#### Welcome to the United States -- where cultures that refuse to accept our mindset become threats and we respond by placing economic sanctions upon them -- our culture bribes us to accept Cuba as an inferior yet threatening nation -- this prevents us from seeking solutions to true oppression and violence.

**Schoultz, 10** – Professor of Political Science at UNC Chapel Hill (Lars, “Benevolent Domination: The Ideology of US Policy Towards Cuba”, NG)

The United States and Cuba have not had normal diplomatic relations since January 3, 1961, eleven U.S. presidents ago. In contrast, the U.S. refusal to recognize both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China lasted for only ﬁve presidents, sixteen and twenty-two years, respectively. And the United States has not simply declined to have normal diplomatic relations with Havana: Washington has also spent most of the past half century in an open attempt to overthrow the island’s government. There is nothing like Cuba in the history of United States foreign policy. This long-standing estrangement is the product of several concrete concerns related to U.S. security, to U.S. economic interests, and to U.S. domestic politics. But underlying these concerns and governing the policies of the past eleven administrations is an ideology based above all else on a belief, widespread in the United States, that Cubans, like most Latin Ameri- cans, are a stunted branch of the human species. Our euphemism for these people and their societies is ‘‘underdeveloped.’’1

This ideology is not a facade masking selﬁsh interests and, in particular, a selﬁsh interest in eliminating challenges to U.S. hegemony in the Caribbean. Rather, it is most useful to think of this ideology toward Latin America as the software Washington has created to take a keystroke from the environment—a revolution, for example—and process it through the policymaking computer and onto the monitor as policy. Working quietly in the background, this soft- ware is difﬁcult to examine because it is politically incorrect to hint at its intellectual core: a ﬁrm belief that, in any hierarchy of peoples, Latin Ameri- cans are beneath the United States. Or as the minutes of a February 1959 National Security Council meeting have the CIA director warning: ‘‘Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that the new Cuban ofﬁcials had to be treated more or less like children. They had to be led rather than rebuffed. If they were rebuffed, like children, they were capable of doing almost anything.’’ As one U.S. diplomat reported in the mid-nineteenth century, ‘‘Were it not for the civilizing inﬂuence of the United States, this country would by degrees revert to the aboriginal state in which Alvarado the Spaniard found it.’’2

The best way to begin—but only begin—to explain U.S. policy toward revolutionary Cuba is not with this ideology, but with a frank recognition that senior U.S. ofﬁcials are extremely busy, all but overwhelmed by an endless array of pressing issues, some of them matters of life and death; it would take both time and political capital to terminate today’s complex embargo that has been cobbled together over half a century. Then, after acknowledging the im- portance of inertia, the next step is to observe that the United States has im- portant interests to protect in Latin America, and the estrangement that began a half century ago was largely a response to the Cuban government’s reluctance to address these interests to Washington’s satisfaction. Correctly or incorrectly, wisely or unwisely, the United States came to perceive Cuba’s revolutionary government as a threat to its interests.

For three of the past ﬁve decades, roughly from 1960 to 1990, the most important of these interests was to protect U.S. security. Although small Carib- bean nations lack the power to threaten the United States, their territory can serve other major powers as a launching pad. And so the ﬁrst statement of U.S. policy toward Latin America, the 1811 No-Transfer Resolution, was aimed to stop the British from securing a toehold in Spanish Florida, and the 1823 Monroe Doctrine was based on the same bedrock principle: prudent people keep potential adversaries as far away as possible, and Cuba is close.

‘‘We will bury you,’’ Nikita Khrushchev boasted in 1956, just as Cuba’s revolutionary leaders were planning their campaign to seize power.3 Then in early 1960, a year after the rebels’ victory, he sent the ﬁrst deputy chair of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Anastas Mikoyan, to open a scien- tiﬁc, cultural, and technical exhibition in Havana. Before leaving the island, Mikoyan signed an agreement to purchase about 20 percent of Cuba’s sugar crop for each of the following ﬁve years, and within three weeks, President Dwight Eisenhower had authorized preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion. A Soviet-friendly government in Cuba was an unacceptable challenge to the primordial U.S. interest in security.

The Cuban Revolution also attacked substantial economic interests. The U.S. government lost some of its own property, principally Cuba’s Nicaro nickel facility, which the U.S. General Services Administration had built during World War II; remaining U.S. government owned, it was operated by a private contractor, Freeport Sulphur Company, which had been developing is own nickel and cobalt mine at Moa Bay, forty miles to the east. Freeport lost that, too, and other U.S. investors suffered losses valued at about $2 billion at a time when a billion was more than pocket change. More than six thousand of those investors ﬁled claims with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, and some were extremely well-connected corporate leaders, such as Robert Kle- berg, the president of King Ranch in Texas, which lost its forty-thousand-acre ranch in Cienfuegos. With help from his representative in Congress, the Senate majority leader Lyndon Johnson, Kleberg promptly marched into the Oval Ofﬁce, demanded President Eisenhower’s help, and got it—a full-court press by U.S. diplomats.

But most investors of Robert Kleberg’s generation wrote off their losses decades ago, and in the post–Cold War era, they have been replaced by a new set of powerful economic interests seeking to reopen trade with the island. Agri- business, the single most powerful lobbying force in Washington, has been key. It took U.S. farmers almost a decade, but in 2000, they ﬁnally pushed through a law that permits the sale of food to Cuba. At ﬁrst Cuba declined to buy, insisting on normal two-way trade, but then it reconsidered after a devastating hurricane in 2001; and the year ended with a boatload of U.S. poultry sailing into Havana’s harbor. It was the ﬁrst signiﬁcant trade with Cuba since 1963.

Cubans apparently liked what they bought, and soon the invisible hand of supply and demand—combined with low shipping costs—began to work its magic. In early 2002, six House Democrats visited the island, including the Arkansas moderate Vic Snyder, touting the rice and pork his constituents pro- duced. Then came a delegation of California producers led by Senator Barbara Boxer, and a North Dakota delegation led by Republican governor John Hoe- ven followed her. The North Dakotans left Havana only hours before two more members of Congress arrived with a delegation featuring a former secretary of agriculture, and this congressional delegation overlapped with a visit by Tam- pa’s mayor Richard Greco, who was shepherding ﬁfteen local business leaders hoping to convince Cubans to use their port for food shipments.

These visits were but a prelude to the main event in 2003: a privately organized food exhibition in Havana featuring 933 representatives of 288 U.S. vendors from thirty-three states and Puerto Rico, plus the agriculture commis- sioners from ten states, all eager to tap into the Cuban market. More than seventy U.S. ﬁrms signed more than $92 million in sales contracts, and North Carolina’s agriculture commissioner drafted an op-ed article on her ﬂight home: ‘‘With our economy on the skids, state budgets in shambles and our farmers going bank- rupt, does it make any sense to continue a 40-year-old embargo with Cuba when there is so much to be gained by both countries? I don’t think so.’’ What was the result? In 2008, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reported that U.S. farmers had become ‘‘Cuba’s largest supplier of food and agricultural products. Cuba has consistently ranked among the top ten export markets for U.S. soybean oil, dry peas, lentils, dry beans, rice, powdered milk and poultry. Cuba also has been a major market for U.S. corn, wheat and soybeans.’’4

So here we are, at a time when national security ofﬁcials no longer have a signiﬁcant interest in Cuba and economic interests are no longer a negative. Why does the estrangement continue? Enter the Cuban American community in Florida, which holds part—but only part—of the answer: a third interest, domestic politics or, more concretely, the interest politicians have in winning elections. As a former chief of the U.S. interests section pointed out in 2005: ‘‘Ninety-eight percent of U.S. citizens never think of Cuba; the only people who think Cuba is important are the Cubans in Miami.’’5 No one would have paid these 1.2 million immigrants much attention if they had settled in Ver- mont, which has only three votes in the U.S. electoral college; but two-thirds chose to settle in booming Florida, which has twenty-seven votes, today’s fourth-largest prize in the quadrennial electoral college sweepstakes, and after the 2010 census, Florida could move into a tie for third with New York, with twenty-nine (New York now has thirty-one but will likely lose two; Florida has twenty-seven and will probably gain two).

At ﬁrst, Cuban immigrants were politically impotent, but soon they began to take out citizenship papers, and then in the 1970s, they started to elbow their way into politics, initially at the local level, where they competed for school boards and similar community councils. Then they set out to elect members of the state legislature, and they also started to form interest groups, capped in 1981 by the creation of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), which moved Cuban Americans up the political food chain to the national level. Primarily, CANF spoke for wealthy ﬁrst-wave immigrants who were largely uninterested in the pork-barrel politics that typically characterize ﬁrst- and second-generation immigrants; instead, CANF’s goal was to inﬂuence U.S. policy toward Cuba, and it did so the old-fashioned way, with campaign contri- butions and bloc voting.6

And CANF did this at a propitious moment: it had spent the 1980s honing its political skills on legislation creating Radio and TV Martí. When the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, the foundation was a recognized force in Washington, perfectly positioned to move into the vacuum left by exiting national security ofﬁcials. With its focus on tightening the embargo, CANF was responsible for both the 1992 Cuban Democracy (Torricelli) Act, passed by a Democratic Con- gress and signed by a Republican president, and then for initiating the campaign against third-country investors in Cuba that led to the Cuban Liberty and Demo- cratic (LIBERTAD) Solidarity Act of 1996 (the Helms-Burton Act), passed by a Republican Congress and signed by a Democratic president.7 Helms-Burton prompted the frustrated chief executive ofﬁcer of the agribusiness heavyweight Archer Daniels Midland, eager to reopen an old market, to complain that ‘‘every presidential candidate is invited to Miami to make a speech to a handful of rich Cubans, and the candidate says, ‘I will never speak to Castro.’ The result is that we look to the rest of the world like idiots.’’8

Then came Elián González, the ﬁve-year-old boy found clinging to an inner tube off Fort Lauderdale on Thanksgiving Day in 1999. Since his mother had drowned after their rickety boat had capsized, and sending Elián back to live with a loving father in Cuba had been the right thing to do, President Bill Clinton wrote in his memoir: ‘‘I was still concerned that it could cost Al Gore Florida in November.’’9 The charges of fraud in Florida’s 2000 election were multiple and centered on the exclusion of more than ﬁfty thousand African American voters, but anyone who had followed Elián’s prolonged ordeal could reasonably con- clude that his return had aroused intense anger in Little Havana. And although it is important not to overstate Cuban American voting clout, one thing is certain: when the dust settled in 2000, the Democrats had lost the state by 537 votes, handing all of Florida’s electoral votes to the Republicans and giving George W. Bush the presidency with a ﬁve-vote electoral college margin.

Since then, the question has been: When will Cuban Americans begin to vote their broader interests—when will they cast their ballots and distribute their campaign contributions on some basis other than which party’s candidates promise to be more vigorous in their hostility toward the government of the country from which they or their forebears emigrated? Much public opinion polling and the 2008 election, when Barack Obama captured about 35 percent of Cuban American votes, have suggested that signiﬁcant dispersion is already occurring; but today’s politicians are still walking a very thin line, as candidate Barack Obama’s Miami speech to CANF illustrated in May 2008. While prom- ising to maintain the embargo as leverage, he argued that ‘‘the United States must be a relentless advocate for democracy.’’ Obama also promised to ‘‘imme- diately allow unlimited family travel and remittances to the island.’’

When implemented in 2009, this relaxation of the embargo’s travel and remittance provisions more than reversed a tightening in 2004, just before that year’s election, when Cuban Americans were feeling neglected. In 2001, his ﬁrst year as president, George W. Bush had presided over a May 20 Indepen- dence Day celebration with a party for Cuban American leaders on the White House lawn. The next year, 2002, was the hundredth anniversary of Cuban independence, and President Bush had ﬂown to Miami to participate in the celebration. But in 2003, when the Iraq War had become a consuming focus, the president’s Independence Day message had been nothing but a forty-second prerecorded restatement of what President Clinton had said a decade earlier: ‘‘My hope is for the Cuban people to soon enjoy the same freedoms and rights as we do.’’ Then a few weeks later, the U.S. Coast Guard had intercepted a hijacked boat in the Straits of Florida and returned the hijackers to Cuba.

Enough is enough, wrote ninety-eight prominent Cuban Americans, taking out an ad in El Nuevo Herald on 3 August 2003, complaining in an open letter to the president that ‘‘current policy toward Cuba has not varied signiﬁcantly from that of the previous administration.’’ The Bush administration responded by creating the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, chaired by Secre- tary of State Colin Powell. Published just before the nominating conventions in mid-2004, the commission’s report recommended that President Bush tighten the embargo by reducing family visits and restricting remittances. These reduc- tions and restrictions were not popular with many Cuban Americans, but they solidiﬁed the president’s ultra-hard-line Cuban American base and probably contributed to his win in Florida.

Both George Bush and Barack Obama understood the importance of Flor- ida’s Cuban Americans, and both candidates’ campaigns were guided by astute pollsters who in 2004 advised Bush to tighten the embargo but in 2008 advised Obama to relax it. The Democrats could not hope to attract the Republicans’ hard-line base, but their polling indicted that a moderate Cuba policy was no longer an electoral death sentence among Cuban Americans. And the candi- date’s stand on Cuba was also important to many of the liberal Democrats who form that party’s base. Walking an exceptionally thin line, Barack Obama promised to maintain the embargo but to lighten up on family visits and remit- tances. And he won Florida.

So where is U.S. policy heading? Given the torpor that has followed the Obama administration’s April 2009 relaxation of restrictions on Cuban Ameri- cans, a safe hypothesis for the near term is that we may be heading toward a few more modest steps, albeit not to the full normalization of relations. But today’s aging generation of Cuban revolutionaries and Cuban American counterrevo- lutionaries is clearly fading into the sunset. In time, the next generation of Cuban leaders will make changes on the island, and assessments of those changes by the next generation of Cuban Americans will slowly diversify. At some point, the pollsters will tell everyone it is safe to end the estrangement.

The truly interesting question is what might come after that. No one knows, of course, but it may be instructive to look at a somewhat similar situation that occurred in the early 1990s, when the Soviet Union disappeared and when Cuba no longer had the resources to promote revolution abroad, especially in Central America, which had been one of Washington’s consuming concerns throughout the 1980s. With national security interests no longer part of the policy debate, a reporter asked the ﬁrst President Bush in 1991 if he intended to engage Fidel Castro as he had engaged Mikhail Gorbachev. ‘‘What’s the point?’’ he replied. ‘‘All I’d tell him is what I’m telling you, to give the people the freedom that they want. And then you’ll see the United States do exactly what we should: Go down and lift those people up.’’10

We should not make too much of this off-the-cuff response, but it suggests that something more than three pedestrian interests—security, economics, and domestic politics—underlies U.S. policy. It suggests the existence of a peculiar mind-set, a way of thinking about Cuba that may point to the direction of U.S. policy in the years immediately ahead. The foundation of this uplifting mind- set is an obvious power disparity: the United States, unlike Cuba, is wealthy, and it has used a substantial portion of its wealth to create the most powerful military in the history of the human race. That raw power, in turn, has given politicians such as Richard Nixon the ability to tell voters that ‘‘the United States has the power, and Mr. Castro knows this, to throw him out of ofﬁce,’’ and it has given cabinet members such as Secretary of State Alexander Haig the ability to ask President Ronald Reagan for a simple green light: what he said to the President, according to Nancy Reagan, is: ‘‘You just give me the word and I’ll turn that f—— island into a parking lot.’’11

What would seem puzzling to a visitor from another planet is why, when the Cubans refused to behave as Washington insisted, their leaders were not thrown out of ofﬁce and their island was not turned into a parking lot. How have they managed to get away with it? There are several answers. Initially, Cuba balanced U.S. power by enlisting the support of a rival superpower, but that answer takes us only to about 1990, when the Soviet Union withdrew its support. Since then, much of Washington’s forbearance can be attributed to the fact that no one has much time or political capital to spend on any Caribbean island. A simple list of all the other issues confronting senior ofﬁcials is sufﬁ- cient to explain why Nixon largely ignored Cuba when he ﬁnally claimed the presidency, why Reagan declined to endorse Haig’s parking-lot solution, and why presidential adviser Arthur Schlesinger Jr. had this to say about the one president who seemed to spend more time than any other on Cuba: ‘‘Castro was not a major issue for Kennedy, who had much else on his mind.’’12

And this combination of awesome power and globe-girding responsibili- ties helps explain why, once Eisenhower- and Kennedy-era leaders had decided to overthrow the island’s revolutionary government, they planned to do it on the cheap, with a covert operation that, like the overthrow of Guatemala’s left- leaning Jacobo Árbenz government in 1954, would take only a couple of days. The CIA predicted a cakewalk, telling Kennedy that ‘‘less than 30 percent of the population is still with Fidel,’’ and ‘‘in this 30 percent are included the negroes, who will not ﬁght.’’13 Then three months later, when Kennedy admin- istration ofﬁcials discovered at the Bay of Pigs that the Cubans would ﬁght back, they had to decide what to do next. Certainly Cubans could be subdued, but not by a couple of thousand exiles; Washington would have to use the Marines, who might have to turn the island into a parking lot. Imagine what that would cost in the currency that might matter most: world opinion.

So what was plan B? First, there were a few years of what we today would call state-sponsored terrorism—Operation Mongoose, which focused on sabo- taging power plants, torching sugar ﬁelds, and arming assassins. But when that low-cost covert activity proved unsuccessful, the consensus opinion was that Cuba was not sufﬁciently important to require costly, decisive action. What happened is that Lyndon Johnson, inexperienced in foreign affairs, waited only a few days after inheriting the White House to seek advice from the widely respected chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, J. William Fulbright. In their telephone conversation, Fulbright began to warn against anything dramatic but had barely completed a sentence before the new presi- dent interrupted to agree: ‘‘I’m not getting into any Bay of Pigs deal. No, I’m just asking you what we ought to do to pinch their nuts more than we’re doing.’’14

Nut pinching—an embargo—has been U.S. policy ever since. During the Kennedy era, ‘‘I used to get a call from McGeorge Bundy or one of his assis- tants every day about something,’’ recalled the State Department’s principal Cuba ofﬁcer; but ‘‘under Johnson, the calls dropped down to probably once a week, and then maybe once every two weeks or once a month.’’15 Why? Be- cause even a superpower has limited resources, and President Johnson, like every one of his successors, had better ways to spend his political capital. Instead of ramping up Operation Mongoose, Johnson initially chose to focus on domestic issues—a month after consulting with Fulbright, he went before a joint session of Congress to declare the War on Poverty and to press for passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Completely absorbed in pursuing these domes- tic initiatives, he had little time for Cuba, especially as his administration’s foreign policy eyes began to focus on Indochina. Soon, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy was encouraging everyone to face reality. ‘‘The chances are very good that we will still be living with Castro some time from now,’’ he said; ‘‘we might just as well get used to the idea.’’16

But tugging U.S. policy toward greater involvement is domestic politics— Cuban American votes—augmented by a ﬁrmly established conviction that the United States is responsible for taking care of Cuba or, as the ﬁrst President Bush told that reporter in 1991, if Fidel Castro would relax his grip on power, ‘‘then you’ll see the United States do exactly what we should: Go down and lift those people up.’’ This idea was close to what candidate Barack Obama told his Cuban American campaign audience in May 2008: the embargo had to be retained as leverage because ‘‘the United States must be a relentless advocate for democracy.’’17 So far, Obama has given Cuba almost none of his attention, but at the April 2009 Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, he repeated his campaign-trail commitment, emphasizing that ‘‘the Cuban people are not free. And that’s our lodestone, our North Star, when it comes to our policy in Cuba.’’ Like its predecessor, the Obama administration is committed to uplifting Cuba.

Like the two post–Cold War presidents sandwiched between them—Bill Clinton and George W. Bush—both the ﬁrst President Bush and President Obama were simply continuing a century-old tradition of uplifting, which has now become a controlling component of Washington’s Cuba ideology. The origin of this uplifting tradition can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century, a time of rapid U.S. territorial expansion. But let us not expand southward, argued one member of the House of Representatives, reacting to a proposal that the United States purchase the island from Spain. His winning argument was, ‘‘We have enough of inferior races in our midst without absorbing and not assimilating the Creoles and blacks of Cuba.’’18 The consensus at the time, in 1869, was that the outright incorporation of Cuba would harm rather than help the United States. But some uplifting could still occur, wrote the U.S. consul in Havana a few years later, urging a reduction of trade barriers so that American merchants could ‘‘extend to the country and its inhabitants the advantages of contact with the higher civiliza- tion, the greater energy, the purer morality of America.’’19

Today’s uplifting effort, which focuses on promoting democracy, carries on a tradition established immediately after the Spanish-American War in the late nineteenth century. The congressional resolution authorizing the war said nothing about the type of government to be established in Cuba once the Spanish had been ousted, but self-rule was explicit in the war resolution’s promise that the United States would ‘‘leave the government and control of the island to its people’’—the demos. This suggested a democracy, but creating one was easier said than done. ‘‘We are going ahead as fast as we can,’’ Governor- General Leonard Wood wrote President William McKinley in 1900, more than a year after the war ended, ‘‘but we are dealing with a race that has steadily been going down for a hundred years into which we have got to infuse new life, new principles and new methods of doing things. This is not the work of a day or of a year, but of a longer period.’’20

Wood’s letter arrived in Washington at a moment when McKinley’s thoughts were on domestic politics—reelection—and when the rival Demo- crats were already making political capital out of his administration’s inability to pacify the Philippines, another part of the spoils seized from Spain. Seeking to balance that quagmire with progress in Cuba, the president ordered Wood to draw up the ﬁrst U.S. plan for Cuba’s democracy.

Wood did so. It began with the disenfranchisement of that part of the Cuban population that had gone furthest downhill. Suffrage was restricted to Cuban- born males over the age of twenty who could meet one of three requirements: the ability to read and write, the possession of property valued at $250 or more, or military service in the insurgent forces before the U.S. intervention. These restrictions eliminated two-thirds of Cuba’s adult males, and Secretary of War Elihu Root was especially pleased to see that ‘‘whites so greatly outnumber the blacks’’ in the electorate: ‘‘When the history of the new Cuba comes to be written the establishment of popular self-government, based on a limited suf- frage, excluding so great a proportion of the elements which have brought ruin to Hayti and San Domingo, will be regarded as an event of ﬁrst importance.’’21

But then, when given their opportunity to vote—for Cuba’s ﬁrst constitu- ent assembly—Cubans elected the wrong individuals. ‘‘The dominant party in the Convention to-day contains probably the worst political element in the Island,’’ Wood reported. Because this was the body that would write Cuba’s ﬁrst constitution, and because the U.S. election was over, Wood’s ﬁrst reaction was to press for a delay, promising ‘‘that at the next municipal elections we shall get hold of a better class of people.’’ He also reopened the issue of keeping the island, citing the concerns of local property owners who, he reported, ‘‘are very reluctant to see a change of government, unless it be annexation to the United States.’’22

But the Republicans had made an unambiguous campaign commitment to Cuban independence, and so they turned to their fallback position—the Platt Amendment, named after Connecticut Senator Orville Platt, chair of the Senate Committee on Relations with Cuba, who worried that Cubans were too juvenile for complete independence: ‘‘In many ways they are like children.’’23 Platt’s 1901 amendment to the army appropriations bill prohibited the withdrawal of U.S. troops until Cubans had amended their new constitution to authorize the United States the right to intervene for ‘‘the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty.’’24 Once Cubans had agreed—they were told they had no choice if they wanted their independence—Wood handed over power to Tomás Estrada Palma, a natural- ized U.S. citizen who had lived in the United States for three decades. Uncon- tested on the ballot, he won Cuba’s ﬁrst U.S.-supervised presidential election without leaving his home in upstate New York. Estrada Palma’s election ended Washington’s ﬁrst effort to promote democracy in Cuba.

A second effort began four years later, in 1906, when a substantial number of Cubans rebelled in response to that year’s fraudulent election. ‘‘I am so angry with that infernal little Cuban republic that I would like to wipe its people off the face of the earth,’’ an exasperated President Theodore Roosevelt con- ﬁded to a friend. ‘‘All we have wanted from them was that they would behave themselves and be prosperous and happy so that we would not have to interfere. And now, lo and behold, they have started an utterly unjustiﬁable and pointless revolution.’’ Roosevelt invoked the Platt Amendment, and U.S. forces took over the island once again. Asked to explain his purpose, the president told to a Harvard audience, ‘‘I am doing my best to persuade the Cubans that if only they will be good they will be happy. I am seeking the very minimum of interference necessary to make them good.’’

Forced to the defensive after retaking a country only recently granted its independence, Roosevelt’s provisional governor of Cuba, Secretary of War William Howard Taft, reminded readers of National Geographic that ‘‘the record of the nine years since the beginning of the Spanish War, looked at from an impartial standpoint, is on the whole an unblemished record of generous, earnest effort to uplift these people’’; and he said the same thing directly to Cubans: ‘‘We are here only to help you . . . with our arm under your arm, lifting you again on the path of wonderful progress.’’ And he continued in the manner of a caring Dutch uncle to an audience celebrating the reopening day of the University of Havana: ‘‘perhaps you will pardon me if I invite your attention, as an educated and intelligent audience, to some of the difﬁculties of your peo- ple.’’ These difﬁculties were many, but the most signiﬁcant problem was that ‘‘the young Cubans who are coming forward into life are not sufﬁciently in- fused with the mercantile spirit.’’ To Taft, it boiled down to a simple thing: ‘‘What you need here among the Cubans is a desire to make money.’’25

As did Leonard Wood before him, Taft understood that the uplifting would not be easy. He told Roosevelt that the insurrection ‘‘could not have occurred in a country in which the common and ignorant people are not as easily aroused’’; he wrote his wife that ‘‘the whole thing demonstrates the utter unﬁttness of these people for self govt.’’ Nonetheless, this second U.S. intervention was also in- tended to be brief—Roosevelt instructed the War Department, ‘‘Our business is to establish peace and order on a satisfactory basis, start the new government, and then leave the island.’’26 These instructions were handed to a new governor- general, Charles Magoon, who agreed that Cuba’s ﬁery culture was the underly- ing problem: ‘‘Like all other people of Spanish origin they are hot blooded, high strung, nervous, excitable and pessimistic.’’ Uplifting would therefore be slow, for ‘‘we cannot change these racial characteristics by administering their Gov- ernment for two years or twenty years.’’27

As an alternative to a time-consuming attempt to de-Hispanicize Cuban culture, Magoon tried to constrain the excitable Cubans by strengthening their institutions. He created the Advisory Law Commission composed of nine care- fully chosen Cubans and three U.S. citizens, and chaired by Colonel Enoch Crowder, an army attorney; it prepared an array of administrative reforms, including a thoroughly revised electoral code that expanded suffrage to nearly all adult males and established proportional representation to encourage the loyal participation of minority parties. Magoon then supervised a clean elec- tion, and in early 1909, he sailed for home.

Although U.S. forces returned in 1912 to quash a complex Afro-Cuban labor dispute in eastern Cuba, it was not until several years later that the United States launched its third effort to promote democracy in Cuba. It began during the Wilson administration, which still today is the record holder for Caribbean Basin interventions. President Wilson is said to have characterized his policy as an effort ‘‘to teach the South American Republics to elect good men,’’ and before Cuba, he had already ordered the invasions of the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama. All of these nearby coun- tries were fortunate, argued Wilson’s assistant secretary of state, who noted in 1916 that ‘‘nature, in its rough method of uplift, gives sick nations strong neighbors.’’ Three months later, the United States sent several hundred soldiers to maintain order around U.S.-owned sugar estates in central Cuba, where they stayed for ﬁve years.28

It was during this partial occupation that the Wilson administration pres- sured President Mario García Menocal to invite Enoch Crowder to take another crack at improving Cuba’s democracy; it also sent a new uplift-oriented ambas- sador, Boaz Long, who believed that ‘‘extending our inﬂuences over these less favored people with the idea of educating them and regulating and improving their agricultural and commercial development, and making them good citizens of a democracy, involves a colossal task, but one not unworthy of an enlight- ened American policy.’’ Acting Secretary of State Frank Polk warned Cubans that more troops would be sent unless ‘‘President Menocal assumes a receptive attitude in respect to the advice and just recommendations which the President has instructed General Crowder to convey to him.’’29

Two days later, Crowder sailed into Havana’s harbor aboard a battleship, the USS Minnesota, which would serve as his home for a year. Because he was already familiar with the island, Crowder wasted no time before producing a stream of memoranda directing García Menocal and his successor, Alfredo Zayas, to enact essential reforms. Memorandum 8 demanded ‘‘the immediate removal from ofﬁce of every ofﬁcial who . . . ,’’ and then follow seven separate categories of behavior indicative of ‘‘Graft, Corruption and Immorality in the Public Administration.’’ Memorandum 10 required ‘‘an immediate reform of the Lottery which is the source of widespread graft.’’30 This type of uplifting is inherently slow, but by 1926, the State Department felt sufﬁciently satisﬁed with Cuba and the series of other Caribbean interventions to pause for a ‘‘mis- sion accomplished’’ moment: ‘‘If the United States has received but little grati- tude, this is only to be expected in a world where gratitude is rarely accorded to the teacher, the doctor, or the policeman, and we have been all three. But it may be that in time they will come to see the United States with different eyes, and to have for her something of the respect and affection with which a man regards the instructor of his youth and the child looks upon the parent who has molded his character.’’ Two years later, when the Senate began debating how to handle equally obstreperous Nicaragua, Senator William Bruce asked his colleagues to ‘‘think of our intervention in Cuba. This is absolutely one of the ﬁnest things in human history.’’31

#### **Current Sanctions imposed upon Cuba fulfill the prophecy of US exceptionialism -- we must control the South and punish the countries that disobey our laws -- disads are epistemologically flawed.**

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The economic sanctions imposed on Cuba by the United States are unique in view of their longevity and of their complexity but they are consistent with the real objectives of the first world power. In order to show this, it is necessary to base this analysis on the following postulate: the blockade is part of a scheme designed not to promote democratic values, as the administration in Washington would have us believe, but to control the natural resources of Third World nations through subjugation. And the history of the United States ­ characterized mainly by violent and bloody conquest of new territories ­ proves this unequivocally.

As far back as the middle of the 19th century, U.S. expansionist William Gilpin announced: "The destiny of the American people is to subdue the continent." The primary goal of the United States is to make sure that the resources of the countries of the South remain at hand of the capital of the masters of the universe. The case of Cuba is exceptional because it is the only country that has dared to refuse to follow the orders set by their northern neighbor, designing its political, economic and social system, at once sovereign and independent, despite the unilateral constraints imposed by Washington. The enmity Cuba is a victim of reflects a historical continuity whose broad lines must be retraced. And by the way, it would be widely-known if something like a sense of respect for obvious historical truisms existed. This topic would not be controversial if the society we live in was intellectually free.

#### The sanctions are in place not only to end anti-Imperialist movements both domestically and abroad but also to expand the cycle of enemy-creation.

Blum 11/8—Foreign Policy Journal, author, historian, and renowned critic of U.S. foreign policy. He is the author of numerous books, including "Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II" and "Rogue State: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower" (William, 2013, The United Nations Vote on the Cuba Embargo – 22 Years In a Row, chm-->//DR. H)

For years American political leaders and media were fond of labeling Cuba an “international pariah”. We haven’t heard that for a very long time. Perhaps one reason is the annual vote in the United Nations General Assembly on the resolution which reads: “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba”. This is how the vote has gone (not including abstentions):

Year Votes (Yes-No) No Votes

1992 59-2 US, Israel 1993 88-4 US, Israel, Albania, Paraguay

1994 101-2 US, Israel 1995 117-3 US, Israel, Uzbekistan

1996 138-3 US, Israel, Uzbekistan

1997 143-3 US, Israel, Uzbekistan

1998 157-2 US, Israel

1999 155-2 US, Israel

2000 167-3 US, Israel, Marshall Islands

2001 167-3 US, Israel, Marshall Islands 2002 173-3 US, Israel, Marshall Islands

2003 179-3 US, Israel, Marshall Islands

2004 179-4 US, Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau

2005 182-4 US, Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau

2006 183-4 US, Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau

2007 184-4 US, Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau

2008 185-3 US, Israel, Palau

2009 187-3 US, Israel, Palau

2010 187-2 US, Israel

2011 186-2 US, Israel

2012 188-3 US, Israel, Palau

2013 188-2 US, Israel

Each fall the UN vote is a welcome reminder that the world has not completely lost its senses and that the American empire does not completely control the opinion of other governments.

Speaking before the General Assembly, October 29, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez declared: “The economic damages accumulated after half a century as a result of the implementation of the blockade amount to $1.126 trillion.” He added that the blockade “has been further tightened under President Obama’s administration”, some 30 US and foreign entities being hit with $2.446 billion in fines due to their interaction with Cuba.

However, the American envoy, Ronald Godard, in an appeal to other countries to oppose the resolution, said:

“The international community … cannot in good conscience ignore the ease and frequency with which the Cuban regime silences critics, disrupts peaceful assembly, impedes independent journalism and, despite positive reforms, continues to prevent some Cubans from leaving or returning to the island. The Cuban government continues its tactics of politically motivated detentions, harassment and police violence against Cuban citizens.”[1]

So there you have it. That is why Cuba must be punished. One can only guess what Mr. Godard would respond if told that more than 7,000 people were arrested in the United States during the Occupy Movement’s first 8 months of protest;[2] that their encampments were violently smashed up; that many of them were physically abused by the police.

Does Mr. Godard ever read a newspaper or the Internet, or watch television? Hardly a day passes in America without a police officer shooting to death an unarmed person?

As to “independent journalism” – what would happen if Cuba announced that from now on anyone in the country could own any kind of media? How long would it be before CIA money – secret and unlimited CIA money financing all kinds of fronts in Cuba – would own or control most of the media worth owning or controlling?

The real reason for Washington’s eternal hostility toward Cuba? The fear of a good example of an alternative to the capitalist model; a fear that has been validated repeatedly over the years as Third World countries have expressed their adulation of Cuba.

How the embargo began: On April 6, 1960, Lester D. Mallory, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, wrote in an internal memorandum: “The majority of Cubans support Castro … The only foreseeable means of alienating internal support is through disenchantment and disaffection based on economic dissatisfaction and hardship. … every possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba.” Mallory proposed “a line of action which … makes the greatest inroads in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government.”[3] Later that year, the Eisenhower administration instituted the suffocating embargo against its everlasting enemy.

#### That requires an endless recreation of existential threats.

Ružić 13—researcher and author for the Central and Eastern European Online Library (Maja, Securitization Outside the Liberal Political Context: Did Cuba Matter in the Cuban Missile Crisis?, <http://www.sintezis.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Securitization-Outside-the-Liberal-Context.pdf>, chm)

After 1990s the international relations scholarship, once dominated by the traditional notion of power politics, became open to and inﬂuenced by the emerging constructivist line of thought. The critiques of traditionalist theories emphasize that the changes that came forth with the end of the Cold War politics had an unprecedented effect on the nature of international relations. The state and military perspective of international relations was no longer dominant, and such a change had to be followed by the re-conceptualization of old concepts and the development of new ones that would reﬂect the new state of affairs. The same constructivist line of thought also made an impact on the security studies scholarship. The new security theories, which make an essential part of what is now known as the critical branch of security studies, challenge the very meaning of the concept of security. According to the challengers, the traditional meaning of the concept of security as the defence of the state from external military threats had to be re-conceptualized in order to embrace security dynamics in the new post-Cold War environment.1 The concept of security had to be diverged from what Berry Buzan and Richard Little had marked as the “Westphalian straitjacket”. The “Westphalian straitjacket” refers to the core concept of traditional security studies that views the state as the only referent object of security.2 Drawn by such incentives, while deﬁ ning the concept of security, critically orientated scholars emphasize above all the non-state and non-military aspects of the potential threat. The most signiﬁcant contribution to the constructivist and critical side of the security studies has been made through the work of scholars within the Copenhagen Conﬂ ict and Peace Research Institute (COPRI), later known as the Copenhagen School. Drawing from the European security agenda from the mid- 1980s and onwards, the Copenhagen scholars introduced the concept of security sectors with the purpose of redeﬁning not only the nature of potential threats but also the nature of the threatened objects. The concept of security sectors outlines that security deals with threats coming not just from military but also from sectors such as economy, environment, politics and society. In addition, the legitimate threatened object for security is not just state, but also society, collective identity, culture, economic integration, popular migration, survival of the species and the survival of the human civilization.3 Therefore, Jef Huysmans is right in pointing out that the Copenhagen’s concept of security sectors can be “universally applied to classify a possible diversity of security problems”.4 Apart from the concept of security sectors, the Copenhagen scholars have also contributed to the scholarship with the development of the securitization theory. The main purpose of the securitization theory is to offer an analytical tool for analysing the emergence of security processes in security sectors. In the centre of the theory is the re-conceptualized concept of security, which deﬁ nes security as a self-referential, intersubjective and socially constructed practice. In other words, securitization theory moves security from being a fact of perception to the fact of utterance. By calling something a security issue, it necessarily becomes one o.5 Deﬁ ned in such a way and placed within the Copenhagen’s theory of securitization, the concept of security is presented as an act of utterance that takes an issue beyond the realm of normal politics, by presenting it as an existential threat to the referent object, and upholds the support of audience for the extraordinary measures that are to eliminate this existential threat.6 Consequently, an analysis of security with the Copenhagen’s securitization framework becomes an examination of the process through which an issue moves from the realm of normal politics, where it could be dealt with communal governance, to the realm of securitization where it is presented as an existential threat that requires the implementation of emergency measures.

**Political rhetoric frames our understanding of political reality.**

**Whisnant 12** Associate Professor of EuropeanHistory (Clayton, November 10, 2012, “Foucault & Discourse,” http://webs.wofford.edu/whisnantcj/his389/foucault\_discourse.pdf)//DR. H

**Discourse creates a world.** By shaping our perceptions of the world, pulling together chains of associations that produce a meaningful understanding, and then organizing the way we behave towards objects in the world and towards other people, one might say that discourse generates the world of our everyday life. After all, even though science teaches us that the “real world” is the material world made up of atoms and energy, in a real way the world for most of us is a world of colors, emotions, ideas, and life. It is a kind of virtual world generated by our minds, but not by us alone—we construct this world socially through a complex interaction between experience, upbringing, and education. Discourses, as chains of language that bind us social beings together, play a key role in the social construction of reality.

**Discourse generates knowledge and “truth.”** Discourse constitutes not only the world that we live in, but also all forms of knowledge and “truth.” Knowledge for Foucault (as for most other structuralists and poststructuralists) was not something that existed independently of language. In other words, knowledge is not simply communicated through language; all knowledge is organized through the structures, interconnections, and associations that are built into language. Foucault would even go so far as to say that discourse generates truth—or what some have called truth-effects. Certain discourses in certain contexts have the power to convince people to accept statements as true. This power can have no relation to any objective correctness of the statement. The medical practice of leeching was accepted in the eighteenth century as helpful despite the harmful affects that we recognize today because it was embedded in a network of ancient medical discourses that many accepted as “true.” Likewise, many medical practices commonly accepted today might have seemed like madness or even barbaric because they had no discursive support.

**Discourse says something about the people who speak it.** Discourse communicates knowledge not only about the intended meaning of the language, but also about the person speaking the discourse. By analyzing the discourse a speaker uses, one can often tell things about the speaker’s gender, sexuality, ethnicity, class position, and even more specifically the speaker’s implied relationship to the other people around him. Medical discourse, for example, gives doctors the authority to speak, thereby placing them in a position of power over their patients. Foucault was particularly interested in looking at modes of discourse that not everyone had a right to use, or that require specific locations to gain authority. 11

A sermon that would be right at home behind a church lectern might produce only an awkward silence if given at a party. And a certified lawyer acquires a certain right to speak legal discourse in a courtroom setting through a complex system of education, a series of exams, and network of state controls.

**Discourse and Power.** This brings us to the fourth way that discourse operates, namely by being intimately involved with socially embedded networks of power. Because certain types of discourse enable specific types of individuals to “speak the truth,” or at the very least to be believed when speaking on specific subjects, discourses also give these individuals degrees of social, cultural, and even possibly political power. Doctors are generally believed when they talk about physical or mental illnesses, and this gives them an authority to recommend courses of action or patterns 11 Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 50. of behavior. In many societies, and for long stretches of Western history, religious authorities wielded tremendous social and political power because they had the power to speak about the divine. This power was caught up with their specific position, but was also based on the fact that religious discourse suffused all of life, shaping social organization and influencing how people interpreted the world.

**Absent our interrogation, extinction becomes inevitable alongside the rendering of human lives into tools.**

**Burke 07** – Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Project MUSE)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper **bedrock of modern reason** that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but **the apparently solid ground of the real itself**. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: **ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained** as it is.

I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form.

I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: **a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning**, **that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being**, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here **we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state)**. When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to **quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation** either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context **violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion**, at limited cost and with limited impact -- **it permeates being.**

This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which **humans are merely utilitarian instruments** for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather **turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction**. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21

What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action.

The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, **instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning**. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including **other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects**. In Heidegger's terms, **technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being**. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' 22

The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made.

The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped?26 How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. **The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time**, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

Friend and Enemy: Violent Ontologies of the Nation-State

In his Politics Among Nations Hans Morgenthau stated that 'the national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, which is the irreducible minimum that diplomacy must defend with adequate power and without compromise'. While Morgenthau defined security relatively narrowly -- as the 'integrity of the national territory and its institutions' -- in a context where security was in practice defined expansively, as synonymous with a state's broadest geopolitical and economic 'interests', what was revealing about his formulation was not merely the ontological centrality it had, but the sense of urgency and priority he accorded to it: it must be defended 'without compromise'.27 Morgenthau was a thoughtful and complex thinker, and understood well the complexities and dangers of using armed force. However his formulation reflected an influential view about the significance of the political good termed 'security'. When this is combined with the way in which security was conceived in modern political thought as an existential condition -- a sine qua non of life and sovereign political existence -- and then married to war and instrumental action, it provides a basic underpinning for either the **limitless resort to strategic violence** without effective constraint, or the perseverance of limited war (with its inherent tendencies to escalation) as a permanent feature of politics. While he was no militarist, Morgenthau did say elsewhere (in, of all places, a far-reaching critique of nuclear strategy) that the 'quantitative and qualitative competition for conventional weapons is a rational instrument of international politics'.28

The conceptual template for such an image of national security state can be found in the work of Thomas Hobbes, with his influential conception of the political community as a tight unity of sovereign and people in which their bodies meld with his own to form a 'Leviathan', and which must be defended from enemies within and without. His image of effective security and sovereignty was one that was intolerant of internal difference and dissent, legitimating a strong state with coercive and exceptional powers to preserve order and sameness. This was a vision not merely of political order but of existential identity, set off against a range of existential others who were sources of threat, backwardness, instability or incongruity.29 It also, in a way set out with frightening clarity by the theorist Carl Schmitt and the philosopher Georg Hegel, exchanged internal unity, identity and harmony for permanent alienation from other such communities (states). Hegel presaged Schmitt's thought with his argument that individuality and the state are single moments of 'mind in its freedom' which 'has an infinitely negative relation to itself, and hence its essential character from its own point of view is its singleness':

Individuality is awareness of one's existence as a unit in sharp distinction from others. It manifests itself here in the state as a relation to other states, each of which is autonomous vis-a-vis the others...this negative relation of the state to itself is embodied in the world as the relation of one state to another and as if the negative were something external.30

Schmitt is important both for understanding the way in which such alienation is seen as a definitive way of imagining and limiting political communities, and for understanding how such a rigid delineation is linked to the inevitability and perpetuation of war. Schmitt argued that the existence of a state 'presupposes the political', which must be understood through 'the specific political distinction...between friend and enemy'. The enemy is 'the other, the stranger; and it sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in an extreme case conflicts with him are possible'.31 The figure of the enemy is constitutive of the state as 'the specific entity of a people'.32 Without it society is not political and a people cannot be said to exist:

Only the actual participants can correctly recognise, understand and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict...to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence.33

Schmitt links this stark ontology to war when he states that the political is only authentic 'when a fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to the whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship...in its entirety the state as an organised political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy distinction'.34 War, in short, is an existential condition:

the entire life of a human being is a struggle and every human being is symbolically a combatant. The friend, enemy and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. War follows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy.35

Schmitt claims that his theory is not biased towards war as a choice ('It is by no means as though the political signifies nothing but devastating war and every political deed a military action...it neither favours war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism') but it is hard to accept his caveat at face value.36

When such a theory takes the form of a social discourse (which it does in a general form) such an ontology can only support, as a kind of originary ground, the basic Clausewitzian assumption that war can be a rational way of resolving political conflicts -- because the import of Schmitt's argument is that such 'political' conflicts are ultimately expressed through the possibility of war. As he says: 'to the enemy concept belongs the ever-present possibility of combat'.37 Where Schmitt meets Clausewitz, as I explain further below, the existential and rationalistic ontologies of war join into a closed circle of mutual support and justification.

This closed circle of existential and strategic reason generates a number of dangers. Firstly, the emergence of conflict can generate military action almost automatically simply because the world is conceived in **terms of the distinction between friend and enemy**; because **the very existence of the other constitutes an unacceptable threat**, rather than a chain of actions, judgements and decisions. (As the Israelis insisted of Hezbollah, they 'deny our right to exist'.) **This effaces agency, causality and responsibility from policy and political discourse: our actions can be conceived as independent of the conflict or quarantined from critical enquiry**, as necessities that achieve an instrumental purpose but do not contribute to a new and unpredictable causal chain. Similarly the Clausewitzian idea of force -- which, by transporting a Newtonian category from the natural into the social sciences, assumes the very effect it seeks -- further encourages the resort to military violence. **We ignore the complex history of a conflict, and thus the alternative paths to its resolution that such historical analysis might provide, by portraying conflict as fundamental and existential in nature; as possibly containable or exploitable, but always irresolvable**. Dominant portrayals of the war on terror, and the Israeli-Arab conflict, are arguably examples of such ontologies in action.

Secondly, the militaristic force of such an ontology is visible, in Schmitt, in the absolute sense of vulnerability whereby a people can judge whether their 'adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life'.38 Evoking the kind of thinking that would become controversial in the Bush doctrine, Hegel similarly argues that:

...a state may regard its infinity and honour as at stake in each of its concerns, however minute, and it is all the more inclined to susceptibility to injury the more its strong individuality is impelled as a result of long domestic peace to seek and create a sphere of activity abroad. ....the state is in essence mind and therefore cannot be prepared to stop at just taking notice of an injury after it has actually occurred. On the contrary, there arises in addition as a cause of strife the idea of such an injury...39

**Identity**, even more than physical security or autonomy, is put at stake in such thinking and can be defended and redeemed through warfare (or, when taken to a further extreme of an absolute demonisation and dehumanisation of the other, by mass killing, 'ethnic cleansing' or genocide). However anathema to a classical realist like Morgenthau, for whom prudence was a core political virtue, these have been influential ways of defining national security and defence during the twentieth century and persists into the twenty-first. They infused Cold War strategy in the United States (with the key policy document NSC68 stating that 'the Soviet-led assault on free institutions is worldwide now, and ... a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere')40 and frames dominant Western responses to the threat posed by Al Qaeda and like groups (as Tony Blair admitted in 2006, 'We could have chosen security as the battleground. But we didn't. We chose values.')41 It has also become influential, in a particularly tragic and destructive way, in Israel, where memories of the Holocaust and (all too common) statements by Muslim and Arab leaders rejecting Israel's existence are mobilised by conservatives to justify military adventurism and a rejectionist policy towards the Palestinians.

On the reverse side of such ontologies of national insecurity we find pride and hubris, the belief that martial preparedness and action are vital or healthy for the existence of a people. Clausewitz's thought is thoroughly imbued with this conviction. For example, his definition of war as an act of policy does not refer merely to the policy of cabinets, but expresses the objectives and will of peoples:

When whole communities go to war -- whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples -- the reason always lies in some political situation and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy.42

Such a perspective prefigures Schmitt's definition of the 'political' (an earlier translation reads 'war, therefore, is a political act'), and thus creates an inherent tension between its tendency to fuel the escalation of conflict and Clausewitz's declared aim, in defining war as policy, to prevent war becoming 'a complete, untrammelled, absolute manifestation of violence'.43 Likewise his argument that war is a 'trinity' of people (the source of 'primordial violence, hatred and enmity'), the military (who manage the 'play of chance and probability') and government (which achieve war's 'subordination as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone') merges the existential and rationalistic conceptions of war into a theoretical unity.44

The idea that national identities could be built and redeemed through war derived from the 'romantic counter-revolution' in philosophy which opposed the cosmopolitanism of Kant with an emphasis on the absolute state -- as expressed by Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Bismarkian Realpolitik and politicians like Wilhelm Von Humbolt. Humbolt, a Prussian minister of Education, wrote that war 'is one of the most wholesome manifestations that plays a role in the education of the human race', and urged the formation of a national army 'to inspire the citizen with the spirit of true war'. He stated that war 'alone gives the total structure the strength and the diversity without which facility would be weakness and unity would be void'.45 In the Phenomenology of Mind Hegel made similar arguments that to for individuals to find their essence 'Government has from time to time to shake them to the very centre by war'.46

The historian Azar Gat points to the similarity of Clausewitz's arguments that 'a people and a nation can hope for a strong position in the world only if national character and familiarity with war fortify each other by continual interaction' to Hegel's vision of the ethical good of war in his Philosophy of Right.47 Likewise Michael Shapiro sees Clausewitz and Hegel as alike in seeing war 'as an ontological investment in both individual and national completion...Clausewitz figures war as passionate ontological commitment rather than cool political reason...war is a major aspect of being.'48

Hegel's text argues that war is 'a work of freedom' in which 'the individual's substantive duty' merges with the 'independence and sovereignty of the state'.49 Through war, he argues,

the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the stabilization of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so the corruption in nations would be the product of a prolonged, let alone 'perpetual' peace.50

Hegel indeed argues that 'sacrifice on behalf of the individuality of the state is a substantial tie between the state and all its members and so is a universal duty...if the state as such, if its autonomy, is in jeopardy, all its citizens are duty bound to answer the summons to its defence'.51 Furthermore, this is not simply a duty, but a form of self-realisation in which the individual dissolves into the higher unity of the state:

The intrinsic worth of courage as a disposition of mind is to be found in the genuine, absolute, final end, the sovereignty of the state. The work of courage is to actualise this end, and the means to this end is the sacrifice of personal actuality. This form of experience thus contains the harshness of extreme contradictions: a self-sacrifice which yet is the real existence of one's freedom; the maximum self-subsistence of individuality, yet only a cog playing its part in the mechanism of an external organisation; absolute obedience, renunciation of personal opinions and reasonings, in fact complete absence of mind, coupled with the most intense and comprehensive presence of mind and decision in the moment of acting; the most hostile and so most personal action against individuals, coupled with an attitude of complete indifference or even liking towards them as individuals.52

A more frank statement of the potentially lethal consequences of patriotism -- and its simultaneously physical and conceptual annihilation of the individual human being -- is rarely to be found, one that is repeated today in countless national discourses and the strategic world-view in general. (In contrast, one of Kant's fundamental objections to war was that it involved using men 'as mere machines or instruments'.53) Yet however bizarre and contradictory Hegel's argument, it constitutes a powerful social ontology: an apparently irrefutable discourse of being. It actualises the convergence of war and the social contract in the form of the national security state.

Strategic Reason and Scientific Truth

By itself, such an account of the nationalist ontology of war and security provides only a general insight into the perseverance of military violence as a core element of politics. It does not explain why so many policymakers think military violence works. As I argued earlier, such an ontology is married to a more rationalistic form of strategic thought that claims to link violent means to political ends predictably and controllably, and which, by doing so, combines military action and national purposes into a common -- and thoroughly modern -- horizon of certainty. Given Hegel's desire to decisively distil and control the dynamic potentials of modernity in thought, it is helpful to focus on the modernity of this ontology -- one that is modern in its adherence to modern scientific models of truth, reality and technological progress, and in its insistence on imposing images of scientific truth from the physical sciences (such as mathematics and physics) onto human behaviour, politics and society. For example, the military theorist and historian Martin van Creveld has argued that one of the reasons Clausewitz was so influential was that his 'ideas seemed to have chimed in with the rationalistic, scientific, and technological outlook associated with the industrial revolution'.54 Set into this epistemological matrix, modern politics and government engages in a sweeping project of mastery and control in which **all of the world's resources -- mineral, animal, physical, human -- are made part of a machinic process of which war and violence are viewed as normal features.**

These are the deeper claims and implications of Clausewitzian strategic reason. One of the most revealing contemporary examples comes from the writings (and actions) of Henry Kissinger, a Harvard professor and later U.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. He wrote during the Vietnam war that after 1945 U.S. foreign policy was based 'on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in emerging countries'. This 'scientific revolution' had 'for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power in foreign policy'.55

Kissinger's conviction was based not merely in his pride in the vast military and bureaucratic apparatus of the United States, but in a particular epistemology (theory of knowledge). Kissinger asserted that the West is 'deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, that knowledge consists of recording and classifying data -- the more accurately the better'. This, he claimed, has since the Renaissance set the West apart from an 'undeveloped' world that contains 'cultures that have escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking' and remain wedded to the 'essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost entirely internal to the observer'.56

At the same time, Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, order and mastery were harder to define and impose. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience' (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'.57 Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony:

For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design. Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.58

Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words. Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. **This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought**. By 1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the rationalist policymaker par excellence, had already decided that U.S. power and technology could not prevail in Vietnam; Nixon and Kissinger's refusal to accept this conclusion, to abandon their Cartesian illusions, **was to condemn hundreds of thousands** **more to die** in Indochina and the people of Cambodia to two more decades of horror and misery.59 In 2003 there would be a powerful sense of déja vu as another Republican Administration crowned more than decade of failed and destructive policy on Iraq with a deeply controversial and divisive war to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of **a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty**. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality...does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'.61

We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said:

...envisions a seat of power in the West and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine's branches feed into it from the East -- human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you -- is processed by the machine, then converted into more power...the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance.62

This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty -- the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has **deep roots in modern thought**, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge. As Kissinger's claims about the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there. While this process has origins in ancient Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and René Descartes, who all combined a hunger for political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a naïve faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar move, Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier, Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65

Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics, which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb. Yet this new scientific power was marked by a terrible irony: as even Morgenthau understood, the control over matter afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons themselves, into political utility and rational strategy.66

Bacon thought of the new scientific method not merely as way of achieving a purer access to truth and epistemological certainty, but as liberating a new power that would enable the creation of a new kind of Man. He opened the Novum Organum with the statement that 'knowledge and human power are synonymous', and later wrote of his 'determination...to lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human power and dignity'.67 In a revealing and highly negative comparison between 'men's lives in the most polished countries of Europe and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies' -- one that echoes in advance Kissinger's distinction between post-and pre-Newtonian cultures -- Bacon set out what was at stake in the advancement of empirical science: anyone making this comparison, he remarked, 'will think it so great, that man may be said to be a god unto man'.68

We may be forgiven for blinking, but in Bacon's thought 'man' was indeed in the process of stealing a new fire from the heavens and seizing God's power over the world for itself. Not only would the new empirical science lead to 'an improvement of mankind's estate, and an increase in their power over nature', but would reverse the primordial humiliation of the Fall of Adam:

For man, by the fall, lost at once his state of innocence, and his empire over creation, both of which can be partially recovered even in this life, the first by religion and faith, the second by the arts and sciences. For creation did not become entirely and utterly rebellious by the curse, but in consequence of the Divine decree, 'in the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread'; she is now compelled by our labours (not assuredly by our disputes or magical ceremonies) at length to afford mankind in some degree his bread...69

There is a breathtaking, world-creating hubris in this statement -- one that, in many ways, came to characterise western modernity itself, and which is easily recognisable in a generation of modern technocrats like Kissinger. The Fall of Adam was the Judeo-Christian West's primal creation myth, one that marked humankind as flawed and humbled before God, condemned to hardship and ambivalence. Bacon forecast here a return to Eden, but one of man's own making. This truly was the death of God, of putting man into God's place, and no pious appeals to the continuity or guidance of faith could disguise the awesome epistemological violence which now subordinated creation to man. Bacon indeed argued that inventions are 'new creations and imitations of divine works'. As such, there is nothing but good in science: 'the introduction of great inventions is the most distinguished of human actions...inventions are a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any'.70

And what would be mankind's 'bread', the rewards of its new 'empire over creation'? If the new method and invention brought modern medicine, social welfare, sanitation, communications, education and comfort, it also enabled the **Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and two world wars; napalm, the B52, the hydrogen bomb, the Kalashnikov rifle and military strategy**. Indeed some of the 20th Century's most far-reaching inventions -- radar, television, rocketry, computing, communications, jet aircraft, the Internet -- would be the product of drives for national security and militarisation. Even the inventions Bacon thought so marvellous and transformative -- printing, gunpowder and the compass -- brought in their wake upheaval and tragedy: printing, dogma and bureaucracy; gunpowder, the rifle and the artillery battery; navigation, slavery and the genocide of indigenous peoples. In short, the legacy of the new empirical science would be ambivalence as much as certainty; degradation as much as enlightenment; the destruction of nature as much as its utilisation.

Doubts and Fears: Technology as Ontology

If Bacon could not reasonably be expected to foresee many of these developments, the idea that scientific and technological progress could be destructive did occur to him. However it was an anxiety he summarily dismissed:

...let none be alarmed at the objection of the arts and sciences becoming depraved to malevolent or luxurious purposes and the like, for the same can be said of every worldly good; talent, courage, strength, beauty, riches, light itself...Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right reason and true religion.71

By the mid-Twentieth Century, after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, such fears could no longer be so easily wished away, as the physicist and scientific director of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer recognised. He said in a 1947 lecture:

We felt a particularly intimate responsibility for suggesting, for supporting and in the end in large measure achieving the realization of atomic weapons...In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no over-statement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin, and this is a knowledge they cannot lose.72

Adam had fallen once more, but into a world which refused to acknowledge its renewed intimacy with contingency and evil. Man's empire over creation -- his discovery of the innermost secrets of matter and energy, of the fires that fuelled the stars -- had not 'enhanced human power and dignity' as Bacon claimed, but instead brought destruction and horror. Scientific powers that had been consciously applied in the defence of life and in the hope of its betterment **now threatened its total and absolute destruction**. This would not prevent a legion of scientists, soldiers and national security policymakers later attempting to apply Bacon's faith in invention and Descartes' faith in mathematics to make of the Bomb a rational weapon.

Oppenheimer -- who resolutely opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb -- understood what the strategists could not: that the weapons resisted control, resisted utility, that 'with the release of atomic energy quite revolutionary changes had occurred in the techniques of warfare'.73 Yet Bacon's legacy, one deeply imprinted on the strategists, was his view that truth and utility are 'perfectly identical'.74 In 1947 Oppenheimer had clung to the hope that 'knowledge is good...it seems hard to live any other way than thinking it was better to know something than not to know it; and the more you know, the better'; by 1960 he felt that 'terror attaches to new knowledge. It has an unmooring quality; it finds men unprepared to deal with it.'75

Martin Heidegger questioned this mapping of natural science onto the social world in his essays on technology -- which, as 'machine', has been so crucial to modern strategic and geopolitical thought as an image of perfect function and order and a powerful tool of intervention. He commented that, given that modern technology 'employs exact physical science...the deceptive illusion arises that modern technology is applied physical science'.76 Yet as the essays and speeches of Oppenheimer attest, technology and its relation to science, society and war cannot be reduced to a noiseless series of translations of science for politics, knowledge for force, or force for good.

Instead, Oppenheimer saw a process frustrated by roadblocks and ruptured by irony; in his view there was no smooth, unproblematic translation of scientific truth into social truth, and technology was not its vehicle. Rather his comments raise profound and painful ethical questions that resonate with terror and uncertainty. Yet this has not prevented technology becoming a potent object of desire, not merely as an instrument of power but as a promise and conduit of certainty itself. In the minds of too many rational soldiers, strategists and policymakers, technology brings with it the truth of its enabling science and spreads it over the world. It turns epistemological certainty into political certainty; it turns control over 'facts' into control over the earth.

Heidegger's insights into this phenomena I find especially telling and disturbing -- because they underline the ontological force of the instrumental view of politics. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger's striking argument was that in the modernising West technology is not merely a tool, a 'means to an end'. Rather **technology has become a governing image of the modern universe, one that has come to order, limit and define human existence as a 'calculable coherence of forces' and a 'standing reserve' of energy**. Heidegger wrote: 'the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.'77

This process Heidegger calls 'Enframing' and through it the scientific mind **demands that 'nature reports itself** in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and remains orderable as a system of information'. Man is not a being who makes and uses machines as means, choosing and limiting their impact on the world for his ends; rather man has imagined the world as a machine and humanity everywhere becomes **trapped within its logic**. Man, he writes, 'comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall...where **he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve**. Meanwhile Man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth.'78 Technological man not only becomes the name for a project of lordship and mastery over the earth, but incorporates humanity within this project as a calculable resource. **In strategy, warfare and geopolitics human bodies, actions and aspirations are caught, transformed and perverted by such calculating, enframing reason: human lives are reduced to tools, obstacles, useful or obstinate matter.**

This tells us much about the enduring power of crude instrumental versions of strategic thought, which relate not merely to the actual use of force but to broader geopolitical strategies that see, as limited war theorists like Robert Osgood did, force as an 'instrument of policy short of war'. It was from within this strategic ontology that figures like the Nobel prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling theorised the strategic role of threats and coercive diplomacy, and spoke of strategy as 'the power to hurt'.79 In the 2006 Lebanon war we can see such thinking in the remark of a U.S. analyst, a former Ambassador to Israel and Syria, who speculated that by targeting civilians and infrastructure Israel aimed 'to create enough pain on the ground so there would be a local political reaction to Hezbollah's adventurism'.80 Similarly a retired Israeli army colonel told the Washington Post that 'Israel is attempting to create a rift between the Lebanese population and Hezbollah supporters by exacting a heavy price from the elite in Beirut. The message is: If you want your air conditioning to work and if you want to be able to fly to Paris for shopping, you must pull your head out of the sand and take action toward shutting down Hezbollah-land.'81

Conclusion: Violent Ontologies or Peaceful Choices?

I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that the available critical, interpretive or performative languages of war -- realist and liberal international relations theories, just war theories, and various Clausewitzian derivations of strategy -- failed us, because they either perform or refuse to **place under suspicion the underlying political ontologies** that I have sought to unmask and question here. Many realists have quite nuanced and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic thought and remain embedded within the existential framework of the nation-state. Both liberal internationalist and just war doctrines seek mainly to improve the accountability of decision-making in security affairs and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war, but (apart from the more radical versions of cosmopolitanism) they fail to question the ontological claims of political community or strategic theory.82

In the case of a theorist like Jean Bethke Elshtain, just war doctrine is in fact allied to a softer, liberalised form of the Hegelian-Schmittian ontology. She dismisses Kant's Perpetual Peace as 'a fantasy of at-oneness...a world in which differences have all been rubbed off' and in which 'politics, which is the way human beings have devised for dealing with their differences, gets eliminated.'83 She remains a committed liberal democrat and espouses a moral community that stretches beyond the nation-state, which strongly contrasts with Schmitt's hostility to liberalism and his claustrophobic distinction between friend and enemy. However her image of politics -- which at its limits, she implies, requires the resort to war as the only existentially satisfying way of resolving deep-seated conflicts -- reflects much of Schmitt's idea of the political and Hegel's ontology of a fundamentally alienated world of nation-states, in which war is a performance of being. She categorically states that any effort to dismantle security dilemmas 'also requires the dismantling of human beings as we know them'.84 Whilst this would not be true of all just war advocates, I suspect that even as they are so concerned with the ought, moral theories of violence grant too much unquestioned power to the is. The problem here lies with the confidence in being -- of 'human beings as we know them' -- which ultimately fails to escape a Schmittian architecture and thus eternally exacerbates (indeed **reifies) antagonisms**. Yet we know from the work of Deleuze and especially William Connolly that **exchanging an ontology of being for one of becoming**, where the boundaries and nature of the self contain new possibilities through agonistic relation to others, provides a less destructive and violent way of acknowledging and dealing with conflict and difference.85

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of **hegemonic forms of knowledge** about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it **drives out every other possibility of revealing**...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87

What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but **by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence**. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from **calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die**. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then **preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses**, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.

The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force.

But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for **a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing**. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more.

When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this **cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought**, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90

**This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning'** as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

#### These attempts to dominate a target nation is based in a form of power over that is a violent approach to the world that must be rejected

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Critical Redefinition of Power in the International Arena The critical redefinition of power that would be involved in a feminist epistemology of international relations would also critique sanctions. Sanctions entrench the concept of power- over, for example, the United States’ power over the government and people of Syria to force them to comply with the United States’ wishes. Saddam Hussein’s response to the sanctions is also typical of a traditional understanding of power, as the response to an attempt at coercion is to resist it at all costs, even if that means injury to the citizens within Iraq. While proponents of sanctions talk of them as persuasion and leverage, their opponents describe sanctions as a weapon used by the dominant intended to force the compliance of the subordinate. There is a literature that encourages sanctions encourages shunning of many sanctioned governments as an ethical statement76, that is, cut off communication as a punishment for the government’s misdeeds. This sort of rhetoric entrenches normative power relations, and allows no space of a transition of power to the ideas of acting in concert as opposed to coercion. The feminist international relations viewpoint would see all nations and people as fundamentally equal. In their equality, nations would not have the ability to exert power over one another in judgment. Simply put, the United States does not have the right to bind other nations by its ethics, as the only way it can do so is its power of its dominance. This viewpoint should not been seen as complicit in or endorsing of the human rights violations that Saddam Hussein inflicts on the people of Iraq, or of The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s military threats towards its neighbors, or of any nation’s state-sponsored terrorism. At the same time, the viewpoint recognizes that there are many violences and tragedies in the international relations arena that the United States has been either complicit or involved in, including but not limited to the humanitarian effects of economic sanctions. The “he started it” argument about the ethical excusability sanctions might have been effective ten years ago, but has lost its weight, as the many nations’ position on the international norms that sanctions attempt to enforce have not changed. Feminism here does not refrain from behavioral criticism, but rejects enforcement of one person or entity’s opinion on a subject via the power-over sort of policy that sanctions is. Like the power-over concept, sanctions are inherently conflict-based. It has been clear from the United States’ behavior concerning the sanctions that compromise is not an option, and that the sanctions’ game is a winner-takes-all fight. Take up the example of Iraq once again. The United States is not going to lift sanctions unless Iraq cooperates with United Nations’ weapons inspections in which the United States is involved; Iraq is not going to cooperate with weapons inspections if the United States is involved in any way. Compromising that has gone on has been minimal, and not really affected the humanitarian effects of sanctions. The oil-for-food program is an example. It maintained the United States’ absolute power-over attitude, as the rules were that Iraq could see oil and purchase food if and only if the United Nations could supervise every transaction and set a limit on the amount of money that was transacted. This would allow the United States to maintain control over the Iraqi economy completely. Also, for various reasons, the oil-for-food program didn’t work. Iraq no longer had, and was not allowed to import, the infrastructure to get the oil out of the ground; and thus could not meet the United Nations’ quotas to sell the oil.77 Also, Iraq had difficulty trading the money for the supplies that were needed because the United States dictated what was allowed under the agreement and not. Finally, oil- for-food did not allow individual citizens to trade with other nations, only the government of Iraq. As we have already been over, the government of Iraq is not the most liberal of institutions, and supplies did not reach all of the people. Sanctions put Iraqis in a little cage, and the oil-for-food program kept them there, just dangling a carrot just out of reach.

#### These sanctions aren’t neutral but rather upheld by securitization

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The United States’ policy determination to keep sanctions in its arsenal of policy choices brings up the question: why? How does the government that imposes most of the world’s sanctions justify the policy? Aside from the justification, why do they implement sanctions? The question of how sanctions are justified can be best answered by looking for statements of sanctions’ proponents in government. The United States justifies and campaigns for sanctions based on the security threats to the United States and its allies, governments’ disregard for international standards, and governments’ human rights records. Most of the rhetoric concerning economic sanctions coming from the United States government emphasizes the potential security threat of the sanctioned nations. Fidel Castro is willing to house ‘our’ enemies a short distance from ‘our shore.’ The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has missiles that will reach Japan, and (gasp) might get ‘The Bomb.’ The threat coming from the nations that are sanctioned is categorized in two different ways. The threats come stem a combination of the dictator and the weapons capacity of these nations. Donna Kaplowitz documents that one of the primary reasons for United States sanctions on Cuba is to encourage the overthrow of Fidel Castro.32 The Air Force’s counterproliferation experts speculate, “Iraq will likely be a potential threat as long as it is governed by Saddam Hussein.”33 The specific threat coming from these sanctioned nations is interpreted in the form of weapons of mass destruction. A writer for the Washington Times jumps on the government bandwagon and asserts, “Iran and Iraq may join North Korea in presenting a ballistic missile threat to the mainland United States within the next ten years.”34A ballistic missile threat is, presumably, bad and dangerous. Never mind that the United States ‘presents a ballistic missile threat’ to every citizen of every nation of the world, if ‘ballistic missile threat’ means the capability to hit the -Continental Ballistic Missile. Still, the security threat posed to the United States is one of the major arguments used to support the use of sanctions. In the words of the State Department, discussing sanctions on ‘rogue nations,’ “we are committed to containing the threat that the regime poses.”35 More often than they use the rhetoric of security threat to the United States to support sanctions, United States policymakers frame nations under U. S. sanctions as security threats to their regions. Referencing the Gulf War and the Iran-Iraq war, Thomas Pickering depicts Iraq as a state of international threats and violence. He argues, “Saddam has repeatedly used force against his neighbors, developed weapons of mass destruction and used those weapons on citizens and neighbors.”36Syria is under sanctions as a security threat for its potential aggression against Israel.37 The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a potential threat to Japan. Iraq is described as a regional security threat in many different scenarios. Anthony Cordesman lists many potential regional war scenarios that could result from an unrestrained Iraq. They include a “confrontation with Israel”38, a “strike at Jordan”, and “clashes with Turkey or Iran38 over Iraqi efforts to attack the Kurds.”39These wouldn’t be small confrontations, the United States’ government argues. Instead, they have the potential to be explosive conflicts. Cordesman speculates that Iraq will engage in activities to upgrade its weapons capabilities in order to threaten its neighbors. He foresees Iraq’s “creation of biological strike capability, purchase nuclear weapon(s) to intimidate region.”40The United States does not just argue that sanctions are necessary to protect the region from Iraq, but that sanctions are necessary to protect the region from Iraq because the region being safe is in United States’ interests. Pickering argues that the United States must guard against Iraq’s serious “potential to destabilize regions of great importance to U. S. interests.”41Thus, sanctions protect both regional stability and United States’ interest, according to their proponents and institutors. In addition to the concern about normative military threats, the United States uses sanctions because of a problem with threats coming from state-sponsored international terrorism. The United States has sanctions on Libya because of Libya’s refusal to extradite the alleged Lockerbie bombers. The United States maintains a list of nations that it believes engage in state sponsored terrorism. Among those nations are five nations that are major targets of United States sanctions, Iran, Syria, The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Cuba, and Iraq. The Counterterrorism Branch of the State Department claims that, in the 1990s, “Iraq continued to engage in state-sponsored internal and international terrorism.”42Cordesman fears that Iraq will engage in the sort of international terrorism it did immediately preceding the Gulf War, that is, nation-nabbing for ransom. He predicts that lifting of sanctions on Iraq might cause a “sudden invasion of Kuwait: Attempt to create ‘hostage state/people.’”43In addition to the use of normative military force for the purposes of terrorism, Cordesman fears that Iraq could resort to “use of chemical or biological terrorism.”44

#### Vote AFF to epistemologically interrogate the security logic the United States federal government used to justify its economic sanctions on Cuba -- The ballot is a referendum on the desirability of security logic -- these sanctions are a heuristic by which we can make that decision.

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While recommendations to **shift our frame of orientation** away from conventional **state-centrism** toward a **'human security' approach** are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the **deeper theoretical assumptions** underlying **conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues**.106 By occluding the **structural origin** and **systemic dynamic** of global **ecological, energy and economic crises**, orthodox approaches are **incapable of transforming them**. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of **'surface' impacts** of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international **terrorism, violent conflict and population movements**. Global crises end up fuelling the **projection of risk onto social networks**, **groups and countries** that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - **which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities**. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to **climate change** impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon **energy resources**, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the **focus of state security** planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad.

The intensifying problematisation and **externalisation of Muslim-**majority regions and populations by **Western `security agencies - as a discourse** - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an **epistemological failure** to **interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration** in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question.

As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it **fundamentally undermines the idea** of a symbiotic **link between natural resources and conflict** per se. **Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance'** (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) **necessitate conflict** by themselves.

There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological **strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution** between different social groups and classes. **Overlooking the systematic causes** of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to **problematise its symptoms**, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to **externalisation of those groups**, **and** the **legitimisation of violence towards them**.

Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional **policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate**. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation.

Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) **translate the social science implications** of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, **lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection** and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, **they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others'**, newly **constructed as traditional security threats** enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to **ecological, energy and economic catastrophe**. Such an outcome, of course, is **not inevitable**, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could **inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.**

**Our epistemological interrogation of Economic Engagement is key.**

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The starting premise of the book is that the pursuit of free trade in any given region is a social endeavor. Much like national market building, it occurs in the midst of rich institutional and political contexts. Market officials take action, but powerful constraints limit their choices. Traditions, structures, values, and norms along with the preferences of powerful actors define the range of what is possible. Societal players, in turn, respond to a broader marketplace by expanding their reach across national borders. Yet which players do so and what, exactly, they engage in depend on the specific opportunities presented to them and the position of those players in their respective environments prior to integration. We thus observe continuity between the shape of RTAs and preexisting local realities. We also observe the uniqueness of any given RTA: each is the result of a widespread desire for regional free trade pursued in very particular local conditions. RTAs are remarkably different creations. This book explores and accounts for their distinctiveness.

The evidence presented in the next chapters has direct implications for three topics of much current debate: globalization, the nature of markets, and the spread of neoliberalism. First, contrary to the fashionable claims of globalization theorists, **the local still matters.** Enduring differences across geographies still shape social life. Second, despite the belief that most economists hold about the spontaneous rise and functioning of markets, we see that social actors make markets in specific contexts. Third, the spread of neoliberalism at the end of the twentieth century was not, as most observers have assumed, a homogenous affair across the globe. As is true for many other economic doctrines, neoliberalism offered a general blueprint for economic activity but no instructions for its practical deployment in real life. To be sure, some of these observations are not novel. Until now, however, they have been articulated with evidence from nation states rather than regions of states. The focus on RTAs brings new evidence to bear on these issues.

The specific focus of the book is on two major areas of difference among RTAs. The first difference concerns the legal systems crafted in pursuit of free trade. In any market, sustainable buying and selling requires that participants share some basic understandings of the world. On the one hand, they must subscribe to similar views of what is being exchanged and of other items and entities associated with that exchange. Unmet expectations engender disappointment and the dissolution of relationships. Thus, for instance, consumers, importers, and producers in a given market must share similar views about what yogurt, beer, and credit cards are without need for recurring explicit discussion. Patients and doctors must similarly agree on the basic elements of a routine physical examination. And clients at a real estate law firm generally assume that their attorneys know the difference between commercial and residential buildings. On the other hand, participants must also subscribe to certain ideas about what is desirable in the world. Life in the marketplace is complex and unpredictable. When engaging in buying and selling, participants must feel confident that business will be reasonably safe, orderly, and fair. Thus, in any given market there must exist numerous notions that guide everyone's behavior. There must be broad agreement, for instance, over whether purchased goods can be returned, food labels should list all ingredients, or racial discrimination in hiring is acceptable.

Regional market building poses special challenges. Historically, most markets have formed slowly over time in tandem with gradual adjustments in the worldviews of market participants. By contrast, the building of regional markets is a deliberate process where barriers to exchange are quickly removed and peoples from diverse backgrounds are expected to interact with each other. The process therefore poses the challenge of standardization: definitions and normative viewpoints about the world must be brought into alignment. This is a major task, since it requires fundamental changes in subtle and sometimes implicit notions about the world.

RTA officials have responded differently to this challenge. In some areas, they have aggressively sought to standardize the world; in others, they have adopted a more laissez-faire approach. The primary tool for standardization at the regional level has been law. This means that in some RTAs officials have erected complex legal architectures rich with standardizing notions about the world. In other RTAs, by contrast, we observe minimalist legal architectures. The latter are often matched by a tendency to encourage participants to trade first or simply rely on standards set by other international organizations (especially for technical matters) and, if problems arise, to turn to reactive conflict-resolution mechanisms.

RTAs differ not only in the complexity of their legal architectures but also in the very targets and content of their laws. They differ in what they standardize, even though similar products are being traded across countries. Thus, for example, in one RTA apples may be subject to standardization (for instance, laws may define varieties of apples) while in a second RTA computer monitors are subject to standardization (for instance, the chemical properties of liquid crystal display screens are specified), even though in both RTAs apples and monitors are bought and sold across national boundaries. There also exist differences in the very content of standardizing law when, in fact, similar subject matters are targeted. The laws of two RTAs, for instance, may define and regulate child labor, medical conditions, and the use of food additives quite differently.

The second claim concerns the responses of societal organizations to regional integration. Different interest groups, businesses, and state units develop regional structures and programs in different RTAs. In one RTA, for example, we may observe the rise of environmental groups with transnational membership bases and objectives. In the same RTA, we may also observe that computer manufacturers have expanded their production infrastructures across national borders, while state labor departments participate in new regional-level coordinating bodies and have developed specialized domestic units to deal with the movement of medical professionals. In another RTA, we observe different dynamics. There, we may note the rise of regional associations of wildlife hunters, the expansion of furniture manufacturers, and the internationalization of transportation departments.

In some cases, analogous organizations develop regional structures and programs across different RTAs. But those cases still see important differences across those organizations in terms of specific structures and programs. If, for instance, farmers emerge at the regional level in two RTAs, their members' profiles and their objectives are likely to vary. Similarly, if textile companies expand internationally in two given RTAs, what exactly they produce will differ.

What helps explain these differences in law and organizational developments? The Social Construction of Free Trade proposes a political-institutional explanation: with regard to both law and organizations, a combination of institutional factors (above all, legal traditions) and political factors (above all, the preferences of powerful actors in society) is at work. This combination in most cases ensures that RTAs offer much continuity with existing conditions on the grounds in the member states and that RTAs acquire their distinctive character.

Specifically, in the case of interventionism versus minimalism in regional law, the presence of civil- versus common-law traditions in the member states of each RTA is of great importance. Civil law represents an attempt to codify the world a priori so as to facilitate social life. Common law is a reactive, case-by-case, and thus gradual approach to regulation. The former is more idealistic and rigid, the latter more pragmatic and flexible. RTA officials instinctively veer towards interventionism when they operate in spaces where member states share traditions of civil law: it is the logical solution to the cacophony of national laws. Officials are naturally inclined towards a minimalist approach when they operate within common-law traditions. There will be times, of course, when not all the member states of a given RTA share a similar legalistic approach. In those cases, officials opt for a regional legal system that matches those that are most prevalent in the member states. The choices of market officials receive the crucial support of key powerful actors (leading economic groups, civil society associations, politicians, and so on) that have flourished in those dominant regulatory environments.

As to the targets and content of regional law, we consider again existing legal principles in the given subject area and the preferences of powerful societal players. When crafting regional laws, officials turn to the predominant domestic approaches in the member states: they regulate mostly that which is regulated at the national level and they articulate principles that more or less replicate, at the regional level, shared national principles. Here too, of course, officials can at times craft regional laws that depart from existing principles in one or a few of the member states. Such departures, however, do not deprive regional law of its roots in the legal principles that are shared by most, if not all, of the member states. Pressuring market officials to follow national legal approaches are powerful actors. With a vested interest in translating at the regional level those legal environments in which they have grown, these actors have a great stake in RTA officials' developing specific types of laws that will solidify their position in society. In many cases, their influence ultimately determines, within the boundaries of the permissible, the final character of any given regional law.

Organizational changes in RTAs also reflect existing institutional and political contexts. Those organizations that develop regional capacities have typically operated in domestic legal environments that have prepared them for expansion. Seldom do weak domestic organizations respond to integration by asserting themselves at the regional level. At the same time, the very presence of regional law (itself an institution) in certain areas of social life has an impact on organizations: regional law creates incentives for organizations that have the necessary resources to become transnational. This happens differently for different types of organizations. The presence of regional law on certain topics encourages certain interest groups to develop regional capacity to lobby and guide the direction of such law. The standardization of certain products and processes encourages certain firms to expand their programs and structures at a regional level. Regional law, in turn, poses for state administrative units problems of oversight, implementation, and reporting that are more readily addressed by developing regional capacity. Thus, in a given RTA, we are likely to see the parallel evolution of law and societal organizations in certain spheres of social life. As regional law takes shape and offers the underpinnings for an economically integrated area, organizations adapt by expanding their operations in tandem with such law.

The evidence for these claims concerns three RTAs in Europe and the Americas: the European Union (EU), Mercosur, and NAFTA, the three most important and, occasional crises notwithstanding, best functioning RTAs in existence. We shall examine NAFTA's minimalism and the interventionism of officials in the EU and Mercosur. We shall also see how EU, Mercosur, and NAFTA officials have differed in what they target for standardization and in the content of their standardizing definitions. For that, we will turn to three subject areas within the realm of economics: the rights of women in the workplace, dairy products, and labor rights. Only EU officials have generated rich notions on working women. Only Mercosur officials, by contrast, have standardized the world of dairy products. In all three RTAs, officials have generated important notions surrounding labor rights, yet their definitions and visions vary significantly.

We will then consider the evolution of three types of organizations in the same three areas of economic life. Here, too, the three RTAs exhibit remarkable differences. We will learn about the development of regional-level women's groups in the EU, but not in Mercosur or NAFTA. In Mercosur alone we will observe dairy companies rushing to expand their op- erations across borders. In all three RTAs we will note that national administrations have developed units and processes with regional capacity in the area of labor rights but, crucially, that those units and processes are particular to each RTA.

The argument and evidence presented in this book directly challenge the recent writing of a number of academics, journalists, politicians, business leaders, and other observers of globalization. The most aggressive theses were put forth in the late 1980s and early 1990s, following the collapse of Communism as a viable option for organizing human societies (Zakaria 2000). There is now an extensive and sophisticated literature on the topic. Edited volumes offer interesting overviews of its breadth and variety (Lechner and Boli 2000; O'Meara et al. 2000; Berger and Huntington 2002). We shall not review that literature here,1 but only refer to some of its most important claims, all of which point to a decreasing relevance of the local as a place of difference. Three strands are especially important.

Some proponents of globalization suggest that the world is becoming an increasingly homogenous place. They describe the impending arrival of single models for political, cultural, economic, legal, and other types of systems (Fukuyama 1992). Central to their view is the end of variety. In the political realm, for instance, they note that democracy is becoming the only acceptable form of governance for any community (Diamond 2000). Dictatorships, empires, and other models possess little or no legitimacy: the world community and its spokesmen, such as the United Nations, ostracize them. Without either recognition or access to external resources, nondemocratic communities are unlikely to survive for long. Similarly, the only sustainable form of economic life is some type of market capitalism. Socialism, various forms of protectionist systems, and other approaches to economic life are unrealistic and untenable. The collapse of the Soviet Union was but one indication of this. China and India are now moving towards market capitalism gradually, with impressive results for both. Countries in Eastern and Central Europe, such as Estonia and Poland, offer similar examples (Arrighi 2000; Burtless et al. 2000).

A second set of globalization theorists point to increased international cooperation. As human communities in various geographical locations adopt similar systems--political, cultural, and other--they also enter into very close relationships on the world stage, creating transnational or supranational structures to solidify their relationships. Thus, democratic countries participate in international democratic institutions and sponsor nongovernmental organizations to help formerly communist or socialist countries transition towards democracy (Mendelson and Glenn 2002). Capitalist countries in turn create international capitalist institutions, such as transnational corporations, and organizations like the IMF or the World Bank (Korzeniewicz 2000). And those concerned with the degradation of the environment and various forms of injustices worldwide join organizations with global agendas and solutions (World Commission on Environment and Development 2000; Amnesty International 2000). To these commentators, we are witnessing the rise of a global village where the boundaries of the traditional nation state are being eroded in favor of a global, cosmopolitan system.

A third group of proponents acknowledges that the world remains full of variation and idiosyncrasies. They also note--in an argument that applies most directly to culture--an unprecedented level of access to that which is different. For example, culinary traditions remain strong, yet foods of diverse origins are available everywhere. In Europe one can eat Cantonese, while in Moscow one can eat Brazilian (Warde 2000). The same applies to music and other forms of art. Again, national traditions remain strong and some even become revitalized, even if they are inevitably influenced by others. What is different is the availability of different artistic traditions (in recordings, live performances, exhibitions, via the Internet, and so on) throughout the world. What applies to culture applies to other spheres as well. As information travels effortlessly across the globe, politicians and economic actors can gain exposure to alternative systems, approaches, and ideas. No nation state can be separate from the world as might have been the case as recently as a few decades ago. Until the mid-1950s, for instance, the Kingdom of Nepal was virtually isolated from the rest of the world. Today, the Nepalese people are well aware of events and systems outside of their small country.

This book challenges these visions of a global world, and especially those related to homogeneity and global cooperation. With regard to homogeneity, it offers evidence that RTAs represent difference--in their architecture and in the societal changes that they engender. These are meaningful differences: they affect whole populations and a variety of businesses, associations, and state structures. They are also rooted in institutional, political, and, therefore, ultimately also in historical and cultural contexts: hence, they are enduring differences. We do not live in a world of converging societies, but in a world where the local--in its multiple dimensions--still matters. As to global cooperation, the book suggests that RTAs represent either an admission that efforts to forge a global economic system have so far failed or a recognition that societies are not ready to fuse themselves into a single economic system. Either way, RTAs represent smaller arenas for economic cooperation, suggesting, even if indirectly, that the vision of global institutions may either be untenable or still only be achieved quite far into the future.

This book naturally aligns itself with the critics of the globalization thesis. But while many of these works have sought to "rescue" the "national" from the "global,"2 only some have pointed to the importance of the "regional." This book contributes to this smaller but also growing body of research. It is worth recalling here some of the most important examples. One is a famous piece by Ohmae (1993) describing the rise of heavily interdependent regional economic systems, comprising portions of nation states. It was paralleled by several works arguing that most trade across nations happens in very circumscribed areas, such as that encompassing Japan, Europe, and North America, or the whole of Southeast Asia (Hirst 2000). Others focused more on culture and politics. Huntington's (1997) famous book describing a world divided along the lines of major civilizations--such as the Western, Eastern Orthodox, Latin American, Islamic, and Japanese--is a good example. The next chapters offer evidence of an intriguing combination of regions with unique legal and organizational characteristics.

This book directly speaks to a second important topic: the nature of markets. For almost two decades now, economic sociologists have challenged in strong terms the neoclassical economic assumption that markets emerge naturally out of the human desire to trade: that markets "are spontaneously generated by the exchange activity of buyers and sellers" (Abolafia 1996: 9). A number of supporting structures and factors must instead be in place before exchanges can take place. In important works, Abolafia (1996), Fligstein (2001), Campbell and Lindberg (1990), and others have examined what, exactly, those supporting structures might be. Abolafia speaks of "rules, roles, and relationships" (1996: 9). Fligstein speaks of "social structures, social relations, and institutions" (2001: 4). Others speak of shared understanding about the commodities and actors involved in the exchange (Spillman 1999; Zelizer 1992).

Clearly, this book contributes directly to the idea that markets require much support to emerge and function. The book is above all an exploration of how RTA officials have worked to build spaces where regional markets can flourish. Yet, this project departs from the existing literature in important ways. Its comparative-regional focus is unique: there exist a few comparative works on market building at the national level, but there are no works on market building across multiple regions. We note in fact only some works on single RTAs--typically the EU (Fligstein and McNichol 1998). A comparative-regional analysis, then, is needed: Do regional markets require supporting structures? What are these structures, how do they come about, and are they identical across markets? What can account for variation across markets? What are the implications of such variation? If the study of national market building, in all of its variety, has proved rewarding, the study of RTAs is likely to yield a whole array of new and exciting insights.

In addition, we should note that RTAs represent a very particular genre of market building. Most existing analyses consider markets that have developed slowly over time, with the direct and indirect participation of numerous players only on occasion conscious that they are working towards the establishment of a particular market. In these accounts, markets emerge from the confluence of several events and trends. One recalls, for instance, Zelizer's (1992) account of the emergence of the life insurance industry in the United States. The process unfolded over several decades as the economic situation of working parents, culture, religion, and family structures underwent complex--and often unrelated--changes. By contrast, RTAs represent deliberate, explicit attempts to create regional markets in very short periods of time. This amounts to a very different kind of market creation: intentional, faster, programmatic. Our attention in this book is thus much less on proving that markets require supporting structures and far more on examining and comparing the choices that certain individuals and groups of individuals have made, in different places, to construct their respective markets.

The book addresses a third important debate: how a particular economic ideology--in this case neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s--has led to remarkably different outcomes in different places. The literature is not only about outcomes, but also concerns the very processes and mediating mechanisms by which ideas are put into practice: the translation of abstract concepts into real-life policies. The argument is quite straightforward. Scholars recognize that the 1980s and 1990s saw a widespread rejection of Keynesian principles of economic management that put a premium on state intervention. Policymakers everywhere turned to the free market as the potential solution to economic stagnation and declining standards of living. The move required restructuring existing state and social structures and instituting mechanisms that would reduce interference with economic life. Initiatives included the deregulation of domestic industries, bureaucratic downsizing, the privatization of state enterprises, the reduction of subsidies, and welfare reforms. Yet, the same scholars argue that the pursuit of broadly similar economic principles led to different outcomes thanks to the very unique processes and mediating mechanisms through which they were pursued. Neoliberalism did not lead to convergence across countries, as some observers thought it might (Boltho 1996).

**Disregard claims of inevitability – only by rejecting the securitization of the affirmative can we open up space for new alternatives – realism is structurally flawed**

**Roberts 08 –** research paper submitted at the University of East Anglia, School of Political, Social and International Studies, cites political scientists such as Fukuyama(July 10, 2008, Adrian Bua Roberts, “Contesting Neo-Realism and Liberal Idealism; Where do Hopes for a ‘Perpetual Peace’ Lie?” <http://www.e-ir.info/2008/07/10/contesting-neo-realism-and-liberal-idealism-where-do-hopes-for-a-%E2%80%98perpetual-peace%E2%80%99-lie/>) // NG

War has been an omnipresent aspect of the international order since the beginning of recorded history. Consequently, ‘realism’ sees conflict and war as the defining aspects of international relations. On the other hand ‘idealists’ posit that **human reason**/different forms of societal organization can curb or even **eliminate belligerency**. This essay shall critically analyse the realist position drawing on ‘critical theory’ to show that it is limited to analysing the world system without committing to change it. Realism’s “a-historic” nature and descriptive limitation presupposes that patterns discovered are immutable truths and by eliminating the internal nature of states from consideration, realism **fails** to provide adequate account for the **changing nature of war**. Following analysis on the effects of economic interdependence and democratic regimes upon war, the essay shall argue that though democracy and economic interdependence amongst equal trading partners hamper belligerency, the effects of capitalist globalization corrupt such gains and perpetuate conflict. The aim is to show that war is not necessarily inevitable, but in order to significantly reduce or eliminate war the world must reach a post-capitalist stage.

THE ROOTS OF WAR

The lack of organization, technology and communication would make war unfeasible until a relatively recent time, so it is safe to assume that mankind’s pre-history was a **non-military one**. Pre-historic breeding and feeding groups may have been prone to group ferocity but this does not amount to “organized armed struggle between groups in which each side seeks to displace or to dispel, to dominate or punish, or simply to be rid of the other by inflicting ‘defeat’”[1]. War requires a political purpose of some sort. Though it has not yet been established whether war is inevitable amongst sovereign[2]states, the **notion of sovereignty** lies at the **root of “war**”. War’s purpose is the removal, limitation or exercise of another state’s ‘sovereignty’, **without ‘Sovereignty’ war would not be necessary**.