# Round 6---Harvard

# 1NC

## 1NC—vs. GBS CK

### 1

#### A. The Prewritten Script. The aff’s “should” draws us into normative thought.

Pierre Schlag, Professor of Law @ the University of Colorado, 1991, “Normativity and the Politics of Form,” Lexis-Nexis

Against this backdrop of bureaucratic power games, it becomes an interesting question just what all of our passionate and very moral normative conversation does or does not contribute. Against the backdrop of this power game of law, our normative conversation can seem exceedingly polite-given to a rather unbelievable romanticization of the enterprise we call "law." Many legal thinkers understand this dramatic conflict in terms of an opposition between the "realities" of practice and the "ideals" of the legal academy. For these legal thinkers, it will seem especially urgent to ask once again: 'What should be done? How should we live? What should the law be? These are the hard questions. These are the momentous questions. And they are the wrong ones. They are wrong because it is these very normative questions that reprieve legal thinkers from recognizing the extent to which the cherished "ideals" of legal academic thought are implicated in the reproduction and maintenance of precisely those ugly "realities" of legal practice the academy so routinely condemns. It is these normative questions that allow legal thinkers to shield themselves from the recognition that their work product consists largely of the reproduction of rhetorical structures by which human beings can be coerced into achieving ends of dubious social origin and implication. It is these very normative questions that allow legal academics to continue to address (rather lamely) bureaucratic power structures as if they were rational, morally competent, individual humanist subjects. It is these very normative questions that allow legal thinkers to assume blithely that – in a world ruled by HMOs, personnel policies, standard operating procedures, performance requirements, standard work incentives, and productivity monitoring – they somehow have escaped the bureaucratic power games. It is these normative questions that enable them to represent themselves as whole and intact, as self-directing individual liberal humanist subjects at once rational, morally competent, and in control of their own situations, the captain of their own ships, the Hercules of their own empires, the author of their own texts. It isn't so.5 And if it isn't so, it would seem advisable to make some adjustments in the agenda and practice of legal thought. That is what I will be trying to do here. Much of what follows will no doubt seem threatening or nihilistic to many readers. In part that is because this article puts in question the very coherence, meaningfulness, and integrity of the kinds of normative disputes and discussion that almost all of us in the legal academy practice. One question will no doubt recur to the reader throughout this article: "But what should we do?" That question is not going to receive a straightforward answer here, and I would like to explain why at the outset. Suppose that you are walking on a road and you come to a fork. This calls for a decision, for a choice. So you ask your companions: "Which fork should we take? Where should we go?" You all begin to talk about it, to consider the possibilities, to weigh the considerations. Given these circumstances, given this sort of problem, the questions, "Where should we go? What should we do?" are perfectly sensible.6 But now suppose that it gets dark and the terrain becomes less familiar. You are no longer sure which road you are on or even if you are on a road at all.7 So you ask, "where are we?" One of your companions says "I don't know-I think we should just keep going forward." Another one says, "I think we should just go back." Yet another says "No, I think we should go left." Now given the right context, each of these suggestions can be perfectly sensible. But not in this context. Not anymore. On the contrary, you know very well that going forward, backward, left or in any other direction makes no sense unless you happen to know where you are. So, of course, you try to figure out where you are. You look around for telltale signs. You scan the horizon. You try to reconstruct mentally how you got here in the first place. You explore. You even start thinking about how to figure out where you are. Meanwhile, if your companions keep asking "But what should we do? Which road should we take?," you are likely to think that these kinds of questions are not particularly helpful. The questions (Where should we go? Which fork should we take?) that seemed to make so much sense a short time back have now become a hindrance. And if your companions keep up this sort of questioning (Which road should we take? Which way should we go?), you're going to start wondering about how to get them to focus on the new situation, how to get them to drop this "fork in the road" stuff and Now one metaphor that recurs throughout this essay is that of the theater.9 Now, you might reasonably think that it's a bit difficult to get from the "fork in the road" metaphor of normative legal thought to the metaphor of law as theater. But actually, it's not that difficult-especially not if you understand at the outset that those individuals who keep saying "Where should we go? What should we do?" are themselves already doing a kind of theater. They are engaged in a particular kind of dramatic action appropriate for a particular kind of scene, agon, and actors. They are doing the kind of theater that is particularly appropriate for forks in the road. Now, one problem with normative legal thought is that it is constantly representing our situation as a fork in the road-calling, of course, for a choice, a commitment to this way or that way. Now, you might think: well, this is not so bad. At least we get to choose. We are free and we can choose which way to go. But, of course, we are not free. The rhetorical script of normative legal thought is already written, the social scene is already set and play after play, article after article, year after year, normative legal thought requires you to choose: "What should we do? Where should we go?" We are free, but we must choose-which is to say that we are not free at all. On the contrary, we (you and I) have been constituted as the kind of beings, the kind of thinkers who compulsively treat every intellectual, social, or legal event as calling for a choice. We must choose. What should we do? Where should we go? These questions are not helpful now. It's time to do a different kind of theater. And the first thing to do is figure out where we are and what we're doing. What we're doing, of course, is normative legal thought.

I. (VIRTUALLY) ALWAYS AND ALREADY NORMATIVE

The orientation of American academic legal thought is pervasively and overwhelmingly normative. For the legal thinker, the central question is "what should the law be?" Or, "what should the courts do?" Or, "how should courts decide cases?" Or, "what values should the ubiquitous (and largely non-referential) 'we' (i.e., us) believe?" Or, "how should...." These questions and their doctrinal derivatives constitute, organize, and circumscribe the tacit agenda of contemporary legal thought. The key verb dominating contemporary legal thought is some version of "should." Sometimes this "should" does not quite rise to the moral "ought," and remains merely an instrumental, technical, or prudential "should." Sometimes it is a covert "should"-hidden beneath layers of legal positivism. But the fact remains that "shoulds" and "oughts" dominate legal discourse. And the question of whether any given "should" is a true moral "ought" or another instrumental "should" turns out to be just another internecine squabble among competing normative perspectives. The normative orientation is so dominant in legal thought that it is usually not noticed. No doubt the very pervasiveness and dominance of this thought has enabled it to escape conscious thematization.11 Indeed, while the concept "normative legal thought" is hardly unknown or unintelligible to American legal thinkers, its precise significance, its precise movements in social or intellectual space, remain largely unrecognized and undetermined. Indeed, the understanding (or rather understandings) of normative legal thought within the legal academy are not nearly as refined or contested as the understandings, for instance, of legal formalism, legal realism, legal process, law and economics, critical legal studies (cls), or the like. Nonetheless, normative legal thought does not arrive on this scene without meaning, without a history. On the contrary, normative legal thought arrives an already loaded term-one that has already been engaged in jurisprudential skirmishes with conceptualism, positivism, and nihilism. Indeed, our image of normative legal thought is already a product of some cognitively and professionally sedimented distinctions12 between normative legal thought and: (a) descriptive thought (as in, for instance, the opposition between descriptive and normative law and economics);13 (b) conceptualism (as in, for instance, the claim that normative legal thought is value-conscious, open-ended, and nonauthoritarian in contrast to conceptualism);14 or (c) nihilism (as in, for instance, the claim that either law is a normatively meaningful enterprise or we face the abyss of a bleak and chaotic nihilism).15 These distinctions and the patterns of argument structures associated with these distinctions have played significant roles in fashioning our pre-conscious, pre-reflective understanding of the character and location of normative legal thought. It is important to attend to these pre-reflective understandings lest they shape our conceptualization of normative legal thought in ways that turn out to be unhelpful. We want to avoid as much as possible "positing" a model or "proposing" a definition of normative legal thought. For us, then, normative legal thought is already a social construction, already having meaning and significance. We want to reveal our own sedimented, pre-reflective images and conceptualizations of normative legal thought so that in the process of revealing, we might learn something about how these pre-reflective conceptualizations will help or hinder the inquiry undertaken here. Indeed, it will turn out that our pre-reflective images and conceptualizations of normative legal thought in some senses help and in others obstruct our attempts to understand normative legal thought. They help in the! sense that they are socially and cognitively operative among legal thinkers and thus allow us to get some shared "fix" on what we mean by normative legal thought. At the same time these images and conceptualizations are unhelpful because once we make their argumentative logic intellectually explicit, they collapse.

#### B. Negative Portable Impact. This desensitizes us to real-world suffering as people outside of debate.

Richard Delgado, Professor of Law @ the University of Colorado, 1991, “Norms and Normal Science,” Lexis-Nexis

But what is the cash value of all this priest-talk in the law reviews, in the classrooms of at least the "better" schools, and in the opinions of at least some judges? Are normativos better than other people? Are we better off for engaging in normative talk, either as speakers or listeners? Pierre Schlag, for example, has described normativity as a zero – as a vacuous, self-referential system of talk, all [\*954] form and no substance, meaning nothing, and about itself. n82 This description may be too generous. Normativity may be more than a harmless tic prevalent only in certain circles.

1. Permission to Ignore Suffering

The history of organized religion shows that intense immersion in at least certain types of normative system is no guarantee against cruelty, intolerance or superstition. n83 In modern times, social scientists have tried to find a correlation between religious belief and altruistic behavior. In most studies, the correlation is nonexistent or negative. In one study, seminary students were observed as they walked past a well-dressed man lying moaning on the sidewalk. n84 Most ignored the man, even though they had just heard a sermon about the Good Samaritan. The proportion who stopped to offer aid was lower than that of passersby in general. The researchers, commenting on this and other studies of religion and helping behavior, hypothesized that religious people feel less need to act because of a sense that they are "chosen" people. n85 I believe this anesthetizing effect extends beyond religion. We confront a starving beggar and immediately translate the concrete duty we feel into a normative (i.e., abstract) question. And once we see the beggar's demand in general, systemic terms, it is easy for us to pass him by without rendering aid. n86 Someone else, perhaps society (with my tax dollars), will take care of that problem. / Normativity thus enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough edges of our world, to tune out or redefine what would otherwise make a claim on us. In the legal system, the clearest [\*955] examples of this are found in cases where the Supreme Court has been faced with subsistence claims.

#### C. Vote negative as an educator to refuse normativity.

Pierre Schlag, Professor of Law @ the University of Colorado, 1990, “Normative and Nowhere to Go,” Lexis-Nexis

All of this can seem very funny. That's because it is very funny. It is also deadly serious. It is deadly serious, because all this normative legal thought, as Robert Cover explained, takes place in a field of pain and death. n56 And in a very real sense Cover was right. Yet as it takes place, normative legal thought is playing language games -- utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays, and thus, utterly uninterested in considering its own rhetorical and political contributions (or lack thereof) to the field of pain and death. To be sure, normative legal thinkers are often genuinely concerned with reducing the pain and the death. However, the problem is not what normative legal thinkers do with normative legal thought, but what normative legal thought does with normative legal thinkers. What is missing in normative legal thought is any serious questioning, let alone tracing, of the relations that the practice, the rhetoric, the routine of normative legal thought have (or do not have) to the field of pain and death. / And there is a reason for that: Normative legal thought misunderstands its own situation. Typically, normative legal thought understands itself to be outside the field of pain and death and in charge of organizing and policing that field. It is as if the action of normative legal thought could be separated from the background field of pain and death. This theatrical distinction is what allows normative legal thought its own self-important, self-righteous, self-image -- its congratulatory sense of its own accomplishments and effectiveness. / All this self-congratulation works very nicely so long as normative legal [\*188] thought continues to imagine itself as outside the field of pain and death and as having effects within that field. n57 Yet it is doubtful this image can be maintained. It is not so much the case that normative legal thought has effects on the field of pain and death -- at least not in the direct, originary way it imagines. Rather, it is more the case that normative legal thought is the pattern, is the operation of the bureaucratic distribution and the institutional allocation of the pain and the death. n58 And apart from the leftover ego-centered rationalist rhetoric of the eighteenth century (and our routine), there is nothing at this point to suggest that we, as legal thinkers, are in control of normative legal thought. / The problem for us, as legal thinkers, is that the normative appeal of normative legal thought systematically turns us away from recognizing that normative legal thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate. The problem for us is that normative legal thought, rather than assisting in the understanding of present political and moral situations, stands in the way. It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic -- its own fantastic understanding of the political and moral scene. n59 Until normative legal thought begins to deal with its own paradoxical postmodern rhetorical situation, it will remain something of an irresponsible enterprise. In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with individual humanist subjects who think themselves empowered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions of bureaucratic practices -- academic and otherwise. / To the extent possible, it is important to avoid this kind of category mistake. For instance, it is important to understand that your automobile insurance adjuster is not simply some updated version of the eighteenth century \*189 individual humanist subject. Even though the insurance adjuster will quite often engage you in normative talk-- arguing with you about responsibility, fairness, fault, allocation of blame, adequacy of compensation, and the like-- he is unlikely to be terribly receptive or susceptible to any authentic normative dialogue. His normative competence, his normative sensitivity, is scripted somewhere else. It is important to be clear about these things. The contemporary lawyer, for instance, may talk the normative rhetoric of the eighteenth century individual humanist subject. But make no mistake: This normative or humanist rhetoric is very likely the unfolding of bureaucratic logic. The modern lawyer is very often a kind of meta-insurance adjuster. And that makes you and me, as legal academics, trainers of meta-insurance adjusters. This is perhaps an unpleasant realization. One of the most important effects of normative legal thought is to intercede here so that we, as legal academics, do not have to confront this unpleasant realization. Normative legal thought allows us to pretend that we are preparing our students to become Atticus Finch [FN61] while we are in fact training people who will enter the meta-insurance adjustment business. For our students, this role-confusion is unlikely to be very funny. It will get even less so upon their graduation -- when they learn that Atticus Finch has been written out of the script. For us, of course, it is a pleasant fantasy to think we are teaching Atticus Finch. When the fantasy is over, it becomes one hell of a category mistake. And in the rude transition from the one to the other, Atticus Finch can quickly turn into Dan Quayle. In fact, if you train your students to become Atticus Finch, they will likely end up as Dan Quayle – cognitively defenseless against the regimenting and monitoring practices of bureaucratic institutions. Atticus Finch, as admirable as he may be, has none of the cognitive or critical resources necessary to understand the duplicities of the bureaucratic networks within which we operate. Apart from the fantasies of the legal academy, there is no longer a place in America for a lawyer like Atticus Finch. There is nothing for him to do here -- nothing he can do. He is a moral character in a world where the role of moral thought has become at best highly ambivalent, a normative thinker in a world where normative legal thought is already largely the bureaucratic logic of institutions.

### 2

#### The world is structurally anti-queer and anti-disabled and the aff’s calls for the creation of a “better normal future” only extends humanity’s project to annihilate difference—any and all futurism is born out of the murder of the queer-crip.

Allison Kafer, 5-16-2013, Associate Professor of Feminist Studies @ Southwestern, MA, PhD, Claremont Graduate University, BA @ Wake Forest University, “Feminist, Queer, Crip,” pg. 28-31, google books

No Future for Crips Lee Edelman has famously argued that queers and queer theory would be better off refusing the future altogether. (“Fuck the Future,” as Carla Freccero puts it.)“ Building on Lauren Berlant’s work on the ﬁgure of the child in American politics, Edelman argues that futurity—an investment in and attention to the future or futures—is almost always ﬁgured in reproductive terms: we cannot “conceive of a future without the ﬁgure of the Child." As a result, the Child serves as "the telos of the social order," the one for whom we all act, “the fantasmatic beneﬁciary of every political intervention.“ I-Ie offers as an example abortion rhetoric, noting that both pro-choice and antiabortion activists frame their ﬁght as on behalf of the children." Patrick McCreery traces a similar parallel among both opponents and supporters of gay marriage: depending on ones stance, gay mar- riage either destroys children's well-being or enhances it, but both sides agree that the future of children is what is at stake in the debate and therefore what should guide our decisions.“ For those in both ﬁghts, then, the struggle becomes no longer about rights or justice or desire or autonomy but about the future of “our” children. Both of these examples show the slipperiness of arguments based on the Child and reproductive futu- rity; one can mobilize the same rhetoric toward mutually opposing goals. What Edelman draws out is the coercive nature of such frames: it is not only that we can use the “future of our children” frame but that we should or must use it; politics itself is and can only be centered around the Child, foreclosing all other possibilities for action. Reading from a queer crip perspective, I can easily see the ways in which “the future," especially as ﬁgured through the “Child,” is used to buttress able-bodied/able- minded heteronormativity. First, the proliferation of prenatal testing, much of which presumes that all positive diagnoses will be “solved” through selective abortion, is a clear manifestation of compulsory able-bodiedness and able-mindedness. As we will see in the following chapters, pregnant women with disabilities and pregnant women whose fetuses have tested “positive” for various conditions are understood as threats to the future: they have failed to guarantee a better future by bringing the right kind of Child into the present." Thus the idealization of the Child as the frontier of politics, the framing that troubles Edelman, should concern crip readers as well; discourses of reproduction, generation, and inheritance are shot through with anxiety about disability. These sites of reproductive futurity demand a Child that both resembles the parents and exceeds them; “we” all want “our” children to be rnore healthy, more active, stronger and smarter than we are, and we are supposed to do everything in our power to make that happen. The Child through whom legacies are passed down is, without doubt, able-bodied/able-minded. Second, a politics based in futurity leads easily to an ethics of endless deferral. "We're held in thrall by a future continually deferred by time itself,” Edelman notes, and this deferment serves to consolidate the status quo.“ Focusing always on the better future, we divert our attention from the here and now; “We are rendered doc-ile,” in other words, “through our unwitting obedience to the future."“ This phrasing is telling: “held in thrall,” “rendered docile,” “unwitting obedience”—each phrase signals stagnation and acquiescence, an inability to move in any direction because of a permanently forward-looking gaze. This deferral, this ﬁrm focus on the future, is often expressed in terms of cure and rehabilitation, and is thereby bound up in nor- malizing approaches to the mind/body. Disability activists have long railed against a politics of endless deferral that pours economic and cultural resources into “curing” future disabled people (by preventing them from ever coming into existence) while ignoring the needs and experiences of disabled people in the present.” This kind of focus on futurity does disabled people no favors, yet it is one of the most common ways of framing disability: we must cure Ierry’s kids now so that there will be no more Ierry’s kids in the future. Moreover, everything from sterilization to institu- tionalization, from bone-lengthening surgeries to growth attenuation, has been jus- tiﬁed on the grounds that such acts will lead to better futures for the disabled person andlor for their communities. Within these discourses, disability cannot appear as anything other than failure. Third, eugenic histories certainly bear the mark of reproductive futurity. Even keeping only to the United States, and only to the past one hundred years or so, exam- ples abound of how concerns about the future of the “race” and the future of the nation (futures often depicted as intertwined) have been wrapped up in fears and anxieties about disability. Tens of thousands of people diagnosed with various “defects” were targeted by eugenic professionals and policies for the ﬁrst half of the twentieth cen- tury, classiﬁed. and managed in order to contain the alleged risks they posed to public health. The category of “defectives” included not only people with disabilities but also people from “suspect” racial, ethnic, and religious groups as well as poor people, sex- ual “delinquents,” and immigrants from the “wrong” countries. All were united under ﬂexible concepts of degeneracy, defect, and disability, with "feeble-minded” serving as one of the most eifective, and expansive, classiﬁcations of all. People placed into one or more of these categories might be tracked by family records oﬂices, institutionalized and segregated from the public, sterilized against their will, barred from entering the country, or, in extreme cases, euthanized. Schools and universities included the study of eugenics in their curriculum, both disseminating and reifying these concepts of degeneration and defect. In many states, sterilization came to be seen as a necessary means of protecting the health of the race and the nation from further degeneration; as Oliver Wendell Holmes asserted in the infamous 1927 Buck v. Bell decision uphold- ing Virginia's compulsory sterilization policies, “Three generations of imbeciles are enough."‘»' While many overtly eugenic policies began to wane in the 1930s and 1940s, eugenic ideologies and practices did not fully disappear but rather ﬂourished well into the Cold War and beyond." Virginia’s sterilization law was not repealed until 1974, and coerced or forced sterilization of women of color, poor women, indigenous women, and disabled women persisted throughout most of the twentieth century; even today, under cer- tain circumstances, disabled people can be sterilized without their consent, and poor women, immigrant women, and women of color continue to have their reproductive futures curtailed by the courts and the legislature.” Institutionalization remains a common response to disabled people, particularly those with "severe" disabilities; despite the Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in Olmstead, which aﬂirmed the right of disabled people to live in their home communities, many states continue to prioritize funding for institutions over funding community-based care.“ State governments across the country are responding to budget crises with cuts to health care and dis- ability services, especially in-home attendant care; given that many disabled people require such services in order to live independently, disability rights activists and health advocates note that even more disabled people, especially disabled people of color and low-income disabled people, are being forced into nursing homes or out onto the street. These trends do not bode well for the futures of disabled people, even as they are touted as necessary for preserving the future health of the state and the nation. Indeed, at one time or another, each of these practices—sterilization, segregation, exclusion, institutionalization—has been justiﬁed by concerns about “the future” and particularly future children. For example, Mary Storer Kostir, an assistant at the Ohio Bureau of luvenile Research, argued in a 1916 publication that "physically rigorous but mentally feeble persons are a social menace. . . . Their children threaten to overwhelm the civilization of the future. . . . [We] must also consider our children, and not burden the future with an incubus of mental deﬁciency?” In making her case for segregat- ing those labeled “feeble-minded,” Kostir weighs the futures of “our” children against those other children, the ones who are mentally deﬁcient, threatening, and burden- some. A 1933 pamphlet by the Human Betterment Foundation similarly warns against the “burden” of "feeble-minded” children, noting that the failure to practice “eugenic sterilization” produces effects that are “disastrous . . . in future generations.“ In these kinds of eugenic discourses, children serve as the sign of the future; the kind of future that awaits us will be determined by the kind of children we bear. Illness, “defect,” “deviance,” and disability are positioned as fundamentally damaging to the fabric of the community: polluting the gene pool, or weakening the nation, or destroying a fam- ily’s quality of life, or draining public services (or, often, some combination of the four). To put it bluntly, disabled people were—and often are—ﬁgured as threats to futurity. Whole books have been written about each of these practices, and this brief, sweeping history cannot begin to do justice to the material or, especially, to the bodies invoked by this material. Such broad summaries all too easily erase differences among people with disabilities, differences not only of race, class, sexuality, gender, and his- tory but also of impairment; there are many bodies falling through the cracks of this overview. And yet, it is imperative to establish a pattern, to demonstrate that we have long felt and acted on the belief that disability destroys the future, or that a future with disability must be avoided at all costs. It is this pattern, these histories, that makes the question of the future so vexed. I can see clearly how futurity has been the cause of much violence against disabled people, such that “fuck the future” can seem the only viable crip response.

#### To presume an ethical relationship towards the goals of the state, of globalization, and of economic engagement is to ignore the brutal underbelly of our history. Subjugation of “abnormal” bodies has contributed to a system of phallic whiteness. We are seduced into championing freedom and stability, concepts that are inconceivable to these bodies, when that goal only serves to entrench the gratuitous violence always already done to them.

Winnubst 06 (Shannon, Phd, Associate Professor of Women’s Studies at Ohio State University, *Queering Freedom*, pg. 43-45)

Across the Atlantic and roughly two centuries after Locke’s writing of his Second Treatise, the post-bellum United States entered into some of the nastiest parts of U.S. history. **The operative nexus of racial and sexual difference surfaced with great clarity: black men were lynched on false allegations of raping white women.** These allegations, rarely if ever pursued, sufficed as ample cause for castration, dismemberment, burning at the stake, hanging. This horrific violence set the scene for two dynamics to emerge explicitly and continue with great force into the early twenty-first-century United States psyche: **the sexualizing of racial difference and the racializing of sexual difference.**18 The propertied Christian white male (straight) body19 alone **remained unmarked**, positioned not only as the politically and economically superior subject, but also as the rational, benevolent patriarch in whose hands the security of all bodies rested. Women and non-white men were accordingly positioned below him, most often pitted against one an other through the fear of alleged aggression and manipulation, as a great deal of twentieth-century African American literature shows all too graphically. 20 **The brutal and ugly underbelly of modernity thus surfaced**. A period that emerged philosophically as the triumph of rationality and politically as the victory of representative democracy and its liberal individual, modernity was also the period of the birth of global capitalism and its counterparts of colonialism and slavery.21 Many of the modern categories that we see at work in Locke’s texts emerged in the post-bellum United States with a defensive tenacity that bred political, cultural, psychic, and physical violence. For example, as political categories such as freedom and individualism began to be broadened through the emancipation of slaves, other structures of modernity asserted themselves to shape the exact contours and limits of the kinds of emergent freedoms and rights that would develop. Namely, as the battles around the Fifteenth Amendment and suffragist movements showed, racial and sexual difference emerged as primary fields of signification through which entry to the precious categories of freedom and individual rights had to be negotiated. **The categories of race and gender were being forged in the explicit terms of legal and political documents**. If one was raced or sexed, one had to fight—against other marked (raced, sexed) bodies—for one’s entry into these categories. But the fight turned on evidence of a specific form of rationality. Or, to put it in the language of race and sexual difference, it turned on one’s ability to approximate maleness or whiteness, the two social categories that govern the epistemological category of ‘proper rationality’ and, dialectically, the social category of property ownership. The disjunction of approximating either maleness or whiteness ensured that no set of marked bodies would achieve ‘true’ freedom or individuality: only the white male occupied both positions of power, maleness and whiteness.22 The seduction of freedom thereby became the seduction of **phallicized whiteness**. Consequently, raced and sexed bodies found themselves fighting against one another in a battle that neither of them could ultimately win: the terms were set by an external ‘overseer.’ This historical scene almost perfectly enacts the logic of power that both Nietzsche and Foucault diagnose so clearly: as the structures of modernity began to be contested philosophically (by Hegel and post-Hegelians, particularly Marx) and politically (by Emancipation), the less codified social and political structures emerged with greater clarity and rigidity to control the kinds of political subjectivities that could emerge.23 As freedom and individual rights, which had been acclaimed as universal, began to be exposed as small section of society, the broader and more vaguely articulated structures of racism and sexism began their slow processes of codification. And the singular standard for the legibility of that emergent political subjectivity of individual freedom remained the same: a propertied Christian white (straight) man, the singular subject position that inhabits both maleness and whiteness—and proper rationality. Broad cultural structures of race and sexual difference thus surface as a complicated nexus of power relations in post-bellum practices such as miscegenation, the one-drop rule, and lynching. In these practices, the intersections of race and sex produce a **confusing conflation of values that serve as smoke screens to *obfuscate* the protected, *unmarked subject position of the white man***. Values such as purity, virginity, and passivity are written on the female body as inherent qualities. In what should appear as an obvious contraposition, values such as bestiality, aggression, and uncivilized nature are written on the black body. The black female body, left in the wreckage of embodying these contradictory ‘natural’ traits, becomes a general aberration that is treated with confusion and fear. And the white male body emerges as the unmarked, normative mode of subjectivity. Or, to put this in the terms above, the white male body solidifies his position as the modern man—the rational, transcendental man in control of both nature and history. The mode of rationality that defines high modernity—namely, as instrumental, transcendental, and detached from history—expresses itself directly in **the mode of subjectivity inhabited by white propertied Christian (straight) men in the post-bellum United States. It is what** **enables and ensures their power over nature and the social field of relations, and their subsequent freedom**.

#### Rhetorical silence normalizes institutional marginalization of homodisabled bodies—denies the institutional natures of heteronormativity and ableism and causes erasure of queer-crip identity.

Santiago Solis, Winter-xx-2007, doctoral student, Learning Dis/abilities, Teachers College @ Columbia, “Snow White and the Seven ‘Dwarfs’—Queercripped,” pg. 117, jstor

A queercrip reading of "Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs" grants us the opportunity to deconstruct hetero-corporo-normative presumptions, stereo- types, and social structures that have predominated in classical fairy tales. Through silence and marginalization, stories such as "Snow White" have treated the homodisabled body as unseemly. By positioning homosexuality and disability at the center of our analysis of "Snow White," queercripping allows us to challenge the desexualization and infantilization of alternative sexual and bodily configurations in the story. It is important here to emphasize that whenever a homodisabled existence is denied, a code of surveillance is permitted to define social ideologies of sexual perversion. A queercrip analysis challenges this surveillance and helps us subvert simplistic classifications of appropriate and acceptable sexual acts. Before I begin my analysis, I want to emphasize the following: Queer theory and disability studies both have origins in and ongoing commitments to activism. Their primary constituen- cies, sexual minorities and people with disabilities, share a history of injustice: both have been pathologized by medicine; demonized by religion ... stereotyped in representation ... Perhaps the most significant similarity between these disci- plines, however, is their radical stance toward concepts of nor-malcy; both argue adamantly against the compulsion to observe norms of all kinds (corporeal, mental, sexual, social, cultural, subcultural, etc.). (Sandahl 2003, 26) Unfortunately, in Western societies, heterosexist and ableist assumptions rest on the beliefs that homosexuality and disability are personal misfortunes and tragedies, and that the social and environmental problems encountered by homosexual and disabled people stem mainly from their own bodies. From this perspective, rehabilitation, restoration, and normalization are the appro-priate goals. In this essay, however, I challenge these heterosexist and ableist Beliefs.

#### The expansion of neoliberal “economic engagement” policies stifles radical queer-crip politics and fractures coalitions between queer and disabled people both here and in Latin America.

Robert McRuer, Spring-xx-2012, Professor of English, Department Chair @ George Washington University, Ph.D., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, “Cripping Queer Politics, or the Dangers of Neoliberalism,” http://sfonline.barnard.edu/a-new-queer-agenda/cripping-queer-politics-or-the-dangers-of-neoliberalism/#sthash.xublhcOP.dpuf

The project of building crip/queer solidarity is not as “straightforward” as it might first seem, however. In particular, the current political and economic system, called neoliberalism by political theorists (see Lisa Duggan’s essay in this issue for a description of neoliberalism), sometimes offers a limited recognition to representative gay or disabled people. This recognition depends on an acceptance of dominant norms, but for the singular difference of being gay or of being disabled. So for example, Lisa Duggan has argued that some proponents of a narrow version of gay rights have built a “homonormativity,” that mirrors dominant norms—white, middle-class and family-oriented—but for the single difference of same-gendered partners in marital relationships. Similarly, disabled people who seek to mirror the dominant society but for the single difference of physical ability can create a politics that excludes queers and others whose identities set them apart from the dominant norms of white, middle-class family life. Such a politics of singular difference can shut down coalition across identities—such as the crip/queer solidarity I am arguing for here—and can also undermine organizing around issues (poverty, health care, the destruction of the environment, and so forth) not directly connected to identity. Neoliberalism is the dominant economic and cultural system of our time. It is a system that positions the market as the answer to everything. Any problem is supposed to be best addressed—most effectively and efficiently—through the market. Neoliberalism positions the move of previously public functions into the private sphere of the market as an unequivocal good and unquestionable common sense. As a corollary, any barriers to the workings of that market (and barriers to the flow of capital) should be eliminated through various kinds of deregulation. Proponents of neoliberalism advocate deregulation even if that deregulation requires (or has required in practice) an increasing regulation on the movement of peoples. And neoliberalism, while promising unparalleled freedom and unstoppable growth, exacerbates all kinds of inequalities around the globe. Neoliberal ideology displays a special genius at making lopsided growth, wealth for a few, and immiseration for many more, seem sexy, progressive, and “modern.” This positioning of neoliberalism as more progressive than conservative regulation, and as the wave of development and the future, means that activist projects can become vehicles for neoliberal policies rather than for social change that will actually challenge the distribution of wealth and power in contemporary societies. “Neoliberalism is,” as Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy write, “a predatory system:” it is predatory on the liberatory energies our movements have generated, the resistant identifications we shape, the resources we might access, and the radical openness to alternative futures that (appears to be a common desire) across progressive movements.[1] LGBT and disability movements have not been immune to these dangers. Neoliberal cultural and economic forces have unevenly mainstreamed LGBT and disability movements. For example, activism on behalf of same-sex marriage often positions gay people as the perfect neoliberal subjects. Because neoliberalism depends on private solutions to all problems, “the family” takes on an increasingly important role as the provider of goods and services like caring labor for those who are young or elderly. Some gay marriage advocates have happily embraced the idea that gay people will take up these responsibilities for their newly formed families without asking anything more of the government than the right to marry. Such narrow campaigns for gay marriage do not support the right to develop a multitude of different kinds of relationships that might provide caring labor, nor do they support social responses, such as government-supported day care, to the question of who is to provide labor. In other words, when gay marriage is promoted in neoliberal terms, gay marriage activists are willing to accept and even promote privatized understandings of the need for care in exchange for mainstream “acceptance” of gay relationships. And as both LGBT and disability movements have, in different ways, accepted this type of mainstreaming and “gone to market,” as Alexandra Chasin has put it, they have narrowed their political vision and sacrificed commitments and solidarities that formerly defined them.[2] The desire to be different (to, for example, form caring relationships that do not follow the model of heterosexual marriage), is sacrificed to the hope for political acceptance and market solutions. As a result, solidarity with all those who persist in doing things differently is also undermined. I don’t agree with some writers who argue that the LGBT movement has always been all about respect and recognition, while neglecting redistribution (and social justice more broadly). But the mainstream movement at the turn of the century definitely has been, and I want to make a few points about that fact.[3] First, with the now-measurable recognition “we” have in fact achieved, LGBT people don’t always face an easily identified homophobic power like “the state” or “the family;” we are, rather, a necessary and material part of the contemporary world. Second, our recognition and flexible incorporation into that world comes with the expectation of privatization and consumption, the wedding planners and registrations at Bloomingdale’s morphing into private retirement plans and jointly owned condos furnished by Design Within Reach. Third, and perhaps most interestingly given what have often been parallel histories,[4] the good queer subject of mainstream representation is now the one most distanced from disability, from embodied differences that might make a gay person visibly different from the mainstream or that might require care beyond what any individual “family” can provide, or that might require changes to social structures—whether the physical structures of the built environment or the relational structures of marriage and family—rather than assimilation into those structures. I could and would reverse this claim and say disability movements face similar dangers (even if they are nowhere near as pronounced as they are for LGBT people). Increasingly, the disability movement or disability studies emphasize recognition within the terms of dominant norms and assimilation into the mainstream, rather than fundamental changes to society. The good disabled subject is similarly the one most distanced from queerness (that is, the unruly kind of queerness that cannot so easily be domesticated). Similarly, at the level of political issues a mainstream emphasis in the United States on marriage (and also military service) for LGBT people comes through deemphasizing or disowning issues that might more directly be comprehended as disabled: unemployment, homelessness, universal health care. The move away from a vibrant HIV/AIDS politics focused on exposing and countering institutionalized oppression, and toward a plea for marriage rights and recognition, is the best turn-of-the-century example of these processes in the United States.

#### Apocalyptic rhetoric implicitly valorizes the Child and reproductive sex—this heteronormative discourse constructs a temporal operation to which queerness is antagonistic.

Leopold Lippert, xx-xx-2008, University Assistant in American Studies @ the University of Vienna, “Utopian Contemporaries: Queer Temporality and America,” jfs

Edelman opens his book with what he modestly terms “a simple provocation” (Future, 3), and what encapsulates the futility of an affirmative and assimilationist queer politics. He argues “that queerness names [...] the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism” (Future, 3), and reveals the implicitly homophobic discourse of all the Obamas and O’Sullivans who are fighting for the future of our children and our grandchildren. The futurist bias towards heteronormativity has been fueled, as Judith Butler points out, by “fears about reproductive relations” (“Kinship”, 21), by uncanny anxieties over the prospect that queer citizenship may interfere with a nation “imagined for fetuses and children” (Berlant, Queen, 1), and by the fundamental antithesis that the queer and the child embody. The principal concern of futurist America, then, is the fate of its offspring, expressed in a fearful inquiry: “What happens to the child, the child, the poor child, the martyred figure of an ostensibly selfish or dogged social progressivism?” (Butler, “Kinship”, 21). Edelman recognizes that the mythical child – as the epitome of a heteronormative future-oriented social – can only be saved by a “marriage of identity to futurity in order to realize the social subject” (Future, 14), which leads him to the ensuing claim that only the linear temporal process of “ever aftering” (“After”, 476, emphasis in the original) can keep “society alive” (“After”, 476). Heteronormative America, accordingly, is constituted through its own posterity, through a temporal operation to which queerness is inherently antagonistic. In an imagined community that relies on futurism as its life-giving engine, then, “the queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the resistance, internal to the social, to every social structure or form” (Edelman, Future, 4).

#### Heteronormativity outweighs—the drive to exterminate “impurity” in society amplifies structural violence and ensures omnicide.

Eve Sedgwick, xx-xx-1990, Professor of English @ CUNY, “Epistemology of the Closet,” p. 127-130

From at least the biblical story of Sodom and Gomorray, scenarios of same-sex desire would seem to have had a privileged, though by no means an exclusive, relation in Western culture to scenarios of both genocide and omnicide. That sodomy, the name by which homosexual acts are known even today to the law of half of the United States and to the Supreme Court of all of them, should already be inscribed with the name of a site of mass extermination is the appropriate trace of a double history. In the first place there is a history of the mortal suppression, legal or subjudicial, of gay acts and gay people, through burning, hounding, physical and chemical castration, concentration camps, bashing--the array of sanctioned fatalities that Louis Crompton records under the name of gay genocide, and whose supposed eugenic motive becomes only the more colorable with the emergence of a distinct, naturalized minority identity in the nineteenth century. In the second place, though, there is the inveterate topos of associating gay acts or persons with fatalities vastly broader than their own extent: if it is ambiguous whether every denizen of the obliterated Sodom was a sodomite, clearly not every Roman of the late Empire can have been so, despite Gibbon's connecting the eclipse of the whole people to the habits of a few. Following both Gibbon and the Bible, moreover, with an impetus borrowed from Darwin, one of the few areas of agreement among modern Marxist, Nazi, and liberal capitalist ideologies is that there is a peculiarly close, though never precisely defined, affinity between same-sex desire and some historical condition of moribundity, called "decadence," to which not individuals or minorities but whole civilizations are subject. Bloodletting on a scale more massive by orders of magnitude than any gay minority presence in the culture is the "cure," if cure there be, to the mortal illness of decadence. If a fantasy trajectory, utopian in its own terms, toward gay genocide has been endemic in Western culture from its origins, then, it may also have been true that the trajectory toward gay genocide was never clearly distinguishable from a broader, apocalyptic trajectory toward something approaching omnicide. The deadlock of the past century between minoritizing and universalizing understandings of homo/heterosexual definition can only have deepened this fatal bond in the heterosexist \*imaginaire\*. In our culture as in \*Billy Bud\*, the phobic narrative trajectory toward imagining a time \*after the homosexual\* is finally inseparable from that toward imagining a time \*after the human\*; in the wake of the homosexual, the wake incessantly produced since first there \*were\* homosexuals, every human relation is pulled into its shining representational furrow. Fragments of visions of a time \*after the homosexual\* are, of course, currently in dizzying circulation in our culture [book published in 1990 -Alec]. One of the many dangerous ways that AIDS discourse seems to ratify and amplify preinscribed homophobic mythologies is in its pseudo-evolutionary presentation of male homosexuality as a stage doomed to extinction (read, a phase the species is going through) on the enormous scale of whole populations.26 The lineaments of openly genocidal malice behind this fantasy appear only occasionally in the respectable media, though they can be glimpsed even there behind the poker-face mask of our national experiment in laissez-faire medicine. A better, if still deodorized, whiff of that malice comes from the famous pronouncement of Pat Robertson: "AIDS is God's way of weeding his garden." The saccharine lustre this dictum gives to its vision of devastation, and the ruthless prurience with which it misattributes its own agency, cover a more fundamental contradiction: that, to rationalize complacent glee at a spectacle of what is imagined as genocide, a proto-Darwinian process of natural selection is being invoked--in the context of a Christian fundamentalism that is not only antievolutionist but recklessly oriented toward universal apocalypse. A similar phenomenon, also too terrible to be noted as a mere irony, is how evenly our culture's phobia about HIV-positive blood is kept pace with by its rage for keeping that dangerous blood in broad, continuous circulation. This is evidenced in projects for universal testing, and in the needle-sharing implicit in William Buckley's now ineradicable fantasy of tattooing HIV-positive persons. But most immediately and pervasively it is evidenced in the literal bloodbaths that seem to make the point of the AIDS-related resurgence in violent bashings of gays--which, unlike the gun violence otherwise ubiquitous in this culture, are characteristically done with two-by-fours, baseball bats, and fists, in the most literal-minded conceivable form of body-fluid contact. It might be worth making explicit that the use of evolutionary thinking in the current wave of utopian/genocidal fantasy is, whatever else it may be, crazy [sic]. Unless one believes, first of all, that same-sex object-choice across history and across cultures is \*one thing\* with \*one cause\*, and, second, that its one cause is direct transmission through a nonrecessive genetic path--which would be, to put it gently, counter-intuitive--there is no warrant for imagining that gay populations, even of men, in post-AIDS generations will be in the slightest degree diminished. Exactly \*to the degree\* that AIDS is a gay disease, it's a tragedy confined to our generation; the long-term demographic depredations of the disease will fall, to the contrary, on groups, many themselves direly endangered, that are reproduced by direct heterosexual transmission. Unlike genocide directed against Jews, Native Americans, Africans, or other groups [the disabled -Alec], then, gay genocide, the once-and-for-all eradication of gay populations, however potent and sustained as a project or fantasy of modern Western culture, is not possible short of the eradication of the whole human species. The impulse of the species toward its own eradication must not either, however, be underestimated. Neither must the profundity with which that omnicidal impulse in entangled with the modern problematic of the homosexual: the double bind of definition between the homosexual, say, as a distinct \*risk group\*, and the homosexual as a potential of representation within the universal.27 As gay community and the solidarity and visibility of gays as a minority population are being consolidated and tempered in the forge of this specularized terror and suffering, how can it fail to be all the more necessary that the avenues of recognition, desire, and thought between minority potentials and universalizing ones by opened and opened and opened?

#### Negation is the only ethical act in the world of hetero-corporo-normativity. Empowerment and resistance for queer-disabled bodies is only possible through the affirmation of civil society’s negative construction of homodisability—this entails calling for the end of the world.

Kendra Langeteig, Winter-xx-1997, Instructor of English @ Indiana University, “Horror Autotoxicus in the Red Night Trilogy: Ironic Fruits of Burroughs's Terminal Vision,” pg. 135-169, muse

This connection between homosexuality and menacing contagion that Burroughs makes explicit in the erotic exhibitionism of the Red Night trilogy obviously goes beyond parody of homosexual adventure and fantasy taken to extremes. These activities have an explosive sexual politics that point, by their very extremity, to Burroughs's acute awareness of how society reads the homosexual body, and demonstrate his urgent need for vindication. Homosexuality is the toxic in the horror autotoxicus of the body politic, condemned to the margin along with society's other outlaws--its toxic waste (the drug addict, the schizophrenic); all are banished in the social project of preventing the transmission of social disorder and preserving the life of the body politic from collapse. Since the AIDS epidemic, this horror of homosexual contagion, more than a psychological threat ("homosexual panic" to be prosecuted in court), is supplied with tangible proof of its toxicity or "unnaturalness" for the reactionary thinker, actually fueling arguments to read this epidemic as a sign from an Old Testament God punishing acts contra natura with plagues. While Burroughs makes no reference to this cultural backlash in Cities--the Red Night plagues prefigure and can be only coincidentally connected with AIDS and its social fallout--his portrayal of homosexuality painfully emphasizes how culture's message about toxicity is inscribed on the gay male body. When the Red Night trilogy moves into the Age of AIDS, with Dead Roads (1983), Burroughs seemingly mocks the "fear of a queer planet" by continuing to align his homosexual heroes with the greatest "natural" disasters--plagues and death. 46 His strategy of affirming society's negative construction of homosexuality as disorder, rather than being victimized or overpowered by it, turns the cultural bias against the "outlaw" on its head--a fatal strategy that transforms the homosexual's mythic toxicity and problematic exile into a paradoxical means of empowerment and resistance. Burroughs forces this cultural analogy between toxicity and homosexuality to the limit, pushes the "needle to nova," by flaunting the kind of "degenerate" sexual activity that we see in the nightclubs described above, reinforced with casual references to fin-de-siècle decadence (Kim reads Rimbaud); and by allying his queer outlaws with the planet's most threatening and destructive powers. Banished to the margins of existence, they not only identify with civilization's toxic horror, its disease and corruption, they thrive on it. Kim and Audrey Carsons are described as "slimy morbid youths" who adore "abominations, unspeakable rites . . . [and] the reek of the terrible Red Fever" in the plagued cities along their journey (PDR, p. 16). In Burroughs's homosexual saga, the "excremental" elements (which pay tribute to Swift's satirical travelogue) are perversely central to his vision. 47 Figuring prominently at the head of Cities is the obscene "Invocation" that sets the tone for the trilogy's "escatology": 48

#### Thus, vote negative to queercrip the 1AC to death.

Santiago Solis, Winter-xx-2007, doctoral student, Learning Dis/abilities, Teachers College @ Columbia, “Snow White and the Seven ‘Dwarfs’—Queercripped,” pg. 114-131, jstor

Ultimately, in “Snow White,” fantasy has such a normalizing function that it is no longer about the reader using her or his imagination to conceptualize unfamiliar realities or unexplored possibilities; instead, the story attempts to restrict or regulate the reader’s imagination by producing its own vision and version of the ideal fantasy—one that negates the existence of homosexuality and disability. In this way, the story operates as a historical narrative as it mirrors what society considers objectionable, indecent, and immoral. Through subtle and open forms of marginalization and silencing, it reinforces and extends homophobia and ableism. Consequently, as the process of homogenization and normalization suppresses alternative sexual and bodily identities, the young female reader may begin to replicate privileged ways of being in the world. After all is said and done, Snow White herself is the embodiment of the classical beauty that girls (but not boys) are expected to reproduce. “Snow White” continues to be a popular fairy tale because it perpetuates sexual and bodily ideals that the mainstream values and sustains. The idealized virtuosity and desirable beauty of Snow White—her presumed feminine qualities (subservient, virginal, defenseless, dependent, delicate, refined, ablebodied, and heterosexual)—help produce the ideal image of how young girls should behave or what they should look like. In a society in which the male gaze dominates, the female body is already viewed as an object of desire, and Snow White’s objectification is not seen as problematic from that perspective. The female body, and the heterosexual and able-bodied female in particular, becomes a site for a specific kind of sexual desire. However, what is striking about the “Snow White” story is that rather than explicitly rejecting the undesirable homosexual and disabled body, it simply disqualifies them as nonexistent—insidiously—through omission. Furthermore, the rhetoric of infantilization that is used to represent the seven dwarfs serves multiple purposes. First, the physical shortcomings that the dwarfs presumably embody confirm ideas about manhood; their disabled bodies explicitly contradict normal conventions of masculinity (sexuality, virility, and so on). The dwarfs are represented as displaced children, and therefore not as real men. Second, the dwarfs are emasculated. Since the Prince is the only one who can view Snow White through the male gaze, it is only he, not the emasculated and infantilized dwarfs, who can claim sovereign authority over Snow White. And since society presumes everyone is heterosexual unless stated otherwise, the Prince is automatically assumed to be only and exclusively heterosexual and, therefore, he must fall in love with Snow White. Third, because of the masculine prowess the Prince displays, young boys (but not girls) are expected and even encouraged to identify with him. Since the Prince epitomizes heterosexual and able-bodied manliness—physical qualities that are recognized and admired by mainstream society—young boys quickly learn to emulate these bodily traits and behaviors. To reiterate, contemporary audiences continue to accept the fairy tale because the story extends idealized notions of social and sexual behaviors, which, as I have argued, are based on heterosexist and ableist apprehensions. I attempted to explore a range of conceivable responses that “Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs” might provoke to ascertain how different authors and illustrators have negotiated the stigma and invisibility surrounding homosexuality and disability. Furthermore, I proceeded chronologically to determine if more recent publications progress toward affirmative representations. Unfortunately, even contemporary variations on the tale continue to produce a public imagery that supports hetero-corporo-normative desire and identity; none of them depart from or defy heterosexist and ableist norms. For this reason, I tried to pay attention to that which remains silenced or unsaid. In doing so, I discovered a number of discounted erotic possibilities (for example, between the dwarfs, between the dwarfs and the Prince, and between the dwarfs and Snow White). But what does it mean, after all, to suppress or negate queercrip representations? Why should future tellings incorporate or provide a queercrip perspective? In other words, What function would a queercrip approach serve? A queercrip reading of the story offers the potential to explore sexual fantasies that might inform and transform narrow images of desirability. The eroticization of the queercrip body, for example, can instill pride and foster public affirmation for queercripness. Queercripness is located “not so much in any specifically . . . [queercrip] practice but in a larger liberation of psychic and social life, one that gives defiantly corporeal form to the repressed materials and forbidden fantasies”

2002, 161). Through the lens of queercripness a fear of sexual fantasies that might be perceived as “deviant” is not only displaced, but fear itself is subsequently replaced by a desire for varied forms of corporeal lustfulness. In this way, each type of body, or body type, is seen as a new source of sexual inspiration. Queercripness, therefore, does not in itself promote homosexuality; instead, it seeks to generate new social conditions from which all types of people can be sexually expressive and passionately embodied. In short, queercripness undoes dichotomized distinctions between the normative and the non-normative. Ultimately, we must challenge rigid definitions of sexuality based on acceptable preferences and identities if picture books are ever to represent all of our corporeal functions and diversities. Hence, countering heterosexism and ableism demands more than “positive” representations requiring assimilation into the dominant culture; instead, representations need to draw upon ambiguities with the understanding that queercripness can never be fully captured, contained, mastered, or disciplined. It is something that is fluid, “since there is no law which can guarantee that things will have ‘one, true meaning,’ or that meanings won’t change over time” (Hall 2001, 9). What queercripness offers, therefore, is a critical stance with respect to heterosexism and ableism. So how can we use queercripness to think forward? Queercripness provides awareness and an urge to question and to problematize. For example, in the four versions of “Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs” examined here, we witness time and again how the seven dwarfs play “a supporting role, serving as a marker for larger narratives about normalcy and legitimacy” (Davidson 2003, 57). However, as sexual fantasies are allowed to surface from the dwarfs’ bodies, spaces of dialogue emerge, spaces from which children can explore “humanizing possibilities” (Greene 1988). But how can teachers and parents transform newfound sexual fantasies into age-appropriate conversations? How can fairy tales like “Snow White” help initiate constructive dialogues? Is it preferable to talk openly about sexual fantasies, or should they continue to function as unacknowledged sexual perversions? These questions force us to consider what sexual practices are most valued in our culture as well as what sexual knowledge deserves to be validated and discussed. According to Jonathan Silin, “When innocence is defined by the absence of the experience presumed to characterize adulthood, the protection of childhood requires controlling access to the knowledge that would signal its loss” (1995, 122). From this perspective, the child is presumed to be unaware of her or his own sexual desires and therefore in constant need of supervision. Unfortunately, even though queercripness promotes multiple ways of knowing, controversial issues such as homosexuality and disability that fall outside the realm of the hetero-corporo-normative are often treated as beyond the child’s immediate intellectual understanding or conceptual scope. In this regard, we are uncomfortable whenever the child has too much knowledge or information about anything queercripped, which brings me back to my opening remarks. In retrospect, my innocence (or ignorance) of homosexuality as a child made me fearful of my homoerotic fantasies. For me, the presumption of hetero-corporo-normativity was extremely limiting in that I grew up feeling ashamed and socially ostracized. Because homosexuality was not part of my daily experience, I grew up with a great deal of self-hatred. I knew I was “different” and this “difference” impelled me into a world of darkness where I remained well into adulthood, for only then was I allowed the opportunity to express my sexuality. Hence the questions: If my sexuality was silenced as a child, how might homodisabled children feel about themselves? Do they feel valued and appreciated as they read different versions of “Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs”? Fortunately, queercripness has made hetero-corporo-normativity questionable, a politically charged phenomenon to be problematized and challenged rather than presupposed or elided. This questioning has begun to unpack what it means to be a child seeking information about sexual identities. However, at what age is it appropriate to talk openly with children about queercripness? In other words, how young is too young before a child’s sexuality ceases to be suppressed or denied? How can a child’s sexual identity be incorporated into the child’s natural development? When, how, and why do we attempt to regulate the child’s sexual identity by reproducing hetero-corporo-normative practices that support “acceptable” feminine and masculine behaviors? And how do these social practices work to protract the institutionalization of homophobia and ableism? While we deliberate over such questions, one thing is certain: the concealment of sexual identities related to homosexuality and disability will only assure the continued isolation of children, especially homodisabled youths, who seek guidance and support. It is because of this group of children that I offer this analysis of “Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs,” in the hope that they will not have to grow up, as I did, in distress over their sexuality.

### Case

#### For people of color the world has already ended

Barbara Omolade 1984 Calvin College’ first dean of multicultural affairs [“Women of Color and the Nuclear Holocaust”, Women’s Studies Quarterly vol. 12, No. 2]

To raise these issues effectively, the movement for nuclear disarmament must overcome its reluctance to speak in terms of power, of institutional racism and imperialist military terror. The issues of nuclear disarmament and peace have been mystified because they have been placed within a doomsday frame which separates these issues from other ones, saying. "How can we talk about struggles against racism, poverty, and exploitation when there will be no world after they drop the bombs?" The struggle for peace cannot be separated from, nor considered more sacrosanct than, other struggles concerned with human life and change In April. 1979. the US Aims Control and Disarmament Agency released a report on the effects of nuclear war that concludes that, in a general nuclear war between the United States and The Soviet Union. 25 to 100 million people would be killed. This is approximately the same number of African people who died between 1492 and 1890 as a result of the African slave trade to the New World. The same federal report also comments on the destruction of urban housing that would cause massive shortages after a nuclear war. as well as on the crops that would be lost, causing massive food shortages Of course, for people of color the world over, starvation is already a common problem, when, for example, a nation's crops are grown for export rather than to feed its own people And the housing of people of color throughout the world's urban areas are already blighted and inhumane, families live in shacks, shanty towns, or on the streets, even in the urban areas of North America, the poor may live without heat or running water. For people of color, the world as we knew it ended centuries ago. Our world. with its Own languages, customs and ways, ended And we are only now beginning to see with increasing clarity that our task is to reclaim that world, struggle for It, and rebuild it in our own image The "death culture" we live in has convinced many to be more concerned with death

than with life. more willing to demonstrate for "survival at any cost" than to struggle for liberty and peace with dignity Nuclear disarmament becomes a safe issue when it is not linked to the daily and historic issues of racism, to the ways in which people of color continue to be murdered Acts of war, nuclear holocausts, and genocide have already been declared on our jobs, our housing, our schools, our families, and our lands. As women of color, we are warriors, not pacifists We must fight as a people on all fronts, or we will continue to die as a people. We have fought in people's wars in China, in Cuba. In Guinea-Bissau, and in such struggles as the civil rights movement. The women's movement, and in countless daily encounters with landlords, welfare departments, and schools. These struggles are not abstractions, but The only means by which we have gained the ability to eat and to provide for the future of our people

# 2NC

## Queercripping

### RoB

#### The liberal subject constituted both in and by the 1AC perpetuates stigma against disabled—claims of the value of role-play and policy-making education assume an able-bodied locus of subjectivity.

Carol Appadurai Breckenridge1 and Candace A Volger2, Fall-xx-2001, Associate Professor of History @ the New School for Social Research, PhD @ University of Wisconsin—Madison1, David B. and Clara E. Stern Professor of Philosophy and Professor in the College at the University of Chicago2, “The Critical Limits of Embodiment: Disability's Criticism,” pg.—, muse

Disability studies teaches that an assumed able body is crucial to the smooth operation of traditional theories of democracy, citizenship, subjectivity, beauty, and capital. By assuming that the normative human is an able-bodied adult, for example, liberal theory can conflate political or economic interests with desires, political representation with having a voice in policy-making, social organization with voluntary association, and so on. Liberal theory naturalizes the political by making it personal. And the “person” at the center of the traditional liberal theory is not simply an individual locus of subjectivity (however psychologically fragmented, incoherent, or troubled). He is an able-bodied locus of subjectivity, one whose unskilled labor may be substituted freely for the labor of other such individuals, one who can imagine himself largely self-sufficient because almost everything conspires to help him take his enabling body for granted (even when he is scrambling for the means of subsistence). However, the mere possibility of a severely cognitively disabled adult citizen disrupts the liberal equations of representation and voice, desire and interest. Advocacy for the severely cognitively disabled is not a matter of voicing their demands. More generally, the intricate practical dialectics of dependence and independence in the lives of many disabled people unsettle ideals of social organization as freely chosen expressions of mutual desire.

### AT: Reform Key

#### Leftist discourse of ‘reform’ exterminates queerness—fetishizes the ever-distant future and assimilates radical queer oppositionality.

Lee Edelman; 1-00-1998; Professor of English @ Tufts University; “The Future is Kid Stuff: Queer Theory, Disidentification, and the Death Drive”; p. 22

The consequences of such a compulsory identification both of and with the child as the culturally pervasive emblem of the motivating end, albeit endlessly postponed, of every political vision as a vision of futurity, must weigh upon the consideration of a queer oppositional politics. For the only queerness that queer sexualities could ever hope to claim would spring from their determined opposition to this underlying structure of the political—their opposition, that is, to the fantasmatic ambition of achieving symbolic closure through the marriage of identity to futurity in order to reproduce the social subject. Conservatives, of course, understand this in ways most liberals never can, since conservatism profoundly imagines the radical rupturing of the social fabric, while liberalism conservatively clings to a faith in its limitless elasticity. The discourse of the right thus tends toward a greater awareness of, and an insistence on, the figural logics implicit in the social relations we inhabit and enact, while the discourse of the left tends to understand better the capacity of the symbolic to accommodate change by displacing those figural logics onto history as the unfolding of narrative sequence.

# 1NR

## Queercripping

### AT: Util

#### QUEER SOCIAL DEATH FIRST---they are invalidated as people

SIERRA-ZARELLA – ‘4 (ELIZABETH SIERRA-ZARELLA, 2004, “Constant Queerying,” Interrupting Heteronormativity, http://www.syr.edu/gradschool/pdf/resourcebooksvideos/Heteronormativity.pdf, p. 110-112)

Intersections of Heteronormativity and the “Work to be done” / As Aman Luthra points out in this volume, Syracuse University has made great strides in the interruption of heteronormative ideologies and practices on campus.1 However, there is still work to be done. The notion of how heteronormativity is constructed and reinforced is not typically addressed in relation to diversity issues on campus or in the classroom. Changing this is an important element of our interviewees’ thoughts about LGBT pedagogy. Jackie Orr (Sociology) says, “The notion of social construction which says that things are not natural, that things are made through culture and history and relations of power, is extremely useful for trying to begin to destabilize … students’ notion of sexual identity as natural and normal.” / Orr’s comment makes clear that recognizing the socially constructed nature of sexuality and gender (along with other social categories) is a powerful and necessary tool in the “work” to interrupt the power of dominant ideologies, including heteronormativity. Interrogating what is typically labeled “normal” and the resultant production of the “abnormal” centrally plays into this effort. / Another area of “work to be done” concerns the ways that LGBT issues ARE entering into the curriculum. While several departments administer courses addressing multiculturalism and diversity on campus and throughout society, the focus of these classes tends to emphasize race and ethnicity while comparatively little attention is given to issues that are specifically faced by the LGBT population. Plus, if attended to at all, LGBT issues are typically presented simply as one of many separate facets of “difference” among the population without acknowledgement of the cumulative effect people’s sexual and gender identities often have on their entire social experience, or the ways that sexuality and gender intersect with other identity categories. If there is a disconnect between gender, sexuality, and the rest of a person’s identities, this has the potential to minimize and invalidate a person’s experience as a complete human being. As Linda Carty (African American Studies) puts it: “To simultaneously deal with the issues of gender, race, class, and sexuality is to recognize that some people experience multiple oppressions simultaneously. So, for example, if you have a woman who is a lesbian, black, and disabled, no one can deny that she would definitely experience more and multiple forms of oppression at the same time. So how can we talk about her without giving legitimacy to all of her? After all, she is never one part of herself without the others.” / Carty reminds us that there are complex elements that interconnect in the construction of identity. How we, as instructors in the classroom, address these multifaceted components is likely to impact how our students self-identify as well as how they make sense of other peoples’ self-concepts. / As a new TA, you may be wondering how you can begin working to recognize, minimize, and interrupt heteronormative practices in your teaching methods. The first step is to explore your own beliefs about lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgendered people. What do you assume about your LGBT students and others with whom you interact? What do you feel when you think about LGBT people and LGBT issues? Why do you think that is? As Barbara Applebaum (Cultural Foundations of Education) states, “A professor who has not dealt with his or her own heteronormative assumptions…will be prevented from incorporating LGBT pedagogy… It’s not a subject you can just teach and not understand yourself.” / Holding biases and stereotypes about people whom you perceive as “different” from you are learned behaviors that are rooted in our socio-cultural context. Growth from and interruption of these biases is not a simple process; it involves a lot of critical reflection and intentional questioning. However, if you want to effectively teach diverse populations without subjecting them to your own personal biases, this reflection is required. / Disrupting heteronormativity in the curriculum and acknowledging the existence and effects of multiple oppressions can be a daunting task for TAs, but we have the responsibility to do so on a daily basis.

#### This is a question of subject position – of course privileged kids from [school] don’t think structural violence is a real issue because it doesn’t directly affect them – only embracing the uncomfortable risk of our impact calculus is ethical

Saunders 5 [Rebecca Comparative Lit @ Illinois St., “Risky Business: Edward Said as Literary Critic” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle Eas p. 529-532]

Risk-free ethics, like all protection from risk, are a class privilege. As Deborah Lupton puts it, “The disadvantaged have fewer opportunities to avoid risks because of their lack of resources compared with the advantaged”; “people’s social location and their access to material resources are integral to the ways in which they conceptualize and deal with risk.”22 Or, as Ulrich Beck argues, “Poverty attracts an unfortunate abundance of risks. By contrast, wealth (in income, power or education) can purchase safety and freedom from risk.”23 Thus when we endorse a risk-free ethics, we should bear in mind that members of social groups with less to lose and more to gain are more likely to engage in risky behaviors than are members of more secure and privileged social groups. Moreover, as Mary Douglas has argued at length, risk is a forensic resource and, much like the “danger” she elaborated in her early work, functions as a means of social control. “Anthropologists would generally agree,” she writes, “that dangers to the body, dangers to children, dangers to nature are available as so many weapons to use in the struggle for ideological domination.”24 These weapons are sharpened, she argues, by Western societies’ association of risk assessment with scientific neutrality. Along similar lines, Nick Fox contends that “risk analysis is a deeply political activity. The identification of hazards (and the consequent definition of what is a risk) can easily lead to “the valorization of certain kinds of living over others.”25 The identification of “risk groups” deemed to be threatening to the social order—the unemployed, criminal, insane, poor, foreign—are a common technology for establishing boundaries between self and other, the normal and the pathological, that is, for securing that “formidable battery of distinctions” Said analyzes between “ours and theirs, proper and improper,” higher and lower, colonial and native, Western and Eastern.26 In a fascinating article on debates over native title in Australia, Eva Mackey demonstrates both the way in which political actors deploy a rhetoric of risk, danger, and threat and the uses of risk management to imperial hegemony. Not only have newspaper headlines “presented native title as an issue that has brought the nation to the brink of a dangerous abyss, to the point of destruction,” but the Howard government “constructs native title as a danger and risk to the ‘national interest,’ particularly a risk to competitiveness, opportunities, and progress. The entire anti-native title lobby have all stated . . . that the uncertainty over native title is dangerous for investment and economic competitiveness.”27 As Mackey points out, these notions of danger imply “a normative, non-endangered state,” and it is through ideas of the normal and deviant that institutional power is maintained.28 A related argument articulated by governmentality theorists is that modern societies normalize risk avoidance and pathologize risk taking, represent the former as rational and mature, the latter as irrational and childish— oppositions that, again, are familiar to any student of colonial discourse.29 These oppositions are buttressed by an elaborate apparatus of expert knowledge produced by disciplines such as engineering, statistics, actuarialism, psychology, epidemiology, and economics, which attempt to regulate risk through calculations of probability and which view the social body as “requiring intervention, management and protection so as to maximize wealth, welfare and productivity.”30 Knowledge produced about probability is then deployed as counsel to individuals about how to conduct their lives. As Lupton contends: “In late modern societies, not to engage in risk avoiding behavior is considered ‘a failure of the self to take care of itself—a form of irrationality, or simply a lack of skillfulness’ (Greco 1993). Risk-avoiding behavior, therefore, becomes viewed as a moral enterprise relating to issues of self-control, self-knowledge and self-improvement.”31 This is a characteristic of neoliberal societies that Pat O’Malley, Franc¸ois Ewald, and others refer to as the “new prudentialism.”32 To recognize that risk is a form of social control, and that risk taking is more necessary to certain classes than to others, is also to recognize that risk is not an objective entity or preexisting fact but is produced by specific cultural, political, and institutional contexts, as well as through competing knowledges. “To call something a risk,” argues Douglas, “is to recognize its importance to our subjectivity and wellbeing.” 33 Anthony Giddens, similarly, contends that “there is no risk which can be described without reference to a value.”34 In a frequently cited passage, Ewald writes, “Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event.”35 Indeed, this is precisely the unconscious of risk-management technologies, which assume both that risks are preexistent in nature and that individuals comport themselves in strict accordance with a “hedonic calculus.” 5 3 1 Also embedded within this insurantial unconscious is the fact that, as Fox puts it, “The welladvertised risk will turn out to be connected with legitimating moral principles.”36 If postcolonial studies, as I am arguing, should more rigorously interrogate risk-avoidance strategies (including those that repress or discipline the foreignness in language) on their political, class, and ideological investments, it should also recognize the degree to which risk management (no doubt among modernity’s most wildly optimistic formulations) indulges in a fantasy of mastery over uncertainty. In risk-management discourses, risk has taken on the technical meaning of a known or knowable probability estimate, contrasted with uncertainty, which designates conditions where probabilities are inestimable or unknown. This transformation of the unknown into a numerical figure, a quantification of nonknowledge that takes itself for knowledge, attempts to master whatever might be undesirable in the unknown (i.e., the future) by indemnifying it in advance—and thereby advertising its own failure. I believe it could be demonstrated, moreover, were we to trace the genealogy of this fantasy, that it coincides at crucial moments with the history of colonization. The notion of risk, first used in relation to maritime adventures, arises contemporaneously with modern imperialism, to describe the hazards of leaving home. With industrial modernity, and particularly the rise of the science of statistics in the nineteenth century, it took on themien of instrumental reason and the domination of nature, nuances that bear an unmistakable resemblance to the logics of concurrent colonial enterprises.37 This fantasy of mastery is also a suppression of possibility; in most instances, risk avoidance is an (implicit or explicit) maintenance of dominant values. Risk taking, by contrast, is the condition of possibility of possibility— that is, of change. It is perhaps no surprise that one’s political position is the strongest predictor of his/her attitude toward risk. Risk, as we have seen, is regularly formulated as that which threatens the dominant order (conceived on the level of a society, a colonial regime, or a global economic order). That threat, of course, is the “danger” of transformation, of reorganized social and ideological hierarchies, redistributed economic and cultural capital, renovated geopolitical relations—in short, precisely the kinds of transformation called for by much of postcolonial studies. Risk, including the risk of errors in meaning, may be necessary to any social change, that is, to engaging in the kind of oppositional criticism Said advocates: “Criticism must think of itself,” he writes, “as constitutively opposed to every form of tyranny, domination, and abuse.”38 The necessity of risk to change (and the craven conformism of risk avoidance) is a principle Friedrich Nietzsche elaborates in Beyond Good and Evil, where, critiquing the “timidity of morality,” he calls for a new species of philosophers, willing to risk untruth, uncertainty, even ignorance, thinkers willing to inhabit “the dangerous maybe.”39 Nietzsche was also prescient in recognizing that “howmuch or how little is dangerous to the community . . . now constitutes the moral perspective; here, too, fear is again themother ofmorals.”40 More recently, philosophers such as Derrida and John D. Caputo (explicitly taking up Nietzsche’s vocation) have argued that change, indeed social responsibility itself, inevitably demands a wager on uncertain possibilities (or, in Derridean terms, the “aporia”). “Let us not be blind,” writes Derrida, “to the aporia that all change must endure. It is the aporia of the perhaps, its historical and political aporia. Without the opening of an absolutely undetermined possible, without the radical abeyance and suspense marking a perhaps, there would never be either event or decision. . . . no decision (ethical, juridical, political) is possible without interrupting determination by engaging oneself in the perhaps.”41 On similar grounds, Caputo argues for “the suspension of the fine name of ethics in the name of obligation” and contends that “to speak of being against ethics and deconstructing ethics is to own up to the lack of safety by which judging is everywhere beset. . . . to admit that ‘obligation’ is not safe, that ethics cannot make it safe, that it is not nearly as safe as ethics would have us believe.”42

#### Rage is constitutive of the queer experience---liberating this objective vertigo comes first

Queer Nation, 6-xx-1990, text of a manifesto originally passed out by people marching with the ACT UP contingent, “History Is a Weapon: The Queer Nation Manifesto,” http://www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/queernation.html \*\*parentheses used to modify for the sake of correct sentence structure

I'm angry. I'm angry for being condemned to death by strangers saying, "You deserve to die" and "AIDS is the cure." Fury erupts when a Republican woman wearing thousands of dollars of garments and jewelry minces by the police lines shaking her head, chuckling and wagging her finger at us like we are recalcitrant children making absurd demands and throwing a temper tantrum when they aren't met. Angry while Joseph agonizes over $8,000 a year for AZT which might keep him alive a little longer and which does make him sicker than the disease he is diagnosed with. Angry as I listen to a man tell me that after changing his will five times he's running out of people to leave things to. All of his best friends are dead. Angry when I stand in a sea of quilt panels, or go to a candlelight march or attend yet another memorial service. I will not march silently with a f[uck]ing candle and I want to take that goddamned quilt and wrap myself in it and furiously rent it and my hair and curse every god religion ever created. I refuse to accept a creation that cuts people down in the third decade of their life. It is cruel and vile and meaningless and everything I have in me rails against the absurdity and I raise my face to the clouds and a ragged laugh that sounds more demonic than joyous erupts from my throat and tears stream down my face and if this disease doesn't kill me, I may just die of frustration. My feet pound the streets and Peter's hands are chained to a pharmaceutical company's reception desk while the receptionist looks on in horror and Eric's body lies rotting in a Brooklyn cemetery and I'll never hear his flute resounding off the walls of the meeting house again. And I see the old people in Tompkins Square Park huddled in their long wool coats in June to keep out the cold they perceive is there and to cling to whatever little life has left to offer them, and I think, ah, they understand. And I'm reminded of the people who strip and stand before a mirror each night before they go to bed and search their bodies for any mark that might not have been there yesterday. A mark that this scourge has visited them. And I'm angry when the newspapers call us "victims" and sound alarms that "it" might soon spread to the "general population." And I want to scream "Who the f[uck] am I?" And I want to scream at New York Hospital with its yellow plastic bags marked "isolation linen," "ropa infecciosa" and its orderlies in latex gloves and surgical masks skirt the bed as if its occupant will suddenly leap out and douse them with blood and semen giving them too the plague. And I'm angry at straight people who sit smugly wrapped in their self-protective coat of monogamy and heterosexuality confident that this disease has nothing to do with them because it only happens to "them." And the teenage boys who upon spotting my "Silence = Death" button begin chanting "Faggots gonna die" and I wonder, who taught them this? Enveloped in fury and fear, I remain silent while my button mocks me every step of the way. And the anger I feel when a television program on the quilt gives profiles of the dead and the list begins with a baby, a teenage girl who got a blood transfusion, an elderly Baptist minister and his wife and when they finally show a gay man, he's described as someone who knowingly infected teenage male prostitutes with the virus. What else can you expect from a faggot? I'm angry.

## Normativity

### 1NR—Top Level

#### AND – this loss of compassion turns case and kills value to life.

Majid Rahnema, Professor @ Fitter College, 1997, The Post-Development Reader, p. 392-3

A first condition for such a search is to look at things as they are, rather than as we want them to be, overcome our fears of the unknown, and instead of claiming to be able to change the world and to save 'humanity', try to save ourselves from our own compelling need for comforting illusions. / The Hubris of the modern individual has led him or her to believe that the existential powerlessness of humankind can usefully be replaced with compulsive ‘actomania’. This illusion is similar to the modem obsession with fighting death at all costs. Both compulsions tend, in fact, to undermine, disfigure and eventually destroy the only forms of power that define true life. Paradoxically, it is through fully experiencing our powerlessness, as painful as that may be, that it becomes possible for us to be in tune with human suffering, in all its manifestations; to understand the “power of the powerless" (to use Vaclav Havel's expression); and to rediscover our oneness with all those in pain. / Blinkered by the promethean myth of Progress, development called on the 'powerless' people to join in a world-wide crusade against the very idea of powerlessness, building its own power of seduction and conviction on the mass production of new illusions. It designed for every user a 'mask of love' – an expression coined by John McKnight to define the modem notion of ‘care’ – which various ‘developers’ could deploy when inviting new recruits to join the crusade. / It is because development incarnated a false love for an abstract humanity that it ended up by upsetting the lives of millions of living human beings. For half a century its 'target populations’ suffered the intrusion in their lives of an army of development teachers and experts, including well-intentioned field workers and activists, who spoke big words – from conscientization to learning from and living with the people. Often they had studied Marx. Gramsci, Freire and the latest research about empowerment and participation. However their lives (and often careers) seldom allowed them to enter the intimate world of their target populations. They were good at giving people passionate lectures about their rights, their entitlements, the class struggle and land reform. Yet few asked themselves about the deeper motivations prompting them to do what they were doing Often they knew neither the people they were working with, nor themselves. They were so busy achieving what they thought they had to do for the people, that they could not learn enough from them about how to actually ‘care’ for them, as they would for their closest relatives and friends with whom they knew and loved. / My intention in bringing up this point is not to blame such activists or field workers many of them may have been kind and loving person. It is rather, to make the point that 'the masks of love; to which they became addicted prevented them discovering the extraordinary redeeming power of human powerlessness, when it opens one's soul to the world of true love and compassion. Similar 'masks of love' have now destroyed the possibilities of our truly 'caring'. Thus, when we hear about the massacres in Algeria, Rwanda, Zaire, the Middle East or Bosnia, or the innumerable children, women and men dying from starvation or being tortured and killed with impunity, we feel comforted and relieved when we send a cheque to the right organization or demonstrate on their behalf in the streets. And although we are fully aware that such gestures are, at very best, like distributing aspirin pills to dying people whom nothing can save; although we may have doubts as to whether our money will reach the victims, or fears that it might even ultimately serve those governments, institutions, or interests who are responsible for this suffering; we continue to do these things. We continue to cheat ourselves because we consider it not decent, not morally justifiable, not 'politically correct', to do otherwise. / Such gestures, which we insist on calling acts of solidarity rather than ‘charity’, may however be explained differently: by the great fear we have of becoming fully aware of our powerlessness in situations when nothing can be done. And vet this is perhaps the most authentic way of rediscovering our oneness with those in pain. For the experiencing of our powerlessness can lead us to encounter the kind of deep and redeeming suffering that provides entry to the world of compassion and discovery of our true limits and possibilities. It can also be the first step in the direction of starting a truthful relationship with the world, as it is. Finally, it can help us understand this very simple tautology that no one is in a position to do more than one can. As one humbly recognizes this limitation, and learns to free oneself from the egocentric illusions inculcated by the Promethean myth, one discovers the secrets of a power of a different quality: that genuine and extraordinary power that enables a tiny seed, in all its difference and uniqueness, to start its journey into the unknown.

### AT: No Alt

#### This is the perfect example of what we’re *criticizing.*

Pierre Schlag, Professor of Law @ the University of Colorado, 1990, “Normative and Nowhere to Go,” Lexis-Nexis

In fact, even as you read and even as I write, normative legal thought is busy urging us (you and me) to ask these very same questions of this very essay at this very moment. "What should we do? What's the point?" asks normative legal thought. "If normative legal thought isn't going anywhere, what should we do instead?" "What do you propose?" "What's the solution?" These familiar questions are usually asked in searching, serious, somber tones. There is no trace of irony in their articulation -- no self-consciousness at all. It is as if the intellectual legitimacy, the political import, of the questions were themselves self-evident, beyond question. n27 "Yes, yes -- but what should we do? How do these observations help?" Usually, the questions are asked with such earnest, self-assured self-certainty that it is as if the body of knowledge that enables the questions to be stated in the first place were somehow outside the problem, outside the difficulty -- already intellectually whole, already politically competent to provide the answers. n28 [\*178] "Right, right, but the question is, what should we do with all this?" / Now you'll notice that here the "What should we do?" is an interruption. It is an interruption posing as an origin. It poses as an origin in that it takes itself to be the original motivation for engaging in legal thought. n29 And yet here, the "What should we do?" interrupts the process of trying to understand what enterprise we, as legal thinkers, are already engaged in. It interrupts the process of attempting to reveal the character of our disciplines and our practices as legal thinkers. "O.K., O.K., but how would such revelations help us decide what we should do?"

### AT: Agency

#### We’ll use our skills for evil

Andy Ellis, UDL Coach, 2004, MESSAGE POSTED TO EDEBATE, archived @ HTTP://WWW.NDTCEDA.COM/ARCHIVES/200404/0463.HTML

3)Lets make this argument perfectly clear too, its not just ok to be like i wanna work on the hill or i wanna work in the washington think tank establishment any more than its ok to be all like well i dont like the third reich but that internship a the chancelors asitant is a good carreer move, people wont say this because we are all supposed to be civil in this activity but what many of the community members use debate as preperation for is preperation for a kind of thinking that has left millions of dead bodies scattered here and around the world. When people say well i do this because i wanna be a congressman so i have to have traditional debate so i can prepare i say see you dont know how right you are, my experience with much actual policy making is that it is a lot like traditional deate, decisons made in a hermeticly sealed insular context free from public participation and input in which the bodies of those most effected by the decsion are wielded entirely out of their control, decisons are always played out ona gameboard and made in a calculative way, much like debates most of the real policymaking is made by privilaged white males in closed door settings, much like traditional debate a discourse of expertise is utilized to exclude anybody who doesnt know the language, so yes debate is preaprtion for the policy making process, but instead of a reason why to keep going its a reason to take action to intervene against the genocidal condensation that exists within the preperatory pedagigy that jake and a bunch of other people simply find fun...lots of people like bull fighting too, doesnt mean that your fun is free of complicty in bad shit / 4)before you tel me about all the good policy makers who have come out of debate that would have otherwise been eviler genocidal fucks, consider the massive amounts of lawyers and policymakers who we have taught to be better genocideres, those folks who will now be better prosecutors better imperial planners, better able to add liberal legitimacy to the pnac empire machine,simply put i dont doubt that many of you are prearing for a future in politics, my problem is with the way you prepare and what you are preapring for.

#### Rove proves – normative debate is an evidence arms race that teaches winning at any cost

Gordon Mitchell, Professor of Communications @ Pitt University, 2003, “Karl Rove’s debate roots,” http://www.ndtceda.com/pipermail/edebate/2003-March/047297.html

Who sees similarities between the brand of Bush steamroller diplomacy being showcased currently on the world stage and Karl Rove's training as an academic high school debater? According to James Moore and Wayne Slater: "Rove didn't just want to win, he wanted the opponents destroyed. His worldview was clear even then: There was his team and the other team, and he would make the other team pay. He would defeat them, slaughter them, and humiliate them. He would win by any means, but he would win" (119). This is a poor approach to debating, one that sacrifices long-term gain for short-term rewards. It unravels the fabric of dialogic cooperation that is essential for the long-term viability of any constructive communicative interchange. It sets a very bad precedent that the ends of winning justify the means of deliberate deception and intimidation, enabling these bankrupt deliberative practices to gain currency. The story about Rove's 4 X 6 evidence card high school debate arms race puts in perspective the Bush administration's current argumentative strategies being deployed in its campaign to secure UN sanction for a preventive military intervention against Iraq. Rove and high school debate partner Emil Langeland kept building up their arsenal of 4 X 6 evidence card boxes as the season went on, trying to intimidate the opposition. Yet as Langland fessed up later about the index cards, "There wasn't a thing on 99 percent of them." Many of the cards being used by the United States to make its case for war against Iraq have also turned out to be blanks: 1) Iraq's aluminum tube imports - Blix ruled they were NOT capable of being used as centrifuges for uranium enrichment; 2) Iraq's alleged nuclear fuel transfer with Niger - Blix ruled that U.S. claims here were based on FORGED DOCUMENTS; 3) Britain's "concealment" dossier - Exposed as a plagiarism of a previously published graduate student paper, even though Secretary Powell leaned on it heavily for proof; 4) Satellite images of chemical weapons activity in northern Iraq presented during Secretary Powell's presentation to the United Nations - Blix ruled this took place in a declared site in northern Iraq and DID NOT prove Iraqi noncompliance. Regardless of whether the United States leads a "coalition of the billing" into Iraq, these argumentative practices deserve careful scrutiny, since their replication in future episodes of world public deliberation on proposed preventive military intervention is a recipe for policy disaster.