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### 1NC – Faceless Zapatismo K

#### Their reading of Zapatismo is fundamentally incorrect – Zapatismo, in and of itself, is a shifting ideology that focuses on the alternatives to modernity and utilizing antimodernity – their use of Zapatismo for antimodernity is false and fails.

Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri, 2011 (Michael Hardt is a Professor of Literature and Italian at Duke University. Antonio Negri is an independent researcher and writer. He has been a Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Paris and a Professor of Political Science at the University of Padua., “common wealth”, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press :)

The Zapatista campaigns for indigenous rights in Mexico provide a clear political example of this altermodernity. The Zapatistas do not pursue either of the conventional strategies that link rights to identity: they neither demand the legal recognition of indigenous identities equal to other identities nor do they claim the sovereignty of traditional indigenous power structures and authorities with respect to the state (according to natural law). For most Zapatistas, in fact, the process of becoming politicized already involves both a conflict with the Mexican state and a refusal of the traditional authority structures of indigenous communities. Autonomy and self-determination are thus the principles that guided the Zapatista strategy in negotiating the constitutional reforms in the 1996 San Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture with the government of Ernesto Zedillo. When the government failed to honor the agreement, however, the Zapatistas began a series of projects to put its principles into action by instituting autonomous regional administrative seats (caracoles) and “good government councils” (juntas de buen gobierno). Even though the members of Zapatista communities are predominantly indigenous, then, and even though they struggle consistently and powerfully against racism, their politics does not rest on a fixed identity. They demand the right not “to be who we are” but rather “to become what we want.” Such principles of movement and self-transformation allow the Zapatistas to avoid getting stuck in antimodernity and move on to the terrain of altermodernity.66 Altermodernity thus involves not only insertion in the long history of antimodern struggles but also rupture with any fixed dialectic between modern sovereignty and antimodern resistance. In the passage from antimodernity to altermodernity, just as tradition and identity are transformed, so too resistance takes on a new meaning, dedicated now to the constitution of alternatives. The freedom that forms the base of resistance, as we explained earlier, comes to the fore and constitutes an event to announce a new political project. This conception of altermodernity gives us a preliminary way to pose the distinction between socialism and communism: whereas socialism ambivalently straddles modernity and antimodernity, communism must break with both of these by presenting a direct relation to the common to develop the paths of altermodernity.

#### Altermodernity is the only way to overcome modernity – antimodernity dooms us to being caught up in the power struggles that modernity desires

Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri, 2011 (Michael Hardt is a Professor of Literature and Italian at Duke University. Antonio Negri is an independent researcher and writer. He has been a Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Paris and a Professor of Political Science at the University of Padua., “common wealth”, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press :)

#### Up to this point we have explored antimodernity as a form of resistance internal to modernity in at least three senses. First, it is not an effort to preserve the premodern or unmodern from the expanding forces of modernity but rather a struggle for freedom within the power relation of modernity. Second, antimodernity is not geographically external to but rather coextensive with modernity. European territory cannot be identified with modernity and the colonial world with antimodernity. And just as the subordinated parts of the world are equally modern, so too antimodernity runs throughout the history of the dominant world, in slave rebellions, peasant revolts, proletarian resistances, and all liberation movements. Finally, antimodernity is not temporally external to modernity in the sense that it does not simply come after the exertion of modern power, a reaction. In fact antimodernity is prior in the sense that the power relation of modernity can be exercised only over free subjects who express that freedom through resistance to hierarchy and domination. Modernity has to react to contain those forces of liberation. At this point, however, especially after having recognized the savage, excessive, monstrous character of liberation struggles, we run into the limits of the concept and practices of antimodernity. In effect, just as modernity can never extricate itself from the relationship with antimodernity, so too antimodernity is finally bound up with modernity. This is also a general limitation of the concept and practices of resistance: they risk getting stuck in an oppositional stance. We need to be able to move from resistance to alternative and recognize how liberation movements can achieve autonomy and break free of the power relation of modernity. A terminological cue from the globalization protest movements shows us a way out of this dilemma. When large demonstrations began to appear regularly at the meetings of leaders of the global system across North America and Europe in the late 1990s and the first years of the new millennium, the media were quick to label them “antiglobalization.” Participants in these movements were uncomfortable with the term because, although they challenge the current form of globalization, the vast majority of them do not oppose globalization as such. In fact their proposals focus on alternative political process – and the movements themselves constructed global networks. The name they proposed for themselves, then, rather than “antiglobalization,” was :”alterglobalization” (or altermondialiste, as is common in France.) The terminological shift suggests a diagonal line that escapes the confining play of opposites – globalization and antiglobalization – and shifts the emphasis from resistance to alternative. A Similar terminological move allows us to displace the terrain of discussions about modernity and antimodernity. Altermodernity has a diagonal relationship with modernity. It marks conflict with modernity’s hierarchies as much as does antimodernity but orients the forces of resistance more clearly toward and autonomous terrain. We should note right away, though, that the term alterrmodernity can create misunderstandings. For some the term might imply a reformist process of adapting modernity to the new global condition while rpeserving its primary characteristics. For others it might suggest alternative forms of modernity, especially as they are defined geographically and culturally, that is, a Chinese modernity, a European modernity, an Iranian modernity, and so forth. We intend for the term “altermodernity” instead to indicate a decisive break with modernity and the power relation that defines it since altermodernity in our conception emerges from the traditions of antimodernity – but it also departs from antimodernity since it extends beyond opposition and resistance. Frantz Fanon’s proposition of the stages of evolution of “the colonized intellectual” provides an initial guide for how to move from modernity and antimodernity to altermodernity. In Fanon’s first stage the colonized intellectual assimilates as much as possible to European culture and thought, believing that everything modern and good and right originates in Europe, thus devaluing the colonial past and its present culture. Such an assimilated intellectual becomes more modern and more European than the Europeans, save for the dark skin color. A few courageous colonized intellectuals, however, achieve a second stage and rebel against the Eurocentrism of thought and the coloniality of power. “In order to secure his salvation,” Fanon explains, “in order to escape the supremacy of white culture the colonized intellectual feels the need to return to his unknown roots and lose himself, come what may, among his barbaric people.”61 It is easy to recognize too a whole series of parallel forms that antimodern intellectuals take in the dominant countries, seeking to escape and challenge the institutionalized hierarchies of modernity along lines of race, gender, class, or sexuality and affirm the tradition and identity of the subordinated as foundation and compass. Fanon recognizes the nobility of this antimodern intellectual position but also warns of its pitfalls, in much the same way that he cautions against the dangers of national consciousness, negritude, and pan-Africanism. The risk is that affirming identity and tradition, whether dedicated to past suffering or past glories, creates a static position, even in its opposition to modernity’s domination. The intellectual has to avoid getting stuck in antimodernity and pass through it to a third stage. “Seeking to stick to tradition or reviving neglected traditions is not only going against history, but against one’s people,” Fanon continues. “When a people support an armed or even political struggle against a merciless colonialism, tradition changes meaning.”62 And neither does identity remain fixed, but rather it must be transformed into a revolutionary becoming. The ultimate result of the revolutionary process for Fanon must be the creation of a new humanity, which moves beyond the static opposition between modernity and antimodernity and emerges as a dynamic, creative process. The passage from antimodernity to altermodernity is defined not by opposition but by rupture and transformation.

#### Thus the alternative – Vikram and I affirm Zapatismo as a constantly shifting resolution - this is the true way of Zapatismo and solves the entirety of the 1AC

Manuel Callahan, Professor of Race relations at Humboldt State University, 2005, “Why not share a dream? Zapatismo as Political and Cultural Practice,” http://www.jstor.org/stable/23263123

While we should not abandon the responsibilities and challenges of sincere solidarity work, taking our cues from the EZLN, we might suggest that Zapatismo invites people to become part of "the struggle" in their own manner, at their own pace, and without being measured by any specific model of "conscientization" or a political program specified by "the organization." However, the effort at encuentro challenges us to interrogate the limitations and contradictions of more traditional solidarity activism. Zapatismo reveals the political tensions of building a movement based only on single issue campaigns, on behalf of a specific constituency, and relying on short-lived fragile coalitions often over-determined by the most immediate crisis. In many cases those solidarity efforts that fail to escape a liberal mold can unwittingly promote possessive individualism, celebrating a single leader, often considered the best and the brightest of the group, who is expected to state the group's issues, history, strategies and goals. The result is a single model, plan, or program dominated by an elite. Consequently, a narrowly defined solidarity effort can easily reproduce paternalism and hierarchy within the organization and between the organization and the constituency being "served." Echoing Holloway's warning in this volume, traditional solidarity projects fall into the trap of defining, representing, and speaking for the struggle(s) of others, while at the same moment insisting on "the progress" of those being aided, making solidarity efforts resistant to modifications and slow to adapt to shifting contexts. Solidarity projects that represent, define and speak for the struggle (s) of others presuppose the progress of those being aided and not the transformation of those pro viding the aid. Moreover, aide workers operating in a narrow solidarity mode are less likely to acknowledge or celebrate the transformations that have already taken place in "targeted" com munities, inadvertently facilitating an insidious imperialism. Professional well-funded NGOs, for example, "can become shadow bureaucracies parallel to Southern nation state administrations."30 Ultimately, a bureaucratic model of social change will not be able to prioritize and promote the transformation of those pro viding the aid. Although there may be valid concerns we must interrogate regarding the challenges of "solidarity," the political practice examined here does not seek to impose a rigidly defined alternative practice. The Zapatistas have been consistent in keeping with what they have argued is the task of an armed movement: to "present the problem, and then step aside."31 As critical catalysts in posing problems they have deliberately not posed solutions on other groups or spaces. "But it is already known that our specialty is not in solving problems, but in creating them. 'Creating them?' No, that is too presumptuous, rather in proposing. Yes, our specialty is proposing problems."32 The Zapatista provocation insists that rights emerge from collective identities and communal needs expressing collectively articulated obligations and not the competing interests of individual need.33 Rather than emphasize networks as our only organizing objective, we might also imagine the movement in solidarity with the Zapatistas as an imagined community, a collective effort to define obligations that are rooted in a locally placed culture generating knowledge about what works across generations. The very act of provocation undertaken has been a bridge manifest in a new international, not an international based on rigid party doctrines or dogmas of competing organizations but "an international of hope." The new international is defined by dignity, "that nation without nationality, that rain bow that is also a bridge, that murmur of the heart no matter what blood lives it, that rebel irreverence that mocks borders, customs and wars."34 "Instead of a new bureaucratic apparatus, for the world coordination of a political movement expressing universal ideals and proposals," Esteva explains, "the International of Hope was created: a web constituted by innumerable differentiated autonomies, without a center or hierarchies, within which the most varied coalitions of discontents can express themselves, to dismantle forces and regimes oppressing all of them."35 The process of creating political space for dialogue between a diverse number of constituencies occupying a particular space suggests that community is neither homogenous nor static. Rather than speak of "the community," Zapatismo strives for a notion of community embodying a multiplicity of histories, experiences, resources, and obligations. The pursuit of new political relationships underscores the need to re-discover strategies to collectively define obligations of and within a community through dialogue based on respect. Political projects and proposals need to emerge organically—not imposed either by an individual (caciquismo) or a cabal (protagonismo). As the Frente Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (FZLN) have warned, people organizing themselves must begin "with the situation in which they find themselves, not in the one which we might desire to be found."36 In new political spaces all voices, all proposals must be responded to with respect. Democracy, as Marcos suggests, is a gesture "to decide upon the dominant social proposal." Liberty implies the freedom necessary to pursue one action over another, the expression of desire for the fulfillment of hope and dignity. Free from oppression, fear or persecution liberty sustains diversity and the choice, "to subscribe to one or another proposal."37 "It is," writes Marcos, "the same desire: democracy, liberty, and justice. In the heroic delirium of the Mexican southeast, hope implies a name: Tachicam, the unity of long ing for a better future."

#### Absent a shifting identity, their focus on antimodernity guarantee’s their failure – focus on a singular effort necessarily fails

Simon Tormey, Head of the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Sydney, 2006, ‘Not in my Name’: Deleuze, Zapatismo and the Critique of Representation”

Thinking more generally about the socio-political ideology of Zapatismo, what becomes evident is the reluctance to commit themselves to a ‘vision’ or blueprint of how the world should be transformed, or indeed how even the Chiapas should be transformed. This again is a source of irritation for otherwise sympathetic onlookers who would like to see in the Zapatistas the vanguard of an attempt to construct a viable ‘counter- empire’ of the kind influentially discussed by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their controversial work Empire. Surely it is asked, there must be some notion of what the world should look like in order to mobilise people against the world as it is now? Again, the notion that ‘resistance against’ can only make sense when seen as the antonym of a ‘resistance for’, in this case in favour of a distinct political system or space is one that is challenged both implicitly and explicitly by Zapatista practice. As Marcos insists: Zapatismo is not an ideology, it is not bought and paid for by a doctrine. It is … an intuition. Something so open and flexible that it really occurs in all places. Zapatismo poses the question: ‘What is it that excluded me?’‘What is that has isolated me?’ In each place the response is different. Zapatismo simply states the question and stipulates that the response is plural, that the response is inclusive … 29 In attempting to elaborate what Zapatismo is, communiqués articulate the idea of ‘a political force’ that operates in negation to that which is, as opposed to the embodiment of something that has yet to be created. In this sense they directly eschew the idea of a government or system ‘in waiting’ as per the classic ‘putschist’ rhetoric of traditional revolutionary movements. As has often been noted, they have yet to articulate a response to the ‘land question’, which is the very issue that caused the Zapatistas to come into being in the first place. Zapatismo is ‘silent’ on this and all the other matters that have animated left radicals over the past two centuries, that have nurtured them in the ‘hard times’, and helped to maintain their faith that history is on their side. But the ‘silence’ is surely telling in positive ways. As we noted at the outset, this is a political force that prefers not to ‘speak’, but rather to ‘listen’ and provide what Marcos terms an ‘echo’ of what it ‘hears’. As Marcos notes, this would be: An echo that recognises the existence of the other and does not overpower or attempt to silence it. An echo that takes its place and speaks its own voice, yet speaks with the voice of the other. An echo that reproduces its own sound, yet opens itself to the sound of the other. An echo […] transforming itself and renewing itself in other voices. An echo that turns itself into many voices, into a network of voices that, before Power’s deafness, opts to speak to itself, knowing itself to be one and many, acknowledging itself to be equal in its desire to listen and be listened to, to recognising itself as diverse in the tones and levels of voices forming it.30 To Marcos this is a different kind of political practice. It is one that insists that there are no a priori truths that can be handed down to ‘The People’; there is no doctrine that has to be learned or spelled out; there is only ‘lived experience’. Zapatismo is a political force that is concerned with the means by which people can be ‘present’ as opposed to being represented, whether it be by political parties, ideologies, or the other familiar devices and strategies that have prevented voices being heard. To quote Marcos, what they are struggling for is a world in which ‘all worlds are possible’. Similarly In The Second Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle, Marcos declares (on behalf of the Zapatistas) that: ‘we aren’t proposing a new world, but something preceding a new world; an antechamber looking into the new Mexico. In this sense, this revolution will not end in a new class, faction of a class, or group in power. It will end in a free and democratic space for political struggle’.30 Their struggle is one to permit other conceptions of the world to come into being. Of course this is punctuated by a view of what it is that such spaces require: the obliteration of party machines, of the bloated and antique structures of representation that clog Mexico’s political system; but the point is such strictures are regarded as the basis upon which a genuine political process can take place. What is left out is any ‘final’ account of justice, equality or democracy. Contrast Zapatismo in other words, with traditional revolutionary rhetoric and more particularly with the communist struggles of the past with their tightly knit, disciplined hierarchies built on a thorough going utilitarianism that is prepared, as Trotsky once bluntly put it, ‘to break eggs to make an omelette’. In Zapatismo we find on the contrary a sentiment that insists that all the ‘eggs’ are of value. It is ‘dignity’ and ‘respect’ for the singular voice that animates this struggle against representation, not a desire to fulfil the historical or foreordained destiny to which all voices are or will be subject. In this sense as in the other senses discussed here, it seems to me that this is a very Deleuzian kind of struggle, and Deleuze (and Guattari) anticipate on the plane of high theory the kinds of demands being articulated by Marcos and the Zapatistas. This is also to say that the search for a post-representational form of political practice should not be read as necessarily ‘nihilistic’ (as Laclau insists) or as one that inevitably pits the aristocratic ‘one’ against the many. Or if it is, then it is a nihilism that, as per Deleuze’s reading of ‘eternal return’, isa struggle in which being and difference are constantly affirmed. It is an affirmation of difference itself, of the singular voice, and of the possibility of and necessity for ‘spaces’ in which those voices can be heard. In the terms offered by Deleuze and Guattari this would be ‘smooth’ space as opposed to the ‘striated’ space of representational systems. It would be a ‘deterritorialised’ space of combination and recombination in accordance with differentiated, disaggregated desires; not the territorialised space of hierarchy, fixed and known roles that define ‘identity’. In terms of Zapatismo, this is a space in which ‘all worlds are possible’and in which it is the constant combination and recombination of the indigenous peoples that determines what ‘happens’.

### 1NC – Agency PIC

#### COUNTER PLAN TEXT: The EZLN should cry Ya Basta!

#### Their understanding of Zapatismo is rooted in whatever they want to achieve. Absent a fix strategy, they have no solvency, but with a fixed strategy they are no longer aligned with the ideology of “infinite planes” that they try to affirm. The notion of a world where many worlds exist is one of dialogue, not debate. Their understanding of Zapatismo is nothing but a puppet vehicle which ends up installing a replica of Eurocentric thought – turns the case.

Edgardo Lander, 2000 (Prof. of Sociology and Latin American studies at the Venezuelan Central University in Caracas , Nepantla: Views from South Volume 1, Issue 3, 2000, “Eurocentrism and Colonialism in Latin American Social Thought”, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/nepantla/summary/v001/1.3lander.html :)

Political and social thought regarding Latin America has been historically characterized by a tension between the search for its specific attributes and an external view that has seen these lands from the narrow perspective of European experience. There has also been an opposition between the challenge of the rich potentialities of this New World and distress over its difference, which stands in contrast with the ideal represented by European culture and racial composition. Nonetheless, external colonial views and regrets because of the difference have been widely hegemonic. A brief revision of the texts of the first republican constitutions is enough to illustrate how liberals, in their attempt to transplant and install a replica of their understanding of the European or North American experience, almost completely ignore the specific cultural and historical conditions of the societies about which they legislate. When these conditions are considered, it is with the express purpose of doing away with them. The affliction because of the difference—the awkwardness of living in a continent that is not white, urban, cosmopolitan, and civilized—finds its best expression in positivism. Sharilanng the main assumptions and prejudices of nineteenth-century European thought (scientific racism, patriarchy, the idea of progress), positivism reaffirms the colonial discourse. The continent is imagined from a single voice, with a single subject: white, masculine, urban, cosmopolitan. The rest, the majority, is the “other,” barbarian, primitive, black, Indian, who has nothing to contribute to the future of these societies. It would be imperative to whiten, westernize, or exterminate that majority.

#### This view perpetuates white supremacy

George Yancy, 2005 (Associate Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University and Coordinator of the Critical Race Theory Speaker Series, “Whiteness and the Return of the Black Body”, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 19.4 (2005) 215-241, Muse :)

I write out of a personal existential context. This context is a profound source of knowledge connected to my "raced" body. Hence, I write from a place of lived embodied experience, a site of exposure. In philosophy, the only thing that we are taught to "expose" is a weak argument, a fallacy, or someone's "inferior" reasoning power. The embodied self is bracketed and deemed irrelevant to theory, superfluous and cumbersome in one's search for truth. It is best, or so we are told, to reason from nowhere. Hence, the white philosopher/author presumes to speak for all of "us" without the slightest mention of his or her "raced" identity. Self-consciously writing as a white male philosopher, Crispin Sartwell observes: Left to my own devices, I disappear as an author. That is the "whiteness" of my authorship. This whiteness of authorship is, for us, a form of authority; to speak (apparently) from nowhere, for everyone, is empowering, though one wields power here only by becoming lost to oneself. But such an authorship and authority is also pleasurable: it yields the pleasure of self-forgetting or [End Page 215] apparent transcendence of the mundane and the particular, and the pleasure of power expressed in the "comprehension" of a range of materials. (1998, 6) To theorize the Black body one must "turn to the [Black] body as the radix for interpreting racial experience" (Johnson [1993, 600]).1 It is important to note that this particular strategy also functions as a lens through which to theorize and critique whiteness; for the Black body's "racial" experience is fundamentally linked to the oppressive modalities of the "raced" white body. However, there is no denying that my own "racial" experiences or the social performances of whiteness can become objects of critical reflection. In this paper, my objective is to describe and theorize situations where the Black body's subjectivity, its lived reality, is reduced to instantiations of the white imaginary, resulting in what I refer to as "the phenomenological return of the Black body."2 These instantiations are embedded within and evolve out of the complex social and historical interstices of whites' efforts at self-construction through complex acts of erasure vis-à-vis Black people. These acts of self-construction, however, are myths/ideological constructions predicated upon maintaining white power. As James Snead has noted, "Mythification is the replacement of history with a surrogate ideology of [white] elevation or [Black] demotion along a scale of human value" (Snead 1994, 4). How I understand and theorize the body relates to the fact that the body—in this case, the Black body—is capable of undergoing a sociohistorical process of "phenomenological return" vis-à-vis white embodiment. The body's meaning—whether phenotypically white or black—its ontology, its modalities of aesthetic performance, its comportment, its "raciated" reproduction, is in constant contestation. The hermeneutics of the body, how it is understood, how it is "seen," its "truth," is partly the result of a profound historical, ideological construction. "The body" is positioned by historical practices and discourses. The body is codified as this or that in terms of meanings that are sanctioned, scripted, and constituted through processes of negotiation that are embedded within and serve various ideological interests that are grounded within further power-laden social processes. The historical plasticity of the body, the fact that it is a site of contested meanings, speaks to the historicity of its "being" as lived and meant within the interstices of social semiotics. Hence: a) the body is less of a thing/being than a shifting/changing historical meaning that is subject to cultural configuration/reconfiguration. The point here is to interrogate the "Black body" as a "fixed and material truth" that preexists "its relations with the world and with others"3 ; b) the body's meaning is fundamentally symbolic (McDowell 2001, 301), and its meaning is congealed through symbolic repetition and iteration that emits certain signs and presupposes certain norms; and, c) the body is a battlefield, one that is fought over again and again across particular historical moments and within particular social spaces. "In other words, the concept of the body provides only the illusion of self-evidence, facticity, 'thereness' for something [End Page 216] fundamentally ephemeral, imaginary, something made in the image of particular social groups" (301). On this score, it is not only the "Black body" that defies the ontic fixity projected upon it through the white gaze, and, hence, through the episteme of whiteness, but the white body is also fundamentally symbolic, requiring demystification of its status as norm, the paragon of beauty, order, innocence, purity, restraint, and nobility. In other words, given the three suppositions above, both the "Black body" and the "white body" lend themselves to processes of interpretive fracture and to strategies of interrogating and removing the veneer of their alleged objectivity. To have one's dark body invaded by the white gaze and then to have that body returned as distorted is a powerful experience of violation. The experience presupposes an anti-Black lived context, a context within which whiteness gets reproduced and the white body as norm is reinscribed. The late writer, actor, and activist Ossie Davis recalls that at the age of six or seven two white police officers told him to get into their car. They took him down to the precinct. They kept him there for an hour, laughing at him and eventually pouring cane syrup over his head. This only created the opportunity for more laughter, as they looked upon the "silly" little Black boy. If he was able to articulate his feelings at that moment, think of how the young Davis was returned to himself: "I am an object of white laughter, a buffoon." The young Davis no doubt appeared to the white police officers in ways that they had approved. They set the stage, created a site of Black buffoonery, and enjoyed their sadistic pleasure without blinking an eye. Sartwell notes that "the [white] oppressor seeks to constrain the oppressed [Blacks] to certain approved modes of visibility (those set out in the template of stereotype) and then gazes obsessively on the spectacle he has created" (1998, 11). Davis notes that he "went along with the game of black emasculation, it seemed to come naturally" (Marable 2000, 9). After that, "the ritual was complete" (9). He was then sent home with some peanut brittle to eat. Davis knew at that early age, even without the words to articulate what he felt, that he had been violated. He refers to the entire ritual as the process of "niggerization." He notes: The culture had already told me what this was and what my reaction to this should be: not to be surprised; to expect it; to accommodate it; to live with it. I didn't know how deeply I was scarred or affected by that, but it was a part of who I was. (9) Davis, in other words, was made to feel that he had to accept who he was, that "niggerized" little Black boy, an insignificant plaything within a system of ontological racial differences. This, however, is the trick of white ideology; it is to give the appearance of fixity, where the "look of the white subject interpellates the black subject as inferior, which, in turn, bars the black subject from seeing him/herself without the internalization of the white gaze" (Weheliye 2005, 42). On this score, it is white bodies that are deemed agential. They configure "passive" [End Page 217] Black bodies according to their will. But it is no mystery; for "the Negro is interpreted in the terms of the white man. White-man psychology is applied and it is no wonder that the result often shows the Negro in a ludicrous light" (Braithwaite 1992, 36). While walking across the street, I have endured the sounds of car doors locking as whites secure themselves from the "outside world," a trope rendering my Black body ostracized, different, unbelonging. This outside world constitutes a space, a field, where certain Black bodies are relegated. They are rejected, because they are deemed suspicious, vile infestations of the (white) social body. The locks on the doors resound: Click. Click. Click. Click. Click. Click. ClickClickClickClickClickClickClick! Of course, the clicking sounds are always already accompanied by nervous gestures, and eyes that want to look, but are hesitant to do so. The cumulative impact of the sounds is deafening, maddening in their distorted repetition. The clicks begin to function as coded sounds, reminding me that I am dangerous; the sounds create boundaries, separating the white civilized from the dark savage, even as I comport myself to the contrary. The clicking sounds mark me, they inscribe me, they materialize my presence in ways that belie my intentions. Unable to stop the clicking, unable to establish a form of recognition that creates a space of trust and liminality, there are times when one wants to become their fantasy, to become their Black monster, their bogeyman, to pull open the car door: "Surprise. You've just been carjacked by a ghost, a fantasy of your own creation. Now, get the fuck out of the car." I have endured white women clutching their purses or walking across the street as they catch a glimpse of my approaching Black body. It is during such moments that my body is given back to me in a ludicrous light, where I live the meaning of my body as confiscated. Davis too had the meaning of his young Black body stolen. The surpluses being gained by the whites in each case are not economic. Rather, it is through existential exploitation that the surpluses extracted can be said to be ontological—"semblances of determined presence, of full positivity, to provide a sense of secure being" (Henry 1997, 33). When I was about seventeen or eighteen, my white math teacher initiated such an invasion, pulling it off with complete calm and presumably self-transparency. Given the historical construction of whiteness as the norm, his own "raced" subject position was rendered invisible. After all, he lived in the real world, the world of the serious man, where values are believed anterior to their existential founding. As I recall, we were discussing my plans for the future. I told him that I wanted to be a pilot. I was earnest about this choice, spending a great deal of time reading about the requirements involved in becoming a pilot, how one would have to accumulate a certain number of flying hours. I also read about the dynamics of lift and drag that affect a plane in flight. After no doubt taking note of my firm commitment, he looked at me and implied that I should be realistic (a code word for realize that I am Black) about my goals. He said that I should become a carpenter or a bricklayer. I was exposing myself, telling a trusted teacher what I wanted to be, and he returned me to myself as something [End Page 218] that I did not recognize. I had no intentions of being a carpenter or a bricklayer (or a janitor or elevator operator for that matter). The situation, though, is more complex. It is not that he simply returned me to myself as a carpenter or a bricklayer when all along I had this image of myself as a pilot. Rather, he returned me to myself as a fixed entity, a "niggerized" Black body whose epidermal logic had already foreclosed the possibility of being anything other than what was befitting its lowly station. He was the voice of a larger anti-Black racist society that "whispers mixed messages in our ears" (Marable 2000, 9), the ears of Black people who struggle to think of themselves as a possibility. He mentioned that there were only a few Black pilots and that I should be more realistic. (One can only imagine what his response would have been had I said that I wanted to be a philosopher, particularly given the statistic that Black philosophers constitute about 1.1% of philosophers in the United States). Keep in mind that this event did not occur in the 1930s or 1940s, but around 1979. The message was clear. Because I was Black, I had to settle for an occupation suitable for my Black body,4 unlike the white body that would no doubt have been encouraged to become a pilot. As with Davis, having one's Black body returned as a source of impossibility, one begins to think, to feel, to emote: "Am I a nigger?" The internalization of the white gaze creates a doubleness within the psyche of the Black, leading to a destructive process of superfluous self-surveillance and self-interrogation. This was indeed a time when I felt ontologically locked into my body. My body was indelibly marked with this stain of darkness. After all, he was the white mind, the mathematical mind, calculating my future by factoring in my Blackness. He did not "see" me, though. Like Ellison's invisible man, I occupied that paradoxical status of "visible invisibility." Within this dyadic space, my Black body phenomenologically returned to me as inferior. To describe the phenomenological return of the Black body is to disclose how it is returned as an appearance to consciousness, my consciousness. The (negatively) "raced" manner in which my body underwent a phenomenological return, however, presupposes a thick social reality that has always already been structured by the ideology and history of whiteness. More specifically, when my body is returned to me, the white body has already been constituted over centuries as the norm, both in European and Anglo-American culture, and at several discursive levels from science to philosophy to religion. In the case of my math teacher, his whiteness was invisible to him as my Blackness was hyper-visible to both of us. Of course, his invisibility to his own normative here is a function of my hyper-visibility. It is important to keep in mind that white Americans, more generally, define themselves around the "gravitational pull," as it were, of the Black.5 The not of white America is the Black of white America. This not is essential, as is the invisibility of the negative relation through which whites are constituted. All of embodied beings have their own "here." My white math teacher's racist social performances (for example, his "advice" to me), within the context of a [End Page 219] white racist historical imaginary and asymmetric power relations, suspends and effectively disqualifies my embodied here. What was the message communicated? Expressing my desire to be, to take advantage of the opportunities for which Black bodies had died in order to secure, my ambition "was flung back in my face like a slap" (Fanon 1967, 114). Fanon writes: The white world, the only honorable one, barred me from all participation. A man was expected to behave like a man. I was expected to behave like a black man—or at least like a nigger. I shouted a greeting to the world and the world slashed away my joy. I was told to stay within bounds, to go back where I belonged. (114–15) According to philosopher Bettina Bergo, drawing from the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, "perception and discourse—what we see and the symbols and meanings of our social imaginaries—prove inextricably the one from the other" (2005, 131). Hence, the white math teacher's perception, what he "saw," was inextricably linked to social meanings and semiotic constructions and constrictions that opened up a "field of appearances" regarding my dark body. There is nothing passive about the white gaze. There are racist sociohistorical and epistemic conditions of emergence that construct not only the Black body, but the white body as well. So, what is "seen" when the white gaze "sees" "my body" and it becomes something alien to me?

### 1NC – Case

#### Zapatismo fails and only entrenches the dominant power of neoliberalism.

Žižek – ‘4 (Slavoj Žižek, 2004, Organs without bodies, p. 198-202)

There was a similar constellation in the last years of the decaying Really-Existing Socialism: the non-antagonistic coexistence, within the oppositional field, of a multitude of ideologico-political tendencies, from liberal human-rights groups to "liberal" business-oriented groups, conservative religious groups and leftist workers' demands. This multitude functioned well, as long as it was united in the opposition to "them," the Party hegemony. Once they found THEMSELVES in power, the game was over. Another case of acting multitude is the crowd that brought back into power Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. However, can we forget the obvious fact that Chavez functions as a Latino-American caudillo, the unique Leader whose function is to magically resolve the conflicting interests of those who support him? "Multitude in power" thus necessarily actualizes itself in the guise of an authoritarian leader whose charisma can serve as the "empty signifier" able to contain the multitude of interests (it was already Peron who was a militaristic patriot to the Army, a devout Christian to the Church, a supporter of the poor against oligarchy on behalf of workers, etc.). The favored example of the supporters (and practitioners) of the new, dispersed counter-power of the multitude is, of course, the Zapatista movement in Chiapas. Here is Naomi Klein's description of how its leading figure, subcommandante Marcos, functions: / [H]e wasn't a commander barking orders, but a subcommandante, a conduit for the will of the councils. His first words, in his new persona, were 'Through me speaks the will of the Zapatista National Liberation Army.' Further subjugating himself, Marcos says to those who seek him out that he is not a leader, but that his black mask is a mirror, reflecting each of their own struggles; that a Zapatista is anyone anywhere fighting injustice, that 'We are you.' Most famously, he once told a reporter that 'Marcos is gay in San Francisco, black in South Africa, an Asian in Europe, a Chicano in San Ysidro, an anarchist in Spain, a Palestinian in Israel, ... a single woman on the Metro at 10 P.M., a peasant without land, a gang member in the slums ... Meanwhile, Marcos himself - the supposed non-self, the conduit, the mirror - writes in a tone so personal and poetic, so completely and unmistakably his own.20 / It is clear that such a structure can function only as the ethico-poetic shadowy double of the existing positive state power structure. No wonder Marcos cannot show his face; no wonder his idea is to throw off his mask and disappear back into anonymity if and when the movement reaches its goals. If the Zapatistas were to effectively take power, statements like "Through me speaks the will of..." would immediately acquire a much more ominous dimension - their apparent modesty would reveal itself as extreme arrogance, as the presumption of one particular individual that his subjectivity serves as a direct medium of expression for the universal will. Do we still remember how phrases like "I am nothing in myself, my entire strength is yours, I am just an expression of your will!" was the standard cliché of "totalitarian" leaders, who also knew very well how to manipulate their dark implication - "...so anyone who attacks me personally is effectively attacking you all, the entire people, your love for freedom and justice!" The greater the poetic potential of Marcos in opposition, as a critical voice of VIRTUAL protest, the greater would be the terror of Marcos as an ACTUAL leader. As to the political effects of the Zapatista movement, one should note the final irony here: when Klein lists as the main Zapatista political achievement that this movement "helped topple the corrupt seventy-one-year reign of the Institutional Revolutionary Party," 21 what this amounts to is that, with Zapatista help, Mexico got the first post-revolutionary government, a government that cut the last links with the historical heritage of Zapata and fully endorsed Mexico's integration into the neo-liberal New World Order (no wonder the two presidents, Fox – ex-boss of the Mexican branch of Coca-Cola - and Bush, are personal friends). / However, is it not that the Zapatistas DID develop a minimal, positive political program, that of local self-determination, of moving in where state power failed and enabling people to constitute new spaces of local community democracy? "What sets the Zapatistas apart from your average Marxist guerilla insurgents is that their goal is not to win control but to seize and build autonomous spaces where 'democracy, liberty and justice' can thrive. ... Marcos is convinced that these free spaces, born of reclaimed land, communal agriculture, resistance to privatization, will eventually create counter-powers to the state simply by existing as alternatives." 22 And yet, we encounter here the same ambiguity: are these autonomous spaces germs of the organization-to-come of the entire society, or just phenomena emerging in the crevices and gaps of the social order? Marcos' formulation that the Zapatistas are not interested in the Revolution, but, rather, in "a revolution that makes revolution possible," is deeply true, but nonetheless profoundly ambiguous: does this mean that the Zapatistas are a "Cultural Revolution" laying the foundation for the actual political revolution (what, way back in the 1960s, Marcuse called "freedom as the condition of liberation"), OR does it mean that they should remain merely a "site of resistance," a corrective to the existing state power (not only without the aim to replace it, but also without the aim to organize the conditions in which this power will disappear)? / When Marcos lists all those covered by the signifier “Zapatista,” all those rendered invisible by neo-liberal globalization, its excluded (“the indigenous, youth, women, homosexuals, lesbians, people of color, immigrants, workers, peasants…”), this effectively sounds like Laclau’s “chain of equivalences.” However, with the twist that this chain clearly refers to a privileged central signifier, that of neo-liberal global capitalism. So, when Klein herself had to note how the Zapatista movement is “keenly aware of the power of words and symbols,” 23 when Marcos proclaims that words are his weapons, one should neither joyfully assert how we are dealing with a truly postmodern “politics of the signifier” nor should one indulge in cynical quips about how the Zapatistas are well versed in mobilizing the fetishizing power of logos (the focus of Naomi’s bestseller). One should, rather, reflect on how this use of mythical-poetic Master-Signifiers affects the actual political impact of the movement. If the defenders of the Zapatistas were to reply here that, in this case, the central Master-Signifier is not a totalizing-homogenizing force but just a kind of empty container, a designation that holds open the space for the thriving of the irreducible plurality, one should add to that this, precisely, is how Master-Signifiers already functioned in fascism and populism, in which the reference to a charismatic Leader serves to neutralize the inconsistent multitude of ideological references. / The response of the partisans of Negri and Hardt to this critique is, of course, that it continues to perceive the new situation from within the old framework. In the contemporary information society, the question of "taking power" is more and more irrelevant, since there is no longer any central Power agency which plays a de facto decisive role - power itself is shifting, decentered, "Protean..." Perhaps, then, today, in the epoch of homo sacer, one of the options is to pursue the trend of self-organized collectives in areas outside the law. Recall life in today's favelas in Latin American megalopolises: are they, in some sense, not the first "liberated territories," the cells of futural self-organized societies? Are institutions like community kitchens not a model of "socialized" communal local life? (And, perhaps, from this standpoint, one can also approach, in a new way, the "politics of drugs." Was it really an accident that, at every moment that a strong self-organized collective of those outside the law emerged, it was soon corrupted by hard drugs - from African-American ghettos after the rebellions in the 1960s and Italian cities after the workers' unrests of the 1970s, up to today's favelas? And, the same holds even for Poland after Jaruzelski's coup in 1980: all of a sudden, drugs were easily available, together with pornography, alcohol, and Eastern Wisdom manuals, in order to ruin the self-organized civil society. Those in power knew full well when to use drugs as a weapon against self-organized resistance.) / However, what about the complex network of material, legal, institutional, etc. conditions that must be maintained in order for the informational "multitude" to be able to function? So, when Naomi Klein writes: "Decentralizing power doesn't mean abandoning strong national and international standards - and stable, equitable funding - for health care, education, affordable housing and environmental protection. But it does mean that the mantra of the left needs to change from 'increase funding' to 'empower the grassroots'" 24 - one should ask the naive question: HOW? How are these strong standards and funding - in short, the main ingredients of the Welfare State - to be maintained? No wonder that, in a kind of ironic twist proper to the "cunning of reason," Hardt and Negri end their Empire with a minimal positive political program of three points: the demand for global citizenship (so that the mobility of the working force under the present capitalist conditions is recognized); the right to a social wage (a minimal income guaranteed to everybody); the right to reappropriation (so that the key means of production, especially those of new informational media, are socially owned). The irony here is not only the content of these demands (with which, in abstractu, every radical liberal or social democrat would agree), but their very form - rights, demands -, which unexpectedly bring back into the picture what the entire book was fighting against: political agents all of a sudden appear as subjects of universal rights, demanding their realization (from whom, if not some universal form of legal state power?). In short (psychoanalytic terms), from the nomadic schizo outside the Law, we pass to the hysterical subject trying to provoke the Master by way of bombarding him with impossible demands.

#### Fetishizing the partial revolution prevents real social change for the better – comparing Chiapas to Cuba proves.

Proyect – ‘2 (Loui Proyect, 2002, “Fetishizing the Zapatistas: A Critique of Change the World without taking Power,” http://www.herramienta.com.ar/debate-sobre-cambiar-el-mundo/fetishizing-zapatistas-critique-change-world-without-taking-power)

For a variety of reasons, socialist revolutions have occurred in backward countries where the development of productive forces has been hampered by a number of factors, including imperialist blockade, technological and industrial underdevelopment, low productivity of labor and the need to stave off invasions and subversion--in other words, the kinds of conditions that make a country like Cuba fall short of communist ideals. Notwithstanding Cuba’s difficulties, the revolution has made a significant impact on peoples’ lives, so much so that it earned the praise of James Wolfensohn, the president of the World Bank, in May of 2001: "Cuba has done a great job on education and health and if you judge the country by education and health they’ve done a terrific job." / Wolfensohn was simply recognizing the reality of statistics in the bank’s World Development Indicators report that showed Cubans living longer than other Latin Americans, including residents of the US Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Literacy levels were on a par with Uruguay, while the life expectancy rate was 76 years, second only to Costa Rica at 77. Infant mortality in Cuba was seven deaths per 1,000 live births, much lower than the rest of Latin America. / While it is true that Cuba is enmeshed in a myriad of ways within the world capitalist economy, it did withdrew from the World Bank and its sister lending agency, the International Monetary Fund, in 1959. Despite the collapse of the USSR and continuing efforts to destroy the country economically by the USA, Cuba continues to develop its productive capabilities and raise the cultural level of the people. Turning to Chiapas, the general picture is far less encouraging. In a February 3, 2003 Newsday article titled "Infant Deaths Plague Mexico", we learn that the Comitan hospital serves nearly 500,000 people in Chiapas. Burdened by inadequate staffing and supplies, babies die at twice the national rate. Meanwhile, the February 21, 2001 Financial Times reported on a study conducted by the Association for the Health of Indigenous Children in Mexico in the village of Las Canadas, Chiapas. It found that not one girl had adequate nutritional levels compared with 39.4 per cent of boys. / Female malnutrition has actually led to physical shrinking over the last decade from an average height of 1.42 meters to 1.32 meters. At the same time, more than half of women who speak an indigenous language are illiterate - five times the national average. / While nobody can blame the EZLN for failing to make a revolution in Mexico, we would be remiss if we did not point out the obvious \*material\* differences between the two societies, especially in the countryside where poverty has traditionally been extreme. With its abundant natural resources, including oil and fertile farmland, it is not too difficult to imagine how much of a difference a socialist Mexico would have made in the lives of people like Irma Cruz. / For John Holloway, access to decent medical care seems far less important than "visibility", a term that he sees as practically defining Zapatismo and presumably missing altogether in dreary Cuban state socialism. This is expressed through the balaclava, the mask that Subcommandante wore at press conferences and which has since been appropriated by Black Block activists breaking Starbucks windows in the name of anti-capitalism: "The struggle for visibility is also central to the current indigenous movement, expressed most forcefully in the Zapatista wearing of the balaclava: we cover our face so that we can be seen, our struggle is the struggle of those without face." / While every movement certainly needs an element of mystique, it is doubtful that the Zapatista movement could sustain itself over the long haul using such symbols. Nor is it likely that it could succeed without linking up to a dynamic, rising mass movement in the rest of Mexico. Localized peasant struggles have a long history in Mexico going back to the 19th century. If you strip away the balaclava and Subcommandante Marcos’s laptop, you will find all the elements that ultimately frustrated the efforts of the original Zapata, namely the failure of a regional uprising to become part of a general assault on state power and the social and economic transformation of society. / To fetishize these sorts of incomplete and partial rebellions as a new way of doing politics not only does a disservice to the valiant efforts of the Mayan people, it also creates obstacles to those of us who also want to change the world but on a more favorable basis. For in the final analysis, it requires a democratic and centralized movement of the working class and its allies to take power in a country like Mexico.

#### System assimilates social movement demands and deprives them of universal appeal.

Žižek – ‘1 (Slavoj Žižek, 2001, “HAVE MICHAEL HARDT AND ANTONIO NEGRI REWRITTEN THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?” RETHINKING MARXISM, VOLUME 13, NUMBER 3/4, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/slavoj-zizek/articles/have-michael-hardt-and-antonio-negri-rewritten-the-communist-manifesto-for-the-twenty-first-century/)

Today we see the signs of general unease, which is already exploding: I am, of course, referring to the events usually listed under the name of "Seattle." The long honeymoon of triumphant global capitalism is over, the long-overdue "seven-year itch" is here. Witness the panicky reactions of the big media which, from Time to the Cable News Network, all of a sudden started to warn about Marxists manipulating the crowd of "honest" protesters. The problem is now the strictly Leninist one of how to actualize the media's accusations: how to invent the organizational structure that will confer on this unrest the form of the universal political demand. Otherwise, the momentum will be lost and what will remain will be the marginal disturbance, perhaps organized as a new Greenpeace, with certain efficiency, but also strictly limited goals, marketing strategy, and so on. In other words, the key "Leninist" lesson today is: politics without the organizational form of the party is politics without politics, so the answer to those who want just the (quite adequately named) "new social movements" is the same as the answer of the Jacobins to the Girondin compromisers: "You want revolution without the revolution!" Today's blockade is that there are two ways open for the sociopolitical engagement: either play the game of the system - "engage in the long march through the institutions" - or get involved in new social movements, from feminism through ecology to antiracism. And again, the limit of these movements is that they are not political in the sense of the universal singular: they are "one-issue movements" lacking the dimension of universality - that is, they do not relate to the social totality. / Here, Lenin's reproach to liberals is crucial: they only exploit the working classes discontent to strengthen their own positions vis-à-vis the conservatives, instead of identifying with it to the end. Is this not also the case with today's left liberals? They like to evoke racism, ecology, workers' grievances, and so forth to score points over conservatives without endangering the system. Recall how, at Seattle, Bill Clinton himself deftly referred to the protesters on the streets outside, reminding the gathered leaders inside the guarded palaces that they should listen to the message of the demonstrators (the message which, of course, Clinton interpreted, depriving it of its subversive sting attributed to the dangerous extremists introducing chaos and violence into the majority of peaceful protesters). It's the same with all new social movements, up to the Zapatistas in Chiapas: systemic politics is always ready to "listen to their demands," depriving them of their proper political sting. The system is by definition ecumenical, open, tolerant, ready to "listen" to all. Even if one insists on one's demands, they are deprived of their universal political sting by the very form of negotiation.

#### Their attempt to endorse the Zapatistas just guarantee’s the continuation of the colonial legacy – speaking for other necessarily gurantee’s the creation of hierarchies

Alcoff – ’92 (Linda Alcoff, Winter, 1991/92, “The Problem of Speaking for Others,” Cultural Critique 20, jstor.org, p. 26)

Looking merely at the content of a set of claims without looking at effects of the claims cannot produce an adequate or even meaningful evaluation of them, partly because the notion of a content separate from effects does not hold up. The content of the claim, or its meaning, emerges in interaction between words and hearers within a very specific historical situation. Given this, we have to pay careful attention to the discursive arrangement in order to understand the full meaning of any given discursive event. For example, in a situation where a well-meaning First World person is speaking for a person or group in the Third World, the very discursive arrangement may reinscribe the "hierarchy of civilizations" view where the United States lands squarely at the top. This effect occurs because the speaker is positioned as authoritative and empowered, as the knowledgeable subject, while the group in the Third World is reduced, merely because of the structure of the speaking practice, to an object and victim that must be championed from afar, thus disempowered. Though the speaker may be trying to materially improve the situation of some lesser-privileged group, the effects of her discourse is to reinforce racist, imperialist conceptions and perhaps also to further silence the lesser-privileged group's own ability to speak and be heard.14 This shows us why it is so important to reconceptualize discourse, as Foucault recommends, as an event, which includes speaker, words, hearers, location, language, and so on.

Alcoff – ’92 (Linda Alcoff, Winter, 1991/92, “The Problem of Speaking for Others,” Cultural Critique 20, jstor.org, p. 22-23)

A final response to the problem that I will consider occurs in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's rich essay "Can the Subaltern Speak?" In Spivak's essay, the central issue is an essentialist, authentic conception of the self and of experience. She criticizes the "self-abnegating intellectual" pose that Foucault and Deleuze adopt when they reject speaking for others on the grounds that it assumes the oppressed can transparently represent their own true interests. According to Spivak, Foucault and Deleuze's position serves only to conceal the actual authorizing power of the retreating intellectuals, who in their very retreat help to consolidate a particular conception of experience (as transparent and self-knowing). Thus, to promote "listening to" as opposed to speaking for essentializes the oppressed as nonideologically constructed subjects. But Spivak is also critical of speaking for others that engages in dangerous representations. In the end Spivak prefers a "speaking to," in which the intellectual neither abnegates his or her discursive role nor presumes an authenticity of the oppressed but still allows for the possibility that the oppressed will produce a "countersentence" that can then suggest a new historical narrative. / This response is the one with which I have the most agreement. We should strive to create wherever possible the conditions for dialogue and the practice of speaking with and to rather than speaking for others. If the dangers of speaking for others result from the possibility of misrepresentation, expanding one's own authority and privilege, and a generally imperialist speaking ritual, then speaking with and to can lessen these dangers. / Often the possibility of dialogue is left unexplored or inadequately pursued by more privileged persons. Spaces in which it may seem as if it is impossible to engage in dialogic encounters need to be transformed in order to do so—spaces such as classrooms, hospitals, workplaces, welfare agencies, universities, institutions for international development and aid, and governments. It has long been noted that existing communication technologies have the potential to produce these kinds of interaction even though research and development teams have not found it advantageous under capitalism to do so. / Spivak's arguments, however, suggest that the simple solution is not for the oppressed or less privileged to be able to speak for themselves, since their speech will not necessarily be either liberatory or reflective of their "true interests," if such exist. I would agree with her here, yet it can still be argued, as I think she herself concludes, that ignoring the subaltern's or oppressed person's speech is "to continue the imperialist project" (298). But if a privileging of the oppressed's speech cannot be made on the grounds that its content will necessarily be liberatory, it can be made on the grounds of the very act of speaking itself. Speaking constitutes a subject that challenges and subverts the opposition between the knowing agent and the object of knowledge, an opposition that is key in the reproduction of imperialist modes of discourse. The problem with speaking for others exists in the very structure of discursive practice, no matter its content, and therefore it is this structure itself that needs alteration.

# 2NC

## Speaking for Others

### Alcoff

#### Impossible to speak solely for one’s self – avoids accountability but cannot erase effects of speech / AT: “I speak for myself”

Alcoff – ’92 (Linda Alcoff, Winter, 1991/92, “The Problem of Speaking for Others,” Cultural Critique 20, jstor.org, p. 20-21)

This problem is that Trebilcot's position, as well as a more general retreat position, presumes an ontological configuration of the discursive context that simply does not obtain. In particular, it assumes that one can retreat into one's discrete location and make claims entirely and singularly based on that location that do not range over others, that one can disentangle oneself from the implicating networks between one's discursive practices and others' locations, situations, and practices. (In other words, the claim that I can speak only for myself assumes the autonomous conception of the self in Classical Liberal theory—that I am unconnected to others in my authentic self or that I can achieve an autonomy from others given certain conditions.) But there is no neutral place to stand free and clear in which one's words do not prescriptively affect or mediate the experience of others, nor is there a way to decisively demarcate a boundary between one's location and all others. Even a complete retreat from speech is of course not neutral since it allows the continued dominance of current discourses and acts by omission to reinforce their dominance. / As my practices are made possible by events spatially far from my body so too my own practices make possible or impossible practices of others. The declaration that I "speak only for myself" has the sole effect of allowing me to avoid responsibility and accountability for my effects on others; it cannot erase those effects. / Let me offer an illustration of this. The feminist movement in the United States has spawned many kinds of support groups for women with various needs: rape victims, incest survivors, battered wives, and so forth, and some of these groups have been structured around the view that each survivor must come to her own "truth," which ranges only over oneself and has no bearing on others. Thus, one woman's experience of sexual assault, its effect on her and her interpretation of it, should not be taken as a universal generalization to which others must subsume or conform their experience. This view works only up to a point. To the extent it recognizes irreducible differences in the way people respond to various traumas, and is sensitive to the genuinely variable way in which women can heal themselves, it represents real progress beyond the homogeneous, universalizing approach that sets out one road for all to follow. However, it is an illusion to think that, even in the safe space of a support group, a member of the group can, for example, trivialize brother-sister incest as "sex play" without profoundly harming someone else in the group who is trying to maintain her realistic assessment of her brother's sexual activities with her as a harmful assault against his adult rationalization that "well, for me it was just harmless fun." Even if the speaker offers a dozen caveats about her views as restricted to her location, she will still affect the other woman's ability to conceptualize and interpret her experience and her response to it. And this is simply because we cannot neatly separate off our mediating praxis that interprets and constructs our experiences from the praxis of others. We are collectively caught in an intricate, delicate web in which each action I take, discursive or otherwise, pulls on, breaks off, or maintains the tension in many strands of a web in which others find themselves moving also. When I speak for myself, I am constructing a possible self, a way to be in the world, and am offering that to others, whether I intend to or not, as one possible way to be. / Thus, the attempt to avoid the problematic of speaking for by retreating into an individualist realm is based on an illusion, well-supported in the individualist ideology of the West, that a self is not constituted by multiple intersecting discourses but consists in a unified whole capable of autonomy from others. It is an illusion that I can separate from others to such an extent that I can avoid affecting them. This may be the intention of my speech, and even its meaning if we take that to be the formal entailments of the sentences, but it will not be the effect of the speech, and therefore cannot capture the speech in its reality as a discursive practice. When I "speak for myself" I am participating in the creation and reproduction of discourses through which my own and other selves are constituted.

# 1NR

## Agency PIC

### AT: “We Change Debate!”

#### Affirming Zapatismo is just a form of white guilt

El Kilombo Intergalactico 2007 [Collective in Durham NC that interviewed Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, Beyond Resistance: Everything p. 1-2]

In our efforts to forge a new path, we found that an old friend—the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista Army of National Liberation, EZLN)—was already taking enormous strides to move toward a politics adequate to our time, and that it was thus necessary to attempt an evaluation of Zapatismo that would in turn be adequate to the real ‘event’ of their appearance. That is, despite the fresh air that the Zapatista uprising had blown into the US political scene since 1994, we began to feel that even the inspiration of Zapatismo had been quickly contained through its insertion into a well-worn and untenable narrative: Zapatismo was another of many faceless and indifferent “third world” movements that demanded and deserved solidarity from leftists in the “global north**.”** From our position as an organization composed in large part by people of color in the United States, we viewed this focus on “solidarity” as the foreign policy equivalent of “white guilt,” quite distinct from any authentic impulse toward, or recognition of, the necessity for radical social change. The notion of “solidarity” that still pervades much of the Left in the U.S. has continually served an intensely conservative political agenda that dresses itself in the radical rhetoric of the latest rebellion in the “darker nations” while carefully maintaining political action at a distance from our own daily lives, thus producing a political subject (the solidarity provider) that more closely resembles a spectator or voyeur (to the suffering of others) than a participant or active agent, while simultaneously working to reduce the solidarity recipient to a mere object (of our pity and mismatched socks). At both ends of this relationship, the process of solidarity ensures that subjects and political action never meet; in this way it serves to make change an a priori impossibility. In other words, this practice of solidarity urges us to participate in its perverse logic by accepting the narrative that power tells us about itself: that those who could make change don’t need it and that those who need change can’t make it. To the extent that human solidarity has a future, this logic and practice do not!

#### You just create more and more people you don’t want because it trains people to be better

Atchison and Panetta ‘9

(Jarrod Atchison, Director of Debate @ Trinity University, and Edward Panetta, Director of Debate @ the University of Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future, p. 317-34)

The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community *may increase the profile of the* winning *team and* the *community problem*, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community. / If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. / From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations *is not a productive one* where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.