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**The plan’s appeasement.**

**Stern 6** (Martin, University of Maryland Graduate, Debunking detente, 11/27/06, http://www.diamondbackonline.com/article\_56223e79-7009-56a3-8afe-5d08bfff6e08.html)

Appeasement is defined as "granting concessions to potential enemies to maintain peace." Giving Iran international legitimacy and removing sanctions would have maintained peace with a potential enemy without changing the undemocratic practices of the enemy. If this isn't appeasement, I don't know how better to define the word.

**That’s not topical – economic engagement is the establishment of economic contacts – not one time appeasement.**

**Resnick 01** – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN ENGAGEMENT AND APPEASEMENT

In contrast to many prevailing conceptions of engagement, the one proposed in this essay allows a **substantive distinction** to be drawn between **engagement** and **appeasement**. The standard definition of appeasement--which derives from the language of classical European diplomacy, namely "a policy of attempting to reduce tension between two states by the methodical removal of the principal causes of conflict between them"(n29)--is venerable but nevertheless inadequate.(n30) It does not provide much guidance to the contemporary policymaker or policy analyst, because it conceives of a foreign policy approach in terms of the **ends** sought while never **making clear** the **precise means** involved. The principal causes of conflict between two states can be removed in a **number of ways**.(n31)

A more refined definition of appeasement that not only remains loyal to the traditional connotations but also establishes a **firm conceptual distinction from engagement** might be: the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state by ceding territory and/or a geopolitical sphere of influence to that state. Indeed, the two best-known cases of appeasement, Great Britain's appeasement of the United States at the turn of the 20th century and of Nazi Germany in the 1930s, reveals that much of this appeasement adopted precisely these guises. The key elements of the British appeasement of the US-acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine-permission for the US to build and fortify a Central American canal, and acquiescence to American claims on the border between Alaska and the Yukon--consisted of explicit acknowledgement of American territorial authority.(n32) Meanwhile, the appeasement of the Third Reich by Great Britain was characterized by acquiescence to: Germany's military reoccupation of the Rhineland (1936); annexation of Austria (1938); acquisition of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia as decided at the Munich Conference; and absorption of the remainder of Czechoslovakia (1939).(n33) A more contemporary example of appeasement is the land for peace exchange that represents the centerpiece of the on-again off-again diplomatic negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority.

Thus, a **rigid conceptual distinction** can be drawn between engagement and appeasement. Whereas both policies are positive sanctions--insofar as they add to the power and prestige of the target state--engagement does so in a less direct and less militarized fashion than appeasement. In addition, **engagement differs from appeasement** by establishing an **increasingly interdependent relationship** between the sender and the target state. At any juncture, the sender state can, in theory, abrogate such a relationship at some (ideally prohibitive) cost to the target state.(n34) **Appeasement, on the other hand, does not involve the establishment of contacts** or interdependence between the appeaser and the appeased. Territory and/or a sphere of influence are merely transferred by one party to the other either unconditionally or in exchange for certain concessions on the part of the target state.

**Blurring the distinction between engagement and appeasement wrecks limits and precision — vote negative.**

**Resnick 01** – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

ENGAGEMENT VS. ISOLATION, APPEASEMENT VS. CONTAINMENT

The proposed definition of engagement helps **clarify the distinctions** between alternative foreign policy approaches that rely on positive sanctions and also makes understandable distinctions among some frequently mentioned alternative approaches that rely on negative sanctions. In current discussions on US foreign policy toward rogue states, and especially on US foreign policy toward China, engagement and containment are paired as antipodal policies. In fact, one recent scholarly article addressing US-P.R.C. relations decries the fact that "the media and many pundits have constructed US choices as limited to 'engagement' and 'containment.'"(n35) However, in light of the distinction I posit between engagement and appeasement, one could more intuitively construe containment to be the opposite of appeasement rather than engagement. Containment has been traditionally construed as the attempt to prevent the geopolitical expansion of a target state.(n36) If appeasement constitutes the cession of territory and/or spheres of influence to a target state, containment might more appropriately be considered the policy of preventing a target state from expanding its territorial scope and/or sphere of geopolitical influence. Thus, whereas a sender state can expand contacts across multiple issue areas with a target state while simultaneously deterring it from committing aggression and/or expanding its geopolitical influence by allying with its neighbors (engagement plus containment), it would be impossible for a sender state to cede territory and/or a sphere of influence to a target state while simultaneously preventing that same state from expanding its territory or sphere of geopolitical influence (appeasement plus containment).

The opposite of a policy of engagement would be one in which a state comprehensively diminishes and withdraws contacts across multiple issue areas with another state. Although such a policy would be considered a negative sanction, it does not attempt to do so through direct geopolitical means, as does a containment policy. One could label such a policy as disengagement or isolation.(n37) Thus, whereas a state can yield another state territory or an enlarged sphere of influence while simultaneously abrogating contacts with that state (appeasement plus disengagement), it is impossible for a state to expand and diminish contacts with another state across multiple issue-areas (engagement plus disengagement).

The distinctions drawn between engagement, appeasement, containment and isolation allow for a **more focused** and **coherent** discussion of some of the options available for dealing with rival states. For example, current US policy toward China can be depicted as engagement plus containment. Efforts in recent years to liberalize trade with China, integrate the P.R.C. into international institutions and regimes, facilitate numerous diplomatic visits and summit meetings, and conduct bilateral exchanges of senior military personnel and academics are representative of engagement. However, at the same time, the US has elected to contain rather than appease China by taking steps to prevent the P.R.C. from expanding its territory or sphere of influence in East Asia. Most important, the US has signaled that it would not stand aside if Beijing tries to absorb Taiwan by force. Toward this end, the US has continued to sell large quantities of arms to the Taiwanese government, and, in 1995 and 1996, it played high stakes gunboat diplomacy with China in the Taiwan Straits.(n38) In addition, the United States has retained its Cold War military alliances with both South Korea and Japan and has maintained a strong troop presence in both countries.(n39) The US has also expressed grave concern about "Chinese intrusions" into disputed island territories in the South China Sea.(n40) Taken together, these steps exemplify Columbia University Professor A. Doak Barnett's 1966 injunction to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that American policy toward China should constitute "containment but not isolation."(n41)

CONCLUSION

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a **precondition for effective policymaking**. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an **erratic, ad hoc fashion** risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error **undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research**. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they **undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy**.

The refined definition I propose as a substitute for existing descriptions of engagement is different in two important ways: First, it clarifies the menu of choices available for policymakers by allowing engagement to be distinguished from related approaches such as appeasement, containment and isolation. Second, it lays the groundwork for systematic and objective research on historical cases of engagement in order to discern the conditions under which it can be used effectively. Such research will, in turn, help policymakers acquire the information necessary to better manage the rogue states of the 21st century.

**They establishes the government as a monolithic actor and a reason they can’t solve**

**Claude, 98–** Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia (Inis, “States and the Global System”, NG)

This view of the state as an institutional monolith is fostered by the notion of sovereignty, which calls up the image of the monarch, presiding majestically over his kingdom. Sovereignty emphasizes the singularity of the state, its monopoly of authority, its unity of command and its capacity to speak with one voice. Thus, France wills, Iran demands, China intends, New Zealand promises and the Soviet Union insists. One all too easily conjures up the picture of a single-minded and purposeful state that decides exactly what it wants to achieve, adopts coherent policies intelligently adapted to its objectives, knows what it is doing, does what it intends and always has its act together. This view of the state is reinforced by political scientists’ emphasis upon the concept of policy and upon the thesis that governments derive policy from calculations of national interest. We thus take it for granted that states act internationally in accordance with rationality conceived and consciously constructed schemes of action, and we implicitly refuse to consider the possibility that alternatives to policy-directed behavior may have importance– alternatives such as random, reactive, instinctual, habitual and conformist behaviour. Our rationalistic assumption that states do what they have planned to do tends to inhibit the discovery that states sometimes do what they feel compelled to do, or what they have the opportunity to do, or what they have usually done, or what other states are doing, or whatever the line of least resistance would seem to suggest. Academic preoccupation with the making of policy is accompanied by academic neglect of the execution of policy. We seem to assume that once the state has calculated its interest and contrived a policy to further that interest, the carrying out of policy is the virtually automatic result of the routine functioning of the bureaucratic mechanism of the state**.** I am inclined tocall this the Genesis theory of public administration, taking as my text the passage: ‘And God said, Let there be light; and there was light’**.** I suspect that in the realm of government, policy execution rarely follows so promptly and inexorably from policy statement**.** Alternatively, one may dub it the Pooh-Bah/Ko-Ko theory, honouring those denizens of William S. Gilbert’s Japan who took the position that when the Mikado ordered that something be done it was as good as done and might as well be declared to have been done.

**That makes the citizens powerless in the face of the government, ceding agency**

**Mann, 97** (Frederick, <http://www.mind-trek.com/reports/tl07e.htm>, NG)

You might think, "So what? Why is this important?" Much of the time, it isn't. When the referent is a thing, a physical object, the distinction isn't important. But what happens when we use a word like "government?" What is the referent? The word "government" is generally used as a singular noun describing a creature that sounds like a human only much more powerful. Here are some examples from earlier articles: "Certainly the government is concerned only for itself and it's kin (politicians). Certainly the government will kill or imprison me if this is perceived to be in its interest. Certainly the government has the power to do so." ... "It may be very difficult for individual humans to be aware of the thought processes of governments..." and "Communicating with a government is not easy at all." You can easily find other examples in the newspaper or just listening to people talk, of the word "government" being used as if it refers to a single volitional entity. Who or what then, is this beast called "government?" Have you seen it? Have you spoken with it? Do you know any one who has? Even though the word "government" is often used as if the referent is a single being, it's obvious that it isn't. So what then does the word "government" refer to? Maybe nothing. No thing. Maybe there is no such THING as "government." At first, this may seem like a trivial distinction. After all, there are still policemen, judges, congressmen, IRS agents and other assorted terrocrats. Yes, there are people who call themselves "government." Some of them are very dangerous and all of them want to interfere with the lives of others. But thinking of "government" as an ill-defined, all-powerful foe, puts you in the position of a victim. How can anyone stand up to such a "government" as that? I certainly couldn't. This is a scary creature. But if I cross paths with a terrocrat or two, I can handle that. Terrocrats are human, with no magical powers. I can arrange my life to avoid or minimize contact with them. I can't defend myself against a mythical "government" beast. Terrocrats are human. I can deal with them.

**Extinction**

**Beres, 94–** Ph.D., Professor of International Law, Purdue University (Louis Rene, “Self-Determination, International Law and Survival on Planet Earth”, NG)

With Hegel's characterization of the State as "the march of God in the world," John Locke's notion of a Social Contract -- the notion upon which the United States was founded n66 -- is fully disposed of, relegated to the ash heap of history. While the purpose of the State, for Locke, is to provide protection that is otherwise unavailable to individuals -- the "preservation of their lives, liberties and States" -- for Hegel, the State stands above any private interests. It is the spirit of the State, Volksgeist, rather than of individuals, that is the presumed creator of advanced civilization. And it is in war, rather than in peace, that a State is judged to demonstrate its true worth and potential. [\*22] How easily humankind still gives itself to the new gods. Promised relief from the most terrifying of possibilities -- death and disappearance -- our species regularly surrenders itself to formal structures of power and immunity. Ironically, such surrender brings about an enlargement of the very terrors that created the new gods in the first place, but we surrender nonetheless. In the words of William Reich, we lay waste to ourselves by embracing the "political plague-mongers," a necrophilous partnership that promises purity and vitality through the killing of "outsiders." This, then, is an altogether different kind of understanding. Rather than rescue humankind by freeing individuals from fear of death, this perspective recommends educating people to the truth of an incontestable relationship between death and geopolitics. By surrendering ourselves to States and to traditional views of self-determination, we encourage not immortality but **premature and predictable extinction**. It is a relationship that can, and must, be more widely understood. There are great ironies involved. Although the corrosive calculus of geopolitics has now made possible the deliberate killing of all life, populations all over the planet turn increasingly to States for security. It is the dreadful ingenuity of States that makes possible death in the billions, but it is in the expressions of that ingenuity that people seek safety. Indeed, as the threat of nuclear annihilation looms even after the Cold War, n71 the citizens of conflicting States

**The affirmative claim to save a particular identity group creates an “us” of ethical insiders vs a “them” of outsiders. This is the root of war, racism, and genocide**

**Badiou, 98** (Alain, Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland, *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil,* 73-77)

What allows a genuine event to be at the origin of a truth -which is the only thing that can be for all, and can be eternally -is precisely the fact that it relates to the particularity of a situation only from the bias of its void. The void, the multiple-of-nothing, neither excludes nor constrains anyone. It is the absolute neutrality of being, such that the fidelity that originates in an event, although it is an immanent break within a singular situation, is none the less universally addressed. By contrast, the striking break provoked by the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, although formally indistinguishable from an event -it is precisely this that led Heidegger astray5 -since it conceives itself as a 'German' revolution, and is faithful only to the alleged national substance of a people, is actually addressed only to those that it itself deems 'German'. It is thus right from the moment the event is named, and despite the fact that this nomination ('revolution') functions only under the condition of true universal events (for example the Revolutions of 1792 or 19I7) -radically incapable of any truth whatsoever. When a radical break in a situation, under names borrowed from real truth-processes, convokes not the void but the 'full' particularity or presumed substance of that situation, we are dealing with a simulacrum of truth. 'Simulacrum' must be understood here in its strong sense: all the formal traits of a truth are at work in the simulacrum. Not only a universal nomination of the event, inducing the power of a radical break, but also the 'obligation' of a fidelity, and the promotion of a simulacrum of the subject, erected -without the advent of any Immortal above the human animality of the others, of those who are arbitrarily declared not to belong to the communitarian substance whose promotion and domination the simulacrumevent is designed to assure. Fidelity to a simulacrum, unlike fidelity to an event, regulates its break with the situation not by the universality of the void, but by the closed particularity of an abstract set [ensemble] (the 'Germans' or the 'Aryans'). Its invariable operation is the unending construction of this set, and it has no other means of doing this than that of 'voiding' what surrounds it. The void, 'avoided' [chassel by the simulacrous promotion of an 'event-substance', here returns, with its universality, as what must be accomplished in order that this substance can be. This is to say that what is addressed 'to everyone' (and 'everyone', here, is necessarily that which does not belong to the German communitarian substance for this substance is not an 'everyone' but, rather, some 'few' who dominate 'everyone') is death, or that deferred form of death which is slavery in the service of the German substance. Hence fidelity to the simulacrum (and it demands of the 'few' belonging to the German substance prolonged sacrifices and commitments, since it really does have the form of a fidelity) has as its content war and massacre. These are not here means to an end: they make up the very real [tout le Tliel] 6 of such a fidelity. In the case of Nazism, the void made its return under one privileged name in particular, the name ‘Jew'. There were certainly others as well: the Gypsies, the mentally ill, homosexuals, communists.... But the name ‘Jew' was the name of names, serving to designate those people whose disappearance created, around that presumed German substance promoted by the 'National Socialist revolution' simulacrum, a void that would suffice to identify the substance. The choice of this name relates, without any doubt, to its obvious link with universalism, in particular with revolutionary universalism -to what was in effect already void [vide] about this name -that is, what was connected to the universality and eternity of truths. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it served to organize the extermination, the name ‘Jew' was a political creation of the Nazis, without any pre-existing referent. It is a name whose meaning no one can share with the Nazis, a meaning that presumes the simulacrum and fidelity to the simulacrum -and hence the absolute singularity of Nazism as a political sequence. But even in this respect, we have to recognize that this process mimics an actual truth-process. Every fidelity to an authentic event names the adversaries of its perseverance. Contrary to consensual ethics, which tries to avoid divisions, the ethic of truths is always more or less militant, combative. For the concrete manifestation of its heterogeneity to opinions and established knowledges is the struggle against all sorts of efforts at interruption, at corruption, at the return to the immediate interests of the human animal, at the humiliation and repression of the Immortal who arises as subject. The ethic of truths presumes recognition of these efforts, and thus the singular operation of naming enemies. The 'National Socialist revolution' simulacrum encouraged nominations of this kind, in particular the nomination of Jew'. But the simulacrum's subversion of the true event continues with these namings. For the enemy of a true subjective fidelity is precisely the closed set [ensemble], the substance of the situation, the community. The values of truth, of its hazardous course and its universal address, are to be erected against these forms of inertia. Every invocation of blood and soil, of race, of custom, of community, works directly against truths; and it is this very collection [ensemble] that is named as the enemy in the ethic of truths. Whereas fidelity to the simulacrum, which promotes the community, blood, race, and so on, names as its enemy -for example, under the name of 'jew' -precisely the abstract universality and eternity of truths, the address to all. Moreover, the two processes treat what is thus named **in diametrically opposite ways.** For however hostile to a truth he might be, in the ethic of truths every 'some-one' is always represented as capable of becoming the Immortal that he is. So we may fight against the judgements and opinions he exchanges with others for the purpose of corrupting every fidelity, but not against his person -which, under the circumstances, is insignificant, and to which, in any case, every truth is ultimately addressed. By contrast, the void with which those who are faithful to a simulacrum strive to surround its alleged substance must be a real void, obtained by cutting into the flesh itself. And since it is not the subjective advent of an Immortal, so fidelity to the simulacrum -that appalling imitation of truths -presumes nothing more about those they designate as the enemy than their strictly particular existence as human animals. It is thus this existence that will have to bear the return of the void. This is **why the exercise of fidelity to the simulacrum is necessarily the exercise of terror**. Understand by terror, here, not the political concept of Terror, linked (in a universalizable couple) to the concept of Virtue by the Immortals of the Jacobin Committee of Public Safety, but the pure and simple reduction of all to their being-for death. Terror thus conceived really postulates that in order to let [the] substance be, nothing must be [pour que La substance soit, rien ne doit etre]. I have pursued the example of Nazism because it enters to a significant extent into that 'ethical' configuration (of 'radical Evil') opposed by the ethic of truths. What is at issue here is the simulacrum of an event that gives rise to a political fidelity. Such a simulacrum is possible only thanks to the success of political revolutions that were genuinely evental (and thus universally addressed). But simulacra linked to all the other possible kinds of truth-processes also exist. The reader may find it useful to identity them. For example, we can see how certain sexual passions are simulacra of the amorous event. There can be no doubt that on this account they bring with them terror and violence. Likewise, brutal obscurantist preachings present themselves as the simulacra of science, with obviously damaging results. And so on. But in each case, these violent damages are unintelligible if we do not understand them in relation to the truth-processes whose simulacra they manipulate. In sum, our first definition of Evil is this: Evil is the process of a simulacrum of truth. And in its essence, under a name of its invention, it is terror directed at everyone.

**Ethical rules are an attempt to freeze the current order and are therefore nihilist and deeply conservative.**

**Badiou, 98** (Alain, Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland, *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil,* 30-34)

The very idea of a consensual 'ethics', stemming from the general feeling provoked by the sight of atrocities, which replaces the 'old ideological divisions', is a powerful contributor to subjective resignation and acceptance of the status quo. For what every emancipatory project does, what every emergence of hitherto unknown possibilities does, is to put an end to consensus. How, indeed, could the incalculable novelty of a truth, and the hole that it bores in established knowledges, be inscribed in a situation without encountering resolute opposition? Precisely because a truth, in its invention, is the only thing that is for all, so it can actually be achieved only against dominant opinions, since these always work for the benefit of some rather than all. These privileged few certainly benefit from their position, their capital, their control of the media, and so on. But in particular, they wield the inert power of reality and time [de la realite et du temps] against that which is only, like every truth, the hazardous, precarious advent of a possibility of the Intemporal. As Mao Tse-tung used to say, with his customary simplicity: 'If you have an idea, one will have to split into two.' Yet ethics explicitly presents itself as the spiritual supplement of the consensus. The 'splitting into two' horrifies it (it smacks of ideology, it's passe . ..). Ethics is thus part of what prohibits any idea, any coherent project of thought, settling instead for overlaying unthought and anonymous situations with mere humanitarian prattle (which, as we have said, does not itself contain any positive idea of humanity). And in the same way, the 'concern for the other' signifies that it is not a matter -that it is never a matter -of prescribing hitherto unexplored possibilities for our situation, and ultimately for ourselves. The Law (human rights, etc.) is always already there. It regulates judgements and opinions concerning the evil that happens in some variable elsewhere. But there is no question of reconsidering the foundation of this 'Law', of going right back to the conservative identity that sustains it. As everyone knows, France -which, under Vichy, approved a law regulating the status of the Jews, and which at this very moment is voting to approve laws for the racial identification of an alleged internal enemy that goes by the name of 'illegal immigrant' [immigre clandestin]; France which is subjectively dominated by fear and impotence -is an 'island of law and liberty'. Ethics is the ideology of this insularity, and this is why it valorizes -throughout the world, and with the complacency of 'intervention' -the gunboats of Law. But by doing this, by everywhere promoting a domestic haughtiness and cowardly self-satisfaction, it sterilizes every collective gathering around a vigorous conception [pensee] of what can (and thus must) be done here and now. And in this, once again, it is nothing more than a variant of the conservative consensus. But what must be understood is that this resignation in the face of (economic) necessities is neither the only nor the worst component of the public spirit held together by ethics. For Nietzsche's maxim forces us to consider that every non-willing (every impotence) is shaped by a will to nothingness, whose other name is: death drive.

**The alternative is to break with such rules and give ourselves over to the particular event**

**Badiou, 98** (Alain, Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland, *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil,* 14-16)

Every collective will to the Good creates Evi1. This is sophistry at its most devastating. For if our only agenda is an ethical engagement against an Evil we recognize a priori, how are we to envisage any transformation of the way things are? From what source will man draw the strength to be the immortal that he is? What shall be the destiny of thought, since we know very well that it must be affirmative invention or nothing at all? In reality, the price paid by ethics is a stodgy conservatism. **The ethical conception of man**, besides the fact that its foundation is either biological (images of victims) or 'Western' (the selfsatisfaction of the armed benefactor), **prohibits every broad, positive vision of possibilities**. What is vaunted here, what ethics legitimates, is in fact the conservation by the so-called 'West' of what it possesses. It is squarely astride these possessions (material possessions, but also possession of its own being) that ethics determines Evil to be, in a certain sense, simply that which it does not own and enjoy [ce qui n 'est pas ce dont elle jouit]. But Man, as immortal, is sustained by the incalculable and the un-possessed. He is sustained by non-being [non-etant]. **To forbid him to imagine the Good**, to devote his collective powers to it, to work towards the realization of unknown possibilities, **to think what might be in terms that break radically with what is, is quite simply to forbid him humanity as such**. Finally, thanks to its negative and a priori determination of Evil, ethics prevents itself from thinking the singularity of situations as such, which is the obligatory starting point of all properly human action. Thus, for instance, the doctor won over to 'ethical' ideology will ponder, in meetings and commissions, all sorts of considerations regarding 'the sick', conceived of in exactly the same way as the partisan of human rights conceives of the indistinct crowd of victims -the 'human' totality of subhuman entities [reels]. But the same doctor will have no difficulty in accepting the fact that this particular person is not treated at the hospital, and accorded all necessary measures, because he or she is without legal residency papers, or not a contributor to Social Security. Once again, 'collective' responsibility demands it! What is erased in the process is the fact that there is only one medical situation, the clinical situation,' and there is no need for an 'ethics' (but only for a clear vision of this situation) to understand that in these circumstances a doctor is a doctor only if he deals with the situation according to the rule of maximum possibility -to treat this person who demands treatment of him (no intervention here!) as thoroughly as he can, using everything he knows and with all the means at his disposal, without taking anything else into consideration. And if he is to be prevented from giving treatment because of the State budget, because of death rates or laws governing immigration, then let them send for the police! Even so, his strict Hippocratic duty would oblige him to resist them, with force if necessary. 'Ethical commissions' and other ruminations on 'healthcare expenses' or 'managerial responsibility', since they are radically exterior to the one situation that is genuinely medical, can in reality only prevent us from being faithful to it. **For to be faithful to this situation means: to treat it right to the limit of the possible. Or, if you prefer: to draw from this situation,** to the greatest possible extent**, the affirmative humanity that it contains. Or again: to try to be the immortal of this situation.** As a matter of fact, bureaucratic medicine that complies with ethical ideology depends on 'the sick' conceived as vague victims or statistics, but is quickly overwhelmed by any urgent, singular situation of need. Hence the reduction of 'managed', 'responsible' and 'ethical' health-care to the abject task of deciding which sick people the 'French medical system' can treat and which others -because the Budget and public opinion demand it -it must send away to die in the shantytowns of Kinshasa.

**Justification of obligation is based on guilt – as long as there is suffering, we must hate ourselves for it**

**Bruckner ’86** (Pascal, Associate professor, [Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institut_d%E2%80%99%C3%89tudes_Politiques_de_Paris), The Tears of the White Man, p.66-68)

That is the wellspring of this religion of compassionate sympathy, which strives to outdo itself with regard to everything that lives, suffers, and feels-from West African peasants to baby seals, to Amnesty International prisoners and fur-bearing animals that have been skinned to warm the shoulders of elegant ladies. The glorification of benevolent impulses is “an instinctive morality that has no head, but appears to be composed only of a heart and helping hands,” as Nietzsche said. It is a glorification chanted day and night by the media, press, politicians, and literary and artistic personalities, and it wallows in the most bastardized form of Christianity. This religion affliction says that ` you have to suffer from life as if it were sickness. As long as men are dying, children are hungry, or prisons are full, no one has the right to be happy. In this way, people are put in the service of the poor, but also in the service of poverty, of sacrifice itself. There must be homeless people and orphans upon whom our liberalism can be practiced to remind us constantly that “my Kingdom is not of this world,” and to make all joy suspect. As appeals for solidarity are made, the blows of misfortune are celebrated, because they are pretexts for humility. At a time when the Church, through its most qualified spokesmen, is questioning the ambivalence of Christian charity, it is the laity-usually Marxists- who are reviving its most dubious reflexes. To take the most oppressed as a measure, as our good Samaritans do, is to imply that suffering and death are not just failures of an unjust worldwide economic system, but are also part “of the immemorial drama of our relation to the Creator.” It means that, far from being abominable and outrageous, the oppressed embellish and typify the human condition. happy. It is a categorical imperative that imposes on us the duty to love man in the abstract, preferably when he is far away. Exactly as Jesus said that the poor are our masters, Third-Worldists make the suffering of the countries of the Southern hemisphere into a kind of virtuous model. These tropical lands are beloved because of their failings and their want, and hunger and evil are simultaneously fought, but subtly enhanced. This is the deep ambiguity from which the Catholic Church has never escaped, and it is the same one that contaminates all organizations providing assistance to the Third World. Even where suffering does not exist, it has to be created, and where it exists, it has to be accentuated. Everywhere, the worship of doom requires that we uphold the principal of universal human suffering. Of course, epidemics, wars and millions of children with empty stomachs are intolerable, because my fellow man is my brother. But such pain is also necessary, because a world without misfortune is one that has taken the place of heaven. This bottomless pit of suffering becomes the tribunal, the supreme court that admonishes the privileged and leisured members of the human race. The fact that people are wallowing in rags and mud strengthens the indictment of silk and ermine. The intolerable disorder of the world is constantly underlined, the eye of an avenging God is cast on it, and he watches over it and endlessly enumerates its weaknesses and faults. The West is satanized and the Third World becomes fixed in its role of the persecuted, the better to show that no compromise at all is possible between them, aside from the infinite repentance of the West. With a remarkable talent for spotting every ethnic group, or others who have been subject to persecution in some way, the world is searched for sadness, bad luck and misfortune. An obscene joy lists the millions of alarms ringing in the world, and a sort of morbid delight is taken in the systematic ruin of the thousands of forms of life on the globe. Such liberals are like hemophiliacs in love with human suffering, ready to bleed for any case; they are the professional mourners of modern history. They have no sooner dried their tears when a new subject for lamentation makes them start weeping anew. Failures and distress are collected because they serve as a clear warning-you have enjoyed yourselves too much, you have wasted too much. You must prepare yourselves for abstinence, chastity, and a return to the land. Hunger in the world is the punishment for our own European sinfulness. Supermarkets, naked women, homosexuality, paper money, Coca Cola- all these are the corruptors of the healthy young of the underdeveloped world. The theme of atonement used to be one of the political Right, but it is now that of the Left. It is a miraculous reconciliation of the ashes of Marshal Petain and Lenin’s tomb under the patronage of a weeping Jesus Christ of Naples.

**This engenders hatred for reality, which ends in extinction**

**Bruckner ’86** (Pascal, Associate professor, [Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institut_d%E2%80%99%C3%89tudes_Politiques_de_Paris), The Tears of the White Man, p.146-147)

The foregoing teaches us this: that hatred of the West is really a hatred of all cultures concentrated on a single one. In the beginning, one finds nothing loveable in oneself, but in the end, one loses the ability to love others. If the value attached to other cultures is in proportion to the disdain for our own it is certain that this fascination will decline as one is reconciled with one’s own society, or at best will linger in a kind of esthetic eclecticism. A doctrine that preaches the liberation of the human race cannot possibly be based on the hatred of an entire civilization. Man does not work to diminish but to increase himself, and there is every reason to mistrust a form of humanism that begins by leaving out a quarter of the surface of the globe and calling for the consignment of a whole society to hatred and oblivion. The great religions, philosophies, and belief systems are so linked to one another that to reject one is to reject all. It is futile to hope that the systematic cultivation of shame will miraculously open us up to far-off societies, and wipe away misunderstandings. Some may say this sense of guilt is our last chance to retain some modicum of respect for the oppressed. But this is pure cynicism, because it means admitting that, aside from a vague feeling of unease, there is nothing that ties us to them. The proclaimed abandonment of Eurocentrism is still an involuntary act, and the first precondition of the acceptance of others is a consensus about our respect for our own culture. Let us become our own friends first, so that we can become friends of others again. If we are tired of our own existence, others are of little use. To love the Third world, for it to have a future, does not require a repudiation of Europe, and the future of industrialized countries does not require that they forget the nations of the Southern hemisphere. Every self-destructive wish carries with it a generalized negativity that envisions the end of the world.

**Embrace suffering to shed guilt and affirm the innocence of existence – this is the only way to affirm life**

**Kain 07** (Philip J., professor of philosophy at University of Santa Clara, “Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence,” the Journal of Nietzsche Studies, muse, Sydnor)

We have seen that in Nietzsche's opinion we cannot bear meaningless suffering and so we give it a meaning. Christianity, for example, explains it as punishment for sin. Eternal recurrence, however, would certainly seem to plunge us back into meaningless suffering (WP 55). It implies that suffering just happens, it repeats eternally, it is fated. There is no plan, no purpose, no reason for it. Eternal recurrence would seem to rub our noses in meaningless suffering. In one sense this is perfectly correct. And Nietzsche does want to accept as much meaninglessness and suffering as he can bear (BGE 39, 225; WP 585a). Nevertheless, we must see that there is meaning here—it is just that it lies precisely in the meaninglessness.Embracing eternal recurrence means imposing suffering on oneself, meaningless suffering, suffering that just happens, suffering for no reason at all. But at the very same time, this creates the innocence of existence. The meaninglessness of suffering means the innocence of suffering. That is the new meaning that suffering is given. Suffering no longer has its old meaning. Suffering no longer has the meaning Christianity gave to it. Suffering can no longer be seen as punishment. There is no longer any guilt. There is no longer any sin. One is no longer accountable (TI "Errors" 8; HH 99). If suffering just returns eternally, if even the slightest change is impossible, how can one be to blame for it? How can one be responsible? It can be none of our doing. We are innocent. This itself could explain why one would be able to embrace eternal recurrence, love every detail of one's life, not wish to change a single moment of suffering. One would be embracing one's own innocence. One would be **loving one's own redemption from guilt.** Eternal recurrence brings the Übermensch as close as possible to the truth, meaninglessness, the void, but it does not go all the way or it would crush even the Übermensch. Eternal recurrence gives the Übermensch meaning. It eliminates emptiness. It fills the void. With what? It fills it with something totally familiar and completely known; with something that is in no way new, different, or strange; with something that is not at all frightening. It fills the void with one's own life—repeated eternally. It is true that this life is a life of suffering, but (given the horror of existence) suffering cannot be avoided anyway, and at least suffering has been stripped of any surplus suffering brought about by concepts of sin, punishment, or guilt. It has been reduced to a life of innocence. Moreover, as Nietzsche has said, it is only meaningless suffering that is the problem. If given a meaning, even suffering becomes something we can seek (GM III:28). Eternal recurrence, the fatedness of suffering, its meaningless repetition, makes our suffering innocent. That might well be reason enough to embrace it. Or, although we may not be able to embrace it ourselves, I think we can at least see why Nietzsche might—and even why it might make sense for him to do so. [End Page 59] Eternal recurrence also gives suffering another meaning. If one is able to embrace eternal recurrence, if one is able to turn all "it was" into a "thus I willed it," then one not only reduces suffering to physical suffering, breaks its psychological stranglehold, and eliminates surplus suffering related to guilt, but one may even in a sense reduce suffering below the level of physical suffering. One does not do this as the liberal, socialist, or Christian would, by changing the world to reduce suffering. In Nietzsche's opinion that is impossible, and, indeed, eternal recurrence of the same rules it out—at least as any sort of final achievement.23 Rather, physical suffering is reduced by treating it as a test, a discipline, a training, which brings one greater power. One might think of an athlete who engages in more and more strenuous activity, accepts greater and greater pain, handles it better and better, and sees this as a sign of greater strength, as a sign of increased ability. Pain and suffering are turned into empowerment. Indeed, it is possible to love such suffering as a sign of increased power. One craves pain—"more pain! more pain!" (GM III:20). And the more suffering one can bear, the stronger one becomes. If suffering is self-imposed, if the point is to break the psychological stranglehold it has over us, if the point is to turn suffering into empowerment, use it as a discipline to gain greater strength, then it would be entirely inappropriate for us to feel sorry for the sufferer. To take pity on the sufferer either would demonstrate an ignorance of the process the sufferer is engaged in, what the sufferer is attempting to accomplish through suffering, or would show a lack of respect for the sufferer's suffering (GS 338; D 135). To pity the sufferer, to wish the sufferer did not have to go through such suffering, would demean the sufferer and the whole process of attempting to gain greater strength through such suffering. Let us try again to put ourselves in Nietzsche's place. He has suffered for years. He has suffered intensely for years. He has come to realize that he cannot end this suffering. He cannot even reduce it significantly. But he has finally been able to break the psychological stranglehold it has had over him. He is able to accept it. He wills it. He would not change the slightest detail. He is able to love it. And this increases his strength. How, then, would he respond to our pity? Very likely, he would be offended. He would think we were patronizing him. He would not want us around. He would perceive us as trying to rob him of the strength he had achieved, subjugate him again to his suffering, strip him of his dignity. He would be disgusted with our attempt to be do-gooders, our attempt to impose our own meaning on his suffering (treating it as something to pity and to lessen) in opposition to the meaning he has succeeded in imposing on it.

#### A 1ac without value is by definition meaningless – presume negative until they can present a value system that does not collapse upon itself or evacuate meaning.

**Henning 09 –** (Brian; Associate Professor of Philosophy at Gonzaga University; “Trusting in the 'Efficacy of Beauty: A Kalocentric Approach to Moral Philosophy”; Ethics & the Environment- Volume 14, Number 1)//RSW

**Final truths** (whether in religion, morality, or science) **are unattainable** not only due to the finitude and fallibility of human inquirers, but because we live in what the theologian John F. Haught calls an "unfinished universe" (2004). The notion that one could achieve anything like a final or absolute formulation in any field of study presupposes that one's object is static. Thankfully, we do not live in such a universe. Over the last century scientists have consistently discovered that the universe is not a plenum of lifeless, valueless facts mechanistically determined by absolute laws. Rather, we live in a processive cosmos that is a dynamic field of events organized in complex webs of interdependence, rather than a collection of objects interacting via physical laws. The intuition that the universe is fundamentally a clockwork machine successfully guided science in the wake of Newton's inspirational formulation of the laws of mechanics, but this metaphor proved increasingly inadequate as Newton's work was supplanted in the early 20th century by both general relativity and quantum mechanics. Even at its peak, the [End Page 107] mechanical metaphor created difficulties for thinking about human beings, who were never effectively illuminated by the assumption that they were complex machines. At the level of elementary particles, quantum mechanics disclosed a world of wave-like particles spread out in space and inextricably entangled with other particles in the local environment. The notion of autonomous "individual" particles disappeared. Although all metaphors are misleading to some degree, the metaphor of the world as an evolving organism has become more helpful than the old mechanical model of the world as a clock. This, in a sense, is the founding insight of Whitehead's "philosophy of organism," which took as its starting point the view that individuals—particles, plants, and people—are not discrete facts walled off from each other but parts of complex and intersecting wholes. Conceived of as an organic process, every individual is inextricably intertwined and interconnected with every other. The fundamental reality is no longer individual entities but rather the ongoing processes by which they interact and create novel structures. **Once we recognize that every individual—from a subatomic event to a majestic sequoia—brings together the diverse elements in its world in just this way, just here, and just now, we see that nothing is entirely devoid of value and beauty**. This process whereby many diverse individuals are brought together into the unity of one new individual, which will eventually add its energy to future individuals, characterizes the most basic feature of reality and is what Whitehead calls the "category of creativity." On this view, reality is best characterized not as an unending march of vacuous facts, but as an incessant "creative advance" striving toward ever-richer forms of beauty and value. Noting its emphasis on interdependence and interrelation, many scholars have rightly noted that Whitehead's metaphysics is uniquely suited to provide a basis for making sense of our relationship to the natural world.10 Decades before modern ecologists taught us about ecosystems, Whitehead was describing individuals as interrelated societies of societies. No individual, Whitehead insisted, can be understood apart from its relationship to others.11 Indeed, whereas ecologists only explain how it is that macroscopic individuals are related in interdependent systems, Whitehead's organic metaphysics of process provides a rich account of how individuals at every level of complexity—from subatomic events to ecosystems, and from oak trees to galaxies—arise and are perpetuated.12 [End Page 108] What is more, Whitehead's philosophy of organism places a premium on an individual's dependence on and relationship to the larger wholes of which it is a part without making the mistake of subsuming the individual into that larger whole.13 With the philosophy of organism we need not choose between either the one or the many, "the many become one and are increased by one" (Whitehead [1929] 1978, 21). By providing a robust alternative to the various forms of reductive physicalism and destructive dualism that currently dominate many branches of science and philosophy, the philosophy of organism is an ideal position from which to address the complex social and ecological challenges confronting us. First, if who and what I am is intimately and inextricably linked to everyone and everything else in the universe, then I begin to recognize that my own flourishing and the flourishing of others are not independent. Not only do I intimately and unavoidably depend on others in order to sustain myself, with varying degrees of relevance, **how I relate to my environment is constitutive of who and what I am.** As we are quickly learning, we ignore our interdependence with our wider environment at our own peril. Moreover, in helping us to recognizing our connection to and dependence on our larger environment, an organic model forces us to abandon the various dualisms that have for too long allowed us to maintain the illusion that we are set off from the rest of nature. Adopting an organic metaphysics of process forces us finally to step down from the self-constructed pedestal from which we have for millennia surveyed nature and finally to embrace the lesson so compellingly demonstrated by Darwin: humans are not a singular exception to, but rather a grand exemplification of, the processes at work in the universe.14 In this way we ought finally to reject not only the materialisms of contemporary science, but also the dualisms that often undergird our religious, social, political, and moral understandings of ourselves and our relationship to the natural world. As John Dewey concisely put it, **"man is within nature, not a little god outside"** (1929, 351). Until we shed our self-deluding arrogance and recognize that who and what we are as a species is fundamentally bound up in and dependent on the wider scope of events unfolding in the universe, the ecological crisis will only deepen. Taken seriously, our understanding of reality as composed of vibrant, organically interconnected achievements of beauty and value, has a dramatic effect on how we conceive [End Page 109] of ourselves, of nature, and of our moral obligations—morality can no longer be limited merely to inter-human relations. In rejecting modernity's notion of lifeless matter, we come to recognize that **every form of actuality has value in and for itself, for others, and for the whole.** In aiming at and achieving an end for itself, **every individual—no matter how ephemeral or seemingly insignificant—has intrinsic value for itself and in achieving this self-value it thereby becomes a value for others and for the whole of reality.** Every individual, from the most fleeting event in deep space to centuries old redwoods, has value for itself, for others, and for the whole of reality and it is from this character of reality that our moral obligations derive (Whitehead 1938, 111). Given that every individual in our universe, no matter how small or seemingly insignificant, has some degree of value, **the scope of our direct moral concern**15 **can exclude nothing.** Thus, in rather sharp contrast to the invidious forms of anthropocentrism that characterize much of western moral thought, our scope of direct moral concern cannot be limited to humans, to sentient beings, or even to all living beings. Morality is not anthropocentric, but neither is it sentientcentric or biocentric. **In affirming the value of every individual, we must begin to recognize that every relation is potentially a moral relation.** As Whitehead vividly puts it, "The destruction of a man, or of an insect, or of a tree, or of the Parthenon, may be moral or immoral.… Whether we destroy or whether we preserve, our action is moral if we have thereby safeguarded the importance [or value] of experience so far as it depends on that concrete instance in the world's history" (1938, 14–15). Morality is not merely about how we ought to act toward and among other human beings, other sentient beings, or even other living beings. **Morality is fundamentally about how we comport ourselves in the world, how we relate to and interact with every form of existence.**

#### We are cosmic dust whirling in the wind — the distinction between “living and non-living” is meaningless and our extinction is inevitable. Only accepting these truths allows us to transcend consciousness.

**Seed 88 –** (John; Australian environmentalist and director of the Rainforest Information Centre; THINKING LIKE A MOUNTAIN - TOWARDS A COUNCIL OF ALL BEINGS; http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/deep-eco/Anthropo.htm)

"But the time is not a strong prison either. A little scraping of the walls of dishonest contractor's concrete Through a shower of chips and sand makes freedom. Shake the dust from your hair. This mountain sea-coast is real For it reaches out far into the past and future; It is part of the great and timeless excellence of things." (1) "Anthropocentrism" or "homocentrism" means human chauvinism. Similar to sexism, but substitute "human race" for"man" and"all other species" for "woman". Human chauvinism, the idea that humans are the crown of creation, the source of all value, the measure of all things, is deeply embedded in our culture and consciousness. "And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth , and upon every fowl of the air, and upon all that moveth on the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hands they are delivered".(2) When humans investigate and see through their layers of anthropocentric self-cherishing, a most profound change in consciousness begins to take place. Alienation subsides. The human is no longer an outsider, apart. Your humanness is then recognised as being merely the most recent stage of your existence, and as you stop identifying exclusively with this chapter, you start to get in touch with yourself as mammal, as vertebrate, as a species only recently emerged from the rainforest. As the fog of amnesia disperses, there is a transformation in your relationship to other species, and in your commitment to them. What is described here should not be seen as merely intellectual. The intellect is one entry point to the process outlined, and the easiest one to communicate. For some people however, this change of perspective follows from actions on behalf of Mother Earth. "I am protecting the rainforest" develops to "I am part of the rainforest protecting myself. I am that part of the rainforest recently emerged into thinking." What a relief then! The thousands of years of imagined separation are over and we begin to recall our true nature. That is, the change is a spiritual one, thinking like a mountain (3), sometimes referred to as "deep ecology". As your memory improves, as the implications of evolution and ecology are internalised and replace the outmoded anthropocentric structures in your mind, there is an identification with all life, Then follows the realisation that the distinction between "life" and "lifeless" is a human construct. Every atom in this body existed before organic life emerged 4000 million years ago. Remember our childhood as minerals, as lava, as rocks? Rocks contain the potentiality to weave themselves into such stuff as this. We are the rocks dancing. Why do we look down on them with such a condescending air. It is they that are immortal part of us. (4) If we embark upon such an inner voyage, we may find, upon returning to present day consensus reality, that our actions on behalf of the environment are purified and strengthened by the experience. We have found here a level of our being that moth, rust, nuclear holocaust or destruction of the rainforest genepool do not corrupt. The commitment to save the world is not decreased by the new perspective, although the fear and anxiety which were part of our motivation start to dissipate and are replaced by a certain disinterestedness. We act because life is the only game in town, but actions from a disinterested, less attached consciousness may be more effective. Activists often don't have much time for meditation. The disinterested space we find here may be similar to meditation. Some teachers of meditation are embracing deep ecology (5) and vice versa(6). Of all the species that have existed, it is estimated that less than one in a hundred exist today. The rest are extinct. As environment changes, any species that is unable to adapt, to change, to evolve, is extinguished. All evolution takes place in this fashion In this way an oxygen starved fish, ancestor of yours and mine, commenced to colonise the land. Threat of extinction is the potter's hand that molds all the forms of life. The human species is one of millions threatened by imminent extinction through nuclear war and other environmental changes. And while it is true that the "human nature" revealed by 12,000 years of written history does not offer much hope that we can change our warlike, greedy, ignorant ways, the vastly longer fossil history assures us that we CAN change. We ARE the fish, and the myriad other death-defying feats of flexibility which a study of evolution reveals to us. A certain confidence ( in spite of our recent "humanity") is warranted. From this point of view, the threat of extinction appears as the invitation to change, to evolve. After a brief respite from the potter's hand, here we are back on the wheel again. The change that is required of us is not some new resistance to radiation, but a change in consciousness. Deep ecology is the search for a viable consciousness. Surely consciousness emerged and evolved according to the same laws as everything else. Molded by environ mental pressures, the mind of our ancestors must time and again have been forced to transcend itself. To survive our current environmental pressures, we must consciously remember our evolutionary and ecological inheritance. We must learn to think like a mountain. If we are to be open to evolving a new consciousness, we must fully face up to our impending extinction (the ultimate environmental pressure). This means acknowledging that part of us which shies away from the truth, hides in intoxication or busyness from the despair of the human, whose 4000 million year race is run, whose organic life is a mere hair's breadth from finished.(7) A biocentric perspective, the realisation that rocks WILL dance, and that roots go deeper that 4000 million years, may give us the courage to face despair and break through to a more viable consciousness, one that is sustainable and in harmony with life again. "Protecting something as wide as this planet is still an abstraction for many. Yet I see the day in our own lifetime that reverence for the natural systems - the oceans, the rainforests, the soil , the grasslands, and all other living things - will be so strong that no narrow ideology based upon politics or economics will overcome it". (8) Jerry Brown, Governor of California. The term "deep ecology" was coined by the Norwegian professor of Philosophy and eco-activist Arne Naess, and has been taken up by academics and environmentalists in Europe, the US and Australia. "The essence of deep ecology is to ask deeper questions... We ask which society, which education, which form of religion is beneficial for all life on the planet as a whole." (9)

**Democracy checks genocide**

**O’Kane 97 –** emeritus professor of comparative political theory at Keele University (Rosemary H.T. O’Kane, Economy and Society, February 1997, “Modernity, the Holocaust, and politics”)//CC

Chosen policies cannot be relegated to the position of immediate condition (Nazis in power) in the explanation of the Holocaust. Modern bureaucracy is **not** ‘intrinsically **capable of genocidal action**’ (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also **economic pluralism** where **workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages** and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very ‘ordinary and common’ attributes of truly modern societies. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern genocides.

**Gradual transition now**

**Piccone, 10/3** – Acting Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institute (Ted, “Cuba’s Stroll Toward Change: A View from the Streets”, Brookings Institute, 10/3/13, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/10/03-cuba-trip-piccone)//SJF

We are witnessing today the unfolding of a transitional hybrid economy that has one foot on the accelerator and one foot on the brake. On one hand, a host of ongoing reforms in the domains of agriculture, tourism, property transfers, travel abroad and even sports are unshackling Cubans from a predominant state. President Obama’s decision in 2009 to relax U.S. travel and remittances rules has also helped give oxygen to the more liberal features of the reforms by providing seed money for new businesses and facilitating the flow of goods and capital from the Cuban diaspora in Florida. On the other hand, implementation of reforms is slow and often limited to pilot projects dispersed throughout the island. Rules for foreign investment are too restrictive and arbitrarily enforced and property rights remain in doubt.

Nonetheless, the package of changes underway in Cuba, under the auspices of Raúl Castro and other heroes of the Revolution, lends a certain political legitimacy to the project that could facilitate a soft landing for such a hard situation. As Richard Feinberg argues in a new Brookings report on the emerging middle classes due out this November, such a soft landing is already underway as small and medium enterprises and cooperatives gain traction. Castro’s announcement last year that his current five-year term will be his last, and the appointment of a much younger vice president to guide the party to the next phase of “prosperous socialism,” give Cubans I spoke to some hope that, in the next five years, Cuba will look even more different than it did five years ago.

This shift is already visible. Open debates among Cuban citizens, including one I attended on the national budget process in a well-appointed theater organized by a leading public affairs magazine, are slowly underway. The Catholic Church is also playing an interesting role. The Conference of Catholic Bishops in Cuba recently released its first pastoral letter in 20 years endorsing the government’s economic liberalization and calling for a political opening that respects “the right to diversity with respect to thoughts, to creativity and to the search for truth.” Outspoken activists are touring European, Latin American and North American cities with their critiques of the current system and returning to the island determined to continue their campaign for greater freedoms, despite continued harassment and detentions. Change is in the tropical air.

As Cuba opens its economy to the world, and gradually finds the confidence to let Cubans be more open at home as well, the United States would be smart to move beyond the confines of its Cold War policy and let Americans see what they can do to support the Cuban people. President Obama can start by expanding the steps he took in his first term to facilitate greater trade, travel and communications with the Cuban people and budding small enterprises. He can also credibly remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, which is severely hampering a whole host of basic financial transactions for legitimate American travelers and businesses alike. It is time to exploit the opportunity offered by Cuba’s economic reforms and let reconciliation – both within the island and across the Florida Straits – begin.

**Newest studies prove-Castro tyranny only gets worse as the US eases sanctions-turns the aff**

**Darby 13** [Brandon, reporter for Breidbart-- http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/01/05/Cuba-Human-Rights-Abuses-Increasing-Despite-US-Sanctions-Easing -Jan 3, 2013--SR]

Cuba was singled out by Human Rights Watch in 2011 as being the only Latin American country that represses virtually all forms of political dissent. It is difficult to understand how such tyranny could get worse.¶ Both Reuters and the Miami Herald report that Cuban Security agents broke their previous records of government political repression in 2012 with 6,602 confirmed detentions of political dissidents. In 2011 there were 4,123 confirmed political arrests which was even higher than the 2,704 arrests from 2010. Both Reuters and the Miami Herald based their data on a 2012 year-end report from the Cuban Committee for Human Rights and National Reconciliation. ¶ To understand what Cuban political repression consists of, the Human Rights Watch 2012 World Report’s section on Cuba describes: “In 2011 Raúl Castro’s government continued to enforce political conformity using short-term detentions, beatings, public acts of repudiation, forced exile, and travel restrictions."¶ Illumination into Cuba’s political repression can be seen in the Miami Herald’s January 4, 2013 article titled Human Rights Activist Says Dissident Arrests Up In 2012, that quotes Cuban human rights activist Elizardo Sánchez Santa Cruz as stating:¶ “...the number of political prisoners, which dropped to about 40 after ruler Raúl Castro freed more than 120 in 2010-2011, climbed again last year with the trials and convictions of about 30 Cubans on political charges.”¶ Those releases were due to an agreement with the Catholic church in 2010 pushing for an ease on US sanctions against the Castro regime. Other Latin American nations, political leaders like Senator Kerry and Congressman Collin Peterson, as well as a letter by 74 Cuban dissidents calling for ending the US travel ban on Cuba all supported easing sanctions. US sanctions have eased substantially, though still stringent in many regards. The pace of the sanctions’ easing increased substantially after then presidential candidate Barack Obama’s May 23, 2008 speech in Miami, Florida, in favor of rolling back Cuban American travel to Cuba. ¶ Human Rights Watch stated in their 2012 World Report on Cuba that the US was a “Key International Actor” in the human rights abuses in Cuba and went further in blaming the US and Israel for preventing a decrease in human rights abuses in Cuba. The report states:¶ “The United States' economic embargo on Cuba, in place for more than half a century, continues to impose indiscriminate hardship on Cubans, and has failed to improve human rights in the country. At the United Nations General Assembly in October, 186 of the 192 member countries voted for a resolution condemning the US embargo; only the US and Israel voted against it.”¶ After placing blame on the US and Israel for Fidel and Raul Castro’s decisions to abuse their citizens, Human Rights Watch reports that Barack Obama has taken actions to ease the sanctions, and thereby ease the suffering of the Cuban people. The report states:¶ “In January 2011 US President Barack Obama used his executive powers to ease “people-to- people” travel restrictions, allowing religious, educational, and cultural groups from the US to travel to Cuba, and permitting Americans to send remittances to assist Cuban citizens. In 2009 Obama eliminated limits on travel and remittances by Cuban Americans to Cuba, which had been instituted during George W. Bush’s administration.”¶ **Unfortunately, the data presented by Human Rights Watch and the the Cuban Committee for Human Rights and National Reconciliation seems to disprove the analysis of Human Rights Watch that the US was a major player in the human rights abuses in Cuba due**.¶ Human Rights Watch was correct to identify that Barack Obama seriously reduced the bite of US sanctions in 2011**. This would make 2012 the first complete year to benefit from the reductions in US sanctions. Regardless of 2012 being a complete year of eased sanctions, the human rights abuses have increased substantially.**

**No internal link – Castro’s the oppressor, not the US.**

**Ros-Lehtinen 13** [Ileana, US Rep (Fl)-- http://ros-lehtinen.house.gov/press-release/human-rights-abuses-cuba-are-rising-some-lawmakers-wrongly-seek-reward-castro-regime - March 21, 2013]

These latest efforts by Castro apologists are a sober reminder that there are those in Congress who refuse to see the obvious – that 50 plus years later, the Castro dictatorship has no intention of letting up its iron grip over the Cuban people. Just this week, Castro’s state security agents surrounded and stoned the home of a leader of the Ladies in White and caused many women to have to be hospitalized due to their injuries. The regime will continue to hide behind so-called reforms in an effort to distract the attention from its atrocious and systematic violation of real basic freedoms and human rights.

# Block

#### Engagement towards a government must be conditional, the plan isn’t

**Haass and O’Sullivan, 2k** - \*Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution AND \*\*a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (Richard and Meghan, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf>

Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.

#### That violates the word “its”.

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 05**

(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

**Challenging single instances of violent language is key to resisting oppression by elites**

**Summy 98** Ralph Summy is the Director of the Matsunaga Institute for Peace, University of Hawaii. He formerly headed the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Queensland, Australia. ”Nonviolent Speech” Peace Review, 10402659, Dec98, Vol. 10, Issue 4

By accepting the introduction of violence into the language, people are contributing to the affirmation of a paradigm that condemns them to the ranks of the dominated and the world at large to a political system of circulating elites and perpetual violence. Thus any action, no matter how small, that can counter the legitimization of violence in all its multifaceted forms will be undermining the foundations of elite domination. Conversely, if the elites can successfully promote the acceptance of legitimate violence, mainly through their control of the institutions of education and communication, their position is assured. Not surprisingly, their focus is thus not directed at reducing the cultural violence of language and media--a violence that rationalizes and helps to sustain the dominant paradigm--but is primarily confined to decreasing the overt violence that can destabilize their position. The relationship between a cultural phenomenon like language and a concrete phenomenon like behavior has been studied at great length. The research overwhelmingly points to the fact that the way in which we express ourselves directs as well as reflects our perceptions, which in turn relate to our actions. **If we communicate with violent language, it tells us something about the values and processes we respect; it also reinforces an outlook rooted in violence which informs us how to behave and how we can expect others to behave**. Moreover, how we communicate impinges on the way others are forced to formulated their thinking and behavior in response. As explained by R. S. Ross, "communication is a process involving a sorting, selecting and sending of symbols in such a way as to help a listener find in his or her own mind a meaning or response similar to that intended by the communicator." While we may not intend for our symbolic language to be taken literally, a violent metaphor may be unintentionally interpreted by the receiver in a literal sense. Even if the symbolic message is conveyed to the listener as it was intended, a violent metaphor has still prescribed the lens through which it must be interpreted, and therefore has helped to perpetuate an output of subconscious violent thinking.

**Tolerance is an unacceptable approach to violent language- it solves nothing while allowing the violent rhetoric to continue**

**Kelley 98** Andrew Kelley lives in Denton, Texas, and teaches philosophy at Texas Woman's University, ON LISTENING ,  By: Kelley, Andrew, Peace Review, 10402659, Dec98, Vol. 10, Issue 4

The alternative, tolerance, does not necessarily fare much better. Tolerance occurs when one party allows certain acts or uses of language to take place, whether or not the party happens to agree with, respect, or condone them. For society to function**, certain types of written or spoken language cannot be tolerated**: out and out lies that harm a person's reputation, shouting "fire" in a crowded theater and the like. But as with censorship, this goes beyond the debate about freedoms and fights. Tolerance does not necessarily promote harmony or connections between people. I can tolerate what my neighbor says and does while at the same time hate her and have no desire to connect or to live in harmony with her.

**Their politically compromised framework allows the West to wage perpetual war on those it considers ethical outsiders**

**Badiou 04** (Alain, FRAGMENTS OF A PUBLIC DIARY ON THE AMERICAN WAR AGAINST IRAQ Vol. 8, No. 3 Summer 2004, pp. 223–238 ISSN 1740-9292 print/ISSN 1477-2876 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals)

From the moment we begin to live indistinctly in the war of democracies against Islamic terrorism, which is to say, quite simply, the war of Good (democratic) against Evil (dictatorial), operations of war – expeditions, bombings – don’t need to be any more solemnly announced than do police raids on petty criminals. By the same token, assassinating heads of state, their wives, children, and grandchildren, or putting a price on their heads like in a western, no longer surprises anyone. Thus, little by little the *continuity* of war comes to be established, the declaration of which, in times past, showed that, on the contrary, war was the present of a discontinuity. Already, this continuity renders war and peace indistinguishable. This means that the question of the protagonists of the state of war is more and more obscure. “Terrorists,” “rogue states,” “dictatorships,” “Islamists”: just what are these ideological entities? Who identifies them, who proclaims them? Traditionally, there were two kinds of war: on the one hand, symmetrical war, between comparable imperial powers, like the two world wars of the twentieth century, or like the cold war between the USA and the USSR; on the other hand, non-symmetrical or dissymmetrical wars between an imperial power and popular forces theoretically much weaker in terms of military power – either wars of colonial conquest (the conquest of Algeria, the Rif war, or the extermination of the Indians in North America), or wars of national liberation (Vietnam, Algeria, and so forth). Today, we can talk about dissymmetrical wars, but without the political identity of the dissymmetry being really conceivable. The proof for this lies in the fact that invasion and occupation operations (Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, and so on) are explicitly presented as liberations – and this despite the fact that the local populations don’t see things in that way at all. In fact, now the concept of war only designates the use of violence, disposed in variable dissymmetries. The only invariable trait is dissymmetry: only the weak are targeted, and as soon as the shadow of power can be seen (North Korea’s atomic bomb, the Russia of brutal extortions in Chechnya, the heavy hand of the Chinese in Tibet), war – war which might risk actually becoming war, and not the peace of the police, or peace/war (*la pe´guerre apre‘s l’apre‘s-guerre?*)–is not on the agenda. In fact, if the American wars don’t constitute any kind of present, it’s because, being politically unconnected to any dialectic, whether interimperialist, whether according to the war/revolution schema, they are not really distinguishable from the continuity of “peace.” And by “peace” is meant American, or “western,” peace, democratic peace/war, whose entire content is the comfort of the above-mentioned “democrats” against the barbarian aggressiveness of the poor.

**Their nihilistic pathos relies on disaster fetishism and a silent pleasure in witnessing Evil --- this outweighs the aff.**

**Badiou, 98** (Alain, Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland, *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil,* 34-35)

We should be more struck than we usually are by a remark that often recurs in articles and commentaries devoted to the war in the former Yugoslavia: it is pointed out -with a kind of subjective excitement, an ornamental pathos -that these atrocities are taking place 'only two hours by plane from Paris'. The authors of these texts invoke, naturally, all the 'rights of man', ethics, humanitarian intervention, the fact that Evil (thought to have been exorcized by the collapse of 'totalitarianisms') is making a terrible comeback. But then the observation seems ludicrous: if it is a matter of ethical principles, of the victimary essence of Man, of the fact that 'rights are universal and imprescriptible', why should we care about the length of the flight? Is the 'recognition of the other' all the more intense if this other is in some sense almost within my reach? In this pathos of proximity, we can almost sense the trembling equivocation, halfway between fear and enjoyment, of finally perceiving so close to us horror and destruction, war and cynicism. Here ethical ideology has at its disposal, almost knocking on the protected gates of civilized shelter, the revolting yet delicious combination of a complex Other (Croats, Serbs, and those enigmatic 'Muslims' of Bosnia) and an avowed Evil. History has delivered the ethical dish to our very door. Ethics feeds too much on Evil and the Other not to take silent pleasure in seeing them close up (in a silence that is the abject underside of its prattle)(For at the core of the mastery internal to ethics is always the power to decide who dies and who does not) Ethics is nihilist because its underlying conviction is that the only thing that can really happen to someone is death. And it is certainly true that in so far as we deny truths, we thereby challenge the immortal disjunction that they effect in any given situation. Between Man as the possible basis for the uncertainty [alia] of truths, or Man as being-for death (or being-for-happiness, it is the same thing), you have to choose. It is the same choice that divides philosophy from 'ethics', or the courage of truths from nihilism.

**Our alternative is to break these universal standards and give ourselves over to the particular event --- Only this gives us a path to meaningful existence—striving for truth is what makes us subjects who are capable of Good and Evil**

**Brown, 04** (Nicholas, University of Illinois at Chicago, Or, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Waiting for Something to Happen, CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3 (2004) 289-319).

Now, for Badiou, the genuine problem of ethics, the question of the good, is entirely bound up with the status of truth. For the only thing that distinguishes human from animal is the vocation for truth: outside of this vocation, humanity is simply, like any other predatory animal "whose charms are not obvious" (Ethics, 12), beneath good and evil. The human subject does not preexist truth: on the contrary, there is "only a particular kind of animal, convoked by certain circumstances, to become a subject. . . . At a certain moment, everything he is—his body, his abilities—is called upon to enable the passing of a truth along its path" (41). Only in relation to truth does humanity become capable of good or evil.

**Truth events are not pre-determined. Subjects CREATE truth through individual struggle or ethical fidelity to an event.**

**Johnston, 02** (Theory and Event, Confronting the New Sophists, 6:2 | © 2002 Adrian Johnston, Book Review of Jason Barker, *Alian Badiou: A Critical Introduction* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), *Adrian Johnston* recently received his Ph.D. in philosophy at SUNY Stony Brook. He is presently an interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory University).

In his fourth chapter, "The Politics of Truth," Barker is careful to nuance his interpretation of the above notions. Badiou stipulates that the status of an event as an event per se is volatile and uncertain. Whether or not a given occurrence should -- with this "should," one sees the tip of the ethico-political iceberg rear up in Badiou's thought -- qualify as an event *qua* emergence of a truth cannot be firmly decided during the moments surrounding it. As is the case for Lacan (a major influence on Badiou), truth is held captive by a *futur antérieur*. Risking a formulation in layman's terms, truth only becomes truth as such through the retroactive "verdict of history," that is to say, by proving, through its endurance, to be immune to any subsequent upheavals and fluctuations in the state of knowledge; it becomes indispensable to thought. Thus, bringing the truth of an event to fruition requires what Badiou calls the "fidelity" of a subject, since the event's truth has to endure long enough in a quasi-indeterminate status to, so to speak, reap the benefits of a favorable historical verdict. The beginning of the truth-process at work between the event and its subject resides in **deciding,** without further ground or guarantee, **that an event has, in actuality, occurred**. In other words, **one has to decide whether an occurrence represents a previously inconceivable break with the paradigms endemic to the *status quo***: Does a certain discovery really represent the foundation of a new science? Is a particular social disturbance the manifestation of a genuine revolutionary upheaval and should it be treated as such? Will a given cultural product such as a novel, painting, or film usher in an unprecedented aesthetic genre? The event is then named, assigned markers capable of singling it out and attesting to its having taken place. This process of decision and nomination involves the creation of a subject, more specifically, a type of subjectivity whose identity is conditioned by the event and its truth (using an example from above, for Saint Paul, the event of Christ is that which gives rise to the Christian subject, and this event and its truth are sustained through this same subject naming and remaining faithful to them). The subject is thereby the support of truth.

**They are right—our alternative does not have a fixed end point. To prescribe one is to already give up on the potentially transformative nature of the event.**

**Badiou, 02** (http://www.lacan.com/badeurope.htm European Graduate School, August 2002, On the Truth-Process, followed by interventions of S. Zizek and G. Agamben, by Alain Badiou).

Modern philosophy is a criticism of truth as adequation. Truth is not limited to the form of judgment. Heidegger suggests that it is a historic destiny. I will start from the following idea: Truth is first of all something new. What transmits, what repeats, we shall call knowledge. Distinguishing truth from knowledge is essential. It is a distinction already made in the work of Kant, between reason and understanding, and it is as you know a capital distinction for Heidegger, who distinguishes truth as aletheia, and understanding as cognition, science, techne. Aletheia is always properly a beginning. Techne is always a continuation, an application, a repetition. It is the reason why Heidegger says that the poet of truth is always the poet of a sort of morning of the world. I quote Heidegger: 'The poet always speaks as if the being was expressed for the first time.' If all truth is something new, what is the essential philosophic problem pertaining to truth? It is the problem of its appearance and its becoming. **Truth must be submitted to thought not as judgment or proposition but as a process in the rea**l. This schema represents the becoming of a truth. The aim of my talk is only to explain the schema. For the process of truth to begin, something must happen. Knowledge as such only gives us repetition, it is concerned only with what already is. For truth to affirm its newness, there must be a supplement. This supplement is committed to chance-it is unpredictable, incalculable, it is beyond what it is. I call it an event. A truth appears in its newness because an eventful supplement interrupts repetition. Examples: The appearance, with Aeschylus, of theatrical tragedy. The eruption, with Galileo, of mathematical physics. An amorous encounter which changes a whole life. Or the French revolution of 1792. An event is linked to the notion of the undecidable. Take the sentence 'This event belongs to the situation.' If you can, using the rules of established knowledge, decide that this sentence is true or false, the event will not be an event. It will be calculable within the situation. Nothing permits us to say 'Here begins the truth.' A wager will have to be made. This is why the truth begins with an axiom of truth. **It begins with a decision, a decision to say that the event has taken place.** The fact that the event is undecidable imposes the constraint that the subject of the event must appear. Such a subject is constituted by a sentence in the form of a wager: this sentence is as follows. 'This has taken place, which I can neither calculate nor demonstrate, but to which I shall be faithful.' **A subject begins with what fixes an undecidable event because it takes a chance of deciding it. This begins the infinite procedure of verification of the Truth**. It's the examination within the situation of the consequences of the axiom which decides the Event. It's the exercise of fidelity. Nothing regulates its cause **choice**. Since the axiom which supports it has arbitrated it outside of any rule of established knowledge, this axiom was formulated in a pure**,** committed by chance, point by point.

#### Ethics comes before knowledge—their advantages are sandcastles built upon a foundation of anthropocentric valuation—Accurate knowledge STARTS with willigness to risk responding to mysterious ecologies demanding your ethical concern

**Weston 09 –** Anthony Weston, Professor of Philosophy at Elon University, 2009

[The Incompleat Eco-Philosopher p. 9-11]

If theworld is a collection of more or less ﬁxed facts to which we  must respond, then the task of ethics is to systematize and unify our  responses. This is the expected view, once again so taken for granted  as to scarcely even appear as a “view” at all. Epistemology is prior to  ethics. Responding to the world follows upon knowing it—and what  could be more sensible or responsible than that? If the world is not  “given,” though—if the world is what it seems to be in part because  we have made it that way, as I have been suggesting, and if therefore  the process of inviting its further possibilities into the light is funda-  mental to ethics itself—then our very knowledge of the world, of the  possibilities of other animals and the land and even ourselves in relation  to them, follows upon “invitation,” and ethics must come ﬁ rst. Ethics  is prior to epistemology—or, as Cheney and I do not say in the paper  but probably should have said, what really emerges is another kind of  epistemology—“etiquette,” in our speciﬁ c sense, as epistemology.  But then of course we are also speaking of something sharply  different from “ethics” as usually understood. We are asked not for a  set of well-defended general moral commitments in advance, but rather  for something more visceral and instinctual, a mode of comportment more than a mode of commitment, more ﬂeshy and more vulnerable.  Etiquette so understood requires us to take risks, to offer trust before  we know whether or how the offer will be received, and to move with  awareness, civility, and grace in a world we understand to be capable  of response. Thus Cheney and I conclude that ethical action itself must be “ﬁ rst and foremost an attempt to open up possibilities, to enrich  the world” rather than primarily an attempt to respond to the world  as already known.  Cheney, true to his nature, also takes the argument on a more  strenuous path, exploring indigenous views of ceremony and ritual.  Once again the question of epistemology turns out to be central.  Euro-Americans, Cheney says, want to know what beliefs are encoded  in the utterances of indigenous peoples. We treat their utterances as  propositional representations of Indigenous worlds. But what if these  utterances function, instead, primarily to produce these worlds? Cheney  cites the indigenous scholar Sam Gill on the fundamentally performa-  tive function of language. When Gill asks Navajo elders what prayers  mean, he reports, they tell him “not what messages prayers carry, but  what prayers do.” More generally, Gill asserts that “the importance of  religion as it is practiced by the great body of religious persons for  whom religion is a way of life [is] a way of creating, discovering, and  communicating worlds of meaning largely through ordinary and com-  mon actions and behavior.”11  What then, Cheney and I ask, if this performative dimension of language is fundamental not just in indigenous or obviously religious   settings, but generally? How we speak, how we move, how we carry  on, all the time, also literally brings all sorts of worlds into being—and  thus, again, the ethical challenge put mindful speech, care, and respect  ﬁ rst. Indeed we would now go even further. Here it is not so much  that epistemology comes ﬁ rst but that, in truth, it simply fades away.  The argument is not the usual suggestion that the West has misunder-  stood the world, got it wrong, and that we now need to “go back” to  the Indians to get it right. Cheney is arguing that understanding the  world is not really the point in the ﬁ rst place. We are not playing a  truth game at all. What matters is how we relate to things, not what  things are in themselves. Front, center, and always, the world responds.  The great task is not knowledge but relationship**.**

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#### the 1ac failure to attend to our relationship as debaters, judges and coaches beyond the human sphere makes them a part of an educational practice that sustains anthropocentric ordering of world despite the “empowerment” offered by the affirmative

**Bell and Russell 2K** – (Anne C. by graduate students in the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University and Constance L. a graduate student at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)//RSW

So far, however, such queries in critical pedagogy have been limited by their neglect of the ecological contexts of which students are a part and of relationships extending beyond the human sphere. The gravity of this oversight is brought sharply into focus by writers interested in environ-mental thought, particularly in the cultural and historical dimensions of the environmental crisis. For example, Nelson (1993) contends that our inability to acknowledge our human embeddedness in nature results in our failure to understand what sustains us. We become inattentive to our very real dependence on others and to the ways our actions affect them. Educators, therefore, would do well to draw on the literature of environ-mental thought in order to come to grips with the misguided sense of independence, premised on freedom from nature, that informs such no-tions as “empowerment.” Further, calls for educational practices situated in the life-worlds of students go hand in hand with critiques of disembodied approaches to education. In both cases, **critical pedagogy challenges the liberal notion of education whose sole aim is the development of the individual, rational mind** (Giroux, 1991, p. 24; McKenna, 1991, p. 121; Shapiro, 1994). Theorists draw attention to the importance of nonverbal discourse (e.g., Lewis & Simon, 1986, p. 465) and to the somatic character of learning (e.g., Shapiro, 1994, p. 67), both overshadowed by the intellectual authority long granted to rationality and science (Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995; S. Taylor, 1991). Describing an “emerging discourse of the body” that looks at how bodies are represented and inserted into the social order, S. Taylor (1991) cites as examples the work of Peter McLaren, Michelle Fine, and Philip Corrigan. A complementary vein of enquiry is being pursued by environmental researchers and educators critical of the privileging of science and abstract thinking in education. They understand learning to be mediated not only through our minds but also through our bodies. Seeking to acknowledge and create space for sensual, emotional, tacit, and communal knowledge, they advocate approaches to education grounded in, for example, nature experience and environmental practice (Bell, 1997; Brody, 1997; Weston, 1996). Thus, whereas both critical pedagogy and environmental education offer a critique of disembodied thought, one draws attention to the ways in which the body is situated in culture (Shapiro, 1994) and to “the social construction of bodies as they are constituted within discourses of race, class, gender, age and other forms of oppression” (S. Taylor, 1991, p. 61). The other emphasizes and celebrates our embodied relatedness to the more-than-human world and to the myriad life forms of which it is comprised (Payne, 1997; Russell & Bell, 1996). Given their different foci, each stream of enquiry stands to be enriched by a sharing of insights. Finally, with regard to the poststructuralist turn in educational theory, ongoing investigations stand to greatly enhance a revisioning of environ-mental education. A growing number of environmental educators question the empirical-analytical tradition and its focus on technical and behavioural aspects of curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Robottom, 1991). **Advocating more interpretive, critical approaches, these educators contest the discursive frameworks** (e.g., positivism, empiricism, rationalism) **that mask the values, beliefs, and assumptions underlying information, and thus the cultural and political dimensions of the problems being considered** (A. Gough, 1997; Huckle, 1999; Lousley, 1999). Teaching about ecological processes and environmental hazards in a supposedly objective and rational manner is understood to belief the fact that knowledge is socially constructed and therefore partial (A. Gough, 1997; Robertson, 1994; Robottom, 1991; Stevenson, 1993). N. Gough (1999) explicitly goes beyond critical approaches to advocate poststructuralist positions in environmental education. He asks science and environmental educators to adopt skepticism towards metanarratives, an attitude that characterizes poststructuralist discourses. Working from the assumption that science and environmental education are story-telling practices, he suggests that the adequacy of narrative strategies be examined in terms of how they represent and render problematic “human trans-actions with the phenomenal world” (N. Gough, 1993, p. 607). Narrative strategies, he asserts, should not create an illusion of neutrality, objectivity, and anonymity, but rather draw attention to our kinship with nature and to “the personal participation of the knower in all acts of understanding” (N. Gough, 1993, p. 621). We contend, of course, that Gough’s proposal should extend beyond the work of science and environmental educators. The societal narratives that legitimize the domination of nature, like those that underlie racism, sexism, classism, heterosexism, and so on, merit everyone’s concern. And since the ecological crisis threatens especially those most marginalized and vulnerable (Running-Grass, 1996; D. Taylor, 1996), proponents of critical pedagogy in particular need to come to terms with the humancentred frameworks that structure their endeavours. No doubt poststructuralist theory will be indispensable in this regard. Nevertheless, **anthropocentric assumptions about language, meaning, and agency will need to be revisited**. In the meantime, perhaps we can ponder the spontaneous creativity of spiders and the life-worlds of woodticks. Such wondrous possibilities should cause even the most committed of humanists to pause for a moment at least.

#### c) the 1AC offers a disposition, a frame of mind, a way of feeling. If fiat is education, we call recess!! Make a sharp left turn from the familiar language game of policy debate.

**Stables 02** – Andrew Stables, Reader in Education at University of Bath, 2002

[Trumpeter 18.1]

Wordsworth is here describing a mood, but one to treasure, and from which he derives (as he makes clear in many other poems) significant personal and ethical guidance. When moods become habitual, as seems certainly to have been the case with Wordsworth, they also tend to become dispositions. I would argue, then, that education for sustainability should, in part, be concerned with enabling the kinds of experience that promote the kind of mood Wordsworth describes. This is, of course, by no means easy; after all, Wordsworth ascribed his own love of nature to an often solitary rural childhood coupled with a naturally sensitive disposition. I shall return to the challenges for educators in providing appropriate experiences below. If a frame of mind is more than just a mood, then the term must refer to some more enduring organizational structure for thinking and feeling. Framing, thus understood, has many, vaguely related connotations in various literatures, but all of them seem to relate to categorizations and definitions determined, to some degree, by human agency. Thus, when I think of Frames, I am reminded of the Kantian definition of the Category, of Wittgensteinian “language games,” of Erving Goffman’s “Frame Analysis,” and, more broadly, of genres, disciplines, ways of thinking, even communities of practice; also, of course, of art, photography, and film. Dispositions relate to tendencies to respond in certain ways within these frames, or to utilise certain frames rather than others, depending on the definition used. Regarding educational processes, I am reminded of Bernstein’s distinction between Weak and Strong Framing and Classification, and the need for teachers to frame things more strongly for children from certain backgrounds than for others. Of course, “determined by human agency” does not imply conscious control. Paul Guyer[1](C:\\Users\\PC\\Dropbox\\Nikhil Debate\\Users\\Lebowski\\Users\\Lebowski\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\anthro final fixed.docx" \l "1) defines Kant’s Categories broadly as “those general concepts by means of which our intuitions are converted into representations of objects or judgments.” Although our intuitions, thus conceived, relate to an absolute reality, bound by time and space, the Categories function prior to our conscious judgments despite being essentially human constructs (and common to all humanity, according to Kant—though not to all sentient life). What Kant does not give much consideration to is the degree of possible variation in how judgments can be made. Put simply, how much might the same frame of mind allow for different arguments and approaches? A belief in cause and effect, for instance, can be enacted very differently in positivist and post-positivist research paradigms in the social sciences. Some of this is also true in a sense of the Wittgensteinian language game:[2](file:///C:\\Users\\PC\\Dropbox\\Nikhil%20Debate\\Users\\Lebowski\\Users\\Lebowski\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\anthro%20final%20fixed.docx" \l "2) truths are constructed from within language games, even though there is no good reason to suppose that the games/frames exist anywhere other than in the human psyche. Millennial global politics, as recent events have all too starkly reminded us, bear witness to the huge differences between perspectives and dispositions at the cultural and religious levels. We may all operate within the same Kantian Categories—even the same Wittgensteinian language games—but the worldviews we construct can still be radically different. Even within the Christian community (to take a currently relatively uncontroversial example) there are stark differences between liberals who interpret the *Bible*according to cultural context, evangelicals, who interpret the contemporary context according to the *Bible*, and fundamentalists, who use the *Bible* to keep their distance from the modern world as entirely as possible. Looked at this way, language games can certainly be played very differently, and we do not necessarily need a new frame of mind. Goffman’s social-psychological account construes frames as indeed dependent on social and cultural change.[3](file:///C:\Users\PC\Dropbox\Nikhil%20Debate\Users\Lebowski\Users\Lebowski\AppData\Local\Temp\anthro%20final%20fixed.docx#3) He sees frames as something like spectacles, or the selective focusing of a camera lens. To see life through rose-coloured spectacles implies the adoption of particular—in this case, overoptimistic—assumptions about spatial and temporal context. Goffman’s frames enable us to read events as appropriate or otherwise within their contexts (and to Goffman, context is all important), thus allowing us, for example, to be unsurprised when a naked person enters the room and sits before us in a life-drawing class, though less composed in the unlikely event that this should happen under other everyday circumstances. (My example, not Goffman’s.) Goffman’s frames are thus heavily culturally determined. Goffman also differs from Kant, and perhaps from Wittgenstein, in his view of the relative teachability of frames. In his discussion of “breaking frames” through bursting into laughter, Goffman refers to the sense of absurdity that recalcitrant youths often feel when their elders and betters ask them to undertake role plays designed to teach them life skills. A simple example arises from the experience of many of us who have been involved in the upbringing of children: it seems ridiculous to say “please” and “thank you” if you have not been taught to do so habitually. Goffman’s frames, therefore, seem less fundamental than Kant’s Categories, or Wittgenstein’s language games; nevertheless, this does not imply that new frames are created at will. However, Goffman’s analysis does seem to leave the educator with some room for manoeuvre, at least with respect to prioritization. Basil Bernstein[4](file:///C:\Users\PC\Dropbox\Nikhil%20Debate\Users\Lebowski\Users\Lebowski\AppData\Local\Temp\anthro%20final%20fixed.docx#4) has perhaps done most to highlight the pedagogical importance of framing, pointing out that schooling at the end of the twentieth century, at least in Britain and countries like it, tended to reproduce the cultural norms and practices of the socially privileged, with well-meaning liberal teachers misguidedly tending to use weak framing and classification in classrooms, whether or not their students shared their preconceptions about how to “play the game” of schooling. Bernstein’s account, taken all in all, is essentially sociological and structural, and more deterministic than Goffman’s, with cultural practices divided along social class lines in relation to Codes that embody both work and domestic practices and are expressed via language and schooling. Thus, for a variety of reasons, working-class children tend to grow up in homes where questions are not invited and feelings are little articulated, where lines of authority are rigid and hierarchical, and where rules are hard and fast, and are made explicit (i.e. strongly framed), whereas the children of the professional classes, particularly in the Post-Fordist West, are invited to enter debate and open exploration of feelings, rules, and opinions, so are more at ease in weakly framed situations (such as when a teacher simply tells pupils to “find out about” something). Bernstein’s key insight in the context of the present debate is that children experience educational events differently according to their backgrounds and prior experiences—and teachers should take this into account. To misquote Tony Blair on schools in England and Wales, in word if not in spirit: “One size*should not* fit all.” This serves as a reminder to environmental educators, for example, that the same experience will not always be interpreted in the same way or produce the same result; the teacher’s frames will not always match those of the taught. Taken together, what do these formulations imply about frames of mind? Perhaps: (i) they organize, and/or determine and constrain thinking. We see the world from within them, not outside them; (ii) yet we do have some metacognitive, aesthetic, or deconstructive capacity to recognize frames, if not from the outside, at least from other frames. Also, our frames can be at least shaken by experience (cf. Kant’s views on the Sublime in the *Critique of Judgment*). Also, either frames change, or our uses of them or operations within them change; (iii)what we cannot do is ever fully articulate the relationship of our frames to the material conditions prior to their development. My ways of seeing the world, which cannot be entirely separate from yours (as Wittgenstein argued at some length in the section of*Philosophical Investigations* devoted to the impossibility of a private language), nevertheless retain an essentially arbitrary relationship to biophysical reality, in the sense that we cannot understand the degree to which our cultural options are constrained by material reality any more than we can understand why a dog is called a dog or a *hund* or a*chien*. This is true even of Kant’s use of the Category. (An interesting corollary of this is that if intelligent life has developed on other planets, there seems little reason to believe that we should be able to communicate with it, as there is no compelling argument that the same material conditions would produce identical frames of mind, let alone identical strategic and tactical judgments within them. Even if material reality can be explained mathematically, there is no reason to suppose that mathematical languages would be replicated. Contexts for action never completely replicate.) I would argue that we tend to see sustainability in terms of the basic Category of cause and effect: modern industrial practices have been the cause; environmental and social degradation are the result; sustainability is the answer. To put it differently, sustainability as a regulative ideal is a product of the dialogue that produced the current sense of environmental and ecological crisis. Given a broad acceptance of this, however, sustainability dialogue is riddled with assumptions that do not really add up. Harré, Brockmeier, and Muhlhausler[5](file:///C:\Users\PC\Dropbox\Nikhil%20Debate\Users\Lebowski\Users\Lebowski\AppData\Local\Temp\anthro%20final%20fixed.docx#5) have shown clearly in *Greenspeak*, for example, how environmentalist rhetoric has cleverly combined palaeontological, cultural, and personal timeframes to create a sense of imminent disaster. Given these paradoxes, and conflicting views about both frames of mind and sustainability, where might we look to develop new orientations to action, whether or not these amount to frames of mind according to the various definitions above? These possibilities occur: (i) in the postmodern science advocated by Aran Gare and others,[6](file:///C:\Users\PC\Dropbox\Nikhil%20Debate\Users\Lebowski\Users\Lebowski\AppData\Local\Temp\anthro%20final%20fixed.docx#6) influenced by Jean-Francois Lyotard’s rejection of scientific progress as anything more, or less, than a narrative, and not one that can override all others,[7](file:///C:\Users\PC\Dropbox\Nikhil%20Debate\Users\Lebowski\Users\Lebowski\AppData\Local\Temp\anthro%20final%20fixed.docx#7) or (ii) in some kind of spiritual, deep ecological movement, involving perhaps a revival of Hegelian idealism, thoroughgoing Romanticism, or religious, mystical and quasi-mystical discourses and practices of transcendence and renunciation. Certain features could be said to be common to each of these, differentiating each from the mainstream of Western modernist thought: a sense of interrelationship; a love of the intangible Other; a delight in the unknown and the unknowable (yet perceivable, under the right circumstances); a belief that the whole is greater than the part will ever apprehend (including the human reason part), so an acceptance of both our power to be at one with nature and the healthy limitation of our powers; and a belief that there may be no ultimate *technological* answer, including no ultimate recipe for sustainability. I have argued elsewhere that scientific and critical realist readings of the environmental crisis tend to lack one or more of these crucial ingredients.[8](file:///C:\Users\PC\Dropbox\Nikhil%20Debate\Users\Lebowski\Users\Lebowski\AppData\Local\Temp\anthro%20final%20fixed.docx#8) The modernist obsession with control over both nature and society, though it has brought us many benefits, has, for example, tended to blind us to the fact that many of our most fulfilling experiences are encounters with the non-human, often when we are alone. A few weeks ago, I sat on a stile in a Wiltshire field and watched a fox as it approached me, stopped and looked at me while I looked at it, and we mutually failed to understand each other. A little later, I spent even longer observing gorillas in a zoo. (The very existence of zoos raises questions about environmental learning, of course.) We remember such things, I would suggest, because they disrupt, or make us question, or make us somehow aware of, our frames and remind us that there is always life beyond the narrow limits of our reason: life to which we are related in some way, though we cannot understand it. We are reminded, as Shakespeare wrote, that there is more in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophies. Some experiences can rattle our frames. So a sustainable world may be one that continues to contain more than we can understand. To bring about sustainability, thus defined, we have to leave open the possibilities for surprise and wonder by reminding ourselves that the real riches of living lie in the world beyond that which we control. Life can be perfect (cf. Kant’s idea of the Beautiful) and awe-inspiring (the Sublime). Whether we can actually guarantee keeping a balance in what we cannot understand or control is a moot question, though we can certainly try to keep a balance within ourselves. How can we pursue knowledge in pursuit of the unknowable? Only, I would suggest (and this makes no pretence at an original answer), by acknowledging some force, a mind, greater than our own, individually, collectively, or historically. While scientific modernity, encouraged perhaps by Kant, may tend to see people as moral agents within a mechanical universe, perhaps a healthy reversal is due. We might rather conceive of much of ourselves, much of the time, as mechanical agents within a mysteriously purposeful universe: little technicians who have often lost sight of our significant insignificance in the greater scheme of things that will always, in its entirety, remain closed to us. Thus understood, we are trapped within frames of mind, or patterns of judgment, dictated by a rather reductionist rationalism and impoverished empiricism, but by opening ourselves up to new experience we can reawaken our sense of wonder and of place, if not ever fully know what we’re here for, or guarantee our sustainability. The path through the maize field to the stile where I saw the fox is there for all to follow; like all footpaths, it was once the obvious way from A to B. Now there is no point in following it unless you have a dog to walk, or you want to experience that sense of something more or different that comes from following the way less travelled. Both were true in my case. Although it was only a field, and therefore, a pretty strongly humanly controlled environment, it was redolent of the mystery of growth and decay that, presumably, we all wish to sustain; I went there to be reminded of more than I had in my mind, and was not disappointed. And what of the pedagogical implications? On the one hand, our students need to understand our ways of doing things as modernist technophiles as much as ever. To function in the modern world requires an education in its ways, and formal education, via schooling, is inevitably largely a conservative process of induction into a culture and its frames. Although frames, as cultural constructs, might change over time, we cannot fully control this process: we cannot simply replace our ways of knowing or our ways of getting to know, either with some new sustainable model, or some pick-and-mix from the more attractive offerings of premodern cultures. The challenge, therefore, becomes to encourage more than what we have been doing, not to pretend to do without it. And where can this added value (for this is real added value) come from? While religious experience has been cited, it is important not to suppose that religious education generally provides this. Often, religious education is received by students as yet another package of facts, and not a very useful one at that. In such cases our teaching is not misguided but is insufficient, not amounting to enough, in many cases, to enrich personal existence through exposing students to their limits and to the mysteries of the world beyond them, even where that may be its espoused intention. However, we are far from incapable of such experience, even in the urban context. Fiction and poetry can do this, as can music and the other arts; contact with animals can do it (particularly, but not solely, in their natural habitats); as can some experiences at the edge of safety and security, including the kind of outdoor pursuit that has become increasingly rare in British schools in an increasingly regulated and litigious climate; sometimes, even science and languages and history in the classroom can do it, perhaps most often for those students rendered susceptible to their mysteries through influences beyond the school. Certain kinds of sense-making are both exploratory and enriching, and resist easy closure. In conclusion, therefore, education for sustainability as a frame of mind, or towards sustainability as a condition of the planet, might take the view that it remains important to learn languages and sciences and history—but that these should be learnt as much as possible as adventures towards encounters with the unknown, and that students might have some other adventures, too, whether in or out of school, so that, even in education, the experience can exceed the expectations, whether or not the frames are changed (because the latter depends on how we conceive of frames of mind). Let the educational quest always be for the unknowable. How else can coming generations learn to live in awe of life? The twentieth century has been characterised as the century of the attempted extermination of the Other by the exploitation of frighteningly powerful technologies, and we continue to suffer the aftershocks. Alain Finkielkraut,[8](file:///C:\\Users\\PC\\Dropbox\\Nikhil%20Debate\\Users\\Lebowski\\Users\\Lebowski\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\anthro%20final%20fixed.docx" \l "8) for example, cites both Stalinism and Nazism as the excesses of a coldly instrumental rationality that demonized difference in the pursuit (quite sincere, in their own terms) of Utopia. It would, I fear, be quite possible to demonize difference in pursuit of a sustainable society, based on principles of scientific ecology. Perhaps almost as uncomfortably, Finkielkraut sees the Millennial postmodern condition as also retreating from encounters with the Other, but this time through a failure to respect any ties, ideologies, traditions, or arguments, so that all human living on Earth is conducted from the superficial perspective of the tourist. Recent events have reminded us just how paper-thin the veneer of mutual tolerance can be. Finkielkraut concludes *In The Name of Humanity* by quoting Hannah Arendt, who considered resentment the natural, and understandable, condition of post-Holocaust humanity, and gratitude as its only feasible alternative. What price an education that makes us grateful for life on Earth?

#### Alt is a prerequisite to the AFF – all forms of exclusion are patterned off the human/non-human divide- de-normalizing the anthropocentric order is critical to challenging ethics

**Kochi 09** – (Tarik, Sussex law school, Species war: Law, Violence and Animals, Law Culture and Humanities Oct 5.3)//RSW

This reflection need not be seen as carried out by every individual on a daily basis but rather as that which is drawn upon from time to time within public life as humans inter-subjectively coordinate their actions in accordance with particular enunciated ends and plan for the future. 21 In this respect, **the violence and killing of species war is not simply a question of survival or bare life, instead, it is bound up with a consideration of the good.** For most modern humans in the West the “good life” involves the daily killing of animals for dietary need and for pleasure. At the heart of the question of species war, and all war for that matter, resides a question about the legitimacy of violence linked to a philosophy of value. 22 The question of war-law sits within a wider history of decision making about the relative values of different forms of life. “Legitimate” violence is under-laid by cultural, religious, moral, political and philosophical conceptions about the relative values of forms of life. Playing out through history are distinctions and hierarchies of life-value that are extensions of the original human-animal distinction. Distinctions that can be thought to follow from the human-animal distinction are those, for example, drawn between: Hellenes and barbarians; Europeans and Orientals; whites and blacks; the “civilized” and the “uncivilized”; Nazis and Jews; Israeli’s and Arabs; colonizers and the colonized. Historically these practices and regimes of violence have been culturally, politically and legally normalized in a manner that replicates the normalization of the violence carried out against non-human animals. Unpacking, criticizing and challenging the forms of violence, which in different historical moments appear as “normal,” is one of the ongoing tasks of any critic who is concerned with the question of what war does to law and of what law does to war? The critic of war is thus a critic of war’s norm-alization.

**Embargo is key to solve human rights violations**

**Delgado 13** (AJ, 4/13/13, “Bill Maher Ignorantly Rants Against The Cuban Embargo, Adding Himself To The List Of Useful Idiots,” Ms. Delgado is a frequent contributor to various political news sites. She holds a Juris Doctor from Harvard Law School and worked for several years as a litigator in New York City. http://www.mediaite.com/tv/bill-maher-ignorantly-rants-against-the-cuban-embargo-adding-himself-to-the-list-of-useful-idiots/)

Few stop to realize that it’s the Cuban-Americans who are most anxious to see the embargo someday lifted and to visit their native land — but only once the Cuban regime changes and institutes respect for its people’s human rights. In other words, it is precisely concern for the Cuban people that drives the embargo. Abandoning them for the sake of a sexy vacation spot seems particularly callous and selfish… though one wonders if Bill wouldn’t mind: after all, one can just ignore the dissident being cracked on his skull with a police baton, simply for demanding the right to read Dr. Martin Luther King‘s works, and focus on the nightlife, girls, and cigars instead.¶ But let’s not get bogged down in silly logic and facts to refuse Maher’s points. While Maher and his crew seem to arrogantly speak on behalf of the Cuban people, let’s instead defer to Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, Cuba’s leading democracy and human rights activist. Does he think the embargo should be lifted? Nope. National Review’s Jay Nordlinger interviewed Dr. Biscet on the matter:¶ It is natural to ask Biscet what he thinks of a contentious issue in the United States: the longstanding sanctions on the Cuban regime, known collectively as “the embargo.” He says, “The embargo has helped the Cuban people both politically and morally.” He wishes that all “free and civilized countries would boycott Cuba, the way they did racist South Africa.” The world made South Africa a pariah state. The American embargo should be lifted, says Biscet, “when the embargo against the Cuban people’s human rights,” imposed by the dictatorship, “is lifted.” He believes that [countries in Europe, Latin America, and North America, such as Canada] have given the dictatorship “life” and “oxygen” for the past 20 years — in other words, since the collapse of the Soviet Union.¶ What hogwash, though! Who needs the words of Dr. Biscet, who has lived in Cuba his whole life and served 25 years in prison for his activism, when we have Bill Maher & Company, the ‘expert panel of the uninformed,’ weighing in? After all, idiots may be idiots but, as Lenin reportedly remarked, they are (especially when pontificating on Cuba) certainly useful. The Cuban propaganda machine is counting on you. Carry on, good soldiers.