### 2ac – t

#### We meet- their celik evidence says that economic engagement includes quote “Trade agreements and promotion”- the plan does that- that’s 1ac French

#### Don’t evaluate the debate through an offense- defense paradigm- causes substance crowd-out that detracts from non-GBN debating- as long as we’re reasonably topical, don’t vote us down.

### 2ac – k

#### Framework – the k must prove that the whole plan is bad – weighing the AFF is vital to fair and predictable engagement – allowing the neg to negate only small parts doesn’t disprove the desirability of the plan – the ballot should simulate the plans enactment and test whether it’s better than the status quo or competitive alternative. Zero link to any of their education offense- we don’t enforce a policy only framework

Globalization is inevitable and sustainable – key to economic stability

Price 11 (John, Graduate in Commerce from Queen's University in Canada, has taught international business at Universidad de las Americas in Mexico City, “Globalization Is Here to Stay: Why Latin America Must Accept Its Globalized Destiny and Ready Itself to Compete," 8/19/11, https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Task\_Force\_Papers/Price-GlobalizationTFPaper.pdf slim\_)

There exists a sizeable industry of academics, pundits, policy makers and journalists that debates the virtues and risks of globalization in Latin America, as if the region has a choice in the matter. It does not. Latin America is the most globalized region in the world and it became that way out of economic survival. And as globalized as Latin America’s trade and investment flows are today, the region would stand to gain from an even deeper embrace of open borders. Only competitive pressure will rekindle the spirit of reform that has sadly gone dormant in Latin America in today’s benign economic conditions of high commodity prices and cheap capital. Little Choice but to Globalize Both Latin America’s competitive strengths and weaknesses oblige it to open itself to trade and investment with other countries, particularly the industrialized world, including China. South America’s greatest strength is its abundant natural resources. As the head of agricultural promotion at PromPeru (Peru’s export promotion agency) once remarked, when asked why the country’s yields were so impressive, “God is almighty and benevolent, and also happens to be Peruvian.” The same retort could be repeated across the continent. South America is home to 20% of the world’s proven oil reserves1 (including the newly discovered Tupí and Jupiter oil fields off the Atlantic coast of Brazil), 26%2 of global mining investment and 25%3 of the world’s arable land. The obvious markets for Latin America’s natural abundance, however, are far away: northern China, Japan, South Korea, Eastern USA and Western Europe. To explore, extract and ship the region’s commodities to distant markets, Latin America needs access to cheap capital and the latest technology, that is, open capital markets and international strategic investors. To attract strategic investors to the mining and energy sectors, where it can take over 10 years to recapture initial investments, nations must build and maintain a sound business climate. When they fail to do so (e.g., Venezuelan and Mexican oil industries currently; Colombian mining industry during the 1990s), productivity and wealth creation drop.

Perm do the plan and all non mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

Imperialism prevents war – interdependence, institution-building, and democracy promotion

Ikenberry 4 (G. John Ikenberry, Prof. of Geopolitics, “Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004)\

Is the United States an empire? If so, Ferguson's liberal empire is a more persuasive portrait than is Johnson's military empire. But ultimately, the notion of empire is misleading -- and misses the distinctive aspects of the global political order that has developed around U.S. power. The United States has pursued imperial policies, especially toward weak countries in the periphery. But U.S. relations with Europe, Japan, China, and Russia cannot be described as imperial, even when "neo" or "liberal" modifies the term. The advanced democracies operate within a "security community" in which the use or threat of force is unthinkable. Their economies are deeply interwoven. Together, they form a political order built on bargains, diffuse reciprocity, and an array of intergovernmental institutions and ad hoc working relationships. This is not empire; it is a U.S.-led democratic political order that has no name or historical antecedent. To be sure, the neoconservatives in Washington have trumpeted their own imperial vision: an era of global rule organized around the bold unilateral exercise of military power, gradual disentanglement from the constraints of multilateralism, and an aggressive effort to spread freedom and democracy. But this vision is founded on illusions of U.S. power. It fails to appreciate the role of cooperation and rules in the exercise and preservation of such power. Its pursuit would strip the United States of its legitimacy as the preeminent global power and severely compromise the authority that flows from such legitimacy. Ultimately, the neoconservatives are silent on the full range of global challenges and opportunities that face the United States. And as Ferguson notes, the American public has no desire to run colonies or manage a global empire. Thus, there are limits on American imperial pretensions even in a unipolar era. Ultimately, the empire debate misses the most important international development of recent years: the long peace among great powers, which some scholars argue marks the end of great-power war. Capitalism, democracy, and nuclear weapons all help explain this peace. But so too does the unique way in which the United States has gone about the business of building an international order. The United States' success stems from the creation and extension of international institutions that have limited and legitimated U.S. power.

#### The aff is literally a gigantic link turn- the embargo is the biggest example of US imperialism towards Latin America

Latin American globalization is key to investor confidence and productivity

Price 11 (John, Graduate in Commerce from Queen's University in Canada, has taught international business at Universidad de las Americas in Mexico City, “Globalization Is Here to Stay: Why Latin America Must Accept Its Globalized Destiny and Ready Itself to Compete," 8/19/11, https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Task\_Force\_Papers/Price-GlobalizationTFPaper.pdf slim\_)

Latin America’s Achilles heel of political risk and flighty investor confidence has obliged Latin savers to park almost $2.5 trillion outside of the region4. Though this tide of money has slowed in recent years, it continues to haunt economies like those of Venezuela, Bolivia and most of those in Central America. When local savers become antsy, as Peruvians were after the presidential victory of Ollanta Humala in 2011, there is a small army of private bankers, located in Miami, ready to move the monies of these Latin Americans off-shore in a matter of hours. As a result, Latin America’s banking system is chronically under-capitalized. Governments and companies turn to international bond markets to raise funds, ostensibly at cheaper rates than they can source at home. Only Chile, with three decades of pension-fund growth, can begin to claim financial independence. Everyone else must convince international bond markets of their worthiness. It has become a rite of passage for newly-elected presidentsto make a pilgrimage to Washington, New York, London and, increasingly, Chinese financial markets, to present their country in a competitive light, making bold promises to the investment and development bank communities about proven policies that they plan to preserve and/or reforms they plan to implement. Those promises, covered widely by the press at home and abroad, become a policy straitjacket that tends to restrain any populist instincts that these new presidents developed during their election campaigns. Even Hugo Chávez, who was first elected president of Venezuela when crude prices per barrel barely reached double digits, made the rounds as president-elect, wooing investors with promises of an open investment climate. His tune changed radically as oil prices climbed and he developed an economic model that could be sustained (for a while) without imported capital and technology. Latin America’s greatest competitive weakness is its lack of legal protections and transparency needed to support innovation. Latin Americans may be creative and entrepreneurial, but the region is the worst performer in the world when it comes to bringing innovation to market. Latin America, home to 9% of the world’s population and 8% of its gross domestic product (GDP), produces only 0.3% of the world’s patents.5 Among Latin American universities, government and the private sector, only 6,000 patents per year are registered. In comparison, there are at least five U.S. universities producing that volume each year, individually. Furthermore, Latin American patent production relies too much on government-funded labs and universities to make them. As a result, they are less commercial in nature than patent production coming out of markets like South Korea or the United States where large companies lead research and development (R&D) investment. Latin America’s economies, therefore, rely on imported technology and products to make them work. Import substitution is a non-starter and only leads to a dramatic drop in productivity. Mexico’s national monopolistic oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex,) facing declining yields from its older oil fields, has for years been desperate to develop the deep water reserves sitting off its Caribbean shore before deep water American oil rigs outside the 200km limit figure out how to poach them. Despite strong political opposition, the Calderón administration was obliged to reform its highly nationalistic energy laws in order to invite third-party service companies into the energy sector. Additional reforms may be required to save Pemex from financial ruin as its output declines. Latin American governments must learn that taxing imported technology makes about as much sense as Japan’staxing imported energy.

#### Transition crushes uniqueness- Cuba is already transitioning but failing, the plan makes it safe

The alternative is Chinese imperialism

Horner and Leiken 6 (Charles, graduate of University of Pennsylvania and former Adjunct Professor in Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and Robert, Ph.D. in Politics from Oxford University, Senior Fellow at Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and Brookings Institution, "Is the Chinese Model Gaining Economic and Political Influence in Latin America?", 8/10/06, www.hudson.org/files/documents/ChineseModelNov21.pdf slim\_)

And the corollary to this, I suppose, is that the only non-white people in the world who really matter, say, in running the international economy are either Japanese or Chinese. Or maybe they’re Korean, but let’s just say for the sake of this argument the Chinese now. It used to be the Japanese had a certain purchase in their model. So the Chinese have a certain thing going for themselves. They’re not European, they’re not American, they’re not white. They have another advantage in the fact that they call their system socialism and that they call their ruling party communist. And this, as Jaime suggests, with respect to their actual conduct, you see, allows them to say or allows them to claim, allows them to think that what they do – that their economic expansion in the world is somehow different in kind from the Western economic expansion of the 19th and 20th century, and that China’s multinational banks and corporations, who are very active in Latin America is something different, and so on, even as, analytically speaking, Hobson or Lenin would recognize China as a kind of economic imperialist power. It imports primary products; it’s a creditor; it exports finished goods; it exploits its own and other countries’ cheap labor, is what it does do; it invests in and wants to control critical infrastructure like ports, airports, highways, telecommunications; and it uses its political influence – that is to say corrupts local political systems to protect its economic interests. But there may – for all of this now, I think we’re already beginning to see the signs of the certain self-limiting aspect of it. As Chair Mao himself once wrote, you see, “Wherever there is oppression, there will be resistance.” And we can’t be surprised therefore that there are resentments already building in Brazil about the terms of trade, or in Mexico about the fact that China is a competitor for the American market. And countries which export primary products are not happy to see the Chinese drifting vaguely into the group of importers, trying to use their own strong position in the market – I think the technical term for this is monopsonist – position to somehow bargain with exporters for price constraints. And therefore it does seem that the countries are on the receiving end of this sort of thing, wherever they are, tend to seek balance. In this case the so-called stronger parties are China and the United States, and presumably it is in the space between them that one finds ones own opportunities as countries in this situation always have ever since 1945.

That kills democracy and leads to protectionism and arms races

Horner and Leiken 6 (Charles, graduate of University of Pennsylvania and former Adjunct Professor in Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and Robert, Ph.D. in Politics from Oxford University, Senior Fellow at Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and Brookings Institution, "Is the Chinese Model Gaining Economic and Political Influence in Latin America?", 8/10/06, www.hudson.org/files/documents/ChineseModelNov21.pdf slim\_)

But in any case, so Latin America welcomes the chance to kind of reduce its dependence on us. But there are several rather negative impacts or even potential impacts of China’s involvement in Latin America for Latin America. First of all, right now, although Latin America has benefited tremendously by China’s huge imports from the region, 2006 may turn out to be the first year where the terms of trade switch because China’s exports, manufactured exports, to Latin America have been increasing very, very rapidly. I thought I had the numbers here but I don’t. But anyway, this year may be the year where Latin America sells more to Latin America than it imports. This clearly is changing. Argentina is a key example where the imports of Chinese goods into Argentina have been growing very, very rapidly compared to the exports to China. The other way in which the involvement in China will work against Latin America, and maybe already has, is that China managed – when it was promising all these great trade benefits and agreements – managed to get Argentina, Chile and Brazil to grant it a – to label it a – give it market economy status, which meant that anti-dumping legislation under the WTO rules would be – the impact of them would be substantially diminished. They couldn’t bring – Latin American countries couldn’t bring those kinds of charges. So as a result, this gave China much more access to their markets in terms of exports of Chinese manufactured goods. Even the United States and Europe didn’t give China the market economy status, and Brazil, Argentina and Chile did. And I think Ecuador recently joined in. So this is going to hurt Latin America because it’s going to tip the scales much more in favor of China, which doesn’t exactly abide by all the free trade kinds of rules. It’s highly protectionist; also, it steals a lot of intellectual property and the like. The other problem with the relationship is that because of the commodities boom, et cetera, Latin America – the chances of Latin America enacting the kinds of economic reforms that are necessary in order to make the Latin American economies more globally competitive are now reduced, with the exception of Chile – everything is always with the exception of Chile. But with the exception of Chile, which is setting aside some of the revenues from the commodities boom for times when the commodities boom is not with us, most of Latin America is just spending the money, taking it in but not thinking ahead, not planning, not using it to make Latin America more economically competitive globally. So these are chickens hat are going to come home to roost. The other negative for Latin America is that obviously Chinese relationships with countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, et cetera, works to undermine democracy in the region and strengthens countries that are not exactly pro-democratic or anti-military or whatever. And, of course, I’m someone who grew up – went to graduate school during the days of dependency theory, where the Latin American scholars were claiming that – coming from the left – that the relationship with U.S. and multinational corporations, et cetera, was bad for Latin America. The terms of trade were bad; that Latin America was being reinforced as a producer of commodities, whereas the United States was selling manufacturers to Latin America. Well, guess what? I mean, that’s China and Latin America now. I mean, you could make the argument that the economic relationship with China is reinforcing Latin America’s traditional role as a commodities producer, and is favoring Chinese efforts to sell manufacturers, which supposedly have, in general, better terms of trade. Finally the issue of, is it good or bad for the United States, China’s relationship with Latin America? I mean, some of this is already obvious, that it helps the United States’ interests in the region to the extent that China helps Latin America grow and stabilize. China is not interested in having a chaotic, unstable Latin America for reasons of its own, and that of course is good for the United States, too. But on the other hand, if you look at the pillars – I mean, a lot of people say that the United States has no policy toward Latin America so there is no way we can even identify what the pillars of the policy are, but I do think we do have a policy toward Latin America. Whether or not it’s the right one or whether or not we’re doing enough is another issue. But support for democracy and human rights, the Chinese involvement is not supportive of that. Support for market economies – China is in a sense kind of neutral. Some of them are being supported; some of them are not. Arms race – it’s helping in terms of supporting countries like Venezuela, et cetera. In terms of support for the Latin American left – we don’t care about the Latin American left in general as long as they’re democratic. Well, the Chinese behavior is also consolidating the – or helping to consolidate the not-good Latin American left.

Chinese imperialism kills the economy

Horner and Leiken 6 (Charles, graduate of University of Pennsylvania and former Adjunct Professor in Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and Robert, Ph.D. in Politics from Oxford University, Senior Fellow at Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and Brookings Institution, "Is the Chinese Model Gaining Economic and Political Influence in Latin America?", 8/10/06, www.hudson.org/files/documents/ChineseModelNov21.pdf slim\_)

It reminds me of that famous – was it Al Capone quote? – which I’m sure I’ll mangle, but someone asked him why he robbed banks and he said, well, that’s where the money is. In a sense, why is China interested in Latin America primarily starting out? That’s where the commodities are. But anyway, in terms of the actual context, I mean, China has been growing about 9.5 percent for the last decade or two, actually two decades, and so obviously to sustain this rate of growth for a population the size of China they need commodities and food. And if you look at the situation today – it was interesting when Charles mentioned that – at a certain point China accounted for – what was it? – 30 percent of the GNP, you said. Today I think it’s only about 4 or 5 percent of the world GNP. But today – well, I have it here: China, 4.4 percent of the world’s GNP, but it consumes, as of today, 7.4 percent of the world’s oil, 31 percent of the world’s coal, 30 percent of the world’s iron, 27 percent of world steel and 40 percent of cement. So clearly China is on a tear economically and needs these kinds of inputs into its economy to continue growth and its economic development effort. But of course its economic development effort isn’t only about economic development; it’s also about political stability. There is an argument to be made that – I don’t know what percentage of economic growth China needs to sustain annually, but if it has been growing at 9.5 percent, obviously to suddenly go down to 2 percent or 3 percent will not keep China stable. It’s hard to predict in that kind of political system what the consequences of a drastic or even a gradual slowing of economic growth would be, but I think that we could all speculate, and it’s not going to be very great, very good. So there is that issue too, the political stability issue. And so both of these things – the desire to modernize the economy and become a great economic power, and also to maintain political stability – are really behind China’s growth – China’s search for commodities and food. The other motivating factor is that China does not like living in a unipolar world, or at least in a world where there is only one superpower. And although we think of China as a big country, basically it’s still developing, and it actually shouldn’t be so surprising to think that China feels itself vulnerable in this kind of situation. And we get all excited when we see China is moving into the Western hemisphere, but we’re all over Asia. I mean, it’s not exactly as if China has control over the whole Asia-Pacific region. It doesn’t. It would like to increase its power and control there obviously. So this sense of Chinese vulnerability and the idea that the United States wants to stay the only superpower – it got this idea because the United States government, in a paper or two, said that that’s exactly what our strategy should be, to maintain our superpower – our only superpower status. And also China looks around and sees that the United States is willing to intervene, both diplomatically and even militarily, when it doesn’t like certain governments because of its politics or human rights behavior or whatever. And although we can say we’re never going to invade China – I mean, we have enough trouble with Iraq; we’re certainly not going to invade China – it’s not clear that China sees it that way – I mean that U.S. behavior in the world undermines or feeds China’s sense of vulnerability. And so as a result of these things, China’s strategy has been to both – how can I put it? – avoid its dependence on any particular area of the world or any particular countries, both economically and politically: economically diversified sources for what it needs to feed its economy, diplomatically work in multilateral institutions to try and create strategic alliances throughout the world, diversify both its strategic and its trade partners, et cetera. And one of the things that it does to do this – and this is part of what disturbs the United States, and I’ll talk about it later – is that it has been – you know, it looks for a particular niche if it could. And one niche that’s just up there for grabs are countries, which for a variety of reasons, don’t have particularly good relations with the United States and/or Europe. And so either because of political instability in those areas, which make them less desirable to foreign investors, or because foreign investors, private investors, or China has an advantage against private investors because they can afford, through their state economic and financial institutions, to lend money at below market rates and they themselves are subsidizing various things that they do, and also they can operate in countries where legal restrictions involving human rights abuses, et cetera, keep the United States and Europe out. And so it should come as no surprise that these countries are particularly receptive to any kinds of Chinese overtures, and China obviously sees that it has a comparative advantage in those kinds of countries.

Development alleviates poverty and inequality

Worstall 12 (Tim, Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute, "So What is this Neoliberal Globalisation Free Trade Thing About Anyway?", 3/1/12, www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/03/01/so-what-is-this-neoliberal-globalisation-free-trade-thing-about-anyway/ slim\_)

It’s easy enough to find people with opinions, strong opinions, on what this neoliberal globalisation and free trade thing is all about. Sadly, you’ll find most of those strong opinions are that it’s about grinding the noses of the poor into the dust, breaking the unions, stiffing the working classes and in general feeding as much money as is humanly possible up to the 1%. You might find a few references to Wall St v. Main St, shipping all the good jobs off to China and even, among the more perceptive, the idea that it’s all about creating a global economy rather than a series of national ones. All would agree though that it’s something that started in the late 70s, was driven along by both Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, has included the lowering of trade barriers, a lifting of regulations and in general a move to a more free market stance on how the economy should be managed and regulated. The what we agree on: the result we obviously don’t. For here is the point, the purpose, the aim and the outcome of this very neoliberal revolution. That’s what it was all about. We wanted to make the poor rich. The data released by the World Bank’s Development Research Group show that 22% of the developing world’s population – or 1.29 billion people – lived on $1.25 or less a day in 2008, down from 43% in 1990 and 52% in 1981 (see top chart above). Nothing Machiavellian about it, nothing to do with trying to make the rich richer, nothing at all to do with shafting the working class. Quite the opposite in fact. The aim and intention was to reduce poverty around the world and as you can see it has rather worked. These last 30 years of the neoliberal globalisation thing have seen the largest reduction in human poverty ever. More people have moved from the destitution that was man’s long lasting lot to a better life of three squares a day and a roof over their heads than in any other time period in our species’ history. It’s difficult to get over quite how large these figures are: we’re talking about more people than the entire population of Europe, or of North America, leaving absolute poverty in fewer years than I have been alive. In fact, not far off half the years I have been alive. This is a simply astonishing development. Think back to the year 2000 when the UN put forward the Millennium Development Goals. One of them was a halving of absolute poverty by the year 2015. We were told that this could only be achieved by huge effort, by a substantial movement of resources from the rich world to the poor. That huge effort hasn’t happened but the target has already been met, years early. Purely through that very neoliberal globalisation. Nothing particularly odd or strange about the process either: allow people economic freedom, allow them to trade with whom they will and wealth just gets created all on its ownsome. I like it when a plan comes together, don’t you? We wanted to aid the poor in getting rich. We have done, by trading with them. A useful conclusion would be that if we want to continue the process of making the poor rich we should expand economic freedom and trade more with them.

US-led reforms are key – solves economic and social distortions

Mesa-Lago 2 (Carmelo, PhD in Labor Economics and Social Security from Cornell University, "Models of Development, Social Policy and Reform in Latin America," unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/7E4B8522A609EC67C1256C7C0039C99D/$file/mesalong.pdf slim\_)

Costa Rica. One of the best representatives of the mixed model, which combined a market economy with a considerable state role, and achieved a fair balance between social and economic goals with good results in both (1953-1981). But the debt crisis of the 1980s and the exhaustion of that model (excessive state intervention and fiscal imbalances) led to structural adjustment reforms in that decade and in the 1990s, albeit so far successful in maintaining the most important social gains (see also Mesa-Lago 2000a). The first two models were extremes: Chile overemphasized the market and economic goals while drastically reducing state functions and social goals, while Cuba did exactly the opposite; Costa Rica managed to fairly balance goals and means. But adjustments have been occurring in the three countries: toward social goals and more state regulatory powers in Chile since the 1990s; toward economic goals and a timid move to the market in Cuba since the 1990s (still with overwhelming state ownership and control); and toward economic goals and the market in Costa Rica since the 1980s. Finally the three diverse economic models have been implemented by different political systems: a military dictatorship in Chile (followed by multiparty democracy), one-party authoritarian socialism in Cuba, and a multiparty democracy in Costa Rica (Mesa-Lago 2000d). The three countries selected are also important examples in Latin America of a relatively early emphasis on social policies, thus ratifying Pierson's observation that "late starters (in industrialization) tended to develop welfare institutions earlier in their own individual development and under more comprehensive terms of coverage" (cited in Mkandawire 2000: 11). Chile and Cuba were two of five regional "pioneers" in the development of social insurance (respectively in the 1920s and 1930s), while Costa Rica's program started later (in 1943 but this country was less developed that the other two) and yet it was expanded in 1960-1970s and reached the level of the other two counterparts. By the 1980s, the three countries had basically accomplished universal coverage of their populations although with diverse schemes (Mesa-Lago 1998). The three countries were selected for a UNRISD comparative study that analyzed the unique experience of seven countries that achieved levels of social performance considerably higher than their per capita income (Ghai 2000). The socioeconomic performance of the three models is summarized in the next section. Socioeconomic Performance of the Three Models Twenty indicators of development were selected to measure the socioeconomic performance of the three countries and historical statistical series elaborated for 1960-1993 (in Chile the relevant period started in 1973). About half of the indicators dealt with economic variables, both internal and external: GDP growth, GDP per capita, investment, inflation, fiscal balance, composition of GDP by economic sector, export concentration/ diversification, import composition, trade partner concentration/diversification, trade balance per capita, and foreign debt per capita. The other half of the indicators dealt with social variables: real wages, composition of the labour force by sector, open unemployment, illiteracy, educational enrolment at three levels, infant mortality, rates of contagious diseases, life expectancy, and housing. Five important social indicators had to be discarded in the final evaluation because of two reasons: lack of data from Cuba (income distribution, poverty incidence) or significant differences in the way those indicators were calculated (womenís participation in the labour force, access to water and sewerage/sanitation, social security coverage). Two types of ranking were used in each of the indicators: (1) absolute, measuring the starting and ending years in the period, for instance, the infant mortality rate in 1960 (or 1973 for Chile) and 1993; and (2) relative improvement, the change in one indicator through time, for instance, the reduction in infant mortality between 1960/73 and 1993. The indicators were merged in each of the two clusters (economic and social), and the two clusters then combined into an index of economic and social development (using various weights). The results of these comparisons in the absolute rankings among the three countries were as follows: Chile ranked best (first) in economic indicators but worse (third) on social indicators; Costa Rica ranked best in social indicators and second in the economic indicators. Cuba ranked second in social indicators (in the 1990s, but first in the 1980s) and worst in economic indicators.1 In the relative improvement indicators, Costa Rica managed to close the gap with Cuba, despite a worse stand at the starting point, for instance, in 1960 life expectancy was 61.6 years in Costa Rica and 64.0 in Cuba but in 1995-2000 they were 76.5 and 76.0 respectively. Finally, a comparison was done with international rankings that include the three countries, with similar results. For instance, the Human Development Index (H.I.) ranked the three countries in 1993 (among 174 countries in the world and 20 in Latin America) as follows: Costa Rica 31 and 1, Chile 33 and 3, and Cuba 79 and 10 (UNDP 1996). The balanced approach to development in Costa Rica, therefore, led to a fair performance in economic indicators and to the best results in social indicators. Conversely, the extreme approaches of the other two countries resulted in good performance in one set but sacrificing the other. In Chile there were strong economic growth, lower inflation and a reduction in the fiscal deficit, but social consequences were adverse: poverty incidence worsened, real wages shrank, educational enrolment at secondary and tertiary levels declined, social security coverage decreased, unemployment jumped to a historical record, and morbidity rates rose. 2 At the end of the 1980s Cuba was leading the region in most social indicators (housing was a notorious exception), but the cost of social programs was very high and adverse economic distortions occurred, for instance, open unemployment was kept low but at the cost of significant overstaffing and very low labour productivity, and egalitarianism probably led to the least income inequality in the region but generated perverse incentives for labour absenteeism.

### 2ac – non-economic engagement

#### Condo is a voting issue –

#### a) Skew – condo allows them to arbitrarily kick arguments destroying effective 2ac strategy

#### b) Decision-making – the need to concede is an important skill to understand arg interaction – allowing them to arbitrarily kick positions prevents this skill

#### c) C/I – One condo solves their offense

#### No spill-up – the Cuba lobby is politically irrational – they will block small steps that help the Castro regime

TP 4-9 – Think Progress

[“How the GOP Response to Beyoncé’s Cuba Trip Highlights Broken Policy”, April 9th, 2013, <http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/04/09/1838661/rubio-beyonce-cuba/>]

Experts at CAP and the Cato Institute alike agree that the policy has been an abject failure at achieving the goals the United States set out. On taking office, President Obama sought to roll-back some of the harsher restrictions the previous administration placed on Cuba, including removing a ban on remittances from Cubans in the U.S. to their families back home and reducing travel restrictions on Americans with immediate family in Cuba. Every step towards reforming Cuba policy, however, has been met with kicking and screaming, mostly from the GOP with some Democrats joining in. While the human rights violations the Cuban regime continues to perpetrate are most certainly a concern, campaign funding may play a strong role in the perpetuation of U.S. policies. A 2009 report from Public Campaign highlighted the nearly $11 million the U.S.-Cuba Democracy Political Action Committee, along with a “network of hard-line Cuban American donors,” spent on political campaigns since 2004. In the report, those candidates who received funding displayed a shift in voting patterns on Cuba policy in the aftermath of the gift

#### Perm: do both-shields the link to the net benefit

#### Cuba only says yes if the US lifts the entire embargo

**LIGNET, 11** - The Langley Intelligence Group Network (LIGNET.com) is a Washington, DC-based service providing global intelligence and forecasting from former CIA, U.S. intelligence and national security officers (“The U.S. Embargo on Cuba: Will It Ever Be Lifted?”, 11/5, <http://www.lignet.com/ArticleAnalysis/The-US-Embargo-on-Cuba-Will-It-Ever-Be-Lifted>)

¶ The Obama administration’s outreach, however, has only gone so far. Refusing to depart from a longstanding tenet of American foreign policy, it has declined to push for an end to the embargo itself (that would require Congressional approval). Instead, it has extended a rhetorical hand to Cuba by promising, in the President’s words, “that we’re prepared to show flexibility and not be stuck in a Cold War mentality.”¶ In response to these pacific overtures the Cuban government has responded with contempt, dismissing them as nothing more than “window dressing.” This choice description from the Cuban Foreign Minister was followed by a vituperative essay penned by Fidel Castro himself in which he called Obama’s recent speech before the United Nations “gibberish” and in which he described NATO’s effort to remove Gadhafi from power in Libya “a monstrous crime.”¶ Given these loud barks of defiance as well as other negative signals (including Cuba’s refusal in 2009 to rejoin the Organization of American States after that organization lifted a ban against it that had been in place since 1962), it is clear that the regime’s intransigence continues to run deep.¶ It would naïve to believe otherwise, especially with the case of the American citizen Alan Gross now front and center. A Maryland contractor employed by the U.S. Agency for International Development, Gross was arrested for bringing illegal communications equipment into Cuba, his ostensible intent being nothing more than a desire to provide internet access to the island’s small Jewish community.¶ Refusing to accept this explanation and branding Gross’s activities “subversive,” the Cuban authorities in March, 2011 sentenced him to fifteen years in prison for his supposed crime. The American government has made a concerted effort to gain his release ever since, even offering to exchange Gross for a Cuban spy currently incarcerated in the United States.¶ To add heft to this diplomat push the former UN Ambassador Bill Richardson was dispatched to Havana in early September, but ultimately to no avail as he was not even permitted to visit Gross in jail. “I am very disappointed and surprised,” Richardson said upon being unceremoniously rebuffed. “The Cuban government has decided it does not want to improve relations...They have not treated me like a friend.”

#### Doesn’t solve for transition or obama cred because it doesn’t negotiate normal trade relations- that’s key for bilateral trade

#### CP empirically doesn’t solve

**Hinderdael 11-** M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center, B.A in History and Economics from University of Virginia (Klaas, “Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership”, 6/11/11, <http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true>, google scholar)//KW

As Cuba has moved down a path of internal transformation, beginning to unclench control over its own society, President Obama has slowly reached out. On January 14, 2011, the administration stepped toward a more active engagement by restoring higher education exchange programs, extending travel remittance allowances to all Americans, and permitting chartered flights to Havana from anyUSairport.19 though this progress indicates that relations are steadily improving, a potential breakthrough in relations and America’s Cuba policy is only possible by opening high-level diplomatic relations and eliminating the US embargo. A Guideline for Breaking Through the Logjam The strategic, economic, and political background that has helped shape America’s Cuba policy has shifted tremendously since the end of the Cold War. For half a century, the United States has attempted—and failed—to force democratization on the island by combining an economic embargo with either diplomatic isolation or limited engagement. In recent years, however, Raúl has increasingly charted a new course for Cuba. Despite many of these reforms being in line with American values and interests, there has not been a drastic change in US-Cuba policy. Given the continued failure of past Cuba policies to achieve the stated goals, American leaders should understand that there is much to gain from ending the embargo and opening diplomatic relations with Cuba—and surprisingly little to lose. Strategic Implications The fall of the Soviet union in 1991 had severe economic repercussions for Cuba, causing its economy to contract by 34 percent between 1990 and 1993 alone.20 It also meant that, almost overnight, the strategic threat the island presented to the united States had drastically diminished. With Fidel Castro subsequently abandoning a policy of internationalism by announcing that he would no longer support armed struggle in the third world, Cuba became even less of a strategic threat.21 As a result, with regard to America’s Cuba policy, domestic politics has trumped international security concerns for over 20 years. Raúl’s recent economic reforms, in an attempt to spur job creation, have allowed an increase of foreign investment in what has traditionally been seen as America’s backyard. Countries quickly exploited such opportunities—with Venezuela and Cuba signing the Integral Cooperation Accord in 2000, according to which Cuba sends thousands of doctors and teachers to Venezuela in return for 90,000 barrels of oil daily.22 China has also strengthened its ties with Cuba since President Hu Jintao’s 2004 visit, and it will soon overtake Canada to become the island’s largest trade partner, purchasing 18 percent of its exports.23 In light of such inroads by friends and foes alike, several concerns might arise for American policymakers. First, the leverage that America’s embargo holds is severely diminished. Second, China, with nearly half of its 2004 foreign direct investment going to Latin America, might slowly impede upon American hegemony in the Western hemisphere.24 third, increased ties with Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela may cause Cuba and Venezuela to attempt to “drive a wedge between the U[nited] S[tates] and its Caribbean partners” in regional relations.25 In other words, the economic embargo in place could potentially lead to geopolitical instability and have enormous repercussions for American security.

#### Cuba responds to half-measures like the CP by with confrontational tactics – it means the CP will never spill up to larger engagement

Cuba Study Group 13 – non partisan non for profit made up of business and professional individuals with experience in Cuban US affairs (Cuba Study Group, Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, Cuba Study Group, February 2013, http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File\_id=7f2193cf-d2ef-45c8-91de-0b1f88d30059)//BDS

The Cuban government has become increasingly adept at manipulating U.S. policy choices. This is why any sign of a thaw from the United States has repeatedly been followed by confrontation or repression, which in turn has been followed by U.S. domestic pressure to tighten economic sanctions. This pattern has become somewhat predictable, as recently exemplified by Cuba’s imprisonment of U.S. contractor Alan Gross after President Obama relaxed family travel and remittance restrictions in 2009 and U.S. policymakers’ refusal to pursue improved bilateral relations in response.xvi It can be reasonably concluded that elements of the Cuban government do not, in fact, seek any substantial liberalization from U.S. sanctions. Indeed, Helms-Burton provides them with an alibi for their own failures and may well be essential to their political survival. Senator Jesse Helms famously said that Helms-Burton “tightened the noose around the neck of the last dictator in the Western Hemisphere, Fidel Castro.”xvii In practice, however, Helms-Burton may have served as an incredibly convenient life raft, giving a struggling and failing system the legitimacy that comes from the appearance of being a “state under siege.”

### 2ac sop da

#### CP kills SOP

Turner 96 (Ronald, U of Alabama, *Journal of Law and Politics*, Winter 96, p. 1)//LA

The increased and aggressive presidential use of executive orders can present serious constitutional questions when there are no congressional or constitutional bases for a particular order. Orders not tethered to or derived from statutes or the Constitution raise issues about the legitimacy of presidential legislation because, as noted previously, lawmaking is a legislative function. Thus, the issuance of an executive order by a President without a clear statutory or constitutional basis can be inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers and the sequential trumping inherent in the constitutional system. A baseless and unauthorized order provides a means for the President to subvert the system of checks and balances, for she can make laws free from congressional involvement or agreement and is "able to make sweeping policy value choices without any check by either the federal courts or by a majority of Congress." Such unchecked executive power allows a President to "alter the distribution of the background set of private rights entitlements" and to evade the filtering mechanisms of the bicameral legislature and judicial review. Evasion is particularly problematic when different political parties dominate different branches of government. An executive order issued by the President of one party that declares national policy that is opposed by the opposition party with a legislative majority can result in a clash of ideologies and views as to the law that should govern the nation. As a result "strengthening a particular institution may not only improve its effectiveness but also the relative influence of a particular political party or ideology."

#### The impact is nuclear war

Forrester 89 (Ray, UC Hastings, *George Washington Law Review*, August 89)//LA

### On the basis of this report, the startling fact is that one man alone has the ability to start a nuclear war. A basic theory--if not the basic theory of our Constitution--is that concentration of power in any one person, or one group, is dangerous to mankind. The Constitution, therefore, contains a strong system of checks and balances, starting with the separation of powers between the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court. The message is that no one of them is safe with unchecked power. Yet, in what is probably the most dangerous governmental power ever

### 2ac – immigration

#### Filibuster reform came in like a wrecking ball- nothing’s going to pass

**Berger, 11/22/13** (Judson, “Filibuster Fallout: Reid maneuver could send ‘wrecking ball’ through talks on key legislation” Fox News, <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/11/22/filibuster-fallout-reid-maneuver-could-send-wrecking-ball-through-talks-on-key/>)

Democrats who claimed victory -- including President Obama -- in stripping the Senate minority of its power to block nominations may have done so at the sacrifice of the president's legislative agenda.

Before Thursday, trust on Capitol Hill was frayed yet there was tentative hope following the bruising fight over the partial shutdown that Republicans and Democrats could find some spectrum of common ground for the rest of Obama's term. Maybe pass a few budgets, maybe do something lasting about that pesky deficit.

But the move to use a rare parliamentary tactic and overhaul Senate procedure making it easier for the majority party to approve presidential nominees has poisoned an already tainted well. Any prospect for compromise on big-ticket items ranging from immigration legislation to a fiscal deal to tax reform is now that much fainter.

"There's no question that the move by Harry Reid will make it much tougher to get anything done between now and 2014," GOP strategist and former long-time Senate aide John Ullyot told FoxNews.com.

"In the short-term, it's a wrecking ball through any efforts that were underway previously to have both parties work together on key bills."

Because of the rule change, non-Supreme Court judicial nominees and executive-office nominees can now be approved with just 51 votes, as opposed to 60.

In the first test of Senate relations following the filibuster change, Republicans united to block a critical defense policy bill. The bill failed in a vote late Thursday, nine votes short of the number needed to advance.

#### Don’t evaluate the disad- it’s not a logical opportunity cost

#### Piecemeal reform won’t pass – no time and Boehner won’t conference

**UPI, 11/20/13** (“Obama would accept piecemeal immigration reform” <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2013/11/20/Obama-would-accept-piecemeal-immigration-reform/UPI-43991384929000/>)

Obama said he was "optimistic" Congress would pass immigration reform next month, meeting a goal he set to have a reform bill passed by the end of the year.

But House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan, R-Wis., told the forum shortly after Obama spoke the bill wouldn't get done this year because there wasn't enough time.

"No offense to the administration, we just don't trust their word on this," Ryan said. There is "literally not enough time" to pass immigration reform by Dec. 31, he said.

"If we are trying to cram and rush just because it's the calendar year, we don't think that's responsible," he said.

Ryan also said he believed some GOP House members supported a path to citizenship for the 11 million immigrants who entered the United States without legal permission.

But he said the House would want to purposely make the process toward citizenship burdensome and drawn out -- perhaps taking 15 years -- to encourage future immigrants to enter the country legally.

The Senate bill, which House leaders reject, would provide a 13-year path to citizenship.

House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, said last week his chamber wouldn't consider hashing out differences between House immigration plans and the bipartisan Senate immigration bill.

House conservatives worry any piecemeal House measures would lose out to the comprehensive Senate bill if the two chambers met in a House-Senate conference committee to resolve bill disagreements, The Washington Post reported.

#### Health care is killing PC on immigration

**McGregor, 11/15/13** (Richard, Financial Times, “Healthcare glitches risk derailing Barack Obama’s second term” <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/13017b2e-4df6-11e3-8fa5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2kkvx15JT>)

The controversy over healthcare is sucking the energy out of Mr Obama’s ability to prosecute his other key second-term initiatives, with Mr Boehner this week scuttling further debate of a bipartisan immigration reform bill passed by the Senate in June.

Healthcare and immigration together form the nucleus of Mr Obama’s second term domestic agenda. After this week, both are in trouble.

Norm Ornstein, of the American Enterprise Institute think-tank, said it was too early to suggest that Mr Obama would not be able to regain his clout but there were many “bad signs” for the president.

“Even if his presidential approval fluctuated in the past, his personal approval did not, because people liked and trusted him,” he said. “But the news of the last few weeks has really tarnished him.”

#### Obama doesn’t push the plan

**Fiedler, 13–** WLS web writer (Christine, “Bobby Rush pushes for better trade relations with Cuba”, <http://www.wlsam.com/common/page.php?pt=Bobby+Rush+pushes+for+better+trade+relations+with+Cuba&id=37263&is_corp=0>, NG)

Congressman Bobby Rush is trying to lift trade restrictions on Cuba. He reintroduced legislation to lift the embargo, travel, and parcel restrictions, normalize trade relations, and it would take Cuba off of the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.

Rush says the U.S. has "shut the door on our two nations coming together to work to build a strong alliance" and that "Cuba is no longer a threat" to the U.S.

His bill also asks for the release of Alan Phillip Gross. Gross was working as a U.S. government contractor when he was arrested and prosecuted in 2011 for bringing phones and computer equipment to Cuba's Jewish community without a permit. He is currently serving a 15-year prison sentence in Cuba.

Improving U.S.-Cuba relations has been a goal of Rush; this follows his United States-Cuba Trade Normalization Act in 2009.

#### Low approval ratings wreck PC

**Sullivan, 11/13/13** – political blogger for the Washington Post (Sean, “In Obama we trust? Americans don’t see it that way anymore — in two charts” Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/11/13/in-obama-we-trust-americans-dont-see-it-that-way-anymore-in-two-charts/>

New polling data released this week show that one of Obama’s long-held political assets is looking more like a liability these days. Americans’ trust in the president has eroded to record low levels amid a torrent of criticism about the rollout of the federal health-care law, including the revelation that his long-standing refrain that all Americans can keep their health plans if they want isn’t accurate.

Two charts tell the story.

The first is from Gallup, which found Americans are now split over whether the label “is honest and trustworthy” applies to Obama or not. Fifty percent say it does, while 47 percent say it doesn’t.

It wasn’t always this way. Throughout most of his presidency, Obama had no trust problem to speak of. In fact, for much of his first term, Obama had a surplus of trust. From 2009-2012, the percentage of Americans saying “honest and trustworthy” applied to Obama hovered around 60 percent. The dissenters, meanwhile, mostly stayed below 40 percent.

The Gallup findings are mirrored by a new Quinnipiac University poll that shows by 52-44 percent margin, voters say Obama is not honest and trustworthy. The poll also shows Obama declining along another key metric: job approval rating. He’s reached a record low 39 percent/54 percent approve/disapprove split.

During his first term, the level of trust in Obama outpaced his approval rating on average by a much wider margin than it has this year, according to Quinnipiac’s polls. Gallup’s trend, meanwhile, shows that Obama’s trust has continued to outpace his approval rating by double-digits. Below is a chart that tracks how Obama’s trust numbers have stacked up against his approval rating dating back to 2009.

The latest numbers come on the heels of Obama apologizing to Americans who are losing their health insurance plans as Obamacare is implemented despite his assurances they would not have to give them up. It also comes as the health-care law’s rollout continues to be plagued by technical problems related to HealthCare.gov.

But health-care doesn’t appear to be to sole cause of the dip in trust for the president. The percentage of Americans who told Gallup “honest and trustworthy” doesn’t apply to Obama climbed to 44 percent in June, as the president dealt with revelations about the broad scope of government surveillance programs. And even before that time, trust in him was already starting to fade.

Generally speaking, presidents have experienced a drop in popularity in modern era. So Obama’s declining numbers may also be symptomatic of a broader and expected decline in the way the public perceives him overall.

Still, it’s striking that yet another of Obama’s former strengths is not anywhere near what is used to be. His personal likability — once a reliably buoyant – has also taken a hit in recent months.

If Obama’s decline continues, there will be little incentive for the president’s allies to come to his defense on various policy fronts. And heading into the 2014 midterm elections, he will be handing fodder to Republicans eager to tie vulnerable Democrats to him as a campaign tactic.

Obama may have run his last campaign, but there is still a lot riding for his agenda on the way he is perceived. And right now, the way he is perceived isn’t good.

#### Obama push is failing

**Sink, 11/13/13** (Justin, “Obama rallies faith leaders on immigration” The Hill, <http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/190133-obama-rallies-faith-leaders-on-immigration>)

President Obama on Wednesday rallied faith leaders to pressure Republicans to pursue comprehensive immigration reform during a morning meeting at the White House.

The meeting comes on the heels of a similar gathering last week with business executives, as the White House looks to regain momentum on a reform effort that has largely stalled in the House.

In addition to the president, Vice President Biden, senior adviser Valerie Jarrett, Domestic Policy Council Director Cecilia Muñoz and director of faith-based partnerships Melissa Rogers attended the meeting.

"The President and the leaders discussed their shared commitment to raise the moral imperative for immigration reform and said they will continue keeping the pressure on Congress so they can swiftly pass commonsense reform," the White House said in a statement.

According to the White House, Obama told the leaders there was "no reason for House Republicans to continue to delay action on this issue that has garnered bipartisan support."

But on Capitol Hill earlier Wednesday, Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) said that House committees needed to "develop the principles" of immigration reform before they "figure out how we’re going to move ahead.”

“But let’s understand something — I want to deal with this issue,” Boehner said. “But I want to deal with it in a common sense, step-by-step way.”

Boehner stressed that he would not be willing to pass legislation that allowed for a conference with the Senate, from which a comprehensive bill might emerge.

“We’ve made it clear that we’re going to move on a common-sense, step-by-step approach in terms of how we deal with immigration,” Boehner said.

“The idea that we’re going to take up a 1,300-page bill that no one had ever read, which is what the Senate did, is not going to happen in the House. And frankly, I’ll make clear we have no intention of ever going to conference on the Senate bill.”

Boehner's comments indicate that efforts by the White House to build pressure on immigration may be failing. Last week, President Obama hosted Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) at the White House for a conversation partially devoted to charting out a path forward.

#### Long-term industrial Ag is inevitable---calls for reversal can only harm progress

**Staniford, 8** – consultant (Invicta Consulting) who earned a PhD in Physics (UC Davis) with an MS in Computer Science (UC Davis) and lead editor of The Oil Drum (Stuart, 1/22/, “The Fallacy of Reversibility,” The Oil Drum, <http://www.theoildrum.com/node/3481>)

This implies that the process of industrialization and development is a reversible process. We in the developed world have evolved from low-energy high-agriculture societies into a high-energy low-agriculture society. So the thinking goes that we can/should/will reverse that process and go back to something like what we were 200 years ago (at least on these large macro-economic variables). Now, coming from a background as a scientist, there are many reversible processes familiar in science (and indeed in everyday life), but there are also a lot of irreversible processes. Some examples of reversible processes - if you lift up a weight, you can set it back down again into the same position it was in before. If you blow up a balloon, then, up to a certain point, you can let the air out and get back more or less the uninflated balloon you had before you started. If you pump water from a lower reservoir to a higher reservoir, you can let it down again, and the lower reservoir will be in little different condition than if you hadn't bothered. If you freeze a liquid by cooling it, you can warm it up again and have the same liquid. Here are some examples of irreversible processes. If you let grape juice ferment into wine, there's no way to get grape juice back. If you bake a cake in the oven, there's no way to turn it back into cake dough. If you ice and decorate the cake, but then accidentally drop it on the floor, there's no way to pick it up and have anything approaching the same cake as if you hadn't dropped it. So when you industrialize a society, is that a reversible process? Can you take it on a backward path to a deindustrialized society that looks in the important ways like the society you had before the industrialization? As far as I can see, the "second wave" peak oil writers treat it as fairly obvious that this is both possible and desirable. It appears to me that it is neither possible or desirable, but at a minimum, someone arguing for it should seriously address the question. And it is this failure that I am calling the Fallacy of Reversibility. It is most pronounced in Kunstler, who in addition to believing we need a much higher level of involvement in agriculture also wants railways, canals, and sailing ships back, and is a strong proponent of nineteenth century urban forms. I am going to christen this general faction of the peak oil community reversalists. This encompasses people advocating a return to earlier food growing or distribution practices (the local food movement), folks wanting to bring back the railways and tramcars, people believing that large scale corporations will all collapse, that the Internet will fail and we need to "make our own music and our own drama down the road. We're going to need playhouses and live performance halls. We're going to need violin and banjo players and playwrights and scenery-makers, and singers." And before moving on, I stress that I'm not making an argument that our time is in all ways better than earlier times and that nostalgia for the past is entirely misplaced. Nor am I making an argument that peak oil does not pose a massive and important challenge to us. Instead, I'm making an argument that society is unlikely to reverse its trajectory of development, regardless of what we might like. Calls for it to do so are a distraction and get in the way of figuring out what we really need to be doing, and what the real options and dangers are.

#### Industrial ag is key to maintain high yields—this prevents billions of deaths, massive species extinctions, and massive methane warming from organic cows

**Avery, 8** – Director of the Hudson Institute's Center for Global Food Issues (Dennis T, 6/16/8, “Will the Greens Sacrifice Their Own “Sacred Cows”?” Canada Free Press, <http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=5643>)

Organics are not the answer: Wired notes that organic farms yield less food per acre. Actually, the organic yields are only about half as high as conventional because the world has an urgent shortage of manure. So all-organic farming would give up half the current world food output, threatening hunger for billions and extinction for species whose wild forests get cleared to plant more low-yield crops. Additionally, organic steers are on pasture much longer, burping up twice as much methane per pound as a feedlot steer, according to the UN’s FAO—and needing three times as much of the world’s scarce land.

#### Food scarcity causes global war

**Calvin, 98** – Theoretical Neurophysiologist at the University of Washington (William, January, Atlantic Monthly, 291.1, p. 47-64)

The population-crash scenario is surely the most appalling. Plummeting crop yields would cause some powerful countries to try to take over their neighbors or distant lands -- if only because their armies, unpaid and lacking food, would go marauding, both at home and across the borders. The better-organized countries would attempt to use their armies, before they fell apart entirely, to take over countries with significant remaining resources, driving out or starving their inhabitants if not using modern weapons to accomplish the same end: eliminating competitors for the remaining food. This would be a worldwide problem -- and could lead to a Third World War -- but Europe's vulnerability is particularly easy to analyze. The last abrupt cooling, the Younger Dryas, drastically altered Europe's climate as far east as Ukraine. Present-day Europe has more than 650 million people. It has excellent soils, and largely grows its own food. It could no longer do so if it lost the extra warming from the North Atlantic.

#### Global warming causes extinction

**Brandenburg and Paxson, 99** – Visiting Prof. Researcher @ Florida Space Institute, and Science Writer (John Monica, “Dead Mars, Dying Earth”, p. 232-233)

One can imagine a scenario for global catastrophe that runs similarly. If the human race adopted a mentality like the crew aboard the ship Californian—as some argue, saying that both ozone hole and global warming will disappear if statistics are properly examined, and we need do nothing about either—the following scenario could occur. The earth goes on its merry way and fossil fuels continue to power it. Rather than making painful or politically difficult choices, such as investing in fusion research or enacting a rigorous plan of conserving, the industrial world chooses to muddle through the temperature climb. Let’s imagine that America and Europe are too worried about economic dislocation to change course. The ozone hole expands, driven by a monstrous synergy with global warming that puts more catalytic ice crystals into the stratosphere, but this affects the far north and south and not the major nations’ heartlands. The seas rise, the tropics roast but the media networks no longer cover it. The Amazon rainforest becomes the Amazon desert. Oxygen levels fall, but profits rise for those who can provide it in bottles.

An equatorial high pressure zone forms, forcing drought in central Africa and Brazil, the Nile dries up and the monsoons fail. Then inevitably, at some unlucky point in time, a major unexpected event occurs—a major volcanic eruption, a sudden and dramatic shift in ocean circulation or a large asteroid impact (those who think freakish accidents do not occur have paid little attention to life or Mars), or a nuclear war starts between Pakistan and India and escalates to involve China and Russia… Suddenly the gradual climb in global temperatures goes on a mad excursion as the oceans warm and release large amounts of dissolved carbon dioxide from their lower depths into the atmosphere. Oxygen levels go down precipitously as oxygen replaces lost oceanic carbon dioxide. Asthma cases double and then double again. Now a third of the world fears breathing. As the oceans dump carbon dioxide, the greenhouse effect increases, which further warms the oceans, causing them to dump even more carbon. Because of the heat, plants die and burn in enormous fires which release more carbon dioxide, and the oceans evaporate, adding more water vapor to the greenhouse. Soon, we are in what is termed a runaway greenhouse effect, as happened to Venus eons ago. The last two surviving scientists inevitably argue, one telling the other, “See! I told you the missing sink was in the ocean!” Earth, as we know it, dies. After this Venusian excursion in temperatures, the oxygen disappears into the soil, the oceans evaporate and are lost and the dead earth loses its ozone layer completely. Earth is too far from the Sun for it to be the second Venus for long. Its atmosphere is slowly lost—as is its water—because of ultraviolet bombardment breaking up all the molecules apart from carbon dioxide. As the atmosphere becomes thin the Earth becomes colder. For a short while temperatures are nearly normal, but the ultraviolet sears any life that tries to make a comeback. The carbon dioxide thins out to form a thin veneer with a few whispy clouds and dust devils. Earth becomes the second Mars—red, desolate, with perhaps a few hardy microbes surviving.