### 1

#### TEXT

THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENTER INTO BINDING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA OVER AN OFFER THAT \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

#### CHINA WILL SAY YES

#### CHINA WILL SAY YES AND WANTS TO CONSULT OVER THE CUBA EMBARGO

PRC Ambassador Wang 12

[Ambassador Wang Min deputy permanent representative of the people's republic of china at the 67th session of the un general assembly on agenda item 41 "necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the united states of america against cuba" States News Service 11/13/12 Westlaw]

Regrettably, however, those resolutions have not been effectively implemented over the years, and the economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba imposed by the United States is yet to be lifted. Such practice has inflicted enormous economic and financial losses on Cuba. According to statistics, Cuba's economic losses directly resulting from the embargo had exceeded 108 billion US Dollars by December 2011. Taking into account the depreciation of the US dollar against the price of gold in the international market, the figure would increase to 1.066 trillion dollars. The embargo has caused shortage of commodities and dealt a heavy blow to Cuba's economy. It stands as the major stumbling block for Cuba's economic development and social progress. Besides, such embargo has brought huge sufferings to the Cuban people and violated their fundamental human rights including the rights to food, health and education as well as their rights to survival and development.

We have noted that one of the most prominent features of the embargo in the last year has been interference with Cuba's international financial transactions. This has not only hit Cuba's economy hard, but also affected the normal economic, commercial and financial interactions between other countries and Cuba and hence impairing the interests and sovereignty of third countries.

The embargo against Cuba severely violated the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the relevant UNGA resolutions and has met the firm opposition of the vast majority of member states. The call of the international community is getting louder and louder, demanding that the US government change its policy towards Cuba, lift embargo and normalize its relations with Cuba. Such calling is fully reflected in this year's Secretary-General's report.

Mr. President,

The Chinese government has always believed that countries should develop mutual relations on the basis of upholding the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and respecting the rights of other countries to independently choose their own social system and development path. China is opposed to any unilateral sanctions against other countries by military, political, economic or other means. Meanwhile, China has strictly followed and implemented the relevant GA resolutions. China and Cuba have maintained normal economic, trade and personnel exchanges. The friendly and mutually-beneficial cooperation in various fields between our two countries has been growing. This is not only in line with the desire of the two peoples, but also conducive to the economic and social development of Cuba.

In today's world, dialogue, exchanges and harmonious coexistence represent the mainstream of international relations. Exchanges and cooperation on an equal footing among countries have become the dominating trend. In the face of differences, dialogue on an equal footing and friendly consultation are the best means to settle disputes. China hopes that the US will follow the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the relevant GA resolutions and terminate its embargo against Cuba as soon as possible. China also hopes that the relationship between the US and Cuba will constantly improve so as to promote the stability and development in Latin America and the Caribbean region. China will again vote in favor of the draft resolution submitted by Cuba under this agenda item.

#### GENUINE CONSULTATION ON REGIONAL HOTSPOTS NECESSARY TO BUILD A FRAMEWORK OF TRUST NECESSARY TO SAVE US-SINO RELATIONS, IMPACT IS WORLD PEACE

Vice Foreign Minister Zhang 12

[Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun at the Eighth Lanting Forum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Stay committed to peaceful development and win-win cooperation the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China: 28 December 2012 Westlaw]

China and the United States, one the world's largest developing country and the other the biggest developed one, are also the two largest economies in the world. That makes their relationship one of the most important yet complex in the world. Whether the two countries will live amicably with each other is an issue whose significance goes far beyond the bilateral scope and which concerns peace, stability and prosperity of the whole world. Some regard it a law of history that there have always been fierce clashes, at times, conflicts and wars, between an established power and an emerging power. But we reject such fatalism. In our view, in this globalized era when countries are inter-dependent with their interests closely linked, there has been a major shift in international relations. In the face of frequent global challenges, all countries would want to stick together to meet challenges together and pursue common development. This is an unstoppable historic trend. Those who go along with it will prosper and those against it perish. We are sober-minded on this and it is from this perspective that we view and approach China-US relations. We are committed to seeking new answers to old problems and are determined to foster a new major-country relationship based on mutual respect and win-win cooperation. What has happened in China-US relations shows that both sides stand to gain from cooperation and lose from confrontation. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the issuance of the Shanghai Communique and the resumption of contact between the two countries. China-US relations have entered a stage where they should no longer have doubts about further growth of this relationship. Over the past 40 years, great progress has been made in China-US relations. In particular, the two presidents have reached important agreement to build a new type of major-country relationship based on mutual respect and win-win cooperation, heralding a new, historic starting point for China-US relations. Two-way trade has surged from nearly zero at the time of resumption of contact to 446.6 billion US dollars last year and is expected to exceed 500 billion US dollars this year. The two sides, once in estrangement and confrontation, now engage in dialogue and cooperation. We have had the Strategic and Economic Dialogues (SandED), the High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange and a total of more than 90 consultation mechanisms covering political, economic, trade, security, defense, scientific, technological, people-to-people, cultural, energy, the environment and many other fields. This is not commonly seen in major-country relations and speaks volumes about the dynamism and potential of China-US relations. More than 3.5 million visits are taking place between the two countries every year, nearly 10,000 every day on average. The two countries have maintained close communication and coordination on counter-terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change and regional hotspot issues. That being said, China and the United States still differ significantly in social system, development stage, history, culture and tradition and still face major and sensitive issues including Taiwan and Tibet-related issues. These issues, if not handled properly, will upset or even seriously damage the bilateral relationship. To dispel strategic mistrust and build a new type of major-country relationship is a demanding task which calls for unflinching efforts from both sides. At the current stage, I believe it is important for the two countries to do the following: First, they need to have candid and in-depth communication so as to avoid strategic misjudgment. China and the United States have maintained close high-level contacts and exchanges through quite a number of mechanisms of dialogue and communication including the SandED, the Strategic Security Dialogue and the Consultation on Asia-Pacific Affairs. Given the profoundly changing and complex international and regional landscape and the growing destabilizing factors and uncertainties, to have in-depth, candid discussions to find solutions and to strengthen coordination and cooperation will help reduce mutual suspicion and boost strategic mutual trust. Apart from increasing dialogue, coordination and cooperation on global issues and international and regional hotspot issues, it is also important that the two sides truly follow the principle of mutual respect, understand each other's national condition and public opinion, respect each other's choice of social system and development path, and refrain from imposing one's own will on the other side.

#### THESE REGIONAL HOTSPOTS INCLUDE LATIN AMERICA

Beijing Xinhua 09

[Xinhua: 1st Round Sino-US Strategic, Economic Dialogue Concludes in Washington World News Connection July 29, 2009 Westlaw]

IV. On Sino-US Cooperation on International and Regional Issues The two sides discussed the common international challenges facing the two countries. They were resolved to maintain close communication and coordination and work together with the rest of the international community for the settlement of conflicts and reduction of tension that trigger regional and global instability. The two sides noted that traditional and nontraditional security threats are intertwined, and situations in Northeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and African require combined efforts. The two sides reaffirmed the importance of the Six-Party Talks, the continuing efforts to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the maintaining of peace and stability of the Peninsula and Northeast Asia. They emphasized the importance of implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1874 and resolving the nuclear issue on the Peninsula through peaceful means. The two sides agreed to exert greater efforts for the early realization of the aforementioned goals. The two countries also pledged to increase coordination to jointly promote stability and development in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They agreed that senior officials from both countries with responsibilities for Iran and the Middle East should continue to consult closely on these issues. The two sides expressed their willingness to increase coordination and consultation on the issue of Sudan to jointly seek an early and enduring political settlement of the Darfur issue and promote the peace process between the north and the south of Sudan. BOTh sides pointed out their shared opposition to terrorism and pledged to work collaboratively to strengthen global non-proliferation and arms control regimes. They reiterated their respective nuclear policies and discussed the upcoming 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] Review Conference and the Conference on Disarmament. The two sides also exchanged views on the Global Nuclear Security Summit proposed by the US side and reiterated the importance of existing dialogues on security, arms control, non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism issues. The two sides intend to further enhance dialogue and cooperation to combat transnational challenges, such as cross-border crimes, terrorism, the illegal drug trade and piracy. The two sides agreed to enhance consultation on policy planning, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America within the Strategic Dialogue framework, with a view to broadening and deepening cooperation on issues of mutual concern. V. On Mechanism for China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue The two sides expressed their shared view that the SED will continue to advance China-US relations in tandem with other existing bilateral mechanisms. The Dialogue represents a major initiative to further develop China-US relations in the new era, and offers an important platform for the two countries to deepen understanding, enhance mutual trust, and promote cooperation. In order to more fully explore shared solutions on a wide range of common challenges, the Chinese and US delegations look forward to further discussions on specific matters raised at the dialogues through special representatives of the two presidents, working groups, and existing bilateral dialogues.

#### OUR IMPACT IS THE BIGGEST – EVERY IMPACT SCENARIO CAN BE SOLVED BY SINO-US RELATIONS

Beijing Xinhua 09

[Beijing Xinhua in English China's official news service for English-language audiences (New China News Agency)] Xinhua 'Commentary': World Has Every Reason To Closely Watch Obama's China Visit 11/17/09 Westlaw]

As American geostrategist Zbigniew Brzezinski said at a January seminar marking the 30th anniversary of the two countries' diplomatic ties, China and the United States have become important forces in global political and economic stability. Since the ice-breaking visit by late U.S. President Richard Nixon to China in 1972 against the backdrop of the Cold War, bilateral cooperation has expanded to the areas of politics, economy, military and culture. BOTh countries are aware of the importance of their relations. Though Obama won the presidential election under the banner of "Change," he decided to keep the U.S.' China policy of communications and cooperation unchanged, according to Harry Harding, a leading China specialist in the United States who has advised several presidents. President Hu Jintao also stressed more than once that healthy development of Sino-U.S. relations is not only in the fundamental interests of both countries, but is also conducive to peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. Given the interwoven relations that China and the United States share in a global village, both nations see huge potential in seeking their common interests through expanded cooperation. And major challenges, such as the global economic downturn, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and climate change, cannot be tackled by a single country on its own. Instead, they need the joint efforts of the international community, where the United States and China, as two influential countries, should play exemplary roles. Obama's visit to China offered an opportunity for China and the United States to reach understandings and agreements and seek solutions to a variety of global issues. China served as an important engine to drive forward global economic recovery while the United States saw its economy reverse the trend of recession in the third quarter of this year. To reinforce the positive economic momentum and promote global development in a steady, orderly manner, the United States and China need to join hands in the spirit of mutual support. Among all of the issues, global warming is a problem of immediate consequence. Earlier this month in Barcelona, representatives from more than 40 small-island countries warned during a five-day convention on climate change that any delay in a solution to the problem would increase the possibility of their homes being flooded. As the world's two major greenhouse gas emitters, how the United States and China will cooperate and assume responsibility is a concern with global ramifications. Undoubtedly, China and the United States still, and will always, have disagreements, especially in the fields of trade, currencies, greenhouse gas emissions, and political and military trust. But disagreements provide room for talks, improved communications and enhanced cooperation.

### 2

#### The narrative of progress structures us foreign policy; it reduces complex social issues to simple technical linear problem/solutions – aff harms aren't true, they can't solve, and it turns case

Escobar 1995 [Arturo, Kenan Distinguished Professor of Anthropology, UNC-Chapel Hill Director, Institute of Latin American Studies, UNC-Chapel Hill Adjunct Professor, Department of Geography, UNC-Chapel Hill Adjunct Professor, Department of Communications, UNC-Chapel Hill Fellow, Institute of Arts and Humanities, UNC Fellow, Center for Urban and Regional Research, UNC Facilitator, World Anthropologies Network / Red de Antropologías Mundiales Research Associate, Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, Bogotá, “Encountering Development THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD” 1995, page 52-53]

CONCLUSION The crucial threshold and transformation that took place in the early post– World War II period discussed in this chapter were the result not of a radical epistemological or political breakthrough but of the reorganization of a number of factors that allowed the Third World to display a new visibility and to irrupt into a new realm of language. This new space was carved out of the vast and dense surface of the Third World, placing it in a ﬁeld of power. Underdevelopment became the subject of political technologies that sought to erase it from the face of the Earth but that ended up, instead, multiplying it to inﬁnity. Development fostered a way of conceiving of social life as a technical problem, as a matter of rational decision and management to be entrusted to that group of people—the development professionals—whose specialized knowledge allegedly qualiﬁed them for the task. Instead of seeing change as a process rooted in the interpretation of each society’s history and cultural tradition—as a number of intellectuals in various parts of the Third World had attempted to do in the 1920s and 1930s (Gandhi being the best known of them)—these professionals sought to devise mechanisms and procedures to make societies ﬁt a preexisting model that embodied the structures and functions of modernity. Like sorcerers’ apprentices, the development professionals awakened once again the dream of reason that, in their hands, as in earlier instances, produced a troubling reality. At times, development grew to be so important for Third World countries that it became acceptable for their rulers to subject their populations to an inﬁnite variety of interventions, to more encompassing forms of power and systems of control; so important that First and Third World elites accepted the price of massive impoverishment, of selling Third World resources to the most convenient bidder, of degrading their physical and human ecologies, of killing and torturing, of condemning their indigenous populations to near extinction; so important that many in the Third World began to think of themselves as inferior, underdeveloped, and ignorant and to doubt the value of their own culture, deciding instead to pledge allegiance to the banners of reason and progress; so important, ﬁnally, that the achievement of development clouded the awareness of the impossibility of fulﬁlling the promises that development seemed to be making. After four decades of this discourse, most forms of understanding and representing the Third World are still dictated by the same basic tenets. The forms of power that have appeared act not so much by repression but by normalization; not by ignorance but by controlled knowledge; not by humanitarian concern but by the bureaucratization of social action. As the conditions that gave rise to development became more pressing, it could only increase its hold, reﬁne its methods, and extend its reach even further. That the materiality of these conditions is not conjured up by an “objective” body of knowledge but is charted out by the rational discourses of economists, politicians, and development experts of all types should already be clear. What has been achieved is a speciﬁc conﬁguration of factors and forces in which the new language of development ﬁnds support. As a discourse, development is thus a very real historical formation, albeit articulated around an artiﬁcial construct (underdevelopment) and upon a certain materiality (the conditions baptized as underdevelopment), which must be conceptualized in different ways if the power of the development discourse is to be challenged or displaced. To be sure, there is a situation of economic exploitation that must be recognized and dealt with. Power is too cynical at the level of exploitation and should be resisted on its own terms. There is also a certain materiality of life conditions that is extremely preoccupying and that requires great effort and attention. But those seeking to understand the Third World through development have long lost sight of this materiality by building upon it a reality that like a castle in the air has haunted us for decades. Understanding the history of the investment of the Third World by Western forms of knowledge and power is a way to shift the ground somewhat so that we can start to look at that materiality with different eyes and in different categories. The coherence of effects that the development discourse achieved is the key to its success as a hegemonic form of representation: the construction of the poor and underdeveloped as universal, preconstituted subjects, based on the privilege of the representers; the exercise of power over the Third World made possible by this discursive homogenization (which entails the erasure of the complexity and diversity of Third World peoples, so that a squatter in Mexico City, a Nepalese peasant, and a Tuareg nomad become equivalent to each other as poor and underdeveloped); and the colonization and domination of the natural and human ecologies and economies of the Third World.26 Development assumes a teleology to the extent that it proposes that the “natives” will sooner or later be reformed; at the same time, however, it reproduces endlessly the separation between reformers and those to be reformed by keeping alive the premise of the Third World as different and inferior, as having a limited humanity in relation to the accomplished European. Development relies on this perpetual recognition and disavowal of difference, a feature identiﬁed by Bhabha (1990) as inherent to discrimination. The signiﬁers of “poverty”, “illiteracy,” “hunger,” and so forth have already achieved a ﬁxity as signiﬁeds of “underdevelopment” which seems impossible to sunder. Perhaps no other factor has contributed to cementing the association of “poverty” with “underdevelopment” as the discourse of economists. To them I dedicate the coming chapter.

#### Specifically, the aff invokes the narrative of progress:

#### <EXPLAIN BY 1AC CITATION/CARD>

#### Our impact is the biggest – the narrative of progress locks us into ignoring pressing economic, environmental, nuclear, and social issues that risk extinction because we believe our exceptionalism

Loewen 07(James W. "Jim" Loewen, American sociologist, historian, and author, University of Vermont, “Lies My Teacher Told Me”, page 285 – 286, 2007, RLA)

This is the America in which most textbook authors grew up and the America they still try to sell to students today. Perhaps textbooks do not question the notion that bigger is better because the idea of progress conforms with the way Americans like to think about education: arneliorative, leading step by step to opportunity for individuals and progress for the whole society. The ideology of progress also provides hope for the future. Certainly most Americans want to believe that their society has been, on balance, a boon and not a curse to mankind and to the planet. History textbooks go even further to imply that simply participating in society. Americans contribute to a notion that is constantly progressing and remains the hope of the world. As Boorstein and Kelley put it, near the end of A History of the United States, “ Americans – makers of something out of nothing – have delivered a new way of life to the far corners of the world.” Thus, the idea of American exceptionalism – the United States as the best country in the world – which starts in our textbooks with the Pilgrims, gets projected into the future. Faith in progress has played various functions in society and in American history textbooks. The faith has promoted the status quo in the most literal sense, for it proclaims that to progress we must simply do more of the same. This belief has been particularly useful to the upper class, because Americans would be persuaded to ignore the injustice of the social class if they thought the economic pie kept getting better for all. The idea of progress also fits in with social Darwinism, which implies that lower class lower owing to its own fault. Progress as an ideology has been intrinsically antirevolutionary: because things are getting better all the time, everyone should believe in the system. Portraying America so optimistically also helps textbooks with stand attacks by unpatriotic critics in Texas and other textbook adaptation states. Internationally, referring to have not countries as “developing nations” has helped the “developed nations” avoid facing the injustice of worldwide stratification. In reality “development” has been making Third World Nations poorer, compared to the First World. Per capita income in the First World was five times that in the Third Word in 1850, ten times in 1960, and fourteen times by 1970. It’s tricky to measure these ratios, partly because a dollar buys more in the Third World than in the First, but per capita income in the First world is now twenty to sixty times that in the Third World, The vocabulary of progress remains relentlessly hopeful, however, with regard to the “undeveloped.” As economist E.J. Mishan put it, “Complacency is suffused over the globe, by referring to these destitute and sometimes desperate countries by the fatuous no – menclature of ‘develiping nations.’ In the nineteenth century, progress provided an equally splendid rational for imperialism. Europeans and Americans saw themselves as performing government services for utilizing natural resources of natives in distant lands who were to backward to do it themselves. ¶ Almost every day brings new reasons for ecological concerns, from deforestation to the equator to ozone holes at the poles. Cancer rates climb and we don’t know why. We have no way to measure the full extend of human impact on earth . The average sperm count in healthy human males around the world has dropped nearly 50 percent over the past fifty years. If environmentally caused, this is no laughing matter, for sperm have only to decline in a straight line for another fifty years and we will have wiped out human kind without knowing how we did it. We Were similarly unaware for years that killing mosquitoes with DDT was wiping out birds of prey around the globe. Our increasing power makes it increasingly possible that humankind will make the earth uninhabitable by accident. Indeed, we almost have on several occasions. In the early 1990s, for example nations around the planet agreed to stop production of CFGs that damaged the ozone in the upper atmosphere. In 2006 Washington Post writer Joel Achenbach noted, “Scientists are haunted by realization that if CFCs had been made with a slightly different type of chemistry they’d have destroyed much of the ozone layer over the entire planet. We were simply lucky. All these considerations imply that more of the same economic development and nation state governance that brought us this far may not guide us to a livable planet in the long run. We do not simply face an energy crisis that might be solved if we only develop low – cost energy that does not pollute or cause global warming. On the contrary, if we had cheaper energy, imagine the havoc we might cause! Scientists have already envisioned how we could happily use it to decrease salinity of the seas, increase our arable Land, and in other ways make our planet nicer for us – in the short run. Instead, we must start treating the earth as if we plan to stay here. At some point in the future, perhaps before readers of today’s high school textbooks pass their fifteenth birthdays. Industrialized nations, including the United States may move towards steady state economies in their consumption of energy and raw materials. Thus, our oil crisis can best be viewed as a wake up call to change our ways. Second our use of oil (and all other fossil fuels) has a serious worldwide impact: global warming, As everyone knows, except some high school history textbook authors, this warming melts the polar ice caps, causing sea levels to rise. Oceans rose one foot in the last century. The most conservative estimates, embraced by the George W Bush Administration, predicts they will rise another three feet in this century. Around the world --- from Mexico to Venace to much of Bangladesh – hundreds of millions of people live close enough to sea level that this rise will endager their lives and occupations. The resulting dislocation will constitute the biggest crisis mankind has faced since the beginning a recorded history. And this is the most pleasant estimate. If the Greenland Ice Sheet Ricses the ocean may rise twenty three feet. Scientists James Lovelock in 1970 famously invented the “Gaia Hypothesus,” the idea that the earth acts as a homeostatic system. Recently Lovelock has pointed out that as Earth’s equilibrium gets disturbed, some disequilibrium processes may cause even faster warming. As the polar ice cap melts, for example , they no longer reflect the son’s rays, so the earth absorbs more heat. Lovelock predicts the death of billions of people before the equilibrium is established once more. Global warming also increases other weather problems: the average windspeeds of hurricanes have doubled in the past thirty years, and they are also more frequent. That’s not all. Evidence shows that carbon dioxide, a normal result of burning oil or coal, also makes oceans more acidic. Scientists warn that, by the end of the century, this acididty could decimate coral reefs and kill of creates that undergurd the sea’s food chain. “It’s the single most profound environmental change I’ve ever learned about in my entire career,” said Thomas Lovejoy, author of Climate Change and Biodivdersity. What we’re doing in the next decade will affect our oceans for millions of years,” said Ken Caldeira, oceanographer at Stanford University. In addition to our energy and global warming crises we face other severe problems. Thousands of species face imminent extinction. One list of likely canidadates includes a third of all amphibians, a fourth of the world’s mammals, and an eight of its birds. Wilson thinks the foregoing is optimistic and believes two thirds of all species will perish before the end of the century. Nuclear proliferation poses another threat. In 1945 only one country – the United States had the know how and economic means to build nuclear weapons. Since then, Great Britian, the USSR, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, and apparently North Korea have joined the nuclear club. If Pakistan and North Korea can do it, clearly almost every nation on earth – and some private organizations, including terrorist groups has the capacity. The United States cam uncomfortably close to using nuclear weapons in Vietnam in 1969, and India and Pakistan came uncomfortably close to using them against each other in 2002. In the long run just keeping to the old paths regarding all these new problems is unlikely to work. “From the mere fact that humanity has survived to the present, no hope for the future can be salvaged,” Mushan noted. “The human race can only perish once.¶

#### Vote neg – refusing the narrative of progress is necessary to allow Latin American movements to rise up to check dominant narratives of exceptionalism

Rosenberg ‘6**,** (Associate Professor of Hispanic Studies and Comparative Literature at Brandeis (Fernando J., The Avant-garde and Geopolitics in Latin America, Google Books, p. 1-6, njw)

THIS BOOK is about the avant-gardes of Latin America and their critique of modernity.1 Rather than engaging in the construction of an alternative modernity or attempting to renegotiate the modern in relation to the traditional, these vanguardists, I contend, sought to produce a critique of the modern as a global project.¶ From the perspective of a narrative of progress, Latin America seems to be cast either as a relic from the primitive past or as an unrealized but promising future. The linear temporality of the Judeo-Christian tradition— "ascending, descending, progressive or regressive," as Gianni Vattimo (1992, 87) characterizes it—and its modern varieties—evolution, decadence, revolution, and novelty—were as deeply embedded in the Latin American discourses of emancipation as they were in every project of modernity. But the difference that the avant-gardes opened to inquiry, a difference that cannot be reduced to the contours of "cultural difference" in the traditional anthropological sense, is that at both ends of the foundational narrative—the promise of the future and redemption through and of the past—Latin American discourse reencountered itself as subject to a larger order. It is as if the various futurisms and primitivisms that European movements displayed in an attempt to articulate a reaction against a bourgeois, conservative order (to express it in blatantly vanguardistic terms) were untenable from the Latin American position. For the Latin American avant-gardes, these alternatives kept referring back to the subaltern situation of Latin Americans themselves vis-a-vis the idea of the West, a concept that neither clearly included nor excluded Latin America.-¶ From this position, Latin American avant-gardes could undertake a critique of modernity and its narratives, including those of "international"1 modernism and its avant-gardes, but along a different axis, not through rushing the temporalities of progress forward or through a return to primitive origins. Instead, they developed narratives of space that articulated the Latin American situation in a shifting world order. Some European avant-gardes movements (cubism, dadaism, surrealism, etc.) attempted to undermine the legacy of the Enlightenment and its foundation in the white man as the model of rationality and historical agency under the direction of universal, abstract progress. Because of their investment in modernity and their peripheral position in its foundational narratives, however, Latin Americans were forced to level their criticism through and with a particular attentive-ness to spatial issues that addressed this problematic inclusion but that were repressed by the same idea of progress that they embraced.¶ This is not to say that Latin American avant-gardes were at any point more "advanced" than their European counterparts. While they tried to unravel European cultural supremacy, European avant-gardes usually remained attached to an assumption of their own universality. Artistic flights overseas were one way in which this was expressed, as the search for non-Western ways of life and perception became an exploration into the repressed soul of the universal human. For Latin American avant-gardists, (many times, no doubt, inspired by the Europeans), that position was untenable because the process of "discovery" was carried out under the suspicion of reproducing colonial dynamics. Therefore, tracking down influences and assessing the degree to which Latin American movements followed or did not follow European movements, as has been done repeatedly, misses the point and reproduces a colonial logic of unilinear development that, as we will see, Latin American avant-gardes tried to destabilize.¶ Vicky Unruh rightly argues in her seminal book Latin American Vanguards (1994) that these movements overcame an idea of national and/or continental identity as rooted in an original nature and landscape.4 What Peter Burger in his Theory of the Avant-Garde (1984) called the nonorganic character of the work of art, that is, the possibility of assembling different components with no final resolution of the internal tensions, is akin to this moment in which identity was conceived as a collage (Unruh, chapter 3). The connection Unruh makes between the collagelike constitution of the work of art and issues of national and continental identity is compelling, since ideas of hybridism, transculturation, and cultural anthropophagy or cannibalization—conceptual tools that the avant-gardes favored—traversed the twentieth-century Latin American discussion. But to what degree did the vanguards represent only another step in the constitution of national or regional identities? No doubt, the different movements and writers are inevitably embedded in national traditions. But some texts of the vanguards, I propose, suggest that the question of identity is intertwined with a redefinition of the location of discourses about it in the context of a global negotiation. In these texts, the problem of loci of enunciation—that is, the conditions of possibility for Latin American artists and writers to intervene in the larger debate about modernity—takes precedence and redefines the problem of identity.¶ As part of a geopolitical shift that, with the advent of World War I, shook loose the assumptions of nineteenth-century liberal culture, the avant-gardists in Latin America explored the limits of a national, culturalist response to crisis of the universality of civilization. The concern of the national Creole elite in the constitution of its hegemony—namely, how to organize the nation (or Latin America, for that matter) so as to inscribe its culture more firmly in the annals of universal history—was for the first time left in suspense, owing to the war that put an end to the nineteenth century's faith in the rationality of European history and the worldwide projection.¶ Since literary criticism in Latin America was by and large engaged in the travails of the national cultural elite, I intend to open up the vanguard texts to this different set of concerns, shedding light by the same token on the makeup of that critical tradition. I am interested in the moments of interruption when vanguard experiments called attention to contemporary places of identification and symbolic production that were neither national cultures nor reducible to them. Such interruptions occurred as literary discourses exhibited an openness to planetary concerns that resulted in an exploration of vanguardistic ambition. As a result, the vanguards were led to recognize the indebtedness of literary discourses to the reproduction of colonial perspectives and to occupy positions of utterance that they imagined to dislodge this coloniality.¶ "From 1922 (the date is tentative, it is a situation of consciousness that has been defining itself little by little) all that has ended," writes Jorge Luis Borges (1926,15), the vanguardist, in reference to the sea change that set in motion a Latin American artistic and intellectual field that would no longer voice "our longing for Europe."5 Without attempting to reduce cultural production to a set of contextual conditions, I want to point out certain major historical trends that framed this alternative imaginary. The 1920s and 1930s were decades when the political order was reconfigured as the consequence of an ongoing change in the global geopolitical balance following World War I. It was a time of increasing democratization in the Latin American social space, but it was also an era of new pacts between conservative forces in different national arenas. The upheavals and revolutions that provoked regime changes in more than one national context at the end of the 1920s differed in character, yet they shared a common soil, as historian Tulio Halperin Donghi (1996, 371) makes clear:¶ The world crises that erupted in 1929 had an immediate and devastating impact in Latin America, the loudest sign of which was the collapse, between 1930 and 1933, of the majority of the political situations that had consolidated during the good times that came before. What was not immediately evident was that the crash differed from previous complications along the way not only in terms of its unprecedented intensity; this crisis ushered in a new era in which the painful solutions that had allowed the continent to incorporate itself into an increasingly global economy proved ineffectual. 6¶ We are not referring to a discrete event but to a broad historical pattern that subtly undermined faith in the viability of national autonomy as a way to frame, understand, and localize the production of culture. The question of what might constitute Latin Americas possibilities, its conditions of cultural production in this "increasingly global economy," was at stake in many avant-garde texts of the early 1920s.¶ A parallel demographic change touched on the imaginary of positive modernity and its inception in foundational national narratives. The rural-urban balance of power on which modernity as spatial conquest was carried out (that is, the city as a model of govern mentality whose effects were to be projected onto the rest of the territory) was unsettled with the formation of what the historian Jose Luis Romero (1986, chapter 7) called the "massified city." Major demographic changes were already occurring in many Latin American cities and had produced an overall change in the cultural landscape at the end of the nineteenth century. But the vanguard movements were the first artistic enterprises of the cultural elite that didn't react to this shift with strategies of domination, separation, or rejection. Instead, in an effort to cross the "great divide" between mass culture and elite culture, they integrated with and accommodated themselves to the logic of mass production and consumption.' The well-studied phenomena of unabashed promotion of artistic movements, the circulation of ideas through magazines, the interest in new media, and the political engagement with increasingly visible nonelite subjects can all be traced back to the vanguards' attempts to break through the narrowly conceived boundaries of literary culture.¶ This change of cultural practices entailed a broader concern with what I will call positionality. At a time when the hierarchies embedded in a notion of a progress that promised to spread from center to periphery and from city to countryside were being questioned, some cultural actors found themselves needing to gauge new configurations of production, circulation, and consumption within an expanded horizon, a world-system of attribution of cultural value and meaning. Countering modernity as a merely expansionist force, to the unilinearity of universal history, Latin American artistic movements would continue to posit places of resistance to anchor their identities in the midst of historical flows. Consequently, the elemental refuge of the baroque rain forest that magically eschews Western categories or the boundary-less hinterlands that haunt the gaze of the observer, though refractory of positivist discourse, would continue to be revamped (by early travelers of the nineteenth century, regional writers of the early twentieth century, and practitioners of magic realism) as a cornerstone of cultural formation. But the avant-gardes opened the possibility of a different strategy. Amid so much praise and condemnation of speed and transportation as icons of the universalized, homogeneously modern abolition of spatial constraints, the vanguards elaborated, for the first time, their own loci of enunciation imbricated in the circulation of goods, discourses, and peoples. Two seminal manifestos of the early 1920s—one Argentinean, the other Brazilian—are exemplary in that regard:¶ A single struggle—the struggle for the way. Lets divide it up: poetry for import. And Brazilwood poetry for export. (Schwartz 1991, 138)¶ Martin Fierro accepts the consequences and responsibilities of situating oneself. . . . Instructed on his antecedents, his anatomy, the meridian on which he walks, he consults the barometer, the calendar, before stepping into the street in order to live it with the nerves and mentality of nowadays... .8 To accentuate and to expand to the rest of the intellectual activities, the independent movement in language initiated by [poet] Ruben Dario doesn't mean .. . that we will renounce, much less pretend not to recognize, that every morning we use Swiss tooth paste, French towels, and English soap (Schwartz 1991, H3-I4)-9¶ Two native, national products, one commercial ("Brazilwood," the first Brazilian export to the metropolis and the source of the regions name) and one cultural (Martin Fierro, the mythic character in the epic poem about an autochthonous gaucho as a founder of Argentinean nationality) are not only the anchor for a renewed nationalism, as has been argued widely, but also become vantage points from which to understand an expanded geopolitics. The map projected to elaborate this position needs to be altogether different from the one inherited from the period of nation-state formation. The modern and the new, so the "Manifesto Martin Fierro" seems to claim, necessarily come from an elsewhere that also has the power to define modernity and its others, whereas the "Brazilwood manifesto" foregrounds the fact that what stands as artistically new also depends on a sort of validation that is not at all foreign to a global circulation of commodities.

## Case

### Multilat

#### Multilateralism empirically doesn’t solve anything – four reasons

**Harvey, 4** – University Research Professor of International Relations, professor in the Department of Political Science, and the director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University (Frank, Smoke And Mirrors: Globalized Terrorism And The Illusion Of Multilateral Security, p. 43-45)

The typical argument favouring multilateralism is a simple one, sum- marized by Ramesh Thakur: ‘Because the world is essentially anarchi- cal, it is fundamentally insecure, characterized by strategic uncertainty and complexity because of too many actors with multiple goals and interests and variable capabilities and convictions. Collective action embedded in international institutions that mirror mainly U.S. value preferences and interests enhances predictability, reduces uncertainty, and cuts the transaction costs of intemational action.’" With respect to peacekeeping, for example, Thakur argues that if ‘the UN helps to mute the costs and spread the risks of the terms of intemational engagement to maximise these benefits, the United States will need to instill in others, as well as itself embrace, the principle of multilateralism as a norm in its own right: states must do X because the United Nations has called for X, and good states do what the United Nations asks them to do.’l2 But **there are several problems with** Thakur's **defence of collective action and associated policy recommendations, particularly in relation to multilateral approaches to security in a post-9/11 setting. First, and foremost, state leaders often refuse to do what the UN asks of them, are often more than prepared to have their publics suffer the consequences of whatever sanctions the UN can mount, and are rarely directly affected by the sanctions that are implemented** – assuming the permanent members of the Security Council find it in their collective interest to implement a sanctions regime in the first place**. The lessons from UN intervention and sanction efforts over the past decade are not at all encouraging in this regard. Second, many state and non-state actors fall outside the institutional constraints imposed on the system through global norms and regimes. As the capacity spreads for smaller and smaller groups to inflict increasingly devastating levels of damage on larger states, international institutions will lose the capacity to force or coerce compliance with international law**. **Consequently, leaders of major powers, such as the U**nited **S**tates, **will be compelled to respond to security threats through unilateral initiatives. This compulsion will force other powers to push that much harder to control American impulses by demanding that multilateral consensus remain the sole guarantor of legitimacy.** These **tensions will be exacerbated by the prevailing perception in the U**nited **S**tates **that these same multilateral institutions are constraining the power and capacity of the U.S. government to protect American citizens from emerging threats of terrorism and prolif**eration. **Third, the collective-action argument** put forward by Thai-cur typically (and erroneously) **assumes that most states are governed by a similar set of political priorities, share common concerns about similar combinations of security threats, are stimulated into action** (or inaction) **by the same set of economic imperatives, are inspired by a common set of interests and overarching values (such as peace, security, stability), and are encouraged by their respective publics to meet their demands for a common set of public goods. But the differences, tensions, and overall level of competition among states in the system are far greater than proponents of multilateralism acknowledge. Some states are more threatened by terrorism and proliferation than others, have more substantial and direct economic interest in particular regions, are less interested in securing peace, and experience pressure from their respective publics to pursue very distinct foreign and security policies**. Consequently, **there is no guarantee that a collection of states will have the same motivation to change the status quo**, or experience the same imperative to address the same security threats with the same level of resolve, commitment, or resources (relative to their size). In sum, **multi- lateral organizations are less likely today to act with the same level of urgency to address security threats that Washington considers imperative. The costs of inaction (derived from exclusive reliance on multilateral consensus) are now perceived as being higher than the costs of unilateralism**. Although similar threats may have guided collective action through multilateral alliances for much of the cold war, these imperatives were a product of a common Soviet threat. But **threats today are many and varied, and few states share the same concerns or face the same obligations to respond**. No case more clearly illustrates the growing divisions among former allies than the 2003 Iraq war. **Fourth,** decreasing transaction costs may be a valid argument in favour of multilateral cooperation in some cases (e. g., to facilitate post- conflict reconstruction, political reforms, democratization, elections run by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, food aid, water distribution, and the provision of medical supplies and facilities), but this is not true for all security challenges. **In a post-9/11 environment, the transaction costs that are saved through joint efforts will always be compared with the costs of depending exclusively on collective-action mechanisms that ultimately may fail - multilateralism is not free of costs or risks**. For example, **one of the many important lessons of the 2003 Iraq war,** at least for American officials, **is that there are no collective-security guarantees any longer, even from traditional allies. The UN Security Council did not function as a separate entity committed to facilitating and coordinating diplomatic exchanges towards a common good**. The UN functions in a highly competitive environment in which traditional power politics plays out. Proponents of multilateralism through the UNSC do not espouse that doctrine in the interest of global security; their **efforts are typically designed to use the institution to limit the capacity of the U.S. to act unilaterally to protect American interests. That level of competition, itself driven by competing interpretations of interests, values, and threats, does not lend itself well to the kind of multilateralism its proponents aspire to achieve**. Of course, if France shared the same concerns about terrorism, or if leaders in Paris were equally motivated to address the potential for WMD proliferation in and through Iraq, the transaction costs incurred by responding through the UN would be more acceptable. But **as threat perceptions continue to diverge, the risks associated with waiting for multilateral consensus are simply too high. The complex nature of contemporary security threats virtually guarantees that similar conflicts will plague multilateral institutions in the future**.

#### OAS Fails – political differences and restrictions

**Lee, 12 -** Brianna Lee, Senior Production Editor “The Organization of American States” <http://www.cfr.org/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/organization-american-states/p27945#p3> April 13, 2012)

One of the OAS's major administrative constraints is its consensus model, which requires a unanimous vote to make many of its decisions. As **political ideologies** have diversified within the region, this has **made it difficult for the OAS to make quick**, decisive **calls to action**. The **polarization between American states has also led to one of the OAS's other major shortcomings**: its many mandates unrelated to the core mission. In 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the OAS to streamline its processes (VOA) from what she called a "proliferation of mandates," noting that the expansion of mandates without proportional expansion of funding made for an "unsustainable" fiscal future. **Election monitoring**, one of the OAS's major functions in light of its commitment to democracy, **is also restricted by its inability to send election observers without the invitation of state governments**. "They can't condemn a country unless that country wants to be condemned," CFR's O'Neil says. Nevertheless, she adds, it has become a norm in many member countries to accept OAS monitors, which she says has been helpful. Within the hemisphere, **conflicting views on the OAS's loyalties abound**. In the summer 2011 issue of Americas Quarterly, Anthony DePalma sums up the range of mistrust: "Insulza and the **OAS itself are widely seen as being bullied by Venezuela** (he denies it), as catering to [Venezuelan President] **Hugo Chavez's friends in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua** (evidence suggests otherwise) **and, strangely, still beholden to the U.S., even though Washington seems to have lost interest**." **Chavez has called the OAS a puppet of the United States**; at the same time, in July 2011, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a Republican-sponsored bill to defund the OAS (ForeignPolicy), on the charge that the organization supported anti-democracy regimes in Latin America.

#### No impact to disease – they either burn out or don’t spread

Posner 05 – Senior Lecturer at University of Chicago (Richard A, “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks and what we can do about them.”, Winter, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_kmske/is\_3\_11/ai\_n29167514/pg\_2?tag=content;col1)//WL

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.

#### Can’t solve for biod – different drivers – prefer this ev – 23 reputable authors contributed equally

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Reducing uncertainty within and among model projections is ¶ urgent. More attention must be paid to evaluating model ¶ projections using indicators that allow comparisons between ¶ models and between models and data. Key components of ¶ this effort will be the development of comprehensive ¶ biodiversity monitoring through efforts such as the Global ¶ Biodiversity Observation Network or GEO BON (58), and ¶ the harmonization of the biodiversity indicators used by the ¶ data and scenarios communities. ¶ **The importance of the drivers of biodiversity change** ¶ **differs across realms, with land-use change being a dominant** ¶ **driver in terrestrial systems, overexploitation in marine** ¶ **systems, while climate change is ubiquitous across realms** ¶ (28). Available **models reflect these differences, but fail to** ¶ **account for the full set of major drivers of future biodiversity** ¶ **change — for instance, the lack of global models of the** ¶ **impact of dams and pollution on freshwater biodiversity**. ¶ Modeling climate change impacts on biodiversity is currently ¶ tractable and popular, in part because a wide range of climate ¶ scenarios and bioclimatic envelope modeling tools are readily ¶ available, **but it is vital to develop models of other important** ¶ **drivers and their interactions** (59). **This will require the** ¶ **development of mechanistic models linking changes in land** ¶ **use, pollution levels, and biotic competition** (e.g. invasive ¶ species) **to population dynamics of individual species through** ¶ **changes in life-history parameters such as survival and** ¶ **dispersal, using techniques that are scalable across space** and ¶ across species assemblages (10, 14). This approach has ¶ recently been explored to assess how interactions between life ¶ history and disturbance regime mediate species extinction ¶ risk under climate change (60)

#### Resource wars are just Hollywood alarmism

**Victor, 7** – professor at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies and director of the School’s new Laboratory on International Law and Regulation (David G., “What Resource Wars?”, National Interest, 11/12/07, http://nationalinterest.org/article/what-resource-wars-1851) EK

**RISING ENERGY prices and mounting concerns about environmental depletion have animated fears that the world may be headed for a spate of "resource wars**"-hot conflicts triggered by a struggle to grab valuable resources. Such fears come in many stripes, but **the threat industry has sounded the alarm bells especially loudly** in three areas. First is the rise of China, which is poorly endowed with many of the resources it needs-such as oil, gas, timber and most minerals-and has already "gone out" to the world with the goal of securing what it wants. Violent conflicts may follow as the country shunts others aside. A second potential path down the road to resource wars starts with all the money now flowing into poorly governed but resource-rich countries. Money can fund civil wars and other hostilities, even leaking into the hands of terrorists. And third is global climate change, which could multiply stresses on natural resources and trigger water wars, catalyze the spread of disease or bring about mass migrations. **Most of this is bunk, and nearly all of it has focused on the wrong lessons for policy. Classic resource wars are good material for Hollywood screenwriters. They rarely occur in the real world**. To be sure, **resource money can magnify and prolong some conflicts, but the root causes of those hostilities usually lie elsewhere**. Fixing them requires focusing on the underlying institutions that govern how resources are used and largely determine whether stress explodes into violence. When conflicts do arise, the weak link isn't a dearth in resources but a dearth in governance.

#### Sustainable multilateralism is structurally impossible and there are a litany of major alt causes the aff can’t overcome

**Held et al, 13** – Master of University College and Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham, and Director of Polity Press and General Editor of Global Policy (David, “Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,” ProQuest, 5/24/2013, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1355105016)

**Economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. The Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is paralyzed in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria**. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common. **Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems - indeed it is - but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries**. A golden era of governed globalization In order to understand why gridlock has come about it is important to understand how it was that the post-Second World War era facilitated, in many respects, a successful form of 'governed globalization' that contributed to relative peace and prosperity across the world over several decades. This period was marked by peace between the great powers, although there were many proxy wars fought out in the global South. This relative stability created the conditions for what now can be regarded as an unprecedented period of prosperity that characterized the 1950s onward. Although it is by no means the sole cause, the UN is central to this story, helping to create conditions under which decolonization and successive waves of democratization could take root, profoundly altering world politics. While the economic record of the postwar years varies by country, many experienced significant economic growth and living standards rose rapidly across significant parts of the world. By the late 1980s a variety of East Asian countries were beginning to grow at an unprecedented speed, and by the late 1990s countries such as China, India and Brazil had gained significant economic momentum, a process that continues to this day. Meanwhile, the institutionalization of international cooperation proceeded at an equally impressive pace. **In 1909,** 37 intergovernmental organizations existed; in 2011, the number of institutions and their various off-shoots had grown to 7608 (Union of International Associations 2011). **There was substantial growth in the number of international treaties in force, as well as the number of international regimes, formal and informal**. At the same time, **new** kinds of. **Postwar institutions created the conditions under which a multitude of actors could benefit from forming multinational companies, investing abroad, developing global production chains, and engaging with a plethora of other social and economic processes associated with globalization**. These conditions, combined with the expansionary logic of capitalism and basic technological innovation, changed the nature of the world economy, radically increasing dependence on people and countries from every corner of the world. This interdependence, in turn, created demand for further institutionalization, which states seeking the benefits of cooperation provided, beginning the cycle anew. This is not to say that international institutions were the only cause of the dynamic form of globalization experienced over the last few decades. Changes in the nature of global capitalism, including breakthroughs in transportation and information technology, are obviously critical drivers of interdependence. However, all of these changes were allowed to thrive and develop because they took place in a relatively open, peaceful, liberal, institutionalized world order. By preventing World War Three and another Great Depression, the multilateral order arguably did just as much for interdependence as microprocessors or email (see Mueller 1990; O'Neal and Russett 1997). Beyond the special privileges of the great powers Self-reinforcing interdependence has now progressed to the point where it has altered our ability to engage in further global cooperation. That is, **economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. Because of the remarkable success of global cooperation in the postwar order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on politics than it did in 1945**. The need for international cooperation has never been higher. **Yet the "supply" side of the equation, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, has stalled. In areas such as nuclear proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales, terrorism, failed states, global economic imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality, biodiversity losses, water deficits and climate change, multilateral and transnational cooperation is now increasingly ineffective or threadbare. Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming a general feature of global governance: cooperation seems to be increasingly difficult and deficient at precisely the time when it is needed most. It is possible to identify four reasons for this blockage, four pathways to gridlock: rising multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation.** Each pathway can be thought of as a growing trend that embodies a specific mix of causal mechanisms. Each of these are explained briefly below. Growing multipolarity. The absolute number of states has increased by 300 percent in the last 70 years, meaning that the most basic transaction costs of global governance have grown. More importantly, the number of states that "matter" on a given issue--that is, **the states without whose cooperation a global problem cannot be adequately addressed--has expanded by similar proportions**. At Bretton Woods in 1945, the rules of the world economy could essentially be written by the United States with some consultation with the UK and other European allies. In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis, the G-20 has become the principal forum for global economic management, not because the established powers desired to be more inclusive, but because they could not solve the problem on their own. However, **a consequence of this progress is now that many more countries, representing a diverse range of interests, must agree in order for global cooperation to occur.** Institutional inertia. The postwar order succeeded, in part, because it incentivized great power involvement in key institutions. From the UN Security Council, to the Bretton Woods institutions, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, key pillars of the global order explicitly grant special privileges to the countries that were wealthy and powerful at the time of their creation. This hierarchy was necessary to secure the participation of the most important countries in global governance. Today, the gain from this trade-off has shrunk while the costs have grown. As power shifts from West to East, North to South, a broader range of participation is needed on nearly all global issues if they are to be dealt with effectively. At the same time, following decolonization, the end of the Cold War and economic development, the idea that some countries should hold more rights and privileges than others is increasingly (and rightly) regarded as morally bankrupt. And yet, the architects of the postwar order did not, in most cases, design institutions that would organically adjust to fluctuations in national power. **Harder problems. As independence has deepened, the types and scope of problems around which countries must cooperate has evolved. Problems are both now more extensive, implicating a broader range of countries and individuals within countries, and intensive, penetrating deep into the domestic policy space and daily life. Consider the example of trade. For much of the postwar era, trade negotiations focused on reducing tariff levels on manufactured products traded between industrialized countries. Now, however, negotiating a trade agreement requires also discussing a host of social, environmental, and cultural subjects - GMOs, intellectual property, health and environmental standards, biodiversity, labour standards--about which countries often disagree sharply. In the area of environmental change a similar set of considerations applies. To clean up industrial smog or address ozone depletion required fairly discrete actions from a small number of top polluters**. By contrast, the threat of climate change and the efforts to mitigate it involve nearly all countries of the globe. Yet, **the divergence of voice and interest within both the developed and developing worlds, along with the sheer complexity of the incentives needed to achieve a low carbon economy, have made a global deal, thus far, impossible** (Falkner et al. 2011; Victor 2011). **Fragmentation**. The institution-builders of the 1940s began with, essentially, a blank slate. But **efforts to cooperate internationally today occur in a dense institutional ecosystem shaped by path dependency**. The exponential rise in both multilateral and transnational organizations has created a more complex multilevel and multi-actor system of global governance. Within this dense web of institutions mandates can conflict, **interventions are frequently uncoordinated, and all too typically scarce resources are subject to intense competition**. In this context, **the proliferation of institutions tends to lead to dysfunctional fragmentation, reducing the ability of multilateral institutions to provide public goods. When funding and political will are scarce, countries need focal points to guide policy** (Keohane and Martin 1995), **which can help define the nature and form of cooperation. Yet, when international regimes overlap, these positive effects are weakened. Fragmented institutions, in turn, disaggregate resources and political will, while increasing transaction costs**. In stressing four pathways to gridlock we emphasize the manner in which **contemporary global governance problems build up on each other**, although different pathways can carry more significance in some domains than in others. **The challenges** now faced by the multilateral order are substantially different from those faced by the 1945 victors in the postwar settlement. They are second-order cooperation problems arising from previous phases of success in global coordination. **Together**, they **now block and inhibit problem solving and reform at the global level**.

#### Multilateralism fails – no international acceptance and poor negotiation

**Walter, 11** – Reader in International Relations at the London School of Economics, specializing in the political economy of international money and finance (“The Mismanagement of Global Imbalances: Why Did Multilateralism Fail?”, London School of Economics and Political Science, 12/7/2011, http://personal.lse.ac.uk/wyattwal/images/Mismanaging.pdf)

**Multilateralism has failed to manage global imbalances**, I suggest, for two other related and deeply political reasons. **First, it stemmed from a persistent unwillingness among all major countries, not just China, to accept the domestic political costs of adjustment and a related shift to different models of economic growth**. I argue below that China is indeed an outlier among the G-4 (consisting of the US, EU, Japan, and China), but only because it is relatively poor, unusually open, and has opted for exchange rate targeting rather than inflation targeting. **It does indeed resist external policy constraint, but in this regard it is little different to other major countries. Second, it stemmed from the weakness of the multilateral policy surveillance framework inherited from the era of western dominance. This framework was poorly suited to facilitate the negotiation of the necessary domestic and international political bargains, particularly as regards policy areas that the major countries viewed as too politically sensitive**. In order for multilateralism to become more effective in the future, these flaws would need to be resolved, but **there are few signs that major governments will accept the constraints on domestic policy choices that this requires**.

#### No one signs on to multilateralism

**Tanner, 2k** – Deputy Director of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (Fred, “Conflict prevention and conflict resolution: limits of multilateralism,” ICRC, 3/9/2000, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jqq2.htm)

The spread and global importance of internal conflicts in the 1990s, together with the increasing diversity of players in international affairs, has led to a certain multilateralization of conflict prevention efforts. This **multilateralization presupposes that international and regional organizations, States and non-State entities would combine their efforts to fight the spread of deadly conflicts**, in other words that all parties involved should accept a policy scheme that subscribes to a common vision on conflict resolution. **But the diversity of mission mandates, the respective organizational turf, the bureaucratic red tape, national interests and conflicting views on conflict prevention and humanitarian actions set limits to effective multilateral action.** Among the various players, the United Nations remains the only institution with global legitimacy for conflict prevention. Yet regional organizations have been gaining importance in security cooperation over the last few years. While this type of cooperation is invaluable, the division of labour between the UN and regional organizations has run into trouble. For example, with regard to the NATO military intervention in Kosovo, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that “**conflict prevention, peace-keeping and peacemaking must not become an area of competition between the U**nited **N**ations **and regional organizations**”. [9 ] **NGOs and humanitarian organizations play an integral and increasingly important role in conflict prevention, owing to their knowledge of and involvement in potential conflict areas. There is**, however, **an uneasy relationship between humanitarian organizations and other parties engaged in conflict prevention and peace implementation.** In the final analysis, States remain the most important players in today’s international system, and if their national interests are at stake, they may tend to short-cut international organizations in favour of international contact groups or unilateral action. The following section will briefly examine each of these entities and their ability and willingness to engage in multilateral preventive action.

#### Alt cause- Ecuador-Colombia Crisis

**Yuxia, 08** – (Jiang Yuxia staff writer, 2008-03-06 “OAS credibility is at stake in Ecuador-Colombia crisis”, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/06/content\_7728445.htm)

RIO DE JANEIRO, March 5 (Xinhua) -- Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim said Wednesday that the credibility of the **Organization of American States (OAS**) **would be at stake if it failed to solve the Ecuador-Colombia diplomatic crisis.** "The OAS needs to act quickly. **That is important for its credibility,**" said the minister. He added that if OAS did not come up with a solution, the impasse would be discussed at the 20th summit of the Rio Group, the permanent mechanism of political consultation and coordination for Latin America and the Caribbean, which will gather officials of 19 countries on March 7 in the Dominican Republic. The summit was scheduled to discuss energy, natural catastrophes and development, but the **regional crisis** that has been brewing since Colombian forces destroyed a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) camp in Ecuador Saturday, killing 21 rebels, including the group's No.2 leader Raul Reyes, **may become the main debate on the agenda.** According to Amorim, the Brazilian government does not favor the involvement of the United States in the impasse, as it regards the affair as exclusively Latin America's. "This is a Latin American matter. The more we keep the issue in the Latin American scope, the bigger are the chances to solve it," he said. In a meeting with Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa in Brasilia Wednesday, Amorim said that Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was committed to helping Ecuador and Colombia find a peaceful solution to the crisis.

#### OAS fails - structural deficiencies and poor leadership

**Daremblum, 09** – (JAIME DAREMBLUM staff writer <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/017/104qcsmd.asp>”A Credibility Gap at the OAS” OCT 22, 2009 • BY JAIME DAREMBLUM)

Several decades after its founding as the Western Hemisphere's premier democratic forum, the Organization of American States (**OAS) is in danger of becoming irrelevant**. As a former Latin America diplomat, I say this with great regret. The OAS should be a powerful vehicle for defending democracy and promoting regional cooperation. **Yet, it has been weakened and corrupted by poor leadership and structural deficiencies.** **The poor leadership** has come from José Miguel Insulza, a Chilean socialist who has served as secretary general of the OAS since 2005. Insulza **has politicized the institution and pursued ideological causes that have little (if any) connection to Latin America's most pressing challenges.** Earlier this year, for example, Insulza spearheaded an aggressive movement to end Cuba's 47-year-old suspension from the OAS. I have never seen the organization so energized over a single issue. In early June, Insulza and his allies got their way, as the ban on Cuban membership was lifted (though the island was not formally readmitted). According to its charter, one of the "essential purposes" of the OAS is "to promote and consolidate representative democracy." **Yet at a time when democracy is being rolled back in several of its member countries, the OAS has been preoccupied with embracing a Communist dictatorship--a dictatorship that says it has no interest in joining the democratic club.**

#### OAS fails – consensus failure and undermined perception

**Isacson, 12 -** Adam Isacson staff writer, Conflict Resolution in the Americas: The Decline of the OAS, 22 May 2012, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11979/conflict-resolution-in-the-americas-the-decline-of-the-oas>)

"The [**Organization of American States] is an enemy of the U.S. and an enemy to the interests of freedom and security**," said Rep. David Rivera, a Republican congressman from Florida, in July 2011 as he joined the House Foreign Affairs Committee's GOP majority in voting to cut off U.S. funding for the OAS. Rivera’s low regard for the organization was matched by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who in urging the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean to form a new regional bloc excluding the United States said, "**You can’t expect much from the OAS.** It’s like a corpse that must be buried." The Organization of American States’ **troubles go beyond being attacked from both extremes of the ideological spectrum**. The April 2012 Summit of the Americas sh**owed many of the region's presidents disagreeing, at times sharply, with the United States on key issues like drug policy and diplomacy toward Cuba; s**everal said they saw little reason to continue with the series of periodic meetings that began in 1995. Latin American governments, meanwhile, have formed a handful of parallel organizations that explicitly exclude the United States. What is going on here? The OAS, the world's oldest regional organization, has never been a diplomatic powerhouse. Since the Pan-American Union's founding in 1910, it has rarely been the center of gravity for the Western Hemisphere's politics or diplomacy. **It has helped to resolve only a small fraction of the region's armed conflicts or crises that threatened to deteriorate into conflicts.** **Instead, the OAS has functioned as a multilateral sounding board, a place to build consensus around broad policies**, from anti-communism to counternarcotics to counterterrorism. The ability to discuss issues at regular general assemblies and special sessions has reduced friction among its members. And some OAS components -- the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, electoral observer missions and efforts to verify postconflict demobilizations -- have made important contributions to regional peace, security and democracy. **But the OAS has been hampered by its design, which keeps it deliberately weak**. **The organization operates on a consensus model, in which a determined minority can prevent action.** Its “one country, one vote” system means that a tiny state like St. Lucia has as much voice as a large state like Brazil. **The OAS has no analogue to the U.N. Security Council and no dispute-resolution or peace-enforcement mechanism to deal with breaches of the peace like that contemplated in Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter.**  **The OAS is also hampered by a perception,** reinforced during the Cold War, **that the Washington-based body is dominated by the United States.** This is perhaps inevitable given the asymmetry of wealth and power between the United States and its regional neighbors. Still, **the perception of an uneven playing field has damaged the organization's "honest broker" status and made Latin American states reluctant to take decisions that might require them to cede sovereignty to the OAS, even for the benefit of a greater good.** As a result, the **OAS has not been viewed as a forum for debating drug policy.** Instead, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), which is largely funded by the United States, has reinforced Washington’s hard-line approach emphasizing supply reduction. Nor has the OAS been a leading voice on regional security issues; little of note has emerged from its Secretariat for Multidimensional Security since it was established in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks. The organization's security guarantees exist mostly on paper: The 1947 Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, which commits all countries to view an attack against one as an attack against all, has not been meaningfully invoked in decades, and Mexico dropped out of it entirely in the 2002 run-up to the Iraq War.

#### OAS consensus blocks effectiveness – reforms not funding key

**Noriega, 11** – (Roger F. Noriega | Latin American AdvisorAugust 09, 2011“How important is the Organization of American States?”, <http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/international-organizations/how-important-is-the-organization-of-american-states/>)

"The OAS' central strength is that it operates by consensus and can serve to organize a genuinely regional response to crises. **However, when a group of countries block consensus on the most fundamental issues** (such as promoting democracy or fighting terrorism or drugs) **in a conscious effort to undermine the organization's effectiveness, 'consensus' becomes a weakness**. **The secretary general can defend the credibility and independence of the OAS if he has the political will to do so.** It is clear that José Miguel Insulza has failed in this responsibility. He has let himself be bullied by Venezuela and its clique of client states, and he has been unwilling or unable to get the United States, Brazil, Canada or other key governments to work with him to do the job he was elected to do. His re-election was a nadir for the OAS, because no government cared enough to field a credible alternative. **Because dictatorships are being created to muzzle popular will, the OAS should be reformed to create a forum for the voice of the people** (in the form of independent branches of government, credible NGOs, media organizations or political parties) to be heard. Donor governments should be permitted to allocate their regular fund contributions to their priorities. The key states should meet informally on a regular basis to agree on a constructive agenda for the OAS and to identify issues that should be put to a vote. And, the secretary general should be elected to a single five-year term and should resign as soon as he or she becomes a candidate for another public office."