# Round 2---NDCA

# 1NC

## 1NC—vs. Juan Diego WF

### 1

#### The affirmative’s attempts to appropriate modernity towards the goals of freedom and justice for the Bracero movement ignores the brutal underbelly of our history. Subjugation of “abnormal” bodies has contributed to a system of phallic anti-queer whiteness. We are seduced into championing freedom and stability, concepts that are inconceivable to these bodies, when that goal only serves to entrench the gratuitous violence always already done to them.

Winnubst 06 (Shannon, Phd, Associate Professor of Women’s Studies at Ohio State University, *Queering Freedom*, pg. 43-45)

Across the Atlantic and roughly two centuries after Locke’s writing of his Second Treatise, the post-bellum United States entered into some of the nastiest parts of U.S. history. **The operative nexus of racial and sexual difference surfaced with great clarity: black men were lynched on false allegations of raping white women.** These allegations, rarely if ever pursued, sufficed as ample cause for castration, dismemberment, burning at the stake, hanging. This horrific violence set the scene for two dynamics to emerge explicitly and continue with great force into the early twenty-first-century United States psyche: **the sexualizing of racial difference and the racializing of sexual difference.**18 The propertied Christian white male (straight) body19 alone **remained unmarked**, positioned not only as the politically and economically superior subject, but also as the rational, benevolent patriarch in whose hands the security of all bodies rested. Women and non-white men were accordingly positioned below him, most often pitted against one an other through the fear of alleged aggression and manipulation, as a great deal of twentieth-century African American literature shows all too graphically. 20 **The brutal and ugly underbelly of modernity thus surfaced**. A period that emerged philosophically as the triumph of rationality and politically as the victory of representative democracy and its liberal individual, modernity was also the period of the birth of global capitalism and its counterparts of colonialism and slavery.21 Many of the modern categories that we see at work in Locke’s texts emerged in the post-bellum United States with a defensive tenacity that bred political, cultural, psychic, and physical violence. For example, as political categories such as freedom and individualism began to be broadened through the emancipation of slaves, other structures of modernity asserted themselves to shape the exact contours and limits of the kinds of emergent freedoms and rights that would develop. Namely, as the battles around the Fifteenth Amendment and suffragist movements showed, racial and sexual difference emerged as primary fields of signification through which entry to the precious categories of freedom and individual rights had to be negotiated. **The categories of race and gender were being forged in the explicit terms of legal and political documents**. If one was raced or sexed, one had to fight—against other marked (raced, sexed) bodies—for one’s entry into these categories. But the fight turned on evidence of a specific form of rationality. Or, to put it in the language of race and sexual difference, it turned on one’s ability to approximate maleness or whiteness, the two social categories that govern the epistemological category of ‘proper rationality’ and, dialectically, the social category of property ownership. The disjunction of approximating either maleness or whiteness ensured that no set of marked bodies would achieve ‘true’ freedom or individuality: only the white male occupied both positions of power, maleness and whiteness.22 The seduction of freedom thereby became the seduction of **phallicized whiteness**. Consequently, raced and sexed bodies found themselves fighting against one another in a battle that neither of them could ultimately win: the terms were set by an external ‘overseer.’ This historical scene almost perfectly enacts the logic of power that both Nietzsche and Foucault diagnose so clearly: as the structures of modernity began to be contested philosophically (by Hegel and post-Hegelians, particularly Marx) and politically (by Emancipation), the less codified social and political structures emerged with greater clarity and rigidity to control the kinds of political subjectivities that could emerge.23 As freedom and individual rights, which had been acclaimed as universal, began to be exposed as small section of society, the broader and more vaguely articulated structures of racism and sexism began their slow processes of codification. And the singular standard for the legibility of that emergent political subjectivity of individual freedom remained the same: a propertied Christian white (straight) man, the singular subject position that inhabits both maleness and whiteness—and proper rationality. Broad cultural structures of race and sexual difference thus surface as a complicated nexus of power relations in post-bellum practices such as miscegenation, the one-drop rule, and lynching. In these practices, the intersections of race and sex produce a **confusing conflation of values that serve as smoke screens to *obfuscate* the protected, *unmarked subject position of the white man***. Values such as purity, virginity, and passivity are written on the female body as inherent qualities. In what should appear as an obvious contraposition, values such as bestiality, aggression, and uncivilized nature are written on the black body. The black female body, left in the wreckage of embodying these contradictory ‘natural’ traits, becomes a general aberration that is treated with confusion and fear. And the white male body emerges as the unmarked, normative mode of subjectivity. Or, to put this in the terms above, the white male body solidifies his position as the modern man—the rational, transcendental man in control of both nature and history. The mode of rationality that defines high modernity—namely, as instrumental, transcendental, and detached from history—expresses itself directly in **the mode of subjectivity inhabited by white propertied Christian (straight) men in the post-bellum United States. It is what** **enables and ensures their power over nature and the social field of relations, and their subsequent freedom**.

#### They have claimed to represent a node in a multitude of transnational radical democracy movements—this buys into and obscures the disempowerment of queer people of color at home and the devastating impacts of their method abroad.

Siskanna Naynaha, composition coordinator at Lane Community College and teaches courses on African American and Latino literature, May 2006, “RACE OF ANGELS: XICANISMA, POSTCOLONIAL PASSIONS, AND RHETORICS OF REACTION AND REVOLUTION,” <https://research.wsulibs.wsu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/2376/492/s_naynaha_050306.pdf?sequence=1>

At the turn of the twenty-first century, Laclau entered into a critical discussion with cultural theorist Judith Butler and Slovenian psychoanalyst and theorist Slavoj Žižek in their collaborative Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues in the Left. Using the theoretical lenses provided by Gramsci, Derrida, and Lacan, the three debate the failure of the Left in contemporary politics and, if there has indeed been a failure, its causes. The major contribution of this work to the field of democratic theory is the ways the authors problematize current watchwords deployed in the cultural rhetoric of US democracy such as “multicultural,” “pluralistic,” and “politically correct.” Ultimately, however, the theorists of so-called radical democracy tend to become bogged down in discussions of the discursivity of democracy; what they neglect here is the material, economic realities of poor people of color in the US and around the globe. Kalyan K. Sanyal elaborates on this critique in his “Postmarxism and the Third World: A Critical Response to the Radical Democratic Agenda.” “By emphasizing the discourse of the right,” he argues, the radical democrats link their multiple struggles to the state because it is the state that endows every citizen with right, and the process of realization of the right must refer to the state rather than to any other form of collectivity . . . [but] what are the implications of the radical democratic agenda for the global order, economic and political? (128) In the end Sanyal finds that the implications are devastating. The most salient is that the “Third World” “has to bear a large part of the cost of accommodating rights in the [First World]. To the extent that these rights impinge on the logic of profit and accumulation, capital has a tendency to move to greener pastures in the Third World where such rights hardly exist” (128). In fact, the rhetoric of democracy in the US has grown out of a Eurocentric obsession with “Western” foundations which inspire and perpetuate an obsessive possessive individualism through constant appeals to Enlightenment era thinking and ideals. The deployment of such rhetoric has long obscured the problems of racism, poverty, patriarchal oppression, and heterosexism within the US, and now, given the global expansion of US domination under the logic of late capitalism, that same rhetoric of democracy obfuscates the historical and material realities of US colonialism and imperialism around the world. Debates about individual “rights” and appropriate “procedures” rage on in the US while suffering rages on in poor neighborhoods populated disproportionately by people of color in the US and enrages the devastated Two-Thirds World. It is a travesty that demands a sustained intervention, one that historicizes the political and economic dimensions of the rhetoric of democracy in the US.

#### Movements towards reparations are liberal schemes which re-inscribe the power of law—they don’t solve anything and disavow systems of Anti-Black domination.

Saidiya V. Hartman, summer-xx-2003, professor @ Columbia, “The Position of the Unthought,” <http://processedlives.wordpress.com/2013/07/03/freedom-coloniality-and-the-fact-of-blackness/> \*\*the part of this article that has been cut is a quote from Hartman, the article itself is written by someone else

The reparations movement puts itself in this contradictory or impossible position, because reparations are not going to solve the systemic ongoing production of racial inequality, in material or any other terms. And like inequality, racial domination and racial abjection are produced across generations. In that sense, reparations seem like a very limited reform: a liberal scheme based upon certain notions of commensurability that reinscribe the power of the law and of the state to make right a certain situation, when, clearly, it cannot. I think too that such thinking reveals an idealist trap; it’s as if once [Americans] know how the wealth of the country was acquired, they’ll decide that black people are owed something. My God! Why would you assume that? Like housing segregation is an accident! I think that logic of “if they only knew otherwise” is about the disavowal of political will. Why is the welfare state dismantled, even though it’s actually going to affect more white women and children than black people? Because it has to do with that political will and an antipathy to blackness that structures… If “inequality, racial domination and racial abjection are produced across generations” as Hartman argues, what does it mean, then, to celebrate the “breaking of chains”? What does it mean to celebrate the “breaking of chains” when the freedom of my enslaved ancestors was contingent on the coerced labour of Indonesian peoples? The histories of enslaved Africans and their descendants are yoked together with the histories of Indonesian peoples.

#### The alternative is to affirm the performance of the 1AC as catastrophe—negation is the only ethical act in the world of heteronormativity. In the face of the 1AC’s call to progress, affirm the end of the world.

Kendra Langeteig, Winter-xx-1997, Instructor of English @ Indiana University, “Horror Autotoxicus in the Red Night Trilogy: Ironic Fruits of Burroughs's Terminal Vision,” pg. 135-169, muse

This connection between homosexuality and menacing contagion that Burroughs makes explicit in the erotic exhibitionism of the Red Night trilogy obviously goes beyond parody of homosexual adventure and fantasy taken to extremes. These activities have an explosive sexual politics that point, by their very extremity, to Burroughs's acute awareness of how society reads the homosexual body, and demonstrate his urgent need for vindication. Homosexuality is the toxic in the horror autotoxicus of the body politic, condemned to the margin along with society's other outlaws--its toxic waste (the drug addict, the schizophrenic); all are banished in the social project of preventing the transmission of social disorder and preserving the life of the body politic from collapse. Since the AIDS epidemic, this horror of homosexual contagion, more than a psychological threat ("homosexual panic" to be prosecuted in court), is supplied with tangible proof of its toxicity or "unnaturalness" for the reactionary thinker, actually fueling arguments to read this epidemic as a sign from an Old Testament God punishing acts contra natura with plagues. While Burroughs makes no reference to this cultural backlash in Cities--the Red Night plagues prefigure and can be only coincidentally connected with AIDS and its social fallout--his portrayal of homosexuality painfully emphasizes how culture's message about toxicity is inscribed on the gay male body. When the Red Night trilogy moves into the Age of AIDS, with Dead Roads (1983), Burroughs seemingly mocks the "fear of a queer planet" by continuing to align his homosexual heroes with the greatest "natural" disasters--plagues and death. 46 His strategy of affirming society's negative construction of homosexuality as disorder, rather than being victimized or overpowered by it, turns the cultural bias against the "outlaw" on its head--a fatal strategy that transforms the homosexual's mythic toxicity and problematic exile into a paradoxical means of empowerment and resistance. Burroughs forces this cultural analogy between toxicity and homosexuality to the limit, pushes the "needle to nova," by flaunting the kind of "degenerate" sexual activity that we see in the nightclubs described above, reinforced with casual references to fin-de-siècle decadence (Kim reads Rimbaud); and by allying his queer outlaws with the planet's most threatening and destructive powers. Banished to the margins of existence, they not only identify with civilization's toxic horror, its disease and corruption, they thrive on it. Kim and Audrey Carsons are described as "slimy morbid youths" who adore "abominations, unspeakable rites . . . [and] the reek of the terrible Red Fever" in the plagued cities along their journey (PDR, p. 16). In Burroughs's homosexual saga, the "excremental" elements (which pay tribute to Swift's satirical travelogue) are perversely central to his vision. 47 Figuring prominently at the head of Cities is the obscene "Invocation" that sets the tone for the trilogy's "escatology": 48

#### The judge should prioritize the positionality of the object in their decision calculus—the world has forsaken the black queer woman, we must burn it to the ground

Winnubst 06 (Shannon, Phd, Associate Professor of Women’s Studies at Ohio State University, *Queering Freedom*, pg. 192-195)

To excavate these lost pasts erased from our consuming consciousness opens middle-class consciousness onto the actual scarcities at work in the fictional scarcity of our consumption practices. To **cultivate these ‘memories’ opens onto a queer consciousness of how desire perpetuates systems of domination.** It can also open onto possibilities that things could be otherwise: we could consume differently, buying and growing and exchanging locally; we could even enjoy our lives without the onslaught of cheap consumer goods that increasingly keep most of the world’s population trapped in economic dependency and political subordination, while also locking us into the endless cycle of anxious consumption and future satiety. And we could recognize that the alleged scarcity of goods that sends us into buying frenzies and their promise of a more secure future is nothing but another marketing tool, one that depends on our not remembering how or where or why or for whom these objects are made. Our senses of power and freedom change when we begin to think and act in these queer ways. **Power is not about one class wielding economic and political power over another; it is about a web of interlocking values that perpetuate the domination of the most privileged at the expense of all other lives, most often through the narrative of desire and its myth of scarcity**. And freedom is not to own as much as we desire; it is not to gain an illusory and impossible security in George W. Bush’s “Ownership Society.” Freedom is to recognize the lost pasts embedded in our everyday practices and to cultivate pleasures that do not perpetuate these violences. It is to stop ignoring and erasing these lost pasts in our idolatry of the (market’s) future, and thereby open onto different kinds of pleasures. These snapshots of different subject positions’ responses to living life without a concept of the future give us some sense of how cultures of phallicized whiteness perceive a call to a politics without a future. To halt the temporality of the future anterior as the dominant mode in which we live our lives is to resist these cultures and their values. It presents a way of interrupting and disrupting the domination of phallicized whiteness, decentering its grip on us. At the same time, to halt the temporality of the future calls us to **risk radical uncertainty** in the politics and erotics of our lives, to open ourselves to not-knowing and unknowing as viable modes of experience. For bodies in power, such a call to risk will likely affront our deepest senses of our selves and worlds: it will likely fall on deaf ears. For oppressed and dominated bodies, this may already be how we are living and to embrace it consciously may be experienced as a call to joy and creativity or, at a minimum, a profound relief. (I use “we” on both sides of this division to express the multiple subject positions I hold on the social map of power.) The call to a politics without a future strikes us in varying ways; it can be decentering, or even a relief, hilarious, and a sense of grounding for movements already underway, giving voice and a space in which to cultivate unimaginable pleasures. How we respond may tell us much about how queerly multiple our “I” of identity can become.

### Case

#### Their failure to recognize their privilege in debate and how they contribute to oppression is what is what causes it in the first place

Darnell L. Moore 2011 (Writer and activist whose work is informed by anti-racist, feminist, queer of color, and a0nti-colonial thought and advocacy, “On Location: The “I” in the Intersection”, http://thefeministwire.com/2011/12/on-location-the-i-in-the-intersection :)

The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression and see as our particular task the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking. The synthesis of these oppressions creates the conditions of our lives. As black women we see black feminism as the logical political movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face. -The Combahee River Collective in A Black Feminist Statement Many radical movement builders are well-versed in the theory of intersectionality. Feminists, queer theorists and activists, critical race scholars, progressive activists, and the like owe much to our Black feminist sisters, like The Combahee River Collective, who introduced us to the reality of simultaneity–as a framework for assessing the multitude of interlocking oppressions that impact the lives of women of color–in A Black Feminist Statement (1978). Their voices and politics presaged Kimberlé Crenshaw’s very useful theoretical contribution of “intersectionality” to the feminist toolkit of political interventions in 1989. Since its inception, many have referenced the term—sometimes without attribution to the black feminist intellectual genealogy from which it emerged—as a form of en vogue progressive parlance. In fact, it seems to be the case that it is often referenced in progressive circles as a counterfeit license (as in, “I understand the ways that race, sexuality, class, and gender coalesce. I get it. I really do.”) to enter resistance work even if the person who declares to have a deep “understanding” of the connectedness of systemic matrices of oppression, themselves, have yet to discern and address their own complicity in the maintenance of the very oppressions they seek to name and demolish. I am certain that I am not the only person who has heard a person use language embedded with race, class, gender, or ability privilege follow-up with a reference to “intersectionality.” My concern, then, has everything to do with the way that the fashioning of intersectionality as a political framework can lead toward the good work of analyzing ideological and material systems of oppression—as they function “out there”—and away from the great work of critical analyses of the ways in which we, ourselves, can function as actants in the narratives of counter-resistance that we rehearse. In other words, we might be missing the opportunity to read our complicities, our privileges, our accesses, our excesses, our excuses, our modes of oppressing—located “in here”—as they occupy each of us. Crenshaw’s theorization has provided us with a useful lens to assess the problematics of the interrelated, interlocking apparatuses of power and privilege and their resulting epiphenomena of powerlessness and subjugation. Many have focused on the external dimensions of oppression and their material results manifested in the lives of the marginalized, but might our times be asking of us to deeply consider our own “stuff” that might instigate such oppressions? What if we extended Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality by invoking what we might name “intralocality”? Borrowing from sociologists, the term “social location,” which broadly speaks to one’s context, highlights one’s standpoint(s)—the social spaces where s/he is positioned (i.e. race, class, gender, geographical, etc.). Intralocality, then, is concerned with the social locations that foreground our knowing and experiencing of our world and our relationships to the systems and people within our world. Intralocality is a call to theorize the self in relation to power and privilege, powerlessness and subjugation. It is work that requires the locating of the “I” in the intersection. And while it could be argued that such work is highly individualistic, I contend that it is at the very level of self-in-relation-to-community where communal transformation is made possible. Might it be time to travel into the deep of our contexts? Might it be time for us—theorists/activists—to do the work of intersectionality (macro/system-analysis) in concert with the intra-local (micro/self-focused analysis)? Intersectionality as an analysis, rightly, asks of us to examine systemic oppressions, but in these times of radical and spontaneous insurgencies—times when we should reflect on our need to unoccupy those sites of privilege (where they exist) in our own lives even as we occupy some other sites of domination—work must be done at the level of the self-in-community. We cannot—as a progressive community—rally around notions of “progression” and, yet, be complicit in the very homo/transphobias, racisms, sexisms, ableisms, etc. that violently terrorize the lives of so many others. If a more loving and just community is to be imagined and advanced, it seems to me that we would need to start at a different location than we might’ve expected: self.

#### This disconnected object narration is a function of whiteness

Yancy ‘5 [George, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University, “Whiteness and the Return of the Black Body,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 19(4), p. 215-216]

I write out of a personal existential context. This context is a profound source of knowledge connected to my "raced" body. Hence, I write from a place of lived embodied experience, a site of exposure. In philosophy, the only thing that we are taught to "expose" is a weak argument, a fallacy, or someone's "inferior" reasoning power. The embodied self is bracketed and deemed irrelevant to theory, superfluous and cumbersome in one's search for truth. It is best, or so we are told, to reason from nowhere. Hence, the white philosopher/author presumes to speak for all of "us" without the slightest mention of his or her "raced" identity. Self-consciously writing as a white male philosopher, Crispin Sartwell observes: Left to my own devices, I disappear as an author. That is the "whiteness" of my authorship. This whiteness of authorship is, for us, a form of authority; to speak (apparently) from nowhere, for everyone, is empowering, though one wields power here only by becoming lost to oneself. But such an authorship and authority is also pleasurable: it yields the pleasure of self-forgetting or [End Page 215] apparent transcendence of the mundane and the particular, and the pleasure of power expressed in the "comprehension" of a range of materials.

#### Reject the 1AC’s call for the ballot ---

#### It is a moment of interest convergence between the Affirmative and the judge – This rhetorical alliance with alterity is a technology of political demand that repeats the strategic attitude of the system it seeks to overturn – The guilty solidarity of the 1AC masks the privilege that prevents the AFF project from directly changing the lives of the people they invoke to warrant a ballot.

Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993

(Rey, *Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies*, p. 16-17)

Why are "tactics" useful at this moment? As discussions about "multiculturalism,' "interdisciplinarity," "the third world intellectual," and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the "otherness” ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new "solidarities" whose ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities arc often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their "victimization" by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarity-with-the-oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that ironically accumulate from their "oppositional" viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, is that "if a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, ... he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen."28 Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is "without any base where it could stockpile its winnings" (de Certeau, p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

#### It is a form of self-subalternization, where the judge is encouraged to found solidarity with the Affirmative Other by valorizing suffering portrayed in the 1AC – However, their rhetorical strategy amounts to nothing more than a sham renunciation authorized by the same structures of power that produce alterity in the first place, turning the case at a higher level of analysis.

Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993

(Rey, *Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies*, p. 10-11)

The Orientalist has a special sibling whom I will, in order to highlight her significance as a kind of representational agency, call the Maoist. Arif Dirlik, who has written extensively on the history of political movements in twentieth-century China, sums up the interpretation of Mao Zedong commonly found in Western Marxist analyses in terms of a "Third Worldist fantasy"—"a fantasy of Mao as a Chinese reincarnation of Marx who fulfilled the Marxist premise that had been betrayed in the West."16 The Maoist was the phoenix which arose from the ashes of the great disillusionment with Western culture in the 1960s and which found hope in the Chinese Communist Revolution.17 In the 1970s, when it became possible for Westerners to visit China as guided and pampered guests of the Beijing establishment, Maoists came back with reports of Chinese society's absolute, positive difference from Western society and of the Cultural Revolution as "the most important and innovative example of Mao's concern with the pursuit of egalitarian, populist, and communitarian ideals in the course of economic modernization" (Harding, p. 939). At that time, even poverty in China was regarded as "spiritually ennobling, since it meant that [the] Chinese were not possessed by the wasteful and acquisitive consumerism of the United States" (Harding, p. 941). Although the excessive admiration of the 1970s has since been replaced by an oftentimes equally excessive denigration of China, the Maoist is very much alive among us, and her significance goes far beyond the China and East Asian fields. Typically, the Maoist is a cultural critic who lives in a capitalist society hut who is fed up with capitalism—a cultural critic, in other words, who wants a social order opposed to the one that is supporting her own undertaking. The Maoist is thus a supreme example of the way desire works: What she wants is always located in the other, resulting in an identification with and valorization of that which she is not/does not have. Since what is valorized is often the other's deprivation—"having" poverty or "having" nothing—the Maoist's strategy becomes in the main a rhetorical renunciation of the material power that enables her rhetoric.

#### The subaltern is subsequently reduced to a fungible object, a passive object for the consumption of the debate community – the affirmative absorbs the power of alterity only to toss its carcass back into the dust

Chow 93 (Rey, Andrew W. Mellon, Professor of the Humanities at Brown University, Writing Diaspora: Contemporary Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, Indiana University Press, pg. 12-13.)

In the “cultural studies” of the American academy in the 1990s. The Maoist is reproducing with prowess. We see this in the way terms such as “oppression,” “victimization,” and “subalternity” are now being used. Contrary to the Orientalist disdain for the contemporary native cultures in the non-West, the Maoist turns the precisely disdained other into the object of his/her study and, in some cases identification. In a mixture of admiration and moralist, the Maoist sometimes turns all people from non-Western cultures into a generalized “subaltern” that is then used to flog an equally generalized “West.” Because the representation of “the other” as such ignores (1) the class and intellectual hierarchies within these other cultures, which are usually as elaborate as those in the West, and (2) the discursive power relations structuring the Maoist’s mode of inquiry and valorization, it produces a way of talking in which notions of lack, subalternity, victimization and so forth are drawn upon indiscriminately, often with the intention of spotlighting the speaker’s own sense of alterity and political righteousness. A comfortably wealthy white American intellectual I know claimed that he was a “third world intellectual” citing as one of his credentials his marriage to a Western European woman of part-Jewish heritage; a professor of English complained about being “victimized” by the structured time at an Ivy League Institution, meaning that she needed to be on time for classes; a graduate student of upper-class background from one of the world’s poorest countries told his American friends that he was of poor peasant stock in order to authenticate his identity as a radical “third worlder representative; male and female academics across the U.S. frequently say they were “raped” when they report experiences of professional frustration and conflict. Whether sincere or delusional, such cases of self-dramatization all take the route of self-sub-alternization, which has increasingly become the assured means to authority and power. What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand. The oppressed, whose voices we seldom hear, are robbed twice - the first time of their economic chances, the second time of their language, which is no longer distinguishable from those who have had our consciousnesses “raised.”

#### Reparations theory is predicated on the assumption of the sufficiency of redistributive justice to resolve and come to terms with the atrocities of the West yet time and time again such moves have only led to failure---the assumption that the state can be used to institute ethical systems masks its irredeemability.

**Woan** (Master of Arts in Philosophy, Politics, and Law in the Graduate School of Binghamton University) 20**11**

(Tansy, “The value of resistance in a permanently white, civil society,” <http://gradworks.umi.com/14/96/1496586.html>, August 2011, pg 9-19)

Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, in then influential Black Power, describe reformist strategies as "playing ball" with the white man. They argue that reform plays the white man's game in order to gain rights, i.e. appeal to a white supremacist government that is the precise agent responsible for the original harms they are seeking to alleviate.9 While this may very well result in the granting of new rights previously denied, it maintains a hierarchical system between whites and nonwhites, since the latter will have to continue to appeal to the former to ask for rights they never should have been denied in the first place. This places the former in a position of power to accept or deny such requests. Thus, in Carmichael and Hamilton's view, **attempting to resist white supremacy by working within white supremacist institutions maintains a dangerous system of power relations that lock in place the hierarchy between whites and nonwhites**. / It is unfortunate enough that members of minority groups face public and private racial discrimination. It is worse, however, to place the burden of combating this discrimination on them. What Carmichael and Hamilton aptly point out is that the hierarchy between races mentioned above is what is responsible for this undue burden. There is not only the constant physical struggle of protesting, writing letters, and being dragged through litigation that can often get expensive, but there is the psychological struggle as well. Why am I not worthy of equal protection under the law? Why is it that others do not even notice the disparate impact of the law? Or, even worse, why is it that those who do notice, seem to not care? / What inevitably comes with these types of reformist strategies is an emotional struggle, namely, an inferiority complex that makes the victimized individual stop and wonder — who put the white man in charge of my body? Appeals to the federal government to repeal discriminatory acts that deny minorities rights becomes analogous to asking whites to eliminate such policies and to allow others access to the same rights they enjoy every day. The racial state becomes in charge of what nonwhites can and cannot do, and when nonwhites continue to go to whites asking them to pass certain policies, nonwhites further legitimate this system of power relations. It is difficult to see how true equality can be achieved wider such a system. / B. Missing the Root Cause: The Racial State / Omi and Winant further support this claim and explain that it is not merely individual policies passed by the United States federal government that are racist, but that racial oppression is a structure of the government itself.10 They describe this structure as the "racial state" to show that the state does not merely support racism, but rather, it supports the concept of race itself. As will be discussed later in this paper, Omi and Winant explain how the state is the agent that has defined race, and that this definition has evolved over time, to maintain the concept of race and support racism. / Given the existence of the racial state, **Omi and Winant critique reformist strategies as falling short of achieving normative goals of eliminating racism since the reforms merely get re-equilibriated**. A look at the history of racial victories in the United States further supports this critique. Racial victories for one minority were often made possible only with the entrapment of another racial minority. For example, while many celebrate the racial victory of the 1954 Brown v. Board decision, many fail to see this happened the same year as Operation Wetback, which shifted the racial discrimination to a different population, removing close to one million illegal immigrants, mostly Mexicans, from the United States.11 Moreover, soon after the ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments granting citizenship and suffrage to Blacks. Congress chose to deny citizenship to Chinese immigrants.12 In 1941, shortly after the establishment of the Committee on Fair Employment Practices permitted Blacks into defense industries, Japanese Americans were taken from their homes and sent off to internment camps. Pei-te Lien argues that all of these "coincidences" support critiques of reformist strategies that merely target individual policies, since without challenging the racial state as a whole, even the **elimination of these individual policies will fail to eliminate racism, as they will simply replicate themselves or shift elsewhere and target racial minorities in different ways**.14 / C. Separatist Movements / This helps to explain why political activists began adopting other more revolutionary strategies. Contrary to Martin Luther King Jr. and many of his followers during the Civil Rights Movement, the Black Power Movement emerged and began advocating for more separatist strategies that rejected making reformist appeals to the United States federal government. In his speech "The Ballot or the Bullet," Malcolm X argued: / When you take your case to Washington D.C., you're taking it to the criminal who's responsible: it's like miming from the wolf to the fox. They're all in cahoots together. They all work political chicanery and make you look like a chump before the eyes of the world. Here you are walking around in America, getting ready to be drafted and sent abroad, like a tin soldier, and when you get over there, people ask you what you are fighting for, and you have to stick your tongue in your cheek. No, take Uncle Sam to court, take him before the world. / Critics of reformist strategies, such as Malcolm X, understood the United States as being inherently racial and thus incapable of reform. They use the "coincidences" listed above as evidence to support this claim. They view the United States federal government as a racial state that will merely continue to define race in new and more modernized ways, ensuring the permanence of racism with the passage of new policies supporting these definitions. This is why they believe reformists are wrong to attack individual policies, rather than the racial state itself. / For example, the legal enforcement of a racially discriminatory housing covenant may have been justified due to a racist belief that members of the minority race restricted from acquiring title within that neighborhood is inferior to the Caucasian race. More specifically, one might support said covenant because one believes the inferiority of that minority race and the potential they might become your neighbor will result in a decrease in the fair market value of your property. After vigorous ongoing protests from civil rights activists, that particular law enforcing those covenants might get repealed. However, the reason for the repeal of that law might arise not from an ethical epiphany, but rather an economic rationale in which the homeowner is shown his property value will remain unaffected, or perhaps even increase. Thus, that particular act may get repealed, but the policymakers responsible for its original draft will still be in power, and will maintain the same beliefs that motivated that piece of legislation in the first place. Because there has been no ethical realization of the injustice in their conduct, the chances remain high that they will construct new, apparently different but equally discriminatory policies that will force activists to join forces once again and continue the same fight. / This is why it is not the individual policies, but the government itself that is the "preeminent site of racial conflict."17 Omi and Winant's proposal of the "racial state" views the government as "inherently racial," meaning it does not simply intervene in racial conflicts, but it is the locus of racial conflict.18 In addition to structuring conceptions of race, the government in the United States is in and of itself racially structured.19 State policies govern racial politics, heavily influencing the public on how race should be viewed. The ways in which it does so changes over time, often taking on a more invisible nature. For example, Omi and Winant describe the racial state as treating race in different ways throughout different periods of time, first as a biologically based essence, and then as an ideology, etc. These policies are followed by racial remedies offered by government institutions, in response to political pressures and in accordance to these different treatments of race, varying in degree depending on the magnitude of the threats those pressures pose to the order of society. Notable achievements during the Civil Rights Movement have served as a double-edged sword. While the reformist strategies utilized during that period helped make certain advances possible, it also drove other more overt expressions of racism underground. These more invisible instantiations of racial injustice are far more difficult to identify than its previously more explicit forms. **Praising these victories risks giving off the illusion that the fight is over and that racism is a description of the past**. / For example, the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment gave off the illusion that all citizens thereafter had equal access to the right to vote. Those who supported its ratification now felt entitled to the moral credentials necessary to legitimize their ability to express racially prejudiced attitudes.21 For example, voter turnout today remains relatively low for Asian-Americans, and many blame this on cultural differences between Asians and Americans.22 Asian-Americans are labeled as apathetic in the political community and they themselves have been attributed the blame for relatively low representation of Asian-Americans in the government today.23 This however, ignores the way in which other more invisible practices serve to obstruct Asian-Americans from being able to exercise their right to vote. / Research by the United States Election Assistance Commission by the Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers University, for example, indicates that restrictive voter identification requirements have effectively served to disenfranchise Asian Pacific Islanders (APIs) from voting.24 In the 2004 election, researchers found APIs in states where voters were required to present proper identification at the polls were 8.5% less likely to vote.25 This study confirmed that voter ID requirements prevented a large number of APIs from voting.26 / Voter suppression tactics also play a large role in the disenfranchisement of APIs. According to a Voter Intimidation and Vote Suppression briefing paper by Demos, a national public policy center, an estimated 50 Asian Americans were selectively challenged at the polls in Alabama during August of 2004, as being ineligible to vote due to insufficient English-speaking skills.27 Many states have allowed this selective challenging of voters to take place at the polls, resulting in a feeling of fear, intimidation, and embarrassment among APIs, driving them away from the polls. / The danger in treasuring monumental victories such as the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment becomes apparent when people interpret this ratification as an indication that voting discrimination is no longer a problem, and that if the voter turnout of Asian-Americans is consistently low, it must be because they are politically apathetic or disinterested in American ideals. Because they originally supported the ratification of the amendment, whites can now feel as if they have the moral credentials to make conclusions such as the cultural differences rationale. The same can be seen after courts ordered the desegregation of public schools and after affirmative action programs became more widespread. People began assuming African-Americans now had an equal opportunity for education and that if they did not succeed, it must be a reflection of their intelligence or work-ethic, failing to see the ways the problem has not been solved, but rather disguised itself in other costumes, such as tracking programs in schools or teachers who view their presence as merely "affirmative action babies" and expect them to fail. / **One might ask, then, why can we not change the racial state one policy at a time?** Perhaps one could first work to gain the right to vote, and then move on to combat discriminatory identification requirements and political scare tactics. It would not seem entirely implausible to assume that the success of individual piecemeal reforms within the government could eventually result in a transformation of the institution itself. However, simply eliminating discriminatory policies is insufficient for an overhaul of a racial institution. / Understanding the motivating reasons for the elimination of individual racist policies is a critical factor in determining the success of a movement. While one justification for passing the Fifteenth Amendment might consist of arguments in favor of equality and exposing racial injustice, another justification might involve maintaining order and minimizing disruption, which is important to the federal government and its ability to run smoothly. Thus, the government often seeks out ways to normalize society through eliminating disruptions to preserve order. When those being denied certain rights grow significantly discontent, they rebel and become disruptions to the functioning of white, civil society. This can take the form of civil disobedience, such as protests, peaceful demonstrations, petitions, letters to the government, etc., or more revolutionary measures, such as damaging government offices or violently harassing officials to acknowledge the injustices and change policy. / All of these measures, however peaceful or violent, disrupt society. A town cannot run smoothly if protesters are filling up the streets or blocking frequently-used road paths, and most certainly cannot run smoothly if town halls are being lit on fire. Thus, in order to return to the desired homeostasis, those in power may often compromise and offer to rectify the situation at hand by granting rights to individuals through changes in legislation in order to appease them and "eliminate" the disruption (the protests, demonstrations, etc.). The lack of effort made towards protecting these rights bolsters Bell's argument that these reforms serve more of a symbolic value rather than functional. If still operating under the racial state, these piecemeal reforms will fail to solve the original racial injustices in the long term, as they will only succeed in establishing a new unstable equilibrium, only to be followed with the replication of new racial problems.28 These new problems will once again create resentment, generate protest, and the cycle will begin to replicate itself, ensuring the permanence of racism. Omi and Winant term this cycle of continuous disruption and restoration of order as the trajectory of racial politics.29 This trajectory supports the treatment of racism as inevitable since even if the racial state mitigates racial disruption over a particular policy and "restores order," another policy based off a new definition of race will emerge triggering another racial disruption, continuing this cycle of racial politics.

#### This flips all their education arguments – regardless of how they articulate their micro-level demand, their discourse is inexorably tied with the macro structures of whiteness.

Pierre Schlag, Professor of Law @ the University of Colorado, 1990, “Normative and Nowhere to Go,” Lexis-Nexis

All of this can seem very funny. That's because it is very funny. It is also deadly serious. It is deadly serious, because all this normative legal thought, as Robert Cover explained, takes place in a field of pain and death. n56 And in a very real sense Cover was right. Yet as it takes place, normative legal thought is playing language games -- utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays, and thus, utterly uninterested in considering its own rhetorical and political contributions (or lack thereof) to the field of pain and death. To be sure, normative legal thinkers are often genuinely concerned with reducing the pain and the death. However, the problem is not what normative legal thinkers do with normative legal thought, but what normative legal thought does with normative legal thinkers. What is missing in normative legal thought is any serious questioning, let alone tracing, of the relations that the practice, the rhetoric, the routine of normative legal thought have (or do not have) to the field of pain and death. / And there is a reason for that: Normative legal thought misunderstands its own situation. Typically, normative legal thought understands itself to be outside the field of pain and death and in charge of organizing and policing that field. It is as if the action of normative legal thought could be separated from the background field of pain and death. This theatrical distinction is what allows normative legal thought its own self-important, self-righteous, self-image -- its congratulatory sense of its own accomplishments and effectiveness. / All this self-congratulation works very nicely so long as normative legal [\*188] thought continues to imagine itself as outside the field of pain and death and as having effects within that field. n57 Yet it is doubtful this image can be maintained. It is not so much the case that normative legal thought has effects on the field of pain and death -- at least not in the direct, originary way it imagines. Rather, it is more the case that normative legal thought is the pattern, is the operation of the bureaucratic distribution and the institutional allocation of the pain and the death. n58 And apart from the leftover ego-centered rationalist rhetoric of the eighteenth century (and our routine), there is nothing at this point to suggest that we, as legal thinkers, are in control of normative legal thought. / The problem for us, as legal thinkers, is that the normative appeal of normative legal thought systematically turns us away from recognizing that normative legal thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate. The problem for us is that normative legal thought, rather than assisting in the understanding of present political and moral situations, stands in the way. It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic -- its own fantastic understanding of the political and moral scene. n59 Until normative legal thought begins to deal with its own paradoxical postmodern rhetorical situation, it will remain something of an irresponsible enterprise. In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with individual humanist subjects who think themselves empowered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions of bureaucratic practices -- academic and otherwise. / To the extent possible, it is important to avoid this kind of category mistake. For instance, it is important to understand that your automobile insurance adjuster is not simply some updated version of the eighteenth century \*189 individual humanist subject. Even though the insurance adjuster will quite often engage you in normative talk-- arguing with you about responsibility, fairness, fault, allocation of blame, adequacy of compensation, and the like-- he is unlikely to be terribly receptive or susceptible to any authentic normative dialogue. His normative competence, his normative sensitivity, is scripted somewhere else. It is important to be clear about these things. The contemporary lawyer, for instance, may talk the normative rhetoric of the eighteenth century individual humanist subject. But make no mistake: This normative or humanist rhetoric is very likely the unfolding of bureaucratic logic. The modern lawyer is very often a kind of meta-insurance adjuster. And that makes you and me, as legal academics, trainers of meta-insurance adjusters. This is perhaps an unpleasant realization. One of the most important effects of normative legal thought is to intercede here so that we, as legal academics, do not have to confront this unpleasant realization. Normative legal thought allows us to pretend that we are preparing our students to become Atticus Finch [FN61] while we are in fact training people who will enter the meta-insurance adjustment business. For our students, this role-confusion is unlikely to be very funny. It will get even less so upon their graduation -- when they learn that Atticus Finch has been written out of the script. For us, of course, it is a pleasant fantasy to think we are teaching Atticus Finch. When the fantasy is over, it becomes one hell of a category mistake. And in the rude transition from the one to the other, Atticus Finch can quickly turn into Dan Quayle. In fact, if you train your students to become Atticus Finch, they will likely end up as Dan Quayle – cognitively defenseless against the regimenting and monitoring practices of bureaucratic institutions. Atticus Finch, as admirable as he may be, has none of the cognitive or critical resources necessary to understand the duplicities of the bureaucratic networks within which we operate. Apart from the fantasies of the legal academy, there is no longer a place in America for a lawyer like Atticus Finch. There is nothing for him to do here -- nothing he can do. He is a moral character in a world where the role of moral thought has become at best highly ambivalent, a normative thinker in a world where normative legal thought is already largely the bureaucratic logic of institutions.

# 2NC

## K

### Edelman

#### Leftist discourse of ‘reform’ exterminates queerness—fetishizes the ever-distant future and assimilates radical queer oppositionality.

Lee Edelman; 1-00-1998; Professor of English @ Tufts University; “The Future is Kid Stuff: Queer Theory, Disidentification, and the Death Drive”; p. 22

The consequences of such a compulsory identification both of and with the child as the culturally pervasive emblem of the motivating end, albeit endlessly postponed, of every political vision as a vision of futurity, must weigh upon the consideration of a queer oppositional politics. For the only queerness that queer sexualities could ever hope to claim would spring from their determined opposition to this underlying structure of the political—their opposition, that is, to the fantasmatic ambition of achieving symbolic closure through the marriage of identity to futurity in order to reproduce the social subject. Conservatives, of course, understand this in ways most liberals never can, since conservatism profoundly imagines the radical rupturing of the social fabric, while liberalism conservatively clings to a faith in its limitless elasticity. The discourse of the right thus tends toward a greater awareness of, and an insistence on, the figural logics implicit in the social relations we inhabit and enact, while the discourse of the left tends to understand better the capacity of the symbolic to accommodate change by displacing those figural logics onto history as the unfolding of narrative sequence.

# 1NR

## K

### AT: Permutation

#### Rhetorical silence normalizes heterosexuality as an invisible norm that leads to interpersonal and social violence

Afshar – ‘4 – Department of Political Science, Syracuse University (Ahoura Afshar, 2004, “The Invisible Presence of Sexuality in the Classroom,” Interrupting Heteronormativity, http://www.syr.edu/gradschool/pdf/resourcebooksvideos/Heteronormativity.pdf, p. 33-37)

Should discussions of sexuality be included in the classroom?1 The easy answer might be no: it is not 'relevant' to the subject matter of most courses except perhaps to those that explicitly engage with human sexuality, such as Child and Family Studies, Sociology, or Women's Studies. Moreover, this reasoning might go, given estimates that within the general population less than ten percent identify as non-heterosexual, there's a good chance that in a class of sixty students everyone is straight. / It is this kind of perspective, however, that not only contributes to the invisibility of LGBT students, but it also constructs and reinforces heteronormativity in our classrooms and across campus.2 LGBT students (and teachers) ARE present in our classrooms—whether we choose to see them or not—and it is their very invisible presence that demonstrates the power of heteronormativity to mask that which does not conform, and to naturalize that which does. This is a problem for both LGBT and heterosexual students and teachers alike. Heteronormative assumptions and practices regulate the beliefs, behaviors, and desires of ALL of us, restricting the range of possibilities of identification and expression for ALL of us, to such an extent that even momentary and joyful expressions (e.g. the heterosexual man singing "I feel like a woman" in the Chevy commercial discussed by Susan Adams) become sources of discomfort and fear. / Practices of regulation and restriction are integral to creating and maintaining hierarchies of power, which in turn limit the kinds of learning and teaching that can happen in our classrooms. As responsible teachers, we know that our pedagogical theories and practices need to expand the kinds of learning opportunities we provide students, not restrict them. In fact, the administration of this university recognizes the importance of this by emphasizing the link between a rich intellectual climate and a diversity of perspectives and people: "[. . .] diversity in our student body, faculty, and staff has far-ranging and significant educational benefits for all non-minorities and minorities alike" (Syracuse University Academic Plan, 2001). Particular strategies to create more inclusive curricula have been developed and implemented in programs and departments university-wide because "[s]tudents in diverse learning environments learn more, and have higher levels of satisfaction and greater degrees of civic engagements. They are better able to appreciate the ideas of others and they are better prepared to enter the world they will lead" (SU Academic Plan, 2001). This diversity of students, faculty, and ideas includes: "race, ethnicity, gender, age, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, and physical and mental ability" (Syracuse University Human Resources, emphasis added). / In principle, then, SU values diversity. Taking a closer look at what diversity means and how it is "practiced," however, exposes some gaps between these principles and actual, everyday classroom procedures, particularly when that "diversity" topic is sexual orientation. It's important to note that sexual orientation is a term that does not reference a particular set of people; it's not only about LGBT people, but also non-LGBT, or heterosexual, people. Why is this broader definition of sexual orientation important? Because the sexual orientation of heterosexuality is simultaneously institutionalized and naturalized to the extent that it becomes the invisible norm against which all other sexual orientations, identifications, or expressions are named "abnormal." The issue of "invisibility," then, isn't just about LGBT students and teachers; it's about the ways in which our assumptions about (hetero)sexuality are invisible to us. And we carry these assumptions into our classrooms. As a result, heteronormativity is reproduced, most often unconsciously, through our own everyday classroom practices. Rather than expanding the kinds of learning opportunities we create space for, we inadvertently reinforce a regulated and restrictive framework for understanding the complexity of human sexuality. / II. Ten years ago, research with Syracuse University LGBT students showed that one third of the respondents would have gone to another school had they had sufficient information on the circumstances surrounding LGBT issues on campus (Sherrill & Hardesty, 1994). Although the situation has changed since then, this statistic may still be accurate to some degree. Bias against those who are perceived to bend the rules of heteronormative behavior pervades SU's campus climate. There are still cases of verbal abuse and physical attacks against LGBT students on this campus: instances of name-calling, of derogatory comments written on doors, dry-erase boards, or computer desktops in residence halls and on campus, and even of physical assault on the basis of perceived sexual orientation (Syracuse University Public Safety, 2004; see also Byrnes, 2003; Wightman, 2003). "Fifty-one percent of bias-related incidents reported last fall [2003] had to do with sexual orientation, while 27 percent concerned gender" (Moritz, 2004). These statistics show that many LGBT students face problems that their straight peers do not. Non-straight students often experience a complex process that involves questioning their sexual orientation, achieving a comfortable sexual identity, coming out, and self-acceptance. They often experience loneliness, isolation, and exclusion in this process. And, they are often targets of homophobia simply because the heterosexual majority claims an exclusive version of sexuality and morality due to the regulative powers of heteronorms. Despite these facts, there is silence in our classrooms when it comes to sexuality. It appears as if no one wants to recognize this silence as a problem, let alone discuss ways of addressing it. Why? / One reason there are so many misconceptions about sexuality is that it is not talked about in U.S. educational systems. It is not generally included in primary schools because, it is argued, it is too early for children to learn about sexuality (Fine, 1988). It is often not included in high school curricula because, the argument goes, adolescents are at a crucial age and should not be exposed to the "promotion of sexuality," especially non-heterosexuality. It is not included in college since it is not 'relevant' to the subject matter in most courses. But, sexuality is relevant: it is not just about sex; it is a critical aspect of life, a primary means through which we identify ourselves, though this identification is usually unconscious for people who identify as "heterosexual" because heterosexuality is the assumed norm, and thus invisible as a "marker" of identity. For LGBT-identified people, however, sexuality is a conscious "marker" of identity; describing oneself in terms such as "gay," "lesbian," "bisexual," "transgender," or "queer" is fundamental to the process of "coming out." Thus, sexuality is not simply a "private" aspect of individuals, but is intimately connected with power relations in our culture, and influences much of our social experiences. There is much misinformation and bias regarding matters of sexuality. There are students with "non-traditional" sexual identities whose needs are not usually met. Only a tiny fraction of the entire student body may take courses that directly address sexuality and the privileges it awards, denies, and limits access to, and hence the majority of students will never discuss the politics of sexuality in any classroom. But it is a mistake to think that this is a problem only for LGBT students. / A social stigma has been attached to sexualities other than heterosexuality, bred out of the myths and misinformation this volume is trying to "interrupt." Hence, some people find moral justification in being violent towards non-straights. Emphasizing the shamefulness of same-sex desire, this logic simply ignores the fact that most people have some sort of "non-heterosexual" fantasy or experience at some point in their lifetime (Laumann et. al., 1994). One may have such experiences without having a LGBT orientation. Being unaware of such facts may cause heterosexuals to experience these fantasies with immeasurable anxiety, dreading that they might be gay. / Gay-bashing may also be seen as a way of proving one's masculinity. The pressure to "prove one's heterosexual manhood" can lead to the need to disparage gays in all ways. This kind of sexual stereotyping not only encourages violence against those who are perceived to be LGBT, but also causes psychological dissonance for straight youth, who are endeavoring to comply with rigid gender roles. It is because of these rigid gender roles that sexuality is an issue that all students face, regardless of their sexual orientation.

#### Their focus on racism obscures heteronormative violence and naturalizes it in society

Hutchinson – ‘99 – Assistant Professor, Southern Methodist University School of Law (Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Winter, 1999, “Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics,” 47 Buffalo L. Rev. 1, lexis)

In addition to placing anti-heterosexism beyond the domain of civil rights policy, Butler's analysis also disparages gay and lesbian equality by marginalizing gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered of color. Butler's attempt to "distinguish" blackness from "homosexuality," like the analogical approach employed by white gay and lesbian activists and theorists, treats blackness and "homo-sexuality" (and black subjugation and homophobia) as unconnected. As a result, Butler's framework erases black gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender experience and places black heterosexuals and white gays and lesbians at the center of analysis. Ironically, Butler criticizes white gay and lesbian activists for omitting "black homosexuals" from discussion through their use of the analogies. n173 His own analysis, however, makes the same omission. For example, after locating "distinctions" between "homosexuality" and blackness, Butler concludes that the "issue of social change relating to homosexuality must be divorced from issues relating to the history of blacks in America." n174 This conclusion essentializes black identity by ignoring the multiplicity of experiences within black communities. Black gay experiences, for example, cannot be "divorced" from black history. Furthermore, Butler, at various points in his analysis, explicitly limits his observations to white gays and lesbians and black heterosexuals. n175 By erasing black gays and lesbians, issues of their multidimensional oppression, the relevance of gay and lesbian equality to "black" liberation, and a discussion of what the repeal of the military's anti-gay policy might mean for gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered of color are excluded from discussion.

#### **This turns their advocacy – failure to acknowledge queer bodies retrenches power structures**

Hutchinson – ‘99 – Assistant Professor, Southern Methodist University School of Law (Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Winter, 1999, “Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics,” 47 Buffalo L. Rev. 1, lexis)

My analysis expands the emergent race-sexuality critiques and my own ongoing analysis of racial and sexual oppression n24 by directing the focus of this critical scholarship to anti-racist legal theory and political discourse. My mission here is to raise and engage, in the context of anti-racism, the compelling observations of the various internal critiques of identity politics. Accordingly, this Article endeavors to demonstrate that anti-racist scholars often exhibit a misunderstanding of (or a lack of concern for) the relationship between racial oppression and other forms of subordination, particularly heterosexism and patriarchy, and that they often perpetuate heterosexism and marginalize gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people of color in their work. As an empirical setting for discussing these claims, this Article examines the social problem of systemic violence against oppressed social groups, the anti-racist and legal responses to this violence, and more generalized discussions of heterosexism and gay and lesbian equality within anti-racist discourse and critical race theory. / The problem of violence against oppressed social groups provides an excellent setting for exploring the multidimensionality of subordination and for developing a challenge to anti-racist essentialism. As this Article reveals, published accounts and available statistical data regarding oppressive violence targeting gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people of color indicate that much of this violence involves the use of sexual subordination to perpetuate racial harms. Despite the deployment of sexualized violence against gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered of color to further racial oppression, anti-racist theorists have not constructed a substantial critique of heterosexism in their work, nor has the issue of sexual justice for gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people been incorporated into the agendas of most anti-racist political organizations. In fact, several anti-racist theorists have questioned the importance of including sexual identity as a protected category within existing civil rights law. / The exclusion or marginalization of issues of homosexuality from and within anti-racist discourse stands in stark contrast to the vigilance with which anti-racism has historically unveiled and challenged the sexualized nature of racial oppression. Yet, much of the historic attention paid to sexualized racial aggression has centered around heterosexual, usually male, victimization. By responding to heterosexually based racial violence and ignoring homophobic forms of racial violence, anti-racism marginalizes gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people of color, allows racial oppression to escape the challenge of anti-racist advocacy, and creates a discriminatory and heteronormative model of racial justice.

### Severance

#### Permutation is a reason to reject the team—its contradictory nature is an embodiment of whiteness

Nakayama & Krizek ‘95 Asst Prof, Dept of Communication @ Arizona State Univ. Asst Prof, Dept of Communication @ St. Louis Univ. 1995 Thomas K. -& Robert L.-; “WHITENESS: A Strategic Rhetoric”; QUATERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH 81, 291-309

Whether or not one discursively positions oneself as “white,” there is little room for maneuvering out of the power relations imbedded in whiteness. Whiteness, stated or unstated, in any of its various forms, leaves one invoking the historically constituted and systematically exercised power relations. This creates an enormous problem for those in the center who do not want to reinforce the hegemonic position of the center and for those elsewhere who would challenge this assemblage and its influence on their lives. As Foucault observed, discursive formations are replete with contradictions. In the assemblage of whiteness, we find that these *contradictions are an important element in the construction of whiteness*, as it is by these contradictions that whiteness is able to maneuver through and around challenges to its space. The dynamic element of whiteness is a crucial aspect of the persuasive power of this strategic rhetoric. *It garners its representational power through its ability to be many things at once,* to be universal and particular, to be a source of identity and difference. The discourses of nationality, for example, run counter to those of scientific classification; yet the emergence of a racialized nation has been marked out time and again in the U.S. and elsewhere. The discourses that define whiteness through its historical relationships to Europe further problematize these discursive movements. Whiteness eludes essentialism through this multiplicity and dynamism, while at the same moment containing within it the discourses of essentialism that classify it scientifically or define it negatively. Our point here is not that there are contradictions within this discursive assemblage. Rather our principal thesis is that these contradictions are central to the dynamic lines of power that resecure the *strategic*, not tactical *space of whiteness*, making it all the more necessary to map whiteness. Whiteness is complex and problematic; yet in communication interactions we are expected to understand what it means when someone says “white” or “American” or even “All-American.” It is perhaps when whites use whiteness in communicating with other whites that the lines of power are particularly occluded, yet resilient as ever. This also has significant implications for communication researchers.