### 1NC

#### “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### The 1AC fails to specify the agent of change – voting issue

#### A. Limits— the agent of change could be the 1AC speech act, the judge, the ballot or they themselves. Agent choice substantially affects our negative strategy and is necessary for argumentative precision. Failure to specify causes a moving target that allows for constant shifting in every speech and allows for smoke and mirror tactics that hamstring clash and turn the debate into a rhetorical shell game

#### B. Predictable Ground – against plan-less 1ACs the negative should be able to counterplan with different agents of change – absent specification these strategies which test agent-choice will always lose to permutation, obviating the research ground for comparative institutional analysis

**Komesar, 94** (Neil, professor of law at the University of Wisconsin, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, p. 41-42)

Even the constitutions of totalitarian states have contained high-sounding announcements of rights. The welfare of the populace depends on the presence of institutions capable of translating high-sounding principles into substance. Issues of institutional representation and participation seem especially important for the least advantaged, who almost by definition have had difficulties with representation and participation in existing institutional processes. If representation and participation are important for resolving the simpler version of the difference principle, they would seem even more important in confronting the more complicated standard that Michelman derives from Rawls. They would seem more important yet when society faces the immense task of fulfilling a measure of justice that seeks to integrate this difference principle with the concepts of equal opportunity and liberty. Determining the character of the legislature or agency given the task of this integration seems **central** here. The real content of Rawlsian justice depends on such a determination. Any theory of justice capable of even minimally capturing our basic sensibilities has many loosely defined components. Because such loosely defined elements and complicated standards are inherent in goal choice and articulation, the character of institutions that will define and apply these goals becomes an essential – perhaps ***the* essential** – component in the realization of the just society. The more complex and vaguely defined the conception of the good, the more central becomes the issue of who decides – the issue of instiutional choice. The discussion of *Boomer* showed that these questions of institutional choice dominate issues of resource allocation efficiency—a definition of the social good more confined and better defined than broader conceptions of the good such as Rawls’s theory of justice. The lessons about the importance and complexity of institutional choice derived from *Boomer* are even more appropriate with more complex definitions of the good.

#### Comparative institutional analysis is the most fundamental question for academics working for social change. Failure to guarantee this ground guarantees organizational failures and prevents critical questioning of ethical responsibility

**Heminway, 05** (Joan, professor of law at the University of Tennessee, 10 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 225, lexis)

This article offers a model for comparative institutional choice specifically for use in the context of federal corporate governance reforms. It also, however, constitutes part of the larger academic movement advocating comparative institutional analysis. Comparative institutional analysis is **critically important** to the work of scholars and other proponents of law reform. These rule proponents should not suggest changes in legal rules without also suggesting the vehicle for the suggested reforms. The determination of the appropriate rulemaking body should be accomplished by employing some rigorous form of comparative institutional analysis. In this regard, the framework included in this article is intended to endorse in full the views of Professor Neil Komesar when he says: [\*384] ¶ Unless we do better with the difficult issues of institutional choice, any reforms, changes and proposals will remain **illusory or cosmetic**. We will continue to cycle through the same proposals with the same arguments. Today's policy will always have feet of clay and be replaced by yesterday's rejected panacea, which somehow reappears (without blemishes) as tomorrow's solution. Attempts to fashion proposals and programs cannot stop until we fully understand institutional choice. That understanding will be long in coming and is more likely to occur if judges, lawyers and law reformers seriously struggle with the subject **as they make** their decisions and proposals. It is that struggle that I hope for. I want those who make or seek to change law to seriously confront and address institutional choice and comparison. I recognize that, to do so, they will often have to rely on intuition and guesses. It is the **responsibility** of legal academics to provide deeper understanding of these central issues and, therefore, to improve the ability of those who struggle with these decisions. [581](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=aa91df1416a18d87537d72b0e3763e33&docnum=20&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=01ed68c7086eb1b7d8508b691f80e0b7&focBudTerms=imperfect%20alternatives%20and%20komesar%20and%20legislative%20or%20legislature%20or%20executive%20w/20%20judicial%20or%20judiciary%20and%20comparative%20institutional%20analysis&focBudSel=all#n581)

#### Non USFG agents explode the topic and makes it impossible to be neg because we can never predict nor clash with the aff – we can’t predict all the possible utopian worlds the aff could imagine or all the possible advantages that aren’t based on the consequences of plan passage

#### Solely defending instrumental adoption is key to debates over policy effects -- failure to do so leaves their pedagody disengaged from any possibility of positive social change and makes their predictive claims vacuous

**McClean ‘1** – Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, Molloy College, New York (David E., “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” Presented at the 2001 Annual Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm,)

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly **understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences.** This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

#### Unbridled affirmation makes research impossible and destroys dialogue in debate

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

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professor.

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

### 1NC

#### The battle for the public sphere is over—we lost. Conservatives and Liberals are now two sides of the same coin, and any movement that actually promises radical change will be destroyed as soon as it becomes visible. An invisible movement has the most subversive potential—voting neg to reject politics is the only political act

**The Invisible Committee, ‘7** [an anonymous group of French professors, phd candidates, and intellectuals, in the book “The Coming Insurrection” published by Semiotext(e) (attributed to the [Tarnac Nine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarnac_Nine) by the French police), <http://tarnac9.noblogs.org/gallery/5188/insurrection_english.pdf>]

Whatever angle you look at it from, **there's no escape from the present. That's** not the least of its virtues. For those who want absolutely to have hope, it knocks down every support. Those who claim to have solutions are proven wrong almost immediately. It's understood that now everything can only go from bad to worse. "There's no future for the future" is the wisdom behind an era that for all its appearances of extreme normalcy has come to have about the consciousness level of the first punks. The sphere of political representation is closed. From left to right, it's the same nothingness acting by turns either as the big shots or the virgins, the same sales shelf heads, changing up their discourse according to the latest dispatches from the information service. Those who still vote give one the impression that their only intention is to knock out the polling booths by voting as a pure act of protest. And we've started to understand that in fact it’s only against the vote itself that people go on voting. Nothing we've seen can come up to the heights of the present situation; not by far. By its very silence, the populace seems infinitely more 'grown up' than all those squabbling amongst themselves to govern it do. Any Belleville chibani 1 is wiser in his chats than in all of those puppets’ grand declarations put together. The lid of the social kettle is triple-tight, and the pressure inside won’t stop building. The ghost of Argentina’s Que Se Vayan Todos 2 is seriously starting to haunt the ruling heads. The fires of November 2005 will never cease to cast their shadow on all consciences. Those first joyous fires were the baptism of a whole decade full of promises. The media’s “suburbs vs. the Republic” myth, if it’s not inefficient, is certainly not true. The fatherland was ablaze all the way to downtown everywhere, with fires that were methodically snuffed out. Whole streets went up in flames of solidarity in Barcelona and no one but the people who lived there even found out about it. And the country hasn’t stopped burning since. Among the accused we find diverse profiles, without much in common besides a hatred for existing society; not united by class, race, or even by neighborhood. What was new wasn’t the “suburban revolt,” since that was already happening in the 80s, but the rupture with its established forms. The assailants weren’t listening to anybody at all anymore, not their big brothers, not the local associations assigned to help return things to normal. No “SOS Racism which only fatigue, falsification, and media omertà 4 could feign putting an end. The whole series of nocturnal strikes, anonymous attacks, wordless destruction, had the merit of busting wide open the split between politics and the political. No one can honestly deny the obvious weight of this assault which **made no demands**, and had no message other than a threat which had nothing to do with politics. But you’d have to be blind not to see what is **purely political** about this **resolute negation of politics,** and you’d certainly have to know absolutely nothing about the autonomous youth movements of the last 30 years. Like abandoned children we burned the first baby toys of a society that deserves no more respect than the monuments of Paris did at the end of Bloody Week 5 -- and knows it. There’s **no social solution** to the present situation. First off because the vague aggregate of social groupings, institutions, and individual bubbles that we designate by the anti-phrase “society” has no substance, because there’s no language left to express common experiences with. It took a half-century of fighting by the Lumières to thaw out the possibility of a French Revolution, and a century of fighting by work to give birth to the fearful “Welfare State.” Struggles creating the language in which the new order expresses itself. Nothing like today. Europe is now a de-monied continent that sneaks off to make a run to the Lidl 6 and has to fly with the low-cost airlines to be able to keep on flying. **None of the “problems” formulated in the social language are resolvable**. The “retirement pensions issue,” the issues of “precariousness,” the “youth” and their “violence” can only be kept in suspense as long as the ever more surprising “acting out” they thinly cover gets managed away police-like. No one’s going to be happy to see old people being wiped out at a knockdown price, abandoned by their own and with nothing to say. And those who’ve found less humiliation and more benefit in a life of crime than in sweeping floors will not give up their weapons, and prison won’t make them love society. The rage to enjoy of the hordes of the retired will not take the somber cuts to their monthly income on an empty stomach, and will get only too excited about the refusal to work among a large sector of the youth. And to conclude, no guaranteed income granted the day after a quasi-uprising will lay the foundations for a new New Deal, a new pact, and a new peace. The social sentiment is rather **too evaporated** for all that. As their solution, they’ll just never stop putting on the pressure, to make sure nothing happens, and with it we’ll have more and more police chases all over the neighborhood. The drone that even according to the police indeed did fly over Seine-Saint-Denis 7 last July 14 th is a picture of the future in much more straightforward colors than all the hazy images we get from the humanists. That they took the time to clarify that it was not armed shows pretty clearly the kind of road we’re headed down. The country is going to be cut up into ever more air-tight zones. Highways built along the border of the “sensitive neighborhoods” already form walls that are invisible and yet able to cut them off from the private subdivisions. Whatever good patriotic souls may think about it, the management of neighborhoods “by community” is most effective just by its notoriety. The purely metropolitan portions of the country, the main downtowns, lead their luxurious lives in an ever more calculating, ever more sophisticated, ever more shimmering deconstruction. They light up the whole planet with their whorehouse red lights, while the BAC 8 and the private security companies’ -- read: militias’ -- patrols multiply infinitely, all the while benefiting from being able to hide behind an ever more disrespectful judicial front. The catch-22 of the present, though perceptible everywhere, is denied everywhere. Never have so many psychologists, sociologists, and literary people devoted themselves to it, each with their own special jargon, and each with their own specially missing solution. It’s enough just to listen to the songs that come out these days, the trifling “new French music,” where the petty-bourgeoisie dissects the states of its soul and the K’1Fry mafia 9 makes its declarations of war, to know that this coexistence will come to an end soon and that a decision is about to be made. This book is signed in the name of an imaginary collective. Its editors are not its authors. They are merely content to do a little clean-up of what’s scattered around the era’s common areas, around the murmurings at bar-tables, behind closed bedroom doors. They’ve only determined a few necessary truths, whose universal repression fills up the psychiatric hospitals and the painful gazes. They’ve made themselves scribes of the situation. It’s the privilege of radical circumstances that justice leads them quite logically to revolution. It’s enough just to say what we can see and not avoid the conclusions to be drawn from it.

#### To make micropolitics visible is to coopt it by giving resistance an object – this understanding allows resistance to be framed, to be declared a failure and prevents the immanence of imperceptible politics from coalescing around mundane practices and habitudes of existence

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In this sense imperceptible politics does not necessarily differ from or oppose other prevalent forms of politics, such as state-oriented politics, micropolitics, identity politics, cultural and gender politics, civil rights movements, etc. And indeed imperceptible politics connects with all these various forms of political engagement and intervention in an opportunistic way: it deploys them to the extent that they allow the establishment of spaces outside representation; that is, spaces which do not primarily focus on the transformation of the conditions of the double-R axiom (rights and representation) but on the insertion of new social forces into a given political terrain. In the previous chapter we called this form of politics outside politics: the politics which opposes the representational regime of policing. Imperceptibility is the everyday strategy which allows us to move and to act below the overcoding regime of representation. This everyday strategy is inherently anti-theoretical; that is, it resists any ultimate theorisation, it cannot be reduced to one successful and necessary form of politics (such as state-oriented politics or micropolitics, for example). Rather, imperceptible politics is genuinely empiricist, that is it is always enacted as ad hoc practices which allow the decomposition of the representational strategies in a particular field and the composition of events which cannot be left unanswered by the existing regime of control. If imperceptible politics resists theorisation and is ultimately empiricist, what then are the criteria for doing imperceptible politics? There are three dimensions which characterise imperceptible politics: objectlessness, totality, trust. Firstly, imperceptible politics is objectless, that is it performs political transformation without primarily targeting a specific political aim (such as transformation of a law or institution, or a particular claim for inclusion, etc). Instead imperceptible politics proceeds by materialising its own political actions through contagious and affective transformations. The object of its political practice is its own practices. In this sense, imperceptible politics is non-intentional - and therein lies its difference from state-oriented politics or the politics of civil rights movements, for example - it instigates change through a series of everyday transformations which can only be codified as having a central political aim or function in retrospect. Secondly, imperceptible politics addresses the totality of an existing field of power. This seems to be the difference between imperceptible politics and micropolitics or other alternative social movements: imperceptible politics is not concerned with containing itself to a molecular level of action; it addresses the totality of power through the social changes which it puts to work in a particular field of action. The distinction between molar and molecular (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 275) has only analytical significance from the perspective of imperceptible politics. In fact imperceptible politics is both molar and molecular, because by being local situated action it addresses the whole order of control in a certain field. Imperceptible politics is located at the heart of a field of power and at the same time it opens a way to move outside this field by forcing the transformation of all these elements which are constitutive of this field. In this sense, imperceptible politics is a driving force which is simul­taneously both present and absent. We described this in the previous chapter by exploring the importance of speculative figurations for the practice of escape. On the everyday level of escape (a level we called in this chapter imperceptible politics) speculative figuration can be translated into trust. This is the third characteristic of imperceptible politics; it is driven by a firm belief in the importance and truthfulness of its actions, without seeking any evidence for, or conducting any investigation into its practices. This is trust. Imperceptible politics is driven by trust in something which seems to be absent from a particular situation. Imperceptible politics operates around a void, and it is exactly the conversion of this void into everyday politics that becomes the vital force for imperceptible politics.

#### Their arguments about personal agency are ultimately conservative and de-politicizing – arguments for localizing activism within the purview of social location are the equivalent of privatizing social change, creating us as dependent on the necessity of their advocacy. The more successful their strategy is the more damage it does by making institutions necessary to our understanding of social change

**Hershock '99**, East-West Center, 1999.  [“Changing the way society changes”, *Journal of Buddhist Ethics*, 6, 154; <http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/6/hershock991.html>]

The trouble is that, like other technologies biased toward control, the more successful legislation becomes, the more it renders itself necessary. Because it aims at rigorous definition -- at establishing hard boundaries or limits -- crossing the threshold of legislative utility means creating conditions under which the definition of freedom becomes so complex as to be self-defeating. Taken to its logical end, legally-biased social activism is thus liable to effect an infinite density of protocols for maintaining autonomy, generating a matrix of limits on discrimination that would finally be conducive to what might be called "axiological entropy" -- a state in which movement in any direction is equally unobstructed *and* empty of dramatic potential. Contrary to expectations, complete "freedom of choice" would not mean the elimination of all impediments to meaningful improvisation, but rather an erasure of the latter's conditions of possibility. The effectiveness and efficiency of "hard," control-biased technologies depend on our using natural laws -- horizons of possibility -- as fulcrums for leveraging or dictating changes in the structure of our circumstances. Unlike improvised contributions to changes taking place in our situation, dictating the terms of change effectively silences our situational partners. Technological authority thus renders our circumstances mute and justifies ignoring the contributions that might be made by the seasons or the spiritual force of the mountains to the meaning -- the direction of movement -- of our ongoing patterns of interdependence. With the "perfection" of technically-mediated control, our wills would know no limit. We would be as gods, existing with no imperatives, no external compulsions, and no priorities. We would have no reason to do one thing first or hold one thing, and not another, as most sacred or dear. Such "perfection" is, perhaps, as fabulous and unattainable as it is finally depressing. Yet the vast energies of global capital are committed to moving in its direction, for the most part quite uncritically. The consequences -- as revealed in the desecration and impoverishing of both 'external' and 'internal' wilderness (for instance, the rainforests and our imaginations) -- are every day more evident. The critical question we must answer is whether the "soft" technologies of legally-biased and controlled social change commit us to an equivalent impoverishment and desecration. The analogy between the dependence of technological progress on natural laws and that of social activism on societal laws is by no means perfect. Except among a scattering of philosophers and historians of science, for example, the laws of nature are not viewed as changeable artifacts of human culture. But for present purposes, the analogy need only focus our attention on the way legal institutions -- like natural laws -- do not prescriptively determine the shape of all things to come, but rather establish generic limits for what relationships or states of affairs are factually admissible. Laws that guarantee certain "freedoms" necessarily also prohibit others. Without the fulcrums of *unallowable* acts, the work of changing a society would remain as purely idealistic as using wishful thinking to move mountains. Changing legal institutions at once forces and enforces societal reform. By affirming and safeguarding those freedoms or modes of autonomy that have come to be seen as generically essential to 'being human', a legally-biased social activism cannot avoid selectively limiting the ways we engage with one another. The absence of coercion may be a basic aim of social activism, but if our autonomy is to be guaranteed both fair and just, its basic strategy must be one of establishing non-negotiable constraints on how we co-exist. Social activism is thus in the business of striking structural compromises between its ends and its means -- between particular freedoms and general equality, and between practical autonomy and legal anonymity. By shifting the locus of freedoms from unique persons to generic citizens -- and in substantial sympathy with both the Platonic renunciation of particularity and the scientific discounting of the exceptional and extraordinary -- social activist methodology promotes dramatic anonymity in order to universally realize the operation of 'blind justice'. Much as hard technologies of control silence the contributions of wilderness and turn us away from the rewards of a truly joint improvisation of order, the process of social activism reduces the relevance of the always unique and unprecedented terrain of our interdependence. This is no small loss. The institutions that guarantee our generic independence effectively pave over those vernacular relationships through which our own contributory virtuosity might be developed and shared -- relationships out of which the exceptional meaning of our immediate situation might be continuously realized. In contrast with Buddhist emptiness -- a practice that entails attending to the mutual relevance of all things -- both the aims and strategies of social activism are conducive to an evacuation of the conditions of dramatic virtuosity, a societal depletion of our resources for meaningfully improvised and liberating intimacy with all things.

### 1NC

#### Our counteradvocacy—endorse the 1AC without the use of the term Latin America

#### The term “Latin America” is inaccurate; it homogenizes the countries in the region and spreads cultural imperialism; their use of the term turns the case and should be rejected.

Donald J. Mabry, 10-15-2009, Professor of History @ Mississippi State University, and The Historical Text Archive, “Colonial Latin America,” http://historicaltextarchive.com/latin/colonial.pdf

Colonial Latin America, which lasted for about 300 years for most of the region, was extraordinarily complex and rich in texture. There are enormous differences between Mexico, on the one hand, and Brazil, on the other. The term “Latin America” is not only shorthand but also a bit of a misnomer, for much of it was not Latin. It was Indian or mestizo or African, often with little more than a veneer of Iberian culture. The degree to which it was any of these are Spanish, Portuguese, African, Indian, or some combination thereof varies according to place and time. We have trouble deciding what to call other humans. Some terms are inaccurate; some are invented to satisfy the politics of the day. Some are acceptable in one era and unacceptable in another. In modern parlance, the earlier immigrants are often called "Native Americans," a term as inaccurate as the term "Indian" or indio as the Iberians called them. They immigrated just like everyone else but not all at the same time. Nor have we wanted to see the coming of the Europeans and Africans to the Western Hemisphere as just another episode in the many thousand years of its immigration history. One is at a loss to decide what terminology would be accurate and inoffensive. Equally serious, is that most people, even scholars, ignore the DNA evidence and the reasonable conclusions that are drawn from it. We do not want to think of all human beings as cousins, which they are, because it forces us to reconsider all kinds of cherished beliefs. We prefer to be inaccurate because it is easier and feels better. Similarly, we refer to some people as Spaniards when, in 1500, there was no Spain. Some Latin Americans today point out that it is politically incorrect for citizens of the United States to expropriate the name “American” for themselves. They see it as sheer arrogance, which it is. On the other hand, we see the Mexican people called Aztecs when, in fact, only a fraction were in 1519; that they are called thusly is imperialism on the part of those who rule Mexico. We do not have to look very hard in this part of the world to find other examples.

### Case

#### They paraphrased the experience of these people which inevitably leaves stuff out and inserts thing the victim would disagree with this frames them as victims which causes psychic violence.

Exclusive narrative focus is solipsism—it stifles dialogue and is reductionist because we can never fully engage personal experience in a deliberative way—our arguments are relevant

David Bridges, Centre for Applied Research in Education, University of East Anglia, 2001, The Ethics of Outsider Research, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 35, No. 3

First, it is argued that only those who have shared in, and have been part of, a particular experience can understand or can properly understand (and perhaps `properly' is particularly heavily loaded here) what it is like. You need to be a woman to understand what it is like to live as a woman; to be disabled to understand what it is like to live as a disabled person etc. Thus Charlton writes of `the innate inability of able-bodied people, regardless of fancy credentials and awards, to understand the disability experience' (Charlton, 1998, p. 128).

Charlton's choice of language here is indicative of the rhetorical character which these arguments tend to assume. This arises perhaps from the strength of feeling from which they issue, but it warns of a need for caution in their treatment and acceptance. Even if able-bodied people have this `inability' it is difficult to see in what sense it is `innate'. Are all credentials `fancy' or might some (e.g. those reflecting a sustained, humble and patient attempt to grapple with the issues) be pertinent to that ability? And does Charlton really wish to maintain that there is a single experience which is the experience of disability, whatever solidarity disabled people might feel for each other?

The understanding that any of us have of our own conditions or experience is unique and special, though recent work on personal narratives also shows that it is itself multi-layered and inconstant, i.e. that we have and can provide many different understandings even of our own lives (see, for example, Tierney, 1993). Nevertheless, our own understanding has a special status: it provides among other things a data source for others' interpretations of our actions; it stands in a unique relationship to our own experiencing; and no one else can have quite the same understanding. It is also plausible that people who share certain kinds of experience in common stand in a special position in terms of understanding those shared aspects of experience. However, once this argument is applied to such broad categories as `women' or `blacks', it has to deal with some very heterogeneous groups; the different social, personal and situational characteristics that constitute their individuality may well outweigh the shared characteristics; and there may indeed be greater barriers to mutual understanding than there are gateways.

These arguments, however, all risk a descent into solipsism: if our individual understanding is so particular, how can we have communication with or any understanding of anyone else? But, granted Wittgenstein's persuasive argument against a private language (Wittgenstein, 1963, perhaps more straightforwardly presented in Rhees, 1970), we cannot in these circumstances even describe or have any real understanding of our own condition in such an isolated world. Rather it is in talking to each other, in participating in a shared language, that we construct the conceptual apparatus that allows us to understand our own situation in relation to others, and this is a construction which involves under- standing differences as well as similarities.

Besides, we have good reason to treat with some scepticism accounts provided by individuals of their own experience and by extension accounts provided by members of a particular category or community of people. We know that such accounts can be riddled with special pleading, selective memory, careless error, self-centredness, myopia, prejudice and a good deal more. A lesbian scholar illustrates some of the pressures that can bear, for example, on an insider researcher in her own community:

As an insider, the lesbian has an important sensitivity to offer, yet she is also more vulnerable than the non-lesbian researcher, both to the pressure from the heterosexual world--that her studies conform to previous works and describe lesbian reality in terms of its relationship with the outside-- and to pressure from the inside, from within the lesbian community itself--that her studies mirror not the reality of that community but its self-protective ideology. (Kreiger, 1982, p. 108)

In other words, while individuals from within a community have access to a particular kind of understanding of their experience, this does not automatically attach special authority (though it might attach special interest) to their own representations of that experience. Moreover, while we might acknowledge the limitations of the under- standing which someone from outside a community (or someone other than the individual who is the focus of the research) can develop, this does not entail that they cannot develop and present an understanding or that such understanding is worthless. Individuals can indeed find benefit in the understandings that others offer of their experience in, for example, a counselling relationship, or when a researcher adopts a supportive role with teachers engaged in reflection on or research into their own practice. Many have echoed the plea of the Scottish poet, Robert Burns (in `To a louse'):

O wad some Pow'r the giftie gie us To see oursels as others see us!3

--even if they might have been horrified with what such power revealed to them. Russell argued that it was the function of philosophy (and why not research too?) `to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom . . .It keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect' (Russell, 1912, p. 91). `Making the familiar strange', as Stenhouse called it, often requires the assistance of someone unfamiliar with our own world who can look at our taken-for-granted experience through, precisely, the eye of a stranger. Sparkes (1994) writes very much in these terms in describing his own research, as a white, heterosexual middle- aged male, into the life history of a lesbian PE teacher. He describes his own struggle with the question `is it possible for heterosexual people to undertake research into homosexual populations?' but he concludes that being a `phenomenological stranger' who asks `dumb questions' may be a useful and illuminating experience for the research subject in that they may have to return to first principles in reviewing their story. This could, of course be an elaborate piece of self-justification, but it is interesting that someone like Max Biddulph, who writes from a gay/bisexual stand- point, can quote this conclusion with apparent approval (Biddulph, 1996).

People from outside a community clearly can have an understanding of the experience of those who are inside that community. It is almost certainly a different understanding from that of the insiders. Whether it is of any value will depend among other things on the extent to which they have immersed themselves in the world of the other and portrayed it in its richness and complexity; on the empathy and imagination that they have brought to their enquiry and writing; on whether their stories are honest, responsible and critical (Barone, 1992). Nevertheless, this value will also depend on qualities derived from the researchers' exter- nality: their capacity to relate one set of experiences to others (perhaps from their own community); their outsider perspective on the structures which surround and help to define the experience of the community; on the reactions and responses to that community of individuals and groups external to it.4

Finally, it must surely follow that if we hold that a researcher, who (to take the favourable case) seeks honestly, sensitively and with humility to understand and to represent the experience of a community to which he or she does not belong, is incapable of such understanding and representation, then how can he or she understand either that same experience as mediated through the research of someone from that community? The argument which excludes the outsider from under- standing a community through the effort of their own research, a fortiori excludes the outsider from that understanding through the secondary source in the form of the effort of an insider researcher or indeed any other means. Again, the point can only be maintained by insisting that a particular (and itself ill-defined) understanding is the only kind of understanding which is worth having.

The epistemological argument (that outsiders cannot understand the experience of a community to which they do not belong) becomes an ethical argument when this is taken to entail the further proposition that they ought not therefore attempt to research that community. I hope to have shown that this argument is based on a false premise. Even if the premise were sound, however, it would not necessarily follow that researchers should be prevented or excluded from attempting to under- stand this experience, unless it could be shown that in so doing they would cause some harm. This is indeed part of the argument emerging from disempowered communities and it is to this that I shall now turn.

#### There needs to be a degree of dialogue between narrative approaches---demanding personal engagement fails and is MONOLOGISM

David Bridges, Centre for Applied Research in Education, University of East Anglia, 2001, The Ethics of Outsider Research, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 35, No. 3

III OUTSIDERS IMPORT DAMAGING FRAMEWORKS OF UNDERSTANDING

Frequent in the literature about research into disability, women's experience, race and homosexuality is the claim that people from outside these particular communities will import into their research, for example, homophobic, sexist or racist frameworks of understanding, which damage the interests of those being researched.

In the case of research into disability it has been argued that outsider researchers carry with them assumptions that the problem of disability lies with the disabled rather than with the society which frames and defines disability. `The essential problem of recent anthropological work on culture and disability is that it perpetuates outmoded beliefs and continues to distance research from lived oppression' (Charlton, 1998, p. 27). By contrast: `a growing number of people with disabilities have developed a consciousness that transforms the notion and concept of disability from a medical condition to a political and social condition' (Charlton, 1998, p.17). Charlton goes on to criticise, for example, a publication by Ingstad and Reynolds Whyte (1995), Disability and Culture. He claims that, although it does add to our understanding of how the conceptualisation and symbolisation of disability takes place, `its language is and perspective are still lodged in the past. In the first forty pages alone we find the words suffering, lameness, interest group, incapacitated, handicapped, deformities. Notions of oppression, dominant culture, justice, human rights, political movement, and self- determination are conspicuously absent' (Charlton, 1998 p. 27).

Discussing the neo-colonialism of outsider research into Maori experience, Smith extends this type of claim to embrace the wider methodological and metaphysical framing of outsider research: `From an indigenous perspective Western research is more than just research that is located in a positivist tradition. It is research which brings to bear, on any study of indigenous peoples, a cultural orientation, a set of values, a different conceptualization of such things as time, space and subjectivity, different and competing theories of knowledge, highly specialized forms of language, and structures of power' (Smith, 1999, p. 42).5

This position requires, I think, some qualification. First, researchers are clearly not immune from some of the damaging and prejudicial attitudes on matters of race, sexuality, disability and gender which are found among the rest of the population, though I might hope that their training and experience might give them above-average awareness of these issues and above-average alertness to their expression in their own work. Even where such attitudes remain in researchers' consciousness, this intelligent self-awareness and social sensitivity mean on the whole that they are able to deploy sufficient self-censorship not to expose it in a damaging way. Researchers may thus remain morally culpable for their thoughts, but, at least, communities can be spared the harm of their expression. It is also a matter of some significance that researchers are more exposed than most to public criticism, not least from critics from within these disempowered communities, when such prejudices do enter and are revealed in their work. If they employ the rhetoric of, for example, anti-racist or anti-sexist conviction, they are at least in their public pronouncements exposed to the humiliation of being hoisted by their own petard. It is difficult to see the fairness in excluding all outsider researchers on the a priori supposition of universal prejudice. It is better, surely, to expose it where it is revealed and, if absolutely necessary, to debar individuals who ignore such criticism and persist in using the privilege of their research position to peddle what can then only be regarded as damaging and prejudicial propaganda. Secondly, it is plainly not the case that Western research is located exclusively (as is implied) in a positivist tradition, even if this tradition has been a dominant one. Phenomenology, ethnography, life history, even, more recently, the use of narrative fiction and poetry as forms of research representation, are all established ingredients of the educational research worlds in the UK, USA or Australasia. Contemporary research literature abounds with critiques of positivism as well as examples of its continuing expression.

I have placed much weight in these considerations on the importance of any research being exposed to criticism--most importantly, perhaps, but by no means exclusively by the people whose experience it claims to represent. This principle is not simply an ethical principle associated with the obligations that a researcher might accept towards participants in the research, but it is a fundamental feature of the processes of research and its claims to command our attention. It is precisely exposure to, modification through and survival of a process of vigorous public scrutiny that provides research with whatever authority it can claim. In contemporary ethnographic research, case-study and life-history research, for example, this expectancy of exposure to correction and criticism is one which runs right through the research process. The methodological requirement is for participants to have several opportunities to challenge any prejudices which researchers may bring with them: at the point where the terms of the research are first negotiated and they agree to participate (or not); during any conversations or interviews that take place in the course of the research; in responding to any record which is produced of the data gathering; in response to any draft or final publication. Indeed, engagement with a researcher provides any group with what is potentially a richly educative opportunity: an opportunity to open their eyes and to see things differently. It is, moreover, an opportunity which any researcher worth his or her salt will welcome.

Not all researchers or research processes will be as open as are described here to that educative opportunity, and not all participants (least of all those who are self-defining as `disempowered') will feel the confidence to take them even if they are there. This may be seen as a reason to set up barriers to the outsider researcher, but they can and should more often be seen as problems for researchers and participants to address together in the interests of their mutual understanding and benefit.

#### Violence is declining

Gat 13 (AZAR GAT, DPhil in History (University of Oxford, 1986); Ezer Weitzman Professor of National Security, Political Science Department, Tel Aviv University; recent books: War in Human Civilization (Oxford University Press, 2006); Victorious and Vulnerable: Why Democracy Won in the 20th Century and How It Is Still Imperiled (Hoover Institution, Rowman & Littlefield, 2010); Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism (Cambridge University Press, 2013). Is war declining – and why? Azar Gat Department of Political Science, University of Tel Aviv azargat@post.tau.ac.il , March 19th 2013)

When quite a number of scholars simultaneously and independently of one another arrive at very similar conclusions on an issue of cardinal theoretical and practical significance, their thesis deserves, and has received, great attention. The thesis is that war and violence in general have progressively decreased in recent times, during the modern era, and even throughout history. Of course, despite their unanimity, all these scholars could still be wrong. Indeed, each of them tells a similar story of people’s disbelief at their findings, most notably that we live in the most peaceful period in human history. Some of them even explain the general incredulity by the findings of evolutionary psychology according to which we tend to be overly optimistic about ourselves but overly pessimistic about the world at large. Having myself written about the marked decrease in deadly human violence (Gat, 2006), I agree with the authors’ general thesis. However, their unanimity falters over, and they are less clear about, the historical trajectory of and the reasons for the decline in violence and war, questions that are as important as the general thesis itself. Previous Section Next Section Hobbes was right, and Rousseau wrong, about the state of nature Steven Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature (2011) towers above all the other books surveyed here in size, scope, boldness, and scholarly excellence. It has deservedly attracted great public attention and has become a best-seller. Massively documented, this 800-page volume is lavishly furnished with statistics, charts, and diagrams, which are one of the book’s most effective features. The book, spanning the whole human past as far back as our aboriginal condition, points to two major steps in the decline of violence. The first is the sharp decline in violent mortality which resulted from the rise of the state-Leviathan from around 5,000 years ago. This conclusion is based on the most comprehensive studies of the subject published over the past 15 years (Keeley, 1996; LeBlanc, 2003; Gat, 2006), which demonstrate on the basis of anthropological and archaeological evidence that Hobbes’s picture of the anarchic state of nature as a very violent one was fundamentally true. Pinker rightly summarizes that violent mortality with the rise of states dropped from a staggering estimated 15% of the population, 25% of the men, in pre-state societies, to about 1–5%. The main reason for this drop is the enforcement of internal peace by the Leviathan, but also, less noted by Pinker, lower mobilization rates and a smaller exposure of the civilian population to war than with tribal groups, as will be explained shortly. This conclusion regarding the dramatic drop in violent mortality with the transition to the state is at odds with the claim made by Jack Levy & William Thompson in their book, The Arc of War (2011). As the book’s title implies, Levy & Thompson posit a great increase in warfare during history, before a decrease during the past two centuries. Thus, the book claims that mortality in fighting greatly increased, ‘accelerated’ in the authors’ language, with the transition to the state. They reach this conclusion by making several mistaken assumptions. First, although professing ignorance about the distant past because of the lack of evidence on the behavior of hunter-gatherer societies before the adoption of agriculture some 10,000 years ago, they cite and are heavily influenced by the old Rousseauite anthropology of the generation after the 1960s, which recent studies have refuted. Obviously, one does not have to accept the above findings regarding the pervasiveness and great lethality of prehistoric warfare. But Levy & Thompson simply do not engage with them. They accept as true the Rousseauite premise that sparse human population could not possibly have had that much to fight about. However, recently extant hunter-gatherer societies prove the opposite. Australia is our best laboratory of hunter-gatherer societies, because that vast continent was entirely populated by them and ‘unpolluted’ by agriculturalists, pastoralists or states until the arrival of the Europeans in 1788. And the evidence shows that the Australian tribes fought incessantly with one another. Even in the Central Australian Desert, whose population density was as low as one person per 35 square miles, among the lowest there is, conflict and deadly fighting were the rule. Much of that fighting centered on the water-holes vital for survival in this area, with the violent death rate there reckoned to have been several times higher than in any state society. In most other places, hunting territories were monopolized and fiercely defended by hunter-gatherers because they were quickly depleted. Even among the Inuit of Arctic Canada, who were so sparse as to experience no resource competition, fighting to kidnap women was pervasive, resulting in a violent death rate 10 times higher than the USA’s peak rate of 1990, itself the highest in the developed world. In more hospitable and densely populated environments casualties averaged, as already mentioned, 15% of the population and 25% of the men, and the surviving men were covered with scars (Gat, 2006: chs 2, 6). We are not dealing here with a piece of exotic curiosity. Ninety-five percent of the history of our species Homo sapiens sapiens – people who are like us – was spent as hunter-gatherers. The transition to agriculture and the state is very recent, the tip of the iceberg, in human history. Furthermore, the human state of nature turns out to be no different than the state of nature in general. Here too, science has made a complete turnabout. During the 1960s people believed that animals did not kill each other within the same species, which made humans appear like a murderous exception and fed speculations that warfare emerged only with civilization. Since then, however, it has been found that animals kill each other extensively within species, a point pressed on every viewer of television nature documentaries. There is nothing special about humans in this regard. Thus, lethal human fighting did not ‘emerge’ at some point in history, as Levy & Thompson posit. Previous Section Next Section Violent death sharply decreased with the rise of the Leviathan As mentioned earlier and as Pinker well realizes, violent mortality actually dropped steeply with the emergence of the state-Leviathan. Here is where Levy & Thompson make a second mistake. For measuring the lethality of warfare they use evidence of battle mortality, but this is highly misleading for various reasons. First, pre-state tribes’ main fighting modes were not the battle but the raid and the ambush – capturing the enemy by surprise and often annihilating entire sleeping camps: men, women, and children. Second, the size of battles merely indicates the size of the states and their armies, which are obviously larger than tribal groups in absolute terms. Yet the main question is relative casualties, what percentage of the population died violently. And here the fact is that while states and their armies grew by a factor of tens, hundreds, and thousands, giving a spectacular impression of large-scale fighting, relative casualties actually decreased under the state, and not only because of internal peace. Indeed, casualties decreased precisely because states grew large. Take Egypt, for example, part of the ‘acceleration’ of war with the emergence of states in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, and China, according to Levy & Thompson. The size of the Egyptian army with which Pharaoh Ramses II fought the Hittite empire at the Battle of Kadesh (commonly dated 1274 BCE) was 20,000–25,000 soldiers. This was a very large army by the standards of the time. Yet the total population of Egypt was about 2–3 million, so the army constituted 1% of the population at most. This was very much the standard in large states and empires throughout history because of the great financial and logistical problems of maintaining large armies for long periods at great distances from home. Thus, in comparison to the high military participation rates of small-scale tribal societies, participation rates, and hence war casualties, in large states’ armies were much lower. Moreover, in contrast to the great vulnerability of women and children in small-scale tribal warfare, the civilian population of Egypt was sheltered by distance from the theaters of military operations and not often exposed to the horrors of war. Such relative security, interrupted only by large-scale invasions, is one of the main reasons why societies experienced great demographic growth after the emergence of the state. It is also the reason why civil war, when the war rages within the country, tends to be the most lethal form of war, as Hobbes very well realized. Warfare and feuds in the pre- and early-modern eras Levy & Thompson further posit that between the 14th and early 19th centuries, Europe was the scene of a second ‘acceleration’ in the historical trajectory of violence. This is very much in line with the prevailing perceptions regarding early modern European history, but these perceptions are most probably wrong, and for the same reason as before: Levy & Thompson count absolute battle casualties, and obviously states became more centralized during this period and armies grew in number, so battles also grew in size. Yet it was the anarchy and feudal fragmentation in Europe between the fall of the Roman Empire and 1200 that were responsible for the pervasive insecurity and endemic violence that characterized the Dark Ages and resulted in, among other things, a sharp demographic decline. Again, small-scale usually meant more, not less, violent mortality. The focus on early modern Europe is misleading also in another way: in the late Middle Ages the Mongol conquests inflicted on the societies of China, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe casualties and destruction that were among the highest ever suffered during historical times. Estimates of the sharp decline experienced by the populations of China and Russia, for example, vary widely. Still, even by the lowest estimates they were at least as great, and in China almost definitely much greater, than the Soviet Union’s horrific rate in World War II of about 15%. The receding of medieval anarchy in the face of the growing European state-Leviathans was the first step towards a steep decline in the continent’s violent mortality rate beginning in early modernity and continuing to the present day. The studies and data cited by Pinker with respect to the domestic aspect of this trend are strikingly paralleled by those of Robert Muchembled’s History of Violence (2012). The work of a historian, the book meticulously documents, on the basis of French legal records, a 20-fold decrease in homicide rates between the 13th and 20th centuries. Earlier studies of other parts of Europe, starting with Gurr (1981), have come up with similar findings. Like Pinker, Muchembled attributes the steep decline to the state’s growing authority, as its justice system effectively replaced and deterred ‘private justice’, vendetta, and pervasive violence, all of them endemic in unruly societies. Correspondingly, again like Pinker, Muchembled invokes Norbert Elias’s (2000) ‘civilizing process’, whereby the defense of honor by sword and knife, a social norm and imperative in most traditional societies, is gradually given up among both the nobility and the general populace. The civilizing process is partly a function of the growing authority of the state’s rule and justice system. But there were other factors involved, which Pinker excels in identifying and weaving together. Although he is not a historian, his historical synthesis is exemplarily rich and nuanced. He specifies the growing humanitarian sensibilities in Europe of the Enlightenment, which he traces to, among other things, the gradual improvement in living conditions, growing commercial spirit and, above all, the print revolution with the attendant values and habits of reasoning, introspection, and empathy that it inculcated among the reading elites. As Pinker points out, not only did homicide rates decline but also other previously common forms of violence, such as judicial disembowelment and torture, were becoming unacceptable by the 18th century. This was the beginning of a continuous process which during the following centuries would bring about, among other things, the abolition of slavery and the decline of capital punishment, tyranny, and political violence in the developed world – most notably in the areas where the values of Enlightenment humanitarianism triumphed. Both Pinker and Muchembled identify a change in the trend towards increased violence and homicide rates in the United States and Europe from the 1960s on. They attribute this change (Pinker is particularly elaborative here) to the erosion of public authority and some reversal of the ‘civilizing process’ with the cults of youth culture, defiance of authority, radical ideologies of violence by the ‘oppressed’, and the fragmentation of the stable family structure. Pinker identifies a return to a downward trend in violence from about 1990 on, which he attributes to an ebbing of much of the above through reasserted state action and changes in the public mood. A last point worth mentioning in this context: Muchembled reveals that throughout the steep decline in homicide rates, from medieval times to the present, 90% or more of all cases have been perpetrated by men, especially between the ages of 20 and 30 years old. As Daly & Wilson (1988: 145–149) have shown, this ratio is found in each and every society studied around the globe, from hunter-gatherers to agricultural and industrial societies, irrespective of the vastly different homicide rates among them. Previous Section Next Section The decline of war and the three `Long Peaces' after 1815 We now move to the decline of war, which is our main concern here. Most people are surprised to learn that the occurrence of war and overall mortality in war sharply decreased after 1815, most notably in the developed world. The ‘Long Peace’ among the great powers after 1945 is more recognized and is widely attributed to the nuclear factor, a decisive factor to be sure, which concentrated the minds of all the protagonists wonderfully. The (inter-)democratic peace has been equally recognized. But in actuality, the decrease in war had been very marked before the nuclear era and encompassed both democracies and non-democracies. In the century after 1815, wars among economically advanced countries declined in their frequency to about one-third of what they had been in the previous centuries, an unprecedented change. Indeed, the Long Peace after 1945 was preceded by the second longest peace among the great powers, between 1871 and 1914, and by the third longest peace, between 1815 and 1854 (Gat, 2006: 536–537, 608). Thus, the three longest periods of peace by far in the modern great powers system all occurred after 1815. Clearly, one needs to explain the entire trend, while also accounting for the glaring divergence from it: the two World Wars. Previous Section Next Section Is modern war more lethal and destructive than before? In his earlier works, Levy (1983) was among the first to document the much-reduced frequency of war after 1815. But what brought about this change? Levy & Thompson assume – this is perhaps the most natural hypothesis – that wars declined in frequency because they became too lethal, destructive, and expensive. Supposedly, a trade-off of sorts was created between the intensity and frequency of warfare: fewer, larger wars supplanting many smaller ones. This hypothesis barely holds, however, because, again, relative to population and wealth wars have not become more lethal and costly than earlier in history. Furthermore, as Levy & Thompson rightly document, the wars of the 19th century – the most peaceful century in European history – were particularly light, in comparative terms, so there is no trade-off here. True, the World Wars, especially World War II, were certainly on the upper scale of the range in terms of casualties. Yet, as already noted, they were far from being exceptional in history. Once more, we need to look at relative casualties, general human mortality in any number of wars that happen to rage around the world, rather than at the aggregate created by the fact that many states participated in the World Wars. I have already mentioned the Mongol invasions, but other examples abound. In the first three years of the Second Punic War, 218–16 BCE, Rome lost some 50,000 citizens of the ages of 17–46, out of a total of about 200,000 in that age demographic (Brunt, 1971). This was roughly 25% of the military-age cohorts in only three years, the same range as the Russian and higher than the German rates in World War II. This, and the devastation of Rome’s free peasantry during the Second Punic War, did not reduce Rome’s propensity for war thereafter. During the Thirty Years War (1618–48) population loss in Germany is estimated at between one-fifth and one-third – either way higher than the German casualties in World War I and World War II combined. People often assume that more developed military technology during modernity means greater lethality and destruction, but in fact it also means greater protective power, as with mechanized armor, mechanized speed and agility, and defensive electronic measures. Offensive and defensive advances generally rise in tandem. In addition, it is all too often forgotten that the vast majority of the many millions of non-combatants killed by Germany during World War II – Jews, Soviet prisoners of war, Soviet civilians – fell victim to intentional starvation, exposure to the elements, and mass executions rather than to any sophisticated military technology. Instances of genocide in general during the 20th century, much as earlier in history, were carried out with the simplest of technologies, as the Rwanda genocide horrifically reminded us. Nor have wars during the past two centuries been economically more costly than they were earlier in history, again relative to overall wealth. War has always involved massive economic exertion and has been the single most expensive item of state spending (e.g. massively documented, Bonney, 1999). Examples are countless, and it will suffice to mention that both 16th- and 17th-century Spain and 18th-century France were economically ruined by war and staggering war debts, which in the French case brought about the Revolution. Furthermore, death by starvation in premodern wars was widespread. Previous Section Next Section Is it peace that has become more profitable? So if wars have not become more costly and destructive during the past two centuries then why have they receded, particularly in the developed world? The answer is the advent of the industrial–commercial revolution after 1815, the most profound transformation of human society since the Neolithic adoption of agriculture. The correlation between the decline of war in the developed world and the process of modernization, both unfolding since 1815, is surely not accidental, and the causation is not difficult to locate. In the first place, given explosive growth in per capita wealth, about 30- to 50-fold thus far, the Malthusian trap has been broken. Wealth no longer constitutes a fundamentally finite quantity, and wealth acquisition progressively shifted away from a zero-sum game. Secondly, economies are no longer overwhelmingly autarkic, instead having become increasingly interconnected by specialization, scale, and exchange. Consequently, foreign devastation potentially depressed the entire system and was thus detrimental to a state’s own wellbeing. This reality, already noted by Mill (1848/1961: 582), starkly manifested itself after World War I, as Keynes (1920) had anticipated in his criticism of the reparations imposed on Germany. Thirdly, greater economic openness has decreased the likelihood of war by disassociating economic access from the confines of political borders and sovereignty. It is no longer necessary to politically possess a territory in order benefit from it. Of the above three factors, the second one – commercial interdependence – has attracted most of the attention in the literature. But the other two factors have been no less significant. Thus, the greater the yield of competitive economic cooperation, the more counterproductive and less attractive conflict becomes. Rather than war becoming more costly, as is widely believed, it is in fact peace that has been growing more profitable. Referring to my argument in this regard, Levy & Thompson (2011: 72–75) excused themselves from deciding on the issue on the grounds of insufficient information regarding the cost of premodern war. But as already noted, the information on the subject is quite clear.

#### Poverty is decreasing

Miroff 12– contributor to NPR, writer for the Washington Post, San Francisco Chronicle, collective winner of a Pulitzer prize (Nick, “Latin American Equality: Free Markets or a Left Wing Success?”, 12/1/12; < http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/121130/latin-america-middle-class-equality-poverty-left-wing-success-story>)//Beddow

HAVANA, Cuba — Latin America has long been a case study in the social ills brought by sharp economic inequality, its class-stratified societies marked by too few haves and too many have-nots. But even as income divisions widen across the United States and much of the developing world, they are narrowing in Latin America. Poverty in the region is at its lowest point in decades, according to several new reports, and millions are moving upward into the middle class. A World Bank survey released this month said Latin America’s broadening middle grew by 50 percent between 2003 and 2009. It was followed by a new United Nations regional economic study showing the percentage of Latin Americans living in poverty at the lowest level in 30 years. Now the question is: Who gets credit for these trends? The region’s improved economic outlook has coincided with the rule of left-wing governments in some of Latin America’s biggest economies: Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela. They have devoted a greater share of their national resources to anti-poverty programs and development projects, boosting social spending. Yet the drop in poverty has also come as Latin governments adopt many of the market-driven policy prescriptions long vilified by the left as “neoliberalism**.**” Foreign investment has poured into countries like Peru, Colombia, and Chile as they’ve opened their economies and embraced globalization. Foreign direct investment into Latin America topped $150 billion last year, UN data shows, up from around $25 billion in 1990. Regardless of political orientation, Latin American governments have also benefited from soaring demand for raw materials, much of it fueled by China. High global commodity prices have allowed countries to reap billions in tax revenues and direct income from sales of copper, gold, soybeans, oil, beef and other exports. In its report, the World Bank credited regional governments for improved economic stability and the delivery of social programs, saying upward mobility has been driven by higher levels of formal employment, urbanization, reduced family size and greater numbers of women in the workforce. It defined the middle class broadly, as anyone earning between $10 and $50 a day, and said about half the population of Latin America now falls into that range. “The recent experience of Latin America and the Caribbean shows the world that policies balancing economic growth while still expanding opportunities for the most vulnerable can spread prosperity to millions of people,” World Bank President Jim Yong Kim said of the findings. “Governments in Latin America and the Caribbean still need to do much more — one-third of the population is still in poverty — but we should celebrate this achievement of growing the middle class and learn from it,” Kim said. Learning from the trend is now a matter of defining what’s really driving it. Left-populist leaders such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Bolivia’s Evo Morales, and Ecuador’s Rafael Correa have won at the polls in the past decade by railing against their country’s economic elites and promising to re-slice the pie in favor of the masses. **By directing more of their nations’ resource wealth to social spending, they have** easedpoverty **and invested billions** into health care**,** education **and other services. But their state-driven development models are heavily dependent on high commodity prices, and often contrasted with the so-called “Brazilian model” made fashionable by former President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva.** His leftist governmen**t remained friendly to foreign investors and maintained pro-business policies even as it lifted tens of millions out of poverty with greater social spending**. Geoff Thale, program director at the DC-based Washington Office on Latin America, said splitting the region into those two models is an oversimplification. “While there's a lot of discussion about the differences between left-populists like Chavez and social democrats as in Brazil, I don't think that the lines are drawn that clearly or that either camp has a single, well-defined approach,” he said. “In reality, it's more an era of experimentation than of ideological lines.” Thale said he views the region today as dominated by “post neoliberal” governments, “whose leaders believe that the state can and should play an active role in the economy and the market, and that social spending targeted at the poorest sectors (even when it's wrapped in neoliberal language about conditionality) is an important government function.” “I think those left-of-center beliefs, shared by a wide range of governments, have had an impact on both poverty and inequality,” Thale added.

The Affirmative’s criticism of American policy is dangerous – it contributes to isolationism and the eventual collapse of U.S. primacy

Kagan, 98(Robert, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and PhD in American History from American University, “The Benevolent Empire,” Foreign Policy. Summer, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=275 AFM)

Those contributing to the growing chorus of antihegemony and multipolarity may know they are playing a dangerous game, one that needs to be conducted with the utmost care, as French leaders did during the Cold War, lest the entire international system come crashing down around them. What they may not have adequately calculated, however, is the possibility that Americans will not respond as wisely as they generally did during the Cold War. Americans and their leaders should not take all this sophisticated whining about U.S. hegemony too seriously. They certainly should not take it more seriously than the whiners themselves do. But, of course, Americans are taking it seriously. In the United States these days, the lugubrious guilt trip of post-Vietnam liberalism is echoed even by conservatives, with William Buckley, Samuel Huntington, and James Schlesinger all decrying American "hubris," "arrogance," and "imperialism." Clinton administration officials, in between speeches exalting America as the "indispensable" nation, increasingly behave as if what is truly indispensable is the prior approval of China, France, and Russia for every military action. Moreover, at another level, there is a stirring of neo-isolationism in America today, a mood that nicely complements the view among many Europeans that America is meddling too much in everyone else's business and taking too little time to mind its own. The existence of the Soviet Union disciplined Americans and made them see that their enlightened self-interest lay in a relatively generous foreign policy. Today, that discipline is no longer present. In other words, foreign grumbling about American hegemony would be merely amusing, were it not for the very real possibility that too many Americans will forget — even if most of the rest of the world does not — just how important continued American dominance is to the preservation of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity. World leaders may want to keep this in mind when they pop the champagne corks in celebration of the next American humbling.

The result is wars around globe—there is simply no alternative

Rosen, 3 (Stephen Peter Rosen, Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of National Security and Military Affairs at Harvard University, The National Interest. “An Empire, if You Can Keep It.” March 22. http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-99377575.html AFM)

Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure and, in the most probable post-imperial world, would revert to the logic of self-help in which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also be very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.

**Heg solves their impact**

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First the absurdity: A few of the most over-the-top Bush-Cheney neocons did indeed promote a vision of U.S. primacy by which America shouldn't be afraid to wage war to keep other rising powers at bay. **It was a nutty concept then**, and it **remains a nutty concept today**. But since it feeds a lot of major military weapons system purchases, especially for the China-centric Air Force and Navy, don't expect it to disappear so long as the Pentagon's internal budget fights are growing in intensity. ¶ Meanwhile, the Chinese do their stupid best to fuel this outdated logic by building a force designed to keep America out of East Asia just as their nation's dependency on resources flowing from unstable developing regions skyrockets. With America's fiscal constraints now abundantly clear, the world's primary policing force is pulling back, while that force's implied successor is nowhere close to being able to field a similar power-projection capacity -- and never will be. So with NATO clearly stretched to its limits by the combination of Afghanistan and Libya, a lot of future fires in developing regions will likely be left to burn on their own. We'll just have to wait and see how much foreign commentators delight in that G-Zero dynamic in the years ahead. ¶ That gets us to the original "insult": the U.S. did not lord it over the world in the 1990s. Yes, it did argue for and promote the most rapid spread of globalization possible. But **the "evil" of the Washington Consensus** only yielded the **most rapid growth of a truly global middle class that the world has ever seen**. Yes, we can, in our current economic funk, somehow cast that development as the "loss of U.S. hegemony," in that the American consumer is no longer the demand-center of globalization's universe. But this is without a doubt the most amazing achievement of U.S. foreign policy, surpassing even our role in World War II. ¶ Numerous world powers served as global or regional hegemons before we came along, **and their record on economic development was painfully transparent**: **Elites got richer, and the masses got poorer**. Then America showed up after World War II and engineered an international liberal trade order, one that was at first admittedly limited to the West. But within four decades it went virally global, and now for the first time in history, more than half of our planet's population lives in conditions of modest-to-mounting abundance -- **after millennia of mere sustenance**. ¶ You may choose to interpret this as some sort of cosmic coincidence, but the historical sequence is undeniable: **With its unrivaled power, America made the world a far better place**. ¶ That spreading wave of global abundance has reformatted all sorts of traditional societies that lay in its path. Some, like the Chinese, have adapted to it magnificently in an economic and social sense, with the political adaptation sure to follow eventually. Others, being already democracies, have done far better across the board, like Turkey, Indonesia and India. But there are also numerous traditional societies where that reformatting impulse from below has been met by both harsh repression from above and violent attempts by religious extremists to effect a "counterreformation" that firewalls the "faithful" from an "evil" outside world.¶ Does this violent blowback constitute the great threat of our age? Not really. As I've long argued, this "friction" from globalization's tectonic advance is merely what's left over now that great-power war has gone dormant for 66 years and counting, with interstate wars now so infrequent and so less lethal as to be dwarfed by the civil strife that plagues those developing regions still suffering weak connectivity to the global economy. ¶ Let's remember what the U.S. actually did across the 1990s after the Soviet threat disappeared. It went out of its way to police the world's poorly governed spaces, battling rogue regimes and answering the 9-1-1 call repeatedly when disaster and/or civil strife struck vulnerable societies. **Yes, playing globalization's bodyguard made America public enemy No. 1 in the eyes of its most violent rejectionist movements**, including al-Qaida, but we made the effort because, in our heart of hearts, we knew that this is what blessed powers are supposed to do. ¶ Some, like the Bush-Cheney neocons, were driven by more than that sense of moral responsibility. They saw a chance to remake the world so as to assure U.S. primacy deep into the future. The timing of their dream was cruelly ironic, for it blossomed just as America's decades-in-the-making grand strategy reached its apogee in the peaceful rise of so many great powers at once. Had Sept. 11 not intervened, the neocons would likely have eventually targeted rising China for strategic demonization. Instead, they locked in on Osama bin Laden. The rest, as they say, is history. ¶ The follow-on irony of the War on Terror is that its operational requirements actually revolutionized a major portion of the U.S. military -- specifically the Army, Marines and Special Forces -- in such a way as to redirect their strategic ethos from big wars to small ones. It also forged a new operational bond between the military's irregular elements and that portion of the Central Intelligence Agency that pursues direct action against transnational bad actors. The up-front costs of this transformation were far too high, largely because the Bush White House stubbornly refused to embrace counterinsurgency tactics until after the popular repudiation signaled by the 2006 midterm election. But the end result is clear: **We now have the force we actually need to manage this global era**.¶ But, of course, **that can all be tossed into the dumpster** if we convince ourselves that our "loss" of hegemony was somehow the result of our own misdeed, instead of being our most profound gift to world history. Again, we grabbed the reins of global leadership and patiently engineered not only the **greatest redistribution -- and expansion -- of global wealth ever seen,** but also the **greatest consolidation of global peace ever seen**. ¶ Now, if we can sensibly realign our strategic relationship with the one rising great power, China, whose growing strength upsets us so much, then in combination with the rest of the world's rising great powers we can collectively wield enough global policing power to manage what's yet to come. ¶ As always, **the choice is ours**.

#### Neoliberalism improves poverty.

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A popular belief among antiglobalization activists is that the opening of international¶ trade throughout Latin America in the 1990s increased poverty¶ and inequality. This idea has been echoed in the media and has become a¶ fundamental component of neopopulist rhetoric. However, it is more a myth¶ than a fact. Indeed, economic research has failed to find hard and robust evidence¶ relating trade openness to the systematic worsening of living standards for the poor as a group. This, of course, does not mean that all the poor gain¶ from globalization or that trade liberalization in every country has been associated¶ with improved social conditions. Existing evidence indicates that, in¶ general, some among the poor win with trade liberalization and some lose;¶ the evidence also indicates that under certain conditions the vast majority of¶ people may benefit from increased trade openness.¶ A detailed review of the evidence on the relationship between globalization¶ and social conditions is well beyond the scope of this book. My interpretation¶ of the data, stemming from my own research on the subject, as well as¶ from reading scores of technical academic papers, articles, and books, may be¶ summarized by the following eight points.¶ First, a greater degree of trade openness has a positive effect on economic¶ growth. Some authors have argued that this effect is strong and lasts for a¶ substantial period of time, while others have noted that this acceleration in¶ growth is a temporary phenomenon.Be that as it may, the important finding¶ is that, at least for some years, countries with a greater degree of trade openness¶ will tend to grow at a faster rate than they would if they had retreated¶ from global markets. In that regard, most scholars who have looked at Chile¶ over the last thirty years have argued that the opening of the economy in the¶ mid-1970s is one of the most important factors behind the country’s stellar¶ performance, rapid economic growth, reduced poverty incidence, and improved¶ social conditions.¶ Second, individuals who work in the export sector tend to experience increases¶ in wages and income aft er trade liberalization reform. On the other¶ hand, those employed in industries formerly protected by import barriers¶ tend to experience income reductions once trade is liberalized. Thus, facilitating¶ the reallocation of workers from formerly protected importing industries¶ to exporting industries is important for countries to reap the full benefits of¶ increased globalization. Easier reallocation of workers requires, in turn, flexible¶ labor markets, where there are no major restrictions to hiring or dismissing¶ workers. This, however, is an area where the vast majority of the Latin¶ American countries have made very little progress. According to the Doing¶ Business data set, the Latin American countries are ranked 122nd on average¶ in the category of ease of employing workers. In contrast, on average the Asian¶ Tigers are ranked 78th, and the advanced commodity exporter countries referred¶ to in chapter 4 are ranked 13th on average. Third, income inequality and poverty tend to decline in regions, states, and¶ provinces that receive significant volumes of foreign direct investment. In turn, ¶ higher investment by foreign firms is generally a consequence of greater trade¶ openness. This result comes out very clearly in research on social conditions¶ in Mexico’s thirty-one states. Economists Fernando Borraz and Jose Ernesto¶ Lopez-Cordova found that poverty and inequality declined significantly in¶ those states that have received a larger volume of foreign direct investment.Fourth, trade reform and export expansion have given low-income women¶ greater opportunities to find formal, stable, and relatively well-remunerated¶ jobs. This is a particularly important finding for Latin America, since in¶ many countries—including Chile—the percentage of women who participate¶ actively in the formal labor market is significantly lower than in countries¶ in other parts of the world that have a comparable level of economic¶ development. Fifth, by forcing companies to become more efficient, trade liberalization¶ induces firms to adopt sophisticated production techniques. As a consequence, ¶ wages of skilled workers who can operate complex machinery tend¶ to increase relative to those of unskilled workers. This in turn tends to increase¶ inequality. This suggests that trade liberalization reforms need to be accompanied¶ by improvements in the educational system, particularly in training¶ programs for displaced workers. However, this is more easily said than done.¶ As discussed below, the quality of education in Latin America is extremely low¶ and has not improved in the last few decades.