# 1NC

#### A. Interpretation - Economic engagement is long-term strategy for promoting structural linkage between two economies

**Mastanduno, 1** – professor of Government at Dartmouth College (Michael, “Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice” <http://web.archive.org/web/20120906033646/http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf>

The basic causal logic of economic engagement, and the emphasis on domestic politics, can be traced to Hirschman. He viewed economic engagement as a long-term, transformative strategy. As one state gradually expands economic interaction with its target, the resulting (asymmetrical) interdependence creates vested interests within the target society and government. The beneficiaries of interdependence become addicted to it, and they protect their interests by pressuring the government to accommodate the source of interdependence. Economic engagement is a form of structural linkage; it is a means to get other states to *want* what you want, rather than to *do* what you want. The causal chain runs from economic interdependence through domestic political change to foreign policy accommodation.

#### B. Violation – the plan is an economic inducement – engagement requires trade promotion

**Celik, 11 –** master’s student at Uppsala University (Department of Peace and Conflict Research) (Arda, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies <http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagement-policies>)

Literature of liberal school points out that economic engagement policies are significantly effective tools for sender and target countries. The effectiveness leans on mutual economic and political benefits for both parties.(Garzke et al,2001).Ecenomic engagement operates with trade mechanisms where sender and target country establish intensified trade thus increase the economic interaction over time. This strategy decreases the potential hostilities and provides mutual gains. Paulson Jr (2008) states that this mechanism is highly different from carrots (inducements). Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow goals. Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and wants her to be aware of the long term benefits of shared economic goals. Sender does not want to contain nor prevent the target country with different policies. Conversely; sender works deliberately to improve the target countries’ Gdp, trade potential, export-import ratios and national income. Sender acts in purpose to reach important goals. First it establishes strong economic ties because economic integration has the capacity to change the political choices and behaviour of target country. Sender state believes in that economic linkages have political transformation potential.(Kroll,1993)

#### C. Voting issue –

1. limits – broad interpretations of engagement include anything that effects the economy, which means everything

2. negative ground – trade promotion is vital for a stable mechanism for disad links and counterplan ground

#### Congress solves a government shutdown now, but it’ll be close

Ben Terris 9/15, National Journal, “Gover nment Shutdown? Not This Time,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/government-shutdown-not-this-time-20130915

It makes for an exciting story—albeit one that we've heard many times recently—but the general consensus, both from outside experts and Republican leaders, is that it's just not going to happen. Yet.¶ "I'm very confident in my belief that a shutdown will not happen," said a Republican leadership aide. "I'm not going to rule out the chance that it ever does. But the leadership team and overwhelming number of our members do not want to shut down the government."¶ Politically, Republican leaders know it's in their best interest not to have the government shut down. A new poll from CNN found that the majority of the country would blame them, not Democrats, if such a thing were to happen. That is certainly part of the pitch from top Republicans to their members. They also want their colleagues to think of passing a budget bill—one that keeps sequester-levels of spending intact—as a victory in and of itself. ¶ And as for fighting for such trophies as delaying or defunding Obamacare, Republican leadership aides say that all they really need is just a bit more time to convince the holdouts that there's a better moment to have that fight.¶ "If you're looking to partially defund or delay the health care law, or individual mandate, or try and force spending cuts, it seems like, given the timing and lay of the land right now, the better place is on the debt limit," said another top Republican staffer.¶ Why? Partly because it gives GOP lawmakers time to rally around a plan. It also has to do with messaging. Many sophomore and freshman Republicans got themselves elected by castigating the country's borrowing habits. For them, it's better to fight about that than to look like a group of people who can't even keep the government's doors open.¶ That doesn't mean it's going to be easy, though. It hasn't been so far.¶ After returning from a monthlong vacation, lawmakers debated nothing but a possible military strike against Syria, leaving very little room for discussions about funding the government. By the time House Majority Leader Eric Cantor came up with a plan for such a funding bill, he and the leadership team couldn't garner enough support from Republicans to even bring it up for a vote. The problem was, conservatives didn't feel Cantor's bill made a real enough effort to defund Obamacare. While the vast majority of Cantor's colleagues supported his plan, it would only take a small fraction of opposition to derail it.¶ The vote was put on hold, but House Speaker John Boehner hinted at a press conference that the plan is still to try and sell Cantor's proposal—or something like it—to his members. When a reporter implied that such a course of action had been rejected, the speaker winked and said: "Not quite yet."¶ It's going to be tough to get Cantor's plan approved by 218 Republicans. Rep. Tom Graves of Georgia has come out with a bill—cosigned by about 50 members and counting—that would fund the government for a year while stripping away funding for Obamacare until 2015.¶ "Our conference is unifying on this in ways I haven't seen in a long time," he said about his bill, which would surely be dead-on-arrival in the Senate. "We have found the sweet spot that keeps the government open and keeps away the harmful effects of Obamacare."¶ But even as Graves whips up support for his own bill, some top conservatives admit there may be other ways to go about achieving their goals.¶ "There are a lot of tools in our tool chest, whether it's the CR or the debt ceiling," said Rep. Steve Scalise, R-La., whose job as the chairman of the Republican Study Committee makes him an influential figure among the House's most conservative members. "There's no one way to get this done. We are not married to one plan."¶ With neither Democrats or Republicans having had much time to prepare for battle, with the debt ceiling just around the corner, and with another possible government funding fight kicked to December, the best time for a knockdown brawl over spending and healthcare may be a little bit later.

#### **The plan puts border security before the budget – kills the deal**

Grant 4-27

[David. Politics for the Christian Science Monitor. “How border security 'trigger' could stop immigration reform.” The CSM, 4/27/13 ln//GBS-JV]

Congressional negotiators say immigration reform will need a border security 'trigger' to pass. But agreeing on what counts as 'border security' won't be easy, and coulddetermine whether reform happens. Immigration reformers want to bring the more than 10 million undocumented immigrants out of the shadows. Border security hawks want assurancesthat if they go along with that plan, they won’t be back in 10 years deciding whether or not to legalize 10 million more. What’s Congress to do?¶ Figure out a “trigger,” where advances in border security are deemed sufficient to trigger the beginning of the journey to citizenship for the undocumented already in the country.¶ As immigration reform negotiations continue, determining just what counts as a “secure border” and how to link that to plans for the undocumented will be crucial. Indeed, finding an answer could determine whether a bipartisan immigration reform measure reaches President Obama’s desk or if 2013 is yet another disappointment for reformers. Historically, those on Capitol Hill have tried to craft a delicate balance between border security and a path to legal status for the undocumented. For example, the comprehensive immigration reform legislation of the George W. Bush years, which ultimately failed, had a series of triggers. In 2009, Sen. Chuck Schumer (D) of New York proposed more broadly that “operational control” of the border “must be achieved within a year of enactment of legislation.”¶ But thosetriggers aren't helpfulanymore. Most of the benchmarks for border security established in 2007, for example, have been met today, according to an analysis by the pro-reform advocacy group America’s Voice.¶Border patrol staffing north of 20,000? Check: there are more than 21,000 agents on the border at present. Requirements for unmanned drones and a variety of other observation methods? All are at or above the 2007 requirements today. Fencing? Within eight miles of the 2007 target. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said on Tuesday that while the department lacks a single measure on which to base a trigger – and that a trigger based on any single measure would be a bad idea – all the data DHS collects point to a border safer than ever before.¶ Some Democrats and immigration reform advocates take this to say that the border is secure already and should not stand in the way of the undocumented becoming US citizens even if further border security measures are needed.¶ Republican reformers like Sen. John McCain of Arizona have a slightly different view, holding that while the southern border certainly is far improved from nearly a decade agothere’s still plenty of room for improvement.¶ “There's no question there's been a significant reduction in illegal crossings over the past five years…. But that work is not yet complete,” Senator McCain said in January at the press conference announcing a bipartisan Gang of Eight’s principles.¶ Other Republicans, like Sen. Jeff Sessions (R) of Alabama, are skeptical of such claims and believe figuring out just what constitutes a secure border should be among the goals of a lengthy series of hearings around immigration reform.¶ So what do lawmakers propose to do this time around? Mr. Obama’s answerappears to bescrap the trigger altogether.¶ His immigration statements have notably left out any linkage between border security and permanent legal status for the undocumented, noting in his immigration reform plan that if an undocumented person meets certain criteria including paying fines, learning English, and waiting until all other current prospective immigrants have passed through the immigration system, “there will be no uncertainty about their ability to become US citizens.”

#### Obama’s push is key to derail GOP opposition

Patrick Reis 9/16, reporter at National Journal, “Obama Dares Republicans to Defy Tea Party on Obamacare, Shutdown Deal,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/obama-dares-republicans-to-defy-tea-party-on-obamacare-shutdown-deal-20130916

President Obama took a swipe at the Hard Right on Monday, accusing tea-party-aligned House Republicans of gambling with the nation's economy by threatening to shut down the government unless Obamacare is defunded.¶ In a sprawling economic speech, Obama called on Congress to avert a government shutdown by passing a budget, and he insisted he would brook no wrangling over a raise in the debt ceiling. Obama said such a shutdown, or even the possibility of default, would damage the still-fragile economic recovery.¶ Specifically, the president went after Republicans who say they won't vote for any budget deal that does not nullify the Affordable Care Act. "I cannot remember a time when one faction of one party promises economic chaos if it can't get 100 percent of what it wants," Obama said. "That's never happened before, and that's what happening right now."¶ Obama appealed to the rest of the Republican Party for help in brokering a budget compromise, challenging members to break with those calling for defunding Obamacare.¶ "Are some of these folks so beholden to one extreme wing of their party that they're willing to tank our whole economy?" he said. "Are they willing to hurt people?"¶ By going after one GOP "faction" and appealing to the other, Obama is seeking leverage in a tactical dispute that has vexed Republicans all summer. In one camp are legislators—headlined by Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas—who are insisting that the party shut down the government unless funding is stripped for the health care law. Other Republicans, including much of the party's leadership, say they too want to defund the health care law, but they see connecting Obamacare to a government shutdown as too politically risky.¶ In seeking to further divide the camps, Obama is hoping to avert a government shutdown while also achieving some Democratic policy aims, such as rollbacks of the sequester-induced spending cuts that Obama on Monday said were hurting economic growth.

#### Shutdown wrecks the economy

Yi Wu, 8-27-2013, “Government Shutdown 2013: Still a Terrible Idea,” PolicyMic, http://www.policymic.com/articles/60837/government-shutdown-2013-still-a-terrible-idea

Around a third of House Republicans, many Tea Party-backed, sent a letter last week calling on Speaker John Boehner to reject any spending bills that include implementation of the Affordable Care Act, otherwise known as Obamacare. Some Senate Republicans echo their House colleagues in pondering this extreme tactic, which is nothing other than a threat of government shutdown as neither congressional Democrats nor President Obama would ever agree on a budget that abolishes the new health care law. Unleashing this threat would amount to holding a large number of of the federal government's functions, including processing Social Security checks and running the Centers for Disease Control, hostage in order to score partisan points. It would be an irresponsible move inflicting enormous damage to the U.S. economy while providing no benefit whatsoever for the country, and Boehner is rightly disinclined to pursue it. Government shutdowns are deleterious to the economy. Two years ago in February 2011, a similar government shutdown was looming due to a budget impasse, and a research firm estimated that quater's GDP growth would be reduced by 0.2 percentage points if the shutdown lasted a week. After the budget is restored from the hypothetical shutdown, growth would only be "partially recouped," and a longer shutdown would result in deeper slowdowns. Further, the uncertainties resulting from a shutdown would also discourage business. A shutdown was avoided last-minute that year, unlike in 1995 during the Clinton administration where it actually took place for four weeks and resulted in a 0.5 percentage-point dent in GDP growth. Billions of dollars were cut from the budget, but neither Boehner nor the Republicans at the time were reckless enough to demand cancellation of the entire health care reform enacted a year before.

#### Global nuclear war

Harris & Burrows 9 Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f\_0016178\_13952.pdf

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the **harmful effects on fledgling democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for** greater **conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism**’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any **economically-induced drawdown** of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, **acquire additional weapons**, and consider pursuing their own **nuclear ambitions**. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an **unintended escalation** and **broader conflict** if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential **nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on **preemption** rather than defense, potentially leading to **escalating crises**. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in **interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

#### Economic engagement is an imperialist tool used to forward US geopolitical dominance – economic influence perpetuates the North/South geographical divide which makes war inevitable

**Jones, Jones, and Woods, 04** (Martin Jones\* - PhD in Human Geography from the University of Manchester, Rhys Jones; Professor of Human Geography at the University

of Wales Aberystwyth\*\* - Professor in Human Geography @ the University¶ of Wales Aberystwyth, Michael Woods\*\*\* - PhD in Human Geography from Bristol University; Professor of Human Geography and Director of the Institute of Geography and Earth Sciences @ the University¶ of Wales Aberystwyth, 2004, “AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY Space, place and politics”, http://118.97.161.124/perpus-fkip/Perpustakaan/Geography/Geografi%20manusia/Pengantar%20Geografi%20Politik.pdf) MD

Political domination can take on many forms. At¶ its most basic and uncompromising, it is based on¶ military relationships between two or more parties.¶ Much of the rationale behind the proliferation of¶ nuclear weapons during the Cold War, for instance,¶ was based upon the West and the East’s need to secure¶ strategic military and, therefore, political advantage¶ over their enemies. This became the main justiﬁcation¶ for the global political and military face-off between¶ East and West that characterised the international¶ relations of the Cold War. A more recent example has been the nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan¶ over the disputed province of Kashmir (Dodds 2000:¶ 103–6). Once again, overt displays of the military¶ might of the two countries have been used as a means¶ of securing strategic, military and political advantage¶ within the region. Political forms of geopolitical¶ domination can also occur in more subtle and hidden¶ ways. A good instance of this is the persistent military¶ inﬂuence of the United States in neighbouring countries in the Caribbean, Central and South America ¶ (see Dodds 2000: 57). The most infamous examples ¶ of these more covert efforts by the United States to¶ influence the internal politics of other independent¶ states have been in Guatemala, Nicaragua and Cuba.¶ These latter examples also begin to demonstrate the¶ strong connections between political and economic¶ aspects of geopolitical strategy, where political interference is accompanied by various forms of financial¶ aid. A key method of securing geopolitical inﬂuence¶ and dominance in recent years has been the ﬁnancial¶ and technological aid offered by dominant countries to¶ other, needy countries. In many ways, if military might represents the ‘stick’ of international relations, then¶ ﬁnancial aid is the ‘carrot’. Numerous examples exist¶ to demonstrate the role of economic influence in¶ shaping international geopolitical relations. In the¶ period after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, for¶ instance, there was much debate in the international¶ community concerning the best way to secure the¶ freedom of the latter. Much of the political shenanigans¶ of the period took place in the corridors of the United¶ Nations in New York. The famous journalist John¶ Pilger (1992) has noted how the United States tried¶ to use its economic muscle as a way of securing the¶ support of other states for its plan to mount an invasion¶ of Kuwait and Iraq. In this respect, its main efforts were¶ directed towards the non-permanent members of the¶ Security Council of the United Nations, which, at that¶ time, included one of the poorest states in the world,¶ Yemen. It is a little-known fact that Yemen voted not¶ to support an invasion of the Middle East by American led UN forces. In the immediate aftermath of the vote,¶ it is alleged by Pilger (1992), the Yemeni ambassador¶ to the United Nations was informed by his US counterpart that that was the most costly decision he¶ had ever made. In the following weeks, $70 million of¶ proposed US aid to Yemen was cancelled, the World¶ Bank and the International Monetary Fund began to¶ question the economic practices of the Yemeni state¶ and 800,000 Yemeni workers were expelled from Saudi¶ Arabia. As Dodds (2000) has argued, occurrences such as¶ these are part of a broader range of economic strategies¶ that help certain Northern states to achieve geopolitical¶ dominance over Southern countries. The influence ¶ of industrialised countries over institutions such as ¶ the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and ¶ the World Trade Organisation has been particularly¶ important. It has helped to generate an additional ¶ layer of compliance within international relations. The¶ best example of this process is the so-called ‘structural¶ adjustment programmes’ of the World Bank, which¶ seek to constrain the range of economic and political¶ policies that can be pursued by less industrialised¶ countries (Dodds 2000: 17; see also Krasner 2001:¶ 28–9). The criticism levelled at these programmes is¶ that they reify a particularly industrialised model of¶ development on southern states and, as such, represent¶ **a new form of informal imperialism by northern states.¶** In many ways, these examples illustrate the strong¶ connections between geopolitics and the broader international political economy (see Agnew and Corbridge¶ 1995).¶

#### This makes imperialistic violence, war and destruction inevitable – Latin America becomes a playground for the elite to commit violence

**Grandin 06** (Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism, Greg Grandin, Macmillan, May 2, 2006 –BRW)

The ARGENTINE WRITER Jorge Luis Borges once remarked that the lack of camels in the Koran proves its Middle Eastern provenance: only a native author, he explained, could have so taken the animal for granted as not to mention it. Perhaps a similar familiarity explains the absence of Latin America in recent discussions about the United States and its empire. Though Latin America has played an indispensable role in the rise of the United States to global power, it elicits little curiosity from its neighbor to the north. "Latin America doesn't matter,” Richard Nixon advised a young Donald Rumsfeld, who was casting about for career opportunities. “Long as we’ve been in it, people don’t give one damn about Latin America.”' Likewise today. In their search for historical precedents for our current imperial moment, intellectuals invoke postwar reconstructions of Germany and japan, ancient Rome and nineteenth-century Britain but consistently ignore the one place where the United States has projected its influence for more than two centuries. "People don’t give one shit" about the place, Nixon said.: Vi/ere it not for Borges’s insight, this studied indifference to Latin America would seem ironic, for the region has long served as a workshop of empire, the place where the United States elaborated tactics of extraterritorial administration and acquired its conception of itself as an empire like no other before it. The Western hemisphere was to be the staging ground for a new “empire for liberty," a phrase used by Thomas Jefferson specifically in reference to Spanish Florida and Cuba. Unlike European empires, ours was supposed to entail a concert of equal, sovereign democratic American republics, with shared interests and values, led but not dominated by the United States—a conception of empire that remains Washington’s guiding vision. The same direction of influence is evident in any number of examples. The United States’s engagement with the developing world after World War II, for instance, is often viewed as an extension of its postwar policies in Europe and japan, yet that view has it exactly backwards. Washington’s first attempts, in fact, to restructure another country’s economy took place in the developing world—in Mexico in the years after the American Civil War and in Cuba following the Spanish-American War. “We should do for Europe on a large seale,” remarked the U.S. ambassador to England in 1914, "essentially what we did for Cuba on a small scale and thereby usher in a new era of human history.” Likewise, most discussions of George W. Bush’s foreign policy focus on the supposed innovation of a small group of neoconservative intellectuals in asserting the right to unilateral preemptive military action both to defend national security and to advance American ideals. But neither the neocons’ dire view of a crisis-ridden world that justifies the use of unilateral and brutal American military power nor their utopian vision of the same world made whole and happy by that power is new. Both have been fully in operation in Washington’s approach to Latin America for over a century. The history of the United States in Latin America is cluttered with “preemptive" interventions that even the most stalwart champions of U.S. hegemony have trouble defending. From the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth century, the U.S. military sharpened its lighting skills and developed its modernday organizational structure largely in constant conflict with Latin America—in its drive west when it occupied Mexico in the midnineteenth century aml took more than half of that country’s national territory. And in its push south: by 1930, Washington had sent gunboats into Latin American ports over six thousand times, invaded Cuba, Mexico (again), Guatemala, and Honduras, fought protracted guerrilla wars in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti, annexed Puerto Rico, and taken a piece of Colombia to create both the Panamanian nation and the Panama Canal. For their part, American corporations and financial houses came to dominate the economies of Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America, as well as large parts of South America, apprenticing themselves in overseas expansion before they headed elsewhere, to Asia, Africa, and Europe. Yet Latin America did more than serve as a staging ground for the United States’s early push toward empire. The region provided a school where foreign policy officials and intellectuals could learn to apply what political scientists like to call “soft power”—that is, the spread of America’s authority through nonnilitary means, through commerce, cultural exchange, and multilateral cooperation} At first, the United States proved a reluctant student. It took decades of mounting Latin American anti-imperialist resistance, including armed resistance, to force Washington to abandon its militarism. But abandon it it finally did, at least for a short time. In the early 1930s, Franklin D. Roosevelt promised that henceforth the United States would be a "good neighbor," that it would recognize the absolute sovereignty of individual nations, renounce its right to engage in unilateral interventions, and make concessions to economic nationalists. Rather than weaken U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere, this newfound moderation in fact institutionalized Washington’s authority, drawing Latin .American republics tighter into its political, economic, and cultural orbit through a series of multilateral treaties and regional organizations. The Good Neighbor policy was the model for the European and Asian alliance system, providing a blueprint for America’s “empire by invitation,” as one historian famously described Washington’s rise to unprecedented heights of world power} But even as Washington was working out the contours of its kinder, gentler empire in postwar Western Europe and japan, back in the birthplace of American soft power it was rearming. **Latin America has once again became a school where the United States studied how to execute imperial violence through proxies.** After World War II, in the name of containing Communism, the United States, mostly through the actions of local allies, executed or encouraged coups in, among other places, Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina and patronized a brutal mercenary war in Nicaragua. Latin America became a laboratory for counter insurgency, as military officials and covert operators applied insights learned in the re-gion to Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. By the end of the Cold War, Latin American security forces trained, funded, equipped, and incited by Washington had executed a reign of bloody terror—hundreds of thousands killed, an equal number tortured, millions driven into exile—from which the region has yet to fully recover. This reign of terror has had consequences more far-reaching than the damage done to Latin America itself, for it was this rehabilitation of hard power that directly influenced America°s latest episode of imperial overreach in the wake of 9/1 1. It is often noted in passing that a number of the current administration’s officials, advisers, and hangers-on are veterans of Ronald Reagan’s Central American policy in the 1980s, which included the patronage of anti-Communist governments in El Salvador and Guatemala and anti-Communist insurgents in Nicaragua. The list includes Elliott Abrams, Bush’s current deputy national security adviser in charge of promoting democracy throughout the world; john Negroponte, former U.N. ambassador, envoy to Iraq, and now intelligence czar; Otto Reich, secretary of state for the Western Hemisphere during Bush°s first term; and Robert Kagan, an ardent advocate of U.S. global hegemony. john Poindexter, convicted of lying to Congress, conspiracy, and destroying evidence in the IranContra scandal during his tenure as Reagan’s national security adviser, was appointed by Rumsfeld to oversee the Pentagon’s stillborn Total Information Awareness program. john Bolton, ambassador to the United Nations and an arch-unilateralist, served as Reagan’s point man in the justice Department to stonewall investigations into Iran-Contra.; Yet the links between the current Bush administrations revolution in foreign policy and Reagan’s hard line in Central America are even more profound than the simple recycling of personnel. It was Central America, and Latin America more broadly, where an insurgent New Right first coalesced, as conservative activists used the region to respond to the crisis of the 1970s, a crisis provoked not only by America’s defeat in Vietnam but by a deep economic recession and a culture of skeptical antimilitarism and political dissent that spread in the war’s wake. Indeed, Reagan’s Central American wars can best be understood as a dress rehearsal for what is going on now in the Middle East. It was in these wars where the coalition made up of neoconservatives, Christian evangelicals, free marketers, and nationalists that today stands behind George W. Bush’s expansive foreign policy first came together. There they had near free rein to bring the full power of the United States against a much weaker enemy in order to exorcise the ghost of Vietnam—and, in so doing, begin the transformation of America’s foreign policy and domestic culture. A critical element of that transformation entailed shifting the rationale of American diplomacy away from containment to rollback, from one primarily justified in terms of national defense to one charged with advancing what Bush likes to call a “global democratic revolution.” The domestic fight over how to respond to revolutionary nationalism in Central America allowed conservative ideologues to remoralize both American diplomacy and capitalism, to counteract the cynicism that had seeped into both popular culture and the political establishment regarding the deployment of U.S. power in the world. Thus they pushed the Republican Party away from its foreign policy pragmatism to the idealism that now defines the “war on terror” as a world crusade of free-market nation building. At the same time, the conflicts in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala allowed New Right militarists to find ways to bypass the restrictions enacted by Congress and the courts in the wake of Vietnam that limited the executive branch’s ability to fight wars, conduct covert operations, and carry out domestic surveillance of political activists. The Reagan White House perfected new techniques to manipulate the media, Congress, and public opinion while at the same time re empowering domestic law enforcement agencies to monitor and harass political dissidents. These techniques, as we shall see, prefigured initiatives now found in the PR campaign to build support for the war in Iraq and in the Patriot Act, reinvigorating the national security state in ways that resonate to this day. The Central American wars also provided the New Christian Right its first extensive experience in foreign affairs, as the White House mobilized evangelical activists in order to neutralize domestic opponents of a belligerent foreign policy. It was here where New Right Christian theologians first joined with secular nationalists to elaborate an ethical justification for a rejuvenated militarism. In other words, it was in Central America where the Republican Party first combined the three elements that give today’s imperialism its moral force: punitive idealism, free-market absolutism, and right-wing Christian mobilization. The first justified a belligerent diplomacy not just for the sake of national security but to advance “freedom.” The second sanctified property rights and the unencumbered free market as the moral core of the freedom it was America’s duty to export. The third backed up these ideals with social power, as the Republican Party learned how to channel the passions of its evangelical base into the international arena. 'lb focus, therefore, exclusively on neoconservative intellectuals, as much of the commentary attempting to identify the origins of the new imperialism does, deflects attention away from the long history of American expansion. The intellectual architects of the Bush Doctrine are but part of a larger resurgence of nationalist militarism, serving as the ideologues of an American revanchism fired by a lethal combination of humiliation in Vietnam and vindication in the Cold War, of which Central America was the tragic endgame.

#### The alternative is to reject the 1AC in order to politicize the affirmative’s conception of geography – discourse analysis solves

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Far more influential have been two conceptual¶ developments which served to further politicise the¶ outlook of human geography as a whole. The ﬁrst of¶ these was the so-called ‘cultural turn’ of the late 1980s¶ and 1990s which promoted a new understanding of¶ culture as the product of discourses through which¶ people signify their identity and experiences and which¶ are constantly contested and renegotiated (see Jackson¶ 1989; Mitchell 2000). Consequently, issues of power¶ and resistance were positioned as central to the analysis¶ of cultural geographies, generating signiﬁcant clusters¶ of research on questions of identity and place, including¶ national identity and citizenship; conflict and contestation between cultural discourses; geographies of¶ resistance; the role of landscape in conveying and¶ challenging power; and ‘micro-geographies’ of politics,¶ including investigation of the body as a site of oppression and resistance (see for example Pile and Keith¶ 1997; Sharp et al. 2000). These themes are discussed¶ further in Chapters 5, 7 and 8.¶ Moreover, the ‘new cultural geography’ drew on the¶ conceptual writings of post-structuralist thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze¶ and Félix Guattari, and postcolonial theorists such ¶ as Homi Bhabha, for whom the relation of power ¶ and space was a key concern (see Box 1.3). A number¶ of different strands of post-structuralist thought have¶ been introduced into political geography, including¶ ideas about difference in research on the cultural¶ politics of identity and the use of Derrida’s method of deconstruction in critical geopolitics (see below).¶ However, it is the work of Michel Foucault that ¶ has arguably had the greatest influence in political¶ geography, in particular through the development ¶ and application of two key concepts. The ﬁrst of these¶ is ‘discourse’, which Foucault redeﬁned as referring to¶ the ensemble of social practices through which the¶ world is made meaningful but which are also dynamic and contested (Box 1.4). In books such as The Order of¶ Things (1973 [1966]) and The Archaeology of Knowledge¶ (1974 [1969]) Foucault examined the articulation of¶ discursive practices and thus established precedents as¶ to how discourses might be analysed. These ideas have¶ been fundamental to the development of geographical¶ work on cultural politics and of critical geopolitics, ¶ as well as to the development of discourse analysis as¶ a methodological approach which is now widely used¶ across political geography. The second key concept is¶ ‘governmentality’, by which Foucault refers to the¶ means by which government renders society governable. Governmentality is essentially about the use ¶ of particular ‘apparatuses of knowledge’ and has been¶ employed in recent years in work on the state and¶ citizenship (see Chapter 8). **A signiﬁcant aspect of both discourse analysis and**¶ **governmentality is the potential they allow for exploration of the incorporation of space itself as a tool in the**¶ **exercise of power.** Much of Foucault’s writing was¶ concerned with power, but he rejected conventional¶ notions of power as a property that is possessed,¶ focusing instead on how power is exercised and how ¶ it circulates through society. Foucault stated that ‘space¶ is fundamental in any exercise of power’ (Rabinow¶ 1984: 252), and this principle underlies much of his¶ work on disciplinary power. His best known illustration of this is his discussion of Jeremy Bentham’s¶ panopticon (Foucault 1977: ch. 3). The panopticon was¶ a proposal for an ideal prison, the spatial arrangement¶ of which would effectively force prisoners to discipline¶ themselves. The panopticon would be built in a circular arrangement with all the cells facing a central observation tower. The circle meant that prisoners could not¶ see or communicate with each other, but also by means¶ of backlighting from a small external window it¶ allowed prisoners to be constantly visible via a large¶ internal window from the observation tower, whose¶ own windows had blinds to prevent prisoners seeing in. The prisoners could not know whether they¶ were being watched at any particular time, but had to¶ presume that they were under constant surveillance and¶ therefore act within the rules. As Foucault describes,¶ the major effect of the Panopticon [is] to induce ¶ in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent¶ visibility that assures the automatic functioning of¶ power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is¶ permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous¶ in its action; that the perfection of power should¶ tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that¶ this architectural apparatus should be a machine ¶ for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it.¶ (Foucault 1979: 201)

#### CP: The United States federal government should offer to create an Automatic Exchange of Information and Trade Transparency Units with Mexico.

#### Terrorist groups are preparing to attack the U.S. – currently expanding their ties to Mexican drug cartels

Boyle, 12 - Investigative reporter @ Daily Caller (Matthew Boyle, 16 November 2012, “Congressional report ties Middle East terrorists to Mexican drug cartels”, http://dailycaller.com/2012/11/16/congressional-report-ties-middle-east-terrorists-to-mexican-drug-cartels/)//Holmes

A new congressional report from the House Homeland Security Committee Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations and Management ties Middle East terror organizations to Mexican drug cartels. The report, released Thursday, is titled “A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border.” It found that the “Southwest border has now become the greatest threat of terrorist infiltration into the United States.” It specifically cites a “growing influence” from Iranian and Hezbollah terror forces in Latin America. “The presence of Hezbollah in Latin America is partially explained by the large Lebanese diaspora in South America,” the report reads. “In general, Hezbollah enjoys support by many in the Lebanese world community in part because of the numerous social programs it provides in Lebanon that include schools, hospitals, utilities and welfare.” The congressional report, prepared by the subcommittee’s chairman, Texas Republican Rep. Michael McCaul, argues that the “explanation for Iranian presence in Latin America begins with its symbiotic relationship with Hezbollah.” “United in their dedication to the destruction of Israel, Iran has helped Hezbollah grow from a small group of untrained guerrillas into what is arguably the most highly trained, organized and equipped terrorist organization in the world,” the report reads. “In return, Hezbollah has served as an ideal proxy for Iranian military force – particularly against Israel – which affords Iran plausible deniability diplomatically. Hence wherever Hezbollah is entrenched, Iran will be as well and vice-versa.” McCaul’s report goes on to argue Iran’s increased presence in Latin America is because of the nation’s close relationship with Venezuela – which recently re-elected socialist leader Hugo Chavez. The report found that Hezbollah’s “relationship with Mexican drug cartels,” has been “documented as early as 2005.” Quoting former Drug Enforcement Administration executive Michael Braun, the report argues these ties are troubling. “Operativesfrom FTOs (foreign terrorist organizations) and DTOs (drug trafficking organizations) are frequenting the same shady bars, the same seedy hotels and the same sweaty brothels in a growing number of areas around the world,” Braun said in a statement quoted in the report. “And what else are they doing? Based upon over 37 years in the law enforcement and security sectors, you can mark my word that they are most assuredly talking business and sharing lessons learned.” In October 2011, Iran apparently tried to exploit its ties to the drug cartels to conduct its eventually foiledassassination attempt on the Saudi ambassador to the United States. “According to a federal arrest complaint filed in New York City, the [Iranian] Qods Force attempted to hire a drug cartel (identified by other sources as the Los Zetas) to assassinate Saudi Ambassador Adel al-Jubeir for a fee of $1.5 million,” the report reads. “The terror attack was to take place at a popular restaurant in Washington, D.C. without regard to collateral deaths or damage.” “The Qods Force made this solicitation because it knows drug traffickers are willing to undertake such criminal activity in exchange for money,” the report continues. “Moreover, if this terror attack had been successful, the Qods Force intended to use the Los Zetas for other attacks in the future. Had it not been for a [Drug Enforcement Agency] DEA informant posing as the Los Zetas operative, this attack could have very well taken place.” In a previous report, McCaul’s subcommittee documented “the emerging power and influence of the Mexican drug cartels along the Southwest border.” “The report elaborated on the increasing cooperation between the drug cartels and prison and street gangs in the United States to facilitate the trafficking and sale of illicit drugs along with the enforcement of remunerations,” the recently-released report says of the previous report. “Those cartels diversified into other areas of criminality such as human smuggling and arms trafficking.” In a statement, McCaul said that “Middle East terrorist networks that continue to plot against the United States are expanding their ties to Mexican drug trafficking organizations, better positioning themselves for a possible attack on our homeland.” “This report documents the increased presence of Iran and Hezbollah in Latin America and addresses the growing concern that terrorist organizations will exploit burgeoning relationships with Mexican drug cartels to infiltrate the Southwest border undetected,” McCaul said. The subcommittee is planning a Friday hearing to further discuss the report’s findings.

#### Mexican economic decline causes a flood of refugees, resulting in border terrorism

Michael Brown 9, Undersecretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response in the Department of Homeland Security, “Border Control: Collapse of Mexico Is A Homeland Security & National Security Issue,” 1/14, <http://michaelbrowntoday.com/journal/2009/1/15/border-control-collapse-of-mexico-is-a-homeland-security-nat.html>

By failing to secure the borders and control immigration, we have opened ourselves up to a frightening scenario. The United States could face a flood of refugees from Mexico if it were to collapse, overwhelming state and local governments along the U.S.-Mexico border. During a time of economic duress, the costs would be overwhelming and would simply add to the already burgeoning costs at the federal level. Immigration and border control never was nor should it ever be about racism. Immigration and border control are national security and homeland security issues. Sleeper cells from numerous terrorist groups could, and probably already have, infiltrated the United States, just laying in wait to attack at an appropriately vulnerable time.

**Dispersal of Bioweapons is Impossible.**

**Smithson 05** Amy E., PhD, project director for biological weapons at the Henry L. Stimson Center.( “Likelihood of Terrorists Acquiring and Using Chemical or Biological Weapons”. <http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?SN=CB2001121259)//NR>

**Terrorists cannot count on** just **filling the delivery system with agent, pointing the device, and flipping the switch to activate it. Facets that must be deciphered include** the **concentration of agent** in the delivery system, **the ways in which the delivery system degrades the potency of the agent**, and **the right dosage to incapacitate or kill** human or animal targets. For open-air delivery, the **meteorological conditions must be taken into account. Biological agents have extreme sensitivity to sunlight, humidity, pollutants in the atmosphere, temperature, and even exposure to oxygen, all of which can kill the microbes**. Biological agents can be dispersed in either dry or wet forms. Using a dry agent can boost effectiveness because drying and milling the agent can make the particles very fine, a key factor since particles must range between 1 to 10 ten microns, ideally to 1 to 5, to be breathed into the lungs. **Drying an agent,** however, **is done through a complex and challenging process that requires a sophistication of equipment and know-how that terrorist organizations are unlikely to possess. The alternative is to develop a wet slurry**, which is much easier to produce but a **great deal harder to disperse effectively**. Wet slurries can clog sprayers and undergo mechanical stresses that can kill 95 percent or more of the microorganisms.

**No extinction from bioweapons**

**O’Neill 4** O’Neill 8/19/2004 [Brendan, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction” <http://www.spiked->online.com/Articles/0000000CA694.htm]//NR

David C Rapoport, professor of political science at University of California, Los Angeles and editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, has examined what he calls 'easily available evidence' relating to the historic use of chemical and biological weapons. He found something surprising - such weapons do not cause mass destruction. Indeed, whether used by states, terror groups or dispersed in industrial accidents, they tend to be far less destructive than conventional weapons. 'If we stopped speculating about things that might happen in the future and looked instead at what has happened in the past, we'd see that our fears about WMD are misplaced', he says. Yet such fears remain widespread. Post-9/11, American and British leaders have issued dire warnings about terrorists getting hold of WMD and causing mass murder and mayhem. President George W Bush has spoken of terrorists who, 'if they ever gained weapons of mass destruction', would 'kill hundreds of thousands, without hesitation and without mercy' (1). The British government has spent £28million on stockpiling millions of smallpox vaccines, even though there's no evidence that terrorists have got access to smallpox, which was eradicated as a natural disease in the 1970s and now exists only in two high-security labs in America and Russia (2). In 2002, British nurses became the first in the world to get training in how to deal with the victims of bioterrorism (3). The UK Home Office's 22-page pamphlet on how to survive a terror attack, published last month, included tips on what to do in the event of a 'chemical, biological or radiological attack' ('Move away from the immediate source of danger', it usefully advised). Spine-chilling books such as Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction and The Survival Guide: What to Do in a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear Emergency speculate over what kind of horrors WMD might wreak. TV docudramas, meanwhile, explore how Britain might cope with a smallpox assault and what would happen if London were 'dirty nuked' (4). The term 'weapons of mass destruction' refers to three types of weapons: nuclear, chemical and biological. A chemical weapon is any weapon that uses a manufactured chemical, such as sarin, mustard gas or hydrogen cyanide, to kill or injure. A biological weapon uses bacteria or viruses, such as smallpox or anthrax, to cause destruction - inducing sickness and disease as a means of undermining enemy forces or inflicting civilian casualties. We find such weapons repulsive, because of the horrible way in which the victims convulse and die - but they appear to be less 'destructive' than conventional weapons. 'We know that nukes are massively destructive, there is a lot of evidence for that', says Rapoport. But when it comes to chemical and biological weapons, 'the evidence suggests that we should call them "weapons of minimum destruction", not mass destruction', he says. Chemical weapons have most commonly been used by states, in military warfare. Rapoport explored various state uses of chemicals over the past hundred years: both sides used them in the First World War; Italy deployed chemicals against the Ethiopians in the 1930s; the Japanese used chemicals against the Chinese in the 1930s and again in the Second World War; Egypt and Libya used them in the Yemen and Chad in the postwar period; most recently, Saddam Hussein's Iraq used chemical weapons, first in the war against Iran (1980-1988) and then against its own Kurdish population at the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war. In each instance, says Rapoport, chemical weapons were used more in desperation than from a position of strength or a desire to cause mass destruction. 'The evidence is that states rarely use them even when they have them', he has written. 'Only when a military stalemate has developed, which belligerents who have become desperate want to break, are they used.' (5) As to whether such use of chemicals was effective, Rapoport says that at best it blunted an offensive - but this very rarely, if ever, translated into a decisive strategic shift in the war, because the original stalemate continued after the chemical weapons had been deployed. He points to the example of Iraq. The Baathists used chemicals against Iran when that nasty trench-fought war had reached yet another stalemate. As Efraim Karsh argues in his paper 'The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis': 'Iraq employed [chemical weapons] only in vital segments of the front and only when it saw no other way to check Iranian offensives. Chemical weapons had a negligible impact on the war, limited to tactical rather than strategic [effects].' (6) According to Rapoport, this 'negligible' impact of chemical weapons on the direction of a war is reflected in the disparity between the numbers of casualties caused by chemicals and the numbers caused by conventional weapons. It is estimated that the use of gas in the Iran-Iraq war killed 5,000 - but the Iranian side suffered around 600,000 dead in total, meaning that gas killed less than one per cent. The deadliest use of gas occurred in the First World War but, as Rapoport points out, it still only accounted for five per cent of casualties. Studying the amount of gas used by both sides from1914-1918 relative to the number of fatalities gas caused, Rapoport has written: 'It took a ton of gas in that war to achieve a single enemy fatality. Wind and sun regularly dissipated the lethality of the gases. Furthermore, those gassed were 10 to 12 times as likely to recover than those casualties produced by traditional weapons.' (7) Indeed, Rapoport discovered that some earlier documenters of the First World War had a vastly different assessment of chemical weapons than we have today - they considered the use of such weapons to be preferable to bombs and guns, because chemicals caused fewer fatalities. One wrote: 'Instead of being the most horrible form of warfare, it is the most humane, because it disables far more than it kills, ie, it has a low fatality ratio.' (8) 'Imagine that', says Rapoport, 'WMD being referred to as more humane'. He says that the contrast between such assessments and today's fears shows that actually looking at the evidence has benefits, allowing 'you to see things more rationally'. According to Rapoport, even Saddam's use of gas against the Kurds of Halabja in 1988 - the most recent use by a state of chemical weapons and the most commonly cited as evidence of the dangers of 'rogue states' getting their hands on WMD - does not show that unconventional weapons are more destructive than conventional ones. Of course the attack on Halabja was horrific, but he points out that the circumstances surrounding the assault remain unclear. 'The estimates of how many were killed vary greatly', he tells me. 'Some say 400, others say 5,000, others say more than 5,000. The fighter planes that attacked the civilians used conventional as well as unconventional weapons; I have seen no study which explores how many were killed by chemicals and how many were killed by firepower. We all find these attacks repulsive, but the death toll may actually have been greater if conventional bombs only were used. We know that conventional weapons can be more destructive.' Rapoport says that terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons is similar to state use - in that it is rare and, in terms of causing mass destruction, not very effective. He cites the work of journalist and author John Parachini, who says that over the past 25 years only four significant attempts by terrorists to use WMD have been recorded. The most effective WMD-attack by a non-state group, from a military perspective, was carried out by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka in 1990. They used chlorine gas against Sri Lankan soldiers guarding a fort, injuring over 60 soldiers but killing none. The Tamil Tigers' use of chemicals angered their support base, when some of the chlorine drifted back into Tamil territory - confirming Rapoport's view that one problem with using unpredictable and unwieldy chemical and biological weapons over conventional weapons is that the cost can be as great 'to the attacker as to the attacked'. The Tigers have not used WMD since.

# 2NC

#### Nafta/Heg – hegemonic conceptualization of places as “lacking stability” is flawed and reproduces the violent effects they claim to solve such as the asia pivot and latin American instability – turns case

**Bialasiewicz et al 7** a Department of Geography, Royal Holloway University of London (Luiza Bialasiewicz, 2007, “Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy”, Political Geography, 405-422)//ah

It is telling just how spatialised some of these speciﬁcations become when worked through in detail. Already in 2000, PNAC argued that the major military mission is no longer to deter Soviet expansionism, but to ‘‘secure and expand zones of democratic peace; deter rise of new great-power competitor; defend key regions; exploit transformation of war’’ (PNAC, 2000: 2). They suggested that rather than the Cold War’s ‘‘potential global war across many theatres’’, the concern now is for several ‘‘potential theatre wars spread across the globe’’ fought against ‘‘separate and distinct adversaries pursuing separate and distinct goals’’ (2000: 2, 3). To counter such threats, the US needs to station its troops broadly, and their presence “in critical regions around the world is the visible expression of the extent of America’s status as a superpower and as the guarantor of liberty, peace and stability” (2000: 14). They claimed that while US security interests have ‘‘expanded’’, and that its forces ‘‘provide the ﬁrst line of defense in what may be 410 L. Bialasiewicz et al. / Political Geography 26 (2007) 405e422Author's personal copy described as the ‘American security perimeter’’’, at the same time ‘‘the worldwide archipelago of U.S. military installations has contracted’’ (2000: 14, 15). Because the security perimeter ‘‘has expanded slowly but inexorably’’ since the end of the Cold War, US forces e ‘‘the cavalry on the new American frontier’’ e ‘‘must be positioned to reﬂect the shifting strategic landscape’’ (2000: 14, 15). Equally, their use of the term ‘homeland’ drew strongly on its use in the Clinton administration e and preﬁgured the creation of the Ofﬁce for Homeland Security under G.W. Bush, with the concept strengthened by both the PATRIOT acts and the establishment of U.S. Northern Command. Again, **it is essential that we conceptualize these strategies as both containing and making imaginative geographies; specifying the ways ‘‘the world is’’ and, in so doing, actively (re)making that same world**. This goes beyond merely the military action or aid programmes that governments follow, but indicates a wider concern with the production of ways of seeing the world, which percolate through media, popular imaginations as well as political strategy. These performative imaginative geographies are at the heart of this paper and will re-occur throughout it. Our concern lies speciﬁcally with the ways in which the US portrays e and over the past decade has portrayed e certain parts of the world as requiring involvement, as threats, as zones of instability, as rogue states, ‘‘states of concern’’, as ‘‘global hotspots’’, as well as the associated suggestion that by bringing these within the ‘‘integrated’’ zones of democratic peace, US security e both economically and militarily e can be preserved. Of course, the translation of such imaginations into actual practice (and certainly results) is never as simple as some might like to suggest. Nonetheless, what we wish to highlight here is how these strategies, in essence, produce the effect they name. This, again, is nothing new: the United States has long constituted its identity at least in part through discourses of danger that materialize others as a threat (see Campbell, 1992). Equally, much has been written about the new set of threats and enemies that emerged to ﬁll the post-Soviet void e from radical Islam through the war on drugs to ‘‘rogue states’’ (for a critical analyses see, among others, Benjamin & Simon, 2003; Stokes, 2005; on the genealogies of the idea of ‘‘rogue states’’ see Blum, 2002; Litwak, 2000).

#### Policy focus is arbitrary and begs the question of whether or not policies are effective means of changing the world, creating a self-serving and insular academic integrity that changes nothing

**Allen, ’11** professor of sociology at Manchester Metropolitan University, Dialogues in Human Geography, “Against dialogue: Why being critical means taking sides rather than learning how to play the ‘policy research’ game,” 1(2) 223–227)//CC

The problem with the authors’ argument is that it is based on a Gadamerian hermeneutics of trust and the associated idea that from dialogue comes a ‘mutual understanding’ that can provide the consensual basis for social progress. As such, it considers the politics of cooperation but not the politics of scepticism and conflict in policy research. Insofar as they address the politics of policy research, then, they merely refer to the importance of ‘negotiating’ and ‘working with’ the grain where policy has ‘broadly progressive foundations’ while, by the logic of their dialogical openness, assuming these ‘progressive foundations’ to be omnipresent.1 The result is that they do not problematize the idea of ‘progressive change’ or raise any questions about it, such as: \_ Who defines what change is and is not? \_ Who defines whether or not it is progressive? \_ Who defines whether it is worth getting our hands dirty in order to achieve such change? Whether or not we think a change is a change, a progressive change or a worthwhile change is clearly contingent on the political stand that we take on such matters. For instance, the authors claim that their involvement in policy research has led to progressive changes. However, other (say, Marxist) geographers are not going to be convinced by the authors’ arguments that they have achieved anything significant from involvement in policy research or that it has been worth getting their hands dirty for. So it seems that we cannot get away from the fact that a politics of scepticism and conflict is entirely legitimate and that, as such**, it must be at the centre of any argument about policy research** and not simply brushed aside. Yet it appears to be absent from the authors’ Gadamerian argument which implies that we should always be open to the idea of cooperation given the possibilities (what possibilities?) presented by policy research. Contra a hermeneutics of trust that leads to a ‘mutual understanding’ upon which ‘progress’ feeds, I would argue that we need to bring the politics of power, domination and exploitation back into the centre of the argument and, in doing so, a hermeneutics of suspicion. We need, in other words, a conflict ontology that explicitly recognizes the fault lines along which the social world is structured (class, gender, ethnicity and so on) and how knowledge is integral to the maintenance and legitimation of these fault lines. Knowledge does not so much provide the basis for dialogue and ‘mutual understanding’ in the service of achieving ‘progress’, then, but transmits power and domination as well as resistance to it. It follows we should eschew Woods and Gardner’s notion that our task is simply to be ‘aware of the political context of research’ while always being open to it and working with and through it. **This is because such a political strategy results in a primary focus on the management of our ‘academic integrity’ as we negotiate our way through the murky business of keeping our pay masters happy.** This is self-serving and does little or nothing to combat oppression. What it does suggest is that we need to take a political stance ourselves which might just necessitate working against the political context of the research. An example from the authors’ article might suffice in explaining the differences in our position here.

#### Embracing the geography of resistance through dispossession solces

**Sparke 08** (Matthew Sparke published may of 2008 Political geography – political geographies of globalization III: resistance \* Department of Geography, Box 353550, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98105, USA <http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqrl/docview/230709084/13EE75FEC2A14F99E92/1?accountid=14667> – BRW)Writing on the geography of resistance is especially indicative of the widened field of political geography. Indeed, breaking the frame of what counts as ‘political’ might even be argued to be one of the major theoretical lessons of studying resistance without romance, a point not coincidentally advanced by Michel Foucault in The history of sexuality (1980). It is worth remembering thus how, after suggesting it is time for scholars to ‘cut off the head of the king’ in analysing power, Foucault proceeded to use a series of spatial metaphors to argue against imagining a single site of resistance opposite and bounded away from a single site of sovereignty: ‘Where there is power, there is resistance,’ he said, ‘and yet or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power ... Points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no single locus of Great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary’ (Foucault, 1980: 95–96). Of course, there has been considerable philosophical debate about whether Foucault’s own rather romantic refusal to replay disciplinary power left him unable to critique forms of violence (such as abusive paedophilia) perpetrated in the name of resistance (Hoy, 2004; on the passionate remaking of romance by Foucault, Miller, 1993). But for geographers who have sought to trace the lived geographies that Foucault mapped with metaphor, his arguments against the binary law of the romantic revolutionary (ie, the oppositional rubric bounding the powerless off from sovereign power) have been profoundly enabling. Most notably (albeit unlikely to be noted because of its own refusal to subject itself to the demands of academic human capital metrics that privilege short articles, short editorials and long CVs) Chris Philo’s insanely big book on ‘the space reserved for insanity’ shows how a conceptualization of power as productive, networked and capillary is in turn productive of a thoroughly nonromantic account of subjectification spaces (Philo, 2004). Tellingly there is no entry on ‘resistance’ in the index of his tome and Philo scrupulously avoids depicting the targets of the mad business as souls of revolt, but his concluding hopes point carefully beyond despair to imagine how the dispossession of ‘the mad’ through both liberal institutionalization and neoliberal deinstitutionalization might be avoided by providing a profusion of care spaces that allow people suffering with mental disease to repossess space and ‘take their “place” in everyday life as human beings at ease with themselves, their loved ones and their immediate surroundings’ (Philo, 2004: 660). Moving from dispossession to repossession (without either denying hierarchies that subjugate nor asserting the homogeneity of rational choice possessive individualism) seems in turn to represent a useful model for reflecting without romance on political geographies of resistance more globally. Thus, beginning here with representations that examine resistance as a response to dispossession, and then turning to others addressing the dilemmas of academic engagement with struggles for repossession, the following two main sections return repeatedly to the ways in which recommendable work on resistance registers both the hierarchy and heterogeneity of power relations at the very same time In his convincing accounts of the new imperialism (Harvey, 2003) and neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005), David Harvey argues that both involve and, indeed, interconnect in expanding ‘accumulation by dispossession’. It is a useful phrase that, as Jim Glassman (2006) has described in further detail, has a long intellectual heritage in Marxist thought: stretching from Marx himself on primitive accumulation (also Perelman, 2000), to Rosa Luxemburg, to the dependency school theorists, to recent studies by geographers on topics ranging from the sexual politics of expanded social reproduction (Mitchell et al ., 2004) to the expansive ecological politics of free-trade agreements (McCarthy, 2004). As Glassman indicates with his final reflections on how accumulation by dispossession thereby relates to the complex diversity of new social movements, it is also a hinge category that, by opening the door to concurrent extra-economic accounts of dispossession, invites the critical supplementation of Marxian theory (also Sidaway, 2007). In other words, alongside economic exploitation and all the other dispossessing dynamics unleashed by a social system predicated on the profit motive, accumulation by dispossession invites critics to examine the role played by racial, sexual and other social power dynamics in co-determining capitalist dispossession through extra-economic oppression (Sparke et al ., 2005). Of course, one implication of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ as a term is that it is still an accumulative and, as such, economic imperative that remains the primary frame for theorizing dispossession. However, if we reject such economic apriorism, and if we are adequately attuned to the accumulation of accounts of ongoing extraeconomic dispossession by those struggling globally for social justice, an altogether more salutary possibility emerges. In short, we can thereby use the formula to point to ties between very different global forms of injury and injustice without on the one side falling prey to economic reductionism or on the other of pretending that the capitalist connections can be ignored. This is an argument that Gillian Hart has fleshed out with especial ethnographic élan in her elaboration of ‘relational comparisons’ (Hart, 2006). She argues that: ‘Accumulation through dispossession may be a useful first step in highlighting the depradations wrought by neoliberal forms of capital, but it needs to be infused with concrete understandings of specific histories, memories, meanings of dispossession. To be grasped as an ongoing process, dispossession also needs to be rendered historically and geographically specific, as well as interconnected – and these specificities and connections can do political as well as analytical work’ (Hart, 2006: 988)

# 1NR

#### A literature consensus supports using Hirschman’s definition which is key to predictability

**Mastanduno, 1** – professor of Government at Dartmouth College (Michael, “Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice” <http://web.archive.org/web/20120906033646/http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf>

An examination of the scholarly literature on economic engagement as an instrument of statecraft reveals a striking pattern. Albert Hirschman’s 1945 study, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, is widely acknowledged today as a starting point for analysis (Hirschman, 1945/1980). Hirschman argued that the conscious cultivation of asymmetrical interdependence, if conducted strategically by the government of a powerful state, would lead weaker states to reorient not only their economies but also their foreign policies to the preferences of the stronger state. He developed a systematic framework for analysis and applied it to the trading and political relationships between Nazi Germany and its central and southeast European neighbors during the interwar period.

#### Economic engagement is a strategy – not a specific tactic – “structural linkage” means a topical affirmative must develop a policy of continual economic benefits to foster greater interdependence between two countries

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Positive economic statecraft can be defined as the provision or promise of economic benefits to induce changes in the behaviour of a target state. It is important to distinguish between two types. The first involves the promise of a well-specified economic concession in an effort to alter specific foreign or domestic policies of the target government. I call this version tactical linkage; others refer to 'carrots' or 'specific positive linkage'. A second version, which I term structural linkage and others refer to as 'general positive linkage' or 'long-term engagement’, involves an effort to use a steady stream of economic benefits to reconfigure the balance of political interests within a target country. Structural linkage tends to be unconditional; the benefits are not turned on and off according to changes in target behaviour. The sanctioning state expects instead that sustained economic engagement will eventually produce a political transformation and desirable changes in target behaviour.

Tactical linkage and long-term engagement are each informed by a different logic. Tactical linkage operates at a more immediate level; the sanctioning state calculates that the provision of a particular type of economic reward will be sufficient to convince policy makers in the target to reconsider their existing policies. For example, immediately after the Second World War, the USA offered sizeable reconstruction loans to Britain, France, and the Soviet Union- in exchange for political concessions. The British and French were generally willing to accommodate US demands that they liberalize their domestic and foreign economic policies; the Soviets were not. In 1973, European states and japan offered economic inducements in the form of aid and trade concessions to Arab states during the OPEC crisis in a largely successful attempt to ensure that they would receive access to oil supplies at predictable prices. In 1982, the USA offered to increase sales of coal to its West European allies to discourage them from a gas pipeline deal with the Soviet Union. This influence attempt failed.

Long-term engagement, however, works at a deeper level, and its logic was most clearly articulated in the classic work of Albert Hirschman (Hirschman 1980 [1 9451). The sanctioning government provides an ongoing stream of economic benefits which gradually transform domestic political interests in the target state. Over time, ‘internationaIist' coalitions that favour interdependence with the sanctioning state will form and strengthen, and will exert influence over the policy of the weaker state in a direction preferred by the sanctioning state. Hirschman demonstrated how Nazi Germany used an array of economic inducements to inculcate economic dependence, and eventually political acquiescence, on the part of its weaker central European neighbours during the inter-war period.

#### Only trade promotion meets this – specific inducements don’t

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Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to change the political behaviour of target state. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows, “It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations”.(p523-abstact).It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that “the direct and positive linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.”