#### Plan: The United States Federal Government should normalize its trade relations with the Republic of Cuba

**contention 1 is Multilat**

**Unilateralism fails- multilateralism promotes band-wagoning and international coalitions, strengthening the US-led system**

\*unilateralism fails –

a. power dilution – arms trade has fallen to NGOs, international organizations are too cumbersome and beaten by small regional alliances, GONGOs are resulting in proxy soft-power competition

b. small state backlash – international norms created by unipolarity cause diffusion of power to smaller states with vetoes that they can use to control us in international institutions

c. economic multipolarity – strong economic globalization means other countries have enough influence to American goals

\*unilateralism causes great power wars via aggressive intervention – military power creates the temptation of policymakers to use it—hegemons are inevitably more aggressive and that leads to adventurism – policymakers have incentives to engage in threat construction and greatly exaggerate threats that allow intervention – Iraq proves

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In an election season, such talk rolls easily off the tongue. But Romney's hackneyed rhetoric is woefully out of step -- both with an American electorate hungry for a less costly brand of foreign policy and with a world in the midst of tectonic change. A sharp **economic downturn** and **expensive, inconclusive conflicts** in Iraq and Afghanistan have left Americans ready for a focus on the home front. Abroad, the charge for the next U.S. president can hardly be to stick his head in the sand and deny that the global distribution of power is fast changing. On the contrary, it is to react soberly and steadily to the implications of such change and ensure that the United States remains secure and prosperous even as economic and military strength spreads to new quarters.

President Barack Obama is on the correct path. Leaving Iraq and overseeing a paced withdrawal from Afghanistan will bring U.S. commitments back into line with U.S. interests. Special operations and drone strikes have proved far more effective in fighting al Qaeda than has occupying countries in the Middle East and South Asia, and an offshore posture in the Persian Gulf is the best way to deal with Iran. Amid **China's rise** and the **economic dynamism** building in its neighborhood, Obama is right to downsize the U.S. presence in Europe and orchestrate a strategic "pivot" to East Asia. The move constitutes a necessary hedge against Chinese ambition and ensures that American workers will benefit from expanding markets in the Pacific Rim. These policies will enable the United States to simultaneously adjust to a shifting global landscape, husband its resources, and grow its economy -- facilitating the president's pledge to focus on "nation-building here at home."

Romney has already denigrated Obama's pragmatism, charging that "our president thinks America is in decline." Obama shot back in his State of the Union address on Jan. 24 that "anyone who tells you that America is in decline … doesn't know what they're talking about." Obama decidedly has the upper hand in this back-and-forth. He recognizes that, the country's strengths notwithstanding, U.S. strategy must adjust to a world in which power will be more broadly distributed. And his focus on rebuilding the American economy speaks directly to an electorate yearning for more equity and prosperity at home.

According to a recent Pew Research Center survey, **46 percent of Americans** want the United States to "mind its own business," and 76 percent think the country should "concentrate more on our own national problems" than on foreign challenges. These are high numbers by historical standards -- a clear indication that the **electorate** is hurting economically and wary of **strategic overreach**. Romney should take note. His chest-thumping talk of a new American century still plays well in some quarters. But Obama's commitment to nation-building at home will play even better.

Even if Romney's rhetoric were to get more domestic traction, it would still bear no resemblance to the new global landscape that is fast emerging. The United States is indeed an exceptional nation -- in its prized geographic location, commitment to freedom and democracy, and brand of international leadership. But the country's exceptionalism should not be used as an excuse to hide from global realities.

China's GDP will catch up with America's over the course of the next decade. The World Bank predicts that the dollar, euro, and China's renminbi will become co-equals in a "multi-currency" monetary system by 2025. Goldman Sachs expects the collective GDP of the top four developing countries -- Brazil, China, India, and Russia -- to match that of the G-7 countries by 2032. The United States will no doubt exit the current slump and bounce back economically in the years ahead. Nonetheless, a more level global playing field is inevitable.

To be sure, America's military superiority will remain second to none for decades to come. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made amply clear, though, military primacy hardly ensures effective influence. And with the **U.S. defense budget poised to shrink** in the service of restoring the country's fiscal health, the United States will have to pick its fights carefully. Shrewd and judicious statecraft will be at least as important as raw power in ensuring the country's security.

To acknowledge the need for the United States to adjust to prospective shifts in the global distribution of power is not, as Duke University professor Bruce Jentleson recently pointed out in Democracy, to be a declinist or a pessimist. It is to be a realist. And safely guiding the United States through this coming transition requires seeing the world as it is rather than retreating toward the illusory comfort of denial.

Adjusting to the rise of the rest requires, for starters, making more room at the table for newcomers. That process is already well under way. The G-20 has supplanted the G-8, widening the circle for global consultations. In the aftermath of reforms adopted in 2010, developing countries now have enhanced weight at the World Bank and IMF. The enlargement of the U.N. Security Council, though currently bogged down in wrangling, is also in the offing.

But making international institutions more representative is the easy part. More challenging will be managing the ideological diversity that will accompany the coming realignment in global power. Precisely because the United States is an exceptional nation, its version of liberal democracy may well prove to be the exception, not the rule.

In China, Russia, and the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, state-led brands of capitalism are holding their own -- and may well do so for the foreseeable future. The Arab Spring could finally bring democratic rule to at least some countries in the Middle East, but it is also breeding political Islam; democratization should not be mistaken for Westernization. Even emerging powers that are already democracies, such as India, Brazil, and Turkey, are charting their own paths. They regularly break with the United States and Europe on trade, Middle East diplomacy, military intervention, the environment, and other issues, preferring to side with other ascending states, whether democratic or not. Romney's paeans to American power are no excuse for his silence on how he plans to manage these complexities.

Promoting international stability will grow more demanding as rising powers bring to the table their differing conceptions of order and governance. The United States has a key role to play in managing such diversity and channeling it toward cooperative ends. Overheated proclamations of American preeminence, however, will do more harm than good. If a new, consensual international order is to emerge, rising powers must be treated as stakeholders in that order, not merely as objects of American power.

Shepherding the transition to this more pluralistic world is arguably the defining challenge facing U.S. statecraft in the years ahead. Romney appears ready to pave over this challenge by denying that such change is afoot and attempting to portray Obama's policies as "an eloquently justified surrender of world leadership."

Obama should welcome this debate and refuse to let his opponents hide behind the veil of American exceptionalism. Democrats no longer need to feel vulnerable on national security; Obama has demonstrated smarts and strength on many issues, including the degradation of al Qaeda, the pivot to Asia, and the isolation of Iran. He understands that agile, firm diplomacy backed by American power will do much more for the United States than congratulatory talk of American primacy.

A smarter, more selective, and less costly U.S. role in the world would not only help the United States get its own house in order, but also give rising powers the wider berth they seek. And good policy would also be good politics; Americans are keen to share with others the burdens and responsibilities of international engagement. The world desperately needs a brand of U.S. leadership that focuses not on ruling the roost, but on guiding a more diverse and unwieldy globe to consensus and cooperation.

**The plan solves–**

**First, repeal would represent a commitment to multilateralism for the international community**

\*plan spreads multilateralism – only the removal of the embargo carries the symbolic weight of revoking previous unilateral efforts to backlash against other countries in votes during conferences in the UN

\*overwhelms alternative causes – removing the embargo signifies an endorsement of international law that overwhelms human rights violations in Guantanamo and Iraq – prefer comparative evidence

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6.3 How would the international community react? At international level all major actors would clearly welcome an end to the embargo. While the sanctions policy allowed European, Canadian and, more recently, Venezuelan, Chinese, Brazilian and Russian to become more involved with Cuba in the absence of competitors from the US (with the exception of agriculture produce), most of the foreign powers, and in particular the EU and Latin American countries, would clearly support a **definite lifting** of the coercive measures. Ending the embargo would be perceived as a decision carrying a momentum of **powerful symbolism** since it would signal a newly found willingness in Washington to reconsider the usefulness of acting unilaterally and outside the international legal framework. As a matter of fact, together with other measures such as closing Guantanamo, signing up to the Kyoto Protocol and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, and possibly, joining the International Criminal Court as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, it would be interpreted by the international community as **steps towards effective multilateralism.**

**Second, the plan fosters a credible conflict resolution model– status quo policies risk disengagement and destabilizing conflict in Kashmir and Middle East**

\*plan fosters a credible conflict resolution model – **increases diplomatic negotiations with Cuba which even if they fail garner international support for America in multilateral negotiations – also increase Cuban relations which spreads democratic efforts worldwide giving the US a hedge in multilateral institutions**

**\*solves Kashmir conflict – plan fosters international momentum and credibility to leverage international dialogue in resolving human rights abuses, military buildup and Indo-Pakistan tensions in the region – solves the root cause of thse problem**

**\*solves Middle East conflict – increased credibility allows Obama to leverage his international reputation with rogue nations like Iran to control fissile material and international leverage allows us to de-escalate Middle East tensions**

**Dickerson 10** – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the US Army War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA,” 1/14/10, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf>) // NG

At the international political level, President Obama sees resuming relations with Cuba as a real step towards multilateralism and leadership. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made the following statement about then President-elect Barrack Obama’s national election. “He spoke about a “new era of global partnership…I am confident that we can look forward to an era of renewed partnership and a new multilateralism." To highlight this point further, U.N. nations have voted overwhelmingly since 1992 to overturn the Cuban Embargo. In 2007, 184 nations voted against the embargo5 - a **powerful statement about U.S. unilateralism with regards to Cuba**. The argument can also be made that the U.S. has foreign relations with China, Saudi Arabia and other non-democratic governments while applying a different standard towardsCuba. With growing perception that Cuba no longer poses a credible threat to the U.S., it appears that U.S. policy has changed from coercive to punitive following the end of the Cold War. With a renewed focus on multilateralism, President Obama could go a long way to break this image by spreading the seeds of a “new beginning” in U.S.-Cuba relations.

While dismissing Cuba’s immediate security threat to the U.S., we cannot ignore their 90-mile proximity to the U.S. shore. As we struggle to contain the illegal Mexican exodus into the U.S. and all the security concerns it poses, we neglect to see the historical similarities in past encounters with the Cuban government that led to similar incursions. So if we critically reexamine the current U.S. – Cuba embargo, why does the U.S. believe it will only lead to Cuban democratization? What about government collapse? A Cuban government collapse akin to Somalia could create a significant refugee situation not to mention an implied U.S. responsibility to provide humanitarian and even stability operations in Cuba. If catastrophe does occur, a search for causes would certainly lead back to our punitive approaches to U.S. diplomacy towards Cuba.

On the other hand, consider that foreign diplomacy achieves a breakthrough under Raul’s Cuba. It could certainly hedge our influence in Latin America. According to Dr. DeShazo, “close bilateral relationships with Venezuela is a product of Fidel Castro-Hugo Chavez friendship and does not enjoy much popular support in Cuba-nor with Raul.” If true, perhaps having a U.S. - Cuba option can become an alternative to that relationship post Fidel Castro. Loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability could be mutually beneficial - and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. **If negotiations break down** and a decision to continue the embargo is reached, **international support would be easier to garner**.

Almost 21 years since the wall fell in Berlin, it is time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. This paper will further define our interests in Cuba and why President Obama should continue his quest for renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba. It will discuss potential risks associated with retaining the current 50-year diplomatic policy and give some broad suggestions regarding a new U.S. – Cuba foreign policy.

Policy and National Interest

Present U.S. policy towards Cuba is economic isolation imposed via embargo to coerce Cuba into establishing a representative government. While the basic policy remains unchanged, the same is not true about U.S. interests in Cuba. During the Cold War, stated U.S. interest was to contain Communism, the leading edge of which was Cuba. More than anything the U.S. wanted Castro’s demise but international support hinged on preventing the spread of communism. After 1989, communism was under siege and capitalism was on the rise. U.S. interests now shifted towards peace and regional stability. Of course, removing the Castro regime was still the preferred method, but without Soviet collusion Castro’s Cuba was no longer a credible threat to the U.S. Not surprisingly, international support quickly dwindled leaving the U.S. as the unilateral enforcer. In hindsight many argued it was the right time to loosen the embargo and seek better relations with Cuba. Instead, a renewed passion to topple Castro and establish democracy fractured any hopes to rekindle relations. In retrospect, Kennedy could not have foreseen a 50-year embargo that survives the Soviet Union’s demise but fails to remove Castro. The same cannot be said about the Obama Administration today. This section will analyze U.S. – Cuba policy, past opportunities and ultimate failure over the past 50 years.

From 1959 to1964, beginning with President Eisenhower but shaped primarily by the Kennedy Administration, U.S. policy was to remove Fidel Castro and establish Democracy in Cuba.6 It can be argued that this policy resonates today but during the early period the U.S. actively pursued removal as the decisive action that would lead to Democracy in Cuba. Political and military efforts to remove Castro in 1961 were reinforced by the initial embargo implementation and tightening that was most effective. Between1965 and 1970, U.S. attempts to maintain a multilateral embargo failed and its effectiveness withered as western governments refused to acquiesce to U.S. - led sanctions. By the time the OAS officially lifted the embargo, Cuba had successfully diversified its trade portfolio and by 1974, 45% of Cuba’s exports came from western governments.7

The period 1965-1972, although officially endorsing the previous administration’s tough stance, largely ignored its neighbor while it dealt with the more pressing conflict in Viet Nam. Containment and a period of Presidential ambivalence towards Cuba allowed tensions to cool between nations. This coupled with a growing fatigue with the Viet Nam War resulted in a renewed engagement to normalize relations with Cuba. A policy of “rapprochement” or normalization began with the Nixon Administration and received promising traction under the Carter Administration in 1977. The rapprochement period, 1973 – 1980, was President Carter’s attempt to curtail communism in Africa and Latin America. By normalizing relations with Cuba, President Carter could leverage this good will to reverse Cuban presence in Ethiopia, Angola and Zaire. Several overt measures were taken to reduce embargo restrictions and in February, 1977 State Department spokesmen Fred Brown “publically acknowledged and accepted a Cuban proposal to begin bilateral talks on maritime boundaries and fishing rights.”8 In June, U.S. National Security Council decided to end the practice of blacklisting foreign ships that called on Cuban ports. Perhaps the most notable improvement that year was to allow foreign diplomats to occupy each other’s embassies. This allowed direct communication between countries; the previous practice had been to use Swiss and Czech proxies.9 Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress.

As President Reagan took office in 1980, U.S. – Cuba relations had already soured. The Reagan Administration would reinforce the weakened embargo and a return to a containment strategy under the auspices that Cuba was “promoting terrorism and subversion in virtually every Latin American country”. But strong Congressional opposition against normalizing relations took center stage during the 1980 presidential elections. Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress. 10 The White House policy was to “disrupt and destabilize the island’s economy, terminate the Cuban-Soviet alliance, end Cuba’s internationalism, and finally reinsert Cuba within the capitalist politicaleconomic orbit.”11 President Reagan made every attempt to return to an “airtight” embargo but Cuba’s persistent trade with the west subverted the effort. In fact, British and Canadian companies could conduct trade in “America’s back garden without having to compete with U.S. companies.”12 Reagan did however, exact a toll on Cuba’s economy by preventing other nations from allowing Cuba to reschedule its debt: “a process of negotiating new loans to replace existing obligations, either by lengthening maturities, deferring of loan principal payment.”13 This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained.

The last meaningful opportunity for change occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall and particularly the window it presented the U.S. following the collapse in Soviet – Cuba relations. During the period 1990 – 1993, internal and economic turmoil following the Soviet Union’s break-up led to a drastic cut in Soviet subsidies and trade relations with Cuba. This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. 14 This led to a 34% drop in Cuban economy forcing Castro to renew western trade options and relook his own draconian business and commercial practices. The first Bush Administration passed on this precious opportunity, ignoring Cuba’s overt concessions late in the previous administration and choosing instead to enact the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act reversing Carter’s amendment to allow third country U.S. companies from trading with Cuba.15

By the time President Clinton came to office, momentum had already shifted in Cuba’s favor. Cuba’s economy began to rise in 1994 reaching its apex in 1996 with a 41% increase thanks to foreign investments in tourism. The introduction of the HelmsBurton legislation in 1996 gained Congressional traction after the Cuban Air force shot down two, anti-Castro “Brothers in Rescue,” planes over Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act created unrealistic expectations for the Cuban government before U.S. would loosen restrictions with Cuba. A total of eight requirements had to be met and the most controversial of these included; a transitional government in place unlike the Castro regime; the dissolution of the Department of State; Cuba must hold free and fair elections and a controversial property law that allowed property owners that left Cuba as early as 1959, to make claims in U.S. Courts on that property. With Cuba’s economy on the rise, this new measure to tighten the noose failed terribly and only succeeded in further alienating both governments.

The second Bush Administration did little to engage Cuba and after September 11, 2001, was completely engrossed in the War on Terror. U.S. policy towards Cuba has changed little in 50 years. Although the embargo continues to fail despite our best efforts to tighten it, our policy has remained steadfast and the U.S. is no closer to normalizing relations with Cuba.

A History of Anger and Distrust

After 50 years, deep-seated distrust and anger exists between the U.S. and Cuba. Perhaps an obvious assessment, but one that if ignored could undermine attempts to repair diplomatic relations between countries. Several diplomatic pitfalls developed over the years could hinder any attempt to reestablish relations. They could spell disaster and set an already tenuous relationship back decades. These triggers are subtle but recognizable over a long and tumultuous period in U.S. – Cuba relations. A historical account will help identify these political impasses and create favorable conditions for diplomatic success in future U.S. – Cuba relations.

Experts argue over who’s started the dispute between nations: was it the Cuban Agrarian Reform Act in 1959 that nationalized agrarian land in Cuba to include U.S. owned lands? Could it have been Cuba’s decision to resume trade with the Soviet 9Union that led to a U.S. imposed embargo on Cuba in 1960? Perhaps the bigger issue was how diplomatic, economic and military efforts by both countries continued to aggravate already strained relations.16 In 1961, Cuban exiles supported by the Central Intelligence Agency failed to topple the Castro government. The Bay of Pigs fiasco sent Cuba a clear signal that the U.S. was not interested in negotiation. Castro answered immediately by allowing Soviets to position nuclear missiles in Cuba, threatening U.S. vital security and leading to the Cuban Missile Crises. These intentions have survived to the present undermining any attempt to pursue common interest and reduce tensions. The underlying fear that U.S. remains committed to toppling the Cuban government constitutes the first diplomatic pitfall in U.S. – Cuban relations. For this very reason, democratic reform will not succeed as a diplomatic bargaining tool with Cuba. Suspicions run deep among Cuban leaders and any inferences to government reform, albeit noble, will impede meaningful relations. Human rights advocacy, free trade and limited business opportunities in Cuba may be more plausible and could eventually encourage the long-term changes U.S. wants in Cuba.

The embargo itself remains a **perpetual albatross** that continues to undermine any real diplomatic progress between nations. A series of coercive measures designed to topple the Castro regime began with U.S. – led efforts to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS) in January 1962 followed by trade prohibitions on imports and exports to Cuba by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). 17 This was achieved by leveraging an existing 1954 OAS Caracas Resolution designed to prevent trade with communist countries called Trading with the Enemy.18 After bilateral sanctions are established, U.S. pursued broader international support by 10enacting the October 1962 Battle Act prohibiting U.S. assistance to any country that traded with Cuba. An early attempt to persuade the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) nations to comply with the embargo yielded limited success.19 However, a new perceived security threat brought on by the Cuban Missile Crises in late 1962 gave U.S. the leverage it needed in February 1964 to convince NATO nations to effectively cease trade with Cuba. In July 1964, OAS followed NATO’s lead; U.S. had succeeded in isolating Cuba from its western traders.20

Tightening the noose placed extraordinary economic pressure on Cuba considering U.S. multilateral efforts reduced western trade by 73% in 1964. Cuba was obliged to subsidize this deficit with the Soviet Union and China between1961 – 1973. This trend continued by enticing Latin American and other western countries like Canada and England in the 1980s and following the Soviet fall in the 1990s.21Commensurately, Presidential administrations have loosened and tightened the embargo repeatedly as the climate between nations improved or deteriorated. The Cuban Defense Act in 1992 and the Helms Burton Act in 1996 tightened embargo restrictions signaling continued U.S. intentions to remove the Castro regime. But the U.S. - led embargo played right into Castro’s hand. Castro accused the U.S. calling it “another economic aggression” and stating that Cubans would have to undergo “long years of sacrifice.”22 By demonizing U.S. policy, he was able to galvanize Cuban support during the toughest times. The embargo helped create the American enemy, removing any popular support for rebellion and elevating Castro’s struggle to a legitimate Cuban struggle.11Castro was also complicit in the failure to mend U.S. – Cuba relations. Hiscontinued attempts to export communism began in Africa with a total 55,000 troops in Angola and Ethiopia by 1978. He focused efforts closer to Latin America by supporting Puerto Rican independence movement in 1975, the Sandinistas overthrow in Nicaragua in 1979 and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation (FMLN) in El Salvador. Cuba’s support to Columbia’s M19 (Columbian Election Day April 19, 1970) guerilla movement labeled Cuba a “state sponsor of terrorism” in 1982.23 Castro’s expansion efforts fueled U.S. security paranoia and prevented several overt efforts by the Carter Administration to improve relations with Cuba. In April 1980, an incident at the U.S. Mission in Havana led 120,000 Cubans to depart Mariel Port by boat to the U.S.24 The incident better known as the “Mariel Boatlift” became the tipping point that inhibited further relations with Cuba. Despite the growing tensions between the U.S. and Cuba, trade between the west and Cuba increased. NATO compliance with U.S. - brokered trade restrictions broke down after 1966 in particular due to British and Canadian opposition. U.S. efforts to use the OAS embargo to influence the United Nations also failed. In 1974, Latin American leaders pushed to end the OAS embargo. In 1975 the OAS lifted the embargo with Cuba and the embargo returned to a bilateral embargo now condemnedby most western countries.25 In 1982, Cuba’s failing economy led Castro to pursue western trade with a renewed vigor. By “1987, more than 370 firms from twenty-three European, Latin American, and Asian countries participated in Cuba’s largest ever annual trade fair.”26

Castro’s interest in improving U.S. - Cuba relations was perhaps the greatest from 1982-1988. Castro made statements in 1982 to resume talks with the U.S.; he took back more than 1000 Mariel Boatlift criminals that came to the U.S. in 1987 and pulled troops out of Angola in 1988 to mention a few. These rare moments and apparent seams in Castro’s armor were left unanswered by the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Instead renewed efforts to continue ratcheting a now largely ineffective bilateral embargo served only to increase animosity between both countries.

It is difficult to quantify, but essential to note, that U.S. action over the years seems to support a hatred for Fidel Castro that interferes with any attempt to established diplomatic relations with Cuba. If true, to neglect this assumption could undermine any efforts to reverse our seemingly punitive approach. Perhaps it can be traced to his support for a Soviet-style communism. After all, few things in 1960 America were feared and despised more than communism. Any country affiliated with the communist movement became an affront to the American way of life. Furthermore, Americans shed blood in Cuba during the 1898 Spanish American War leading to Cuban Independence in 1902.27 Fidel Castro became evil’s face in Cuba and any attempt to partner with Castro seemed equally tainted. Fast forwarding to the present, with communism no longer a threat, perhaps it’s time to let the anger fade and deal with Cuba for its’ diplomatic merit not past indiscretions. The question remains whether clear objectiveness leads U.S. diplomatic efforts with Cuba? It is important to note that what’s at stake here is U.S. national interests and not the legacy of Fidel Castro.

Another important pitfall is to exploit democracy as a precondition for diplomacy and **economic engagement** in Cuba. If democracy is virtuous, then why must we exploit it? It casts a negative shadow on a positive change in government. There is a common perception that U.S. policy with regards to security and stability can only exist under the precondition of a “Democratic Cuba”. It has prevented any real progress in U.S. – Cuba relations because of well placed fears that we mean to subvert the Cuban government. A popular Cuban American lobby group, The Cuban American National Foundation summarizes traditional U.S. beliefs towards Cuba. They suggest, “U.S. – Cuba policy should focus on (1) advancing U.S. interests and security in the region and (2) empowering Cuban people in their quest for democracy and prosperity…that these are “intertwined and one cannot be individually accomplished without the other.”28 The recommendation then focuses largely on steps to pursue a democratic Cuba.

To separate security and stability from democratic pursuits in Cuba could benefit both causes. Focusing on better diplomatic relations could further democracy as a byproduct of increased exposure to open markets, businesses and globalization. China is a good example. The U.S. has diffused tensions with China by exposing them to open markets. Although they continue to embrace communism, their version of communism has been somewhat diluted as they modified their business practices, trade and other aspects to compete in the global marketplace. If you take into account that Cuba’s Growth National Product (GDP) decreased by 4% since 2006 while their debt grew by 16% to almost $20B in 2008, Cuba certainly has incentive to do the same.29 By imposing democracy we jeopardize diplomatic avenues to our principal security and stability pursuits. To assuage the Cuban America position on this issue may be simpler today than 10 years ago. Today’s younger Cuban-American generation is more amenable to closer relations with Cuba. The anger carried by their immigrant forefathers14after 50 years may be passing and perhaps the time is right to leverage this new Cuban American generation to open dialogue with Cuba without the democratic preconditions tied to negotiations.

As we pursue diplomatic relations with Cuba we should not expect full disclosure, immediate results and a Cuban government anxious to please the U.S. We should expect a cautious and limited first engagement that appears noticeably weighted in U.S. effort. Let us assume the U.S. makes significant diplomatic and economic concessions but Cuba is less willing to provide some reciprocal offering. U.S. policy could conclude that Cuba has no genuine desire to consummate new diplomatic relations and diplomacy could fail. It is imperative to understand that the U.S. has done most of the “taking” and hence will, at least for the near future, do most of the “giving”. A steady, patient and continued engagement is needed until Cuba has the confidence to commit to further diplomatic relations.

Current U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis

Understanding the deep-seated animosity and distrust that continues to fuel U.S. - Cuba tensions will aid us in properly analyzing the feasibility, acceptability and suitability (FAS) of current and future U.S. policy with Cuba. Identifying FAS applications to diplomacy, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) will highlight weaknesses in current U.S. – Cuba relations that can be modified for future improvement.

The logical question with regards to current U.S. – Cuba policy is whether it’s feasible to continue the current policy. At least for the foreseeable future, the answer is yes. It equates to doing nothing diplomatically, militarily and economically. Perhaps this 15option is appealing given a robust domestic agenda and U.S. involvement in two wars. According to Professor Schwab and other experts however, the U.S. has lost the information campaign targeted at the Cuban people. It has only, “buttressed Fidel’s popularity in Cuba and elsewhere, which eviscerates the very purposes the embargo was set up for.”30 It’s like the classic biblical story of David triumphing over Goliath – the bigger the oppressor the greater the victory. True or not, Fidel has made the case successfully to the Cuban people. While it’s feasible for the U.S. to pursue the current course there is no evidence it will succeed.

How acceptable is it to U.S. foreign policy? There are three elements of national power that highlight our current policy: diplomacy, economy and law enforcement. It is subjective to evaluate acceptability strictly in terms of current national power invested and subsequent pay offs in foreign policy. U.S. needs international cooperation to achieve the coercive effects that only complete economic strangulation can accomplish. This is tough to do and North Korea and Iran bear this true. If we look at it from a broader international and economic perspective we can begin to see why it’s not acceptable. Take a UN General Assembly vote renouncing the U.S.-led embargo on Cuba for instance; since1992 there has been overwhelming vote to end the embargo.31 In essence, it has garnered sympathy for Castro and encouraged western nations like Canada and Spain to continue open relations with Cuba. Even if the embargo could work, U.S. diplomacy has failed to yield the international tourniquet needed to bring change in Cuba. Applying economic force without first garnering the necessary diplomatic support failed to achieve intended changes succeeding instead in hurting the Cuban people it hoped to protect. Whether or not an embargo can work in Cuba is suspect but succeeding without international support is impossible. Since the embargo hinges on a larger multinational participation, international and not just U.S. acceptability is necessary to achieve U.S. ends in Cuba.

Several embargo refinements over the years like the Libertad Act have further tightened restrictions on Cuba. These restrictions have placed a heavy burden on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) particularly in Miami. A 2007 GAO report highlights these burdens and how they impede other more important Law Enforcement activities in defense of the homeland.32 GAO findings suggest there’s a real need to balance U.S. paranoia for “everything Cuba.” This rebalancing purports an unacceptable cost-benefit to the current law enforcement aspect of the embargo. It diminishes our greater need to defend against terrorist, criminals and other real threats to our national security. In essence, our efforts to impose embargo restrictions are unacceptable tradeoffs for homeland security.

In the final analysis, U.S. – Cuba policy is not sustainable because it has failed to meet desired national ends: Cuban democracy and human rights. Prior to 1989, the U.S. could make the argument that the embargo contained communism and generally marginalized the Castro government. It failed however, to depose Fidel Castro and democratize the Cuban government. A post Cold War Cuba no longer poses a threat to the U.S. - communism is contained and Cuba is still under embargo. Despite a 50-year failure to affect change in Castro’s government, our policy with regards to Cuba remains unchanged. We have foregone diplomatic engagement and chosen coercive economic power as our only political tool.

Does Cuba Pose A Security Threat to the U.S.?

Let’s begin by asking this question: can we afford to escort commerce through Caribbean waters from Cuban pirates? This sounds as farfetched as an attack from an Afghan-based Al-Qaida using commercial airliners to destroy the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This scenario while unexpected is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. The greater possibility that “something” unfavorable happens in Cuba that threatens U.S. national interests is certainly more relevant. Although Cuba poses no traditional threats to the U.S., geographically, their 90-mile proximity should concern us. Our proximity to Cuba assures U.S. involvement, be it voluntary or involuntary, in a major crisis. Consider a disease outbreak that begins in Cuba over a break down in hygiene, government pollution or other misfortune attributable to economic strife. The disease has no boundaries and quickly reaches the Florida shores via travelling Cuban American citizens. This scenario could be mitigated or even preventable under the auspices of better relations. Aside from the obvious medical benefits a partnership provides, established communications with Cuba would likely prevent an uncontrolled spread in the U.S. There are definite advantages to having healthy regional partnerships to deal with regional problems.

While economic pressure has failed to bring about government change, it could trigger a government collapse. If **Cuba becomes a “failing” or “failed state”** we could see a huge refugee flood into the U.S., increased crime and drug trafficking across U.S. borders, and renewed security and stability issue in the region. In 1980, 120,000 Cuban refugees fled Mariel and 20,000 more in 1994 after Cuba declared an open immigration policy.33 From 2004 – 2007, 131,000 Cubans have made residence in the U.S. Almost 38,000 settled in Florida alone in 2006. Although it’s mere speculation to presume Cuba will fail, if it did, there is no question where Cubans would seek refuge. A failed state could eventually draw U.S. involvement into nation building in Cuba taking a greater toll on our national resources. This scenario, while unexpected, is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. Current U.S. policy is no longer a sustainable option to achieving our national interests in Cuba. Until realignment can bring national policy back in line with national interests, conditions will not exist for real change in U.S. – Cuba relations.

Proposed U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis

If today marks President Obama’s “new strategy” towards Cuba we must begin with U.S. National interests in the broader Latin American context. Over the past 50 years our approach has been germane to Cuba and not the larger Latin American construct. In so doing we have isolated Cuba from Latin America for coercive reasons yes, but also for the very democratic principles we hoped Cuba would follow.

The State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (covers Canada and Cuba) has set the following goals for the region: “Economic partners that are democratic, stable, and prosperous; Friendly neighbors that help secure our region against terrorism and illegal drugs; Nations that work together in the world to advance shared political and economic values.”34 To simplify these goals, let us just say stability, economic prosperity and democracy. Using these as a benchmark, I propose our new diplomatic strategy towards Cuba must be similar - achieve economic stability, security and a representative government as the “end state” goal and not the prerequisite for engagement. President Obama can implement this policy by first building American and Congressional support for engagement. He should establish a formal infrastructure that communicates to Cuba and the International Community at large that we’re serious about diplomatic engagement with Cuba. Finally, we must loosen embargo restrictions and expose Cubans to U.S. open markets, business opportunities and 21st Century living. This combination will improve relations with Cuba by regaining their trust, improving their living conditions and exposing them to the democratic enticements we hope they will emulate.

Achieving Congressional approval will be difficult although not impossible in the present economic recession. The economic benefits associated with new business opportunities in Cuba can encourage skeptics in Congress to mobilize. As a counterargument to a continued embargo, the President can point to the dangers associated with failed states like Somalia inadvertently caused by the very environment sanctions create. A strong communication strategy to gain American support coupled with a softening Cuban American stance, shrouded in economic opportunity, could encourage Congressional dialogue and resolution. President Obama can succeed if he sets realistic goals and expresses these to the American public before the media or his opposition defines these.

We’ve established that coercive means have failed to achieve democracy and economic stability in Cuba. I’m suggesting there is another mutually beneficial alternative. Using China as an example, their exposure and need to compete in free global markets broadened their horizons and shifted their hard line communist approach to international diplomacy. This was a feat that coercive diplomacy has not accomplished in Cuba. Yet we still have civil disagreements with China on human rights issues, Taiwan’s right to independence and other contentious issues without resorting to coercive measures. Why should Cuba receive different treatment? The confusion lies with our tendency to impose democracy as a precondition for diplomatic relations. How can Cuba subscribe to small business practices, a free economy building block, if business opportunities are not available? Diplomatic engagement and economic encouragement has a better chance. Cuba’s economic condition incentivizes their willingness to begin diplomatic negotiations. The U.S. should begin by focusing efforts to establish diplomatic relations through incentives rather than coercion. We must also set the democratic precondition aside to pursue when the relationship matures and trust is reestablished. Exposing them to new opportunities will eventually, through their own discovery and U.S. shepherding, lead them to a more representative government.

If we accept that reestablishing relations with Cuba is the first real step to a democratic end-state then the first action must be to appoint an Ambassador to Cuba. This diplomatic gesture signals that U.S. is serious about foreign relations. The Ambassador’s first actions must include setting the conditions with Cuba to allow a loosening of embargo restrictions. President Obama, in the spirit of multilateralism, should pursue international solidarity since some countries enjoying exclusive trade with Cuba would certainly protest the immediate competition. Choosing a time-phased removal would protect U.S. assets and interests in the remote possibility that Cuba fails to comply with the agreed bi-national or international terms. It might also sooth domestic and partisan anxiety regarding open trade with Cuba. President Obama must accomplish this early in his first term to allow time to reap success or mitigate failure before the next elections.

The U.S. cannot afford to miss another opportunity to normalize relations with Cuba. A Cuba without Fidel is an opportunity – whether it is Raul or his replacement in 2013. The U.S. must lay the foundation today for renewed U.S. Cuba relations. Delaying could also signal the contrary to Raul Castro suspiciously awaiting the true purpose of recent U.S. concessions.

While a long term goal may be to influence change in government, it cannot be the basis for initial success and continued diplomacy. With diplomatic patience and a prosperous Cuba, we have reason to believe, like China and Russia that capitalism will prevail over communism. But new politicians and a younger generation of Americans who measure success between terms and administrations will not understand if results aren’t immediate or commensurate to U.S. efforts. Instead, the strategy pursued must occur with a measured diplomatic optimism that insures immediate setbacks don’t derail the restoration of trust that must occur before complete reciprocation can be expected.

Conclusion

Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative that we take into consideration that distrust will characterize negotiations with the Cuban government. On the other hand, consider that loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability to provide goods and services could be profitable and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish.

If the Cuban model succeeds President Obama will be seen as a true leader for multilateralism. Success in Cuba could **afford the international momentum and credibility to solve other seemingly “wicked problems” like the Middle East and Kashmir**. President Obama could leverage this international reputation with other rogue nations like Iran and North Korea who might associate their plight with Cuba.35 The U.S. could begin to lead again and reverse its perceived decline in the greater global order bringing true peace for years to come.

**Third, the plan sends a clear signal of Latin American cooperation**

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FOR most of our history, the United States assumed that its security was inextricably linked to a partnership with Latin America. This legacy dates from the Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1823, through the Rio pact, the postwar treaty that pledged the United States to come to the defense of its allies in Central and South America.¶ Yet for a half-century, our policies toward our southern neighbors have alternated between intervention and neglect, inappropriate meddling and missed opportunities. The death this week of President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela — who along with Fidel Castro of Cuba was perhaps the most vociferous critic of the United States among the political leaders of the Western Hemisphere in recent decades — offers an opportunity to restore bonds with potential allies who share the American goal of prosperity.¶ Throughout his career, the autocratic Mr. Chávez used our embargo as a wedge with which to antagonize the United States and alienate its supporters. His fuel helped prop up the rule of Mr. Castro and his brother Raúl, Cuba’s current president. The embargo no longer serves any useful purpose (if it ever did at all); President Obama should end it, though it would mean overcoming powerful opposition from Cuban-American lawmakers in Congress.¶ An **end to the Cuba embargo would send a powerful signal to all of Latin America** that the United States wants a new, warmer relationship with democratic forces seeking social change throughout the Americas.¶ I joined the State Department as a Foreign Service officer in the 1950s and chose to serve in Latin America in the 1960s. I was inspired by President John F. Kennedy’s creative response to the revolutionary fervor then sweeping Latin America. The 1959 Cuban revolution, led by the charismatic Fidel Castro, had inspired revolts against the cruel dictatorships and corrupt pseudodemocracies that had dominated the region since the end of Spanish and Portuguese rule in the 19th century.¶ Kennedy had a charisma of his own, and it captured the imaginations of leaders who wanted democratic change, not violent revolution. Kennedy reacted to the threat of continental insurrection by creating the Alliance for Progress, a kind of Marshall Plan for the hemisphere that was calculated to achieve the same kind of results that saved Western Europe from Communism. He pledged billions of dollars to this effort. In hindsight, it may have been overly ambitious, even naïve, but Kennedy’s focus on Latin America rekindled the promise of the Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt and transformed the whole concept of inter-American relations.¶ Tragically, after Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, the ideal of the Alliance for Progress crumbled and “la noche mas larga” — “the longest night” — began for the proponents of Latin American democracy. Military regimes flourished, democratic governments withered, moderate political and civil leaders were labeled Communists, rights of free speech and assembly were curtailed and human dignity crushed, largely because the United States abandoned all standards save that of anti-Communism.¶ During my Foreign Service career, I did what I could to oppose policies that supported dictators and closed off democratic alternatives. In 1981, as the ambassador to El Salvador, I refused a demand by the secretary of state, Alexander M. Haig Jr., that I use official channels to cover up the Salvadoran military’s responsibility for the murders of four American churchwomen. I was fired and forced out of the Foreign Service.¶ The Reagan administration, under the illusion that Cuba was the power driving the Salvadoran revolution, turned its policy over to the Pentagon and C.I.A., with predictable results. During the 1980s the United States helped expand the Salvadoran military, which was dominated by uniformed assassins. We armed them, trained them and covered up their crimes.¶ After our counterrevolutionary efforts failed to end the Salvadoran conflict, the Defense Department asked its research institute, the RAND Corporation, what had gone wrong. RAND analysts found that United States policy makers had refused to accept the obvious truth that the insurgents were rebelling against social injustice and state terror. As a result, “we pursued a policy unsettling to ourselves, for ends humiliating to the Salvadorans and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional conception of the national interest.”¶ Over the subsequent quarter-century, a series of profound political, social and economic changes have undermined the traditional power bases in Latin America and, with them, longstanding regional institutions like the Organization of American States. The organization, which is headquartered in Washington and which excluded Cuba in 1962, was seen as irrelevant by Mr. Chávez. He promoted the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States — which excludes the United States and Canada — as an alternative.¶ At a regional meeting that included Cuba and excluded the United States, Mr. Chávez said that “the most positive thing for the independence of our continent is that we meet alone without the hegemony of empire.”¶ Mr. Chávez was masterful at manipulating America’s antagonism toward Fidel Castro as a rhetorical stick with which to attack the United States as an imperialist aggressor, an enemy of progressive change, interested mainly in treating Latin America as a vassal continent, a source of cheap commodities and labor.¶ Like its predecessors, the Obama administration has given few signs that it has grasped the magnitude of these changes or cares about their consequences. After President Obama took office in 2009, Latin America’s leading statesman at the time, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, then the president of Brazil, urged Mr. Obama to normalize relations with Cuba.¶ Lula, as he is universally known, correctly identified our Cuba policy as the chief stumbling block to renewed ties with Latin America, as it had been since the very early years of the Castro regime.¶ After the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington set out to accomplish by stealth and economic strangulation what it had failed to do by frontal attack. But the clumsy mix of covert action and porous boycott succeeded primarily in bringing shame on the United States and turning Mr. Castro into a folk hero.¶ And even now, despite the relaxing of travel restrictions and Raúl Castro’s announcement that he will retire in 2018, the implacable hatred of many within the Cuban exile community continues. The fact that two of the three Cuban-American members of the Senate — Marco Rubio of Florida and Ted Cruz of Texas — are rising stars in the Republican Party complicates further the potential for a recalibration of Cuban-American relations. (The third member, Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, is the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but his power has been weakened by a continuing ethics controversy.)¶ Are there any other examples in the history of diplomacy where the leaders of a small, weak nation can prevent a great power from acting in its own best interest merely by staying alive?¶ The re-election of President Obama, and the death of Mr. Chávez, give America a chance to reassess the irrational hold on our imaginations that Fidel Castro has exerted for five decades. The president and his new secretary of state, John Kerry, should quietly reach out to Latin American leaders like President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia and José Miguel Insulza, secretary general of the Organization of American States. The message should be simple: The president is prepared to show some flexibility on Cuba and asks your help.¶ Such a simple request could transform the Cuban issue from a bilateral problem into a multilateral challenge. It would then be up to Latin Americans to devise a policy that would help Cuba achieve a sufficient measure of democratic change to justify its reintegration into a hemisphere composed entirely of elected governments.¶ If, however, our present policy paralysis continues, we will soon see the emergence of two rival camps, the United States versus Latin America. While Washington would continue to enjoy friendly relations with individual countries like Brazil, MxzsaAQW23EWW33G3SW”[‘” ico and Colombia, the vision of Roosevelt and Kennedy of a hemisphere of partners cooperating in matters of common concern would be reduced to a historical footnote.

**That bolsters influence in international institutions, allowing the US to lead multilateral forums**

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Speaking in Santiago, Chile, in March of last year, President Obama called Latin America “a region on the move,” one that is “more important to the prosperity and security of the United States than ever before.” Somebody forgot to tell the Washington brain trust. The Center for a New American Security, a respected national security think tank a half-mile from the White House, recently released a new series of policy recommendations for the next presidential administration. The 70-page “grand strategy” report only contained a short paragraph on Brazil and made only one passing reference to Latin America. Yes, we get it. The relative calm south of the United States seems to pale in comparison to other developments in the world: China on a seemingly inevitable path to becoming a global economic powerhouse, the potential of political change in the Middle East, the feared dismemberment of the eurozone, and rogue states like Iran and North Korea flaunting international norms and regional stability. But the need to shore up our allies and recognize legitimate threats south of the Rio Grande goes to the heart of the U.S.’ changing role in the world and its strategic interests within it. Here are three reasons why the U.S. must include Latin America in its strategic calculations: 1. Today, pursuing a global foreign policy requires regional allies. Recently, countries with emerging economies have appeared to be taking positions diametrically opposed to the U.S. when it comes to matters of global governance and human rights. Take, for example, Russia and China’s stance on Syria, rejecting calls for intervention. Another one of the BRICS, Brazil, tried to stave off the tightening of U.N. sanctions on Iran two years ago. And last year, Brazil also voiced its official opposition to intervention in Libya, leading political scientist Randall Schweller to refer to Brazil as “a rising spoiler.” At a time of (**perceived**) declining U.S. influence, it’s important that America deepens its ties with **regional allies** that might have been once taken for granted. As emerging nations such as Brazil clamor for permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council and more representatives in the higher reaches of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. will need to integrate them into global decision-making rather than isolate them. If not, they could be a thorn in the side of the U.S. as it tries to implement its foreign policy agenda. Worse, they could threaten to undermine efforts to defend international norms and human rights. 2. Latin America is becoming more international. It’s time to understand that the U.S. isn’t the only country that has clout in Latin America. For far too long, U.S. officials and Latin America experts have tended to treat the region as separate, politically and strategically, from the rest of the world. But as they’ve fought battles over small countries such as Cuba and Honduras and narrow bore issues such as the U.S.-Colombia free-trade agreement, other countries like China and India have increased their economic presence and political influence in the region. It’s also clear that countries such as Brazil and Venezuela present their own challenges to U.S. influence in the region and even on the world forum. The U.S. must embed its Latin America relations in the conceptual framework and strategy that it has for the rest of the world, rather than just focus on human rights and development as it often does toward southern neighbors such as Cuba. 3. There are security and strategic risks in the region. Hugo Chavez’s systematic deconstruction of the Venezuelan state and alleged ties between FARC rebels and some of Chavez’s senior officials have created a volatile cocktail that could explode south of the U.S. border. FARC, a left-wing guerrilla group based in Colombia, has been designated as a “significant foreign narcotics trafficker” by the U.S. government. At the same time, gangs, narcotics traffickers and transnational criminal syndicates are overrunning Central America. In 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched a controversial “war on drugs” that has since resulted in the loss of over 50,000 lives and increased the levels of violence and corruption south of the Mexican border in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and even once-peaceful Costa Rica. Increasingly, these already-weak states are finding themselves overwhelmed by the corruption and violence that has come with the use of their territory as a transit point for drugs heading north. Given their proximity and close historical and political connections with Washington, the U.S. will find it increasingly difficult not to be drawn in. Only this case, it won’t be with or against governments — as it was in the 1980s — but in the far more complex, sticky situation of failed states. There are many other reasons why Latin America is important to U.S. interests. It is a market for more than 20% of U.S. exports. With the notable exception of Cuba, it is nearly entirely governed by democratically elected governments — a point that gets repeated ad nauseum at every possible regional meeting. The Western Hemisphere is a major source of energy that has the highest potential to seriously reduce dependence on Middle East supply. And through immigration, Latin America has close personal and cultural ties to the United States. These have been boilerplate talking points since the early 1990s. But the demands of the globe today are different, and they warrant a renewed engagement with Latin America — a strategic pivot point for initiatives the U.S. wants to accomplish elsewhere. We need to stop thinking of Latin America as the U.S. “backyard” that is outside broader, global strategic concerns.

**This overcomes all problems**

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The Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom (Brett D., "The Role and Relevance of Multilateral Diplomacy in U.S. Foreign Policy," Heritage Foundation, 2-14-11, <http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/2011/02/the-role-and-relevance-of-multilateral-diplomacy-in-us-foreign-policy>, SMS)

The U.S. is hindered by not being a leader of a tight-knit bloc. We’re a part of the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), but the Europeans dominate that group through sheer numbers. Needless to say, we don’t always agree. So while the U.S. wields great economic, military, and diplomatic influence, in the U.N. it is often alone or supported by a few allies. If you want evidence, take a look at pretty much any U.N. vote on Israel. The trick to success for U.S. diplomats is to identify the key players and try to sway them early in direct talks in anticipation of the upcoming debate or in informal meetings prior to formal consideration of the matter. Once positions calcify, change is enormously difficult. Getting traction early is even more important because relatively few votes are taken in the U.N. The goal of “consensus” is the alpha and the omega of the international system because it implies agreement and legitimacy. The desire for consensus is supported by the makeup of the membership. Most diplomats just want to get on with things as quickly as possible. Remember: For most countries, the issue being considered often doesn’t matter very much.

#### Only through credible multilateral legitimacy can the US maintain primacy

Finnemore, 9 – professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University (Martha, , “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be,” World Politics, Volume 61, January 2009, <http://home.gwu.edu/~finnemor/articles/2009_unipolarity_wp.pdf>, SMS)

Legitimacy is, by its nature, a social and relational phenomenon. One's position or power cannot be legitimate in a vacuum. The concept only has meaning in a particular social context. Actors, even unipoles, can- not create legitimacy unilaterally. Legitimacy can only be given by others. It is conferred either by peers, as when great powers accept or reject the actions of another power, or by those upon whom power is exercised. Reasons to confer legitimacy have varied throughout history. Tradition, blood, and claims of divine right have all provided reasons to confer legitimacy, although in contemporary politics conformity with international norms and law is more influential in determining which actors and actions will be accepted as legitimate.9 Recognizing the legitimacy of power does not mean these others necessarily like the powerful or their policies, but it implies at least tacit acceptance of the social structure in which power is exercised. One may not like the inequalities of global capitalism but still believe that mar- kets are the only realistic or likely way to organize successful economic growth. One may not like the P5 vetoes of the Security Council but still understand that the United Nations cannot exist without this conces- sion to power asymmetries. We can see the importance of legitimacy by thinking about its absence. Active rejection of social structures and the withdrawal of recognition of their legitimacy create a crisis. In domes- tic politics, regimes suffering legitimacy crises face resistance, whether passive or active and armed. Internationally, systems suffering legiti- macy crises tend to be violent and noncooperative. Post-Reformation Europe might be an example of such a system. Without at least tacit acceptance of power's legitimacy, the wheels of international social life get derailed. Material force alone remains to impose order, and order creation or maintenance by that means is difficult, even under unipolar- ity. Successful and stable orders require the grease of some legitimation structure to persist and prosper.10 The social and relational character of legitimacy thus strongly colors the nature of any unipolar order and the kinds of orders a unipole can construct. Yes, unipoles can impose their will, but only to an extent. The willingness of others to recognize the legitimacy of a unipoles actions and defer to its wishes or judgment shapes the character of the order that will emerge. Unipolar power without any underlying legiti- macy will have a very particular character. The unipoles policies will meet with resistance, either active or passive, at every turn. Coopera- tion will be induced only through material quid pro quo payoffs. Trust will be thin to nonexistent. This is obviously an expensive system to run and few unipoles have tried to do so. More often unipoles attempt to articulate some set of values and shared interests that induce acquiescence or support from others, there- by legitimating their power and policies. In part this invocation of val- ues may be strategic; acceptance by or overt support from others makes exercise of power by the unipole cheaper and more effective. Smart leaders know how to "sell" their policies. Wrapping policies in shared values or interests smoothes the path to policy success by reassuring skeptics." Rhetoric about shared interests in prosperity and economic growth accompanies efforts to push free trade deals on unwilling part- ners and publics. Rhetoric about shared love of human rights and de- mocracy accompanies pushes for political reforms in other states. In their examination of debates leading up to the 2003 Iraq war in this issue of World Politics, Jack Snyder, Robert Shapiro, and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon provide an example of unipolar attempts to create legiti- macy through strategic use of rhetoric. They show how "evocative and evasive rhetoric" allowed proponents of the war to imply links between the 9/11 attacks, weapons of mass destruction, and Saddam Hussein's regime. Potentially unpopular or controversial policies were rational- ized by situating them in a larger strategic vision built on more widely held values, as when the authors of the 2002 National Security Strategy memorandum wove together the global war on terror, the promotion of American democratic values abroad, and the struggle against authori- tarian regimes to create a justification for preventive war.12 Indeed, as Ronald Krebs and Patrick Jackson argue, rhetorical "sales pitches" of this kind can be highly coercive. Examining the same case (the selling of the Iraq war), Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz show how the adminis- tration's "war-on-terror" discourse, which cast the U.S. as a blameless victim (attacked for "who we are" rather than anything we did), was designed in such a way as to leave opponents with very few arguments they could use to rally effective opposition in Congress.13 Usually this articulation of values is not simply a strategic ploy. Deci- sion makers and publics in the unipole actually hold these values and believe their own rhetoric to some significant degree. Unipole states, like all states, are social creatures. They are composed of domestic soci- eties that cohere around some set of national beliefs. Their leaders are products of those societies and often share those beliefs. Even where leaders may be skeptical, they likely became leaders by virtue of their abilities to rally publics around shared goals and to construct foreign and domestic policies that reflect domestic values. Even authoritarian (and certainly totalitarian) regimes articulate shared goals and function only because of the web of social ties that knit people together. Certainly all recent and contemporary strong states that could be candidates for unipoles—the U.S., China, Russia, Germany, and Britain—do.14 Thus unipole states, like all states, find naked self-aggrandizement or even the prescriptions of Machiavellian virtue difficult to pursue.15 Unipoles and the people who lead them pursue a variety of goals de- rived from many different values. Even "national interest" as most people and states conceive of it involves some broader vision of social good beyond mere self-aggrandizement. Americans like to see democ- racy spread around the world in part for instrumental reasons—they believe a world of democracies is a safer, more prosperous world for Americans—and also for normative ones—they believe in the virtues of democracy for all. Likewise, Americans like to see markets open in part for instrumental reasons—they believe a world of markets will make Americans richer—and also for normative ones—they believe that markets are the ticket out of poverty. Much of unipolar politics is thus likely to revolve around the degree to which policies promoting the unipoles goals are accepted or resisted by others. Other states and foreign publics may need to be persuaded, but often influential domestic constituencies must also be brought on board. Channels for such persuasion are many and varied, as is evident from past U.S. diplomatic efforts to sell its policies under bipolarity. The shift from laissez-faire to what John Ruggie terms the "embedded liberal compromise" as the basis for the U.S.-led economic order after WWII required extensive diplomatic effort to persuade other states and New York's financial elite to go along. The tools of influence used to accomplish this were sometimes material but also intellectual and ideological. It was the "shared social purposes" of these economic ar- rangements that gave them legitimacy among both state and societal actors cross-nationally-16 A unipoles policies are thus circumscribed on two fronts. The poli- cies must reflect values held at home, making them legitimate domes- tically. At the same time, in order to induce acquiescence or support from abroad, they must appeal to the leaders and publics of other states. Constructing policies across these two spheres—domestic and inter- national—may be more or less difficult, depending on circumstances, but the range of choices satisfying both constituencies is unlikely to be large. Widespread disaffection on either front is likely to create signifi- cant legitimacy costs to leaders, either as electoral or stability threats domestically or as decreased cooperation and increased resistance in- ternationally. Creating legitimacy for its policies is thus essential for the unipole but it is also difficult, dangerous, and prone to unforeseen consequenc- es. Domestically, the need to cement winning coalitions in place has polarized U.S. politics, creating incentives to exploit wedge issues and ideological narratives. As Snyder, Shapiro, and BIoch-Elkon describe, neoconservatives, particularly after 9/11, used these tools to great effect to generate support for the Bush administration's policies. Such ideo- logically-driven persuasion efforts entail risks, however. Constructing coherent ideological narratives often involves sidelining inconvenient facts, what Snyder and his coauthors call "fact bulldozing." This is more than just highlighting some facts at the expense of others. It may (or may not) begin with that aim, but it can also involve changing the facts people believe to be true, as when large numbers of people came to believe that weapons of mass destruction were indeed found in Iraq. Thus, to the degree that these persuasion efforts are successful, if their ideology does not allow them to entertain contrary facts, policymakers and publics may make decisions based on bad information. This kind of self-delusion would seem unlikely to result in smart policy. To the extent that ideological narratives become entrenched, these delusions may extend to future generations of policymakers and make them vic- tims of blowback. Even if successors come to terms with the facts, they may be entrapped by the powerful legitimating rhetoric constructed by their predecessors.17 Internationally, this need to construct legitimate policies also creates important opportunities for opponents and potential challengers to a unipole. As Stephen Walt notes in this issue, opportunities for conven- tional material balancing are limited under our current unipolar situa- tion and, by definition, one would expect this to be so in most, if not all, unipolar systems. What is a challenger to do? With material balancing options limited, one obvious opening for rival states is to undermine the legitimacy of unipolar power. A creative rival who cannot match or balance a unipole's military or economic strength can easily find strat- egies to undercut the credibility and integrity of the unipole and to concoct alternative values or political visions that other states may find more attractive. Thus, even as a unipole struggles to construct politi- cal programs that will attract both domestic and international support with an ideology or values that have wide appeal, others may be trying to paint those same programs as self-aggrandizing or selfish. Attacks on legitimacy are important "weapons of the weak."18 Even actors with limited or no material capability can mount damaging at- tacks on the credibility, reputation, and legitimacy of the powerful. The tools to mount such attacks are not hard to come by in contemporary politics. Information and the ability to disseminate it strategically are the most potent weapons for delegitimating power in all kinds of situ- ations, domestic and international. Even non-state actors like nongov- ernmental organizations (NGOs) and activist networks whose material capabilities are negligible in the terms used in this article have been able to challenge the legitimacy of policies of powerful states and the legitimacy of the states themselves. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (icbl) is one prominent example. Civil society groups and like-minded states were able to attract signatures from more than 120 governments to ban these devices in 1997 despite opposition from the unipole (U.S.) government. The fact that the ICBL received the Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts is suggestive of its success at dele- gitimating unipole policies on this issue. If legitimacy were irrelevant, the U.S. would have ignored this challenge; it did not. The Pentagon has begun phasing out these weapons and replacing them with newer, more expensive devices meant to conform to the treaty requirements. Indeed, that the U.S. began touting the superiority of its new mine policy (promulgated in February 2004) over the ICBLs Ottawa treaty requirements highlights the power of this transnational civil society network to set standards for legitimate behavior in this area.19 Similar cases of NCO pressure on environmental protection (including climate change), human rights, weapons taboos, and democratization amply suggest that this ability to change what is "legitimate" is a common and consequential way to challenge unipoles.20 The fact that these chal- lenges are mounted on two fronts—international pressure from foreign governments, international organizations, and NGO activists on the one hand, and domestic pressure from the unipole's own citizens who sup- port the activists' views on the other—makes these challenges doubly difficult to manage. State actors, too, can use these weapons to attack the unipole's poli- cies and do so regularly. Among states, attempts to delegitimate the policies of others are a staple of foreign policy-making and may be employed more often in states that have fewer material capabilities with which to achieve their goals against a unipole. France may be un- able to balance effectively against U.S. material power in contemporary politics, but it can (and has) raised questions about U.S. leadership and the legitimacy of U.S. policies, especially U.S. inclinations toward uni- lateralism. Exploiting multilateralism's legitimacy as a form of action, French attempts since the late 1990s to label the U.S. a "hyperpower" and to promote a more multilateral, even multipolar, vision of world politics are clearly designed to constrain the U.S. by undermining the legitimacy of any U.S. action that does not receive widespread interna- tional support and meet international standards for "multilateralism."21 Countering such attacks on legitimacy is neither easy nor costless. It requires constant management of the transnational conversation sur-rounding the unipole's behavior and continuing demonstrations of the unipole's commitment to the values or vision that legitimate its power. To simply dismiss or ignore these attacks is dangerous; it smacks of contempt. It says to others, "You are not even worth my time and at- tention." A unipole need not cater to the wishes of the less powerful to avoid conveying contempt. It can argue, justify, and respectfully dis- agree—but all of these take time, attention, and diplomacy. Dismissal is very different than disagreement, however. Peers disagree and argue; subordinates and servants are dismissed. By treating the less powerful with contempt the unipole communicates that it does not care about their views and, ultimately, does not care about the legitimacy of its own power. To dismiss or ignore the views of the less capable is a form of self- delegitimation. Contempt is thus a self-defeating strategy for unipoles; by thumbing its metaphorical nose at others, the unipole undercuts the legitimacy needed to create a wide range of policy outcomes.21 Social control is never absolute and material power alone cannot cre- ate it. Effective and long-lasting social control requires some amount of recognition, deference, and, preferably, acceptance on the part of those over whom power is exercised. Other parties, not the unipole, thus hold important keys to the establishment of effective and stable order under unipolarity. Paradoxically, then, preponderant power can only be converted into social control if it is diffused. To exercise power to maximum effect, unipoles must give up some of that power to secure legitimacy for their policies.

**Multilateralism leads to greater power sharing and international cooperation, resolving conflict**

\*multilateralism solves global problems –

a. fosters great power sharing – increased multilateral dialogue devises similar analytics lenses that make policies more readily adopted on a large scale

b. increases international cooperation – lends legitimacy to policies by virtue of debate and increases efficient implementation of joint programs because actors feel invested in solutions – creates a self-reinforcing dynamic which creates new focal points for strategic interaction

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Because it rests on open, nondiscriminatory debate, and the routine exchange of viewpoints, the multilateral procedure introduces three key advantages that are gained, regardless of the specific policies adopted, and tend to diffuse across all participants. Contrary to the standard viewpoint, according to which a rational preference or functional imperative lead to multilateral cooperation, here it is the systematic practice of multilateralism that creates the **drive to cooperate**. At the theoretical level, the premise is that it is not only what people think that explains what they do, but also what they do that determines what they think (Pouliot 2010). Everyday multilateralism is a self-fulfilling practice for at least three reasons. First, the joint practice of multilateralism creates mutually recognizable [and] patterns of action among global actors. This process owes to the fact that practices structure social interaction (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming).2 Because they are meaningful, organized, and repeated, practices generally convey a degree of mutual intelligibility that allows people to develop social relations over time. In the field of international security, for example, the practice of deterrence is premised on a limited number of gestures, signals, and linguistic devices that are meant, as Schelling (1966:113) put it, to ‘‘getting the right signal across.’’ The same goes with the practice of multilateralism, which rests on a set of political and social patterns that establish the boundaries of action in a mutually intelligible fashion. These structuring effects, in turn, allow for the development of **common frameworks** for appraising global events. Multilateral dialog serves not only to find joint solutions; it also makes it possible for various actors to zoom in on the definition of the issue at hand—a particularly important step on the global stage. The point is certainly not that the multilateral procedure leads everybody to agree on everything—that would be as impossible as counterproductive. Theoretically speaking, there is room for skepticism that multilateralism may ever allow communicative rationality at the global level (see Risse 2000; Diez and Steans 2005). With such a diverse and uneven playing field, one can doubt that discursive engagement, in and of itself, can lead to common lifeworlds. Instead, what the practice of multilateralism fosters is the emergence of a shared framework of interaction—for example, a common linguistic repertoire—that allows global actors to make sense of world politics in mutually recognizable ways. Of course, they may not agree on the specific actions to be taken, but at least they can build on an established pattern of political interaction to deal with the problem at hand—sometimes even before it emerges in acute form. In today’s pluralistic world, that would already be a considerable achievement. In that sense, multilateralism may well be a constitutive practice of what Lu (2009) calls ‘‘political friendship among peoples.’’ The axiomatic practice of principled and inclusive dialog is quite apparent in the way she describes this social structure: ‘‘While conflicts, especially over the distribution of goods and burdens, will inevitably arise, under conditions of political friendship among peoples, they will be negotiated within a global background context of norms and institutions based on mutual recognition, equity in the distribution of burdens and benefits of global **cooperation, and power-sharing** in the institutions of global governance rather than domination by any group’’ (2009:54–55). In a world where multilateralism becomes an end in itself, this ideal pattern emerges out of the structuring effects of axiomatic practice: take the case of NATO, for instance, which has recently had to manage, through the multilateral practice, fairly strong internal dissent (Pouliot 2006). While clashing views and interests will never go away in our particularly diverse world, as pessimists are quick to emphasize (for example, Dahl 1999), the management of discord is certainly made easier by shared patterns of dialog based on mutually recognizable frameworks. Second, the multilateral procedure typically ensures a remarkable level of **moderation** in the global policies adopted. In fact, a quick historical tour d’horizon suggests that actors engaged in multilateralism tend to **avoid radical solutions** in their joint decision making. Of course, the very process of uniting disparate voices helps explain why multilateralism tends to produce median consensus. This is not to say that the multilateral practice inevitably leads to lowest common denominators. To repeat, because it entails complex and often painstaking debate before any actions are taken, the multilateral procedure forces involved actors to devise and potentially share **similar analytical lenses** that, in hindsight, make the policies adopted seem inherently, and seemingly ‘‘naturally,’’ moderate. This is because the debate about what a given policy means takes place before its implementation, which makes for a much smoother ride when decisions hit the ground. This joint interpretive work, which constitutes a crucial aspect of multilateralism, creates outcomes that are generally perceived as inherently reasonable. Participation brings inherent benefits to politics, as Bachrach (1975) argued in the context of democratic theory. Going after the conventional liberal view according to which actors enter politics with an already fixed set of preferences, Bachrach observes that most of the time people define their interests in the very process of participation. The argument is not that interests formed in the course of social interaction are in any sense more altruistic. It rather is that the nature and process of political practices, in this case multilateralism, matter a great deal in shaping participants’ preferences (Wendt 1999). In this sense, not only does the multilateral practice have structuring effects on global governance, but it is also constitutive of what actors say, want, and do (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming). Third and related, multilateralism lends **legitimacy** to the policies that it generates by virtue of the debate that the process necessarily entails. There is no need here to explain at length how deliberative processes that are inclusive of all stakeholders tend to produce outcomes that are generally considered more socially and politically acceptable. In the long run, the large ownership also leads to more **efficient implementation**, because actors feel **invested** in the enactment of solutions on the ground. Even episodes of political failure, such as the lack of UN reaction to the Rwandan genocide, can generate useful lessons when re-appropriated multilaterally—think of the Responsibility to Protect, for instance.3 From this outlook, there is no contradiction between efficiency and the axiomatic practice of multilateralism, quite the contrary. The more multilateralism becomes the normal or self-evident practice of global governance, the more benefits it yields for the many stakeholders of global governance. In fact, multilateralism as an end in and of itself could generate even more diffuse reciprocity than Ruggie had originally envisioned. Not only do its distributional consequences tend to even out, multilateralism as a global governance routine also creates **self-reinforcing dynamics** and new focal points for strategic interaction. The axiomatic practice of multilateralism helps define problems in commensurable ways and craft moderate solutions with wide-ranging ownership—three processual benefits that further strengthen the impetus for multilateral dialog. Pg. 21-23

**Multilateralism solves inevitable Asian transition wars which go nuclear**

\*great power war goes nuclear, mutually assured destruction can’t check – best power transition experts conclude based off decades of demographic and economic research that inevitable transition wars from collapse of unilateralism causes retrenchment wars spurring lash-out drawing in China and India – only multilateralism solves by persuading Chinese leaders to maintain the status quo

**Kugler 06 –** Professor of World Politics at Claremont Graduate University (Jacek, “The Asian Ascent: Opportunity for Peace or Precondition for War?”, <http://sobek.colorado.edu/~lewiso/Kugler%20-%20The%20Asian%20Ascent.pdf>)//NG

Given the fundamental importance of demographic and economic forces in establishing the roster of states capable of fundamentally affecting the structure of world politics, whatever resolution there might be to the Global War on Terror will not alter the major challenge faced by the United States. In the long run, China’s demographic and hence economic power cannot be denied. By the same reasoning, the Middle East has no long-run demographic or economic power. The U.S. courts long-term peril by being obsessively distracted by short-term objectives. To ensure real peace, the U.S. would be much better advised to preserve strong links with the EU, maintain and improve cordial relations with Russia, and most importantly, open a sincere dialogue with India and China designed to maximize their support for the existing status quo. To be sure, positive, but limited, steps have been taken by the United States. American support for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization was important because it helps integrate China’s growing economy more fully into the capitalist world economy. Similar recognition for India, not to mention support for Indian membership on the United Nations Security Council, would also be beneﬁcial. Because Taiwan and Korea have replaced the Cold War’s Berlin as focal points for potential Great Power conﬂict, ﬁnding an accommodation that meets the desires of the main parties with respect to them is central to the preservation of long-term peace. The economic, demographic, and political science research summarized above suggests that American foreign policy attention must center on China and India as the major future contenders for global leadership. Although China retains a political ideology inconsistent with democracy, there are good reasons to expect and thus to work toward change to a participatory system based on increasing prosperity (Feng 2003; Feng and Zak 2003). India is the largest democracy in the world, but like China it is still not a major partner of the Western world. While these relationships may develop and prosper on their own, the relative amount of attention paid to these rising giants compared with the Global War on Terror is simply insupportable. Neither convergence arguments nor power transition theory suggests that future Great Power war between Asia and the West is inevitable. The research described here offers evidence about probabilistic relationships between parity and status quo evaluations on the one hand, and war on the other. Thus, while China’s overtaking of the U.S. may be relatively certain, the result of that overtaking is not. Power transition research supports claims that overtakings are dangerous when policy makers fail to accommodate them. A conﬂict between China or India and the United States as the Asian giants emerge from the shadows of underdevelopment is **not inevitable**. Rather, the political negotiations among contenders determine whether potential challengers can be made satisﬁed with the rules and norms governing world politics. If the declining dominant state is able to engineer a satisfactory compromise between the demands of the rising state and its own requirements (as Britain and the U.S. did when peacefully passing the mantle of international leadership), war is not expected. If the two sides remain intransigent, **war is expected**. It is clear that such a war in the twenty-ﬁrst century would have a **very high probability** of involving **nuclear weapons**. A clear counterexpectation can be drawn from classical nuclear deterrence arguments. They involve a fundamental assumption that as the costs of war increase, the probability of war decreases. Nuclear weapons are then alleged to alter calculations substantially because they raise the expected costs of war so high that war becomes unthinkable. According to this logic, a global war between a newly predominant China and a declining U.S. will never occur thanks to the pacifying inﬂuence of the balance of terror. A new Cold War is anticipated by this nuclear deterrence argument. Consistent with this theory, various scholars have advocated the proliferation of nuclear weapons as one method to prevent wars (Intriligator and Brito 1981; Waltz 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 1982). An odd paradox is raised by the fact that many world leaders accept nuclear deterrence claims, such as that about the stability of mutual assured destruction (MAD), while rejecting the logical concomitant that proliferation of nuclear weapons to more and more states is desirable. What follows logically has stubbornly resisted practical implementation. Thus, using some other logic, leaders of nuclear nations seem to agree that deterrence is stable under MAD but nevertheless also agree that nuclear proliferation must be prevented in order to preserve peace. If decision makers really believed MAD is stable, it is impossible to understand why they would oppose nuclear proliferation to Iran, thereby creating stable nuclear parity in the Middle East. This inconsistency was noted years ago by Rosen (1977), but subsequently conveniently overlooked. Theory and policy may frequently be at odds, but seldom when the costs of such logical inconsistency are so high. Power transition theorists are inherently suspicious of MAD arguments about nuclear stability because they essentially resurrect traditional balance of power arguments. Rather than focusing on conventional balance as a pacifying inﬂuence, nuclear deterrence proponents of MAD suggest that a nuclear balance will maintain the peace. Given a fortuitous absence of wars among nuclear states thus far, it is impossible to test arguments such as that about MAD. But what we can observe is not promising. It is not only policy makers who doubt the veracity of MAD when they deny the logical consequence of ‘‘beneﬁcial’’ proliferation. Recent formal presentations of deterrence arguments strongly suggest that a preponderance of nuclear capabilities specifically in the possession of satisﬁed states is more amenable to peace than is MAD (Zagare and Kilgour 2000). Power transition theorists, informed by their own as well as by **decades** of demographic and economic research, strongly doubt that nuclear parity between the U.S. and a risen but dissatisﬁed China could preserve the peace. Conclusions It is entirely reasonable to anticipate that Asia will dominate world politics by the end of the century. The most important issue facing American decision makers is how to handle the anticipated overtaking. The research summarized here indicates that the one element of Asia’s ascent that Western decision makers can manipulate is Asia’s relative acceptance of the international system’s existing norms and values. War is not an inevitable certainty. The opportunity for peace is at hand. If Western decision makers can persuade Chinese and Indian leaders through word and deed to join with the current global status quo, peace and prosperity should endure. If, on the other hand, China and India cannot be persuaded to join the existing structure of relations, then the chances for conﬂict increase around mid-century. The research summarized here suggests this is true even in the face of the enormous costs that reasonably would be anticipated from a nuclear war.

#### War is at its lowest level in history because of US primacy---best statistical studies prove

**Owen 11** John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us?

Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological.

Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A.

But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another.

Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now.

Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries).

These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars.

We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony.

A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant.

There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world.

How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history.

The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth.

Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.

The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

#### Social science proves—multipolarity supports the natural incentive to seek status by fighting

**Wohlforth, 09** – professor of government at Dartmouth (William, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Affairs, January, project muse)

The upshot is a near scholarly consensus that unpolarity’s consequences for great power conflict are indeterminate and that a power shift resulting in a return to bipolarity or multipolarity will not raise the specter of great power war. This article questions the consensus on two counts. First, I show that it depends crucially on a dubious assumption about human motivation. Prominent theories of war are based on the assumption that people are mainly motivated by the instrumental pursuit of tangible ends such as physical security and material prosperity. This is why such theories seem irrelevant to interactions among great powers in an international environment that diminishes the utility of war for the pursuit of such ends. Yet we know that people are motivated by a great many noninstrumental motives, not least by concerns regarding their social status. 3 As John Harsanyi noted, “Apart from economic payoffs, social status (social rank) seems to be the most important incentive and motivating force of social behavior.”4 This proposition rests on much firmer scientific ground now than when Harsanyi expressed it a generation ago, as cumulating research shows that humans appear to be hardwired for sensitivity to status and that relative standing is a powerful and independent motivator of behavior.5 [End Page 29]

Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. 6 Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is.

Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.7 “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”8 While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum.9

**contention 2 is transitions**

**The status quo is resolving many issues, but normalized relations with Cuba are key to maintain stability in Cuba’s economy**

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Cuba under Raúl Castro has entered a new period of economic, social, and political transformation. Reforms instituted within the past few years have brought the expansion of private sector entrepreneurial activity, including lifting restrictions on the sales of residential real estate, automobiles, and electronic goods. Additional reforms included, more than a million hectares of idle land has been leased to private farmers, where citizens have been granted permission to stay in hotels previously reserved for tourists, and freedom being granted for most Cubans to travel abroad. ¶ Stating that it was time for the “gradual transfer” of “key roles to new generations,” President Raúl Castro announced that he will retire by 2018, and named as his possible successor a man who was not even born at the time of the Cuban Revolution. [1]¶ The twilight of the Castro era presents challenges and opportunities for US policy makers. Normalization of relations is inevitable, regardless of timing, yet external and internal factors may accelerate or retard the process. ¶ The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez is likely to undermine the already dysfunctional Cuban economy, if it leads to reductions in oil imports and other forms of aid. This could bring social chaos, especially among the island’s disaffected youth. Such an outcome would generate adverse consequences for US national and regional security. To maintain Cuba’s social and economic stability while reforms are maturing, the United States must throw itself open to unrestricted bilateral trade with all Cuban enterprises, both private and state-owned.**¶** The collapse of Cuba’s tottering economy could seismically impact the United States and neighboring countries. It certainly did during the Mariel Boatlift of 1980, precipitated by a downturn in the Cuban economy which led to tensions on the island. Over 125,000 Cuban refugees landed in the Miami area, including 31,000 criminals and mental patients. Today, the United States defines its national security interests regarding Cuba as follows:¶ • Avoid one or more mass migrations;¶ • Prevent Cuba from becoming another porous border that allows continuous large-scale migration to the hemisphere;¶ • Prevent Cuba from becoming a major source or transshipment point for the illegal drug trade;¶ • Avoid Cuba becoming a state with ungoverned spaces that could provide a platform for terrorists and others wishing to harm the United States. [2]¶ All of these national security threats are directly related to economic and social conditions within Cuba.**¶** US policy specifically supports “a market-oriented economic system” [3] toward Cuba, yet regulations prohibit the importation of any goods of Cuban origin, whether from the island’s potentially booming private sector – including 300,000 agricultural producers – or State-Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”). [4] Such a policy is counterproductive to US interests. Regardless of over 400,000 entrepreneurs, including agricultural cultivators, it could be many years, if ever, when Cuba’s private sector would be ready to serve as the engine of economic growth. SOEs employ 72 percent of Cuban workers. [5] ¶ A rational commercial rapprochement towards Cuba would therefore require a change in current laws and in the system of regulations prohibiting the importation of Cuban goods and products. **Normalized bilateral trade will benefit the Cuban people by helping to provide economic stability** and fostering the growth of a middle class – both of which are essential for the foundation of democratic institutions. Two-way trade must include both Cuba’s private sector as well as SOEs.¶ Cuban SOEs are in a state of gradual transition like other parts of the economy. In December 2012, the Cuban government authorized a wide range of co-ops that will allow workers to collectively open new businesses or take over existing SOEs in construction, transportation, and other industries. Considered a pilot program that is a prime candidate for an expansion, the co-ops “will not be administratively subordinated to any state entity.” [6] ¶ Many Cuban officials, well aware of the limits to small-scale entrepreneurism, appear to harbor hope that co-ops could shift a large portion of the island’s economy to free-market competition from government-managed socialism. In other transitional states, particularly in post-socialist economies, co-ops have served as commercial bridges between state-owned and privatized business. Of the 300 largest co-ops in the world, more than half are in United States, Italy, or France. [7]¶ Ironically, the outputs of such co-ops, including agricultural products which could find strong demand in the American market, are barred by short-sighted federal regulations, thus hampering, if not defeating, what could be a major US policy goal.¶ The United States has been actively trading with foreign SOEs for years. China, a one party, communist state, is the United States’s second largest trading partner, and Chinese SOE’s account for a large percentage of the nearly $400 billion USD in goods exported to America each year. Venezuela is in the top fifteen of US trading partners, and the bulk of that country’s exports are petroleum products deriving from the state-owned PDVSA (which in turn owns Houston-based CITCO oil company). ¶ Another communist country, Vietnam – which initially was the subject of a US economic embargo similar to that imposed on Cuba – is the second largest source of US clothing imports and a major manufacturing source for footwear, furniture, and electrical machinery. [8] On these matters, the Cuban government has said that it wants to “replicate the paths of Vietnam and China.” [9]¶ Of relevance to Cuban trade relations, Vietnam has formally requested to be added to the US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program as a “beneficiary developing country,” which authorizes the US president to grant duty-free treatment for eligible products. The statute also provides the president with specific political and economic criteria to use, when designating eligible countries and products. “Communist” countries are not eligible for GSP membership unless the president determines that certain conditions have been met, including whether the applicant is “dominated or controlled by international communism.” Furthermore, countries that fail to recognize “internationally accepted workers’ rights” are excluded. [10]¶ US statutes do not provide a general definition of a “communist” country, and the Obama administration is expected to declare that Vietnam is no longer “communist” in terms of its economic system. The argument will be that even if Vietnam is a “communist” country (hard to deny, considering it has one party government that is officially titled the Communist Party of Vietnam), it is “not dominated or controlled by international communism” because no such entity exists following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Similar arguments may be applied to Cuba in considering normalized relations with the United States.¶ At the request of the US Congress, the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted detailed reviews of the frameworks for seven key statutes that govern Cuban sanctions. [11] The resulting reports concluded that (i) the president still maintains “broad discretion” to make additional modifications to Cuban sanctions; and (ii) prior measures, implemented by the executive branch have had the effect of easing specific restrictions of the Cuba sanctions and have been consistent with statutory mandates as well as within the discretionary authority of the president. [12] Some legal scholars assert that absence of such explicit statutory provisions in other areas suggests that Congress did not intend to prohibit the executive branch from issuing general or specific licenses to authorize certain transactions with Cuba when “such licenses are deemed to be appropriate and consistent with US policies.” [13]¶ Although a complex variety of federal statutes have re-stated the regulatory prohibition on importation of Cuban goods under 31 CFR § 515.204, enabling legislation to codify the restriction, has not been passed. For example, 22 USC § 6040(a) “notes” that 31 CFR § 515.204 prohibits the importation of goods from Cuba, but does not codify or expressly prohibit such activity, and 22 USC § 7028 acknowledges that Congress did not attempt to alter any prohibitions on the importation of goods from Cuba under 31 CFR § 515.204. [14]¶ The complete dismantling of the Cuban economic embargo will undoubtedly **require congressional legislation**; however, the president has broad powers to modify policy towards Cuba, particularly in an emergency situation that could affect US national security. [15] For example, imports of Cuban origin goods are prohibited under the Cuban Asset Control Regulations (“CACRS”) except as “specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses or otherwise.” [16]¶ Such authority could allow the president to argue for the modification of 31 C.F.R. § 204’s complete prohibition on the importation of Cuban goods by stating that Cuban exports to the United States help the Cuban people by creating employment and thereby maintaining the island’s social stability. Considering the domestic political constituency and the political obduracy of US Congress, a more realistic presidential rationale for allowing Cuban imports from all types of enterprises could be the protection of US borders during an era of grave concerns about homeland security.**¶** Some policy analysts suggest that bilateral trade with Cuba should be restricted to businesses and individuals engaged in certifiably independent (i.e. non-state) economic activity. [17] While well-intentioned, such a policy would likely have a negligible impact on Cuba’s economic development and fails to recognize that commercial enterprises that the US government would classify as SOEs are actually co-ops or other types of quasi-independent entities that are in the early stages of privatization. Restrictions such as this also fail to address larger national and regional security concerns which are the primary responsibility of the president.¶ Although ultimately the Cuban people must freely choose their own political and economic systems, President Obama should be seen as having legal authority to support the transition taking place on the island by opening US markets to Cuban imports. Normalized bilateral trade will benefit the Cuban people and help to provide economic and social stability that is in turn vital to US national and regional security.**¶** Such trade must include both the island’s small, yet growing, private sector and State-Owned Enterprises. In this regard, it would be both unfair and strategically unwise to treat Cuba differently from its stated models, China and Vietnam.

**The embargo collapses the economy and Raul’s reforms will collapse Cuba by widening inequality and cutting social programs**

**Bowie, 11/1/13** - Nile Bowie is a political analyst and photographer currently residing in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (Russia Today, “Isolated & discredited: Intransigent US policy impedes Cuba’s reforms” <http://rt.com/op-edge/us-cuba-economic-benefits-089/>)

Despite the mutual economic benefits of normalizing ties with Cuba, the unceasing and immoral embargo further emboldens the Obama administration’s diplomatic incompetence. It is no exaggeration to say that the world is opposed to the crippling economic embargo unilaterally imposed on Cuba by the United States. 188 nations approved a resolution calling for an end to the blockade at this year’s annual vote on the issue at the UN General Assembly, with only 2 countries opposing – the United States and Israel. The outcome was unsurprising, as Washington has refused to waver from its policy for over five decades, despite immense opposition from the international community that it so often claims to represent. As a result of the embargo, Cuba cannot sell its products on the US market and cannot use dollars in its transactions, hindering foreign trade, the establishment of joint ventures, and international investment. Third countries have been aggressively fined and pursued by the US to stop them from trading with Cuba, while fines against embargo violators have risen totaling $2.5 billion to date. Cuba is also prevented from accessing medical and surgical equipment, and drugs needed for the effective treatment of tumors, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and cancer. According to Havana, the cost of the embargo to the Cuban economy is estimated at $1.1 trillion dollars. China and Venezuela railed against the US for its reactionary stance following the recent vote, while Russia criticized Washington’s policy as being “reminiscent of the Cold War.” The rationale behind the US embargo has remained essentially unchanged since the 1960s, and is best described by Lester D. Mallory, former deputy assistant Secretary of State. “The majority of the Cuban people support Castro. There is no effective political opposition… The only foreseeable means of alienating internal support is through disenchantment and disaffection and hardship… every possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba… a line of action which… makes the greatest inroads in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government,” wrote Mallory, during the height of the Cold War. The stance of every US president since Kennedy has effectively been, “give it time.” Perestroika in Havana In an apparent justification of Washington’s defiant policy on Cuba, US envoy Ronald Godard slammed Havana as for maintaining "one of the most restrictive economic systems in the world." It is wholly insincere of the US to maintain this position when it refuses to scale back the decades-long climate of economic hostility, which remains a critical obstacle to Cuba’s own reform process. President Raúl Castro, who is seen to be more pragmatic and less ideological than his brother Fidel, unveiled an ongoing series of reforms in 2010 aimed at moving the island’s stagnant Soviet-style economy toward a mixed economy, with market functions similar to that of China or Vietnam. In an effort to reduce dependency on a bloated state-bureaucracy, Havana laid off some 500,000 state workers, while significantly relaxing prohibitions on small business activity and the individual hiring of labor. Former state-employees were encouraged to go into business for themselves by driving taxis, opening barbershops, clothing shops and restaurants. Farmers were allowed to sell their goods for a profit, while state-owned companies were permitted to keep 50 percent of their after-tax income to reinvest in productivity, indicating measures to attract foreign investment capital. Recent reforms are bolder, aimed at establishing a tax-free special development zone just west of Havana where foreign companies will be able to transfer tariff-free profits abroad; contract lengths will be extended to 50 years, while full ownership will be allowed for firms operating in the zone. The zone will allow foreign companies to import raw materials, relying on cheap Cuban labor to assemble finished products for export. Companies operating in the zone will pay salaries directly to the Cuban government rather than to workers themselves. Labor will be sold at market rates, while workers are paid on a Cuban scale, allowing the state to appropriate the difference. Critics see this as a closer integration with an exploitive capitalistic business model that will widen existing income disparities. Income inequality between those employed in the party bureaucracy or tourism sector and those who struggle to earn enough to buy goods in state-run shops has deepened in recent times. If the government is perceived as being the biggest benefactor of foreign investment without earnings being adequately channeled to efforts to foster nascent entrepreneurialism and social welfare programs, it will have negative social – and political – ramifications. No shock therapy – we promise! Another significant development is the announcement of an ambitious currency reform that would unify Cuba’s two-currency system. Cuba uses low-valued national pesos alongside convertible pesos tied to the US dollar, introduced for use in the tourism sector and foreign trade to protect the domestic economy from cash influxes, although many would argue these measures had the opposite effect – enriching those who had access to foreign capital while emboldening the shadow economy. State-run shops sell goods in convertible pesos, while most salaries are paid in national pesos – valued at 24 to a convertible peso – which offers much weaker purchasing power. Havana is attempting to converge the exchange rate gradually between the two peso currencies, and the government – acknowledging the potential for volatility in light of the task’s complexity – and promised to avoid imposing "shock therapy" on Cubans. President Raúl has confirmed plans retire at the end of his current term in 2018, and these policies can be interpreted as his efforts to establish a bridge between Fidel’s central planning and the hybrid socialist-market economy that a new generation of Cuba’s Communist Party will inherit. The success of that transition depends on how effectively these experimental new policies are implemented. Raúl’s socialist-austerity policies will come to find more enemies than proponents if a privatized growth model undermines socialized health and education services – the jewels of Fidel’s revolution – and produces oligarchs who have more loyalty to foreign investors than to the values of egalitarianism promoted by the state for so long. Despite severe sanctions and scant resources, Cuba has achieved 99.8% literacy levels through free universal education, and is one of the world’s leading exporters of teachers and doctors. Cuba’s universal health-care is among the best in the developing world; services are freely provided to citizens, and public health indicators surpass that of the United States in many areas. The resilience of the Cuban people is astounding, and if reform policies are sensibly implemented, there will be much room for optimism. A rapprochement between Washington and Havana is not unthinkable, and would foster significant economic benefits, the beginnings of which can be seen through informal trade between Cuban-Americans in south Florida and their families in Havana.

**Lack of external foreign capital will doom the transition**

**Rodriguez and Garcia, 12/27** – Reporters for the AP (Andrea & Anne-Marie, "Lack of customers dooms many Cuban businesses," US News and World Report, 12-27-13, <http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2013/12/27/lack-of-customers-dooms-many-cuban-businesses>, SMS)

HAVANA (AP) — The dented metal pizza trays are packed away, so too the old blender that never worked when it was needed. Gone is the sweet smell of rising dough that infused Julio Cesar Hidalgo's Havana apartment when he and his girlfriend were in business for themselves, churning out cheesy pies for hungry costumers. Two years on the front lines of Cuba's experiment with limited free market capitalism has left Hidalgo broke, out of work and facing a possible crushing fine. But the 33-year-old known for his wide smile and sunny disposition says the biggest loss is harder to define. "I feel frustrated and let down," Hidalgo said, slumped in a rocking chair one recent December afternoon, shrugging his shoulders as he described the pizzeria's collapse. "The business didn't turn out as I had hoped." The Associated Press recently checked in with nine small business owners whose fortunes it first reported on in 2011 as they set up shop amid the excitement of President Raul Castro's surprising embrace of some free enterprise. Among them were restaurant and cafeteria owners, a seamstress and taekwondo instructor, a vendor of bootleg DVDs and a woman renting her rooms out to well-heeled tourists. Their fates tell a story of divided fortunes. Of the six ventures that relied on revenue from cash-strapped islanders, four are now out of business, their owners in more dire financial straits than when they started. But the three enterprises that cater to well-heeled foreigners, and to the minority of well-paid Cubans who work for foreign businesses, are still going and in some cases thriving. While the sample size is small, the numbers point to a basic problem that economists who follow Cuba have noted from the start: There simply isn't enough money to support a thriving private sector on an island where salaries average $20 a month. "Clearly, there is a macroeconomic environment that does not favor the private sector or the expansion of demand that the private sector requires," said Pavel Vidal, a former Cuban Central Bank economist. Vidal has long called on Communist authorities to adopt a huge stimulus package or more aggressively seek capital from foreign investors. Now a professor at Colombia's Javeriana University, he says one has only to look at the trends since 2011 to see the private sector economy is nearly tapped out. After a surge of enthusiasm, the number of islanders working for themselves has stalled for the past two years at about 444,000 — or 9 percent of the workforce. Even in developed countries where entrepreneurs have access to capital, loans and a wide pool of paying customers, startups are risky ventures. According to the U.S. Small Business Administration, about half of all new establishments in America close within five years, and two-thirds are gone within a decade. The failure rate of Cuban entrepreneurs followed by AP was 44 percent in less than two years, and worse if one considers only those that relied primarily on Cuban customers. "There's not enough money circulating in the economy in the hands of everyday people," said Ted Henken, a professor of Latin American studies at Baruch College in New York and author of an upcoming book on private enterprise in Cuba. "You're all competing for the same customers, most of whom are poor and have very limited disposable income." Economists have criticized the Cuban government for a series of measures to crack down on what it sees as illegal activities — including banning private movie cinemas, taxing the import of hard-to-get products in travelers' luggage, and banning the sale of imported clothing. But on Saturday, Castro came down firmly in favor of increased regulation, sternly warning entrepreneurs that "those pressuring us to move faster are moving us toward failure." Henken and Vidal said Cuba must find a way to raise state salaries, expand state-funded microcredits and create a functional wholesale market to service the new businesses. They also noted that for a relatively well-educated society like Cuba's, there are remarkably few white collar jobs on the list of nearly 200 activities that have been legalized. Still, not every entrepreneur is struggling. High-end bars and glamorous new restaurants have become common in Havana, with shiny state tour buses disgorging photo-snapping travelers to sample lobster tail and filet mignon at upward of $20 a plate. Private rooms and homes that rent to foreigners can go for $25-$100 a night, less than most tourist hotels. Cubans with the means, and the business sense, to tap into the gravy train can do very well. Chef-owner Javier Acosta sank more than $30,000 into Parthenon, a private restaurant catering to tourists and diplomats. He struggled at first, telling the AP back in 2011 that there were nights when nobody came in and he and his four waiters just sat around. But the restaurant slowly gained a reputation, in part because Acosta makes a potent Cuban mojito and offers a special suckling pig that can feed up to five people for $50. These days, Acosta is expanding. He recently added tables in a new room decked out with mosaic tiles and faux Greek pillars, and plans to build a roof deck. He even has started advertising, paying $300 a year to have his establishment included in a tourist magazine. "I haven't yet managed to recover my initial investment and the other money we've put into the place," the 40-year-old said. "But in two or three more years maybe I can." Even more humble operations can do well, as long as they have some access to foreign money. One woman who rents an apartment to foreigners for $25 a night in the upscale Vedado neighborhood says her business provides a stable income that supports her and allows her to help her son and granddaughter. Two women who sell $1.25 box lunches to Cubans and foreigners in a building in Old Havana with many international firms and consular offices have managed to stay afloat despite a sharp drop in customers following the departure of several companies, and what they say has been a steady rise in prices of key ingredients like black beans, rice, cooking oil and pork. "This has become difficult," said Odalis Lozano, 48. "But we're still here, because we can always make some money." For those without access to that foreign cash line, the results have been grim. Besides, the failed pizzeria, a DVD salesman, seamstress and street-side cafe owner who allowed the AP to tell their stories shut down after less than a year in business, citing high monthly taxes, a lack of customers and limited resources and business sense. The only two operations that rely on everyday Cubans for revenue which remain in business are gymnasiums. One is run by Maria Regla Zaldivar, who in 2011 was giving taekwondo classes to children in Nuevo Vedado and dreamed of converting a ruined dry cleaning factory into a proper gymnasium. The factory remains a crumbling shell, but Zaldivar said her business continues. She declined to grant a formal interview, but said in a brief phone call that she had rented a small space near her apartment and continued to give classes. The other success story belongs to Neysi Hernandez, the mother of Julio Cesar Hidalgo's girlfriend. Hernandez opened a simple gymnasium for women in the courtyard and garage of her home in Havana's La Lisa neighborhood, charging the equivalent of $5 a month for membership. Two years later, she has 25 paying clients and ekes out a small profit. Hernandez says her customers are loyal, despite the fact the gymnasium lacks basic amenities like a shower room, lockers and towels. Unable to afford imported equipment, Hernandez uses sand-filled plastic water bottles for weights. Her three exercise bicycles and mechanical treadmill are creaky and aging. "My gymnasium is modest, but they like it," Hernandez said, adding she has dreams of one day installing a small massage room and sauna. "A little bit at a time." For the pizza man Hidalgo, however, the experience with private enterprise has been a bitter one. He says he lost between $800 and $1,000 on the pizzeria. He is appealing a $520 fine levied by tax authorities who accuse him of understating his profits, even though the business failed. He has had bouts with illness, and has been unemployed since the pizzeria closed in April. Hidalgo says he has not given up on the idea of opening a new business one day. But he is also setting his sights beyond Cuba's shores. "What I wanted was to work and make money so that I could live a normal life, have money to buy myself shoes, eat, and go out with my girlfriend," Hidalgo said, punctuating each modest desire with a flip of his hand and a rueful smile. "I hope that kind of work materializes in my country, but if the opportunity presents itself to work somewhere else, I won't turn it down." Recently, Hidalgo's girlfriend, Gisselle de la Noval, 25, took out a license to operate a nail salon in the space once occupied by the pizzeria. The salon has been open a matter of weeks and it is too soon to know if it will do well. But she says she is content, charging about 40 cents for a manicure and slightly more for a pedicure. "I don't miss the pizzeria, but I am sad it wasn't a success," she says with a shrug. "But I am young, so whatever. Now I'm dedicated to this."

**Waiting it out fails. Instability is more likely without the plan**

**Whiting ’13** (Ashley, LEEHG Institute for Foreign Policy, Policy Recommendation to Lift the Cuban Embargo, 1/30/13,

<http://www.leehg.org/?p=467>)

**The U**nited **S**tates’ **embargo against Cuba has failed** to fulfill its purpose even half a century after its implementation. Although the Cold War ended over twenty years ago, the United States still utilizes this outdated mindset in their relations towards Cuba. The Cuban embargo is one of the last relics of the Cold War era, and it is time to move forward in terms of foreign policy. During a time when containment was the overruling policy of foreign affairs, imposing an embargo against Cuba was rational diplomacy. In today’s times though, using failed and outdated tactics against Cuba will not yield the results that the United States desires. The time has come to reform relations with Cuba. The Cuban embargo should be lifted due to the sanctions’ ineffectiveness, the correlation between wealth and democracy, the benefits of free trade, and the disapproval by the international community. Before entering into the core arguments against the embargo, it is important to understand the history of U.S.-Cuban relations. The embargo was implemented in 1960, during the height of the Cold War, when the Cuban government nationalized U.S. businesses on their land. The Castro regime has still not paid their reparations, and most likely will not do so anytime soon. With the rising communist government, the support from the Soviet Union, and the looming danger of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the embargo was a highly reasonable decision at that time. Although U.S.S.R.-Cuban relations troubled the U.S. fifty years ago, this relationship is no longer an issue. The Helms-Burton act, implemented during the Clinton Administration, strengthened the sanctions but allowed for humanitarian aid. Although critics of the embargo hoped that President Obama would ease these trade restrictions in 2009, the President has openly stated that he shall continue the embargo until Cuba shows signs of democratization. One of the core arguments against the embargo is that the sanctions have failed to spread democracy to Cuba. Although economic sanctions provide an attractive alternative to full-scale military intervention against an antagonistic nation, they often prove to be ineffective. According to research by Abel Escriba-Folch and Joseph Wright in their publication, Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers, a sanction will fail if it is unsuccessful at affecting the citizens in a leader’s support coalition. This concept correlates perfectly with the core arguments of the rational political ambition theory. A leader’s support coalition is the percentage of people which a leader must satisfy in order to remain in office. If a leader wants to maintain power, then domestic policies must be focused on satisfying the winning coalition. Considering this hypothesis, dictators will value private goods due to the small size of their winning coalition, whereas democratic leaders will distribute more public goods due to the large size of their winning coalition.[5] Although research shows that sanctions are more effective against other democracies, the United States generally imposes sanctions against authoritarian governments. These sanctions may be used to destabilize a totalitarian state, or to simply demonstrate disapproval. Unintentionally, sanctions against dictatorships generally harm those citizens outside of the electorate. These citizens cannot choose their leaders, but they still face the extreme consequences of their government’s policies. If a sanction fails to negatively alter the support coalition’s loyalty, then the leader shall remain in office. Some studies suggest that imposed sanctions strengthen a dictatorship since the leader must reinforce oppression in response to rising foreign pressure. If this is true, then one could argue that the embargo strengthens the Castro regime more than Cuba’s chances of democratization.[5] Considering the correlation between wealth and democracy, lifting the embargo can serve as a beneficial strategy in democratizing Cuba. Research from Freedom House and GDP measurements have demonstrated a strong correlation between a state’s economic growth and level of democracy. Considering the gruesome fate that generally awaits a dictator after leaving office, it is predictable for totalitarian leaders to avoid implementing democratic reforms. Since the United States cannot force Castro to reform, the U.S. must take a different approach. **By strengthening the Cuban middle class, the U.S. can indirectly push Cuba further down the path of democratization.** One well-known hypothesis, created by political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, states that, “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain a democracy“.[3] Various examples in history have supported this hypothesis, such as with the prosperity of South Korea. A once autocratic nation, South Korea has flourished after decades of industrialization and urbanization. A strong middle class is the core of a democracy, since economic stability allows for more political participation. Increased economic inequality may not directly decrease democratic stability, but an impoverished population certainty will. If the majority of a population lacks the necessary resources to fulfill their basic needs, then the probability of them participating in politics is quite low. Without such opportunities, these oppressed people can only change their government in the form of a revolution. Even so, revolutions are rare, unpredictable, chaotic, and catastrophic to those directly involved. When considering basic macroeconomic ideas, free trade is theoretically preferable over pure self-reliance. In this age of globalization, the increased rise of economic interdependency must not be ignored. If each country produces that which they have a comparative advantage in, then all states can capitalize on their own prosperity. A tariff on trade generally helps those companies that cannot compete, but such restrictions defeat the purpose of comparative advantage. Even the concept of free trade between international markets injures communism at its core. Lifting the trade embargo shall not only stimulate the United States’ economy, but shall also improve the living conditions of the Cuban population. By opening up the markets in Cuba, the country may slowly move towards capitalist ideals. [4] The Cuban embargo has become increasingly unpopular through the eyes of the public. The international community overwhelmingly condemns the Cuban embargo, with the U.N. General Assembly member states voting 186-2 against the embargo in 2011.[2] Critics of the embargo argue that the United States uses a double standard towards foreign policy with Cuba. The U.S. does not always trade with other capitalist democracies. China is a communist country, and is also one of the United States’ most important trading partners. Saudi Arabia is commonly defined as a dictatorship, yet the U.S. receives oil and other valued resources from this state. In the long run, **Castro’s communism shall eventually crumble.** However, the Cuban embargo has not helped this process of democratization. The embargo has failed at destabilizing the Castro regime, and succeeded in unintentionally harming the civilian population. These sanctions are ineffective since they have failed at directly harming Castro’s support coalition. The lack of a strong middle class decreases Cuba’s chances of democratizing, and enables Castro to continue his oppression. Instead of coercing Castro into making top-down democratic reforms, **the U**nited **S**tates **can stimulate the Cuban economy and encourage reform from the bottom-up.** From a more liberal viewpoint, free trade shall benefit the United States economy since it may allow a new source of income and a wider access of resources. All things considered, the United States should lift this failed embargo and take a new approach in influencing the domestic politics of Cuba.

**Two scenarios for escalation—**

**First, Cuban economic collapse incapacitates U.S. deterrence and exacerbates hotspots**

**Gorrell, 5** – Lieutenant Colonel (Tim, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18/5, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074>)

**Regardless of the succession**, under the current U.S. policy, **Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans** on the island, **there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community** within Cuba **who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war.** **Whether Raul or another successor** from within the current government **can hold power is debatable.** However, **that individual will** nonetheless **extend the current policies** for an indefinite period, **which will only compound the** Cuban **situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility** if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. **The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast.** In the midst of this chaos, **thousands will flee the island.** During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; **this time the number could be several hundred thousand flee**ing **to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.¶** Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, **the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems.** Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, **Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs** – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, **the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increasesa. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency.** The ramifications of this action could very well **fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas.** A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? **The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast.** **The administration**, given the present state of world affairs, **does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management.** The President and other government and military leaders have warned that **the GWOT will be long and protracted.** These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that **Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity**, so these areas should be secure. **North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation?** Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, **Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These6 are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. I**n view of such global issues, **can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out?** The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

**Cuban distraction prevents effective forces to stop hotspot escalation**

**O’Hanlon, 07** [Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Sydney Stein Jr. Chair in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution and Frederick Kagan, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and “The Case for Larger Ground Forces”, Stanley Foundation Report, April, http://stanleyfoundation.org/publications/other/Kagan\_OHanlon\_07.pdf]

We live at a time when **wars** not only rage **in nearly every region** but **threaten to erupt** **in** many **places where the current relative calm is tenuous**. To view this as a strategic military challenge for the United States is not to espouse a specific theory of America’s role in the world or a certain political philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American foreign policy makers since World War II that **overseas threats must be countered before they** can directly **threaten** this country’s shores, that **the basic stability of the international system** is essential to American peace and prosperity, and that **no country besides the U**nited **S**tates **is in a position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order**. Let us highlight the **threats** and their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those that **involve key strategic regions** of the world **such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia, or key** potential **threats to** American **security, such as the spread of nuclear weapons and** the **strengthening of** the global **Al Qaeda**/jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections. What will happen if the US—or Israeli—government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? North Korea, of course, has already done so, and the ripple effects are beginning to spread. Japan’s recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that country’s constitution to support increased armed forces—and, possibly, even nuclear weapons— may well alter the delicate balance of fear in Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now, **Sino- Taiwanese tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and Pakistan**, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the United States, and so on. Meanwhile, the world’s nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to America’s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in **Iraq** today, they **could get worse**. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lost—but the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, **over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place**, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. **The only serious response** to this international environment **is to develop armed forces capable of protecting** America’s **vital interests** throughout this dangerous time. **Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions—including** not only **deterrence of great power conflict in** dealing with potential **hotspots in Korea**, the **Taiwan** Strait, **and the** Persian **Gulf but also** associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and **stabilization operations**. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnelintensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large-scale missions for a while. But preparing for the possibility, while doing whatever we can at this late hour to relieve the pressure on our soldiers and Marines in ongoing operations, is prudent. At worst, the only potential downside to a major program to strengthen the military is the possibility of spending a bit too much money. Recent history shows no link between having a larger military and its overuse; indeed, Ronald Reagan’s time in office was characterized by higher defense budgets and yet much less use of the military, an outcome for which we can hope in the coming years, but hardly guarantee. While the authors disagree between ourselves about proper increases in the size and cost of the military (with O’Hanlon preferring to hold defense to roughly 4 percent of GDP and seeing ground forces increase by a total of perhaps 100,000, and Kagan willing to devote at least 5 percent of GDP to defense as in the Reagan years and increase the Army by at least 250,000), we agree on the need to start expanding ground force capabilities by at least 25,000 a year immediately. Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

**These conflicts are likely and go nuclear**

**Arbatov, 13** [Military Power in World Politics in the 21st Century Alexei Arbatov is Director of the International Security Center at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations; Full Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Real and Imaginary Threats, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Real-and-Imaginary-Threats-15925]

At the same time, **there is an ongoing rivalry** between them, **involving indirect means** **and local conflicts**, for economic, political and military influence in the post-Soviet space and **in** **some regions** (especially rich in raw materials) **in Asia, Africa and Latin America**. In addition, **they are seeking to gain** military and technological **advantages over rivals to exert** political and psychological **pressure on them** (missile defense, and high-precision conventional weapons, including suborbital and hypersonic ones). **Military force is used to stake one’s claim to control over important geographical areas and lines of communication (the Eastern** **Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Hormuz and Taiwan Straits, the Strait of Malacca, the South China Sea, shipping lanes in the** **Indian Ocean, extensions of the continental shelf and communications in the Arctic**, etc.). **Intense rivalry is going on in arms markets** (especially in countries of the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and North Africa). **This rivalry** involves political leverage and **has political consequences**. Of all hypothetical conflicts among the great powers, **a conflict between China and the U.S. over Taiwan would be of the greatest danger**. **There is a possibility of an aggravation of the crisis over South China Sea islands**, **in which Southeast Asian countries will** **support the U.S. against China**. **Generally, U.S.-Chinese rivalry** for domination in the Asia-Pacific region **is becoming the** **epicenter of global military**-political **confrontation** and competition. **Failure of cooperation among** the **great powers** and alliances **against** common **security threats (terrorism,** the proliferation of **WMD** and their delivery systems) **is quite imaginable**, **which would bring about inability to counter new challenges** and threats **and an increas**ing **chaos in the world economy** and politics. **More likely are conflicts between major regional powers**: **India and Pakistan, Israel** (**together with or without the U**nited **St**ates) **and Iran, and North and South** Korea. **The danger of these conflicts is exacerbated by** their **possible escalation to a nuclear war**. **The greatest threat in this regard is posed by military-political confrontation in South Asia**.

**Second, Cuban failed state triggers terrorism**

**Piazza, 8** – Assistant Professor Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Charlotte (James A., "Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing

States Promote Transnational Terrorism?," International Studies Quarterly, 2008, [http://www.politica**l**science.uncc.edu/jpiazza/Terrorism%20and%20Failed%20States%20ISQ%202008.pdf](http://www.politicalscience.uncc.edu/jpiazza/Terrorism%20and%20Failed%20States%20ISQ%202008.pdf), SMS)

Both **failed** and failing **states**, scholars argue, **are** theoretically **more likely to contain terrorist groups**, experience terrorist attacks, **have their citizens join in and perpetrate terrorist acts, and see their territory used as bases from which to launch attacks abroad.** This pattern occurs because failed and failing states are easier for terrorist movements to penetrate, recruit from, and operate within. **This is because they lack the ability to police for and deter terrorist activity**, and because they provide important opportunities for terrorist movements. Takeyh and Gvosdev (2002) construct the most comprehensive explanation of the mechanics of the relationship between failed and failing states and terrorism, to which I add some elaboration. First, because **they lack the ability to project power internally and have incompetent and corrupt law enforcement** capacities, **failed** and failing **states provide** **opportunities,** and **lower costs**, for terrorist groups **to organize, train, generate revenue, and set up logistics** and communications beyond those afforded by the network of safe houses in non-failed state. Terrorist groups can therefore develop their own capabilities with little governmental interference of scrutiny. This phenomenon is also referred to as the exploitation of "stateless areas," or the use of actual, spatial regions of a country that are beyond the policing control of the central government and within which non-state actors can set up autonomous political, economic, and social institutions, or the segments of the polity of a country that are impenetrable by state power and provide networks of resistance to state authority. An example of the former would be the southern region of Afghanistan where the Taliban is active, and an example of the latter would be the system of radical "madrassas" or religious schools in Pakistan. **The presence of stateless areas within states frees-up group resources otherwise allocated towards evading government agents and permit more extensive and aggressive fundraising, recruitment, and training** efforts. Those groups with ambitions to launch transnational attacks, in particular have more expensive logistical and training needs and therefore need autonomous space without the costs of evading law enforcement. **Second, failed states offer terrorist groups a larger pool of potential recruits because they contain large numbers of insecure, disaffected, alienated, and disloyal citizens** for whom political violence is an accepted avenue of behavior. Failed states are chronically unable to provide basic security and economic sustenance to their citizens, and thereby give rise to what Ehrlich and Liu (2002) and O'Neil (2002) identity as a key contributing factor to the growth of terrorism – "basic human insecurity." Also, Gunaratna (2002) argues that **poor governance**, poor **economic development, corruption, and lack of human rights** – all hallmarks of failed states **– sharpen the appeal of fanaticism, and by extension terrorism**, among potential political actors. Failed states, through their incompetence, create "political goods vacuums" into which terrorist groups can step and parcel out personal security, economic assistance, or other service to win the support of the local population and widen their activities.

**Causes extinction --- high probability**

**Hellman, 8** [Martin E. Hellman, Professor @ Stanford, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf]

The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also **significant**. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of **85 national security experts**, Senator Richard Lugar **found** a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of **an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring** somewhere in the world **in the next 10 years**,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a **full-scale nuclear war**, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, society’s almost total neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important. The cosT of World War iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War II’s fatalities were double or triple that number—chaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, “Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western **civilization will be destroyed**” [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons were “totally irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact: “The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) … a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further millions … might eventually die of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant fire- storms could usher in a **nuclear winter** that might **erase homo sapiens from** the face of the **earth**, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have **devastating** long-lasting c**limatic consequences** due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.

**contention 3 is solvency**

**Normal Trade Relations is key to trade**

**French, 9** – editor of and a frequent contributor to The Havana Note. She has led more than two dozen research trips to Cuba (Anya, “Options for Engagement A Resource Guide for Reforming U.S. Policy toward Cuba” <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Cuba/USPolicy/options-for-engagement.pdf>)

the path to “normal” trade relations If the United States were to lift its trade embargo against Cuba, this would not automatically confer “normal” status to the bilateral trade relationship. It would mean that the United States and Cuba have the opportunity to begin trading in more goods and services than they have in the last fifty years. Whether much expanded trade **actually occurs** depends on whether the United States were to take additional steps beyond lifting the embargo: the most important of which is the provision of Normal Trade Relations (NTR). NTR is a technical term which refers to the provision of nondiscriminatory treatment toward trading partners. Cuba and North Korea are the only two countries to which the United States continues to deny “normal trade relations.” All other countries either have permanent normal trade relations or temporary, renewable normal trade relations with the United States.161 Assuming that the Cuba-specific trade sanctions contained in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (the continuity of which was codified by the 1996 Helms-Burton Act) were to be eliminated, achieving normal trade relations between Cuba and the United States would not be a simple matter. A first stumbling block could be the 1974 Trade Act provision dubbed “Jackson-Vanik,” which prohibits non-market economy countries from receiving normal tariff treatment, entering into a bilateral commercial agreement, or receiving any U.S. government credits or loan guarantees, until the President has reported to Congress that such a country does not: 1) deny its citizens the right to emigrate, 2) impose an unreasonable tax or fine for emigrating, and 3) impose more than a “nominal tax, levy, fine, fee or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice.”162 Thus, Cuba’s restrictions on its citizens’ emigration rights pose an obstacle to normalization of bilateral trade. Only once the requirements set forth by the Jackson-Vanik amendment have been met, (and absent any other Cuba-specific sanctions, such as the Export Administration Act controls on countries found to be supporting international terrorism), could the United States begin negotiations of a bilateral commercial agreement with Cuba. To begin to extend normal trade relations to Cuba, the United States would need to enter into a reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba (not equivalent to a “free trade agreement”) that would provide a balance of trade benefits and protections to U.S. exports and commercial entities doing business with Cuba, at the same time it would provide such benefits to Cuba. Such an agreement would need to include protection for U.S. patents and trademarks and for “industrial rights and processes,” include a safeguard mechanism to prevent market disruptions due to trade, and provide that the agreement, and its continuation, be subject to the national security interests of both parties.163 Assuming bilateral relations had reached the appropriate milestones to begin discussing two-way trade, negotiating such an agreement could potentially take years, as both countries would need to adopt statutory and regulatory changes.

**Unconditional lifting is key**

**Ratliff, 9 -** Research Fellow at the Independent Institute and a member of the Board of Advisors of the Institute’s Center on Global Prosperity. He is also a Research Fellow and Curator of the Americas Collection at the Hoover Institution(William, “Why and How to Lift the U.S. Embargo on Cuba”, 5/7,

http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2496)

How has the embargo failed? It has not brought down the Castro brothers, advanced democracy, freedom, human rights or prosperity in Cuba, or gotten compensation for Americans whose assets Cuba seized decades ago. It largely denies Americans the freedom to travel to Cuba, or to trade freely and otherwise interact Cubans on the island. And in recent decades it has given Fidel the scapegoat he needs—us—to excuse his economic utopianism and brutality. Supporters of the embargo see it as an expression of America’s moral indignation at Castro’s brutal policies. By limiting the flow of dollars to Cuba we deny some funds to Cuban security forces, as they argue, but we simultaneously withhold support for the daily lives of the Cuban people. For twenty years the embargo placated the very noisy Cuban American community in Florida, but by late 2008 even a majority of Cuban Americans, according to a Florida International University poll, had turned against it. It isn’t that Cuban Americans are going soft on Fidel, but that a majority finally see or admit that this policy is more harmful than positive to its own interests. And it is harmful to U.S. interests as well, which ought to be our primary concern, alienating the Hemisphere and the world as a whole while having only negative impacts in Cuba. The Cuban American National Foundation, long the epicenter of anti-Castroism in the United States, recently admitted that for many years the embargo has been “little beyond posturing for domestic electoral purposes.” How can we best end this policy with a minimum of confrontation, frustration and delay? The only way we can keep full control of the process is by **lifting it unilaterally**. The State Department recently lauded the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia. “It has long been and remains the position of the United States that normalization should take place without preconditions,” State said. So why not between the United States and Cuba, where the pain of the past hardly equals that of Turkey and Armenia? Is Castro a brutal dictator? Sure, but his atrocities are hardly worse than those of Robert Mugabe, the thug who rules Zimbabwe, a country we recognize. The United States demands more concessions from Cuba for recognition than from any other country in history. In fact, the Helms Burton Act is blatantly imperialistic, in the spirit of the Platt Amendment to the Monroe Doctrine a century ago, which poisoned U.S. relations with Cuba for decades. Negotiations without preconditions, which Obama says he supports, are the next best though potentially deeply flawed approach. Informal discussions between U.S. and Cuban diplomats already are underway. If Cuban pragmatists, including President Raul Castro, can over-ride Fidel’s anti-American passions, perhaps the United States, if we are very flexible, and Cuba can work out a step-by-step, face-saving plan to reduce tensions and normalize relations. The Obama administration got off to a positive start by dropping the misguided 2004 Bush administration restrictions on remittances and travel to Cuba, but then in public statements fell immediately into the trap of previous administrations by demanding “reciprocity.” This seems a just and reasonable demand, but in the propaganda-filled public arena it is a game-stopper. In practical terms, the public demand for reciprocity **hands Cuba a veto over U.S. policy** which it has used before to short-circuit emerging U.S. moderation. Cuba will never make tradeoffs on important matters so long as the core of the basically flawed embargo remains in place. Lifting the embargo would unleash a new dynamic and put full responsibility for Cuban rights violations and economic failure squarely on Cuba’s leaders where it belongs. We can hope, but can’t guarantee, that ending the embargo will encourage real domestic reforms in Cuba. We can guarantee that it will rid us of a demeaning, hypocritical and counterproductive policy

**Policy won’t change absent the plan**

**Wilkinson, 13** – chair of the International Institute for the Study of Cuba (Stephen, “ What Will a New Generation of Leadership Mean for Cuba?” 3/6, <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3254>)

A: Stephen Wilkinson, chairman of the International Institute for the Study of Cuba: "This is a very challenging question to answer for any Cuba watcher because I think it is fair to say that the appointment of Miguel Díaz-Canel came as a surprise. He is not a person who was hitherto well-known. He traveled abroad very rarely and has had very little contact with the United States or foreign affairs. This means that it is almost impossible to predict what his appointment will mean. It is evident that he is the first person to hold the post of first vice-president who was born after the revolution. He is therefore a member of the generation that benefitted the most from the social advances that it made. He comes from a relatively modest background, and he is not a member of any of the prominent families that fought the revolution, nor is he a military figure. This might suggest that he has been carefully selected because in him it is very difficult to accuse the Cuban leadership of being nepotistic or dynastic, or of being militarized. His lack of prior contact with the United States is also important to consider. As an unknown quantity, he will be harder to influence or predict. He has an impeccable record as a party member, appears to be modest and is obviously extremely hard-working. I feel therefore that he will represent continuity rather than change. I believe talk of a significant generational switch is somewhat exaggerated. Even if he obtains the highest office, Díaz-Canel will still be surrounded for years by members of the generation that fought the revolution, many of whom are not as old as the Castros. Esteban Lazo Hernández for example, who has just taken over the presidency of the National Assembly, is 68 and fought in the revolution as boy. Even under the new two-term rule, he could still be in office in 2022! If anything, the lesson I would draw from this for the policymakers in Washington is to wake up to the fact that waiting for the Castros to die is a waste of time."

**Cuba says yes- Raul and economic reforms**

**LeoGrande, 13** - professor in the Department of Government, School of Public Affairs at American University in Washington, D.C. (William, “The Danger of Dependence: Cuba's Foreign Policy After Chavez” World Politics Review, 4/2, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12840/the-danger-of-dependence-cubas-foreign-policy-after-chavez>)

In Cuba, **Raúl Castro's historic economic reforms are** moving the island toward a mixed socialist economy, and incipient political decompression is allowing more space for open debate. These changes, undertaken in response to domestic necessity rather than U.S. demands, are nevertheless **moving Cuba in directions long cited by Washington as necessary for better relations**. To exert any positive influence on the trajectory of Cuba's evolution, however, Washington has to engage not just with Cuban society but with Cuba's government.

**Eager to put Cuba on a more solid footing** before passing the torch to the next generation of leaders, **Raúl** Castro **seems genuinely interested in opening talks with Washington. Unlike his older brother, Raúl did not make his political career by mobilizing nationalist sentiment against the U**nited **S**tates. **He has a strong incentive to settle this conflict so he can focus on renovating the Cuban economy and open it up to U.S. trade and investment**.

**Links are non-unique**

**Taylor, 13** (Guy Taylor, 7/4/13, “Private talks hint at change in U.S.-Cuba relationship”, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/4/private-talks-hint-at-change-in-us-cuba-relationsh/print/)//EM

**The** **State** **Department** **has** quietly **been** **holding talks** **with** **a** small but diverse **cadre** **of Cuban natives in Washington** — including democracy activists offering insider views of the communist island's politics — that analysts say could send shock waves through the long-standing debate about what a future U.S. policy toward Cuba should look like. Obama administration officials are mum on the closed-door meetings, including one held at Foggy Bottom last week with renowned Cuban hunger-striker Guillermo Farinas, who came bearing a somewhat paradoxical message: Most pro-democracy activists now operating in Cuba, which has been a Communist dictatorship and a U.S. enemy for more than a half-century, oppose lifting the long-standing U.S. embargo on trade with their nation. Such realities may not surprise close Cuba watchers, who say U.S. officials have known for years that ending the embargo might unleash a flow of badly needed foreign cash to the government of President Raul Castro — enhancing its ability to crush the island's fragile pro-democracy movement. But activists like Mr. Farinas are now being allowed to inject their views directly into the heart of Washington's foreign policy establishment, ironically because he and other dissidents have been allowed to take advantage of January's historic lifting by the Castro government of a decades-old ban on travel abroad. "The activists are feeling with their blood and bones the repression of the Cuban security apparatus," said Mauricio Claver-Carone, executive director of the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC in Washington. U.S. policymakers "now get to actually see it and feel it firsthand from the protagonists themselves," he said. "That's extraordinary and it's very helpful." The impact such visits are having on the Obama administration, however, is a subject of debate. Mr. Farinas' visit occurred in the shadow of headlines from a landmark meeting last month between U.S. and Cuban officials, who talked about possibly re-establishing direct mail service between the two nations. The two nations plan to meet July 17 to talk about regulating migration. Together, the **negotiations** **have some** in Washington **wondering** **whether** the **Obama** administration **is looking to break the stalemate that has defined U.S. relations with Havana** since Cuban leader Fidel Castro agreed to house Soviet ballistic missiles in 1961. Mr. Castro, 86, stepped down in 2008, and the top post is now held by his 82-year-old brother, who has allowed such incremental reforms as the easing of the ban on his citizens' travel. Raul Castro has said that he will step down when his five-year term ends in 2018. But Cuba remains on Washington's list of state sponsors of terrorism, and sources close to the Obama administration told The Washington Times that ongoing frustration with Havana's detention of American Alan Gross is likely to prevent the kind of wide-scale redefinition of policy some thought would come during Mr. Obama's presidency. Washington wants the release of Mr. Gross, a subcontractor who was arrested in 2009 while working for a U.S. Agency for International Development-funded program. Cuban authorities accused him of illegally delivering satellite phones to individuals in the nation's Jewish community and gave him a 15-year prison sentence. His detention served only to amplify back-channel tensions with Havana. The Castro government has for its part long complained about U.S. treatment of the "Cuban Five" — a group of Cuban intelligence officers convicted in Miami in 2001 of conspiracy to spy on U.S. military installations, Cuban exiles and anti-Castro politicians. 'Modest thaw' **The recent move toward re-establishing direct mail with the U.S. and the upcoming talks on migration** might seem insignificant within the context of such tensions. **"These talks are not a major breakthrough**," said Geoff Thale, a program director at the Washington Institute on Latin America. "**But they are one more signal that there is at least a modest thaw in the relationship, a new willingness to talk."** But even **those** modest **steps** **have been criticized by some U.S. lawmakers**, **most prominently Cuban-American Republican s who represent districts in Florida heavy with anti-Castro exiles.**