**1ac – plan**

**Plan: The United States federal government should negotiate a mediation-inclusive Bilateral Investment Treaty with Venezuela.**

**1ac – warming**

**CONTENTION 1 IS WARMING –**

**Warming is real and anthropogenic.**

**Science Daily 5/15,** 5/15/13, “Scientific Consensus On Anthropogenic Climate Change,” http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/05/130515203048.htm)//DR. H

A comprehensive analysis of peer-reviewed articles on the topic of global warming and climate change has revealed an overwhelming consensus among scientists that recent warming is human-caused.

The study is the most comprehensive yet and identified 4000 summaries, otherwise known as abstracts, from papers published in the past 21 years that stated a position on the cause of recent global warming -- 97 per cent of these endorsed the consensus that we are seeing human-made, or anthropogenic, global warming (AGW)

Led by John Cook at the University of Queensland, the study has been published 16 May, in IOP Publishing's journal Environmental Research Letters.

The study went one step further, asking the authors of these papers to rate their entire paper using the same criteria. Over 2000 papers were rated and among those that discussed the cause of recent global warming, 97 per cent endorsed the consensus that it is caused by humans.

The findings are in stark contrast to the public's position on global warming; a 2012 poll\* revealed that more than half of Americans either disagree, or are unaware, that scientists overwhelmingly agree that Earth is warming because of human activity.

John Cook said: "Our findings prove that there is a strong scientific agreement about the cause of climate change, despite public perceptions to the contrary.

"There is a gaping chasm between the actual consensus and the public perception. It's staggering given the evidence for consensus that less than half of the general public think scientists agree that humans are causing global warming.

"This is significant because when people understand that scientists agree on global warming, they're more likely to support policies that take action on it."

In March 2012, the researchers used the ISI Web of Science database to search for peer-reviewed academic articles published between 1991 and 2011 using two topic searches: "global warming" and "global climate change."

After limiting the selection to peer-reviewed climate science, the study considered 11 994 papers written by 29 083 authors in 1980 different scientific journals.

**Most qualified evidence concludes it causes extinction.**

**Hansen 12** Head of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies since 1981, an adjunct professor in the Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences at Columbia University, Ph.D. in Physics from the University of Iowa, best known for his research in the field of climatology, his testimony on climate change to congressional committees in 1988 that helped raise broad awareness of global warming, the author of “Storms of My Grandchildren.”(James, May 9, 2012, “Game Over for the Climate,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/opinion/game-over-for-the-climate.html)//DR. H

If we were to fully exploit this new oil source, and continue to burn our conventional oil, gas and coal supplies, concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere eventually would reach levels higher than in the Pliocene era, more than 2.5 million years ago, when sea level was at least 50 feet higher than it is now. That level of heat-trapping gases would assure that the disintegration of the ice sheets would accelerate out of control. Sea levels would rise and destroy coastal cities. Global temperatures would become intolerable. Twenty to 50 percent of the planet’s species would be driven to extinction. Civilization would be at risk. That is the long-term outlook. But near-term, things will be bad enough. Over the next several decades, the Western United States and the semi-arid region from North Dakota to Texas will develop semi-permanent drought, with rain, when it does come, occurring in extreme events with heavy flooding. Economic losses would be incalculable. More and more of the Midwest would be a dust bowl. California’s Central Valley could no longer be irrigated. Food prices would rise to unprecedented levels. If this sounds apocalyptic, it is. This is why we need to reduce emissions dramatically. President Obama has the power not only to deny tar sands oil additional access to Gulf Coast refining, which Canada desires in part for export markets, but also to encourage economic incentives to leave tar sands and other dirty fuels in the ground. The global warming signal is now louder than the noise of random weather, as I predicted would happen by now in the journal Science in 1981. Extremely hot summers have increased noticeably. We can say with high confidence that the recent heat waves in Texas and Russia, and the one in Europe in 2003, which killed tens of thousands, were not natural events — they were caused by human-induced climate change. We have known since the 1800s that carbon dioxide traps heat in the atmosphere. The right amount keeps the climate conducive to human life. But add too much, as we are doing now, and temperatures will inevitably rise too high. This is not the result of natural variability, as some argue. The earth is currently in the part of its long-term orbit cycle where temperatures would normally be cooling. But they are rising — and it’s because we are forcing them higher with fossil fuel emissions.

**4 internal links –**

**1. Land use emissions and system legitimacy.**

**Lee et al 10** – Research Director, Energy, Environment and Resource Governance at Chatham House (Bernice, “The United States and climate change: from process to action,” 2-23, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/16489\_us0510\_lee\_grubb.pdf)

Despite the crucial importance of national and regional initiatives, the world ultimately cannot solve the climate problem without an effective multilateral approach. Ironically, the election of a more multilateralist US president and the events of 2009 culminating with the Copenhagen Accord have only served to increase debate around the form it might take and how inclusive it needs to be. In reality, any major deal is always built upon smaller coalitions of powerful actors. Many proposals have been made for a core of US leadership, bilateral or trilateral leadership by variants of the US–EU–China/Japan/Asia nexus, the G8, the G8+5, the G20, or the Major Economies Forum (MEF). Doubtless, action by most of these groupings is necessary, though it is also of interest that the MEF process did not reach any specific deal until the relationships fostered during the year were put under the pressure of the Copenhagen summit. Ultimately all such efforts face serious limitations if there is no recognition of the need for a truly multilateral framework. This is for three main reasons: scope, competitiveness and political legitimacy. First, carbon emissions are so widespread geographically that any subset of countries becomes increasingly unable to solve the problem unless others are involved. The dominance of US, EU and Chinese emissions today would be swamped by 2050 if these countries delivered steep reductions while others did not. And none of these are significant contributors to land-use emissions (such as deforestation), which involve a wholly different group of countries. Moreover, models which centre upon innovative solutions by a ‘critical mass’ of the private sector diffusing technology and investment globally without government incentives can founder – carbon capture and storage (CCS), which inevitably involves significant extra costs over and above coal plants without CCS, is a case in point. Second, a partial solution that encompassed the big emitters would not solve the perceived risks of loss of competitiveness in energy-intensive sectors vis-à- vis non-participants (to smaller economies such as Singapore, for example). Third, a deal between the big emitters only is unlikely to secure global legitimacy. In no legal or moral system can a solution be imposed by those inflicting the damage, without at some level engaging those that would most suffer the consequences of inadequate action.

**2. Spurs south-south cooperation.**

**IAD 12** the Inter-American Dialogue is the leading US center for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs(“Remaking the Relationship The United States and Latin America”, April 2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)

In addition to economic and financial matters, Brazil and other Latin American nations are assuming enhanced roles on an array of global political, environmental, and security issues . Several for which US and Latin American cooperation could become increasingly important include: ¶ As the world’s lone nuclear-weapons-free region, Latin America has the opportunity to participate more actively in non-proliferation efforts. Although US and Latin American interests do not always converge on non-proliferation questions, they align on some related goals. For example, the main proliferation challenges today are found in developing and unstable parts of the world, as well as in the leakage—or transfer of nuclear materials—to terrorists. In that context, south-south connections are crucial. Brazil could play a pivotal role.¶ Many countries in the region give priority to climate change challenges . This may position them as a voice in international debates on this topic . The importance of the Amazon basin to worldwide climate concerns gives Brazil and five other South American nations a special role to play. Mexico already has assumed a prominent position on climate change and is active in global policy debates. Brazil organized the first-ever global environmental meeting in 1992 and, this year, will host Rio+20 . Mexico hosted the second international meeting on climate change in Cancún in 2010 . The United States is handicapped by its inability to devise a climate change policy. Still, it should support coordination on the presumption of shared interests on a critical policy challenge. ¶ Latin Americans are taking more active leadership on drug policy in the hemisphere and could become increasingly influential in global discussions of drug strategies. Although the United States and Latin America are often at odds on drug policy, they have mutual interests and goals that should allow consultation and collaboration on a new, more effective approach to the problem.

**3. Sustainable technology investment.**

**Edwards 11** – Brown University Research Fellow & co-founder of Intercambio Climatico [Guy, “Climate, energy to dominate US-Latin American relations”, 18 Jul, http://www.trust.org/item/?map=climate-energy-to-dominate-us-latin-american-relations]

Since the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere, Arturo Valenzuela, resigned via Twitter last Friday, commentators have been debating who should replace him and whether this change presents an opportunity to alter the Obama administration’s policies in the region.

With the challenges of climate change, clean energy, resource scarcity and green growth set to dominate U.S.-Latin American relations, Valenzuela’s successor should have experience in these areas.

These issues are a priority for the Obama administration and present lucrative opportunities for the U.S. to improve trade and commercial relations with Latin America at a time when the region is a magnet for investment in clean energy.

In Chile, President Barack Obama spoke of the urgency of tackling climate change and embracing a more secure and sustainable energy future in the Americas. The Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas, which aims to accelerate the deployment of clean energy and advance energy security, is an essential component of hemispheric relations.

Multiple U.S. agencies and departments are carrying out extensive work on climate change. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which runs the Global Climate Change Initiative, argues that climate change is one of the century’s greatest challenges and will be a diplomatic and development priority.

The U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change, Todd Stern, says that Latin America is a significant focus of funding with over $60 million spent in 2009-10 on climate-related bilateral assistance in the region. The U.S. military Southern Command co-hosted two events in Colombia and Peru focused on climate change concluding that the issue is a major security concern and as a result could be a powerful vehicle for U.S. military engagement in the region.

This year the Union of South American Nations’ (UNASUR) Defense Council (CDS) inaugurated the new Defense Strategic Studies Center (CEED), which will look at various challenges including the protection of strategic energy and food resources and adapting to climate change.

THE REGION’S RESOURCES

Latin America and the Caribbean boast incredible and highly coveted natural resources including 25 percent of the planet’s arable land, 22 percent of its forest area, 31 percent of its freshwater, 10 percent of its oil, 4.6 percent of its natural gas, 2 percent of coal reserves and 40 percent of its copper and silver reserves.

The International Energy Agency forecasts that in the future world consumers are going to become more dependent on the Americas to satisfy their demand for oil with Brazil, Colombia, the U.S. and Canada set to meet the demand.

Brazil will host the U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012 with the green economy theme topping the agenda. Peter Hakim, president emeritus of Inter-American Dialogue, argues that while U.S.-Brazilian relations are fraught, both countries need to work harder to improve cooperation.

Climate change, clean energy, resource scarcity and green growth are key potential areas for U.S.-Brazilian relations. The launch of a U.S.-Brazilian Strategic Energy Dialogue, focusing on cooperation on biofuels and renewable energy, among other areas, is a productive start.

Although Latin America and the Caribbean continue to be the largest U.S. export market, the U.S.’s share of the region’s imports and exports has dropped over the last few years. China is now the top destination for the exports of Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay. Latin American exports to China are concentrated in raw materials, which account for nearly 60 percent, while exports to the U.S. are more diversified.

THE RISE OF CHINA

Arturo Valenzuela says this makes Latin Americans better off trading with the U.S. because they can take advantage of greater technology in the value chain. However, crude oil remained the top export to the U.S. for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela in the 2007-2009 time period.

The U.S. may assert it has a superior trade model to China, but the U.N.’s economic commission for the region argues there is a perceived lack of strategic vision by the U.S. in Latin America. Although the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas is the flagship U.S. initiative in the region and will be a key focus for President Obama at the 2012 Summit of the Americas, it is not yet comparable to past initiatives such as the 1960s-era Alliance for Progress.

This comes at a time when China’s twelfth Five Year Plan emphasizes technological innovation, improving environmental standards and various targets such as reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP by 16 percent. In 2010, China was the top installer of wind turbines and solar thermal systems, suggesting there are possible areas to collaborate between China and Latin America.

The U.S. was the largest investor in Latin America in 2010 with the majority of this investment being channeled into natural resources. But as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) reports, Latin America saw the biggest increase in renewable energy investment among developing regions, presenting U.S. companies with great opportunities south of the border.

The State Department and USAID have announced a new partnership with the Private Finance Advisory Network to accelerate private finance in renewable energy projects in Central America. However, the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas, which aims to encourage investment in the deployment of clean energy, is yet to receive notable financial support from the private sector.

ENERGY HOTTEST INVESTMENT

Encouragingly, an American Chambers of Commerce Abroad recent membership poll listed “energy” as the hottest investment sector for members investing in Latin America. Recently, Cannon Power Group, a U.S. wind company, signed a 10-year joint-venture contract with the Spanish company, Gamesa, to harness wind energy in Mexico.

The threats of climate change and growing resource scarcity, combined with the opportunities presented by green growth, provide the impetus for increasing trade and investment in low carbon and high-tech industries.

Although the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative leads U.S. trade policy in the Western hemisphere, the State Department’s diplomats complement this work and Valenzuela’s successor can make a valuable contribution in this area with the relevant expertise.

As climate, clean energy, resource scarcity and green growth begin to define U.S.-Latin American relations, the U.S.’s top diplomat in the region should have the appropriate experience to ensure greater policy coherence among U.S. agencies and effective dialogue with Latin American governments, many of which are trailblazing in these areas.

**Venezuela’s key – Chavez’s death opens up a unique opportunity.**

**Edwards and Mage 13** (Guy, research fellow at Brown University's centre for environmental studies and is co-founder of Latin America's first multilingual website on climate change, Intercambio Climático. Susanna Mage is a recent graduate from Brown University and is currently interning at Intercambio Climático, Death of Hugo Chávez gives Venezuela a choice on climate change: Will the oil-rich country become a key engineer in a new global climate deal, or will it sabotage progress?” http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2013/mar/07/death-hugo-chavez-venezuela-climate-change)//DR. H

Regardless of one's position on el Comandante Hugo Chávez, the death of the Venezuelan president opens the door for a policy debate on a critical issue for Venezuela and the world's security: climate change. As the 2015 deadline to create a new global treaty on climate change approaches, the question for the oil-rich country looms: will Venezuela be a key architect of an ambitious and equitable deal, or will it sabotage progress?

The International Energy Agency reports that no more than one-third of proven fossil fuel reserves can be consumed prior to 2050 if we are to limit warming to 2C. Writer Bill McKibben pointed out that if Venezuela were to exploit its heavy crude oil and Canada's tar sands are fully tapped, this would mean "game over" for the climate as both reserves would fill up the remaining "atmospheric space" or "carbon budget."

President Chávez oversaw a schizophrenic posture on climate change. He insisted that climate change is an existential crisis caused by capitalism, while simultaneously pushing for the development of the Orinoco's heavy crude. Under Chávez, Venezuela's oil dependency increased and it now obtains 94% of export earnings and more than 50% of its federal budget from oil revenues.

Due to high oil prices and Chávez's leadership, poverty and inequality have dropped. Chávez's administration appeared committed to increase oil production to continue funding its social programmes, often through long-term agreements with China to supply oil. Venezuela's "commodity backed loans" from China, estimated at more than $35bn, require it to pay back China in oil.

The key to solving climate change is shifting all countries to low carbon economies. At a United Nations negotiation in Bonn, Germany, in 2009, however, a Venezuelan official said that a shift to a low-carbon economy would adversely impact developing country oil exporters, suggesting that a robust climate change treaty would conflict with Venezuela's development model.

At the climate negotiations, Venezuela has clung to arguments that developing countries have the right to emit to ensure their development. Undermining Venezuela's position at the negotiations has been their often vociferous rhetoric, while exhibiting a lack of action at home. Meanwhile, a number of poorer countries have shown a willingness to take on far more ambitious emissions cuts.

Venezuela releases only 0.56% of the global total of greenhouse gas emissions, but its per capita emissions (at approximately six tonnes per person) are much higher than the world's poorest nations. Venezuela's current emissions, however, pale in significance compared to what is at stake if it does fully develop its oil reserves. Former UK special representative for climate change John Ashton has said that a country's ability to contribute to global efforts to tackle climate change depends on the credibility of its domestic policies.

Venezuela's national development plan (2013-19) includes measures to limit emissions, which include the oil industry and would create a world movement to confront climate change. The Venezuelan government has invested $500m in windfarms and distributed 155m energy-saving lightbulbs.

However, critics suggest that Venezuela has little interest and commitment in tackling climate change, and that the plan's objectives are unlikely to be implemented. According to ClimateScope, which ranks a country's ability to attract capital for low-carbon energy sources and efforts to build a green economy, Venezuela is currently 24th out of 26 countries.

In the UN climate negotiations, Venezuela is part of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA) with Ecuador, Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua, which is praised by many citizens' groups for fighting for climate justice. Venezuela is also a member of the Like-Minded group alongside China, India, Saudi Arabia and its ALBA partners.

Venezuela will understandably not stop oil production at the expense of its social programmes, nor its loan repayments to China. Partial or full compensation for loss of revenue from keeping the oil in the ground is unlikely. Venezuela could consider backing Ecuador's fascinating plan to be proposed at the next Opec meeting to create a 3-5% 'Daly-Correa' tax on every barrel of oil exported to rich countries to raid billions for poor countries to adapt to climate change.

With the death of its great leader, Venezuela has a choice on climate change. It can rebrand itself as a proactive actor at home by working towards a low-carbon economy while joining with its ambitious neighbors at the UN climate negotiations. With the largest known oil reserves, Venezuela's position on climate change is pivotal. En route to 2015, it remains to be seen whether it will be regarded as an engineer of an ambitious and equitable global treaty, or as a saboteur.

**BITs key to relationship—develop information sharing and communication channels**

**Welsh and Schneider 13**—Nancy Welsh is the William Trickett Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law at Penn State Law and Andrea Kupfer Schneider is a Professor Of Law at Marquette University Law School (“The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration”, Spring) EL

3. Recommended “Default” Model of Mediation for the¶ Investor-State Context¶ Arguably, at least, the aim of mediation in the investment context¶ should be enhancing parties’ ability to communicate, inform, and¶ negotiate directly with each other. After all, it will be important for¶ the parties to maintain or improve ongoing relationships, collaborate¶ on the implementation of any agreement, and acknowledge volatile¶ political situations (often accompanied by difficult emotions) to enable¶ representatives (and their constituencies) to embrace good solutions,¶ even if they are not everyone’s preferred solutions. All of these¶ factors suggest the value of a “default” model of mediation that begins¶ with facilitative or elicitive interventions and a focus on interests.¶ Such a model should be preceded by careful preparation.¶ Importantly, however, this model of mediation should also be supplemented¶ as necessary with evaluative or directive interventions and¶ consideration of legal rights and norms. As we have discussed supra,¶ it is the combination of these interventions that is the hallmark of¶ effective mediators. A process that begins facilitatively should enable¶ the parties’ “mutual consideration”165 of each other’s perspectives¶ and underlying needs. In other words, it should facilitate the parties’¶ ability to engage in a procedurally just process with each other. Investors¶ and states will need sufficient opportunity to speak and be¶ heard, but also to listen to each other, reflect upon what was said,¶ demonstrate that they have listened to each other, and also make¶ meaningful movement toward resolution.166¶ This recommendation assumes that states and investors need access¶ to mediation because they currently have only three other procedures¶ available to them—negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration—¶ to resolve their disputes.167 The “default” mediation model that is¶ presumptively facilitative and interest-based therefore offers something¶ new and useful. First, of course, it provides a third party to¶ assist the parties’ negotiations; this differentiates it from negotiation.¶ Second, its focus is on facilitating the parties’ communication, information-¶ sharing and negotiation, thus placing it within the “facilitated”¶ category of processes, while conciliation and binding¶ arbitration fit into the “advisory” and “imposed” categories, respectively.¶ Finally, this model of mediation provides an explicit opportunity¶ to identify and focus on the discussion of interests, while¶ conciliation and arbitration presumptively focus on rights. As a “default,”¶ parties may elect to depart from this model, but they must do¶ so explicitly and agree upon such a departure.

**The peer reviewed studies corroborating our warming claims are best—prefer them over hackery cloaked as skepticism**

**Davies 8** – 6/11, Author and Geophysicist at the Australian National University

[Dr. Geoff Davies, June 11 2008, Science Alert, “Why listen to scientists?”, <http://www.sciencealert.com.au/opinions/20081106-17474.html>]

Professor Don Aitkin’s recent promotion (PDF 258KB) of the “sceptical” view of global warming and the ensuing heated debates on several web sites bring to the fore the question of what authority attaches to the published conclusions and judgments of climate scientists. Professor Aitkin, who is not a scientist, is in no doubt himself that the more outspoken climate scientists have a “quasi-religious” attitude. That is the mild end of the spectrum of opinions of sceptics/denialists/contrarians. Most of the media and many politicians seem to have the view that scientists are just another interest group, and that scientists’ opinions are just opinions, to be heard or discarded like any others. The Australian government seems to credit only the very conservative end of climate scientists’ warnings, because it is acting as though we have many decades in which to adjust, and many years before anything serious needs to be under way. The big difference between scientists’ professional conclusions and those of others is that science has a pervasive and well-developed quality-control process. The first stage is called peer review. Any paper that is published in a reputable scientific journal must be given the OK by several other scientists in the same field. Furthermore, after publication a paper will be read critically by many more scientists, and it is not uncommon for conclusions to be challenged in subsequent publications. For a paper to become widely acknowledged it must survive such scrutiny for a reasonable period, typically several years. All of this is on top of the fact that a scientific paper is based on observations of the world and on a large accumulation of well-tested regularities, such as the “laws” of physics. Few other groups have any comparable process. Certainly the media, politicians and climate sceptics have no such process. Most of the studies referred to by sceptics have either not been published in a relevant peer-reviewed scientific journal or have subsequently been challenged and found wanting in other peer-reviewed studies. The peer-review process is far from perfect, but it yields a product distinctly less unreliable than all the other opinions flying around. The process of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) adds another layer of caution. Basically the IPCC gets a large number of relevant scientists to step back from the front-line disputes and ask “What can most of us agree on?”. Sceptics who dismiss all of the science because there are many disputes miss or obfuscate this basic aspect of IPCC assessments. There is a degree of judgment involved in the IPCC process, and in virtually any public summary by a climate scientist. Some would claim judgment is not the job of scientists; it is the job of politicians and others. But scientists are the best placed to judge the state of knowledge in their field. If their conclusions are potentially of great import, then they have a responsibility to state their best professional judgment. The claim by Professor Aitkin and many other sceptics that climate scientists don’t discuss the uncertainties in their conclusions and judgments simply misrepresents or misperceives the abundant information on uncertainties. Even the IPCC’s most terse summary statements clearly acknowledge uncertainty when they say, for example, “Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations” [emphasis in original]. The term “very likely” is specifically defined in the IPCC summaries to mean the “assessed likelihood, using expert judgment”, is greater than 90 per cent. Clive Hamilton contrasts the scientific and IPCC processes with those of many sceptics (see Atkin’s response here). He traces connections from relatively naïve people like Professor Aitkin back to people and web sites funded by ExxonMobil and others. Sceptics love to question the motives of climate scientists, but rarely mention the motives of the very powerful multi-trillion-dollar fossil fuel industry, parts of which are actively promoting doubt and disinformation in exactly the manner used by the tobacco industry for many years. Observations from the past two or three years, too recent to have been included in the 2007 IPCC Reports, show disturbing signs that the Earth’s response to our activities is happening much faster than expected. The most dramatic sign is a sudden acceleration of the rate of shrinkage of Arctic sea ice. Prominent NASA climate scientist Dr James Hansen is perhaps the most vocal, but far from alone, in arguing that the Earth may be very close to a tipping point beyond which large, unstoppable and irreversible climate change could occur. Scientific issues are not settled by appeals to authority, nor by a vote. That is not the issue here. The issue is whether scientists’ professional judgments have weight. Those in strategic positions in our society, like politicians and journalists, who treat scientists’ collective professional judgments as no better than any other opinion are being seriously irresponsible. You can ignore the IPCC if you want, but you should realise that its most recent assessment may have seriously understated the global warming problem. You can ignore James Hansen if you want, but you should know that his judgments from two or three decades ago are being broadly vindicated.

**Utopian policy proposals are valuable even if they are never enacted—they still put pressure on power to accede to demands and create a vision for social change**

**Streeten, 1999** (Paul, Development, v. 42 n.2 ingenta)

First, Utopian thinking can be useful as a framework for analysis. Just as physicists assume an atmospheric vacuum for some purposes, so policy analysts can assume a political vacuum from which they can start afresh. The physicists’ assumption plainly would not be useful for the design of parachutes, but can serve other purposes well. Similarly, when thinking of tomorrow’s problems, Utopianism is not helpful. But for long-term strategic purposes it is essential. Second, the Utopian vision gives a sense of direction, which can get lost in approaches that are preoccupied with the feasible. In a world that is regarded as the second-best of all feasible worlds, everything becomes a necessary constraint. All vision is lost. Third, excessive concern with the feasible tends to reinforce the status quo. In negotiations, it strengthens the hand of those opposed to any reform. Unless the case for change can be represented in the same detail as the case for no change, it tends to be lost. Fourth, it is sometimes the case that the conjuncture of circumstances changes quite suddenly and that the constellation of forces, unexpectedly, turns out to be favourable to even radical innovation. Unless we are prepared with a carefully worked out, detailed plan, that yesterday could have appeared utterly Utopian, the reformers will lose out by default. Only a few years ago nobody would have expected the end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, the break-up of Yugoslavia, the marketization of China, the end of apartheid in South Africa. And the handshake on the White House lawn between Mr Peres and Mr Arafat. Fifth, the Utopian reformers themselves can constitute a pressure group, countervailing the self interested pressures of the obstructionist groups. Ideas thought to be Utopian have become realistic at moments in history when large numbers of people support them, and those in power have to yield to their demands. The demand for ending slavery is a historical example. It is for these five reasons that Utopians should not be discouraged from formulating their proposals and from thinking the unthinkable, unencumbered by the inhibitions and obstacles of political constraints. They should elaborate them in the same detail that the defenders of the status quo devote to its elaboration and celebration. Utopianism and idealism will then turn out to be the most realistic vision. It is well known that there are three types of economists: those who can count and those who can’t. But being able to count up to two, I want to distinguish between two types of people. Let us call them, for want of a better name, the Pedants and the Utopians. The names are due to Peter Berger, who uses them in a different context. The Pedants or technicians are those who know all the details about the way things are and work, and they have acquired an emotional vested interest in keeping them this way. I have come across them in the British civil service, in the bureaucracy ofthe World Bank, and elsewhere. They are admirable people but they are conservative, and no good companions for reform. On the other hand, there are the Utopians, the idealists, the visionaries who dare think the unthinkable. They are also admirable, many of them young people. But they lack the attention to detail that the Pedants have. When the day of the revolution comes, they will have entered it on the wrong date in their diaries and fail to turn up, or, if they do turn up, they will be on the wrong side of the barricades. What we need is a marriage between the Pedants and the Utopians, between the technicians who pay attention to the details and the idealists who have the vision of a better future. There will be tensions in combining the two, but they will be creative tensions. We need Pedantic Utopian Pedants who will work out in considerable detail the ideal world and ways of getting to it, and promote the good cause with informed fantasy. Otherwise, when the opportunity arises, we shall miss it for lack of preparedness and lose out to the opponents of reform, to those who want to preserve the status quo.

**The aff should get to weigh the case – political simulation of Latin American policy is key to social progress – prefer specificity**

**Giordano and Li 12** - \*Paolo, PhD in Economics from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Lead Economist @ the Integratoin and Trade Sector of the IADB, \*\*Kun, Research Fellow @ IADB

(“An Updated Assessment of the Trade and Poverty Nexus in Latin America,” p. 375-377)//BB

Despite the move towards more open trade regimes, Latin American economies are still ¶ relatively closed to international trade. Under the pressure of globalisation, it is likely that in the ¶ coming years the region will need to open further and adjust to compete in an increasingly ¶ challenging global environment. Latin America being one of the most unequal regions of the ¶ world, the assessment of the trade and poverty nexus is crucial to devise policies aiming at ¶ better distributing the gains from trade. Latin America-specific research on this topic will ¶ provide policymakers and stakeholders with evidence necessary to underpin a debate which ¶ seems to be nurtured more by anxiety than rigorous knowledge. ¶ In this light, it is useful to refer to a few conclusions with the aim of building up a solid base ¶ for policy debates and future research.¶ There is a gap in the availability of methodologies to explore the link between macro policy ¶ reforms like trade liberalisation and micro-economic determinants of welfare and poverty. It is ¶ therefore crucial to invest in the generation of data and research techniques, to adapt the ¶ research agenda to the specificity of Latin America and to consider qualitative issues that are ¶ difficult to measure. Meanwhile, normative statements referring to the trade policy nexus should ¶ cautiously consider the limitations of current positive knowledge.¶ Trade openness, inequality and poverty are wide multidimensional concepts. Measuring and ¶ attributing causal relations among these variables without carefully qualifying the specific ¶ dimensions explored or the particular transmission mechanisms at play may be misleading. It is ¶ important to disentangle the specific dimension of the trade and poverty nexus from the wider ¶ debate on globalisation and financial integration, the competing concepts of relative and ¶ absolute inequality and the objective and subjective dimension of poverty and deprivation.¶ Despite the impossibility to rigorously and unambiguously assert that trade openness is ¶ conducive to growth and poverty reduction, the preponderance of evidence supports this ¶ conclusion. However, the majority of empirical macro studies also show that the impact of trade ¶ on growth and poverty is also generally small and that the causes of indigence are to be found ¶ elsewhere. But it is in fact extremely arduous to find evidence that supports the notion that trade ¶ protection is good for the poor. The question is therefore how to make trade and growth more ¶ pro-poor and not how to devise improbable alternatives to trade integration aiming at improving ¶ the livelihood of the poor.¶ Specific evidence on Latin America reveals that deductive generalisations of the neoclassical ¶ trade theory and global cross-country empirical studies may be of little help in understanding ¶ the trade and poverty nexus in the region. Several factors may explain why the integration of ¶ Latin America into the global economy may not necessarily bring about rising wages of ¶ unskilled workers and poverty reduction. The most compelling arguments are related to the ¶ existence of rigidities in the labour markets, the historical pattern of protection that created rents ¶ in unskilled intensive sectors, the emergence of low wage countries such as China and India that ¶ shifts the comparative advantage of Latin American economies, and institutional factors that ¶ protract the effects of an initial unequal distribution of factor endowments against the poor.¶ Trade liberalisation may in fact be associated with rising inequality. But country case studies ¶ present contrasting indications. Although there is some evidence of rising inequality in the ¶ aftermath of trade opening, such as in the case of Mexico, Colombia, Argentina and Chile, it ¶ seems that the specific effects of trade liberalisation are small or indirect. Skill-biased technical ¶ change, often directly related with the increase of foreign direct investment or with capital ¶ account liberalisation, seems to have a stronger explanatory power than trade liberalisation. ¶ There is also little evidence that trade opening has generated more informality. On the other ¶ hand, the case of Brazil, where trade liberalisation seems to have contributed to the reduction of ¶ wage inequality, is illustrative of the conditions under which trade reforms may have ¶ progressive distributive effects¶ The empirical analysis addressing the direct effect of trade integration on poverty reveals a ¶ similar landscape. Trade integration seems to be good for the poor but the effects are small. ¶ Generalisations should be taken with a great deal of caution because this is a domain where data ¶ may present considerable shortcomings. In any event it seems that foreign trade reforms are ¶ more important for poverty reduction than unilateral ones or than the national component of ¶ reciprocal trade reforms. The countries of the region may therefore expect further contributions ¶ of trade integration to poverty reduction, particularly from the liberalisation of the agriculture ¶ sector where the greatest pockets of residual protectionism are still concentrated. However, ¶ predicting ex ante the pro-poor effects of trade reforms is an extremely sensitive task highly¶ dependent on the quality of the data and the correct specification of the simulation instruments. ¶ It is hard to overstate the importance of strengthening the capacity of policymaking in this area.

**Policy involvement is inevitable- we need to proactively engage in the language of policy making for movements to be effective**

**Themba-Nixon, 2000** Makani. Executive Director of The Praxis Project, Former California Staffer, Colorlines. Oakland: Jul 31, 2000.Vol.3, Iss. 2; pg. 12

The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. Policy is for wonks, sell-out politicians, and ivory-tower eggheads. Organizing is what real, grassroots people do. Common as it may be, this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. Given who's usually present, most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, and the tried and true: cold, hard cash. Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at the smaller scale of local politics. At the local level, we have greater access to elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for reelection. For example, getting 400 people to show up at city hall in just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand, 400 people at the state house or the Congress would have a less significant impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually constituents, and the impact is even greater. Recent trends in government underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of measures devolving significant power to state and local government. Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water safety are among the areas where states and localities now have greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure. History has taught us that, for social services and civil rights in particular, the lack of clear federal standards and mechanisms for accountability lead to uneven enforcement and even discriminatory implementation of policies. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing progressive initiatives in this more localized environment. Greater local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement important social policies that were heretofore out of reach. To do so will require careful attention to the mechanics of local policymaking and a clear blueprint of what we stand for. Getting It in Writing Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.

**Our approach is more valuable and educational for us as students of the environment - Environmental philosophers must learn how to address policy issues to prevent irrelevancy.**

Bryan **Norton**, Fall **2007**. Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Georgia Tech, Ivan Allen College School of Public Policy. “THE PAST AND FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS/PHILOSOPHY,” Ethics & the Environment 12.2, Project Muse.

About 15 years ago, at one of the first meetings of the group known as the International Society for Environmental Ethics (ISEE) at American Philosophical Association (APA) meetings, I drew an analogy with the field of medical ethics, arguing that environmental ethicists should look beyond philosophy departments and seek liaisons with Schools of Forestry, Schools of Marine Science, and Environmental Studies Programs, and that philosophers should take a more active role in policy discussions and process. At that time, I was actively engaged in the actual policy processes, at the Environmental Protection Agency and other agencies, and perceived that: (a) These agencies desperately needed the kinds of conceptual and normative analysis philosophers could provide; but that (b) Practitioners of environmental policy did not find that the categories and concepts of traditional “metaphysical” approaches to environmental value provided them with useful guidance in policy decision making. My urging gained me some heavy criticism, and even made me some enemies, as leading members of the environmental ethics establishment openly complained that my judgment—in seeing philosophy of environmental protection as needing a basis in analysis of possible actions—had been compromised by “spending too much time inside the beltway.” Since those early years, I have watched my colleagues in environmental ethics debate this point, but mainly as a sideline to their metaphysical speculation. In the meantime, my colleagues in medical ethics have populated medical schools, formed liaisons with medical research institutions, and become regular commentators on newscasts about ethically controversial medical issues. Meanwhile, Chris Stone, the legal scholar, had his students do a word search of the Congressional Record over several years, and found almost no references to “environmental ethics.” As I see it, there are three differences between the environmental ethics and the medical ethics cases: (1) Philosophers have responded to medical issues by engaging practitioners, while most environmental ethicists have become, at best, “token” members of philosophy departments and, whereas medical ethics practitioners tend to talk about decision criteria (“informed consent”, etc.), environmental ethicist continue to concentrate on the metaphysical foundations of environmental values; (2) The medical profession, beset with public controversies, recognized the need for more ethical discourse about medical choices, and actively embraced philosophers in their programs, whereas most environmental practioners cannot see how philosophical analysis will help them to make better decisions; and (3) Being much wealthier than environmentalists, the medical schools and professionals were able to initiate positions and offer financial support, while environmental ethicists have to compete with other environmental researchers and commentators for small pots of funding. While we can’t do much about (3), we can, I assert, do a lot more about (1) and (2). With respect to philosophy departments, the trend may be(and in my view should be) toward developing joint appointments between philosophy departments and policy schools, forestry schools, and environmental studies programs. This will bring philosophers and students into more direct contact with real problems and the language of decision making, rather than metaphysics. And with respect to point (2), I continue to urge environmental philosophers to address real problems, rather than operating on an abstract level and then finding “applications” of these abstractions. Philosophers, in other words, should become more “pragmatic” in their approach to both policy and philosophy. One aspect of this move is the need—after years of thinking of environmental philosophy as environmental ethics—to concentrate on epistemological, not metaphysical, aspects of environmental science and decision making. Let me expand on this last point, because it seems to me to be the most important consideration affecting the future of environmental ethics, at least in the short and medium run. I think the central debates about whether nonhumans have “intrinsic value” will be (and should be) replaced with a vigorous discussion of the epistemology of all environmental values. Recently, two leading environmental philosophers, Baird Callicott and Mark Sagoff, have strongly endorsed what would traditionally be called “non-naturalist” approaches to the epistemology of environmental ethics. For Sagoff, this involved positing “ethical and aesthetic” facts which should guide environmental policy discourse away from any discussion of the utilitarian benefits of an improved environment. On the other hand, Callicott embraces “subjectivism,” claiming that attributions of intrinsic value are based on personal whim—that one could, without reproach, attribute intrinsic = noninstrumental value to “an old worn-out shoe.” These non-naturalist approaches, which rests on a sharp separation of empirical knowledge and ethical content, if followed, will certainly lead to a continued separation of environmental science, environmental philosophy, and environmental ethics. They also shift the debate from the type of value that environmental values are, to a debate about how one might justify a claim that some aspect of nature should be protected. In Sagoff’s case, we need an account of how ethical facts are established. In Callicott’s case, we need to explore whether and how environmental values (as construed by him) can have a rational impact on policy choices, since (presumably) I would be laughed off the stage if we insisted that public resources be devoted to saving my old shoes. In my view then, it is time—way past time—that the discussions in environmental ethics should shift from metaphysics to epistemology. Characterizing environmental values does very little good if we have no way to support them with reasonable arguments. But now, with the rise of environmental pragmatism—which explicitly supports a naturalistic epistemology of environmental values—the debate needs to be about the prospects for providing philosophical and ethical advice to policy makers. That debate can only be joined if we develop, far more fully than has been done, a reason-based approach to justifying environmental goals and policies.

**Switch-side debate inculcates skills that empirically improve climate policy outcomes**

**Mitchell 10** (Gordon R. Mitchell, is Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, where he also directs the William Pitt Debating Union. Robert Asen’s patient and thoughtful feedback sharpened this manuscript, which was also improved by contributions from members of the Schenley Park Debate Authors Working Group (DAWG), a consortium of public argument scholars at the University of Pittsburgh that strives to generate rigorous scholarship addressing the role of argumentation and debate in society, “Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science,” Spring 2010, Vol. 13 Issue 1, http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/Mitchell2010.pdf)

The watchwords for the intelligence community’s debating initiative— collaboration, critical thinking, collective awareness—resonate with key terms anchoring the study of deliberative democracy. In a major new text, John Gastil defines deliberation as a process whereby people “carefully examine a problem and arrive at a well-reasoned solution aft er a period of inclusive, respectful consideration of diverse points of view.”40 Gastil and his colleagues in organizations such as the Kettering Foundation and the National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation are pursuing a research program that foregrounds the democratic telos of deliberative processes. Work in this area features a blend of concrete interventions and studies of citizen empowerment.41 Notably, a key theme in much of this literature concerns the relationship between deliberation and debate, with the latter term often loaded with pejorative baggage and working as a negative foil to highlight the positive qualities of deliberation.42 “Most political discussions, however, are debates. Stories in the media turn politics into a never-ending series of contests. People get swept into taking sides; their energy goes into figuring out who or what they’re for or against,” says Kettering president David Mathews and coauthor Noelle McAfee. “Deliberation is different. It is neither a partisan argument where opposing sides try to win nor a casual conversation conducted with polite civility. Public deliberation is a means by which citizens make tough choices about basic purposes and directions for their communities and their country. It is a way of reasoning and talking together.”43 Mathews and McAfee’s distrust of the debate process is almost paradigmatic amongst theorists and practitioners of Kettering-style deliberative democracy. One conceptual mechanism for reinforcing this debate-deliberation opposition is characterization of debate as a process inimical to deliberative aims, with debaters adopting dogmatic and fixed positions that frustrate the deliberative objective of “choice work.” In this register, Emily Robertson observes, “unlike deliberators, debaters are typically not open to the possibility of being shown wrong. . . . Debaters are not trying to find the best solution by keeping an open mind about the opponent’s point of view.”44 Similarly, founding documents from the University of Houston–Downtown’s Center for Public Deliberation state, “Public deliberation is about choice work, which is different from a dialogue or a debate. In dialogue, people oft en look to relate to each other, to understand each other, and to talk about more informal issues. In debate, there are generally two positions and people are generally looking to ‘win’ their side.”45 Debate, cast here as the theoretical scapegoat, provides a convenient, low-water benchmark for explaining how other forms of deliberative interaction better promote cooperative “choice work.” The Kettering-inspired framework receives support from perversions of the debate process such as vapid presidential debates and verbal pyrotechnics found on Crossfire-style television shows.46 In contrast, the intelligence community’s debating initiative stands as a nettlesome anomaly for these theoretical frameworks, with debate serving, rather than frustrating, the ends of deliberation. The presence of such an anomaly would seem to point to the wisdom of fashioning a theoretical orientation that frames the debate-deliberation connection in contingent, rather than static terms, with the relationship between the categories shift ing along with the various contexts in which they manifest in practice.47 Such an approach gestures toward the importance of rhetorically informed critical work on multiple levels. First, the contingency of situated practice invites analysis geared to assess, in particular cases, the extent to which debate practices enable and/ or constrain deliberative objectives. Regarding the intelligence community’s debating initiative, such an analytical perspective highlights, for example, the tight connection between the deliberative goals established by intelligence officials and the cultural technology manifest in the bridge project’s online debating applications such as Hot Grinds. An additional dimension of nuance emerging from this avenue of analysis pertains to the precise nature of the deliberative goals set by bridge. Program descriptions notably eschew Kettering-style references to democratic citizen empowerment, yet feature deliberation prominently as a key ingredient of strong intelligence tradecraft . Th is caveat is especially salient to consider when it comes to the second category of rhetorically informed critical work invited by the contingent aspect of specific debate initiatives. To grasp this layer it is useful to appreciate how the name of the bridge project constitutes an invitation for those outside the intelligence community to participate in the analytic outreach eff ort. According to Doney, bridge “provides an environment for Analytic Outreach—a place where IC analysts can reach out to expertise elsewhere in federal, state, and local government, in academia, and industry. New communities of interest can form quickly in bridge through the ‘web of trust’ access control model—access to minds outside the intelligence community creates an analytic force multiplier.”48 This presents a moment of choice for academic scholars in a position to respond to Doney’s invitation; it is an opportunity to convert scholarly expertise into an “analytic force multiplier.” In reflexively pondering this invitation, it may be valuable for scholars to read Greene and Hicks’s proposition that switch-side debating should be viewed as a cultural technology in light of Langdon Winner’s maxim that “technological artifacts have politics.”49 In the case of bridge, politics are informed by the history of intelligence community policies and practices. Commenter Th omas Lord puts this point in high relief in a post off ered in response to a news story on the topic: “[W]hy should this thing (‘bridge’) be? . . . [Th e intelligence community] on the one hand sometimes provides useful information to the military or to the civilian branches and on the other hand it is a dangerous, out of control, relic that by all external appearances is not the slightest bit reformed, other than superficially, from such excesses as became exposed in the cointelpro and mkultra hearings of the 1970s.”50 A debate scholar need not agree with Lord’s full-throated criticism of the intelligence community (he goes on to observe that it bears an alarming resemblance to organized crime) to understand that participation in the community’s Analytic Outreach program may serve the ends of deliberation, but not necessarily democracy, or even a defensible politics. Demand-driven rhetoric of science necessarily raises questions about what’s driving the demand, questions that scholars with relevant expertise would do well to ponder carefully before embracing invitations to contribute their argumentative expertise to deliberative projects. By the same token, it would be prudent to bear in mind that the technological determinism about switch-side debate endorsed by Greene and Hicks may tend to flatten reflexive assessments regarding the wisdom of supporting a given debate initiative—as the next section illustrates, manifest differences among initiatives warrant context-sensitive judgments regarding the normative political dimensions featured in each case. Public Debates in the EPA Policy Process Th e preceding analysis of U.S. intelligence community debating initiatives highlighted how analysts are challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of vast amounts of diff erent kinds of data flowing through intelligence streams. Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often don’t work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges. In fact, the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to “decisionism,” the formulaic application of “objective” decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, “whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process.” Accordingly, he notes, “we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument.”51 One can see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Davis’s EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering resolutions craft ed to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were craft ed to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream states’ authority to control upstream states’ discharges and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In the first debate on interstate river pollution, the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest University argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while their opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal. Reflecting on the project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 107 debaters’ ability to act as “honest brokers” in the policy arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues.52 Davis observed that since the invited debaters “didn’t have a dog in the fight,” they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations.53 Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, “Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects.”54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard’s concept of argumentative “epistemics” to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of diff erent policy options. In so doing, the diff ering, oft en tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate eff orts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. Th e dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, “If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work.”56 Here, an institution’s need for “strategically located allies” to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of “switch-side public 108 Rhetoric & Public Affairs debate” diff ers both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field’s performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism’s tendency to locate its foundations in the English field’s tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis’s response to the EPA’s institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis’s dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, “Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 bc), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens.”60 As John Poulakos points out, “older” Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue.61 Th e few surviving fragments of Protagoras’s work suggest that his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that “two accounts [logoi] are present about every ‘thing,’ opposed to each other,” and further, that humans could “measure” the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the “weaker argument stronger” to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62 Following in Protagoras’s wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchesthe, a centripetal exercise of “coming together” deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchesthe, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 109 Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, one sees in Isocratic synerchesthe, as well as in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essay’s earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft , such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. Th e significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of theoretical faith. Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchesthe, alliance formation. Th e intelligence community’s Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard University’s participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically black colleges and universities (hbcus) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Davis’s dual-focus vision. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College’s tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in hbcus across the nation.68 On the other hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPA’s public debating initiative. Th is dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger’s and Wayne Brockriede’s vision of “total” debate programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Davis’s dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using “words as weapons”70—there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of hbcu-leveraged dissoi logoi diff ers significantly from the intelligence community’s eff ort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such diff erence is especially evident in light of the EPA’s commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister: 110 Rhetoric & Public Affairs Having a public debater argue against their convictions, or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a war of words. Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other’s argumentation and the process of deliberative exchange.71 Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking convergence among (1) the expressed need for dissoi logoi by government agency officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality of argumentation in the public policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate debaters to tailor public switch-side debating performances in specific ways requested by agency collaborators. These points of convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions regarding the relationship of debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in institutional decision making. But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether to contribute switch-side debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors the way policy planning in the “argumentative turn” is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of policy planning with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation.

**Death precedes all other impacts – it ontologically destroys the subject and prevents any alternative way of knowing the world**

**Paterson, 03** - Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81

In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

**Science should be trusted—their authors are ignorant and indict the discipline, not our truth claims**

**Sullivan, 98** (Phillip A., professor of aerospace engineering at the University of Toronto’s Institute for Aerospace Studies, “An Engineer Dissects Two Cases Studies”, A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths about Science, edited by Noretta Koertge)

With a telephone line held open to allow us immediate access to data on spacecraft geometry, masses, and other quantities, we worked in two groups. One used Newton's laws of mechanics to estimate LEM separation speeds attainable with various tunnel pressures. The second group estimated the strength of the pressure pulse generated  
by the explosive charge. They adapted formulas verified, in the first instance, by comparisons with photographs of the first atomic explosion at Alamogordo, New Mexico. 1 We concluded that a tunnel pressure of 2 psi would provide sufficient separation speed while minimizing the risk of damage to the reentry module. We assumed that other groups were consulted, but we subsequently learned that our advice was the main basis for a decision to lower the tunnel pressure and thus to complete a successful rescue. 2 Such incidents convince us that science provides an efficient and objective way of obtaining, organizing, and using the knowledge in the disciplines we practice. Typically, the history of space exploration provides numerous examples in which Newton's laws of mechanics and gravitation have been used to accurately predict both the trajectories and timing of missions. In a word, science works! Consequently, when we learn that certain philosophers, sociologists, and other humanists claim that scientific knowledge is not objective or value free or that scientific laws are inventions and not discoveries, our instinctive reaction is to dismiss such views as based on ignorance or even envy. 3 But some of us, increasingly concerned that these views are adversely influencing public attitudes toward science, have decided to scrutinize our critics' work. This essay is therefore one engineer's reaction to two samples of the literature. I conclude that the initial instinctive reaction of scientists is well founded, that the problems these philosophers, sociologists, and humanists have with scientific knowledge reflect problems in those disciplines and not problems in science.

**The critique refuses to accept the same falsifiable review our evidence goes through – disproves their methodology, destroys academic debate, and causes extinction.**

**Coyne, 06** – Author and Writer for the Times (Jerry A., “A plea for empiricism”, FOLLIES OF THE WISE, Dissenting essays, 405pp. Emeryville, CA: Shoemaker and Hoard, 1 59376 101 5)

Supernatural forces and events, essential aspects of most religions, play no role in science, not because we exclude them deliberately, but because they have never been a useful way to understand nature. Scientific “truths” are empirically supported observations agreed on by different observers. Religious “truths,” on the other hand, are personal, unverifiable and contested by those of different faiths. Science is nonsectarian: those who disagree on scientific issues do not blow each other up. Science encourages doubt; most religions quash it. But religion is not completely separable from science. Virtually all religions make improbable claims that are in principle empirically testable, and thus within the domain of science: Mary, in Catholic teaching, was bodily taken to heaven, while Muhammad rode up on a white horse; and Jesus (born of a virgin) came back from the dead. None of these claims has been corroborated, and while science would never accept them as true without evidence, religion does. A mind that accepts both science and religion is thus a mind in conflict. Yet scientists, especially beleaguered American evolutionists, need the support of the many faithful who respect science. It is not politically or tactically useful to point out the fundamental and unbreachable gaps between science and theology. Indeed, scientists and philosophers have written many books (equivalents of Leibnizian theodicy) desperately trying to show how these areas can happily cohabit. In his essay, “Darwin goes to Sunday School”, Crews reviews several of these works, pointing out with brio the intellectual contortions and dishonesties involved in harmonizing religion and science. Assessing work by the evolutionist Stephen Jay Gould, the philosopher Michael Ruse, the theologian John Haught and others, Crews concludes, “When coldly examined . . . these productions invariably prove to have adulterated scientific doctrine or to have emptied religious dogma of its commonly accepted meaning”. Rather than suggesting any solution (indeed, there is none save adopting a form of “religion” that makes no untenable empirical claims), Crews points out the dangers to the survival of our planet arising from a rejection of Darwinism. Such rejection promotes apathy towards overpopulation, pollution, deforestation and other environmental crimes: “So long as we regard ourselves as creatures apart who need only repent of our personal sins to retain heaven’s blessing, we won’t take the full measure of our species-wise responsibility for these calamities”. Crews includes three final essays on deconstruction and other misguided movements in literary theory. These also show “follies of the wise” in that they involve interpretations of texts that are unanchored by evidence. Fortunately, the harm inflicted by Lacan and his epigones is limited to the good judgement of professors of literature. Follies of the Wise is one of the most refreshing and edifying collections of essays in recent years. Much like Christopher Hitchens in the UK, Crews serves a vital function as National Sceptic. He ends on a ringing note: “The human race has produced only one successfully validated epistemology, characterizing all scrupulous inquiry into the real world, from quarks to poems. It is, simply, empiricism, or the submitting of propositions to the arbitration of evidence that is acknowledged to be such by all of the contending parties. Ideas that claim immunity from such review, whether because of mystical faith or privileged “clinical insight” or the say-so of eminent authorities, are not to be countenanced until they can pass the same skeptical ordeal to which all other contenders are subjected.” As science in America becomes ever more harried and debased by politics and religion, we desperately need to heed Crews’s plea for empiricism.

**Crisis don’t arise without warning, humanity will foresee them and take preventive action to circumscribe extinction**

**Kurasawa 4 –** Associate Professor of Social and Political Thought, (Fuyuki, Co-President of the International Sociological Association’s Research Committee on Sociological Theory, York University of Toronto, “Cautinoary Tales: Transnational Social Movements and the Prevention of Global Catastrophes” Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004, pg 453-475)

When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter from some intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism about the very value of the exercise. A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors. Combining a sense of analytical contingency toward the future and ethical responsibility for it, the idea of early warning is making its way into preventive action on the global stage. Despite the fact that not all humanitarian, technoscientific, and environmental disasters can be predicted in advance, the multiplication of independent sources of knowledge and detection mechanisms enables us to foresee many of them before it is too late. Indeed, in recent years, global civil society’s capacity for early warning has dramatically increased, in no small part due to the impressive number of NGOs that include catastrophe prevention at the heart of their mandates.17 These organizations are often the first to detect signs of trouble, to dispatch investigative or fact-finding missions, and to warn the international community about impending dangers; to wit, the lead role of environmental groups in sounding the alarm about global warming and species depletion or of humanitarian agencies regarding the AIDS crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, frequently months or even years before Western governments or multilateral institutions followed suit. What has come into being, then, is a loose-knit network of watchdog groups that is acquiring finely tuned antennae to pinpoint indicators of forthcoming or already unfolding crises. This network of ‘early warners’ are working to publicize potential and actual emergencies by locating indicators of danger into larger catastrophic patterns of interpretation, culturally meaningful chains of events whose implications become discernable for decision-makers and ordinary citizens (‘this is why you should care’).18 Civic associations can thus invest perilous situations with urgency and importance, transforming climate change from an apparently mild and distant possibility to an irreversible and grave threat to human survival, and genocide from a supposedly isolated aberration to an affront to our common humanity. The growing public significance of preventive message in global affairs is part and parcel of what Ignatieff has termed an “advocacy revolution,”19 since threatened populations and allied organizations are acting as early warning beacons that educate citizens about certain perils and appeal for action on the part of states and multilateral institutions. Global civil society players have devised a host of ‘naming and shaming’ strategies and high-profile information campaigns to this effect, including press conferences, petitions, mass marches, and boycotts, and spectacular stunts that denounce bureaucratic inertia, the reckless pursuit of profit, or the preponderance of national interests in world affairs.20 The advocacy revolution is having both ‘trickle-down’ and ‘trickle-up’ effects, establishing audiences of constituents and ordinary citizens conversant with some of the great challenges facing humanity as well as putting pressure on official institutions to be proactive in their long-term planning and shorter-term responses. None of this would be possible without the existence of global media, whose speed and range make it possible for reports of an unfolding or upcoming disaster to reach viewers or readers in most parts of the world almost instantaneously. Despite the highly selective character of what is deemed newsworthy and state and commercial influence on what is broadcast, several recent attempts to hide evidence of acts of mass violence (Tiananmen Square, East Timor, Chechnya, etc.) and crises (e.g., during the Chernobyl nuclear accident in the Soviet Union or the SARS outbreak in China) have failed; few things now entirely escape from the satellite camera, the cellular telephone, or the notebook computer. And although the internet may never become the populist panacea technological determinists have been heralding for years, it remains a key device through which concerned citizens and activists can share and spread information. While media coverage almost always follows a crisis rather than preceding it, the broadcast of shocking images and testimonies can nevertheless shame governments and international organizations into taking immediate steps. The ‘CNN or BBC effect,’ to which we should now add the ‘Al-Jazeera effect,’ is a surprisingly powerful force in impacting world public opinion, as the now notorious Abu Ghraib prison photographs remind us. The possibility that the threat of media exposure may dissuade individuals and groups from enacting genocidal plans or reckless gambles with our future is one of the lynchpins of prevention in our information-saturated age. Are forewarnings of disasters being heard? The mobilization of official intervention and popular interest has certainly been mixed, yet global civil society is having some success in cultivating audiences and advocates coalescing around specific perils (mass human rights violations, ecological devastation, genetic engineering, epidemics, and so on). After Bhopal and Chernobyl, after ‘mad cow disease’ and the war in Iraq, citizens are scrutinizing, questioning and even contesting official expertise in risk assessment more than ever before.21 Hence, in a world where early warnings of cataclysms are often available, pleading ignorance or helplessness to anticipate what may come in the future becomes less and less plausible.

# 2ac say yes v2

**Pressure to increase investment is high now—power outages and economic problems**

**BBC 9/6**—“Venezuela’s economic woes: Sabotage or mismanagement?”, Irene Caselli, <http://www.americas-forum.com/venezuelas-economic-woes-sabotage-or-mismanagement/>) EL

Theories abound in Venezuela regarding Tuesday’s blackout which affected more than two-thirds of the country. While President Nicolas Maduro has accused political opponents of sabotaging the power system, the opposition blames government incompetence for the largest power cut in five years. As parts of the country are still facing problems with the electricity and the political finger-pointing continues, many are asking just how vulnerable Venezuela’s infrastructure is. The capital, Caracas, is not used to the power cuts which have become quite common in other regions. On Tuesday, cash machines, traffic lights and the underground stopped working. There was traffic chaos, with some people stuck in train carriages. ‘Lack of investment’ Thousands of workers poured into the streets, with many finding it hard to make their way down from upper floors when emergency lamps turned out to be faulty. Jose Manuel Puente, an economist at the IESA School of Management, says the power cut is a sign of a wider malaise. “Unfortunately what happened on Tuesday is similar to what’s happening to the country’s entire infrastructure. Investment in certain areas has been reduced to minimum under [Hugo Chavez's Bolivarian] revolution,” he explained. “What we see now is an inexorable consequence of over a decade of unbalanced economic policies.” Most supporters of the late president and his successor Nicolas Maduro would not agree with Mr Puente’s analysis. But even Finance Minister Nelson Merentes recently acknowledged that the economic policies followed by the government had not been successful. In a television interview broadcast on the weekend, he called for reforms to tackle structural economic problems. “This is a government that has won 18 elections, that has had social achievements,” he told TV channel Televen. “But it still has to be successful on the economy.”

**Maduro is working with investment capital both from the US and Venezuela now**

**Van Auken 6/7**-- politician and activist for the Socialist Equality Party (Bill, “Venezuela’s Maduro reaches out to big business and Washington”, 2013, <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/07/vene-j07.html>) EL

After three months in office, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, the handpicked successor of the late Hugo Chavez, has put aside left rhetoric to seek accommodation with Venezuela’s biggest capitalists as well as with the Obama administration in Washington. Maduro has repeatedly charged in recent months that US imperialism was conspiring to bring down his government and was the guiding hand behind a wave of political violence that followed his narrow election victory against right-wing candidate Henrique Capriles in April. Yet Venezuela’s Foreign Minister Elias Jaua was all smiles Wednesday, following a 40-minute meeting in Guatemala with US Secretary of State John Kerry. The two, who met privately on the sidelines of the Organization of American States General Assembly meeting in Antigua, Guatemala, declared their commitment to, in Kerry’s words, “establish a more constructive and positive relationship.” This is to include resuming the exchange of ambassadors, which has been suspended since late 2010. It was Venezuela that requested the meeting. “We agreed today there will be an ongoing, continuing dialogue between the State Department and the Foreign Ministry, and we will try to set out an agenda by which we agree on things we can work together,” said Kerry. For his part, Jaua declared that “A good relationship between the government of President Nicolas Maduro and the government of President Barack Obama is what suits both peoples, it’s the guarantee of peace and stability for our peoples.” Just last month, Maduro referred to Obama in a public speech as “the big boss of the devils” and accused him of backing the “fascist right” in attacking the Venezuelan people. In Guatemala, Jaua said that he had presented Kerry with a report on the violence that followed the April 14 election to choose Chavez’s successor in which 11 people were killed and 80 injured, most of them Maduro supporters. He gave the US secretary of state an extract of the report prepared on the incidents by Venezuela’s Public Advocate’s office. He said that the discussion had “alerted Kerry to the actions of anti-democratic groups in Venezuela, which threaten Venezuelan democracy, stability and which often are being supported by political and economic sectors of other countries.” In point of fact, the most significant “sectors” seeking to destabilize the Venezuelan regime have long been the CIA and the US State Department. Maduro’s turn toward accommodation with US imperialism has been accompanied by a similar approach to both foreign and domestic capital. Among the most significant deals in terms of foreign capital was reached late last month with Chevron Corp. Chevron is providing $2 billion in financing for Petroboscan, a joint venture between the US oil giant and Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, PDVSA, to boost heavy crude production in the northwestern state of Zulia. Shortly beforehand, PDVSA secured a $1 billion credit line with Houston-based Schlumberger Ltd., the world’s largest oilfield services company. While oil exports to the US have declined to about 900,000 barrels a day, it remains Venezuela’s chief customer for oil, responsible for 95 percent of the country’s export earnings and roughly half of its federal budget revenue. From the standpoint of the US-based energy conglomerates, securing dominance over Venezuela’s oil reserves, the largest in the world, remains a strategic objective. The investments by Chevron and Schlumberger make clear that they see the potential for major profits, the Venezuelan government’s rhetoric about “Bolivarian socialism” notwithstanding. Domestically, after charging for months that major Venezuelan capitalists, backed by the US, were waging an “economic war” against his government, Maduro invited the country’s second-richest individual, Lorenzo Mendoza, the head of the country’s largest food company, Polar, to meet with him last month at the Miraflores presidential palace in Caracas. Both Chavez and Maduro had singled out Polar and Mendoza for attack over the country’s increasingly severe shortages and rising food prices. Holding them responsible for hoarding and waging an “economic war,” they threatened to nationalize the firm. For his part, Mendoza, who is worth some $4.5 billion, was an enthusiastic supporter of the US-backed coup that briefly unseated Chavez in April 2002. This history had contributed to his keeping a fairly low profile under Chavez, but it was noted in the Venezuelan media that he mounted a vigorous public defense of his company in the face of Maduro’s recent charges. Mendoza described the meeting as “very cordial, direct, sincere,” adding, “The president was very kind in listening to us and communicating the need to keep investing, producing and supplying markets. That is our lifelong commitment, passion and vocation.” He said that the two had reached an agreement “not to politicize” the issue of food. Vice President Jorge Arreaza provided a similar description of the encounter between the “working class” president and the billionaire. “The problem’s been overcome,” he said. The meeting with Mendoza was only the most visible of a series of talks between the government and prominent Venezuelan capitalists. Among the deals reached is the lifting of certain price controls and the easing of currency restrictions. “In another sign of the rapprochement, the hallways of the finance ministry for the first time in years are filled with businessmen in sharp suits,” Reuters reported. “Many carry folders stuffed with requests for greater flexibility in the currency control system and an easing of price controls.” The news agency quoted Finance Minister Nelson Merentes stating after one meeting with business executives: “We’ve entered a phase of creating closer ties with the private sector, without ignoring the new socialist economy.” After months of charging the big bourgeoisie in Venezuela with “sabotage,” the Maduro government is now currying its favor and begging it to increase production. This turn is driven by a deepening economic crisis characterized by a decline in growth, soaring inflation and widespread shortages. Venezuela’s inflation rate is now near 30 percent, with the bulk of it reflecting the sharp rise in the price of food. Meanwhile, the growth rate for the first quarter of 2013 amounted to just 0.7 percent. This overall figure, however, masks the severity of the situation. Venezuela’s financial sector, which continues to enjoy some of the highest profit rates in the world, saw a 31 percent growth during this period, while manufacturing declined by 3.6 percent and construction by 1.2 percent. The scarcity index, which tracks the amount of products missing from store shelves, has hit its highest level since the Central Bank began tracking these figures. The accommodation between the Maduro government and Venezuelan capitalists, on the one hand, and Washington, on the other, has taken the political wind out of the sails of the rightist candidate Henrique Capriles, who has continued to charge electoral fraud and condemn Maduro as an illegitimate president. While the Obama administration has yet to formally recognize Maduro’s close election victory, it has turned a cold shoulder to demands for OAS sanctions against Venezuela. And Mendoza’s visit to Miraflores indicates that the billionaire accepts Maduro as legitimate. Clearly, both domestic and foreign capital recognize that behind the left rhetoric and the limited social reforms of “Bolivarian Socialism,” Maduro’s government defends capitalism and they can do business with it. More fundamentally, continued agitation by the right wing and a further weakening of the government under conditions of deepening economic crisis and rising popular discontent poses the danger of provoking a social explosion in the working class.

**warming reps are good**

**The plan over comes apocalyptic fear -- coupling our rhetoric with a solution solves**

**Feinberg and Willer 11** - Psychology Dept and Sociology Dept, UC Berkeley (Matthew and Robb, "Apocalypse Soon? Dire Messages Reduce Belief in Global Warming by Contradicting Just-World Beliefs", Psychological Science January 2011 vol. 22 no. 1 34-38)//KL

These results demonstrate how dire messages warning of the severity of global warming and its presumed dangers can backfire, paradoxically increasing skepticism about global warming by contradicting individuals’ deeply held beliefs that the world is fundamentally just. In addition, we found evidence that this dire messaging led to reduced intentions among participants to reduce their carbon footprint – an effect driven by their increased global warming skepticism. Our results imply that because dire messaging regarding global warming is at odds with the strongly established cognition that the world is fair and stable, people may dismiss the factual content of messages that emphasize global warming’s dire consequences. But if the same messages are delivered coupled with a potential solution, it allows the information to be communicated without creating substantial threat to these individuals’ deeply held beliefs. Our findings extend past research showing that fear-based appeals, especially when not coupled with a clear solution, can backfire and undermine the intended effects of messages (Witte, 1992; 1994). In addition, our results complement recent research showing that framing environmentalism as patriotic can successfully increase proenvironmental behavioral intentions in those most attached to the status quo (Feygina, Jost, & Goldsmith, 2010). Taken together, these findings stress the importance of framing global warming messages so they do not contradict individuals’ deeply held beliefs. Additionally, our results suggest that reducing individuals’ just world beliefs could result in decreased global warming skepticism. Although we were able to manipulate such beliefs in Study 2, it remains to be seen how just world beliefs could be

changed longer-term in field settings.

**Framing environmental threats in terms of extinction is key to mobilize action**

**Epstein and Zhao 9** – Lab of Medicine @ Hong Kong Richard J. Epstein and Y. Zhao ‘9 – Laboratory of Computational Oncology, Department of Medicine, University of Hong Kong, The Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name; Human Extinction, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine Volume 52, Number 1, Winter 2009, Muse

Final ends for all species are the same, but the journeys will be different. If we cannot influence the end of our species, can we influence the journey? To do so—even in a small way—would be a crowning achievement for human evolution and give new meaning to the term civilization. Only by elevating the topic [End Page 121] of human extinction to the level of serious professional discourse can we begin to prepare ourselves for the challenges that lie ahead. Table 3.   Human Thinking Modes Relevant to Extinction: from Ego-Think to Eco-Think  The difficulty of the required transition should not be underestimated. This is depicted in Table 3 as a painful multistep progression from the 20th-century philosophical norm of Ego-Think—defined therein as a short-term state of mind valuing individual material self-interest above all other considerations—to Eco-Think, in which humans come to adopt a broader Gaia-like outlook on themselves as but one part of an infinitely larger reality. Making this change must involve communicating the non-sensationalist message to all global citizens that “things are serious” and “we are in this together”—or, in blunter language, that the road to extinction and its related agonies does indeed lie ahead. Consistent with this prospect, the risks of human extinction—and the cost-benefit of attempting to reduce these risks—have been quantified in a recent sobering analysis (Matheny 2007).  Once complacency has been shaken off and a sense of collective purpose created, the battle against self-seeking anthropocentric human instincts will have only just begun. It is often said that human beings suffer from the ability to appreciate their own mortality—an existential agony that has given rise to the great religions— but in the present age of religious decline, we must begin to bear the added burden of anticipating the demise of our species. Indeed, as argued here, there are compelling reasons for encouraging this collective mind-shift. For in the best of all possible worlds, the realization that our species has long-term survival criteria distinct from our short-term tribal priorities could spark a new social ethic to upgrade what we now all too often dismiss as “human nature” (Tudge 1989). [End Page 122]

**2ac neolib k**

**\*Lack of a concrete advocacy destroys the alt’s potential**

**McClean 1** SOCIETY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY – GRADUATE AND PHILOSOPHER – NYU [DAVID E., “THE CULTURAL LEFT AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL HOPE”, http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm]

Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"

The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

**\*Turn- Chavez’s alternative to neoliberalism will collapse without aid AND the US can learn from Venezuelan alternatives- engagement is key**

**Schultz, 13** -- freelance writer and anthropologist

[Kylie, "The Rocky U.S.-Venezuela Relationship: What Both Countries Could Learn," The International, 3-17-13, www.theinternational.org/articles/370-the-rocky-us-venezuela-relationship-wh, accessed 7-2-13, mss]

On March 5, the Latin American world both mourned and spurned the death of Venezuela’s enigmatic president, Hugo Chavez. Chavez, who died after a two year battle with an undisclosed type of cancer, was one of Latin America’s most influential and admired leaders, although his presidency caused deep and polarized divides among the population in his home country of Venezuela. As the news of his death spread, condolences poured in and dignitaries from around the world, including Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Cuba’s Raul Castro, arrived for his state funeral. While the United States sent a representative, Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-NY), the Obama administration itself offered no condolences. “At this challenging time of President Hugo Chavez’s passing, the United States reaffirms its support for the Venezuelan people and its interest in developing a constructive relationship with the Venezuelan government,” said a statement released by the White House. “As Venezuela begins a new chapter in its history, the United States remains committed to policies that promote democratic principles, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.” Criticized by many Chavez supporters for its unsympathetic and, some claim, contemptible tone, the White House statement and the reactions it has elicited are representative of the divide between the United States and Venezuela which emerged during Chavez’s presidency. The influence and standing of the United States in Latin America has decreased in recent years as domestic inequality and political polarization in America rise. There seem but few signs that Chavez’s death will spark a shift in U.S.-Venezuelan relations. As Venezuela enters into the post-Chavez era with a struggling economy, high inflation, and some of the worst crime rates in the world, why do both countries continue to demonize one another? Chavez, his politics, and his legacy Throughout his 14 year presidency, Hugo Chavez was defined foremost as a revolutionary. Chavez believed that the inequalities of wealth and power that plagued Venezuela during his childhood were a result of western imperialism and foreign ownership of local resources. Calling himself a “21st century socialist,” Chavez denounced and reviled imperialism, with much of his rhetoric aimed at the United States. In line with his socialist ideology, Chavez instituted economic policies which took vast amounts of money from state-owned oil exports, Venezuela’s primary resource and export, and used the revenue to create and fund social projects called ‘misiones’. These missions promoted literacy, free education, subsidized food, free healthcare, and other social services which vastly decreased inequality and gaps in Venezuelan wealth distribution, enhanced living standards, and promoted a participatory style of government. In a roundtable discussion for the grassroots media station Democracy Now!, author and professor Miguel Tinker Salas noted that Chavez’s rise to power helped Venezuela gain a presence and standing on the regional and international geopolitical stage. “Just recall where Venezuela was in 1998. It had no real presence on the international stage. [Chavez] had this oil-producing country that had 60 percent of people living in poverty. Today, that has dramatically changed,” Salas said. Eva Golinger, friend and advisor of Chavez, stated during the same roundtable discussion that Chavez was a “champion for the poor, for social justice, against imperialism, against aggression, against war. He’s someone who has left an extraordinary legacy, not just in his own country, but around the world.” Although Chavez passed tremendous social policies and massively reduced the percentage of Venezuela’s population living in poverty – from 42.8 percent in 1999, to 26.5 percent in 2011 – Chavez’s immense spending, near sole economic reliance on oil, and lack of government structuring has left a Venezuela with staggering crime rates, economic and social insecurity, crumbling infrastructure, shortages of basic goods, one of the highest inflation rates in the world, and a currency that has recently been devalued for the fourth time. His mixed legacy has left many wondering if Venezuela can survive by maintaining Chavez’s strict, nationalist economic policies. Venezuela and U.S.’s damaged relations While Chavismo, the term often given to describe Chavez’s social and political movement, was conceived with anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist rhetoric, it wasn’t until a failed coup in 2002 that Chavez adopted explicitly anti-American rhetoric. Although evidence shows that America was not directly behind or involved in the 2002 attempted coup against Chavez, the Bush administration’s detached reaction to the coup convinced Chavez that the United States was implicitly involved, the first cause of the struggles between the two countries. Relations between the two countries remain strained as ambassadors have not been exchanged between the two nations since 2010, and on March 5, interim president Nicolas Maduro, Chavez’s hand-picked successor, expelled two U.S. diplomats from Venezuela, accusing them of trying to “destabilize” the country. The United States responded on March 11 by declaring two Venezuelan diplomats as personae non gratae and expelling them. U.S. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland claimed that the Venezuelan diplomats were expelled because “when our people are thrown out unjustly, we’re going to take reciprocal action.” Similarly, another State Department spokesman said that the “fallacious” accusations against the U.S. diplomats expelled from Venezuela leads the U.S. to “conclude that, unfortunately, the current Venezuelan government is not interested in an improved relationship.” Despite negative “tit-for-tat” relations and searing rhetoric on both sides, trade has never stopped between the two countries – unlike the U.S.’s half decade embargo on Cuba – leaving some to conclude that the harsh rhetoric between the two serves a different purpose. Author and journalist David Sirota wrote in Salon that although the U.S. media and government often criticize and portray Chavez as a despot with radical human rights violations under his belt, the American government continues to maintain friendly relations with the governments of Mexico and Colombia who have similar negative records. “No, Chavez became the bugaboo of American politics because his full-throated advocacy of socialism and redistribution at once represented a fundamental critique of neoliberal economic, and also delivered some indisputably positive results,” wrote Sirota. For the United States, Chavez’s successful socialist policies can be perceived as a threat to the corporate capitalism now under scrutiny in the United States. On the other hand, Chavez’s radical leftist approach and highly centralized government inspired his “21st century socialism,” which he believed was the only system that could yield a “genuine” society. These ideologies inspired a the complete denouncement of capitalism and free-trade policies which has limited Venezuela’s economic avenues. A report from the Inter-American Dialogue notes that other governments in the region, like Brazil, who have not utterly denounced all free-trade policies and mandated privatization but have embraced a nationalist government, have realized stabilized economies while also decreasing inequality, a feat that Venezuela is still trying to achieve. When other more pragmatic leaders in the region incorporated aspects of free-trade into their leftist and progressive governments, Chavez had to work to maintain control over a population divided by his policies. Anti-American rhetoric worked to build support for Chavismo in opposition to a common enemy. Rory Carroll, a journalist for the Guardian’s Caracas bureau, stated in an interview with Mother Jones that Chavez’s “anti-imperialist posturing so dazzled his cheerleaders that they overlooked his flaws, flaws which worsened over time.” While confrontational rhetoric towards one another might serve some purpose for each country, the continued trade between the two countries, and the unique economic and social struggles facing each nation give both much more to gain from establishing a positive relationship than an oppositional one. Why U.S. and Venezuela are wrong and how they can learn from each other The aforementioned 2012 report from The Inter-American Dialogue on remaking U.S. and Latin American relations states that the longer relations are stagnant, “the harder it will be to reverse course and rebuild vigorous cooperation.” The United States has lost standing with Latin American countries who see political gridlock, poor immigration policies, and substantial inequality and wealth disparity in the United States as undermining its “capacity to propose and carry out strategies to deal with the issues that most concern” Latin America. The United States has long been accused of putting Latin American relations on the backburner which has led many Latin American countries to remain economically connected with the United States, but politically detached. The Inter-American dialogue report highlights the fact that the United States must be flexible, innovative and sensitive to different definitions of democratic ideals to reshape regional institutions and “better align them with current realities and challenges to make them more effective.” The United States has also seen a sharp increase in poverty, and as current discussions over the national budget consider cutting social programs like welfare, medicaid and social security, the government needs to consider the success of social programs throughout Latin America and Venezuela which have vastly decreased those nations’ poverty levels, lowered infant mortality and unemployment, increased literacy and availability of education, and increased living standards. Venezuela’s extreme Chavez-era policies may prove to not be economically viable; instead Venezuela could look to more conservative leftist Latin American governments, like Brazil, who have implemented policies which allow for some free-trade, privatization and foreign investment, in order to ensure a more sustainable economy in the future. There is hope that Chavez’s supposedly more pragmatic successor, Nicolas Maduro, if elected in next month’s elections, might be open to a more positive relationship with the United States. Both sides have expressed interest in open dialogue and perhaps the exchange of ambassadors, but the recent expulsion of diplomats from each country seems to illustrate stubbornness from both parties. When it comes to Hugo Chavez and his legacy in Venezuela, opinions remain divided. Whether he is remembered as a champion of the people, who trampled inequality and redistributed wealth while openly criticized the western policies which he believed promoted such inequality, or whether he is remembered as a radical leader who altered Venezuela forever through revolution but left it in shambles, the legacy of Chavez challenges the world, and the United States, to consider the effectiveness of their own governments and policies. In his Time magazine obituary for Chavez, journalist Tim Padgett states that “Washington and the rest of the world need to remember the unmistakable reasons for his rise to power” which has been their failure to build institutions that can close the “unconscionable wealth gap.” It seems both countries have much to learn and gain from one another, but seem unwilling to do so to the possible detriment of their own people and economies.

**\*Latin American rejection of neolib exacerbates social inequalities and turns their ethics arguments**

**Montaner 05**

(Carlos Albert Montaner, Exiled Cuban author and journalist of Afro-Cuban descent known for his more than 25 books and thousands of articles, including several novels, Latin America: Fragmentation and Forecasts, Lecture #883 on Latin America, http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/latin-americafragmentation-and-forecasts) /samusaran

In fact, reforms toward a market economy, moderation in public spending, fiscal balance, privatizations, liberalizations, and the control of inflation did not take long in losing their attractiveness in Latin America. Their enemies--neopopulists, coming out of the old Marxist left and at times out of the nationalist right--craftily discredited these measures, creating the label "neoliberalism." Suddenly, Latin America's poverty was a "consequence of the savage neoliberal tax imposed by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and, in the final analysis, American imperialism." Anyone ticketed with the label "neoliberal" would be politically destroyed, so that adjective was utilized demagogically in any electoral battle. Reforming the state, therefore, lost almost all its attractiveness. However, this phenomenon seemed to affect only Latin Americans. Eastern Europeans coming out of the Communist bloc had a clear notion that the model to follow was the one used by successful countries, and they understood that, no matter how painful the adjustments would be, it was unavoidable that they needed to follow capitalist rationality. In the final analysis, the Maastricht Treaties--whereby the euro, the common European monetary unit, was created--looked substantially like the so-called Washington Consensus so greatly derided by Latin American neopopulists. It was unavoidable to privatize state-owned enterprises, to abandon price and salary controls, to stimulate the free functioning of the market, to combat inflation, to limit public spending, and to balance budgets, even though this would lead to a cutback in state services. What is the result of this divergence between the path followed by the Eastern European countries and those of Latin America? Very stark: Practically all of the 10 former Communist countries that recently joined the European Union have today healthier economies than their Latin American counterparts, and one of them--Slovenia, the most prosperous one--has an annual per capita income of $19,000 in purchasing power parity, practically triple the average PPP of Latin America. In general, these 10 nations, after going through a difficult transition period that included nothing less than the reinvention of capitalism and the reintroduction of private property, report macroeconomic data much better than those achieved by Latin America.

**\*Neoliberalism is inevitable and sustainable**

**Peck 2**—Canada Research Chair in Urban & Regional Political Economy and Professor of Geography, University of British Columbia. Former Honourary Professorial Fellow, School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester. PhD in Geography. AND—Adam Tickell—Professor of Geography, University of Bristol. PhD (Jamie, Neoliberalizing space, Antipode 34 (3): 380-404, AMiles)

In many respects, it would be tempting to conclude with a Ideological reading of neoliberalism, as if it were somehow locked on a course of increasing vulnerability to crisis. Yet this would be both politically complacent and theoretically erroneous. One of the most striking features of the recent history of neoliberalism is its quite remarkable transformative capacity. To a greater extent than many would have predicted, including ourselves, neoliberalism has demonstrated an ability to absorb or displace crisis tendencies, to ride—and capitalize upon—the very economic cycles and localized policy failures that it was complicit in creating, and to erode the foundations upon which generalized or extralocal resistance might be constructed. The transformative potential—and consequent political durability—of neoliberalism has been repeatedly underestimated, and reports of its death correspondingly exaggerated. Although antiglobalization protests have clearly disrupted the functioning of "business as usual" for some sections of the neoliberal elite, the underlying power structures of neoliberalism remain substantially intact. What remains to be seen is how far these acts of resistance, asymmetrical though the power relations clearly are, serve to expose the true character of neoliberalism as a political project. In its own explicit politicization, then, the resistance movement may have the capacity to hold a mirror to the process of (ostensibly apolitical) neoliberalization, revealing its real character, scope, and consequences.

**Capitalism and Globalization are good—it’s responsible for most of the good in the world. The root cause of structural violence is a lack of free markets. Areas that have started to develop must transition to the next level of capitalism or they will be locked in misery for a very long time – key to the environment and freedom**

**Goklany 7** (Indur, scholar who has 25 years of experience working and writing on global and national environmental issues. He has published several peer-reviewed papers and book chapters on an array of issues Author of The Improving State of the World: Why We're Living Longer, Healthier, More Comfortable Lives on a Cleaner Planet, Mar. 23, http://www.reason.com/news/show/119252.html, twm)

Environmentalists and globalization foes are united in their fear that greater population and consumption of energy, materials, and chemicals accompanying economic growth, technological change and free trade—the mainstays of globalization—degrade human and environmental well-being. Indeed, the 20th century saw the United States’ population multiply by four, income by seven, carbon dioxide emissions by nine, use of materials by 27, and use of chemicals by more than 100. Yet life expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years. Onset of major disease such as cancer, heart, and respiratory disease has been postponed between eight and eleven years in the past century. Heart disease and cancer rates have been in rapid decline over the last two decades, and total cancer deaths have actually declined the last two years, despite increases in population. Among the very young, infant mortality has declined from 100 deaths per 1,000 births in 1913 to just seven per 1,000 today. These improvements haven’t been restricted to the United States. It’s a global phenomenon. Worldwide, life expectancy has more than doubled, from 31 years in 1900 to 67 years today. India’s and China’s infant mortalities exceeded 190 per 1,000 births in the early 1950s; today they are 62 and 26, respectively. In the developing world, the proportion of the population suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1970 and 2001 despite a 83 percent increase in population. Globally average annual incomes in real dollars have tripled since 1950. Consequently, the proportion of the planet's developing-world population living in absolute poverty has halved since 1981, from 40 percent to 20 percent. Child labor in low income countries declined from 30 percent to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. Equally important, the world is more literate and better educated than ever. People are freer politically, economically, and socially to pursue their well-being as they see fit. More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb, and property. Social and professional mobility have also never been greater. It’s easier than ever for people across the world to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth. People today work fewer hours and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time than their ancestors. Man’s environmental record is more complex. The early stages of development can indeed cause some environmental deterioration as societies pursue first-order problems affecting human well-being. These include hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy, and lack of education, basic public health services, safe water, sanitation, mobility, and ready sources of energy. Because greater wealth alleviates these problems while providing basic creature comforts, individuals and societies initially focus on economic development, often neglecting other aspects of environmental quality. In time, however, they recognize that environmental deterioration reduces their quality of life. Accordingly, they put more of their recently acquired wealth and human capital into developing and implementing cleaner technologies. This brings about an environmental transition via the twin forces of economic development and technological progress, which begin to provide solutions to environmental problems instead of creating those problems. All of which is why we today find that the richest countries are also the cleanest. And while many developing countries have yet to get past the “green ceiling,” they are nevertheless ahead of where today’s developed countries used to be when they were equally wealthy. The point of transition from "industrial period" to "environmental conscious" continues to fall. For example, the US introduced unleaded gasoline only after its GDP per capita exceeded $16,000. India and China did the same before they reached $3,000 per capita. This progress is a testament to the power of globalization and the transfer of ideas and knowledge (that lead is harmful, for example). It's also testament to the importance of trade in transferring technology from developed to developing countries—in this case, the technology needed to remove lead from gasoline. This hints at the answer to the question of why some parts of the world have been left behind while the rest of the world has thrived. Why have improvements in well-being stalled in areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world? The proximate cause of improvements in well-being is a “cycle of progress” composed of the mutually reinforcing forces of economic development and technological progress. But that cycle itself is propelled by a web of essential institutions, particularly property rights, free markets, and rule of law. Other important institutions would include science- and technology-based problem-solving founded on skepticism and experimentation; receptiveness to new technologies and ideas; and freer trade in goods, services—most importantly in knowledge and ideas. In short, free and open societies prosper. Isolation, intolerance, and hostility to the free exchange of knowledge, technology, people, and goods breed stagnation or regression. Despite all of this progress and good news, then, there is still much unfinished business. Millions of people die from hunger, malnutrition, and preventable disease such as malaria, tuberculosis, and diarrhea. Over a billion people still live in absolute poverty, defined as less than a dollar per day. A third of the world’s eligible population is still not enrolled in secondary school. Barriers to globalization, economic development, and technological change—such as the use of DDT to eradicate malaria, genetic engineering, and biotechnology—are a big source of the problem. Moreover, the global population will grow 50 percent to 100 percent this century, and per capita consumption of energy and materials will likely increase with wealth. Merely preserving the status quo is not enough. We need to protect the important sustaining institutions responsible for all of this progress in the developed world, and we need to foster and nurture them in countries that are still developing. Man’s remarkable progress over the last 100 years is unprecedented in human history. It’s also one of the more neglected big-picture stories. Ensuring that our incredible progress continues will require not only recognizing and appreciating the progress itself, but also recognizing and preserving the important ideas and institutions that caused it, and ensuring that they endure.

# 2ac coloniality

**Current investment system is unethical—reforms key**

**Trew 10**-- Trade Campaigner with the Council of Canadians (Stuart, “Public statement urges reform of international investment regime”, 8/31, <http://www.canadians.org/node/4250>) EL

"The aim of this statement is to bring the concerns expressed above to the attention of decision-makers and the public in general," say the academics, which include professors from York University, University of Toronto, University of Ottawa, University of Waterloo, University of Victoria, and 19 other universities across nine countries.¶ International decision-makers are meeting Xiamen, China next week for the World Investment Forum 2010. The event is organized biennially by the UN Conference on Trade and Development "to strengthen international cooperation in the interest of promoting international investment and its contribution to economic growth and development."¶ Don Stephenson, assistant deputy minister at DFAIT and former ambassador of the Canadian mission to Geneva, will represent Canada. On Tuesday, September 7, Mr. Stephenson will participate with 35 other international ministerial representatives in a round table on "Revisiting Investment Policies". It is doubtful he'll be taking the message of the 24 academics with him.¶ For example, their strong statement says:¶ Investment treaty arbitration as currently constituted is not a fair, independent, and balanced method for the resolution of investment disputes and therefore should not be relied on for this purpose. There is a strong moral as well as policy case for governments to withdraw from investment treaties and to oppose investor-state arbitration, including by refusal to pay arbitration awards against them where an award for compensation has followed from a good faith measure that was introduced for a legitimate purpose.¶ As Jim Stanford wrote this week, the AbitibiBowater settlement proved again that the Harper government is more interested in standing up for corporate rights (to fire people, remove production from Canada and leave an environmental mess for public money to clean up) than for broader social or moral considerations. Mr. Stephenson will have little room to consider alternative investment regimes when he travels to China next week.¶ Likewise, Canadian trade negotiators are trying to insert an investor-state dispute process, like exists in NAFTA, most Canadian bilaterals, and all Foreign Investment Protection Agreements, into CETA. European fair trade, environmental and social justice groups under the banner of the Seattle To Brussels network are resisting European Commission efforts to go this route. The groups have called for:¶ - all Member States' BIT (bilateral investment treaty) negotiations should be put on hold, while the new and improved EU investment policy framework is being defined¶ - a sunset clause is set on all existing Member States' BITs, under which they would expire at a certain date unless they were reviewed to achieve a greater balance between the protection of public and private interests and of economic, social, environmental and developmental interests;¶ - the European Commission undertakes a thorough assessment of the Member States BITs and the functioning of international investor-to-state arbitration regarding their impact on the policy space of governments to further sustainable development, gender justice and social equity and to implement their obligations under international conventions and treaties on human, women's and labour rights, the environment and climate change¶ - broad public consultations are held before any decision on an EU investment policy is taken.¶ Canada's experience with investor-state disputes has been mixed. But increasingly investment disputes have nothing to do with trade. They are excuses for companies to avoid Canadian courts and take their complaints to unelected trade panels with a mandate to rule in favour of a permissive investment environment -- one with as few regulatory barriers to profit as possible. Harper's capitulation to AbitibiBowater last week will only encourage multinationals to throw their weight around in international arbitration.¶ Isn't it time Canada reviewed this regime, too? Of course it is. We should make the AbitibiBowater decision an election issue this fall (or whenever we head to the polls). In the meantime, let's do as the good professors suggest and bring our concerns about the investment regime to our politicians and the public.

**No prior questions—focus on critical theory makes it impossible to describe the world and act**

**Owen 2** David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitme

nts. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

**Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative—modernity and coloniality are separable**

**Grossberg 10** (Distinguished Professor of Communication Studies and Cultural Studies, and Adjunct Distinguished Professor of American Studies, Anthropology, and Geography at the University of North Carolina)

(Lawrence, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense, pg. 264) //DDI13

The M/C project, focused on the possibility of radical alterity, seeks to find "an other way of thinking ... [and] talking about 'worlds and knowledges otherwise’ (Escobar 2007, 179). They too agree that what I have called the alternative modernities model, “in the last instance . . . end[s] up being a reflection of a euro-centered social order, under the assumption that modernity is now everywhere" (183). There is, however, fundamental conceptual disagreement that separates our projects without, I hope, closing off the conversation. They assume that there is no modernity without coloniality. Or, in slightly different terms, “colonialism and the making of the capitalist world system [is] constitutive of modernity" (183). That is, they equate modernity with euro-modernity, and this guarantees that they see their project not as looking for other modernities, but, rather for alternatives to modernity. As I have said previously, I do not disagree that some of the struggles over modernity in the world today are actually struggles against any moder- nity, propelled by a desire to find alternatives to modernity, and that such struggles have to be supported on their own terms, but I do not think these are the only two choices. Additionally, I do agree that the possibility of other modernities, or for that matter, of alternatives to modernity, will require a decolonization of knowledge itself

**Alt fails-- They universalize coloniality. That method’s *worse*; misinforms transitions and disproves the K *in Cuba context*.**

**Powell ‘8**

Kathy Powell. Lecturer. PhD Social Anthroplogy – National University of Ireland, Galway. Critique of Anthropology – Vol 28(2) p. 177–197 – Sage Database

Yet, within these broad patterns, it is clear from the behaviour of different¶ states and the diversity of political responses that neoliberalism has¶ spread unevenly, been adopted selectively and hybridized with existing political¶ processes and political cultures; that neoliberalism in practice is characterized¶ by an ‘unstable and volatile historical geography’ (Harvey, 2005: 70).¶ Emphasizing the need to study such ‘actually existing neoliberalisms’, Peck¶ and Tickell insist that ‘[w]hile processes of neoliberalization are clearly at work in . . . diverse situations, we should not expect this to lead to a simple¶ convergence of outcomes, a neoliberalized end of history and geography’¶ (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 384, quoted in Gledhill, 2004). Such a focus not¶ only fractures the notion of neoliberalism as a monolithic force; its emphasis¶ on process also complicates the notion of political ‘transitions’ by raising¶ questions about the normativities underlying perceptions of previous¶ periods as well as future ones (Gledhill, 2002; Roseberry, 1985; Verdery,¶ 2002) – and Cuba is particularly burdened by the reification of ‘transition’.¶ An emphasis on historically and contextually specific studies shares¶ conceptual and methodological ground both with historical anthropology’s¶ critique of monolithic views of colonialism, the spread of capitalism and¶ state formation ( Joseph and Nugent, 1994; Roseberry, 1985), and with calls¶ for an ‘ethnography of the state’: these similarly critique binary state/society¶ models (Gupta, 1995; Nugent, 1994), focusing on the ‘degree to which the¶ state has become implicated in the minute texture of everyday life’ (Gupta,¶ 1995: 375) and the specific nature of these intimate relations, where people¶ deal with the corrupt bureaucrat, petition the official representative, avoid¶ the police, and engage in discursive constructions of the state which both¶ inform and make sense of their accommodations and resistances – and¶ which reveal the state as an ‘ensemble of social relations’ ( Jessop, 2002: 40).¶ Cuba both shares in and departs from these broad regional tendencies,¶ and presents a particularly complex historical conjuncture. Centeno notes¶ that ‘[Cuba] remained exceptional during the 1990s as it not only resisted¶ neoliberalism, but also the accompanying democratizing wave’ (2004:¶ 404). Resistance came at an immense social cost: the 1990s in Cuba¶ mirrored the decimation much of the rest of Latin America endured¶ during the 1980s under structural adjustment, and revealed the exclusionary¶ and punitive logic of neoliberal hegemony.3 As mentioned above,¶ resistance entailed accommodation in the marketization of certain sectors,¶ resulting in an economic and social bifurcation and hierarchization,¶ reproducing regional patterns of inequality, informality and migration:¶ these processes (discussed in more detail below) coexist in some tension¶ with the government’s strong political imperatives to firmer resistance in¶ the face of heightened hostility.¶ The Cuban state’s formal ‘ensemble of social relations’ and the¶ ways in which it is ‘implicated in the minute texture of everyday life’, are¶ exemplified by official mass organizations4 with active and highly politicized¶ memberships at neighbourhood level and upwards. These organizations¶ can be seen as attempts to ‘monopolize social allocation’, which¶ Verdery (2002: 382) argues have been characteristic of socialist systems: at¶ the same time, while such ‘monopolization’ cannot be exhaustive, it does tend to view with suspicion unofficial social groupings and dynamics,¶ particularly when these ‘escape’ into informality,5 positing more ambiguous¶ sets of relations. By no means everyone is captured by the mass organizations,¶ and the socially divisive effects of growing inequality work against¶ their efforts to sustain a vigorous attachment to Cuban socialism. For some¶ disaffected sectors of the population, the Cuban state’s resistance to neoliberalism¶ itself represents the continued hegemony of the socialist regime,¶ which is in turn unevenly resisted in a variety of everyday ways, such as¶ evasion, political apathy, valorization of self-interest and, especially, dreams¶ of escape to an imagined capitalist prosperity; and here alienated¶ discourses of a ‘totalizing’ state re-emerge which construct a future resolved¶ by the demise of socialism.

**Imperialism can’t be blamed solely on the imperialist**

**Said 94** (Edward W., was a professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, a literary theorist, and a public intellectual, “Culture and Imperialism” May 31, 1994, pg. 19)

Domination and inequities of power and wealth are perennial facts of human society. But in today's global setting they are also interpretable as having something to do with imperialism, its history, its new forms. The nations of contemporary Asia, Latin America, and Africa are politically independent but in many ways are as dominated and dependent as they were 'when ruled directly by European powers. On the one hand, this is the consequence of self-inflicted wounds, critics like V. S. Naipaul are wont to say: they (everyone knows that "they" means coloreds, wogs, niggers) are to blame for what "they" are, and it's no use droning on about the legacy of imperialism. On the other hand, blaming the Europeans sweepingly for the misfortunes of the present is not much of an alternative. What we need to do is to look at these Matters as a network of interdependent histories that it would be inaccurate and senseless to repress, useful and interesting to understand.¶ The point here is not complicated. If while sitting in Oxford, Paris, or New York you tell Arabs or Africans that they belong to a basically sick or unregenerate culture, you are unlikely to convince them. Even if you prevail over them, they are not going to concede to you your essential superiority or your right to rule them despite your evident wealth and power. The history of this standoff is manifest throughout colonies where white masters were once unchallenged but finally driven out. Conversely, the triumphant natives soon enough found that they needed the West and that the idea of fatal independence was a nationalist fiction designed mainly for what Fanon calls the "nationalist bourgeoisie," who in turn often ran the new countries with a callous, exploitative tyranny reminiscent of the departed masters.

**Even if our impacts are extremely unlikely they still outweigh—it’s more devastating than repetitive systemic harm**

**Sunstein 2007** – Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, clerked for Justice Marshall in the Supreme Court (Cass, Harvard University Press, “Worst-case scenarios”, pages 138-9)

A Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, of the modest kind just sketched, raises several questions. The most obvious is whether a low-probability risk of catastrophe might not deserve more attention than higher-probability risks, even when the expected value appears to be equal. The reason is that the loss of 200 million people may be more than 1,000 times worse than the loss of 2,000 people. Pause over the real-world meaning of a loss of 200 million people in the United States. The nation would find it extremely hard to recover. Private and public institutions would be damaged for a long time, perhaps forever. What kind of government would emerge? What would its economy look like? Future generations would inevitably suffer. The effect of a catastrophe greatly outruns a simple multiplication of a certain number of lives lost. The overall "cost" of losing two-thirds of the American population is far more than 100,000 times the cost of losing

2,000 people.

The same point holds when the numbers are smaller. Following the collapse of a dam that left 120 people dead and 4,000 homeless in Buffalo Creek, Virginia, psychiatric researchers continued to find significant psychological and sociological changes two years after the disaster occurred. Survivors still suffered a loss of direction and energy, along with other disabling character changes.41 One evaluator attributed this "Buffalo Creek Syndrome" specifically to "the loss of traditional bonds of kinship and neighborliness."42

Genuine catastrophes, involving tens of thousands or millions of deaths, would magnify that loss to an unimaginable degree. A detailed literature on the "social amplification of risk" explores the secondary social losses that greatly outrun the initial effects of given events.43 The harm done by the attacks of 9/11, for instance, far exceeded the deaths on that day, horrendous as those were. One telling example: Many people switched, in the aftermath of the attack, to driving long distances rather than flying, and the switch produced almost as many highway deaths as the attacks themselves, simply because driving is more dangerous than flying.44 The attacks had huge effects on other behaviors of individuals, businesses, and governments, resulting in costs of hundreds of billions of dollars, along with continuing fear, anxiety, and many thousands of additional deaths from the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.

We might therefore identify a second version of the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, also attuned to expected value but emphasizing some features of catastrophic risk that might otherwise be neglected: Regulators should consider the expected value of catastrophic risks, even when the worst-case scenario is highly unlikely. In assessing expected value, regulators should consider the distinctive features of catastrophic harm, including the "social amplification” of such harm. Regulators should choose