## 2ac

### Vietnam good

#### THE WAR IN VIETNAM WAS JUSTIFIED–THE AFTERMATH OF COMMUNIST CONTROL PROVES THAT INTERVENTION WAS GOOD AND OPPOSITION WAS WRONG

**WEBB 2003** (James, Vietnam vet and former Secretary of the Navy, “Why we Fought and Why we Would do it Again,” September, http://www.jameswebb.com/articles/variouspubs/amlegionwhywefought.htm)

On a national level, and in the eyes of history, the answer is easier. One can gain an appreciation for what we attempted to achieve in Vietnam by examining the aftermath of the communist victory in 1975. A gruesome holocaust took place in Cambodia, the likes of which had not been seen since World War II. Two million Vietnamese fled their country – mostly by boat. Thousands lost their lives in the process. This was the first such diaspora in Vietnam’s long and frequently tragic history. Inside Vietnam, a million of the south’s best young leaders were sent to re-education camps; more than 50,000 perished while imprisoned, and others remained captives for as long as 18 years. An apartheid system was put into place that punished those who had been loyal to the United States, as well as their families, in matters of education, employment and housing. The Soviet Union made Vietnam a client state until its own demise, pumping billions of dollars into the country and keeping extensive naval and air bases at Cam Ranh Bay. In fact, communist Vietnam did not truly start opening up to the outside world until the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

Would I Do It Again? Others are welcome to disagree, but on this I have no doubt. Like almost every Marine I have ever met, my strongest regret is that perhaps I could have done more. But no other experience in my life has been more important than the challenge of leading Marines during those extraordinarily difficult times. Nor am I alone in this feeling. The most accurate poll of the attitudes of those who served in Vietnam – Harris, 1980 – showed that 91 percent were glad they’d served their country, and 74 percent enjoyed their time in the service. Additionally, 89 percent agreed that “our troops were asked to fight in a war which our political leaders in Washington would not let them win.”

On that final question, history will surely be kinder to those who fought than to those who directed – or opposed – the war.

#### Vietnam was crucial for American hegemony and democracy promotion.

Podhoretz, 82 – adviser to the US Information Agency and laureate of the Presidential Medal of Freedom – 1982 (Norman Podhoretz, *Why We Were in Vietnam,* P. 19-20)

Thus, on June 1, 1956, two years after delivering Schlesinger's favorite speech, Kennedy spoke before the American Friends of Vietnam on "America's Stake in Vietnam." By this time the French had been defeated, and Vietnam had been partitioned under a set of agreements negotiated in Geneva, with a Communist regime under Ho Chi Minh established in the North and a non-Communist government under Ngo Dinh Diem set up in the South. According to the Geneva agreements, Vietnam was to be unified under a government to be elected in 1956, but Kennedy declared that "neither the United States nor Free Vietnam [was] ever going to be a party to an election obviously stacked and subverted in advance" by the Communists of the North and their agents and allies in the South. To Kennedy, Vietnam represented "the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia," the keystone to the arch, the finger in the dike. Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia . . . would be threatened if the red tide of Communism overflowed into Vietnam. " This was the first of the four reasons Kennedy g ve for "America's stake in Vietnam." The second was that Vietnam represented "a proving ground for democracy in Asia…the alternative to Communist dictatorship. If this democratic experience fails, if some one million refugees have fled the totalitarianism of the North only to find neither freedom nor security in the South, then weakness, not strength, will characterize the meaning of democracy in the minds of still more Asians." It was, Kennedy said, an experiment we could not "afford to permit to fail." The third reason was that Vietnam, in addition to representing, a test of democracy in Asia, also represented "a test of American responsibility and determination" there. Characterizing the United States as the "godparents" of "little Vietnam" and Vietnam as "our offspring" ("We presided at its birth, we gave assistance to its life, we have helped to shape its future"), Kennedy concluded that if Vietnam were to fall "victim to any of the perils that threaten its existence-Communism, political anarchy, poverty and the rest," we would be held responsible and our prestige in Asia would "sink to a new low." Finally (and most prophetically), America's stake in Vietnam was "a very selfish one" in the sense that "American lives and American dollars" would inevitably have to be expended if "the apparent security which has increasingly characterized that area I under the leadership of President Diem" were to be jeopardized.

### at: neolib k

#### Neoliberalism solves war – empirics flow aff

**Griswold 98 –** (Daniel, Associated Director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the CATO Institute, “Peace on Earth, Free Trade for Men,” 31 Dec, http://www.cato.org/dailys/12-31-98.html)

Advocates of free trade have long argued that its benefits are not merely economic. Free trade also encourages people and nations to live in peace with one another. Free trade raises the cost of war by making nations more economically interdependent. Free trade makes it more profitable for people of one nation to produce goods and services for people of another nation than to conquer them. By promoting communication across borders, trade increases understanding and reduces suspicion toward people in other countries.

International trade creates a network of human contacts. Phone calls, emails, faxes and face-to-face meetings are an integral part of commercial relations between people of different nations. This human interaction encourages tolerance and respect between people of different cultures (if not toward protectionist politicians).

Ancient writers, expounding what we now call the Universal Economy Doctrine, understood the link between trade and international harmony. The fourth-century writer Libanius declared in his Orations (III), "God did not bestow all products upon all parts of the earth, but distributed His gifts over different regions, to the end that men might cultivate a social relationship because one would have need of the help of another. And so He called commerce into being, that all men might be able to have common enjoyment of the fruits of the earth, no matter where produced."

Open trade makes war a less appealing option for governments by raising its costs. To a nation committed to free trade, war not only means the destruction of life and property. It is also terrible for business, disrupting international commerce and inflicting even greater hardship on the mass of citizens. When the door to trade is open, a nation's citizens can gain access to goods and resources outside their borders by offering in exchange what they themselves can produce relatively well. When the door is closed, the only way to gain access is through military conquest. As the 19th century Frenchman Frederic Bastiat said, "When goods cannot cross borders, armies will."

History demonstrates the peaceful influence of trade. The century of relative world peace from 1815 to 1914 was marked by a dramatic expansion of international trade, investment and human migration, illuminated by the example of Great Britain. In contrast, the rise of protectionism and the downward spiral of global trade in the 1930s aggravated the underlying hostilities that propelled Germany and Japan to make war on their neighbors.

In the more than half a century since the end of World War II, no wars have been fought between two nations that were outwardly oriented in their trade policies. In every one of the two dozen or so wars between nations fought since 1945, at least one side was dominated by a nation or nations that did not pursue a policy of free trade.

### at: china reps

#### Our knowledge of China is accurate—their authors have flawed information

Chan 4—PhD in Political Science from Minnesota U, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Colorado U at Boulder (Steve, Asian Affairs, Vol 31, No. 3 (Fall, 2004), “Extended Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: Learning from Rationalist Explanations in International Relations”, JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172621>, p. 167, RBatra)

Rationalist interpretations do not imply that people are omnipotent in their ability to procure and process information. We know all too well that people are subject to a variety of cognitive and perceptual errors (for example, Jervis 1976; Levy 1997; Kahneman and Tversky 2000; Tversky and Kahneman 1977). This recognition of limits to rationality, however, hardly warrants general attributions of naiveté , even stupidity, to government leaders. On the contrary, it seems sensible to start from the premise that officials know their counterparts far better than scholars may wish to acknowledge. Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, for instance, invest enormous time, effort, and resources in trying to gain an accurate understanding of each other. Academics have a hard time claiming **any special insight** or unique source of wisdom, whether it is based on mastery of the other side's language, intimate familiarity with its culture, or access to timely and sensitive information with restricted distribution. If anything, they are usually at a considerable disadvantage on these scores when compared to diplomats, intelligence analysts, and even journalists and business people. Indeed, academics in fields such as history and political science typically operate in the realm of common knowledge, outdated information, and mundane data. This confession in turn implies that at least for some of us, our individual and collective forte lies with the analysis of persistent empirical patterns and the formulation of general models of foreign policy conduct.

### 2ac – k

#### Framework – the k must prove that the whole plan is bad – weighing the AFF is vital to fair and predictable engagement – allowing the neg to negate only small parts doesn’t disprove the desirability of the plan – the ballot should simulate the plans enactment and test whether it’s better than the status quo or competitive alternative. even if they win framework, our in-round discourse is key to support the American empire- that’s Eyago

#### Perm: do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

#### No prior questions to problem oriented IR – empirical validity is best

\*emphasis on metaphysical hurdles destroys any chance of effectively describing the world and guiding action.

**Owen 02 –** [David**,** Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3, p. 655-7]

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may **provide the best account available to us.** In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a **theory-driven** rather than **problem-driven** approach to IR**.** Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially **vicious circle arises.**

#### No risk of endless intervention- we redefine priorities away from unilateral multilateralism to multilateralism which provides restraint on action

#### Vote aff despite prior questions—impact timeframe means you gotta act on the best info available

Kratochwil, professor of international relations – European University Institute, 2008 (Friedrich, “The Puzzles of Politics,” pg. 200-213)

The lesson seems clear. Even at the danger of “fuzzy boundaries”, when we deal with “practice” ( just as with the “pragmatic turn”), we would be well advised to rely on the use of the term rather than on its reference (pointing to some property of the object under study), in order to draw the bounds of sense and understand the meaning of the concept. My argument for the fruitful character of a pragmatic approach in IR, therefore, does not depend on a comprehensive mapping of the varieties of research in this area, nor on an arbitrary appropriation or exegesis of any specific and self-absorbed theoretical orientation. For this reason, in what follows, I will not provide a rigidly specified definition, nor will I refer exclusively to some prepackaged theoretical approach. Instead, I will sketch out the reasons for which a pragmatic orientation in social analysis seems to hold particular promise. These reasons pertain both to the more general area of knowledge appropriate for praxis and to the more specific types of investigation in the field. The follow- ing ten points are – without a claim to completeness – intended to engender some critical reflection on both areas. Firstly, a pragmatic approach does not begin with objects or “things” (ontology), or with reason and method (epistemology), but with “acting” (prattein), thereby preventing some false starts. Since, **as historical beings placed in a** specific situations**, we do not have the luxury** of deferring decisions **until we have** found the “truth”, **we have to act and must do so always under time pressures and in the face of incomplete information.** Pre- cisely because the social world is characterised by strategic interactions, what a situation “is”, is hardly ever clear ex ante, because it is being “produced” by the actors and their interactions, and the multiple possibilities are rife with incentives for (dis)information. This puts a premium on quick diagnostic and cognitive shortcuts informing actors about the relevant features of the situ- ation, and on leaving an alternative open (“plan B”) in case of unexpected difficulties. Instead of relying on certainty and universal validity gained through abstraction and controlled experiments, we know that completeness and attentiveness to detail, rather than to generality, matter. To that extent, likening practical choices to simple “discoveries” of an already independently existing “reality” which discloses itself to an “observer” – or relying on optimal strategies – is somewhat heroic. These points have been made vividly by “realists” such as Clausewitz in his controversy with von Bülow, in which he criticised the latter’s obsession with a strategic “science” (Paret et al. 1986). While Clausewitz has become an icon for realists, only a few of them (usually dubbed “old” realists) have taken seriously his warnings against the misplaced belief in the reliability and use- fulness of a “scientific” study of strategy. Instead, most of them, especially “neorealists” of various stripes, have embraced the “theory”-building based on the epistemological project as the via regia to the creation of knowledge. A pragmatist orientation would most certainly not endorse such a position. Secondly, since acting in the social world often involves acting “for” someone, special responsibilities arise that aggravate both the incompleteness of knowledge as well as its generality problem. Since we owe special care to those entrusted to us, for example, as teachers, doctors or lawyers, we cannot just rely on what is generally true, but have to pay special attention to the particular case. Aside from avoiding the foreclosure of options, we cannot refuse to act on the basis of incomplete information or insufficient know- ledge, and the necessary diagnostic will involve typification and comparison, reasoning by analogy rather than generalization or deduction. Leaving out the particularities of a case, be it a legal or medical one, in a mistaken effort to become “scientific” would be a fatal flaw. Moreover, **there still remains the crucial element of “timing” –** of knowing when to act. Students of crises have always pointed out the importance of this factor but, in attempts at building a general “theory” of international politics analogously to the natural sci- ences, such elements are neglected on the basis of the “continuity of nature” and the “large number” assumptions. Besides, “timing” seems to be quite recalcitrant to analytical treatment.

#### The alt fails---the system’s too sticky to simply wish away

Sorensen 98 – British International Studies Association (Georg, IR Theory after the cold war, 87-88)

What, then, are the more general problems with the extreme versions of the postpositivist position? The first problem is that they tend to overlook, or downplay, the actual insights produced by non-post-positivists, such as, for example, neorealism. It is entirely true that anarchy is no given, ahistorical, natural condition to which the only possible reaction is adaptation. But the fact that anarchy is a historically specific, socially constructed product of human practice **does not make it less real**. In a world of sovereign states, anarchy is in fact **out there in the real world in some form**. In other words, it is not the acceptance of the real existence of social phenomena which produces objectivist reification. Reification is produced by the transformation of historically specific social phenomena into given, ahistorical, natural conditions.21 Despite their shortcomings, neorealism and other positivist theories have produced valuable insights about anarchy, including the factors in play in balance-of-power dynamics and in patterns of cooperation and conflict. Such insights are downplayed and even sometimes dismissed in adopting the notion of 'regimes of truth'. It is, of course, possible to appreciate the shortcomings of neorealism while also recognizing that it has merits. One way of doing so is set forth by Robert Cox. He considers neorealism to be a 'problem-solving theory' which 'takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships . . . as the given framework for action . . . The strength of the problem-solving approach lies in its ability to fix limits or parameters to a problem area and to reduce the statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination'.22 At the same time, this 'assumption of fixity' is 'also an ideological bias . . . Problem-solving theories (serve) . . . particular national, sectional or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order'.23 In sum, objectivist theory such as neorealism contains a bias, **but that does not mean that it is without merit** in analysing particular aspects of international relations from a particular point of view. The second problem with post-positivism is the danger of extreme relativism which it contains. If there are no neutral grounds for deciding about truth claims so that each theory will define what counts as the facts, then the door is, at least in principle, **open to anything goes.** Steve Smith has confronted this problem in an exchange with Øyvind Østerud. Smith notes that he has never 'met a postmodernist who would accept that "the earth is flat if you say so". Nor has any postmodernist I have read argued or implied that "any narrative is as good as any other"'.24 But the problem remains that if we cannot find a minimum of common standards for deciding about truth claims a post-modernist position appears unable to come up with a metatheoretically substantiated critique of the claim that the earth is flat. In the absence of at least some common standards it appears difficult to reject that any narrative is as good as any other.25 The final problem with extreme post-positivism I wish to address here concerns change. We noted the post-modern critique of neorealism's difficulties with embracing change; their emphasis is on 'continuity and repetition'. But extreme post-positivists have their own problem with change, which follows from their metatheoretical position. In short, how can post-positivist ideas and projects of change be distinguished from pure utopianism and wishful thinking? Post-positivist radical subjectivism leaves no common ground for choosing between different change projects. A brief comparison with a classical Marxist idea of change will demonstrate the point I am trying to make. In Marxism, social change ( e.g. revolution) is, of course, possible. But that possibility is tied in with the historically specific social structures (material and non-material) of the world. Revolution is possible under certain social conditions but not under any conditions. Humans can change the world, but they are **enabled and constrained** by the social structures in which they live. There is a dialectic between social structure and human behaviour.26 The understanding of 'change' in the Marxist tradition is thus closely related to an appreciation of the historically specific social conditions under which people live; any change project is not possible at any time. Robert Cox makes a similar point in writing about critical theory: 'Critical theory allows for a normative choice in favor of a social and political order different from the prevailing order, but it limits the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world . . . Critical theory thus contains an element of utopianism in the sense that it can represent a coherent picture of an alternative order, but its utopianism is constrained by its comprehension of historical processes. It must reject improbable alternatives just as it rejects the permanency of the existing order'.27 That constraint appears to be absent in post-positivist thinking about change, because radical post-positivism is **epistemologically and ontologically cut off from evaluating the relative merit** of different change projects. Anything goes, or so it seems. That view is hard to distinguish from utopianism and wishful thinking. If neorealism denies change in its overemphasis on continuity and repetition, then radical post-positivism is metatheoretically compelled to embrace any conceivable change project.28

#### We control impact uniqueness- hegemony has empirically decreased the amount of violence that’s Owen

No alt solvency: their explanation of modern/coloniality locks subjects in with NO ESCAPE—at the same time, there’s warrant for their assertions about colonial subjectivity

**Grossberg** (Distinguished Professor of Communication Studies and Cultural Studies, and Adjunct Distinguished Professor of American Studies, Anthropology, and Geography at the University of North Carolina) **10**

(Lawrence, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense, pg. 265-66) //DDI13

This exteriority is, it seems to me, further compromised by the assumption that the other is constituted as a subject. Thus, the argument moves from coloniality as a complex political relation to the colonial difference as a matter of subjectivity.5 The colonial difference slides between a space of productive possibility, a notion of a prior indigenous way of living/subject, and a wounded yet celebrated identity/subject position occupied by spe- cific people who have been the ''victims" of colonization. On the one hand, that position offers a vision of a hybridized colonial subject, which is, in its very extremity, the very inescapability of its violent subordination, and therefore offers a clearer experience---and critique---of modernity from its extremity. And on the other hand, the position also offers the possibility of alternatives to modernity. Presumably, the assumption is that the colo- nial subject is more than just the colonized subject, that their very hybridity points to another space-time of their existence (in another place, another time) that opens the possibilities not of going back but of imagining new futures.

But the excluded, subalternized other is never outside of modernity, since it is a necessary aspect of modernity' itself, since modernity cannot be sepa- rated from coloniality. There must be something more, for the critique of modernity is also ''from the exterior of the modern/colonial world." There seems to be no reason why that exteriority which, as quoted above, interpellates the Other, must always and only be located within modernity/coloniality or as subjectivity. While it is important to recognize that there are vibrant alternatives to modernity, might such alternatives not also come from other spaces of social possibility and political imagination? Might they not also open up the possibility of other modernities? Might not the possibility that the M/C group seeks a ''positive affirmation of the alternative ordering of the world" (Escobar 2 0 0 7 , r88) open up the multiplicity of modernities as well as alternatives to modernity?

#### Social science proves—multipolarity supports the natural incentive to seek status by fighting

**Wohlforth, 09** – professor of government at Dartmouth (William, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Affairs, January, project muse)

The upshot is a near scholarly consensus that unpolarity’s consequences for great power conflict are indeterminate and that a power shift resulting in a return to bipolarity or multipolarity will not raise the specter of great power war. This article questions the consensus on two counts. First, I show that it depends crucially on a dubious assumption about human motivation. Prominent theories of war are based on the assumption that people are mainly motivated by the instrumental pursuit of tangible ends such as physical security and material prosperity. This is why such theories seem irrelevant to interactions among great powers in an international environment that diminishes the utility of war for the pursuit of such ends. Yet we know that people are motivated by a great many noninstrumental motives, not least by concerns regarding their social status. 3 As John Harsanyi noted, “Apart from economic payoffs, social status (social rank) seems to be the most important incentive and motivating force of social behavior.”4 This proposition rests on much firmer scientific ground now than when Harsanyi expressed it a generation ago, as cumulating research shows that humans appear to be hardwired for sensitivity to status and that relative standing is a powerful and independent motivator of behavior.5 [End Page 29]

Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. 6 Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is.

Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.7 “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”8 While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum.9

#### They’ve overdetermined the role of epistemology – even if threats are socially constructed, that construction is still real. Their critical authors are equally guilty of the same epistemological bias and you should reject the neg’s methodology for not being specific enough to 1ac claims

**Lipshutz 2011** – Prof of Politics at UC Santa Cruz, speaking after hearing a policy debate in which the affirmative read a straight up policy aff and the negative read a security criticism (Ronnie, Speaking about the final round at the California Round Robin, Feb 18, Accessed here: <http://nfltv.org/2011/02/24/cal-round-robin-policy/> JC)

RONNIE LIPSCHUTZ: Well, many many years ago, one day when I was reading the San Francisco chronicle I clipped a little phrase. I’ve never been able to find it, but it was something like, one of the emperor Fredrichs said the surest way to ruin your country is to put it under the charge of college professors. I have to say that I am now fully convinced of the truth of that statement. But since I have been charged here with taking on the philosophical side of things, I wanna make a few point about in particular the negative arguments but also I think about the the affirmative. I’m not a debater by the way, so I don’t quite understand what’s been going on. But what I think in particular is a problem is, first of all, we have sort of incommensurate conceptual sort of categories going on here that the affirmative is taking a farther narrow policy question and proposing a change to it. The negative then raises these questions of epistemology and ontology which in a way **are not** obvious **confronting the policy question which**, and I agree with Erin, **is very very narrowly construed**. I mean, there was no sort of question about, well, let me put it this way: that although there was a discussion of the virtues of the alliance with Japan, It was largely taken as a given and therefore of course that causes a problem, and **by taking this sort of epistemological and ontological approach**, its sort of, **its ships passing in the night.** And then of course the theory question came up, and that I thought was problematic for both sides. A couple of things I wanna say. The first one is that, **social constructions can kill.** And I think this is a very important sort of thing to remember that, threats can be socially constructed but threats, social constructions have material components, and they are aimed in particular directions. So the fact that something is a social construction or is epistemologically and ontologically questionable does not mean that there aren’t missiles being deployed, and that those missiles are not going to go off. These arguments are I think operating at a somewhat different space, it does raise a question of how is it that we judge what is a threat in the first place. And of course we have nuclear friends and nuclear enemies. You ought to ask the question, “Why is it that Great Britain has nuclear weapons and yet there is nobody, as far as I know, that is planning a war with Great Britain?”. Now I could be wrong about this, since the Pentagon probably has plenty of analysts who have nothing to do ERIN SIMPSON: They make power points LIPSHUTZ: Yeah, they make power points. So that, then, of course raises some of these epistemological questions. Which I think if you want to somehow deploy the stuff that it seems like, sadly, I have said somewhere that it is important to sort of take that much more carefully into account. The other thing that I am sort of struck by is that I’ve become in recent, in the last year ago a great fan of Pierre Bourdieu. All of these guys, all of my friends that you were citing, although I don’t consider Mearshimer a friend, as I listen to this I think, what, you know, what patent nonsense it is that they are basically spouting. But **this is the way that the academic realm goes**, you know. I mean its attack and counter-attack. And I think you have to be very careful again in interrogating, so If you’ve got to be critical, you should be very critical of those who are critical, you know, to ask what is the politics behind the critique. Because **there are politics in all of this.** Not just politics in the policy, okay, and interests and all kinds of deeply imbedded commitments, which are impossible to change. If you watch congress in action right now, you can see that. But also that there is a kind of, I mean its, **academics is more by other means**, I guess, to take a leaf from both Clausewitz and Foucault. Anyway, to go back to Bourdieu. Bourdieu, who’s a sociologist who died several years ago, has a sort of very interesting approach to some of these things which is oriented around practice. You know, what are the practices that groups, societies, engage in, and how do we understand those practices reinforcing normative beliefs and policies and approaches. Okay, and **If you really are interested in how do things change, you have to look at how practices change rather than intellectual arguments on the one hand or arming to the teeth on the other.** So perhaps I would encourage, you know, if you are to go on with debate, you should probably take a look at Bourdieu. I’m done.

#### The alternative won’t change policy practice – their radical descriptions of the world are alienating – even if the academy shapes policy, the neg’s method is so bankrupt it results in serial policy failure because it ignores institutional constraints

**Lipshutz 11** – Prof of Politics at UC Santa Cruz, Prof of Politics at UC Santa Cruz, speaking after hearing a policy debate in which the affirmative read a straight up policy aff and the negative read a security criticism (Ronnie, Speaking about the final round at the California Round Robin, Feb 18, Accessed here: <http://nfltv.org/2011/02/24/cal-round-robin-policy/> JC)

Look, you know, policy -- Public policy -- is obviously influenced by what analysts have learned in college, but it is also shaped by the organization of the institutions, am I right? I mean this is the rules, and the roles that are developed. I think that to carry the idea of theoretical distinction into the realm of policymaking is not appropriate, in the sense that it doesn’t play that role. Now, having said that, If you are in the pentagon, or in some sort of agency charged with being concerned with security, the sort of general norms are going to be that you know you have to go along to get along. So you can’t go in and sort of say you know, ontologically or epistemologically, your entire sort of policy-making framework is wrong. That’s not gonna, you know, **you’re going to be out on the street very quickly.** Its interesting how many, I wouldn’t say it’s a lot, but its interesting when generals retire and suddenly become argued pacifists. And you sort of say, well, why did you wait for retirement in order to do this? It’s because if they did it while they were on active duty they wouldn’t last very long, they’d be cashiered very quickly. So the point is, you know, the academic approach is to try and develop what are called parsimonious approaches to sort of theorizing, you know. Pick out the important variables. Now the critical approach doesn’t really do that. But what you do do, you know, **you sacrifice complexity for simplicity.** If you read Waltz, which, you know, I’m surprised nobody here cites, Waltz basically says, you simplify as much as you can…. ERIN SIMPSON: Very Parsimonious RONNIE LIPSHUTZ: In Mans state in war, he basically says, its international anarchy that makes war possible. You can’t prevent it. And then, as a kind of a coda, he says, to explain specific wars, you have to look at personalities and the state itself. So at the end of the day, he’s gone through all this trouble of simplifying the argument only to say, you know, all it tells you is that war is possible, it doesn’t tell you anything about wars. And so I think you have to be very careful about…. You Know, these are dangerous things. And this is why I think that administrations who enlist large numbers of college professors often suffer the most grievous policy failures. Because the college professors have these theories, and they want to apply them. I mean, this is what happened with Kennedy in particular. Kennedy and I think Johnson. **They have these theories, and they want to see them operational. These theories are not about reality.** **This is not talking about realism. So it’s being realistic**. And sometimes realism means you don’t intervene, you let people alone, you let them decide what they want to do without trying to get involved. You know, we should let the Egyptians decide what they want to do without worrying about, “what should we do, what should we do”, that kind of thing right. That’s being realistic, not being a realist.

#### Threats real – threat inflation would get our authors fired

Earl C. Ravenal 9, distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies @ Cato, is professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He is an expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget. He is the author of *Designing Defense for a New World Order.*What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy.” *Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society* 21.1 (2009) 21-75

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly(not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:¶ In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)¶ Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:¶ Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.¶ There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.¶ This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense.¶ Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives.¶ My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role.¶ Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations.¶ Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.¶ My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are).¶ A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious,“rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operatecompared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit

opportunities for personal profit.

#### Literally zero link to the critique

#### The plan gives security transformative potential --- alt alone fails and their impact is false

Nunes, 12 [Reclaiming the political: Emancipation and critique in security studies, João Nunes, Security Dialogue 2012 43: 345,Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK, p. sage publications]

In the works of these authors, one can identify a tendency to see security as inherently connected to exclusion, totalization and even violence. The idea of a ‘logic’ of security is now widely present in the critical security studies literature. Claudia Aradau (2008: 72), for example, writes of an ‘exclusionary logic of security’ underpinning and legitimizing ‘forms of domination’. Rens van Munster (2007: 239) assumes a ‘logic of security’, predicated upon a ‘political organization on the exclusionary basis of fear’. Laura Shepherd (2008: 70) also identifies a liberal and highly problematic ‘organizational logic’ in security. Although there would probably be disagreement over the degree to which this logic is inescapable, it is symptomatic of an overwhelmingly pessimistic outlook that a great number of critical scholars are now making the case for moving away from security. The normative preference for desecuritization has been picked up in attempts to contest, resist and ‘unmake’ security (Aradau, 2004; Huysmans, 2006; Bigo, 2007). For these contributions, security cannot be reconstructed and political transformation can only be brought about when security and its logic are removed from the equation (Aradau, 2008; Van Munster, 2009; Peoples, 2011). This tendency in the literature is problematic for the critique of security in at least three ways. First, it constitutes a blind spot in the effort of politicization. The assumption of an exclusionary, totalizing or violent logic of security can be seen as an essentialization and a moment of closure. To be faithful to itself, the politicization of security would need to recognize that there is nothing natural or necessary about security – and that security as a paradigm of thought or a register of meaning is also a construction that depends upon its reproduction and performance through practice. The exclusionary and violent meanings that have been attached to security are themselves the result of social and historical processes, and can thus be changed. Second, the institution of this apolitical realm runs counter to the purposes of critique by foreclosing an engagement with the different ways in which security may be constructed. As Matt McDonald (2012) has argued, because security means different things for different people, one must always understand it in context. Assuming from the start that security implies the narrowing of choice and the empowerment of an elite forecloses the acknowledgment of security claims that may seek to achieve exactly the opposite: alternative possibilities in an already narrow debate and the contestation of elite power.5 In connection to this, the claims to insecurity put forward by individuals and groups run the risk of being neglected if the desire to be more secure is identified with a compulsion towards totalization, and if aspirations to a life with a degree of predictability are identified with violence. Finally, this tendency blunts critical security studies as a resource for practical politics. By overlooking the possibility of reconsidering security from within – opting instead for its replacement with other ideals – the critical field weakens its capacity to confront head-on the exceptionalist connotations that security has acquired in policymaking circles. Critical scholars run the risk of playing into this agenda when they tie security to exclusionary and violent practices, thereby failing to question security actors as they take those views for granted and act as if they were inevitable. Overall, security is just too important – both as a concept and as a political instrument – to be simply abandoned by critical scholars. As McDonald (2012: 163) has put it, If security is politically powerful, is the foundation of political legitimacy for a range of actors, and involves the articulation of our core values and the means of their protection, we cannot afford to allow dominant discourses of security to be confused with the essence of security itself. In sum, the trajectory that critical security studies has taken in recent years has significant limitations. The politicization of security has made extraordinary progress in problematizing predominant security ideas and practices; however, it has paradoxically resulted in a depoliticization of the meaning of security itself. By foreclosing the possibility of alternative notions of security, this imbalanced politicization weakens the analytical capacity of critical security studies, undermines its ability to function as a political resource and runs the risk of being politically counterproductive. Seeking to address these limitations, the next section revisits emancipatory understandings of security.

#### Security isn’t fundamental – the alt causes conservative backlash and threats real

Nunes, 12 [Reclaiming the political: Emancipation and critique in security studies, João Nunes, Security Dialogue 2012 43: 345,Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK, p. sage publications]

Conclusion This article advanced three main arguments. First, the commitment to politicization that constitutes the cornerstone of critical security studies has been detrimentally affected by a tendency to conceive security as having an undesirable logic. This happens at a time when critique is blunted by the proliferation of the ‘critical’ label and by the successes of critical security studies in highlighting the problems with predominant ways of thinking and doing security. Next, it was argued that security as emancipation can potentially provide a platform for reclaiming the political in critical security studies. By taking insecurity as its starting point, by conceiving theory as a form of praxis and by mobilizing immanent critique, this approach promises to address the current blind spots of politicization. Finally, the article provided a revision of security as emancipation that addresses the shortcomings of the versions provided by Booth and Wyn Jones. Two themes are central to this revised version: recognition of the political relations and structures underpinning the reality of security, and engagement with the multifaceted nature of power as determination of action, government and domination. This article has suggested that a re-engagement with – as well as reconsideration of – security as emancipation is crucial for addressing the current impasse in critical security studies. As in previous moments in the development of this field, there is much to gain from dialogue between approaches. However, this discussion also suggests that it is perhaps time to abandon the idea of a division of labour between the deconstructive and reconstructive sides of critical security studies. This was at the heart of the Copenhagen School’s reluctance to consider at length the transformative potential of its work.14 It was also accepted by Booth, for whom deconstructing security is runs the risk of becoming a conservative stance that diverts attention from the ‘real’ condition of insecurity. In contrast with this division of labour, this article has begun to show the fruitfulness of a cumulative vision of critique. Indeed, the reconsideration of security as emancipation proposed here points towards a notion of critique that is committed to deconstruction but also unashamedly reconstructive. It brings together insights that for too long have been kept apart in the critical literature, and introduces other insights that so far have been insufficiently considered: that security has no fundamental logic; that a detailed analysis of its assumptions and effects can be achieved by problematizing its reality and by working with a broad notion of power; that one can make judgments about the desirability of security arrangements by considering structures and relations of vulnerability and disadvantage; and that, on the basis of this, it is possible to identify potential for transformation and devise strategies to achieve it. The conjunction of these insights can help realize the promise of the critical security literature and provide critique with a renewed strength and sense of purpose.

## 1ar

**Neolib inevitable – Cuba government can’t be convinced to bail on neoliberalism – proves no link**

**Perez 12** – Yenisel Rodriguez Perez – lived in Cuba for his entire life until March 30, 2013. Currently a resident in the city of Miami. Writer for the Havana Times and holds a degree in socio-cultural studies –

“The Ideological Success of Neoliberalism in Cuba” – Havana Times – April 29, 2012

http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=68708#sthash.tWIio2fK.dpuf

Despite this, we know that the Cuban government has affected a neoliberal shift in its reform policies. Nonetheless, even today it’s difficult to find a direct connection between the socioeconomic “reforms” implemented by the government and fundamentals of international neoliberalism. The similarities, which clearly exist, fail to form a definite pattern of neoliberal-style economic and social policy. This is why it’s so difficult to follow the economic moves of the political elite in their desperate retreat toward the deregulation of the economy. However at the ideological level, this complicity is apparent. It’s at this level that **neoliberalism has become hegemonic in Cuba.** The ideological foundations of neoliberalism have achieved a tremendous success in the sphere of the government on the island. The authorities have proclaimed the deregulation of Cuba’s economy as inevitable, as they quietly accept the consolidation of inequality as well as decreased social spending and the renunciation of full employment as a goal. These are basic principles of neoliberalism, ones reflected by measures which they say should guide economic policy over the times to come .**The government is *convinced* that neoliberalism has won the ideological battle** on the field of international relations, despite its economic and social failures. Because of this they are paving the way for a future of the radicalized application of its principles of economic deregulation and social inequality.

**Yes we get util – ethics argument was new in the 2nc**

**Cummiskey 90** – Professor of Philosophy at Bates (David Cummiskey, 1990, “Kantian Consequentialism,” pp. 145-146)//CC

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have "dignity, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), but, as rational beings, persons also have a fundamental equality which dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others. The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

**Multilateralism works, politics of fear is key**

**Futterman 94 –** (J. A. H., Physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Meditations on the Bomb,” <http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html>)

But the inhibitory effect of reliable nuclear weapons goes deeper than Shirer's deterrence of adventurer-conquerors. It changes the way we think individually and culturally, preparing us for a future we cannot now imagine. Jungian psychiatrist Anthony J. Stevens states, [15] "History would indicate that people cannot rise above their narrow sectarian concerns without some overwhelming paroxysm. It took the War of Independence and the Civil War to forge the United States, World War I to create the League of Nations, World War II to create the United Nations Organization and the European Economic Community. Only **catastrophe**, it seems, **forces people** to take the wider view. Or what about fear? Can the **horror** which we all experience when we contemplate the possibility of nuclear extinction **mobilize** in us sufficient libidinal energy to resist the archetypes of war? Certainly, the moment we become blasé about the possibility of holocaust we are lost. As long as horror of nuclear exchange remains uppermost we can recognize that **nothing is worth it**. War becomes the impossible option. Perhaps horror, the experience of horror, the consciousness of horror, is our only hope. Perhaps horror alone will enable us to overcome the otherwise invincible attraction of war." Thus I also continue engaging in nuclear weapons work to help fire that world-historical warning shot I mentioned above, namely, that as our beneficial technologies become more powerful, so will our weapons technologies, unless genuine peace precludes it. We must build a future more peaceful than our past, if we are to have a future at all, with or without nuclear weapons — a fact we had better learn before worse things than nuclear weapons are invented. If you're a philosopher, this means that I regard the nature of humankind as mutable rather than fixed, but that I think most people welcome change in their personalities and cultures with all the enthusiasm that they welcome death — thus, the **fear of nuclear annihilation** of ourselves and all our values may be what we **require** in order to become **peaceful** enough to survive our future technological breakthroughs. In other words, when the peace movement tells the world that we need to treat each other more kindly, I and my colleagues stand behind it (like Malcolm X stood behind Martin Luther King, Jr.) saying, "Or else." We provide the peace movement with a needed sense of urgency that it might otherwise lack.

**Preventing nuclear war is the prerequisite to positive peace**

Folk, 78 Professor of Religious and Peace Studies at Bethany College, 78[Jerry, “Peace Educations – Peace Studies : Towards an Integrated Approach,” Peace & Change, volume V, number 1, Spring, p. 58]

Those proponents of the positive peace approach who reject out of hand the work of researchers and educators coming to the field from the perspective of negative peace too easily forget that the prevention of a nuclear confrontation of global dimensions is the prerequisite for all other peace research, education, and action. Unless such a confrontation can be avoided there will be no world left in which to build positive peace. Moreover, the blanket condemnation of all such negative peace oriented research, education or action as a reactionary attempt to support and reinforce the status quo is doctrinaire. Conflict theory and resolution, disarmament studies, studies of the international system and of international organizations, and integration studies are in themselves neutral. They do not intrinsically support either the status quo or revolutionary efforts to change or overthrow it. Rather they offer a body of knowledge which can be used for either purpose or for some purpose in between. It is much more logical for those who understand peace as positive peace to integrate this knowledge into their own framework and to utilize it in achieving their own purposes. A balanced peace studies program should therefore offer the student exposure to the questions and concerns which occupy those who view the field essentially from the point of view of negative peace.