# 1NC

#### resolved requires a policy

**Louisiana House 05 –** 3-8-2005, http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### “United States federal government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental action

**Ericson 03 –** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb **should**—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The **entire debate** is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### “economic engagement” is limited to expanding economic ties

**Çelik 11** – Arda Can Çelik, Master’s Degree in Politics and International Studies from Uppsala University, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies, p. 11

Introduction

Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies **differ from other tools** in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender stale to change the political behaviour of target stale. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway lo perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows "It is a policy of **deliberate expanding economic ties** with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations ".(p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that " the direct and positive linkage of interests of stales where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.

#### Resolutional basis—substantially means in substance, not illusory

**Merriam-Webster, 8** (“substantial”, 2008, http://www.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=substantially)

Main Entry: sub·stan·tial

1 a: consisting of or relating to substance b: not imaginary or illusory : real, true c: important, essential

#### They undermine clash—it’s impossible to engage their ideas if we don’t know what they are—that clash is critical to develop strategies and test ideas which eventually result in social change

**Branham 1995** (Robert, Professor of Rhetoric at Bates College, Argumentation and Advocacy, Winter)

In the years following his release from prison, Malcolm X honed his speaking skills through sidewalk preaching and his ministry in New York Temple No. 7 and other mosques. He gained national attention in the late 1950s through a series of public confrontations with Black clergy, civil rights leaders and the press. After complaining about the lack of coverage of the NOI in the Amsterdam News, he was given his own column in which he blasted Christian ministers as "chicken-eaters" who served "the slaveowners' church." When a delegation of prominent New York ministers protested, editor James Hicks offered them equal space in a column that would run beside Malcolm X's - a debate in print. "By the third week," Hicks recalls, "it was apparent that, by having a target, Malcolm was even more devastating. Malcolm murdered the man" (Goldman, 1973, p. 61). Hicks' rhetorical assessment was an astute one. Malcolm X was at his best when able to use the ideas of another as a foil for his own, which shone most brightly in the light generated by confrontation.

#### A general subject isn’t enough—debate requires a specific point of difference

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### A predictable topic forces pre-round internal-reflective deliberation which is the only way to convince people of the legitimacy of the 1ac

**Goodin and Niemeyer 03 –** (Robert and Simon, Australian National University, “When Does Deliberation Begin, Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy” Political Studies, Volume 50, p 627-649, WileyInterscience)

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – **before** the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing **attention on a topic**, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to **internal-reflective deliberation**, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earl iest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or the anticipation of participating) in formally **organized group discussions** might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

#### That’s key to critical thinking which is a portable educational skill – outweighs your offense

**Harrigan 08 –** (Casey, Director of Debate at MSU, Master’s in Communications – Wake Forest U., “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May, pp. 6-9)

Additionally, there are social benefits to the practice of requiring students to debate both sides of controversial issues. Dating back to the Greek rhetorical tradition, great value has been placed on the benefit of testing each argument relative to all others in the marketplace of ideas. Like those who argue on behalf of the efficiency-maximizing benefits of free market competition, it is believed that arguments are most rigorously tested (and conceivably refined and improved) when compared to all available alternatives. Even for beliefs that have seemingly been ingrained in consensus opinion or in cases where the public at-large is unlikely to accept a particular position, it has been argued that they should remain open for public discussion and deliberation (Mill, 1975). Along these lines, the greatest benefit of switching sides, which goes to the heart of contemporary debate, is its inducement of critical thinking. Defined as "reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do" (Ennis, 1987, p.10), critical thinking learned through debate teaches students not just how advocate and argue, but how to decide as well. Each and every student, whether in debate or (more likely) at some later point in life, will be placed in the position of the decision-maker. Faced with competing options whose costs and benefits are initially unclear, critical thinking is necessary to assess all the possible outcomes of each choice, compare their relative merits, and arrive at some final decision about which is preferable. In some instances, such as choosing whether to eat Chinese or Indian food for dinner, the importance of making the correct decision is minor. For many other decisions, however, the implications of choosing an imprudent course of action are potentially grave. As Robert Crawford notes, there are "issues of unsurpassed important in the daily lives of millions upon millions of people...being decided to a considerable extent by the power of public speaking" (2003). Although the days of the Cold War are over, and the risk that "The next Pearl Harbor could be 'compounded by hydrogen" (Ehninger and Brockriede, 1978, p.3) is greatly reduced, the manipulation of public support before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 points to the continuing necessity of training a well-informed and critically-aware public (Zarefsky, 2007). In the absence of debate-trained critical thinking, ignorant but ambitious politicians and persuasive but nefarious leaders would be much more likely to draw the country, and possibly the world, into conflicts with incalculable losses in terms of human well-being. Given the myriad threats of global proportions that will require incisive solutions, including global warming, the spread of pandemic diseases, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cultivating a robust and effective society of critical decision-makers is essential. As Louis Rene Beres writes, "with such learning, we Americans could prepare...not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet" (2003). Thus, it is not surprising that critical thinking has been called "the highest educational goal of the activity" (Parcher, 1998). While arguing from conviction can foster limited critical thinking skills, the element of switching sides is necessary to sharpen debate's critical edge and ensure that decisions are made in a reasoned manner instead of being driven by ideology. Debaters trained in SSD are more likely to evaluate both sides of an argument before arriving at a conclusion and are less likely to dismiss potential arguments based on his or her prior beliefs (Muir 1993). In addition, debating both sides teaches "**conceptual flexibility**," where decision-makers are more likely to reflect upon the beliefs that are held before coming to a final opinion (Muir, 1993, p,290). Exposed to many arguments on each side of an issue, debaters learn that public policy is characterized by extraordinary complexity that requires careful consideration before action. Finally, these arguments are confirmed by preponderance of empirical research demonstrating a link between competitive SSD and critical thinking (Allen, Berkowitz, Hunt and Louden, 1999; Colbert, 2002, p.82).

#### political simulations are educationally valuable – deliberation is empowering and activates agency

**Hanghoj 08** – Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor (http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansends- schemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of **educational gaming** cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. **Dramatic rehearsal** The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by **projecting** and **choosing between** various scenarios for **future action**. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (**in imagination**) of various competing possible **lines of action**… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a **thought experiment**. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding **everyday rationality** (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “**crystallizing possibilities** and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “**thought experiment**” will be successful. But what it cando is make the **process** of choosing more **intelligent** than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a **valuable perspective** for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into **domain-specific scenarios**. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to **inquire into** and resolve **scenario-specific problems** (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a **striking difference** between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the **actual consequences** that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or **simulate** the stakes and risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “**competing** possible **lines of action**” that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the “right” answers, but more a question of exploring the **contingent outcomes** and **domain-specific processes** of **problem-based scenarios**.

#### critical approaches can’t resolve real world problems like poverty, racism, war and doom their project to irrelevance – political pragmatism solves your advocacy

**McClean 01** – Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, Molloy College, New York

(David E., “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” Presented at the 2001 Annual Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm, JMP)

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me **hugely more irrelevant** than Habermas in their narrative attempts to **suggest policy prescriptions** (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who **actually want to be relevant**, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in **neological and multi-syllabic jargon.** These **elaborate theoretical remedies** are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left **retreats from activism** and adopts a **spectatorial approach** to the problems of its country. **Disengagement** from practice produces **theoretical hallucinations**"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action."

Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as **beyond reform** and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be **disastrous for our social hopes**, as I will explain.

Leftist American culture critics might put their **considerable talents to better use** if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help **forge public and political possibilities** in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of **public intellectual** who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to **move past high theory** to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"

**The new public philosopher** might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our **quotidian social institutions,** into the **grimy pragmatic details** where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly **understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences.** This might help keep us from being **slapped down in debates by true policy pros** who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to **listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers** and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

#### Plan texts are key —failure guarantees that oppression continues and efforts for change backfire

**STEVE 2007** (Anonymous member of Black Block and Active Transformation who lives in East Lansing, MI, Date Last Mod. Feb 8, http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/global/a16dcdiscussion.htm)

What follows is not an attempt to discredit our efforts. It was a powerful and inspiring couple of days. I feel it is important to always analyze our actions and be self-critical, and try to move forward, advancing our movement. The State has used Seattle as an excuse to beef up police forces all over the country. In many ways Seattle caught us off-guard, and we will pay the price for it if we don't become better organized. The main weakness of the Black Block in DC was that clear goals were not elaborated in a strategic way and tactical leadership was not developed to coordinate our actions. By leadership I don't mean any sort of authority, but some coordination beside the call of the mob. We were being led around DC by any and everybody. All someone would do is make a call loud enough, and the Black Block would be in motion. We were often lead around by Direct Action Network (DAN - organizers of the civil disobedience) tactical people, for lack of our own. We were therefore used to assist in their strategy, which was doomed from the get go, because we had none of our own. The DAN strategy was the same as it was in Seattle, which the DC police learned how to police. Our only chance at disrupting the IMF/WB meetings was with drawing the police out of their security perimeter, therefore weakening it and allowing civil disobedience people to break through the barriers. This needs to be kept in mind as we approach the party conventions this summer. Philadelphia is especially ripe for this new strategy, since the convention is not happening in the business center. Demonstrations should be planned all over the city to draw police all over the place. On Monday the event culminated in the ultimate anti-climax, an arranged civil disobedience. The civil disobedience folks arranged with police to allow a few people to protest for a couple minutes closer to where the meetings were happening, where they would then be arrested. The CD strategy needed arrests. Our movement should try to avoid this kind of stuff as often as possible. While this is pretty critical of the DAN/CD strategy, it is so in hindsight. This is the same strategy that succeeded in shutting down the WTO ministerial in Seattle. And, while we didn't shut down the IMF/WB meetings, we did shut down 90 blocks of the American government on tax day - so we should be empowered by their fear of us! The root of the lack of strategy problem is a general problem within the North American anarchist movement. We get caught up in tactical thinking without establishing clear goals. We need to elaborate how our actions today fit into a plan that leads to the destruction of the state and capitalism, white supremacy and patriarchy. Moving away from strictly tactical thinking toward political goals and long term strategy needs to be a priority for the anarchist movement. No longer can we justify a moralistic approach to the latest outrage - running around like chickens with their heads cut off. We need to prioritize developing the political unity of our affinity groups and collectives, as well as developing regional federations and starting the process of developing the political principles that they will be based around (which will be easier if we have made some headway in our local groups). The NorthEastern Federation of Anarchist Communists (NEFAC) is a good example of doing this. They have prioritized developing the political principles they are federated around. The strategies that we develop in our collectives and networks will never be blueprints set in stone. They will be documents in motion, constantly being challenged and adapted. But without a specific elaboration of what we are working toward and how we plan to get there, we will always end up making bad decisions. If we just assume everyone is on the same page, we will find out otherwise really quick when shit gets critical. Developing regional anarchist federations and networks is a great step for our movement. We should start getting these things going all over the continent. We should also prioritize developing these across national borders, which NEFAC has also done with northeastern Canada. Some of the errors of Love and Rage were that it tried to cover too much space too soon, and that it was based too much on individual membership, instead of collective membership. We need to keep these in mind as we start to develop these projects. One of the benefits of Love and Rage was that it provided a forum among a lot of people to have a lot of political discussion and try to develop strategy in a collective way. This, along with mutual aid and security, could be the priorities of the regional anarchist federations. These regional federations could also form the basis for tactical leadership at demonstrations. Let me first give one example why we need tactical teams at large demos. In DC the Black Block amorphously made the decision to try to drive a dumpster through one of the police lines. The people in front with the dumpster ended up getting abandoned by the other half of the Black Block who were persuaded by the voice of the moment to move elsewhere. The people up front were in a critical confrontation with police when they were abandoned. This could be avoided if the Black Block had a decision making system that slowed down decision making long enough for the block to stay together. With this in mind we must remember that the chaotic, decentralized nature of our organization is what makes us hard to police. We must maximize the benefits of decentralized leadership, without establishing permanent leaders and targets. Here is a proposal to consider for developing tactical teams for demos. Delegates from each collective in the regional federation where the action is happening would form the tactical team. Delegates from other regional federations could also be a part of the tactical team. Communications between the tactical team and collectives, affinity groups, runners, etc. could be established via radio. The delegates would be recallable by their collectives if problems arose, and as long as clear goals are elaborated ahead of time with broader participation, the tactical team should be able to make informed decisions. An effort should be made to rotate delegates so that everyone develops the ability. People with less experience should be given the chance to represent their collectives in less critical situations, where they can become more comfortable with it. The reality is that liberal politics will not lead to an end to economic exploitation, racism, and sexism. Anarchism offers a truly radical alternative. Only a radical critique that links the oppressive nature of global capitalism to the police state at home has a chance of diversifying the movement against global capitalism. In order for the most oppressed people here to get involved the movement must offer the possibility of changing their lives for the better. A vision of what "winning" would look like must be elaborated if people are going to take the risk with tremendous social upheaval, which is what we are calling for. We cannot afford to give the old anarchist excuse that "the people will decide after the revolution" how this or that will work. We must have plans and ideas for things as diverse as transportation, schooling, crime prevention, and criminal justice. People don't want to hear simple solutions to complex questions, that only enforces people's opinions of us as naive. We need practical examples of what we are fighting for. People can respond to examples better than unusual theory. While we understand that we will not determine the shape of things to come, when the system critically fails someone needs to be there with anti-authoritarian suggestions for how to run all sorts of things. If we are not prepared for that we can assume others will be prepared to build up the state or a new state.

**Text:** ***The United States federal government should dissolve the US-Mexican border***

**Anonymity in social movements is crucial to prevent the movement from becoming identified with individuals rather than the overall cause and therefore preventing marginalization of social movements.**

**Public Sphere Project, ’08** – (an initiative of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) to help promote more effectiveand equitable public spheres all over the world, “Liberating Voices! A Pattern Language for Communication Revolution,” http://www.publicsphereproject.org/patterns/pattern.pl/public?pattern\_id=379)

By refusing to put a face on those in a group or movement, the cause becomes the focus and not the individuals promoting it. (By insisting "we are you" the masks worn by Zapatistas are promoted to be mirrors that reflect the face of onlookers, (not the wearers) the emphasis is allowed to remain on the(ir) issue.) Groups who want to create social change without the entanglements of personalities can use this generic pattern. Appealing to humanity on a global scale requires common identifiers. Resistance by marginalized and repressed groups against governing forces is a universally recognized struggle. (By maintaining anonymity the Zapatistas are able to evade being minimalized as cultural or indigenous resistors.) Anonymity permits transcendent identification with their core message, which is to defend safe places of democracy for those who desire them. For example, the Indigenous people of Chiapas Mexico have been forced from their anonymous lifestyle into the global sphere to protect their culture and create a safe democratic space in order to continue their lifestyle in freedom. In the process, they have assumed an anonymous identity that represents all marginalized and discriminated citizens of the world. The Zapatistas of Chiapas, Mexico have awakened conscientious members of society who join them in solidarity. The phrase “we are you” refers to the anonymous mask worn by Zapatistas which is purported to be a mirror reflecting the identity of all those who fight for freedom from tyranny. Therefore: Anonymity is a tool that affords groups to bring focus to their agenda rather than the participants of the movement. Anonymity is a successful strategy to prevent a movement from being marginalized into a cultural issue rather than one resisting control and insisting on peace, democracy and freedom for the oppressed (etc). This form of communicating information is more effective at promoting conviviality in the human sphere as it promotes identification with any timeless struggle we face. The use of anonymity as a perennial solution of a recurring problem (control) within a social change context brings life to the Zapatista movement and translates what began as a grass roots resistance for survival into the fight for peace and democracy for the marginalized populations of the world.

**Like the masks of the Zapatistas, our anonymity represents the struggle against co-option. We wear masks and do not use our names in order to avoid becoming reduced to a photo on the t-shirt of a rich white teenager in America who calls for revolution while knowing nothing of hardship.**

**Elmer, ’02** – (Greg, Ph.D. in Communications, Bell Globe media Research Chair, Associate Professor of Radio TV Arts, and Director of the Infoscape Research Lab at Ryerson University, 2002. “Critical Perspectives on the Internet,” pp. 116-17)

The masked commander Marcos’s mestizo ethnicity affirms this fluidity of Zapatista identity. While “the Sup,” as he is affectionately called, gained immediate notoriety as well as the hero status in the eyes of many Mexicans, including peasants and middle-class people throughout the country, by projecting the image of a Robin Hood defending the rights of the downtrodden against an unjust and repressive government. As a disguise, the black ski mask not only shields Marcos and other Zapatistas from being identified by the government and the military, but **it also masks differences among Zapatistas and symbolizes the antiauthoritarian structure of the movement**. In his writings, he also uses the mask as a metaphor for how the neoliberal establishment ignores and disguises the human suffering it has created. He thus submits a call to “break silences and pull off masks.” He primarily considers the signature black ski masks as symbolic challenge against authoritative rule: “The main reason is that we have to be careful that nobody tries to be the main leader. The masks are meant to prevent this from happening. **It is about being anonymous, not because we fear for ourselves, but rather to avoid being corrupted.** Nobody can then appear all the time and demand attention. Our leadership is a collective leadership and we must respect that. Even though you are listening to me now, elsewhere there are others who are masked and who are also talking. So, the masked person here today is called “Marcos” and tomorrow might be “Pedro in Las Margaritas, or “Josue” in Ocosingo, or “Alfredo” in Altamarino, or whatever he is called. So the one who speaks is a more collective heart, not a single leader, or caudillo. That is what I want you to understand, not acaudillo in the old style and image. The only image that you will have is that those who have made this rebellion wear ski masks. And the time will come when the people will realize that it is enough to have dignity and put on a mask and say that they too can do this.” (Harvey, 1998, 7) The black ski masks are rich in meaning. While providing safety through anonymity and communicating strength through their threatening appearance, they also symbolize the collaborative and pluralistic structure of the movement. **Note that one does not hide by wearing the mask, rather by taking it off.** Furthermore the mask symbolizes transformation. Wearing the ski mask legitimizes Marcos as a movement spokesperson for it symbolizes his own transformation from middle-class intellectual to crusader for indigenous rights. He strips away his old identity so that he may be considered equal with others who wear ski masks. By wearing the mask, movement supporters take on the collective identity, which is in turn, enacted through the movement’s centralized organizational structure.

**Just like our embrace of anonymity, the masks of the Zapatistas prevent the development of a cult of personality around any particular leader in their movement and preserve their cause from marginalization and commodification by the system against which they fight.**

**Pitawanakwat, ’2k**– (Brock,University of Victoria, “The Mirror of Dignity: Zapatista Communications &Indigenous Resistance” pp. 10-11)

Perhaps the most visible and well-known Zapatista symbol is the ski mask, balaclava, or pasamontañas in Spanish. During the first day of the uprising, Subcommandante Marcos explained to surprised witnesses of the rebellion in San Cristóbal that until indigenous peoples put on their masks, no one saw them. Various interpretations exist for their use by the rebels. For example, they: 1) maintain equality amongst the leadership and dispute the idea that it was led by any single rebel 2) show solidarity between the indigenous and the mestizo within the EZLN; 3) constitute a unifying form of self-identification analogous to the beards of the Cuban rebels during that country’s 1959 revolution; 4) function as a symbol of Mexico’s refusal to recognize its indigenous peoples;5) shield the identities of the rebels in order to prevent reprisals against their communities and families; and 6) perhaps more practically, protect against the cold weather.Marcos, has stated that he will remove his own mask only when “Mexican society takes off its own mask, the one it uses to cover up the real Mexico.”In his first appearance in the media spotlight, Marcos explained to reporters that the rebels were masked in order to prevent any particular commandante from becoming a figurehead and therefore a target for government cooptation or corruption.But in preventing the figurehead syndrome, the mask also helps to maintain a collective and diffused leadership that prevents “protagonism” and supports the movement’s “leading by obeying” principle.The mask has been symbolically tied to Mexico’s attempt to hide the third world conditions in which its indigenous peoples live while its government attempts to secure first world status with trade deals such as NAFTA.

#### But every one of these lines is different, it requires different practices and different words to be reproduced and given force. The affirmative’s representations ultimately homogenize all borders into one metaphorical border, taking the uniqueness and difference present at every border and reducing it to something analogous to themselves. THEIR particular border becomes ALL borders. This ideological imperialism not only reduces the diversity of the other to what is analogous to the self, it also produces a utopian politics that ignores the complex ways resistance itself is produced in power relations, and reproduces a universalist politics that replicates colonialist practices

Vila ’05 - , Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Texas at San Antonio, 2005 [Pablo, “Conclusion: The Limits of American Border Theory,” *Ethnography at the Border*, Ed. Pablo Vila, p.307-315]

After dominating the field for some time, this corpus of work has come under criticism in recent years. This criticism does not deny the pathbreaking character of those books but seeks to address several shortcomings that have now become apparent. As Heyman points out, "A single-image representing grand theoretical assertions is too general for the political and economic environment of the border. I propose that we specify our analytical tools for the border: that is, that we respect the concretely located nature of the Mexico–U.S. border" (1994, 43). Thus several authors have lately advanced different criticisms of mainstream border theory. First, some Mexican scholars (Tabuenca, Barrera) have complained that the U.S.–Mexico border most of this work portrays with such theoretical sophistication has little resemblance to the border they experience from the other side of the (literal) fence. Second, other writers have noted the exclusionary character of border studies and theory exemplified in these major works and claim that current mainstream border theory essentializes the cultures that must be crossed. Third, as I claim hereafter, in the vast majority of recent border scholarship, there is a general failure to pursue the theoretical possibility that fragmentation of experience can lead to the reinforcement of borders instead of an invitation to cross them. Thus crossing borders, and not reinforcing borders, is the preferred metaphor in current border studies and theory. Fourth, a corollary of the previous trend is the tendency to construct the border crosser or the hybrid (in some cases the Latin American international immigrant in general, but in others the Chicano in particular—at least in the books I am criticizing here) into **a new "privileged subject of history"** Fifth, border studies have recently moved from the study of issues related to the U.S.–Mexico border in particular to broader themes, in which the metaphor of borders is used to represent any situation where limits are involved. Border studies thus takes as its own object of inquiry any physical or psychic space about which it is possible to address problems of boundaries: borders among different countries, borders among disciplines, and the like. Borderlands and border crossings seem to have become ubiquitous terms to represent the experience of (some) people in a postmodern world described as fragmented and continually producing new borders that must again and again be crossed. And if current border studies and theory propose that borders are everywhere, the border-crossing experience is in some instances assumed to be similar

#### Treating debate itself as a borderland that links geographically and ideologically different borders leads to a shallow politics that cannot produce change—instead of contact with actual others, debate becomes a detour that teaches us to enjoy communicating this metaphor of the border, while flattening out and detaching us from specific political contests

Ang, Prof. of Cultural Studies at the University of Western Sydney, Nepean, 1998 [Ien, “Doing cultural studies at the crossroads,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 1(1), p. 18-20]

It is this paradox that I find myself in need of coming to terms with in thinking about cultural studies as/at the crossroads. To put it bluntly, meetings at a crossroads – say, the 'Crossroads in Cultural Studies' conference – are more often than not just brief encounters; they are seemingly decontextualized, **fleeting moments** of incidental and transient linkage **after which we all go our separate ways**, on to our individual destinations back in our own countries, institutions, discip­linary enclaves, and specialist fields of interest. If this conference is a meeting place for such a diverse range of people to share their ideas under the common banner of 'cultural studies', what can that sharing consist of? Or better, how can we make sure that that sharing takes place, that the brief encounters we make here will have more long-standing effects? Of course, brief encounters are by no means inevitably inconse­quential – we all know that they are not! – but for them to have life-changing impacts, so to speak, there would need to be some pretty powerful and effective communicative exchange going on. And just as in advertising, effective communication in the heterogeneous field of cultural studies also depends on the right rhetorical strategies.

Let me give you a concrete example to clarify what kind of difficulties I have in mind. As a cultural studies practitioner, I am currently engaged in a research project with a highly localized and historically specific focus. It bears the peculiar title 'Reimagining Asians in a Multicultural Australia' and is funded by the Australian Research Council. When the conference organizers asked me to deliver a keynote speech at the `Crossroads in Cultural Studies' conference, I felt the desire to speak about this project, but felt I could not do so without first addressing the wretched audience problem.3 How could I speak about the project, in a keynote speech where I engage in a brief encounter with an audience, without losing some of them along the way? If I were to talk about the contextual specificities of the project, about the regional and theoretical subtleties governing the formulation of the questions I intend to address in it, and the particular political interventions I hope to make in answering those questions, I would risk sinking into a discourse of conjunctural idiosyncrasy that may fail to connect and intersect with other concerns, other interests, other knowledges. Somehow it would seem much easier to evoke the concepts of race, ethnicity and nation, for example, or those of migrancy, hybridity and diaspora – which, as the title of my project should make clear, are the key concepts framing my particular object of study – without rather than with a particular reference to the uncommon specificities of the Australian context.

The paradox, then, is that while cultural studies has staked so much on the irreducible significance of context, on the importance of specificity and particularity, on the articulation of historical conjuncture, the valori­zation of crossroads encounters in the borderlands can actually have the effect of **discouraging us from grounding our discourse in the uncom­promising contingencies of concrete particularities and specificities**, as it would necessitate the tedious explanation of a wealth of more or less rarefied descriptive nuances that might not resonate with the curiosity and the interests of our audience. **In such a situation the metalanguage of metaphor and theory** – **the stylish abstractions of which can be picked up and recycled without the inhibiting interference of particularizing context** – **would be much more instantly gratifying for its apparent communicative achievement.** Thus, it is probably much more likely for an Australian and a Finnish conference delegate to find quick common ground, say, in a discussion about the figure of the migrant as a metaphor for the prototypical postmodern subject – an ontological discourse able to be globalized as if it were context-neutral – than in a sustained and more timme-consuming cross-cultural exchange about the history of Aboriginal politics in Australia, on the one hand, and that of Sami politics in Finland, on the other, even though **a superficial similarity** can be found in the trans-specific category of 'indigenous peoples'. Of course, as Stuart Hall, Larry Grossberg and many others have repeatedly argued, cultural studies can only proceed through a 'detour through theory' – for no understanding can be reached without an appropriate level of theoretical abstraction – but **there is a danger**, within the borderland cultural intellectualism of contemporary cultural studies, **to never return from the detour, to turn the detour into a never-ending trip in itself.** The comparison I made a while ago with the world of advertising is not entirely gratuitous in this respect. Precisely because theory 'travels' more easily across cultural and national borders, it is also more amenable to global marketing, as any academic publisher would tell you. As Meaghan Morris and Stephen Muecke (1995: 1) remark in their editorial statement to the new Australian cultural studies journal the UTS Review, 'as publishers want cultural studies from all over the world to be written for an international market', what tends to be favoured is a 'socially groundless, history-free genre of "Theory" that cannot engage with the cultural differences it endlessly evokes'. Decontextualized theory sells precisely because its abstractions allow it to be appropriated by a wide range of audiences, while localized studies and knowledges are always in danger of being ghettoized in their own field of particularity.4

#### this reduction of diverse borders to a universal metaphor is a smoothing out of differences to make compelx lives fit into our politics. This smoothing out of all differences is precisely what authorizes the normalizing violence of societies—this fantasy world has always been the ideology that begins to eliminate that which does not fit—like Stalin and Hitler, we begin by eliminating groups, and end by wishing for the elimination of everything

Bogard, Professor of Sociology at Whitman, 2000 [William, “Smoothing Machines and the Constitution of Society,” *Cultural Studies* 14 (2), 269-275]

Introduction

IMAGINE SOCIERY AT A production of ‘smoothing machines’. In such a society, everything fits – work, play, eating, sex, sleep, and images – everything connects and disconnects the way it should. No rough spots, no bottlenecks or pinch points, just everything free, clean and fast. Smooth is good. We like things smooth, and we like smooth things, life and death to name just two. A life where my work is perfect, my sex is perfect, my image is perfect – and TV proves it. When I die, it will be a perfect death, smooth, fast and clean. I won’t even notice it. The right blend of things, the right mixture of ingredients, gives me intense pleasure and a feeling of power. My child is perfect, my home is perfect, this time and place are perfect. A society that smoothes, that is a smoothing machine, is fast and clean and perfect. I enter your number, and here you are! I order a thing, and it arrives. I imagine a scene, and it appears, as if by magic. Perhaps one day in the not too distant future, people and things will arrive even before they are summoned, and appearances will precede, even replace, my imagination of them. A society of perfect information, perfect communication, perfect control. *All is not utopia in this society*, though – not yet anyway. For better or worse, my body will bear the marks of all these smoothing machines – perfect vision (contact lenses, lens implants), perfect skin (cosmetic operations), perfect organs (transplants, artificial pumps and filters), perfect birth (episiotomy), perfect genes (spliced and diced). But marked as it is, that’s what makes it a smooth body, a smoothing-body. Fast and clean. Connected to all the other smooth bodies in its territory, in a smooth-running collective machine.

When I say society ‘as the production’ of smoothing machines, I am referring to the flow of production – to societalization1 – not just to what is produced. Society is not the ‘object’ or ‘end’ of production, but as Marx understood, production itself. More precisely, it is smoothing-production – not a ‘product’ of smoothing machines, like the shine on a shoe, but the shining that marks the shoe. Smoothing machines are not subjects, either, but markings. They are conducts through which a body or bodies is inscribed as a subject.2 As forces of inscription, smoothing machines have a double function – extraction and deposition.

# Block

#### Refusing to use the state empowers its worst aspects

**Barbrook, professor at the Hypermedia Research Centre at the University of Westminster, 1997 (Richard, message to a list serve,** <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9706/msg00034.html>**)**

I thought that this position is clear from my remarks about the ultra-left posturing of the 'zero-work' demand. In Europe, we have real social problems of deprivation and poverty which, in part, can only be solved by state action. This does not make me a statist, but rather an anti-anti-statist. By opposing such intervention because they are carried out by the state, anarchists are tacitly lining up with the neo-liberals. Even worse, refusing even to vote for the left, they acquiese to rule by neo-liberal parties. I deeply admire direct action movements. I was a radio pirate and we provide server space for anti-roads and environmental movements. However, this doesn't mean that I support political abstentionism or, even worse, the mystical nonsense produced by Hakim Bey. It is great for artists and others to adopt a marginality as a life style choice, but most of the people who are economically and socially marginalised were never given any choice. They are excluded from society as a result of deliberate policies of deregulation, privatisation and welfare cutbacks carried out by neo-liberal governments. During the '70s, I was a pro-situ punk rocker until Thatcher got elected. Then we learnt the hard way that voting did change things and lots of people suffered if state power was withdrawn from certain areas of our life, such as welfare and employment. Anarchism can be a fun artistic pose. However, human suffering is not.

#### Reasonability is impossible – it’s arbitrary and undermines research and preparation

Resnick 1 assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, ‘1 (Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a preconditionfor effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

#### Using the border as a METAPHOR to connect distant situations severs them from their specific contexts, obscuring the specificity of distant modes of domination

Ang, Professor of Cultural Studies at the University of Western Sydney, Nepean, 1998 [Ien, “Doing cultural studies at the crossroads,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 1(1), p. 17-18]

I am invoking these divergent political and cultural significations of borderland existence to make the point that if doing cultural studies implies entering a borderland of sorts – the transdisciplinary, translocal, transcultural borderland of critical intellectualism in the globalized world of the late 20th century – then this should not be mythologized simply as a liberating space for the democratic expression and arti­culation of multiple perpectives, partial truths and positioned identities, the space for the emergence of a happy (and radical) heteroglossia of narratives, experiences and voices. Inhabiting the borderlands does not only entail political empowerment and transcultural enrichment, but also poses its own, distinctive difficulties, **which we cannot capture through the abstract embrace of** what Arif Dirlik (1994) calls **'borderland radicalism'**. While I do not share all of Dirlik's dismissive attack on authors such as Anzaldúa, there is much validity in his complaint that the notion of the borderland appears too often in cultural studies and postcolonial theory 'in ahistorical and metaphorical guise' (p. 97). Indeed, one of the problems in much cultural studies writing these days is the extent to which interrelated spatial notions such as border-crossing, travel, migrancy, exile, deterritorialization, and so on have taken on **the status of abstract metaphors, severed from their historical grounding in concrete, specific and particular contexts`** (Kaplan, 1996). But didn't the strength of cultural studies lie precisely in its attention to context, in the rigorously anti-reductionist theoretical and methodological assumption that relations between people, culture and power can only be grasped in their concrete, particular and specific contexts?

I can now clarify why the metaphor of the crossroads signals a height­ened sense of paradox and crisis for me. The paradox is that the very self-reiteration of cultural studies as a transdisciplinary, transnational border­land, an intellectual crossroads of people and ideas coming from different locations and encompassing a wide range of focal concerns, approaches and interests, may have contributed to the increasing prominence of metaphorical thinking in its theoretical discourses. If the crisscrossing of a variety of languages, experiences and voices is characteristic of the discursive world of cultural studies, how does one make oneself not only heard, but also listened to? Put simply, how does one communicate in a heterogeneous world? This, to an extent, is a question of what is commonly called 'intercultural communication'. But if the problematic this refers to – how differently positioned subjects can make themselves understood and construct shared understandings across cultural boundaries – is a central one for social life in our increasingly multi­cultural world, both nationally and internationally, isn't it, or shouldn't it be, equally central in the borderland world of cultural studies?

How, for example, would Gloria Anzaldúa and lain Chambers, coming from the different gender, racial, geographical and cultural backgrounds that they do, be able to enter into a dialogue with each other and have a meaningful conversation? Such questions are not often asked in cultural studies; instead, differential positionalities and discursive (in)commen­surabilities are glossed over precisely through the use, for example, of metaphors. **The use of metaphors may give us a sense of communicative satisfaction precisely because they work to condense complex and contra­dictory meanings into handsome, manageable symbols**. Thus the common use of 'borderlands' as a metaphor for the experience of the blurring of cultural boundaries that both Anzaldúa and Chambers thematize in their work may establish a shared discursive territory, but it may also **obscure the very different trajectories each has travelled to arrive at that common ground, the distinctive histories and experiences that have informed their respective conceptualization and experience** of the 'borderlands'. One consequence is that Anzaldúa's specific reference to the physical Mexican/US border and her particular Chicana per­spective **tends to be ignored as her work is taken up as representing the borderland in general**, while Chambers's reference to the Italian/North African interface is generally overlooked in favour of an abstract appre­ciation of the notion of 'border dialogues' as such. At worst, then, the metaphorization of the notion of the borderlands can have the effect of foreclosing rather than stimulating the 'going on theorizing' through ongoing contextualization that cultural studies purports to be committed to.

#### Their representations of the borderlands oversimplifies the violence of borders, eschewing deep political engagement for utopian politics—simply voting against border violence does nothing to remove the real structures that produce that violence, especially in places we have no real connection to

Ang, Professor of Cultural Studies at the University of Western Sydney, Nepean, 1998 [Ien, “Doing cultural studies at the crossroads,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 1(1), p. 14-16]

The importance of the ethic of the encounter is reflected in the current popularity within cultural studies of a notion closely related to that of the crossroads – that of the borderlands, aptly described by Henry Giroux (1992: 209) as a space 'crisscrossed with a variety of languages, experiences, and voices'. For Giroux, such borderlands are analytically and politically productive because the experiences and voices coming together in them 'intermingle with the weight of particular histories that will not fit into the master narrative of a monolithic culture' (p. 209). Giroux speaks here of the voices and experiences of students in the context of the teaching of cultural studies, but it seems fair to say that these ideas are axiomatic more generally for cultural studies as an academic practice. As cultural studies routinely conceives of itself as a borderland formation, an open-ended and multivocal discursive for­mation with a commitment to what Stuart Hall refers to as 'going on theorising' (Morley and Chen, 1996), there is a clear inclination in this theorizing to value, if not celebrate and romanticize, notions of the borderland. The 'third space', the liminal in-between, and so on, are the symbolic spaces where fixed and unitary identities are hybridized, sharp demarcations between self and other are unsettled, singular and absolute truths are ruptured, **etc., etc. That is**, the borderland tends to be **imagined as a utopic site of transgressive intermixture, hybridity and multiplicity, the supposed political radicalness of which mostly remains** **largely unquestioned.**1

This utopic vision of the borderlands strikes me, ironically, as a postmodern version of the modernist Habermasian notion of the 'ideal speech situation', where everybody can participate equally and freely in unrestrained rational conversation and communication (Habermas, 1984). Habermas's vision has rightly been criticized for its universalist oversight of the power relations that overdetermine the differential communicative capacities and opportunities of inescapably embodied speakers. But postmodern celebrations of the borderlands, too, are often **infused by a desire to wish away** (or at least overcome) **the operation of power** and by a claim to the possibility of transcendence. They tend to nurture a poetic vision of the borderlands as a site of radical openness where the 'resistive' forces of dialogic excess triumph over the dominant forces of discursive closure, where the disorderly contaminations of the margins subvert the orderly impositions of the centre, where, as Hall puts it in his essay ‘For Allon White', 'the fluidity of heteroglossia' dislocates and displaces 'language's apparently "finished" character' (1996: 297).

Thus for the Chicana feminist poet Gloria **Anzaldúa**, author of the widely acclaimed Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, the borderland, 'that juncture where the mestiza stands', is the site 'where the possibility of uniting all that is separate occurs' (1987: 79). As she says in her preface, 'the Borderlands are physically present wherever two or more cultures edge each other, where people of different races occupy the same territory, where under, lower, middle and upper classes touch, where the space between two individuals shrinks with intimacy'. The hybrid creature of the mestiza is, for Anzaldúa, the inhabitant par ex­cellence of the borderlands. The mestiza 'operates in a pluralistic mode –nothing is thrust out, the good the bad and the ugly, nothing rejected, nothing abandoned', giving birth to 'a new consciousness': 'though it is a source of intense pain, its energy comes from continual creative motion that keeps breaking down the unitary aspect of each new paradigm' (1987: 80). Drawing on her own experience of living on the traumatic cultural border zone between Mexico and the United States, Anzaldúa celebrates the 'new consciousness' that has grown in her, while ex­claiming that 'To survive the Borderlands, you must live sin fronteras, be a crossroads' (1987: 195).

Writing from an entirely different socio-spatial positionality, Iain Chambers (1994) also emphasizes the transgressive and redemptive cultural effects of crossing borders. Entering the cultural borderlands, as he eloquently describes:

I perhaps learn to tread lightly along the limits of where I am speaking from. I begin to comprehend that where there are limits, there also exist other voices, bodies, worlds, on the other side, beyond my particular boundaries. Inthe pursuit of my desires across such frontiers I am paradoxically forced to face my confines, together with that excess that seeks to sustain the dialogues across them. Transported some way into this border country, I look into a potentially further space: the possibility of another place, another world, another future. (Chambers, 1994: 5)

Yet we all know that traffic through a crossroads is never free flowing and uncontrolled: there are traffic lights, road signs and rules that all road users must obey, for example, those approaching the crossroads from a minor road are supposed to give way to those passing through from the main road. Consequently, borderlands (which are spaces where the con­dition of crossroads traffic is normalized) are generally heavily policed and patrolled, and it depends on your identity card, your credentials, what you own, or simply the way you look – and, in the cultural studies borderland, what you have read – how you are treated, whether you are searched, whether you are let in and out, and so on. In other words, these interstitional spaces are pervaded by power structures of their own. As the Mexican performance artist Guillermo Gómez-Peña notes, referring as does Anzaldúa to the Mexican/US border, 'Crossing the border from North to South has very different implications than crossing the same border from South to North; the border cannot possibly mean the same to a tourist as it does to an undocumented worker' (1996: 9). Indeed, it is precisely because the borderland is a site for potentially conflictive juxta­positionings and collisions between incompatible or illegitimate types that the operation of regulatory and classificatory powers is intensified here. In this sense, **the voluntaristic desire for dialogues with 'the other side' in the border country** expressed by Chambers **may be a worthy pursuit possible only from a position of relative, arguably Eurocentric, privilege.** As Gómez-Peña usefully reminds us, 'People with social, racial, or economic privilege have an easier time crossing physical borders, but they have a much harder time negotiating the invisible borders of culture and race' (1996: 9). In other words, it matters who you are in borderland encounters, **just as it matters which borders**, both physical and symbolic, **are being crossed.** Chambers, in fact, does not present his discourse as context-neutral: the historical experiences that made him reflect on the necessity of 'border dialogues' are the influx of North African immigrants into Italy, where Chambers, himself an immigrant from England lives and works.2 Yet while Chambers enters the borderlands for the opportunity they afford him to be enriched by encounters with others and to be made aware of his own boundaries (which is a political act not easily engaged in by those who usually live with a 'normal' – and comfortable – sense of unitary self and identity), for Anzalda inhabiting (and celebrating) the borderlands as the site where the mestiza's plural personality is forged is not a matter of desire, but one of survival.

#### Their representation of the border romanticizes the good subject on the border, creating a utopian political position from whence resistance is always good, and should always be affirmed—this elides the complexities of power and produces new forms of domination

Vila, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Texas at San Antonio, 2005 [Pablo, “Conclusion: The Limits of American Border Theory,” *Ethnography at the Border*, Ed. Pablo Vila, p.322-329]

THE "BORDER CROSSER" OR THE "HYBRID" AS THE NEW "PRIVILEGED SUBJECT"

Sometimes it seems that the search for the "privileged subject"—either in its bourgeois incarnation (the upper-middle-class, white heterosexual male "rational" subject) or in its proletarian one (the heterosexual working-class male who was slated to make the revolution)—has moved from its old enclave in history to the new identity politics of the fragmented postmodern world. One example of this move is the important place the "border crosser" or the "hybrid" occupies in current border studies and theory. As Johnson and Michaelsen point out: “'the border' . . . is assumed to be a place of politically exciting hybridity, intellectual creativity, and moral possibility" (1997, 3). For instance, Guillermo Gomez-Peña (1988, 130) claims that border artists like himself have a privileged understanding of reality because of their deterritorialized perspective, which allows them to act as facilitators of intercultural dialogue among ethnic groups.9

Hannerz (1997, 545) proposes a historical understanding of this type of stance, from the "marginal man" (usually a tragic figure in the social sciences) to the current celebration of those who live in margins, cross borders, and the like. In this regard, according to Hannerz, the sense that crossings go with creativity is widespread in studies focusing on diasporas, exiles, cosmopolitanism, hybridity, synergy, creolization, and border zones. For instance, discussing the work of Renato Rosaldo, Hannerz points out the celebratory spirit that characterizes mainstream border studies and theory. Thus he stresses the highly metaphorical character of Rosaldo's border: "Defined by their poets rather than by their police. . . . There may be a battle for survival here, but at the same time we are in a cultural zone 'between stable places,' with freedom, people playing, and dance of life. This border is explored as a ludic space . . . a potentially and in principle a free and experimental region of culture, a region where not only new elements but also new combinatory rules may be introduced" (Hannerz 1997, 541).

This characterization of those living on borders, the hybrids, as having a kind of privileged ontological status (in terms of gender, class, ethnicity, nationality, etc.) is not only mainstream in border studies and theory but also part and parcel of what Grossberg identifies as current mainstream cultural studies in general (1996, 90-91). According to Gross-berg, the figure of hybridity appears in at least three different usages in current mainstream cultural studies: as "third space," "liminality," and "border crossing." These are "three different images of border existences, of subaltern identities as existing between two competing identities."

Images of a "third space" (as in Bhabha) portray subaltern identities as unique third terms, literally defining an "in-between" place inhabited by the subaltern. Images of liminality collapse the geography of the third space into the border itself; the subaltern lives, as it were, on the border. In both of these variants of hybridity, the subaltern is neither one nor the other, but is defined by its location in a unique spatial condition which constitutes it as different from either alternative . . . Closely related to these two figures of hybridity is that of the "border-crossing;" marking an image of between-ness which does not construct a place or condition of its own other than the mobility, uncertainty and multiplicity of the fact of the constant border-crossing itself. (Grossberg 1996, 91-92)

Polkinhorn (1988) seems heavily influenced by these cultural studies images. According to Socorro Tabuenca:

Border literature, Chicano literature for Polkinhorn, is subversive because it is "bastard," and its bastardism lies in the change of linguistic code in the nonrecognition of the identity or relationship of Chicanos and Chicanas with an external "us." According to the critic, such illegitimacy can de-stabilize the status quo ... "because we do not know who they are, their mere existence becomes unsettling„ because they do have the ability to reinforce our notion of who we are." ... According to Polkinhorn, the fact that the Chicano community belongs to what the Anglo-Saxon public knows as "the unknown" . . . is what gives Chicanos their power. However, I consider that the lack of elaboration of this claim left us disoriented and with the possibility of inferring that the Chicano community (or its literature) is the only "bastard," marginal and subversive. (1999, translation mine)

Clearly Anzaldúa works with this assumption too, as when she describes Aztlán as a borderland: "A borderland is a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary. . . . People who inhabit both realities . . . are forced to live in the interface between the two" (1987, 37). In this sense, the privileged position of those living on the U.S.–Mexico border to understand and change reality arises precisely from the hybrid character of their identity, that complex mixture of Indian, Mexican, black, and Anglo that characterizes the border. And the commentators who praise Anzaldúa’s work agree with her on that point: "The voices of . . . Anzaldúa and others broke down the boundaries of the geopolitical border and illustrated the multidimensional character of life on the borderlands. . . . Through bilingual, bicultural, and binational voices, Chicanos and Chicanas illustrated the crossing of the conceptual lines of gender, race, class, nation and ethnicity. Borders took on a new meaning" (Alvarez 1995, 461).

At the same time, as Russ Castronovo points out:

Commentators who treat the distinct experiences of nationality, alternative permutations of sexuality, racial marginalization, and varying degrees of political oppression that appear in such works as Gloria Anzaldúa's Borderland/La Frontera or Americo Paredes's With His Pistol in His Hand nonetheless tell similar stories ... [that] contribute to a narrative, teleologically successful and consistent, that **reads like a story of classic heroism:** a text overcomes the impediments of being marginal to two or more cultures, and indeed subversively benefits from these limitations and prejudices to undermine the oppressive structures that in the first place differentiated and hierarchized Texas and Mexico. . . . This critical account usually concludes

#### The homogenization of the border reduces our experience of the other to precisely that which can be tolerated by global capitalism—this flattening our separates the good other from the bad other, selling the culture of the former while demonizing the latter, and reproducing the very violence they try and resist

Vila, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Texas at San Antonio, 2005 [Pablo, “Conclusion: The Limits of American Border Theory,” *Ethnography at the Border*, Ed. Pablo Vila, p.331-333]

To fully understand the complex relationship between culture and identity in current border situations, we must consider Žižek's arguments.

Contemporary "postmodern" racism is the symptom of multiculturalist late capitalism. . . . Liberal "tolerance" condones the **folklorist Other deprived of its substance**—like the multitude of "ethnic cuisines" in a contemporary megalopolis; however, any "real" Other is instantly denounced for its "fundamentalism," since the kernel of Otherness resides in the regulation of its jouissance: the "real Other" is by definition "patriarchal," "violent," never the Other of ethereal wisdom and charming customs. (1997, 37)

This is so because despite what current border studies and theory claim, in some border situations, sharing certain aspects of a culture does not necessarily mean sharing a common identity. The opposite can be true, and **people who seem culturally very similar consider themselves to be very different.** If this is not so, how can we explain many Mexican Americans on the U.S.–Mexico border who proudly celebrate Mexican holidays, eat Mexican food, speak Spanish, and sing Mexican songs—but simultaneously applaud all efforts by American authorities to stop the immigration (legal or illegal) of "real" Mexicans, who, for some Mexican Americans, represent the real "Others"? How should we interpret the case of Mexican Fronterizos who mix Spanish with English ("Se me ponchó la Ilanta", "No pude parquear la troca," "Vamos a cornernos unas winnies [hot dogs]," etc.), eat hamburgers at McDonalds, always go to the "other side" to buy American merchandise, listen to American rock, and so on, but at the same time constantly criticize gringos (and their cousins, the Mexican Americans) for their unrestrained consumerism and racism, the fundamentalism of the "other"? It is one thing to talk about the border as a "third country," culturally (which is Paredes's and Anzaldúa's claim). It is another to claim that such a country has a homogeneous identity.

The issue of the difference between culture and identity on the U.S.—Mexico border brings us back to Žižek's distinction between the "folklorist other" and the "real other." The new racism that arises in multicultural late global capitalism **splits the other into two halves in order to celebrate one of those halves while demonizing the other.** Thus some aspects of the culture of the other are accepted and, sometimes, incorporated (Taco Bell, Taco Cabana, mariachis, tortillas, tacos, burritos, etc.). But other aspects are framed as "fundamentalism" and rejected (Mexican machismo, fatalism, violence, etc.). **This is precisely the "trick" global capitalism performs to guarantee its world expansion.** As Stuart Hall points out:

In one trip around the world, in one weekend, you can see every wonder of the ancient world. You take it in as you go by, all in one, living with difference, wondering at pluralism, this concentrated, corporate, over-corporate, over-integrated, over-concentrated, and condensed form of economic power which lives culturally through difference and which is constantly teasing itself with the pleasures of the transgressive Other. (1991a, 35)

But the "transgressive Other" must be tamed in order to be "safely" accepted as part of "my" culture (and, eventually, identified as one of "us"), because the kernel of otherness resides, precisely, in the regulation of its jouissance. Thus, for instance, the hegemonic process in late globalized border capitalism on the American side of the divide is no longer to "convince" Mexican nationals and Mexican Americans to fully Americanize. On the contrary, the goal is to demonstrate to them that we Anglos fully respect their culture, or at least the aspects of it that can be incorporated "safely" into Anglo culture. Aspects of Mexican culture are thus, on the one hand, increasingly penetrating the U.S.—Mexico border, creating a variety of "hybrid" products (Tex-Mex cuisine, Conjunto music, and the like). But meanwhile the border has recently experienced dramatic processes of reinforcement to keep the "real other" on the southern side of the line. The various "Operation Blockades" all along the border, and the new stringent requirements legal Mexican crossers are asked to comply with, are good examples of this process. **Even as culture is increasingly shared, identities become more fixed and hostile.**

To complicate matters further, the two halves into which the other split are not constant across different social actors but change depending on which "Mexicans" and "Americans" meet. Thus, in my previous example, I counterposed "exotic Mexican cuisine" against machismo; but in other possible border encounters, the half of the Mexican other that is lauded may well be its "family orientation," "religiosity," and the like. Here, a version of multiculturalism may be embraced, contradictorily, by Anglo fundamentalists. The possibility is well documented in the case of the British new Right, which suddenly discovered that the ideal version of the conservative British family is most embraced by .. . Muslim immigrant families! Or when some Mexican Americans argue that Anglo fear of Mexican secessionism in the Southwest is unfounded because Mexicans embrace the conservative cultural values Anglos value: family values, respect for authority, nationalism, and the like.

As we can easily see, nothing is more removed from reality than the idea of a straightforward correspondence between culture and identity on the U.S.—Mexico border.