# Round 4---NDCA

# 1NC

## 1NC—vs. Marist AB

### 1

#### Economic engagement must be quid-pro-quo

Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books]

In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy. The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power. The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China. The tactics of economic engagement should promote China’s economic integration through negotiations on trade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged. The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8 [To footnotes] 8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in Fareed Zakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).

### 2

#### The affirmative’s attempt to seal humanity off from existential risk is grounded in anxiety and a fear of the contingencies of the world that denies all that makes life worth living. The alternative is to love like we’ve never been hurt—vulnerability is a pre-requisite to finding value in existence – the alternative is to embrace the squo

Martha Nussbaum, xx-xx-1994, Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics, University of Chicago, “Pity and Mercy: Nietzsche’s Stoicism”

Finally, we arrive at what is perhaps the deepest question about the anti-pity position: is its ideal of strength really a picture of strength? What should we think about a human being who insists on caring deeply for nothing that [they] [themselves] [do] not control; who refuses to love others in ways that open him to serious risks of pain and loss; who cultivates the hardness of self-command as a bulwark against all the reversals that life can bring? We could say, with Nietzsche, that this is a strong person. But there clearly is another way to see things. For there is a strength of a specifically human sort in the willingness to acknowledge some truths about one's situation: one's mortality, one's finitude, the limits and vulnerabilities of one's body, one's need for food and drink and shelter and friendship. There is a strength in the willingness to form attachments that can go wrong and cause deep pain, in the willingness to invest oneself in the world in a way that opens one's whole life up to the changes of the world, for good and for bad. There is, in short, a strength in the willingness to be porous rather than totally hard, in the willingness to be a mortal animal living in the world. The Stoic, by contrast, looks like a fearful person, a person who is determined to seal [them]self off from risk, even at the cost of loss of love and value. / Nietzsche knows, or should know, this. For a central theme in his work is that Christianity has taught us bad habits of self-insulation and self-protection, alienating us from our love of the world and all of its chanciness, all of its becoming. On this account we have become small in virtue, and will remain small, unless we learn once again to value our own actions as ends, and our worldly existence as their natural home. I think that in the end Nietzsche fails to go far enough with this critique. He fails, that is, to see what the Stoicism he endorses has in common with the Christianity he criticizes, what "hardness" has in common with otherworldliness: both are forms of self-protection, both express a fear of this world and its contin-gencies, both are incompatible with the deepest sort of love, whether per-sonal or political.

### 3

#### Cuban reforms are successful now—the plan puts reforms on overdrive which collapses the transition.

Piccone 12—vice president and director for the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institute, served on the National Security Council (Ted, “Cuba Is Changing, Slowly but Surely,” The Brookings Institute, 1/19, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/01/19-cuba-piccone)//BJ

A closer look, however, reveals something more profound—a wholesale mental shift, outlined clearly by President Raul Castro over the last two years, that the time has come to move the Cuban people from wholesale dependence on the state to a new era of individual responsibility and citizenship. This is going to take time. The economic reforms or “updating” of Cuba’s Soviet-style economic system, approved last spring at the Communist Party’s first National Congress in 14 years, are just beginning to be enacted. They include an expansion of licenses for private enterprise (over 350,000 have been granted), opening more idle land to farmers and cooperatives, allowing businesses to hire employees, empowering people to buy and sell their houses and cars, and opening new lines of credit with no legal ceilings on how much Cubans can borrow. Non-state actors are allowed now to sell unlimited services and commodities directly to state-owned enterprises and joint ventures, thereby opening new channels of commercial activity between farmers and tourist hotels, for example. Think Viet Nam or China. The reforms include tough measures too, like shrinking the buying power of the longstanding ration card that every Cuban gets to purchase subsidized basic goods, cutting unemployment benefits, and eventually dismissing anywhere from 500,000 to one million employees from the state sector as bureaucratic middlemen become obsolete and tax revenues rise. These changes, while painful, are reason enough to be optimistic about Cuba’s economic future. But something much more fundamental is at work—a turn away from government control of pricing and subsidizing products throughout the economy to a more decentralized framework of subsidizing persons based on need. At heart, the Castro government is prepared to move Cuba from a society based on equity of results to equality of opportunity, infused with a culture of humanism. Not that Cuba’s system ever offered true equality, as one taxi driver reminded me as we drove down Havana’s famous seaside Malecon. The door, however, is now opening wider to the inevitable rise in inequality that comes from capitalism, even restrained forms of it. Whether one is able to prosper as a self-employed restauranteur, or is the beneficiary of generous relatives sending remittances and goods home from Miami, new gradations in Cuba’s economic and social strata are on the way. As long as someone arrives at their wealth legally and pays their taxes, assured one senior party official, they are free to become rich. The big question for Cuba’s leaders today is whether they can bring their people with them down this new, uncertain path after five decades of Cuban-style communism. If reforms happen too quickly, it could cause excessive dislocation and unhappiness and potentially destabilize the regime. Already bureaucrats who have something to lose under the new system are resisting change, much to Raul Castro’s chagrin. If the pace of change is too slow, on the other hand, budding entrepreneurs, the middle class and disaffected youth, who have no overt commitment to the values of the 1959 revolution, may give up sooner and head to greener pastures in the United States, Spain or Canada. As it is, Cubans are leaving the island in droves to join their families in Florida and beyond, beneficiaries of U.S. policies that grant Cubans preferred immigration benefits once their feet reach American soil, and of Spanish laws that grant some Cubans Spanish citizenship.

#### That destabilizes the Carribbean.

Gorrell, 2005 (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074>)

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis. Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably. In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems. U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations.

#### Causes LNG attacks.

Anthony T. Bryan1 and Stephen E. Flynn2, 10-21-2001, director of the Caribbean program @ the North/South Center1, senior fellow @ the Council on Foreign Relations2, “Terrorism, Porous Borders, and Homeland Security: The Case for U.S.-Caribbean Cooperation,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/4844/terrorism\_porous\_borders\_and \_homeland\_ security.html

Terrorist acts can take place anywhere. The Caribbean is no exception. Already the linkages between drug trafficking and terrorism are clear in countries like Colombia and Peru, and such connections have similar potential in the Caribbean. The security of major industrial complexes in some Caribbean countries is vital. Petroleum refineries and major industrial estates in Trinidad, which host more than 100 companies that produce the majority of the world’s methanol, ammonium sulphate, and 40 percent of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), are vulnerable targets. Unfortunately, as experience has shown in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, terrorists are likely to strike at U.S. and European interests in Caribbean countries. Security issues become even more critical when one considers the possible use of Caribbean countries by terrorists as bases from which to attack the United States. An airliner hijacked after departure from an airport in the northern Caribbean or the Bahamas can be flying over South Florida in less than an hour. Terrorists can sabotage or seize control of a cruise ship after the vessel leaves a Caribbean port. Moreover, terrorists with false passports and visas issued in the Caribbean may be able to move easily through passport controls in Canada or the United States. (To help counter this possibility, some countries have suspended "economic citizenship" programs to ensure that known terrorists have not been inadvertently granted such citizenship.) Again, Caribbean countries are as vulnerable as anywhere else to the clandestine manufacture and deployment of biological weapons within national borders.

#### Outweighs nuclear use.

Lovin and Lovin 1 Amory B. Lovin, Chief Scientist of the Rocky Mountain Institute, and L. Hunter Lovin, President – National Capitalism and Co-Founder – Rocky Mountain Institute, “Brittle Power: Energy Strategy for National Security”, 2001, http://verdilivorno.it/doc\_gnl/198204\_Brittle\_Power\_intro\_GNL\_note.pdf

About nine percent of such a tankerload of LNG will probably, if spilled onto water, boil to gas in about five minutes. It does not matter how cold the water is; it will be at least two hundred twenty-eight Fahrenheit degrees hotter than the LNG, which it will therefore cause to boil violently.) The resulting gas, however, will be so cold that it will still be denser than air. It will therefore flow in a cloud or plume along the surface until it reaches an ignition source. Such a plume might extend at least three miles downwind from a large tanker spill within ten to twenty minutes.4 It might ultimately reach much farther—perhaps six to twelve miles.5 If not ignited, the gas is asphyxiating. If ignited, it will burn to completion with a turbulent diffusion flame reminiscent of the 1937 Hindenberg disaster but about a hundred times as big. Such a fireball would burn everything within it, and by its radiant heat would cause third-degree burns and start fires a mile or two away.6 An LNG fireball can blow through a city, creating “a very large number of ignitions and explosions across a wide area. No present or foreseeable equipment can put out a very large [LNG]... fire.”7 The energy content of a single standard LNG tanker (one hundred twenty-five thousand cubic meters) is equivalent to seven-tenths of a megaton of TNT, or about fifty-five Hiroshima bombs.

### 4

#### Transition to an ethanol economy catalyzes the use of steam reforming processes for ethanol use in fuel cells.

Prakash D. Vaidya1 and Alirio E. Rodrigues2, 3-15-2006, Ph.D Tech in Chemical Engineering, Institute of Chemical Technology, Mumbai, Department of Chemical Engineering1, University of Porto, Department of Chemical Engineering2, “Insight into steam reforming of ethanol to produce hydrogen for fuel cells,” <http://www.researchgate.net/publication/244361886_Insight_into_steam_reforming_of_ethanol_to_produce_hydrogen_for_fuel_cells>

Ethanol can be prepared from agricultural residues and hence is a renewable resource. Its production is simple and cheap and hence steam reforming of ethanol to produce hydrogen for fuel cells is attractive. Process engineering aspects of ethanol steam reforming are discussed here. High temperatures, low pressures and high water-to-ethanol ratios in the feed favor hydrogen production. Ni, Co, Ni/Cu and noble metal (Pd, Pt, Rh)-supported catalysts are promising. Major concerns are fast catalyst coking and formation of by-products such as methane, diethyl ether and acetaldehyde. To overcome these problems, the process should be carried out in a two-layer fixed bed catalytic reactor: at first, ethanol should be dehydrogenated to acetaldehyde in presence of Cu-based catalyst at 573–673K and then this stream should be passed over a bed containing a mixture of Ni-based catalyst and a chemisorbent at low temperatures around 723K. The entire process of ethanol steam reforming coupled with selective CO2 removal by chemisorption will enable production of high-purity H2 and hence is very promising.

#### Ethanol steam reforming for fuel cells causes mass carbon monoxide production.

Cleantechnica Nathan, 7-17-2013, writer for CleanTechnica, “Ethanol Steam Reforming For Fuel Cells — Major Obstacle Overcome,” <http://cleantechnica.com/2013/07/17/ethanol-steam-reforming-fuel-cell/>

Ethanol steam reforming is a process whereby hydrogen gas can be generated directly within fuel cell systems by decomposing bioethanol — all that’s necessary are catalysts. The main appeal of the approach is that it would allow the continued use of our current gasoline delivery infrastructures, no need for new infrastructure. There are still some issues with the approach, though — primarily, the reality that its “multiple reaction pathways” can lead to the creation of toxic carbon monoxide byproducts which then damage the fuel cell membranes.

#### High carbon monoxide levels cause extinction.

William D. Euille et al, 4-23-2009, Mayor of Alexandria, Virginia, with the Alexandria City Council, prepared by the Office of Environmental Quality, Transportation and Environmental Services, City of Alexandria, “Alexandria’s State of the Air Report – Past, Present and Future,” <http://alexandriava.gov/uploadedFiles/tes/oeq/State%20of%20Air%20Report.pdf>

High CO levels can cause harmful health effects by reducing oxygen delivery to the body's organs (like the heart and brain) and tissues. When CO enters the bloodstream, it reduces the capacity of the body to deliver oxygen to its organs and tissues, thus depriving the body of an essential for life. The health threat from ambient CO is most serious for those who suffer from particular cardiovascular diseases. Elevated CO levels can lead to visual impairment, reduced work capacity, poor learning ability, and difficulty in the performance of complex tasks. At still higher levels, levels that can occur in the indoor environment, CO can lead to headaches and nausea, even in healthy persons.

### 5

#### [CP TEXT: The Department of Defense should substantially increase its investment in Mexican sugar for sugar to ethanol conversion at its military installations. The United States federal government should substantially increase its investment in Mexican non-corn biofuels.]

#### Mexico has sugar---CP solves.

Francisco Campos-Ortiz and Mariana Oviedo-Pacheco, 11-xx-2013, “Study on the Competitiveness of the Mexican Sugar Industry,” <http://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-discursos/publicaciones/documentos-de-investigacion/banxico/%7B8D769E82-BDFD-E7F7-C7A9-23B37D093D11%7D.pdf>

The importance of the sugar industry in Mexico first becomes clear through its share of the food industry’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The average value of sugar production in cycles 2006/07 through 2010/11 (the sugar cycle in Mexico runs from October 1 to September 30 of the following year) was 2.1 % of GDP of the food industry, reaching in 2011 a maximum of MXN 53,745 million, or 2.4% of GDP of the alluded industry. 2, 3 The contribution to the agricultural GDP of sugarcane—the crop from which sugar is produced in Mexico—has been at average levels of 7.8% over the 2006-2011 period, rising to 8.6% in 2011, or MXN 30,369 million. This places sugarcane as the second most valuable agricultural commodity in the country, preceded only by grain corn. Likewise, sugarcane constitutes one of the 10 major crops (out of approximately three hundred), judging by the surface of land that it covers, with a harvested area slightly over 710 thousand hectares—circa 3.9% of total harvested area in the agricultural cycle of 2011. 4 Sugarcane is a crop that grows in tropical or subtropical climates. Its shipment to sugar mills needs to be fast so as to avoid quality losses, which affects negatively the amount of sugar extracted. Based on these factors, sugarcane harvest and sugar production is concentrated in 15 states of Mexico with tropical and subtropical climates, among which Veracruz, San Luis Potosí and Jalisco stand out, with a combined contribution of almost 60% of the national production of sugarcane and sugar (see Table 1). 2

### 6

#### [CP TEXT: The Department of Defense should substantially increase its investment in Cuban sugar for sugar to methanol conversion at its military installations. The United States federal government should halt its investments in and support for ethanol biofuel conversion processes.]

#### It solves – methanol is a comparatively better biofuel than ethanol and doesn’t lead to steam reforming.

Patrick Takahashi, 6-10-2008, Director Emeritus with the Hawaii Natural Energy Institute of the University of Hawaii, former professor of engineering, was for 15 years director of the Hawaii Natural Energy Institute and co-founder of the Pacific International Center for High Technology Research, awarded the Bechtel Energy Award by the American Society of Civil Engineers, the Spark Matsunaga Memorial Award by the National Hydrogen Association and Ocean Pioneer Award by the Ocean Energy Council, “Ethanol Vs. Methanol,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/patrick-takahashi/ethanol-vs-methanol_b_106380.html>

Ethanol and biodiesel are dead, long live methanol! Methanol is the simplest alcohol, with one carbon atom; ethanol has two. Thus, given biomass, it should be cheaper to produce methanol than ethanol. Surely enough, in a comprehensive assessment Stone & Webster performed for the U.S. Department of Energy two decades ago, with the Hawaii Natural Energy Institute as an associate, this fact was confirmed. However, methanol has a few flaws. First, if drunk, you can go blind. But, who drinks gasoline? Second, there was a time when methanol was used as the feedstock to produce MTBE as a gasoline additive. MTBE is carcinogenic. Methanol is not, just don't drink it. Third, methanol can dissolve certain plastics and embrittle a some metals. So change the plastic and metals to avoid this problem. Methanol has only half the energy content per gallon of gasoline. Ethanol is two-thirds the intensity of gasoline. However, a fuel cell powered vehicle is at least twice the efficiency of an internal combustion engine, so the tank storage problem would be solved with a direct methanol fuel cell. The DMFC for portable electronics is said to soon replace batteries, so the technology is real. Methanol is the only biofuel capable of being directly fed to a fuel cell. Ethanol and gasoline need to first be passed through an expensive reformer. Plus, and this is difficult to accept, but true: one gallon of methanol has more hydrogen than one gallon of liquid hydrogen. Thus, the infrastructure is already largely in place for a methanol economy. George Olah in his book, Beyond Oil and Gas: The Methanol Economy, provides all the science and speculation you need. So why is our country and rest of world enamored over ethanol and biodiesel? In two words, the Farm Lobby. They came up with a politically brilliant scheme to use corn as an answer to imported oil. By so doing, the price of farm commodities recently doubled and more. Farmers are ecstatic! The poor around the world are suffering. Global food riots occurred, so the Farm Lobby thought, oh, no problem, we'll now, more and more, begin to convert the cellulose into ethanol, for, after all, those tax incentives are already in place. Well, if you have biomass and want a biofuel, you either hydrolyze and ferment it to produce ethanol, or gasify and catalyze it to make methanol. But the current mentality is stuck in an ethanol mode. Before farmers and their partners build fermented ethanol from biomass factories, they need to totally re-think the long term and just change the congressional language to say: ethanol, biodiesel and other renewable biofuels. Methanol does not even need to be mentioned. Otherwise, they will be creating a second herd of white elephants. With all this logic, won't methanol soon displace ethanol? No. Why? The Farm Lobby is so dominant that they will continue to insure for the continued use of ethanol for another decade because those facilities are already built, and they don't want them to suddenly become obsolete. Okay, fair enough, let those plants profitably phase out. But don't compound the problem by adding that second elephant herd. I might add that there has been a sudden surge of interest in biofuels from algae. Certainly, as algae can be from two to ten times more efficient in converting sunlight into biomass than any terrestrial crop; grown in the ocean where there is no irrigation problem (and Peak Freshwater looms on the horizon); if fed the cold water effluent from the ocean thermal energy conversion process there will not be a need for fertilizers (deep ocean effluents are high in just the right nutrients--farm fertilizers are manufactured from fossil fuels); and with genetic engineering, who knows where this option can go--this has been my dream for a third of a century. However, the eventual costs are unknown. Yes, do the R&D, but don't expect a magic solution within a decade. Biomethanol is real and immediately available for commercial prospecting.

### Warming

#### Warming is a hoax

**Bell 11** (Larry Bell, Architecture professor and columnist Larry Bell has a new book of climate science disinformation out, Climate of Corruption, January 5th 2011, Forbes.com, <http://www.forbes.com/2011/01/03/climate-change-hoax-opinions-contributors-larry-bell.html>//AXU)

I've encountered some folks who appear offended by the title of my new book Climate of Corruption: Politics and Power Behind the Global Warming Hoax. Why do you call it a "hoax"? they ask. Why not refer to the matter as a debate? The reason is quite simple: A debate describes a discussion in which participants competitively argue opposing points of view that are assumed to be based upon honest positions. A hoax is a deceptive act intended to hoodwink people through deliberate misinformation, including factual omissions. My book is about the latter. (And by the way, it can be ordered through primary vendors, and is currently being featured on "new releases" tables at 200 major Barnes and Noble stores.) Article Controls The central lie is that we are experiencing a known human-caused climate crisis, a claim based on speculative theories, contrived data and totally unproven modeling predictions. And the evidence? Much is revealed by politically corrupted processes and agenda-driven report conclusions rendered by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which are trumpeted in the media as authoritative gospel. S. Fred Singer, former director of the U.S. Weather Satellite Service and University of Virginia professor emeritus commented about these sorry circumstances in the foreword of my book, stating in part: "Many would place the beginning of the global warming hoax on the Senate testimony delivered by James Hansen of NASA [director of the Goddard Institute for Space Studies] during the summer of 1988. More than anything else, this exhibition of hyped alarm triggered my active skepticism about the man-made global warming scare. This skepticism was amplified when I acted as reviewer of the first three IPCC reports, in 1990, 1996, and 2001. Increasingly claims were made for which there was no evidence; in some cases the 'evidence' was clearly manufactured. For example, the 1966 report used selective data and doctored graphs. It also featured changes in the text that were made after the scientists had approved it and before it was printed." Other fraud is evident through public exposure of e-mail files retrieved from the Climate Research Unit (CRU) at Britain's University of East Anglia. Scandalous exchanges among prominent researchers who have fomented global warming hysteria confirm long-standing and broadly suspected manipulations of climate data. The communications also reveal conspiracies to falsify and withhold information, to suppress contrary findings in scholarly publications, and to exaggerate the existence and threats of man-made global warming. Many of these individuals have had major influence over summary report findings issued by the IPCC. Still other evidence comes from mouths of government officials, international climate summit organizers and leading science spokespeople recorded in candid public admissions.

#### NASA Aqua satellites disprove their impact

Owen McShane, chairman of the policy panel of the New Zealand Climate Science Coalition and director of the Centre for Resource Management Studies, 2008

(Cites Roy Spencer, principal research scientist for U of Alabama in Huntsville and recipient of NASA's Medal for Exceptional Scientific Achievement, “Climate change confirmed but global warming is cancelled”, The National Business Review (New Zealand), Lexis)

Atmospheric scientists generally agree that as carbon dioxide levels increase there is a law of "diminishing returns" - or more properly "diminishing effects" - and that ongoing increases in CO2 concentration do not generate proportional increases in temperature. The common analogy is painting over window glass. The first layers of paint cut out lots of light but subsequent layers have diminishing impact. So, you might be asking, why the panic? Why does Al Gore talk about temperatures spiraling out of control, causing mass extinctions and catastrophic rises in sea-level, and all his other disastrous outcomes when there is no evidence to support it? The alarmists argue that increased CO2 leads to more water vapour - the main greenhouse gas - and this provides positive feedback and hence makes the overall climate highly sensitive to small increases in the concentration of CO2. Consequently, the IPCC argues that while carbon dioxide may well "run out of puff" the consequent evaporation of water vapour provides the positive feedback loop that will make anthropogenic global warming reach dangerous levels. This assumption that water vapour provides positive feedback lies behind the famous "tipping point," which nourishes Al Gore's dreams of destruction, and indeed all those calls for action now - "before it is too late!" But no climate models predict such a tipping point. However, while the absence of hot spots has refuted one important aspect of the IPCC models we lack a mechanism that fully explains these supposed outcomes. Hence the IPCC, and its supporters, have been able to ignore this "refutation." So by the end of last year, we were in a similar situation to the 19th century astronomers, who had figured out that the sun could not be "burning" its fuel - or it would have turned to ashes long ago - but could not explain where the energy was coming from. Then along came Einstein and E=mc2. Hard to explain Similarly, the climate sceptics have had to explain why the hotspots are not where they should be - not just challenge the theory with their observations. This is why I felt so lucky to be in the right place at the right time when I heard Roy Spencer speak at the New York conference on climate change in March. At first I thought this was just another paper setting out observations against the forecasts, further confirming Evans' earlier work. But as the argument unfolded I realised Spencer was drawing on observations and measurements from the new Aqua satellites to explain the mechanism behind this anomaly between model forecasts and observation. You may have heard that the IPCC models cannot predict clouds and rain with any accuracy. Their models assume water vapour goes up to the troposphere and hangs around to cook us all in a greenhouse future. However, there is a mechanism at work that "washes out" the water vapour and returns it to the oceans along with the extra CO2 and thus turns the added water vapour into a NEGATIVE feedback mechanism. The newly discovered mechanism is a combination of clouds and rain (Spencer's mechanism adds to the mechanism earlier identified by Professor Richard Lindzen called the Iris effect). The IPCC models assumed water vapour formed clouds at high altitudes that lead to further warming. The Aqua satellite observations and Spencer's analysis show water vapour actually forms clouds at low altitudes that lead to cooling. Furthermore, Spencer shows the extra rain that falls from these clouds cools the underlying oceans, providing a second negative feedback to negate the CO2 warming. Alarmists' quandary This has struck the alarmists like a thunderbolt, especially as the lead author of the IPCC chapter on feedback has written to Spencer agreeing that he is right! There goes the alarmist neighbourhood! The climate is not highly sensitive to CO2 warming because water vapour is a damper against the warming effect of CO2. That is why history is full of Ice Ages - where other effects, such as increased reflection from the ice cover, do provide positive feedback - while we do not hear about Heat Ages. The Medieval Warm Period, for example, is known for being benignly warm - not dangerously hot. We live on a benign planet - except when it occasionally gets damned cold. While I have done my best to simplify these developments they remain highly technical and many people distrust their own ability to assess competing scientific claims. However, in this case the tipping point theories are based on models that do not include the effects of rain and clouds. The new Nasa Aqua satellite is the first to measure the effects of clouds and rainfall. Spencer's interpretation of the new data means all previous models and forecasts are obsolete. Would anyone trust long-term forecasts of farm production that were hopeless at forecasting rainfall? The implications of these breakthroughs in measurement and understanding are dramatic to say the least. The responses will be fun to watch.

#### And, CO2 doesn’t cause warming – Mars proves it’s solar irradiance

Solomon ‘7

(Lawrence Solomon, Staff Writer, National Post, “Look to Mars for Truth on Global Warming,” http://www.nationalpost.com/story.html?id=edae9952-3c3e-47ba-913f-7359a5c7f723&k=0)

Climate change is a much, much bigger issue than the public, politicians, and even the most alarmed environmentalists realize. Global warming extends to Mars, where the polar ice cap is shrinking, where deep gullies in the landscape are now laid bare, and where the climate is the warmest it has been in decades or centuries. / "One explanation could be that Mars is just coming out of an ice age," NASA scientist William Feldman speculated after the agency's Mars Odyssey completed its first Martian year of data collection. "In some low-latitude areas, the ice has already dissipated." With each passing year more and more evidence arises of the dramatic changes occurring on the only planet on the solar system, apart from Earth, to give up its climate secrets. / NASA's findings in space come as no surprise to Dr. Habibullo Abdussamatov at Saint Petersburg's Pulkovo Astronomical Observatory. Pulkovo -- at the pinnacle of Russia's space-oriented scientific establishment -- is one of the world's best equipped observatories and has been since its founding in 1839. Heading Pulkovo's space research laboratory is Dr. Abdussamatov, one of the world's chief critics of the theory that man-made carbon dioxide emissions create a greenhouse effect, leading to global warming. / "Mars has global warming, but without a greenhouse and without the participation of Martians," he told me. "These parallel global warmings -- observed simultaneously on Mars and on Earth -- can only be a straightline consequence of the effect of the one same factor: a long-time change in solar irradiance." / The sun's increased irradiance over the last century, not C02 emissions, is responsible for the global warming we're seeing, says the celebrated scientist, and this solar irradiance also explains the great volume of C02 emissions. / "It is no secret that increased solar irradiance warms Earth's oceans, which then triggers the emission of large amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. So the common view that man's industrial activity is a deciding factor in global warming has emerged from a misinterpretation of cause and effect relations."

#### No warming – newest data, sun, and oceans prove

Hudson, 9

Paul Hudson, Climate Correspondent, BBC News, 10/9, “What happened to global warming?”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8299079.stm

This headline may come as a bit of a surprise, so too might that fact that the warmest year recorded globally was not in 2008 or 2007, but in 1998. / But it is true. For the last 11 years we have not observed any increase in global temperatures. / And our climate models did not forecast it, even though man-made carbon dioxide, the gas thought to be responsible for warming our planet, has continued to rise. / So what on Earth is going on? / Climate change sceptics, who passionately and consistently argue that man's influence on our climate is overstated, say they saw it coming. / They argue that there are natural cycles, over which we have no control, that dictate how warm the planet is. But what is the evidence for this? / During the last few decades of the 20th Century, our planet did warm quickly. / Sceptics argue that the warming we observed was down to the energy from the Sun increasing. After all 98% of the Earth's warmth comes from the Sun. / But research conducted two years ago, and published by the Royal Society, seemed to rule out solar influences. / The scientists' main approach was simple: to look at solar output and cosmic ray intensity over the last 30-40 years, and compare those trends with the graph for global average surface temperature. / And the results were clear. "Warming in the last 20 to 40 years can't have been caused by solar activity," said Dr Piers Forster from Leeds University, a leading contributor to this year's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). / But one solar scientist Piers Corbyn from Weatheraction, a company specialising in long range weather forecasting, disagrees. / He claims that solar charged particles impact us far more than is currently accepted, so much so he says that they are almost entirely responsible for what happens to global temperatures. / He is so excited by what he has discovered that he plans to tell the international scientific community at a conference in London at the end of the month. / If proved correct, this could revolutionise the whole subject. / Ocean cycles / What is really interesting at the moment is what is happening to our oceans. They are the Earth's great heat stores. / According to research conducted by Professor Don Easterbrook from Western Washington University last November, the oceans and global temperatures are correlated. / The oceans, he says, have a cycle in which they warm and cool cyclically. The most important one is the Pacific decadal oscillation (PDO). / For much of the 1980s and 1990s, it was in a positive cycle, that means warmer than average. And observations have revealed that global temperatures were warm too. / But in the last few years it has been losing its warmth and has recently started to cool down. / These cycles in the past have lasted for nearly 30 years. / So could global temperatures follow? The global cooling from 1945 to 1977 coincided with one of these cold Pacific cycles. / Professor Easterbrook says: "The PDO cool mode has replaced the warm mode in the Pacific Ocean, virtually assuring us of about 30 years of global cooling." / So what does it all mean? Climate change sceptics argue that this is evidence that they have been right all along. / They say there are so many other natural causes for warming and cooling, that even if man is warming the planet, it is a small part compared with nature.

### Air Power

#### Airpower doesn't deter—ground forces are the only thing that is perceived

Allan, Air Force National Defense Fellow at the CSIS, 94 (Charles, "Extended Conventional Deterrence: In from the Cold and Out of the Nuclear Fire?" Washington Quarterly, Summer)

Information*.* As we have seen, imperfect information about a defender's commitment may be present for both the defender and the attacker. Prior to the crisis, the "intended deterrees [themselves] will not know how much of a politically and technically credible threat it would take to deter them" (Gray 1991, 14). In addition, as Arquilla and Davis point **out** (Arquilla and Davis 1992; Davis and Arquilla 1991), adversaries have historically discounted key elements of U.S. power such as strategic mobility, precision weapons, maritime power, and airpower due to lack of familiarity with these systems. Without understanding these elements of U.S. military strength, the regional aggressor will view the absence of U.S. heavy ground forces as evidence of a lack of both capability and commitment. Moreover, Adam Garfinkle (1992) asserts that third world leaders are frequently misled into overly optimistic views of their own forces' capabilities. Without clear recognition of U.S. power, deterrence cannot hold.

#### Kosovo proves – the usefulness of airpower is on the decline

Lambeth 2001 (Benjamin, Senior Staff Member, RAND) NATO'S Air War For Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment p. 1

Between March 24 and June 9, 1999 , NATO, led by the United States , conducted an air war against Yugoslavia in an effort to halt and reverse the continuing human-rights abuses that were being committed against the citizens of its Kosovo province (see the Frontispiece, Map of Kosovo) by Yugoslavia's elected president, Slobodan Milosevic. As it turned out, that 78-day effort, called Operation Allied Force, represented the third time in a row during the 1990s, after Operations Desert Storm and Deliberate Force, in which air power proved pivotal in determining the outcome of a regional conflict. Yet notwithstanding its ultimate success, what began as a hopeful gambit for producing quick compliance on Milosevic's part soon devolved, for a time at least, into a seemingly ineffectual bombing experiment with no clear end in sight . Not only was the operation's execution hampered by uncooperative weather and a surprisingly resilient opponent, it was further afflicted by persistent hesitancy on the part of U.S. and NATO decisionmakers that was prompted by fears of inadvertently killing civilians and losing friendly aircrews as well as by sharp differences of opinion within the most senior U.S. command element over the best way of applying allied air power against Serb assets to achieve the desired effects. All of that and more, however unavoidable some aspects of it may have been, made NATO's air war for Kosovo a substantial step backward in efficiency when compared to Desert Storm.

#### They got it wrong – airpower causes terrorist attacks

ARKIN 2002 (William, Senior Military Adviser, Human Rights Watch, NPR, July 24)

However, here's the other side of this coin. Why are people so uncomfortable with air warfare sometimes? Why are they uncomfortable with this remote mode of warfare in which it appears as if the United States does not take the risks in order to achieve its military and political objectives? And I think the answer is September 11, that the very fact that al‐Qaeda and Osama bin Laden attacked the United States in this asymmetric way, not attacking our military military‐to‐military, but attacking the civilian population, I think derives, to some degree, from this sense that exists in many parts of the world that the United States has this vast military capability and is unapproachable militarily, and therefore, the only way that you can attack is is by attacking its civilian population. Now I'm not for one minute suggesting, therefore, that we should somehow put our boys at risk on the ground in order to remedy this, but I think we should recognize and understand that the cost that we pay additionally for the exclusive use of air‐ and missile power in the conduct of warfare is that we provide sort of fodder, if you will, confirmation on the part of those who believe that the United States is conducting military operations and being an imperial superpower without ever putting itself at risk. And so, therefore, there is a greater desire to conduct terrorism and to conduct strikes against the United States. And that's just the world we live in. Again, I think this would be an important factor then to take into consideration. For instance, in a war against Iraq, if you were going to try to think through what you want the endgame to be, beyond just the toppling of Saddam Hussein, how would you want a war in Iraq to be seen in the Arab world? And so, therefore, you might actually decide to fight a certain type of war with a certain type of strategy merely because you want the political outcome to be a certain thing, and it might not necessarily be the most efficient military strategy. It might be something that fulfills your larger political aims.

#### Barriers check to zero risk of terrorism

GSN ‘9

(Global Security Newswire, “Experts Debate Threat of Nuclear, Biological Terrorism,” http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20090113\_7105.php)

In even the most likely scenario of nuclear terrorism, there are 20 barriers between extremists and a successful nuclear strike on a major city, said John Mueller, a political science professor at Ohio State University / The process itself is seemingly straightforward but exceedingly difficult -- buy or steal highly enriched uranium, manufacture a weapon, take the bomb to the target site and blow it up. Meanwhile, variables strewn across the path to an attack would increase the complexity of the effort, Mueller argued / Terrorists would have to bribe officials in a state nuclear program to acquire the material, while avoiding a sting by authorities or a scam by the sellers. The material itself could also turn out to be bad / "Once the purloined material is purloined, [police are] going to be chasing after you. They are also going to put on a high reward, extremely high reward, on getting the weapon back or getting the fissile material back," Mueller said during a panel discussion at a two-day Cato Institute conference on counterterrorism issues facing the incoming Obama administration / Smuggling the material out of a country would mean relying on criminals who "are very good at extortion" and might have to be killed to avoid a double-cross, Mueller said. The terrorists would then have to find scientists and engineers willing to give up their normal lives to manufacture a bomb, which would require an expensive and sophisticated machine shop / Finally, further technological expertise would be needed to sneak the weapon across national borders to its destination point and conduct a successful detonation, Mueller said / Every obstacle is "difficult but not impossible" to overcome, Mueller said, putting the chance of success at no less than one in three for each. The likelihood of successfully passing through each obstacle, in sequence, would be roughly one in 3 1/2 billion, he said, but for argument's sake dropped it to 3 1/2 million / "It's a total gamble. This is a very expensive and difficult thing to do," said Mueller, who addresses the issue at greater length in an upcoming book, Atomic Obsession. "So unlike buying a ticket to the lottery ... you're basically putting everything, including your life, at stake for a gamble that's maybe one in 3 1/2 million or 3 1/2 billion." / Other scenarios are even less probable, Mueller said / A nuclear-armed state is "exceedingly unlikely" to hand a weapon to a terrorist group, he argued: "States just simply won't give it to somebody they can't control." / Terrorists are also not likely to be able to steal a whole weapon, Mueller asserted, dismissing the idea of "loose nukes." Even Pakistan, which today is perhaps the nation of greatest concern regarding nuclear security, keeps its bombs in two segments that are stored at different locations, he said (see GSN, Jan. 12) / Fear of an "extremely improbable event" such as nuclear terrorism produces support for a wide range of homeland security activities, Mueller said. He argued that there has been a major and costly overreaction to the terrorism threat -- noting that the Sept. 11 attacks helped to precipitate the invasion of Iraq, which has led to far more deaths than the original event / Panel moderator Benjamin Friedman, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, said academic and governmental discussions of acts of nuclear or biological terrorism have tended to focus on "worst-case assumptions about terrorists' ability to use these weapons to kill us." There is need for consideration for what is probable rather than simply what is possible, he said. /

#### Terrorists don’t want nukes

Richard A Falkenrath, Autumn 1998, JFK School of Government @ Harvard, Survival 40.3, p MetaPress

The second reason for the rarity of NBC terrorism is that mass destruction, to the extent it is desired, is possible without WMD. The overwhelming majority of organised violence undertaken by terrorist groups has involved only conventional weapons - chemical explosives, guns and knives. Chemical explosives -ranging from the simplest, such as ammonium nitrate mixed with fuel oil, to the most advanced military high explosives, such as C4 and Semtex - can be used to kill up to several hundred people. Third, the acquisition and use of NBC weapons would entail additional risks and challenges to a terrorist group beyond those associated with conventional weapons. Holding other factors constant, a rational attacker will employ the simplest, least costly, and most reliable means of attack available to it. There are of course costs, risks and challenges associated with acquiring conventional weapons as well, but these are less severe than those associated with WMD. With respect to acquisition, NBC weapons are clearly more technologically challenging than conventional weapons, and also generally more expensive. Moreover, work on WMD inevitably involves a heightened hazard to health. Attempts to acquire NBC weapons raise the risk that the group would be found out and crushed by the authorities, especially if individuals with special expertise must be recruited for the NBC-acquisition effort. With respect to the actual use of the device, NBC weapons again present risks and challenges beyond those of their conventional counterparts. Terrorists in particular prefer predictable and reliable forms of attack. The immediate and long-term effects of an NBC weapon will generally be less predictable than a conventional one. NBC weapons may also have a harmful physical or psychological effect on the human operatives charged with handling or delivering them. The final and most controversial explanation for lack of interest in NBC weapons among groups capable of acquiring and using them is that group leaders and members may hold moral objections." This may seem counter-intuitive, given the willingness of most terrorist groups and many states to kill innocent people in order to achieve their political goals. NBC weapons, how-ever, have a special stigma. This norm against NBC use probably is strongest in the case of biological weapons. While it will never be possible to separate the causal impact of self-interest (including group preservation) from that of morality on decisions not to launch NBC weapons attacks, the idea should not be ignored.

#### LOL Deterrence isn’t a thing

Wilson 8 (Ward Wilson, senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, director of the Rethinking Nuclear Weapons Project, November 2008, “The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence,” published in the *Nonproliferation Review* Volume 15 Number 3, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/153\_wilson.pdf) gz

Some people try to make the case for nuclear deterrence not by explaining its theoretical¶ basis but by simply pointing to its track record. They assert that nuclear deterrence¶ prevented nuclear attacks for the thirty years from 1950 to 1980 and claim that that is¶ proof enough of its efficacy. There are problems with this, however. In order to answer the¶ question, ‘‘did deterrence work?’’ you must first be able to know whether your opponent¶ had a fully formed intention to attack and then refrained from doing so because of your¶ threat. Questions of intention, particularly the intention of world leaders\*who are¶ typically reluctant to admit being thwarted in almost any circumstances\*are rarely¶ documented, and when documentary evidence is present, difficult to judge. As George¶ and Smoke note, ‘‘It is difficult . . . to identify cases of deterrence success reliably in¶ the absence of better data on the policy calculations of potential initiators who were¶ presumably deterred. Instances of apparently successful deterrence . . . may be spurious.’’¶ 39¶ There are also a number of other plausible explanations for the absence of war¶ during this period. Most major wars are followed by periods, sometimes quite long¶ periods, of relative peace. The hundred years following the Napoleonic wars were for the¶ most part ones of peace in Europe. The period following the Thirty Years War also was¶ strikingly pacific. Why does it make sense to attribute the peace following the Thirty Years¶ War and the Napoleonic Wars to ‘‘war weariness,’’ ‘‘economic exhaustion,’’ or ‘‘domestic¶ political distraction,’’ but the peace after World War II to nuclear deterrence?¶ Consider, for example, the case of chemical weapons following World War I. The¶ conditions necessary for deterrence with these weapons of mass destruction were present.¶ In the early 1920s, Germany, England, France, Italy, Russia, the United States, and others¶ possessed the means necessary (industrial capacity to mass produce the chemical agents,¶ bombers with sufficient range and carrying capacity, naval ships capable of firing large¶ shells over long ranges) to use chemical weapons against the densely populated coastal¶ and interior urban centers of their enemies.40 Such attacks, properly planned and¶ executed, could have killed hundreds of thousands. They would certainly have ranked on a¶ par with the most deadly city attacks in World War II.¶ Yet no standard histories of the post-World War I era ascribe the peace that was¶ maintained during those years to a ‘‘delicate balance’’ of deadly weapons of mass¶ destruction. We do not rush to give deterrence the credit for the peace of those years. If¶ nuclear weapons are seen as preventing war from 1950 to 1980, why is it that chemical¶ weapons are not seen as having prevented war for the seven years from 1918 to 1925?41¶ Locating the reason why an action or phenomenon did not occur, finding the cause¶ of an absence, is always problematic. For example, I believe firmly that the garlic I wear¶ around my neck has prevented vampire attacks. The proof, I say, is that no vampires have,¶ as yet, attacked me. Yet objective observers might still be skeptical.¶

# 2NC

## T

### AT: Overlimiting

#### Here’s proof – they allow tons of random unilateral measures

CSG 13 [Cuba Study Group, a non-profit, non-partisan organization, comprised of business and community leaders of Cuban descent who share a common interest and vision of a free and democratic Cuba, “Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S. Policy Toward Cuba,” Feb 2013, http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File\_id=45d8f827-174c-4d43-aa2f-ef7794831032]

4. Additional Steps the U.S. President Can Take to Promote Change in Cuba¶ While we wait for Congress to act, the Executive Branch should exercise its licensing authority to further safeguard the flow of contacts and resources into the Island, encourage independent economic and political activity, and further empower the Cuban people. To that end, the Cuba Study Group proposes that the President pursue the following measures:¶ i) Modify Remittance and Export Limitations: Increase the $3,000 limit on remittances that can be carried to Cuba by authorized travelers and expand the types of goods that travelers may legally take to Cuba to support micro entrepreneurs. Fewer limitations in these areas will make it easier for U.S. travelers to provide seed capital and in-kind contributions for start-ups.¶ ii) Authorize Travel by General License for NGOs and Allow Them to Open Cuban Bank Accounts: Regulations enacted on January 28, 2011 allow U.S. full- and part-time university staff to travel to Cuba by general license. These regulations also allow U.S.-based academic institutions to open accounts in Cuban banks with funds to support their educational programs in Cuba. A similar license for foundations and NGOs whose mission involves support for micro and small businesses would also help support this growing segment of civil society.¶ iii) Establish New Licenses for the Provision of Services to Cuban Private Entrepreneurs: The President could build on existing authorizations that allow U.S. persons and institutions to pay individual Cuban scholars musicians and artists for their work. New licenses could extend to additional groups, such as artisans or farmers, and authorize a greater scope of activities such as recording, publication, distribution, etc.¶ iv) Authorize Imports of Certain Goods and Services to Businesses and Individuals Engaged in Certifiably Independent Economic Activity in Cuba: The President could authorize the importation of limited types of Cuban-origin goods and services under general or specific licenses, particularly when such authorizations could be justified as providing support for the Cuban people or democratic change in Cuba. For example, the President could authorize imports from private producers or allow U.S. persons to directly engage and hire Cuban professionals.¶ v) Authorize Export and Sale of Goods and Services to Businesses and Individuals Engaged in Certifiably Independent Economic Activity in Cuba: Amend existing licensing policy to establish a presumption of approval for specific items deemed to support the U.S.-stated policy goal of promoting independent economic activity on the Island. Since 2000, legislation has allowed the export of a broad range of agricultural products and a limited range of medicines and medical devices. This should be expanded to include other inputs in demand by indepen - dent businesses, including—but not limited to—good such as art supplies, food preparation equipment, bookkeeping materials, and basic electronic equipment and software required for retail sales and business administration.¶ vi) Authorize the Sale of Telecommunications Hardware in Cuba : Current U.S. regulations, as amended by the Obama administration in 2009, allow for donations of some telecommunications equipment, thereby recognizing that these goods by themselves do not violate the embargo. The next step should be to allow for the sales of those same goods inside the Island. Along with those provisions, changes should also allow for the provision of general travel licenses for research, marketing and sale of those goods.¶ vii) Authorize the Reestablishment of Ferry Services to Cuba : Current U.S. regulations allow both “aircraft and vessels” to serve Cuba as an exception to the U.S. embargo against the Island. The use of chartered aircrafts to transport Cuban-Americans and other licensed U.S. travelers to and from Cuba has long been authorized by the U.S. Department of Treasury. The next step should be to reestablish safe and secure chartered ferry services to transport the same categories of passengers to and from Cuba. Ferry service offers an affordable alternative to airline travel to Cuba and would allow an increase in the amount of goods that Cuban-Americans and other licensed travelers may legally take to Cuba to support their families and micro entrepreneurs.¶ viii) Simplify the Provision of Controlled Commodities, such as Computers and Laptops Direct the Department of Commerce to provide more detailed guidance for individuals to determine whether or not controlled commodities, such as laptops and printers, qualify under the general export waiver.¶ ix) Allow Licensed U.S. Travelers Access to U.S.-Issued Debit, Credit, and Pre-Paid Cards and Other Financial Services While on Authorized Travel in Cuba: Currently, U.S. travelers to Cuba have no access to U.S. bank accounts, credit cards, debit cards or other basic financial services. With few exceptions, U.S. travelers are forced to carry cash with them to Cuba. Allowing U.S. travelers access to electronic payment systems would help ensure their safety and security while being on the Island. Moreover, authorizing new electronic payment systems would facilitate the Administration’s goal of promoting people-to-people contacts and facilitating private economic activity by safeguarding the transfer of money from U.S. residents to relatives and independent entrepreneurs on the island.¶ x) Review Cuba’s Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism: Cuba’s status on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism has been subject to debate for more than a decade. The President should order a comprehensive, apolitical review to determine whether this designation reflects the reality of Cuba today.¶ xi) Develop an expanded bilateral agenda with a range of specific topics of mutual interest : Agenda should include topics such as the resolution of property claims to help foster an environment of dialogue, problem- solving and trust building— thereby helping to set the stage for an eventual normalization of relations.

## Air Power

### 2NC—Alt Causes

#### Your author

Thompson 13--Loren B. Thompson 2013, PhD, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Lexington Institute, [www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Defense/AirDominance-ISR.pdf](http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Defense/AirDominance-ISR.pdf)

The United States has enjoyed global air dominance for many decades. No U.S. soldier on the ground has been killed by hostile aircraft since the Korean War, and no U.S. pilot in the air has been killed by hostile aircraft since the Vietnam War.1 U.S. air dominance has been preserved by pouring vast amounts of money into technology and training, far surpassing the efforts of other nations. The scale of this funding was driven by an awareness of how crucial air dominance was to other facets of warfighting, plus the fear that a few mis-steps might result in America losing its edge in the air. However, since the Cold War ended, modernization efforts in the Air Force and Navy -- the main providers of U.S. air dominance -- have lagged. Plans to replace Air Force bombers, tankers and reconnaissance aircraft were canceled or delayed, while programs to recapitalize tactical air fleets in both services were repeatedly restructured. In addition, efforts to develop next- generation intelligence, navigation, communication, missile-warning and weather satellites have fallen far behind schedule. As a result, the joint inventory of fixed-wing aircraft and orbital systems enabling air dominance has aged considerably. Unmanned aircraft are an exception to this trend, but their utility in contested airspace is unproven. While modernization of airborne and orbital assets was lagging, the global threat environment changed. China emerged as the world's second-largest economy, pursuing regional security objectives with increasing vigor. Rogue states of varying stripe developed weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Non-state actors with extreme agendas were empowered by the proliferation of new military tools and techniques. And the focus of global security shifted from technologies in which only a few countries could play, such as long-range ballistic missiles, to technologies in which many players could develop deep expertise. If recent trends persist, the United States will gradually lose its claim to global air dominance. That claim is already being challenged in the Western Pacific, where a scattered and aging U.S. air fleet is faced with growing Chinese investment in new aircraft and air defenses. When China's increasing military might is combined with its intrinsic geographical advantages in the region, the possibility arises that America may cease to be the dominant air power in what has become the industrial heartland of the new global economy.2 Similar outcomes could occur in other regions, because with recent advances in surface-to-air missiles, multi-spectral sensors, tactical networks and other military systems, it is no longer necessary to match every aspect of U.S. air power in order to defeat it. With all that in mind, the Lexington Institute embarked on a year-long inquiry into the requirements for maintaining U.S. global air dominance. The inquiry focused on the four core components of air dominance: intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance; air superiority; long- range strike; and mobility. In each area, the inquiry sought to understand the current force structure and modernization programs being funded, and then identify gaps in future capabilities that need to be addressed. It also examined alternative approaches to satisfying operational requirements, and explored how those alternatives might be implemented in varying fiscal circumstances. A series of working groups and studies were conducted in support of the final report, to be issued in Spring of 2013. The present study is about intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance -- typically referred to among air-power practitioners as "ISR." Timely, precise insights into =enemy actions and intentions have always been valuable in warfare, but with the coming of the information revolution they have assumed overriding importance because there are now so many options for collecting, analyzing and exploiting relevant data. Air power provides a unique perspective on modern warfare, because there are some features of military activity that can only be captured from above. Airborne ISR also generates information essential to the deterrence of aggression, the enforcement of arms-control treaties, and the prevention of nuclear proliferation. In a world of rapidly changing technology and diverse threats, constant vigilance is a necessary cost of preserving the peace, and providing that vigilance is an overarching mission of the nation's air forces.

### 2NC—No Nuke Terror

#### Statistics prove

Smithson, 5

(Staff, 4/17/05, lexis)

No one knows what will happen in the future, but the numbers indicate an overwhelming terrorist preference for their stock tools of the trade: bullets and bombs. From 1997 to 2004, the RAND/MIPT database, arguably the most comprehensive figures that are publicly available, tallied 11,922 terrorist events around the world. None of those attacks involved nuclear weapons or radiological devices. Of the 15 incidents with biological substances, 12 were related to the infamous anthrax letters of 2001. In 20 attacks featuring chemical substances, acid was splashed on a handful of people, tear gas was used and letters with traces of cyanide and the toxin ricin were mailed.

\*\*\*[15 / 11922 is LESS THAN 0.125%]

#### Even if terrorists aquire nukes, enforcement and safety features would obviate the threat

Stratfor ‘9

(“Debunking Myths about Nuclear Weapons and Terrorism”, 5/29 http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090528\_debunking\_myths\_about\_nuclear\_weapons\_and\_terrorism)

However, the effort involved in actually trying to steal a nuclear weapon would entail a significant dedication of resources and an immense intelligence effort beyond the reach of almost any terrorist organization. Indeed, the odds of a failure are high, no matter how careful and meticulous the planning. Some nuclear weapons facilities around the world are obviously not as hardened as others, but taken as a whole, they are some of the hardest targets on the planet, and the personnel better vetted than almost any other institution. Even the lightest attempt to begin probing runs the risk of not only failing to acquire a bomb, but setting off a series of alarms and red flags that brings such an aggressive investigative and law enforcement/military response down on the terrorist organization that it could be completely wiped out before it ever attempted to target its true objectives (whatever they might be). And even if one could be stolen or otherwise acquired, modern nuclear weapons have been designed to include a series of (highly classified) safety features. Though all nuclear weapons are not created equal, these range from permissive action links without which the device cannot be armed (a feature Pakistan is now thought to employ) to configurations that will actually render the fissile core(s) useless if improperly accessed. The security of nuclear weapons in Pakistan has long been something STRATFOR has kept a close eye on, and something we continue to monitor. The Hollywood scenario of a terrorist group stealing away with a nuclear device in the night and automatically being able to arm it at its convenience is not grounded in reality. Furthermore, the theft would be difficult to carry off without setting off the same alarms and red flags that would leave little opportunity for the device to be smuggled particularly far — much less half way around the world.

## Warming

### 2NC—CO2 Not Key

#### [\_] Past emissions overwhelm

Adve ‘8

(Nagraj Adve, One World South Asia, “Can we avoid dangerous global warming?” http://www.k4d.org/Environment/can-we-avoid-2018dangerous2019-global-warming/)

The problem, as Paul Brown explains in Global Warming: The Last Chance for Change, is that there’s more warming in the pipeline. There’s a lag of about 25-30 years between greenhouse gases being emitted and the full effects of their warming. So the recent climate chaos is actually the consequence of emissions in the late 1970s. The full effects of more recent emissions, including from China’s coal-based power stations that some are suddenly and rightly concerned about, will be felt in the years to come.

#### Plus, greenhouse effect isn’t real

Solomon ‘7

(Lawrence Solomon, Staff Writer, National Post, “Look to Mars for Truth on Global Warming,” http://www.nationalpost.com/story.html?id=edae9952-3c3e-47ba-913f-7359a5c7f723&k=0)

Dr. Abdussamatov goes further, debunking the very notion of a greenhouse effect. "Ascribing 'greenhouse' effect properties to the Earth's atmosphere is not scientifically substantiated," he maintains. "Heated greenhouse gases, which become lighter as a result of expansion, ascend to the atmosphere only to give the absorbed heat away."

#### Even if CO2 does cause warming, there’s a massive diminishing returns effect – increased CO2 now does nothing to temperature

Tom Harris, Executive Director, Natural Resources Stewardship Project, and Tim Ball, Professor of Climatology, University of Winnipeg, 2007, “Science Ignored in Heated Debate,” Lexis-Nexis

Clearly, most MPs either have completely forgotten their grade school science or hope that most Canadians have. Carbon dioxide currently is not a major climate driver. Even if CO2 concentration doubles or triples, the effect on temperature would be minimal. The relationship between temperature and CO2 is like painting a window black to block sunlight. The first coat blocks most of the light. Second and third coats reduce very little more. Plants function best with CO2 between 1,000 and 1,200 parts per million (ppm), a level typically found in a crowded room. Greenhouses inject CO2 to reach these concentrations and so increase their yields significantly. This suggests that plants evolved to suit levels around 1,000 ppm and are CO2-starved at today's 380 ppm. At 200 ppm of CO2 plants begin to suffer and at 120 ppm they start to die. U.S. Department of Agriculture scientist Sherwood Idso calculated that the 33-per-cent rise in CO2 over the past 150 years has resulted in an increase in average world wheat yields of about 60 per cent. Higher CO2 levels enhance the health-promoting properties of food plants and decrease their water loss as the pores on leaves shrink and exhale less water, a characteristic important in drought stricken regions. It is not until CO2 levels reach 15,000 ppm that humans experience serious health impacts. That is almost 4,000 per cent higher than current concentrations and more than double the highest CO2 level seen in the past half-billion years.

# 1NR

## Gradualism DA

### 2NC T—Top Level

#### Cuba doesn’t need the US—they can make a stable transition on their own.

Lance Koenig\*\*, 3-11-2010, US Army Colonel, paper submitted for a Masters in Strategic Studies at the US Army War College, “Time for a New Cuba Policy,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518130

\*\*1AC author for GBS—that’s awkward

Path of least resistance, stay the course. The United States can continue with the current policy of trade embargo, travel restrictions, and limited diplomatic relations. The United States will not likely choose this path, but will rather go down it because it is easier politically to not change the status quo. This policy requires a long-term commitment and continuing patience. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 provides the way ahead that the Cuban government must follow in order to gain normalized relations with the United States. This option follows the path of the last forty nine years and no significant change is required on the part of the United States. Politically, this avoids the problems generated by going against the Cuban voters of Florida that have been strong supporters of the current policy. The risk is that the United States will miss a window of opportunity to make fundamental positive changes to our relationship with Cuba. Additionally, Cuba could attain economic prosperity in spite of the United States’ actions. Cuba would be forced to continue to look towards China and Venezuela for trade and security relationships. Additionally, for both trade and tourism, Cuba will continue to develop relationships with Canada and the European Union, while the United States’ influence will continue to wane. 30

### 2NC T—Uniqueness Trick

#### Not normalizing economic relations now is best—it prevents a Cuban state collapse and allows for normalization in the long term once Castro leaves power—that means the status quo solves the aff.

George 13—a Project Manager with the Bertelsmann Foundation (a European think tank); developing a Latin America project portfolio for the Global Economic Dynamics project (Samuel, “Cuba in Transition, United States Stuck in Yesterday,” No Se Mancha, 3/3, [http://semancha.com/2013/03/03/cuba-in-transition-united-states-stuck-in-yesterday/)//BJ](http://semancha.com/2013/03/03/cuba-in-transition-united-states-stuck-in-yesterday/)/BJ)

On Sunday, February 24, President of the Council of State of Cuba and de facto head of state Raúl Castro announced that he would surrender power in 2018. He also appointed 52-year old Miguel Diaz-Canel as first vice president, implying that a man who had yet to be born when Fidel Castro took Havana would be Cuba’s next leader. The exit of Raúl, the emergence of a younger, less ideological generation of leaders, and the incessant, if slow transition to a market economy combine to create an opportunity for the US to normalize relations with the Caribbean island. In fact, such normalization would reinforce all three trends. Little is immediately clear about Vice President Diaz-Canel. We understand that he was a heartthrob in the 1980s, that he rides his bike to work, and that he listens to The Beatles. We know Raúl Castro has praised his “ideological firmness” and that he has served in the Cuban military – two facts that have raised red flags for hardliners in Miami. Diaz-Canel: Party hack? Agent of Change? The US can help decide. Yet compelling indicators suggest that Diaz-Canel is more than a party hack, and that he will continue Raúl’s progress towards economic liberalization. Diaz-Canel has distinguished himself for his pragmatism. He is believed to have played a key role in facilitating foreign investment in Cuban hotels. As Minister of Higher Education, he gained the respect of his peers by listening and probing, rather than dictating. The ascension of Diaz-Canel represents a break from the geriatric revolutionary leaders – a break that was likely a precondition for any serious modernization. Moreover, Diaz-Canel would struggle to hold a hard line even if he wanted to. Raúl’s reforms have been slow and halting, but they have also been irreversible. The Economist reports that “much of Cuban farming” has been privatized and that, by 2015, one-third of the workforce will be in the private sector. With cars, computers and phones already traded, the momentum of commercialization – the allure of possession – will be difficult to stymie. The Castros’ success in containing reform momentum owes much to personal allegiance and veneration. Diaz-Canel will command no such respect.

### 2NC T—AT: No Link

#### Yes link—softening the embargo, which is what they do, would pressure Cuba to rapidly reform.

Cave, 2012 – foreign correspondent for The New York Times, based in Mexico City and has a B.A. from Boston College and an M.S. from Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism (Damien, “Easing of Restraints in Cuba Renews Debate on U.S. Embargo”, NY Times, 11/19/12, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/changes-in-cuba-create-support-for-easing-embargo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)//EX>

Still, in a country where Cubans “resolve” their way around government restrictions every day (private deals with customs agents are common), many Cubans anticipate real benefits should the United States change course. Mr. López, a meticulous mechanic who wears plastic gloves to avoid dirtying his fingers, said legalizing imports and investment would create a flood of the supplies that businesses needed, overwhelming the government’s controls while lowering prices and creating more work apart from the state. Other Cubans, including political dissidents, say softening the embargo would increase the pressure for more rapid change by undermining one of the government’s main excuses for failing to provide freedom, economic opportunity or just basic supplies. “Last month, someone asked me to redo their kitchen, but I told them I couldn’t do it because I didn’t have the materials,” said Pedro José, 49, a licensed carpenter in Havana who did not want his last name published to avoid government pressure. “Look around — Cuba is destroyed,” he added, waving a hand toward a colonial building blushing with circles of faded pink paint from the 1950s. “There is a lot of work to be done.”

### 2NC T—AT: Transition Failing

#### These reforms will update the Cuban model and spur growth—our evidence is predictive.

Perez 11—an economist at the University of Havana's Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubana (Omar Everleny, “Will Cuba's Economic Reforms Succeed? Yes,” Americas Quarterly, Spring 2011, [http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/2450)//BJ](http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/2450)/BJ)

Cuba's recent economic reforms to its economic model are not entirely new. What is new is the perception and the importance placed on them, especially on the role of the non-state sector. Once implemented, these reforms will update the country’s economic model. In announcing the “Draft Guidelines for Economic and Social Policy”—upon which the reforms are based—at the Sixth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party in October 2010, Cuban officials acknowledged inefficiencies in the economic model. These included: low economic growth, especially in industry and agriculture; inefficiencies in investment; low levels of investment in productivity and infrastructure; the gap between workers’ incomes and the rising prices of goods and services, both in markets free from price controls and the state foreign currency, and convertible peso markets; lack of connection between workers’ productivity and salaries; excessive economic centralization; increased state restrictions on certain goods and services; the low level of housing construction; and the foreign and domestic deficits. To counter these inefficiencies, the government proposed a series of adjustments designed to improve productivity by promoting entrepreneurship, establishing a more efficient tax system, and balancing public finances. The most important adjustments focus on incentives for creating non-state employment. For instance, the government will now recognize 178 categories of work or trade. In the agricultural sector, it promises to put unused land into productive use. Cubans will no longer be forbidden from selling homes and vehicles—even to foreigners or temporary residents. Businesses will be granted greater autonomy, and multiple licenses will be available for conducting business not only in one’s hometown but anywhere in the country. Private restaurants can expand from 12 to 20 seats. And in a move toward ensuring food self-sufficiency and eliminating rationing, individuals will be allowed to lease state facilities, including those in the food industry. Among the measures, those targeting self-employed workers will undoubtedly have the greatest positive impact. The policy is being encouraged at all levels of government, and for good reason. Under its reorganization plan, the Cuban state intends to move between 1 million and 1.3 million state workers off state payrolls within the next few years, making self-employment policies the most urgent. The openings providing for self-employment will permit the creation of microenterprises. Since October, the number of licenses granted to micro-enterprises has surpassed 113,000, a nearly 50 percent increase from before the start of the reforms. These developments will expand supplies of consumer goods and services. There are already signs that the measures have had a positive impact. The number of workers hired by other self-employed workers has increased. So has the number of microenterprises dedicated to the preparation and sale of food, the manufacture of household goods and transportation. For many people, microenterprise has constituted an alternative source of income to state salaries and pensions. For the state, it will provide a source of new tax revenue. The new measures also focus on balancing public finances by decreasing public payrolls and unemployment compensation. And as the state reduces total payroll expenses and increases revenue from taxes on self-employed workers, it will be able to increase public-sector salaries. To improve productivity, details have also emerged about a more efficient form of contracting labor. Companies will be able to count on greater funds for salaries to distribute among fewer employees. This will be done through a system of results-based payments, which will mean an increase in productivity and, consequently, growth in the economy as a whole. Under the proposed adjustments, it has been estimated that new non-state annual tax contributions will exceed $1 billion per year. At the core of the reforms is an acknowledgement by the Cuban state that it must relinquish control over those activities and sectors, such as retail, that do not serve it strategically and that it believes have the capacity to absorb the growing labor force in coming years. However, the proper functioning of the private sector depends on nondiscrimination and competition. For this, a number of conditions will be important. Among them: access to technical and material supply markets; access to sources of financing and insurance to cover risk; access to fair and competitive domestic consumer markets and export markets; regulations that do not impose undue burdens in their compliance or administration; and a tax burden consistent with the desired activity and size of the project. If these conditions are established, non-state employment will meet its expected contribution to the economy, above all in terms of job creation and the production of goods and services. I estimate Cuba could grow at a rate of 5 percent after the reforms. It will be a complex task to effectively design and implement the steps needed to unleash the production forces of a “handmade” economy, where discretion has prevailed over rules, institutions and respect for regulations. Time has changed the functions and needs of our socialist project. Those changes, along with the success of other countries’ experiences, demonstrate that the Cuban state is in vital need of updating its economic model. This means the market must play an ever-increasing role in the Cuban economy, even if planning will officially prevail over the market. The measures that the authorities have taken are a first step in the right direction.

### AT: Impact Defense

#### Outweighs

Tom Bender, 1-15-2005, architect, author, economist, one of the founders of the “green architecture” and “sustainability” movements, his “Factor 10” economic principles have been endorsed by the European Union, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development and the United Nations Environmental Program, cites a research study from the Sandia National Laboratories, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center and a part of the DOE, “LNG Imports: Neither Safe nor Wise,” http://www.tombender.org/societyworthlivingforarticles/lng.pdf

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is considered by transportation officials to be a "hazardous and noxious substance". The Port of Astoria, and the community has been told by Calpine representatives that their proposed Skipanon LNG import terminal would be safe, and that any LNG spills would just fizz and evaporate "like 7-UP". But a just-released Sandia research lab study (SAND2004-6258) joins the voices of long-term government funded researchers to strongly disagree. Although the operational safety of the LNG industry has been good overall, the hazards of our post 9/11 world are not operational safety but intentional acts of destruction. And LNG terminals and tankers are prime terrorist targets. LNG tankers are huge – as long as the World Trade Center buildings were tall – and contain 35,000,000 gallons or more of LNG. That represents the energy equivalent of 60 to 80 Hiroshima bombs. Not one, but sixty to eighty Hiroshima bombs! An accident affecting even a tiny part of that energy can be catastrophic. LNG is less likely to be as "explosive" as a nuclear weapon, but the far greater amount of energy, and drifting fireballs of burning gas could be even more destructive than Hiroshima. "Terrorist attacks on tankers carrying liquefied natural gas into a U.S. port could trigger a fire that could burn the skin of people a mile away and cause major injuries and significant structural damage within about a third of a mile," says the Washington Post (Dec 22, '04). The Sandia report, prepared by that Energy Department laboratory, stated that, "terrorists could use rocket-propelled grenades, missiles, planes or boats to break open the tankers." The Post also quotes James A. Fay, a professor emeritus of mechanical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who has studied LNG safety for 35 years, "If there were a successful attack, then the consequences can be very severe. I think this report has done a lot to get the science of this consequence analysis out on the table where everyone can see it." An LNG spill can create major hazards that extend over considerable area. It can cause asphyxiation, cryogenic burns, structural damage and failure, 3000oF fireballs several thousand feet across and hundreds of feet high, fuel-air (vapor cloud) detonations or explosions that can cover very large distances, and rapid phase transitions (explosive boiling of the cold liquid). There remains considerable uncertainty about extent of potential hazard depending on rate of LNG release, possible ignition sources, wind direction and speed, etc. But the fine print isn't important with fire hazards of that scale. And with abutting property owner, Weyerhaeuser, having filed for a permit to expand the size of their open-flame boilers, is Warrenton a good location for an LNG terminal? A burning vapor cloud from an LNG tanker at the Skipinon site could extend beyond Astoria. Even this new report may significantly underestimate potential damage. It assumes that only three of the five or more holds of a tanker might be affected, and that the hole through which LNG would be released would not be larger than 5 meters2 – although a hole twenty times as large (100 meter2) had already been blown by terrorists in the double-hulled Limberg oil tanker, (below). And the amounts of LNG involved are 100 to 1000 times as large as any real tests which have ever been performed. The firestorms from bombing Dresden and Tokyo in WWII were not predicted from the effects of dropping a few single bombs. This 30' (100 meter2) hole blasted by terrorists through the double hull of the French oil tanker Limburg indicates that LNG can be spilled far more rapidly than by the 5 meter2 opening used in government safety studies. The Sandia report also largely ignores airborne attacks on tankers (where tanks are unprotected by the ship's double hull), and the potential use of fuel-air bombs to disperse the LNG more explosively into the air. The tops of LNG tanker holds are far more vulnerable to terrorist actions than the lower parts, which are protected by double hulls and greater amounts of insulation. Fuel-air bombs are shockwave bombs that could cause dispersal and detonation of a tanker of LNG like atomic bombs are used to detonate larger hydrogen bombs. (A GOOGLE on "fuel-air bombs" will give you immediately two New Scientist articles – "First Test for US Monster Bomb" saying it "creates a mushroom cloud and a shockwave similar to that of a small nuclear explosion" and a second, "Experts Fear Terrorists Are Seeking Fuel-Air Bombs" telling where terrorists can obtain either large or shoulder rocket launched versions. Reading these reports do not dispel fears of LNG terminal hazards. The "superbomb" fuel-air explosives get their destructive power by dispersing their "fuel" into the air before detonation. Use of their shock blast to disperse LNG tanker cargo into the air before detonation has the potential for the same action on vastly larger scale.