir Amin, Andre Guilder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein9—but the basic theme is that the exploitation of the empire (the bullion from the great gold and silver mines in Mexico and Peru, the profits from plantation slavery, the fortunes made by the colonial companies, the general social and economic stimulus provided by the opening up of the "New World") was to a greater or lesser extent crucial in enabling and then consolidating the takeoff of what had previously been an economic backwater. It was far from the case that Europe was specially destined to assume economic hegemony; there were a number of centers in Asia and Africa of a comparable level of development which could potentially have evolved in the same way. But the European ascent closed off this development path for others because it forcibly inserted them into a colonial network whose exploitative relations and extractive mechanisms prevented autonomous growth. / Overall, then, colonialism "lies at the heart" of the rise of Europe.50 The economic unit of analysis needs to be Europe as a whole, since it is not always the case that the colonizing nations directly involved always benefited in the long term. Imperial Spain, for example, still feudal in character, suffered massive inflation from its bullion imports. But through trade and financial exchange, others launched on the capitalist path, such as Holland, profited. Internal national rivalries continued, of course, but this common identity based on the transcontinental exploitation of the non-European world would in many cases be politically crucial, generating a sense of Europe as a cosmopolitan entity engaged in a common enterprise, underwritten by race. As Victor Kiernan puts it, "All countries within the European orbit benefited however, as Adam Smith pointed out, from colonial contributions to a common stock of wealth, bitterly as they might wrangle over ownership of one territory or another... [T]here was a sense in which all Europeans shared in a heightened sense of power engendered by the successes of any of them, as well as in the pool of material wealth... that the colonies produced."51 / Today, correspondingly, though formal decolonization has taken place and in Africa and Asia black, brown, and yellow natives are in office, ruling independent nations, *the global economy* is essentially dominated by the former colonial powers, their offshoots (Euro-United States, Euro-Canada), and their international financial institutions, lending agencies, and corporations. (As previously observed, the notable exception, whose history confirms rather than challenges the rule, is Japan, which escaped colonization and, after the Meiji Restoration, successfully embarked on its own industrialization.) Thus one could say that the world is essentially dominated by white capital. Global figures on income and property ownership are, of course, broken down nationally rather than racially, but if a transnational racial disaggregation were to be done, it would reveal that whites control a percentage of the world's wealth grossly disproportionate to their numbers. Since there is no reason to think that the chasm between First and Third Worlds (which largely coincides with this racial division) is going to be bridged—vide the abject failure of various United Nations plans from the "development decade" of the 1960s onward—it seems undeniable that for years to come, the planet will be white dominated. With the collapse of communism and the defeat of Third World attempts to seek alternative paths, the West reigns supreme, as celebrated in a London Financial Times headline: "The fall of the Soviet bloc has left the IMF and G7 to rule the world and create a new imperial age."52 Economic structures have been set in place, causal processes established, whose outcome is to pump wealth from one side of the globe to another, and which will continue to work largely independently of the ill will/good will, racist/antiracist feelings of particular individuals. This globally color-coded distribution of wealth and poverty has been produced by the Racial Contract and in turn reinforces adherence to it in its signatories and beneficiaries. / Moreover, it is not merely that Europe and the former white settler states are globally dominant but that within them, where there is a significant nonwhite presence (indigenous peoples, descendants of imported slaves, voluntary nonwhite immigration), whites continue to be privileged vis-a-vis non-whites. The old structures of formal, de jure exclusion have largely been dismantled, the old explicitly biologistic ideologies largely abandoned53—the Racial Contract, as will be discussed later, is continually being rewritten—but opportunities for nonwhites, though they have expanded, remain below those for whites. The claim is not, of course, that all whites are better off than all nonwhites, but that, as a statistical generalization, the objective life chances of whites are significantly better. / As an example, consider the United States. A series of books has recently documented the decline of the integrationist hopes raised by the 1960s and the growing intransigence and hostility of whites who think they have "done enough," despite the fact that the country continues to be massively segregated, median black family incomes have begun falling by comparison to white family incomes after some earlier closing of the gap, the so-called "black underclass" has basically been written off, and reparations for slavery and post-Emancipation discrimination have never been paid, or, indeed, even seriously considered.54 Recent work on racial inequality by Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro suggests that wealth is more important than income in determining the likelihood of future racial equalization, since it has a cumulative effect that is passed down through intergenerational transfer, affecting life chances and opportunities for one's children. Whereas in 1988 black households earned sixty two cents for every dollar earned by white households, the comparative differential with regard to wealth is much greater and, arguably, provides a more realistically negative picture of the prospects for closing the racial gap: "Whites possess nearly twelve times as much median net worth as blacks,

or $43,800 versus $3,700. In an even starker contrast, perhaps, the average white household controls $6,999 in net financial assets while the average black household retains no NFA nest egg whatsoever." Moreover, the analytic focus on wealth rather than income exposes how illusory the much-trumpeted rise of a "black middle class" is: "Middle class blacks, for example, earn seventy cents for every dollar earned by middle-class whites but they possess only fifteen cents for every dollar of wealth held by middle-class whites." This huge disparity in white and black wealth is not remotely contingent, accidental, fortuitous; it is the direct outcome of American state policy and the collusion with it of the white citizenry. In effect, "materially, whites and blacks constitute two nations,"55 the white nation being constituted by the American Racial Contract in a relationship of structured racial exploitation with the black (and, of course, historically also the red) nation. / A collection of papers from panels organized in the 1980s by the National Economic Association, the professional organization of black economists, provides some insight into the mechanics and the magnitude of such exploitative transfers and denials of opportunity to accumulate material and human capital. It takes as its title The Wealth of Races—an ironic tribute to Adam Smith's famous book The Wealth of Nations–and analyzes the different varieties of discrimination to which blacks have been subjected: slavery, employment discrimination, wage discrimination, promotion discrimination, white monopoly power discrimination against black capital, racial price discrimination in consumer goods, housing, services, insurance, etc.56 Many of these, by their very nature, are difficult to quantify; moreover, there are costs in anguish and suffering that can never really be compensated. Nonetheless, those that do lend themselves to calculation offer some remarkable figures. (The figures are unfortunately dated; readers should multiply by a factor that takes fifteen years of inflation into account.) If one were to do a calculation of the cumulative benefits (through compound interest) from labor market discrimination over the forty-year period from 1929 to 1969 and adjust for inflation, then in 1983 dollars, the figure would be over $1.6 trillion.57 An estimate for the total of "diverted income" from slavery, 1790 to 1860, compounded and translated into 1983 dollars, would yield the sum of $2.1 trillion to $4.7 trillion.58 And if one were to try to work out the cumulative value, with compound interest, of unpaid slave labor before 1863, underpayment since 1863, and denial of opportunity to acquire land and natural resources available to white settlers, then the total amount required to compensate blacks "could take more than the entire wealth of the United States"59 / So this gives an idea of the centrality of racial exploitation to the U.S. economy and the dimensions of the payoff for its white beneficiaries from one nation's Racial Contract. But this very centrality, these very dimensions render the topic taboo, virtually undiscussed in the debates on justice of most white political theory. If there is such a backlash against affirmative action, what would the response be to the demand for the interest on the unpaid forty acres and a mule? These issues cannot be raised because they go to the heart of the real nature of the polity and its structuring by the Racial Contract. White moral theory's debates on justice in the state must therefore inevitably have a somewhat farcical air, since they ignore the central injustice on which the state rests. (No wonder a hypothetical contractarianism that evades the actual circumstances of the polity's founding is preferred!) / Both globally and within particular nations, then, white people, Europeans and their descendants, continue to benefit from the Racial Contract, which creates a world in their cultural image, political states differentially favoring their interests, an economy structured around the racial exploitation of others, and a moral psychology (not just in whites but sometimes in nonwhites also) skewed consciously or unconsciously toward privileging them, taking the status quo of differential racial entitlement as normatively legitimate, and not to be investigated further.

## ‘Latin America’ PIC

### AT: Words Bad

#### **2 arguments –**

#### First, censoring arguments just locks in their use and repetition, reproducing their harms

#### Second, words have different meanings in different contexts – no reason why ours are uniquely bad

Butler, 97

Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature – University of California-Berkeley, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative p. 38 Judith

This story underscores the limits and risks of resignification as a strategy of opposition. I will not propose that the pedagogical recirculation of examples of hate speech always defeats the project of opposing and defusing such speech, but I want to underscore the fact that such terms carry connotations that exceed the purposes for which they may be intended and can thus work to afflict and defeat discursive efforts to oppose such speech. Keeping such terms unsaid and unsayable can also work to lock them in place, preserving their power to injure, and arresting the possibility of a reworking that might shift their context and purpose. That such language carries trauma is not a reason to forbid its use. There is no purifying language of its traumatic residue, and no way to work through trauma except through the arduous effort it takes to direct the course of its repetition. It may be chat trauma constitutes a strange kind of resource, and repetition, its vexed but promising instrument. After all, to be rained by another is traumatic: it is an act that precedes my will, an act that brings me into a linguistic world in which I might then begin to exercise agency at all. A founding subordination, and yet the scene of agency, is repeated in the ongoing interpellations of social life. This is what I have been called. Because I have been called something, I have been entered into linguistic life, refer to myself through the language given by the Other, but perhaps never quite in the same terms that my language mimes. The terms by which we are hailed arc rarely the ones we choose (and even when we try to impose protocols on how we are to be named, they usually fail); but these terms we never really choose arc the occasion for something we might still call agency, the repetition of an originary subordination for another purpose, one whose future is partially open.

#### **Neg is overly scriptocentric – this means that instead** of dealing with the actual problems, we continually focus on language and never get anything done

Meisner, 95

(Mark, professor of environmental studies at York University, “Resourcist Language: The Symbolic Enslavement of Nature”, Proceedings of the Conference on Communication and Our Environment, ed: David Sachsman, p. 242)

Changing the language we use to talk about non­human nature is not a solution. As I suggested, language is not the problem. Rather, it seems more like a contagious symptom of a deeper and multi-faceted problem that has yet to be fully defined. Resourcist language is both an indicator and a carrier of the pathology of rampant ecological degradation. Further­more, language change alone can end up simply being a band-aid solution that gives the appearance of change and makes the problem all the less visible. In a recent article on feminist language reform, Susan Ehrlich and Ruth King (1994) argue that because meanings are socially constructed, attempts at introducing nonsexist language are being undermined by a culture that is still largely sexist. The words may have shifted, but the meanings and ideologies have not. The real world cure for the sick patient matters more than the treatment of a single symptom. Consequently, language change and cultural change must go together with social-moral change. It is naive to believe either that language is trivial, or that it is deterministic.

### AT: ‘Latin America’ Bad

#### Ending the use of the term “Latin America” is bad – disavows cultural developments

Ardila ’96 (Ruben Ardila- Colombian psychologist, he received a BA in Psychology at the National University of Colombia and later a PhD in Experimental Psychology at Nebraska University; “Political Psychology: The Latin American Perspective”; June 1996; Political Psychology, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Jun., 1996), pp. 339-351; available Jstor @ http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3791814.pdf?acceptTC=true)

Social identity in Latin America has been a very complicated issue since the beginning and has awakened great interest in many researchers in this region. What does it mean to be Latin American? What are the differences with the Anglo-Ameri- cans? What are the factors that Latin American nations share with the rest of the world? Does racial mixture (white, black, and indigenous) convey positive or negative implications? Are we a "global race" (a mixture of all races), or are we condemned to be second-class citizens without making any legacy to universal culture? In reality, we Latin Americans are part of Western, Judeo-Christian culture, inherited from Spaniards and Portuguese who colonized this part of the world 500 years ago. We are also members of the indigenous cultures and subcultures, rooted in this continent many centuries before the arrival of the Europeans, and we are descendants of the black slaves brought to America to work in the gold mines and plantations. We are the result of a mixture of different cultures and ethnic groups, a new culture that is manifested in every nation of Latin America, from Mexico to Patagonia, a culture that has many characteristics in common, despite the differ- ences that are observed among the various countries and within them. These points of convergence are more relevant than those of divergence, and are related to language, history, tradition, philosophy of life, and social conscience.

#### Geographers initiated the term---it’s not violent, simply convenient for productive discussions

Holloway ‘08 (Thomas H.- author of “A Companion to Latin American History”; “Latin America: What’s in a Name?”; January 2008; http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-1405131616.html>)

Geographers, it should be noted, giving priority to contiguous landmasses and bodies of water rather than to historical processes or cultural commonalities, traditionally divide the Americas into two continents and two regions. The continents are North America (from northern Canada to the isthmus of Panama) and South America (from the Panama-Colombia border to the southern tip of Tierra del Fuego, an island south of the straight of Magellan). The sub-regions are Central America (from Guatemala to Panama) and the Caribbean (the islands from the Bahamas and Cuba in the northwest to Trinidad and Tobago in the southeast). These different approaches to regional divisions and groupings have led to confusion as frequent as it is superficial. For example, Mexico might be placed in North America by geographers (and in the names of such economic and political arrangements as the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA), but it is definitely part of Latin America for historians. And Puerto Rico, an island of the Caribbean, is politically attached to the United States, but is historically and culturally part of Latin America.

#### The term “Latin America” isn’t linked to coloniality

Holloway ‘08 (Thomas H.- author of “A Companion to Latin American History”; “Latin America: What’s in a Name?”; January 2008; http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-1405131616.html>)

Historically, the first use of the term Latin America has been traced only as far back as the 1850s. It did not originate within the region, but again from outside, as part of a movement called “pan-Latinism” that emerged in French intellectual circles, and more particularly in the writings of Michel Chevalier (1806-79). A contemporary of Alexis de Tocqueville who traveled in Mexico and the United States during the late 1830s, Chevalier contrasted the “Latin” peoples of the Americas with the “Anglo-Saxon” peoples (Phelan 1968; Ardao 1980, 1993). From those beginnings, by the time of Napoleon III’s rise to power in 1852 pan-Latinism had developed as a cultural project extending to those nations whose culture supposedly derived from neo-Latin language communities (commonly called Romance languages in English). Starting as a term for historically derived “Latin” culture groups, L’Amerique Latine then became a place on the map. Napoleon III was particularly interested in using the concept to help justify his intrusion into Mexican politics that led to the imposition of Archduke Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico, 1864-67. While France had largely lost out in the global imperial rivalries of the previous two centuries, it still retained considerable prestige in the world of culture, language, and ideas (McGuinness 2003). Being included in the pan-Latin cultural sphere was attractive to some intellectuals of Spanish America, and use of the label Latin America began to spread haltingly around the region, where it competed as a term with Spanish America (where Spanish is the dominant language), Ibero-America (including Brazil but presumably not French-speaking areas), and other sub-regional terms such as Andean America (which stretches geographically from Venezuela to Chile, but which more usually is thought of as including Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia), or the Southern Cone (Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay) (Rojas Mix 1991).

## Framework

### AT: FW

#### Resolved is to reduce through mental analysis

Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary (<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved?s=ts>)

to reduce by mental analysis (often followed by into).

#### Government is the people

Jeff Oakes, Freelance writer who has published 6 books, No Date “What IS the Intent of the Constitution?” <http://criminaljusticelaw.us/issues/gun-control/chapter-4-intent-constitution/>

The very first principle forms the foundation for the new government, namely a Representative Democracy with the words, “WE the People.”  We hear this so often that we tend to forget the basic principle here is that this nation, the government, is the people not the representatives in Congress, nor the President, nor [the Supreme Court](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_court).  Our government is “WE,” so if we have a problem with our government, we have a problem with ourselves.  If we do not like the job done by those we send to represent us, we can fire them.  Strangely enough, many claim to not be pleased, yet the same folks continually get elected for the most part, thus negating that claim.  But this is a principle we really need to take to heart—WE are the Government.  Not them.

#### Claims of fairness, objectivity, predictability are ways to marginalize the out group and retrench power structures

Delgado, Law Prof at U. of Colorado, 1992 [Richard, “Shadowboxing: An Essay On Power,” In Cornell Law Review, May]

We have cleverly built power's view of the appropriate standard of conduct into the very term fair. Thus, the stronger party is able to have his/her way and see her/himself as principled at the same time. Imagine, for example, a man's likely reaction to the suggestion that subjective considerations -- a woman's mood, her sense of pressure or intimidation, how she felt about the man, her unexpressed fear of reprisals if she did not go ahead-- ought to play a part in determining whether the man is guilty of rape. Most men find this suggestion offensive; it requires them to do something they are not accustomed to doing. "Why," they say, "I'd have to be a mind reader before I could have sex with anybody?" "Who knows, anyway, what internal inhibitions the woman might have been harboring?" And "what if the woman simply changed her mind later and charged me with rape?" What we never notice is that women can "read" men's minds perfectly well. The male perspective is right out there in the world, plain as day, inscribed in culture, song, and myth -- in all the prevailing narratives. These narratives tell us that men want and are entitled  [\*820]  to sex, that it is a prime function of women to give it to them, and that unless something unusual happens, the act of sex is ordinary and blameless. We believe these things because that is the way we have constructed women, men, and "normal" sexual intercourse. Yet society and law accept only this latter message (or something like it), and not the former, more nuanced ones, to mean refusal. Why? The "objective" approach is not inherently better or more fair. Rather, it is accepted because it embodies the sense of the stronger party, who centuries ago found himself in a position to dictate what permission meant. Allowing ourselves to be drawn into reflexive, predictable arguments about administrability, fairness, stability, and ease of determination points us away from what  [\*821]  really counts: the way in which stronger parties have managed to inscribe their views and interests into "external" culture, so that we are now enamored with that way of judging action. First, we read our values and preferences into the culture; then we pretend to consult that culture meekly and humbly in order to judge our own acts.

#### Non-traditional forms of debate have the most real world impact – the LBS movement proves

Dana Roe Polson, former debate coach and Co-Director, teacher, and founder of ConneXions Community Leadership Academy, 2012 “Longing for Theory:” Performance Debate in Action,” <http://gradworks.umi.com/3516242.pdf>

I think the Talented Tenth is actually the wrong metaphor for leadership in the performance debate community. Du Bois, later in his life, sharply criticized and disavowed a reliance on the Black elite to lead, believing that they were more preoccupied with individual gain than with group struggle, and willing to work within current structures rather than calling for radical change. They were becoming Americanized, Du Bois believed, and deradicalized. This deradicalization “occurs when more privileged African Americans (re) align themselves to function as a middle class interested in individual group gain rather than race leadership for mass development” (James, 1997, p. 24). Instead of his youthful belief in the Black elite, “Gradually, black working-class activists surpassed elites in Du Bois’s estimation of political integrity and progressive agency. He democratized his concept of race leaders through the inclusion of the radicalism of nonelites” (James, 1997, p. 21). The young people who have emerged as leaders in the performance debate community were definitely not those Du Bois would have identified as the Talented Tenth in 1903. Du Bois was talking to and about the Black elite, the educated middle class. Earlier in Du Bois’s life, he assumed that those people, college-educated, were the natural leaders. My participants who might be seen as potential leaders do not come from such backgrounds. Many do end up going to college and becoming potential leaders, but they are privileged through this process rather than prior to it. In addition, their focus is most definitely political as opposed to cultural. Nowhere in my research did I hear a Bill Cosby-esque injunction for Black people to shape up and work harder. Instead, the critique is focused on “uplift as group struggle” for continued liberation. Finally, these young leaders are most definitely radicalized as opposed to interested in incremental change that rocks no boats. From CRT and their open critique of white supremacy to their willingness to call for change openly in debate rounds, these young leaders are contentious and bold. Two of my participants, and many of their former debate peers, are involved with a Baltimore group called Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle (LBS). The website of the LBS establishes their identity: We are a dedicated group of Baltimore citizens who want to change the city through governmental policy action. Our purpose is to provide tangible, concrete solutions to Baltimore’s problems and to analyze the ways that external forces have contributed to the overall decline of our city. (“Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle,” n.d.) As we see in this statement of identity, then, LBS as one model of leadership is focused on the political and on an analysis of external influences; this focus is very different from a racial uplift position, and their model of leadership very different from the Talented Tenth. LBS has developed platforms regarding jobs, education, incarceration, and many other issues facing Black people in the city. They hold monthly forums for discussion of these topics, inviting guests and discussing the topics themselves. Further, one of the LBS members ran for City Council this year. He lost, but plans to run again. The training my participants discuss, therefore, is not in the abstract: it is training for the real world, for their own empowerment and that of their communities. This work is extending into local high schools, as well, and Paul Robeson High School now has students involved in LBS. They attend events and meetings not only to help out but as a form of leadership training.

#### Only the ballot forces teams to confront the racial privilege that is upheld now – Louisville movement proves

Dr. Shanara Reid Brinkley, 2008, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF ‘ACTING BLACK’: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE,”

Zompetti’s fears are fairly reasonable. The Louisville Project has not convinced the debate community to change its normative practice. Given the adversarial nature of tournament competition, opposing teams seem most concerned with developing viable strategies to beat Louisville inside the tournament round. Such a competitive atmosphere may not allow a resolution of conflict between the Louisville team and other community members. Yet, it seems that attempts to engage the structural barriers that maintain the lack of community diversity seems to not have substantially increased racial and ethnic inclusion. That the Louisville team shifts the discussion on racial inclusion into actual debate competition forces the broader debate community to significantly increase its discussion of the problem. In other words, the Project may not directly result in sweeping changes in the policy debate community, it did create a rhetorical controversy that forced the issue of racial exclusion and privilege onto the community’s agenda. Thus, I argue that the tournament round is a critical plateau from which to force a reflexive conversation about the normative practices of debate that might operate to maintain racial exclusion and privilege.

#### Switch side leads to American exceptionalism

Ronald Walter Greene, fmr debater and communication professor at U of Minnesota, and Dennis Hicks, fmr debater and communication professor, 2005 “LOST CONVICTIONS; Debating both sides and the ethical self-fashioning of liberal citizens,” <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=ronaldwaltergreene>

In the hands of Dennis Day, the goal of debate was to reassign the convictions of students to the process of debate as a democratic form of decision-making. In this way debate training was no longer simply a mechanism for developing critical thinking or advocacy skills, but instead, debate was now a performance technique that made possible the self-fashioning of a new form of liberal citizen. The citizen’s commitments were to be redirected to the process of debate. This redirection entails a procedural notion of liberal citizenship that asks the student to invest in debate as a method of deliberation. Our argument here rests on Day’s attempt to ethically defend debating both sides by linking the pedagogical rationale of debate to a public ethic, in this case, full and free expression. We are not claiming that debate actually creates a situation in which students who participate in the activity abandon their convictions and commitments on the issues of the day nor are we claiming that debate asks students to embrace an ungrounded relativism. For us, what is important here is that when faced with an ethical criticism of debating both sides, Day sets out a deliberative-oriented vision of democracy whereby the liberal citizen materializes by divorcing his/her speech from the sincerity principle. To embody one’s commitment to the democratic norm of free and full expression required students to argumentatively perform positions they might personally oppose in order to instantiate the circulation of free and full expression and to secure a commitment toward debate as a democratic form of decision-making. Thus, the debate over debate was a struggle over the ethical attributes required for liberal citizenship. The argument that we will develop in this section begins with the premise that a key element of Cold War liberalism was the attempt to re-position the United States as the leader of the Free World (Greene 1999). One way Cold War liberalism made possible the emergence of US world leadership was by pulling together a national and international commitment to ‘American exceptionalism’. According to Nikhil Pal Singh (1998), American exceptionalism is a product of the attempt to conceptualize the United States as a concrete representative of the universal norms of democracy. In so doing, the US is granted a status and history that is deemed unique from other nations at the same time as that uniqueness qualifies the US to be the leader and judge of democratic attributes, characteristics and norms. In the aftermath of World War II, the proliferation of free speech as a characteristic of the US helped to warrant Cold War liberal claims to American exceptionalism. As Paul Passavant (1996) suggests, the ‘Millian paradigm’ of free speech has been appropriated by U.S. constitutional theorists to grant ‘America’ the status of a nation whereby ‘one legitimately claims the right to free speech’ (pp. 301/2). For Passavant, the process by which the US emerged as a nation whereby citizens claim the right to free speech creates a moral geography in which other nations are not granted the ‘maturity’ necessary for free speech and/or simultaneously must conform to the U.S. vision of free speech. It is our argument that during the cold war, the debate-free speech assemblage helped to make possible the emergence of ‘America’s’ status as an exemplar of democracy.

### AT: Roleplaying

#### You should be an informed citizen, not the government – roleplaying shuts down critical thinking and deliberation

Steele 10—Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas [gender/ableist language modified with brackets]

(Brent, *Defacing Power: The Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics* pg 130-132, dml)

When facing these dire warnings regarding the manner in which academic-intellectuals are seduced by power, what prospects exist for parrhesia? How can academic-intellectuals speak “truth to power”? It should be noted, first, that the academic-intellectual’s primary purpose should not be to re-create a program to replace power or even to develop a “research program that could be employed by students of world politics,” as Robert Keohane (1989: 173) once advised the legions of the International Studies Association. Because academics are denied the “full truth” from the powerful, Foucault states, ¶ we must avoid a trap into which governments would want intellectuals to fall (and often they do): “Put yourself in our place and tell us what you would do.” This is not a question in which one has to answer. To make a decision on any matter requires a knowledge of the facts refused us, an analysis of the situation we aren’t allowed to make. There’s the trap. (2001: 453) 27 ¶ This means that any alternative order we might provide, this hypothetical “research program of our own,” will also become imbued with authority and used for *mechanisms of control*, a matter I return to in the concluding chapter of this book. ¶ When linked to a theme of counterpower, academic-intellectual parrhesia suggests, instead, that the academic should use his or her pulpit, their position in society, to be a “friend” “who plays the role of a parrhesiastes, of a truth-teller” (2001: 134). 28 When speaking of then-president Lyndon Johnson, Morgenthau gave a bit more dramatic and less amiable take that contained the same sense of urgency. ¶ What the President needs, then, is an intellectual ~~father~~-confessor, who dares to remind him[/her] of the brittleness of power, of its arrogance and ~~blindness~~ [ignorance], of its limits and pitfalls; who tells him[/her] how empires rise, decline and fall, how power turns to folly, empires to ashes. He[/she] ought to listen to that voice and tremble. (1970: 28) ¶ The primary purpose of the academic-intellectual is therefore not to just effect a moment of counterpower through parrhesia, let alone stimulate that heroic process whereby power realizes the error of its ways. So those who are skeptical that academics ever really, regarding the social sciences, make “that big of a difference” are missing the point. As we bear witness to what unfolds in front of us and collectively analyze the testimony of that which happened before us, the purpose of the academic is to “tell the story” of what actually happens, to document and faithfully capture both history’s events and context. “The intellectuals of America,” Morgenthau wrote, “can do only one thing: live by the standard of truth that is their peculiar responsibility as intellectuals and by which men of power will ultimately be judged as well” (1970: 28). This will take time, 29 but if this happens, if we seek to uncover and practice telling the truth free from the “tact,” “rules,” and seduction that constrain its telling, then, as Arendt notes, “humanly speaking, no more is required, and no more can reasonably be asked, for this planet to remain a place fit for human habitation” ([1964] 2006: 233).