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**Protest within the academy support dominant ideologies because they are co-opted as self-congratulatory proof of the liberal tolerance of the existing order. The co-optation of safe protest also legitimates the violent elimination of more threatening protest.**

**Lockard and Schalit, 04** (Issue #65, (ASU Professor, Journal Editor) Joe and Joel, Protest Culture, Neo-liberalism, and Contingent Human Rights, January).

If protest culture represents the expression of intellectual and political liberty in contemporary neo-liberal societies, it also represents the scope and limitations of such freedoms. According to such a perspective, the right to protest and engage in **social criticism** uncomfortably **validates the political constellations that simultaneously produce war, poverty, and neo-colonial power relations**. Such are the dialectical antimonies of participatory democracies with free market economies. They express their hostility towards their own democratic political structures through their contradictory embrace of freedom of speech and constitutional rights on the one hand, with laissez-faire economics and military-driven foreign policies on the other. What makes this uncomfortable balancing act work is the continuous demand for *tolerance* made by citizens and civil libertarians, specifically *state tolerance* of the necessary role that dissent always plays in democratic societies. For example, on a visit to Germany in May 2003, greeted by large groups of demonstrators, US President George W. Bush affirmatively stated "That's good. That's democracy. See, I love to visit a place that is confident in her freedom, a place where people feel free to express themselves, because that's what I believe in." Equally, American soldiers in Iraq repeatedly cite US domestic protest as a validation of their military campaign ('we're fighting here so you can protest there'), even as they occupy a foreign country and deny its citizens the most basic of political freedoms. Protest may gain tolerance, but protest is feared depending on its origin. Media scenes of **civil dissent within the dominant West have become part of neo-liberalism's self-complimentary ideological paradigm, whereas protests originating from subordinated cultures and nations represent an intrinsic threat**. The confidence that Bush expresses is a belief in the efficacy of internalized social controls that marginalize dissent within powerful metropolitan cultures like those which exist in the US. It is market hubris that Bush exudes, a deeply-held faith that constitutional democracies will consistently reject the destabilizing potential of protest and affirm the ideological values that underwrite social inequality. For such a worldview, protest is the right of ideological losers who pose no intrinsic threat to a transnational, consolidated, expansive, and entrenched middle-class electoral bloc that bases its present and future prosperity on being winners in a global market. Even if protest should be successful, it also unconsciously confirms a systemic belief in the internal capacity of electoral democracy — a narrowly-conceived understanding of democracy's ultimate potential — to correct its errors and override the contradictory nature of constitutions which guarantee civil but not economic equality. In the United States, for example, the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s achieved retrospective legitimization as corrective social protest that confirmed, not challenged, the democratic nature of the nation, despite the fact that racial discrimination has shifted in nature rather than been eliminated. The social destabilizations of the 1960s and its protests have been converted into historical capital to contribute to confidence in the nation, not a questioning of that confidence. Such expressions of certitude emerge from a consumer confidence in protest as a state-protected value, not in the desirability or efficacy of social protest in practice: protest is one more available commodity and option for consumer dissatisfaction in a democracy. Dissent and protest evidence the existence of a free market of opinion, one that profits through diverse social valuations and confirms a fundamental governing stability. Communications media provide a nominally free exchange mechanism that informs the market of public opinion, and yet these very same media are the basis of an ideological hegemony that protest criticizes because these media continually reaffirm and normalize the values of American capitalism. **And thus the cycle turns on itself as state authority generates protest, protest confirms the existence and legal protection of democratic values,** media restate that protest is both part of the democratic value system yet marginal**, and this circular hegemonic ideology in turn confirms the benign character of state authority**. While protest may always express a post-capitalist utopian horizon that transcends this negative dialectic, in such a scenario, horizons do not consistently — if ever — translate into concrete political practices that transcend their negation by the market.

**Confusing criticism with action is like the TV viewer who thinks that sarcastic commentary puts them above viewers who have been fooled into enjoyment by the poor plot or cheesy writing. The joke is actually on the cynic because all that the critique changes is the type of enjoyment derived from watching. Given that their end goal is the empty gesture of the ballot, the 1AC criticism turns itself by placing us even more firmly within the existing order.**

**Donahue, 01** (Brian, (Department of English, Gonzaga University),“Marxism, Postmodernism, Žižek,” Postmodern Culture,12.2, Project Muse).

Developing this idea in specifically Marxist terms, Žižek emphasizes the point that commodity fetishism is a property not of consciousness but of objective behavior and that belief in the fetish is always ascribed to a "subject presumed to believe." Thus in their actual socioeconomic behavior, in their everyday activity, people fetishize commodities, even though consciously, they are perfectly aware that the "relations between things" mask "relations between people" ("Supposed" 41). In such a context, Žižek points out, the task for theory is not to "demonstrate how the original human belief was transposed onto things"; on the contrary, "displacement is original and constitutive" ("Supposed" 41). No one consciously acknowledges that he or she believes in the magical properties of commodities; rather, this belief is attributed always to an Other, in this case, to the uncritical consumer who is duped by the messages of advertising, ignorantly seeking happiness through the consumption of commodities: There are some beliefs, the most fundamental ones, which are from the very outset "decentered," beliefs of the Other; the phenomenon of the "subject supposed to believe" is thus universal and structurally necessary.... All concrete versions of this "subject supposed to believe" (from the small kids for whose sake their parents pretend to believe in Santa Claus to the "ordinary working people" for whose sake communist intellectuals pretend to believe in socialism) are stand-ins for the big Other. So the answer to the conservative platitude according to which every honest man has a profound need to believe in something is that every honest man has a profound need to find another subject who would believe in his place. ("Supposed" 41-42) After summarizing this argument about the psychological displacement of belief that characterizes the subject's relation to commodities in capitalist society, Žižek specifies the appropriate Marxist response, which is not to perform a kind of primary-level ideology critique, since the bourgeois subject is already consciously critical: What the fetish objectivizes is "my true belief," the way things "truly seem to me," although I never effectively experience them this way.... So when a critical Marxist encounters a bourgeois subject immersed in commodity fetishism, the Marxist's reproach to him is not "Commodity may seem to you a magical object endowed with special powers, but it really is just a reified expression of relations between people"; the actual Marxist's reproach is rather "You may think that the commodity appears to you as a simple embodiment of social relations (that, for example, money is just a kind of voucher entitling you to a part of the social product), but *this is not how things really seem to you*--in your social reality, by means of your participation in social exchange, you bear witness to the uncanny fact that a commodity really appears to you as a magical object endowed with special powers." ("Supposed" 54) In other words, bourgeois subjects think they see through the veil of the commodity form and rest comfortably in that critical knowledge of socioeconomic relations; but in reality, they behave as if they believe differently from what they know, and their relation to commodities is the objective illustration of this disavowed belief. **This line of reasoning, then, locates ideology not in consciousness but in real activity.** Žižek cites the formula for contemporary cynical ideology proposed in Peter Sloterdijk's *Critique of Cynical Reason*: as opposed to the traditional Marxist notion, according to which people are "duped" into believing the ruling ideology and thus "do not know what they are doing" when they effectively participate in their own subjugation, contemporary popular cynicism forces us to consider the notion of an "enlightened false consciousness" whereby "they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it" (*Sublime* 29). Like most analyses of subjectivity in contemporary theory, this version disrupts radically the notion of a fully self-present subject: the grain of material practice in time is always already altering all ideological symbolization. To use Žižek's Lacanian language: the irreducible "hard kernel" of the Real remains unassimilated into the Symbolic order. One can, for example, have a self-conception as an ironic, critical viewer who watches TV comedies as kitsch or as the detritus of the culture industry, but according to Žižek's version of externalized ideology, as long as one sits and watches--whether laughing idiotically or making ironic, cynical comments--objectively, one is doing one's duty to "enjoy the show." This notion has significant implications for theories of both ideology and subjectivity. For example, the determining effect of objective activity regardless of subjective intention can be read as another way of stating the existentialist slogan that there is no "dress rehearsal" for life: **at each moment actions are final and decisive, even if one believes oneself to be**, for example, **merely "performing a role" temporarily before returning to some other "real life**." That real life is being determined at each instant by numerous material factors in the face of which a concept like "personal choice" loses the certainty of its suggestion of direct action in pursuit of clearly understood interests.

**Academics engaged in critique can be entirely sincere as they speak from a position of privilege within academy. But, when we passionately cry out on behalf of the subaltern, we bring them into not only our discussion, but into the world order we claim to protest against. We still know what is best for the Other. Critiques are a continuation of colonialist violence.**

**Nayar, 99** (School of Law, University of Warwick) 99 (Jayan, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Fall, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599).

As we contemplate transformations, therefore, it is essential that we do not detach ourselves from the "worlds" which are the objects of our critique and imaginations. To some, those who might have the occasion to read this current article, the changes brought about by the advent of the so-called post-colonial, post-communist, post-ideological, post-modern period may indeed have been beneficial. Some of us--the expert intellectual community, the development planners, the security strategists, the bureaucratic elites, even the "students" who might have been encouraged to refer to the insights contained in this Symposium--are, to some extent or the other, the beneficiaries of this order(ing). From this location, then, it becomes not too difficult to rationalize the limited successes, if not defend the fundamentals, of "our world" within a transnational, global reality. n49 **It becomes not too difficult to intellectualize pleasure and pain and to project toward ever-more "new beginnings"** in which the virtues of "our world" may be extolled. **For this is the "truth" of the "world" as experienced within these locations of privilege**. Others among us, without the comforts of such complacencies and with the best of intentions, may seek to extend and apply the benefits of the world that we know, that is "our" truth, to those who we identify as being "excluded." The politics of inclusion then dominates our attention--inclusion of the poor in "development," inclusion of the terrorized in the framework of "security," inclusion of all those thus far marginalized into the "world." The keyword for this new politics of inclusion, we often hear, is "participation." So we might struggle to bring the excluded within the fora of national, international and transnational organizations, articulate their interests and demand service to their cause. And yet, so much inclusion has done little to change the culture of violence**. However sympathetic, even empathetic, we may be to the cause of the "subaltern," however sophisticated and often self-complicating our exposition of violence, one thing is difficult for us to face: when all is said and done, most of us engaged in these transformatory endeavors are far removed from the existential realities of "subaltern"  suffering**. For "them," what is the difference, I wonder, between the violence of new orders and that of the old, what is the difference between the new articulations of violence and those of the old, when violence itself is a continuing reality? But we push on, keeping ourselves busy. What else can we do but suggest new beginnings? I am not suggesting that all "new beginnings" of world-order, past and present, were envisioned with cynical intent. Quite the opposite is the reason for the point I wish to make. The persistent realities of violence within "ordered" worlds are all the more glaring when we acknowledge that they arise in the name of human aspirations that were mostly articulated by progressive forces, in the wake of real struggles, to contribute to the transformation of the inequities and violence of the then existing "orders." Yet more and more talk of universal human welfare, transformed world-orders, new beginnings and the like have only given us more and more occasion to lament the resulting dashed hopes. My questioning is not of intent, or of commitment, or of the sincerity of those who advocate world-order transformations. Rather, my questionings relate to a perspective on "implications." Here, there is a very different, and more subtle, sort of globalized world-order that we need to consider--the globalization of violence, wherein human relationships become disconnected from the personal and are instead conjoined into distant and distanced chains of violence, an alienation of human and human. And by the nature of this new world-ordering, as the web of implication in relational violence is increasingly extended, so too, the vision of violence itself becomes blurred and the voice, muted. **Through this implication into violence, therefore, the order(ing) of emancipatory imagination is reinforced.** What we cannot see, after all, we cannot speak; what we refuse to see, we dare not speak.

**Hence we present our alternative: reject the affirmative on the grounds that it plays into the power of the structures they claim to critique. We will not claim to solve better, just to avoid making it worse.**

### 1nc – topicality

#### TOPICALITY – Our interpretation is that the affirmative should have an advocacy statement tied to the benefits of engagement toward Cuba, Mexico, or Venezuela.

#### Economic Engagement is only tangible trade and financial benefits – not the aff.

Haass 2k – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Senior Fellows in the Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 5-6

\*plenty of neg flex

\*most real world – policymaker’s choices

Architects of engagement strategies have a wide variety of incentives from which to choose. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans, and economic aid.’2 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties,

whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market.’

Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, or the scheduling of summits between leaders—or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of International Military Educational Training (IMET) both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign mffitary officers.’4 These areas of engagement are likely to involve, working with state institutions, while cultural or civil society engagement is likely to entail building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organizations, facilitating the flow of remittances, establishing postal and telephone links between the United States and the target country, and promoting the exchange of students, tourists, and other nongovernmental people between the countries are some of the incentives that might be offered under a policy of cultural engagement.

This brief overview of the various forms of engagement illuminates the choices open to policymakers. The plethora of options signals the flexibility of engagement as a foreign policy strategy and, in doing so, reveals one of the real strengths of engagement. At the same time, it also suggests the urgent need for considered analysis of this strategy. The purpose of this book is to address this need by deriving insights and lessons from past episodes of engagement and proposing guidelines for the future use of engagement strategies. Throughout the book, two critical questions are entertained. First, when should policymakers consider engagement? A strategy of engagement may serve certain foreign policy objectives better than others. Specific characteristics of a target country may make it more receptive to a strategy of engagement and the incentives offered under it; in other cases, a country's domestic politics may effectively exclude the use of engagement strategies. Second, how should engagement strategies be managed to maximize the chances of success? Shedding light on how policymakers achieved, or failed, in these efforts in the past is critical in an evaluation of engagement strategies. By focusing our analysis, these questions and concerns help produce a framework to guide the use of engagement strategies in the upcoming decades.

#### That’s a voting issue –

#### First, limits and ground – non-economic areas are huge, overstretch research burdens and require completely different strategies – trade and finance allow sufficient flexibility but lock-in a core mechanism for preparation. That’s key to decision-making and advocacy skills.

Steinberg and Freeley 08 Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, David L. Steinberg; Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, “Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making” pp45-48

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. **The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by** focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Second, discussion of specific policy-questions is crucial for skills development – we’re not saying you have to defend the federal government, just that the discussion of specific policy proposals creates engagement with and resolution of competing perspectives to improve social outcomes and break down traditional pedagogical frameworks by positing students as agents of decision-making.

Esberg and Sagan 12 Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal. Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7

By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Third, Switch-side is key – forces critical thinking and better advocacy of one’s positions.

Keller et al 01– Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago (Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spring/Summer 2001, EBSCO)

SOCIAL WORKERS HAVE a professional responsibility to shape social policy and legislation (National Association of Social Workers, 1996). In recent decades, the concept of policy practice has encouraged social workers to consider the ways in which their work can be advanced through active participation in the policy arena (Jansson, 1984, 1994; Wyers, 1991). The emergence of the policy practice framework has focused greater attention on the competencies required for social workers to influence social policy and placed greater emphasis on preparing social work students for policy intervention (Dear & Patti, 1981; Jansson, 1984, 1994; Mahaffey & Hanks, 1982; McInnis-Dittrich, 1994). The curriculum standards of the Council on Social Work Education (CSWE) require the teaching of knowledge and skills in the political process (CSWE, 1994). With this formal expectation of policy education in schools of social work, the best instructional methods must be employed to ensure students acquire the requisite policy practice skills and perspectives. The authors believe that structured student debates have great potential for promoting competence in policy practice and in-depth knowledge of substantive topics relevant to social policy. Like other interactive assignments designed to more closely resemble "real-world" activities, issue-oriented debates actively engage students in course content. Debates also allow students to develop and exercise skills that may translate to political activities, such as testifying before legislative committees. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, debates may help to **stimulate critical thinking** by shaking students free from **established opinions** and helping them to **appreciate the complexities involved in policy dilemmas.** Relationships between Policy Practice Skills, Critical Thinking, and Learning Policy practice encompasses social workers' "efforts to influence the development, enactment, implementation, or assessment of social policies" (Jansson, 1994, p. 8). Effective policy practice involves analytic activities, such as defining issues, gathering data, conducting research, identifying and prioritizing policy options, and creating policy proposals (Jansson, 1994). It also involves persuasive activities intended to influence opinions and outcomes, such as discussing and debating issues, organizing coalitions and task forces, and providing testimony. According to Jansson (1984,pp. 57-58), social workers rely upon five fundamental skills when pursuing policy practice activities: value-clarification skills for identifying and assessing the underlying values inherent in policy positions; conceptual skills for identifying and evaluating the relative merits of different policy options; interactional skills for interpreting the values and positions of others and conveying one's own point of view in a convincing manner; political skills for developing coalitions and developing effective strategies; and position-taking skills for recommending, advocating, and defending a particular policy. These policy practice skills reflect the hallmarks of critical thinking (see Brookfield, 1987; Gambrill, 1997). The central activities of critical thinking are identifying and challenging underlying assumptions, exploring alternative ways of thinking and acting, and arriving at commitments after a period of questioning, analysis, and reflection (Brookfield, 1987). Significant parallels exist with the policy-making process--identifying the values underlying policy choices, recognizing and evaluating multiple alternatives, and taking a position and advocating for its adoption. Developing policy practice skills seems to share much in common with developing capacities for critical thinking. R.W. Paul (as cited in Gambrill, 1997) states that critical thinkers acknowledge the imperative to argue from opposing points of view and to seek to identify weakness and limitations in one's own position. Critical thinkers are aware that there are many legitimate points of view, each of which (when thought through) may yield some level of insight. (p. 126) John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28). The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying **one's own policy position.** In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.

#### Fourth, Decisionmaking outweighs.

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If we assume it to be possible without recourse to violence to reach agreement on all the problems implied in the employment of the idea of justice we are granting the possibility of formulating an ideal of man and society, valid for all beings endowed with reason and accepted by what we have called elsewhere the universal audience.14

I think that the only discursive methods available to us stem from techniques that are not demonstrative—that is, conclusive and rational in the narrow sense of the term—but from argumentative techniques which are not conclusive but which may tend to demonstrate the reasonable character of the conceptions put forward. It is this recourse to the rational and reasonable for the realization of the ideal of universal communion that characterizes the age-long endeavor of all philosophies in their aspiration for a city of man in which violence may progressively give way to wisdom.13

Whenever an individual controls the dimensions of" a problem, he or she can solve the problem through a personal decision. For example, if the problem is whether to go to the basketball game tonight, if tickets are not too expensive and if transportation is available, the decision can be made individually. But if a friend's car is needed to get to the game, then that person's decision to furnish the transportation must be obtained.

Complex problems, too, are subject to individual decision making. American business offers many examples of small companies that grew into major corporations while still under the individual control of the founder. Some computer companies that began in the 1970s as one-person operations burgeoned into multimillion-dollar corporations with the original inventor still making all the major decisions. And some of the multibillion-dollar leveraged buyouts of the 1980s were put together by daring—some would say greedy—financiers who made the day-to-day and even hour-to-hour decisions individually.

When President George H. W. Bush launched Operation Desert Storm, when President Bill Clinton sent troops into Somalia and Haiti and authorized Operation Desert Fox, and when President George W. Bush authorized Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, they each used different methods of decision making, but in each case the ultimate decision was an individual one. In fact, many government decisions can be made only by the president. As Walter Lippmann pointed out, debate is the only satisfactory way the exact issues can be decided:

A president, whoever he is, has to find a way of understanding the novel and changing issues which he must, under the Constitution, decide. Broadly speaking ... the president has two ways of making up his mind. The one is to turn to his subordinates—to his chiefs of staff and his cabinet officers and undersecretaries and the like—and to direct them to argue out the issues and to bring him an agreed decision…

The other way is to sit like a judge at a hearing where the issues to be decided are debated. After he has heard the debate, after he has examined the evidence, after he has heard the debaters cross-examine one another, after he has questioned them himself he makes his decision…

It is a much harder method in that it subjects the president to the stress of feeling the full impact of conflicting views, and then to the strain of making his decision, fully aware of how momentous it Is. But there is no other satisfactory way by which momentous and complex issues can be decided.16

John F. Kennedy used Cabinet sessions and National Security Council meetings to provide debate to illuminate diverse points of view, expose errors, and challenge assumptions before he reached decisions.17 As he gained experience in office, he placed greater emphasis on debate. One historian points out: "One reason for the difference between the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis was that [the Bay of Pig\*] fiasco instructed Kennedy in the importance of uninhibited debate in advance of major decision."18 All presidents, to varying degrees, encourage debate among their advisors.

We may never be called on to render the final decision on great issues of national policy, but we are constantly concerned with decisions important to ourselves for which debate can be applied in similar ways. That is, this debate may take place in our minds as we weigh the pros and cons of the problem, or we may arrange for others to debate the problem for us. **Because we** all **are** increasingly **involved in the decisions of** the campus, community, and **society** in general, it is in our intelligent self-interest to reach these decisions through reasoned debate.

#### That turns the case.

Steinberg and Freeley 08 Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law. David L. Steinberg is a Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

### case

**They universalize coloniality. That method’s *worse*; misinforms transitions and disproves the K *in Cuba context*.**

**Powell ‘8**

Kathy Powell. Lecturer. PhD Social Anthroplogy – National University of Ireland, Galway. Critique of Anthropology – Vol 28(2) p. 177–197 – Sage Database

Yet, within these **broad** patterns, it is clear from the behaviour of **different**¶states and the **diversity** of political responses that neoliberalism has¶ spread unevenly, been adopted selectively and hybridized with existing political¶ processes and political cultures; that neoliberalism in practice is characterized¶ by an ‘unstable and volatile historical geography’ (Harvey, 2005: 70).¶ Emphasizing the need to study such ‘actually existing neoliberalisms’, Peck¶ and Tickell insist that ‘[w]hile processes of neoliberalization are clearly at work in . . . **diverse situations**, **we should not expect this to lead to a simple**¶ convergence of **outcome**s, a neoliberalized end of history and geography’¶ (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 384, quoted in Gledhill, 2004). Such a focus not¶ only **fractures the notion of neoliberalism as a monolithic force**; its emphasis¶ on process **also complicates** the notion of **political ‘transitions’** by raising¶ questions about the normativities underlying perceptions of previous¶ periods as well as future ones (Gledhill, 2002; Roseberry, 1985; Verdery,¶ 2002) – and Cuba is particularly burdened by the reification of ‘transition’.¶ An emphasis on historically and **contextually specific** studies shares¶ conceptual and methodological ground both with historical anthropology’s¶ **critique of monolithic views of colonialism**, **the spread of capitalism** **and**¶ **state** formation ( Joseph and Nugent, 1994; Roseberry, 1985), and with calls¶ for an ‘ethnography of the state’: these similarly critique binary state/society¶ models (Gupta, 1995; Nugent, 1994), focusing on the ‘degree to which the¶ state has become implicated in the minute texture of everyday life’ (Gupta,¶ 1995: 375) and the specific nature of these intimate relations, where people¶ deal with the corrupt bureaucrat, petition the official representative, avoid¶ the police, and engage in discursive constructions of the state which both¶ inform and make sense of their accommodations and resistances – and¶ which reveal the state as an ‘ensemble of social relations’ ( Jessop, 2002: 40).¶ **Cuba** both shares in and **departs from** these **broad** regional **tendencies**,¶ and presents a particularly complex historical conjuncture. Centeno notes¶ that ‘[Cuba] remained exceptional during the 1990s as it not only resisted¶ neoliberalism, but also the accompanying democratizing wave’ (2004:¶ 404). Resistance came at an immense social cost: the 1990s in Cuba¶ mirrored the decimation much of the rest of Latin America endured¶ during the 1980s under structural adjustment, and revealed the exclusionary¶ and punitive logic of neoliberal hegemony.3 As mentioned above,¶ resistance entailed accommodation in the marketization of certain sectors,¶ resulting in an economic and social bifurcation and hierarchization,¶ reproducing regional patterns of inequality, informality and migration:¶ these processes (discussed in more detail below) **coexist** in some tension¶ with the government’s strong political imperatives to firmer resistance in¶ the face of heightened hostility.¶ The Cuban state’s formal ‘ensemble of social relations’ and the¶ ways in which it is ‘implicated in the minute texture of everyday life’, are¶ exemplified by official mass organizations4 with active and highly politicized¶ memberships at neighbourhood level and upwards. These organizations¶ can be seen as attempts to ‘monopolize social allocation’, which¶ Verdery (2002: 382) argues have been characteristic of socialist systems: at¶ the same time, while such ‘monopolization’ cannot be exhaustive, it does tend to view with suspicion unofficial social groupings and dynamics,¶ particularly when these ‘escape’ into informality,5 positing more ambiguous¶ sets of relations. By no means everyone is captured by the mass organizations,¶ and the socially divisive effects of growing inequality work against¶ their efforts to sustain a vigorous attachment to Cuban socialism. For some¶ disaffected sectors of the population, the Cuban state’s resistance to neoliberalism¶ itself represents the continued hegemony of the socialist regime,¶ which is in turn unevenly resisted in a variety of everyday ways, such as¶ evasion, political apathy, valorization of self-interest and, especially, dreams¶ of escape to an imagined capitalist prosperity; and here alienated¶ discourses of a ‘totalizing’ state re-emerge which construct a future resolved¶ by the demise of socialism.

**Imperialism can’t be blamed solely on the imperialist**

**Said 94** (Edward W., was a professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, a literary theorist, and a public intellectual, “Culture and Imperialism” May 31, 1994, pg. 19)

Domination and inequities of power and wealth are perennial facts of human society. But in today's global setting they are also interpretable as having something to do with imperialism, its history, its new forms. The nations of contemporary Asia, Latin America, and Africa are politically independent but in many ways are as dominated and dependent as they were 'when ruled directly by European powers. On the one hand, this is the consequence of self-inflicted wounds, critics like V. S. Naipaul are wont to say: they (everyone knows that "they" means coloreds, wogs, niggers) are to blame for what "they" are, and it's no use droning on about the legacy of imperialism. On the other hand, blaming the Europeans sweepingly for the misfortunes of the present is not much of an alternative. What we need to do is to look at these Matters as a network of interdependent histories that it would be inaccurate and senseless to repress, useful and interesting to understand.¶ The point here is not complicated. If while sitting in Oxford, Paris, or New York you tell Arabs or Africans that they belong to a basically sick or unregenerate culture, you are unlikely to convince them. Even if you prevail over them, they are not going to concede to you your essential superiority or your right to rule them despite your evident wealth and power. The history of this standoff is manifest throughout colonies where white masters were once unchallenged but finally driven out. Conversely, the triumphant natives soon enough found that they needed the West and that the idea of fatal independence was a nationalist fiction designed mainly for what Fanon calls the "nationalist bourgeoisie," who in turn often ran the new countries with a callous, exploitative tyranny reminiscent of the departed masters.

#### A focus on reforming policies is necessary to fix societal problems – other criticisms are irrelevant to the day-to-day affairs that we confront

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(David E., “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” Presented at the 2001 Annual Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm, JMP)

There is a lot of philosophical prose on the general subject of social justice. Some of this is quite good, and some of it is quite bad. What distinguishes the good from the bad is not merely the level of erudition. Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those, for example, still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near total disconnect from empirical reality. This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure, jargon-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it the lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported" by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws, and the amendment of existing regulations that might actually do some good for someone else. The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally emerge from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course, comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical sensibilities, it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis, and no self-respecting Pragmatist can really take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." What Pragmatists see instead is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat policy and reform as more important than Spirit and Utopia.

Like light rain released from pretty clouds too high in the atmosphere, the substance of this prose dissipates before it can reach the ground and be a useful component in a discussion of medicare reform or how to better regulate a pharmaceutical industry that bankrupts senior citizens and condemns to death HIV patients unfortunate enough to have been born in Burkina Faso - and a regulatory regime that permits this. It is often too drenched in abstractions and references to a narrow and not so merry band of other intellectuals (Nietzsche, Bataille, Foucault, Lukács, Benjamin) to be of much use to those who are the supposed subject matter of this preternatural social justice literature. Since I have no particular allegiance to these other intellectuals, no particular impulse to carry their water or defend their reputations, I try and forget as much as I can about their writings in order to make space for some new approaches and fresh thinking about that important question that always faces us - "What is to be done?" I am, I think, lucky to have taken this decision before it had become too late.

One might argue with me that these other intellectuals are not looking to be taken seriously in the construction of solutions to specific socio-political problems. They are, after all, philosophers engaged in something called philosophizing. They are, after all, just trying to be good culture critics. Of course, that isn't quite true, for they often write with specific reference to social issues and social justice in mind, even when they are fluttering about in the ether of high theory (Lukács, for example, was a government officer, albeit a minister of culture, which to me says a lot), and social justice is not a Platonic form but parses into the specific quotidian acts of institutions and individuals. Social justice is but the genus heading which may be described better with reference to its species iterations- the various conditions of cruelty and sadism which we wittingly or unwittingly permit. If we wanted to, we could reconcile the grand general theories of these thinkers to specific bureaucracies or social problems and so try to increase their relevance. We could construct an account which acts as a bridge to relevant policy considerations. But such attempts, usually performed in the reams of secondary literature generated by their devotees, usually make things even more bizarre. In any event, I don't think we owe them that amount of effort. After all, if they wanted to be relevant they could have said so by writing in such a way that made it clear that relevance was a high priority. For Marxians in general, everything tends to get reduced to class. For Lukács everything tends to get reduced to "reification." But society and its social ills are far too intricate to gloss in these ways, and the engines that drive competing interests are much more easily explained with reference to animal drives and fears than by Absolute Spirit. That is to say, they are not easily explained at all.

#### In the context of Latin America policy debates that focus on how to best utilize liberalized trading lead to the best forms of stability and decrease oppressive regimes - decades of reforms prove

**Korzeniewicz ‘00**

[Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz and William C. Smith, “Poverty, Inequality, and Growth in Latin America: Searching for the High Road to Globalization”, Latin American Research Review, 2000, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2692041]

A major concern addressed by the intellectual architects of the original consensus involved the social conflicts and political instability of the 1970s, both linked to the crisis of civilian rule and the prevalence of authoritarian regimes in the region. Rising instability, associated with "macroeconomic populism, “was linked to the crisis of state-centric development models in closed protectionist economies (see, for example, Dornbusch and Edwards 1991). In this regard, the collapse of heterodox shock policies (such as the Austral, Cruzado, and Inti plans in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru) contributed to the growing hegemony of more orthodox neoclassical policies. In addition, cross-regional comparisons with the then thriving East Asian economies called attention to the advantages of an alternative model of development based on a "market-friendly" strategy built on trade liberalization and export orientation as engines of growth (Kahler 1990, 1992; World Bank 1993c).¶ According to this new World Bank perspective, although poverty rates may have recently declined somewhat in some countries, this outcome is due not to trade and financial reforms but to lower inflation and a return to modest growth. This admission brings the views of the bank into alignment with the broad consensus previously discussed. Moreover, the authors of these studies agree that formal and informal unemployment has risen in many countries and that wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers have worsened.16 This rather pessimistic assessment of a decade of Washington Consensus-style reforms is the basis for their advocacy of "a dialogue among policy-makers, civil society, and the academic community in [Latin America and the Caribbean] on how best to design and reform institutions-that is, on how to 'supply' institutional reforms to meet new societal demands" (World Bank 1998, 2).

#### The ideology of imperialism is to deeply entrenched in society that the State has been corrupted and prevents any alternative

**Van Elteren 3** (Mel, Associate Professor of Social Sciences at Tilburg University, “US Cultural Imperialism Today” http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v023/23.2elteren.html)

To the extent that advertising constitutes a pervasive public "art form," however, it has become the dominant mode in which thoughts and experiences are expressed. This trend is most evident in U.S. society. While alternative values and ideologies do exist in this culture, it is harder to find representations for them. Advertising distorts and flattens people's ability to interpret complex experiences, and it reflects the culture only partially, and in ways that are biased toward a capitalist idealization of American culture. 47 At this level, goods are framed and displayed to entice the customer, and shopping has become an event in which individuals purchase and consume the meanings attached to goods. The ongoing interpenetration and crossover between consumption and the aesthetic sphere (traditionally separated off as an artistic counter-world to the everyday aspect of the former) has led to a [End Page 182] greater "aestheticization of reality": appearance and image have become of prime importance. Not only have commodities become more stylized but style itself has turned into a valuable commodity. The refashioning and reworking of commodities—which are themselves carefully selected according to one's individual tastes—achieve a stylistic effect that expresses the individuality of their owner. 48 This provides the framework for a more nuanced and sometimes contradictory second order of meaning. The dynamics of cultural change therefore entail both processes of "traveling culture," in which the received culture (in this case globalizing capitalist culture) is appropriated and assigned new meaning locally, and at the same time a "first order" meaning that dominates and delimits the space for second order meanings—thus retaining something of the traditional meaning of cultural imperialism. The latter is, ultimately, a negative phenomenon from the perspective of self-determination by local people under the influence of the imperial culture. Traditional critiques of cultural globalization have missed the point. The core of the problem lies not in the homogenization of cultures as such, or in the creation of a "false consciousness" among consumers and the adoption of a version of the dominant ideology thesis. Rather, the problem lies in the global spread of the institutions of capitalist modernity tied in with the culturally impoverished social imagery discussed above, which crowd out the cultural space for alternatives (as suggested by critical analysts like Benjamin Barber and Leslie Sklair). The negative effects of cultural imperialism—the disempowerment of people subjected to the dominant forms of globalization—must be located on this plane. It is necessary, of course, to explore in more detail how the very broad institutional forces of capitalist modernity actually operate in specific settings of cultural contact. The practices of transnational corporations are crucial to any understanding of the concrete activities and local effects of globalization. A state-centered approach blurs the main issue here, which is not whether nationals or foreigners own the carriers of globalization, but whether their interests are driven by capitalist globalization.

#### Lack of a concrete advocacy destroys the aff’s potential

**McClean 1** SOCIETY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY – GRADUATE AND PHILOSOPHER – NYU [DAVID E., “THE CULTURAL LEFT AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL HOPE”, http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm]

Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political *possibilities* in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve *our* country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"

The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions *actually* function in the *actual* world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

**Empirics first – discourse focus is epistemologically flawed and paralyzes action**

**Rodwell 5** (Jonathan, Ph.D. student at Manchester Metropolitan University, "Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson," www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm *slim*\_)

The reason it there is no attempt to explore the complexity of causation is that this would clearly automatically undermine the concentration on discourse. Moreover it would require the admittance of identifiable evidence about the real world to be able to say anything about it! For if something historical changed the meaning of a word, or if something about society gave the word a different meaning and impact, then it would be an identifiable ‘something’. Moreover if the word is tied to and altered by an historical event or social impact, would it not be a case of assessing the effect of original event itself as well as the language? The larger problem is that without clear causal links between materially identifiable events and factors any assessment within the argument actually becomes nonsensical. Mirroring the early inability to criticise, if we have no traditional causational discussion how can we know what is happening? For example, Jackson details how the rhetoric of anti-terrorism and fear is obfuscating the real problems. It is proposed that the real world killers are not terrorism, but disease or illegal drugs or environmental issues. The problem is how do we know this? It seems we know this because there is evidence that illustrates as much – Jackson himself quoting to Dr David King who argued global warming is a greater that than terrorism. The only problem of course is that discourse analysis has established (as argued by Jackson) that King’s argument would just be self-contained discourse designed to naturalise another arguments for his own reasons. Ultimately it would be no more valid than the argument that excessive consumption of Sugar Puffs is the real global threat. It is worth repeating that I don’t personally believe global terrorism is the world’s primary threat, nor do I believe that Sugar Puffs are a global killer. But without the ability to identify real facts about the world we can simply say anything, or we can say nothing. This is clearly ridiculous and many post-structuralists can see this. Their argument is that there “are empirically more persuasive explanations.”[xi] The phrase ‘empirically persuasive’ is however the final undermining of post-structural discourse analysis. It is a seemingly fairly obvious reintroduction of traditional methodology and causal links. It implies things that can be seen to be right regardless of perspective or discourse. It again goes without saying that logically in this case if such an assessment is possible then undeniable material factors about the word are real and are knowable outside of any cultural definition. Language or culture then does not wholy constitute reality. How do we know in the end that the world not threatened by the onslaught of an oppressive and dangerous breakfast cereal? Because empirically persuasive evidence tells us this is the case. The question must then be asked, is our

**Their root cause claims are false-there is no single cause of events, rather many different causes**

**Wallerstein, is an American sociologist, historical social scientist, and world-systems analyst, 97**

(Immanuel, an American sociologist, historical social scientist, and world-systems analyst. His bimonthly commentaries on world affairs are syndicated, 1997, Binghamton.edu "Eurocentrism and its Avatars: The Dilemmas of Social Science," <http://www2.binghamton.edu/fbc/archive/iweuroc.htm>, Accessed: 7/6/13, LPS.)

But even if we agree on the definition and the timing, and therefore so to speak on the reality of the phenomenon, we have actually explained very little. For we must then explain why it is that Europeans, and not others, launched the specified phenomenon, and why they did so at a certain moment of history. In seeking such explanations, the instinct of most scholars has been to push us back in history to presumed antecedents. If Europeans in the eighteenth or sixteenth century did x, it is said to be probably because their ancestors (or attributed ancestors, for the ancestry may be less biological than cultural, or assertedly cultural) did, or were, y in the eleventh century, or in the fifth century B.C. or even further back. We can all think of the multiple explanations that, once having established or at least asserted some phenomenon that has occurred in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, proceed to push us back to various earlier points in European ancestry for the truly determinant variable.

There is a premise here that is not really hidden, but was for a long time undebated. The premise is that whatever is the novelty for which Europe is held responsible in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, this novelty is a good thing, one of which Europe should be proud, one of which the rest of the world should be envious, or at least appreciative. This novelty is perceived as an achievement, and numerous book titles bear testimony to this kind of evaluation.

There seems to me little question that the actual historiography of world social science has expressed such a perception of reality to a very large degree. This perception of course can be challenged on various grounds, and this has been increasingly the case in recent decades. One can challenge the accuracy of the picture of what happened, within Europe and in the world as a whole in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. One can certainly challenge the plausibility of the presumed cultural antecedents of what happened in this period. One can implant the story of the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries in a longer duration, from several centuries longer to tens of thousands of years. If one does that, one is usually arguing that the European "achievements" of the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries thereby seem less remarkable, or more like a cyclical variant, or less like achievements that can be credited primarily to Europe. Finally one can accept that the novelties were real, but argue that they were less a positive than a negative accomplishment.

**Decolonization requires an encounter with the colonized – simply deconstructing one knowledge base doesn’t allow for any new modes of thought**

**Mignolo, Duke University professor of Literature and Romance Studies, 2**

(Walter, Argentine semiotician and professor at Duke University, Published Winter 2002, “The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference”, Pg. 69-71, The South Atlantic Quarterly, Volume 101, Number 1, Winter 2002, Accessed July 10 2013, JB)

The irreducible colonial difference that I am trying to chart, starting from Dussel's dialogue with Vattimo, was also perceived by Robert Bernasconi in his account of the challenge that African philosophy puts forward to continental philosophy. Simply put, Bernasconi notes that "Western philosophy traps African philosophy in a double bind. Either African philosophy is so similar to Western philosophy that it makes no distinctive contribution and effectively disappears; or it is so different that its credentials to be genuine philosophy will always be in doubt." 45 This double bind is the colonial [End Page 70] difference that creates the conditions for what I have elsewhere called "border thinking." 46 I have defined border thinking as an epistemology from a subaltern perspective. Although Bernasconi describes the phenomenon with different terminology, the problem we are dealing with here is the same. Furthermore, Bernasconi makes his point with the support of African American philosopher Lucius Outlaw in an article titled "African ‘Philosophy': Deconstructive and Reconstructive Challenges." 47 Emphasizing the sense in which Outlaw uses the concept of deconstruction, Bernasconi at the same time underlines the limits of Jacques Derrida's deconstructive operation and the closure of Western metaphysics. Derrida, according to Bernasconi, offers no space in which to ask the question about Chinese, Indian, and especially African philosophy. Latin and Anglo-American philosophy should be added to this. After a careful discussion of Derrida's philosophy, and pondering possible alternatives for the extension of deconstruction, Bernasconi concludes by saying, **"Even after such revisions, it is not clear what contribution deconstruction could make** to the contemporary dialogue between Western philosophy and African philosophy." 48 Or, if a contribution could be foreseen, it has to be from the perspective that Outlaw appropriates and that denaturalizes the deconstruction of the Western metaphysics from the inside (and maintains the totality, á la Derrida). That is to say, it has to be a deconstruction from the exteriority of Western metaphysics, from the perspective of the double bind that Bernasconi detected in the interdependence (and power relations) between Western and African philosophy. However, if we invert the perspective, we are located in a particular deconstructive strategy that I would rather name the decolonization of philosophy (or of any other branch of knowledge, natural sciences, social sciences, and the humanities). Such a displacement of perspective was already suggested by Moroccan philosopher Abdelkhebir Khatibi, which I have discussed at length elsewhere. 49 However, certainly Bernasconi will concur with Khatibi in naming decolonization as the type of deconstructive operation proposed by Outlaw, thus maintaining and undoing the colonial difference from the colonial difference itself. That is to say, maintaining the difference under the assumption that "we are all human" although undoing the coloniality of power that converted differences into values and hierarchies. "The existential dimension of African philosophy's challenge to Western philosophy in general and Continental philosophy in particular is located in the need to decolonize the mind. This task is at least as important for [End Page 71] the colonizer as it is for the colonized. For Africans, decolonizing the mind takes place not only in facing the experience of colonialism,

but also in recognizing the precolonial, which established the destructive importance of so-called ethnophilosophy." 50 The double bind requires also a double operation from the perspective of African philosophy, that is, an appropriation of Western philosophy and at the same time a rejection of it grounded in the colonial difference. Bernasconi recognizes that these, however, are tasks and issues for African philosophers. What would be similar issues for a continental philosopher? For Europeans, Bernasconi adds, "decolonizing the colonial mind necessitates an encounter with the colonized, where finally the European has the experience of being seen as judged by those they have denied. The extent to which European philosophy championed colonialism, and more particularly helped to justify it through a philosophy of history that privileged Europe, makes it apparent that such a decolonizing is an urgent task for European thought." 51

# 2nc

#### D/m uniquely turns colonialism.

Steinberg and Freeley 08 Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law. David L. Steinberg is a Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### There has to be a balance of ground or else one side claims the high ground and creates a de facto monologue

**Hanghoj 08** – PhD, assistant professor, School of Education, University of Aarhus, also affiliated with the Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark (Thorkild, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point **with** the **monological discourse** of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which **the teacher never learns anything new** from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, **discourse becomes monologised when “someone who** knows and possesses the truth **instructs someone** who is **ignorant** of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) **and a normative** term as dialogue is an **ideal** to be worked for **against** the forces of “**monologism”** (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### SFG is the government in Washington D.C.

Encarta 2k Online Encyclopedia 2K <http://encarta.msn.com>

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC”

#### Government is not the people

Costello and Thomas 2k (George A. and Kenneth R., Congressional Research Service, The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation, <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution~preamble/#annotations>)

Article Text I Annotations We the People of the United States. in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish *this Constitution* for the United States of America. Annotations PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF THE PREAMBLE Although the preamble is not a source of power for any department of the Federal Government, 1 the Supreme Court has often referred to it as evidence of the origin, scope, and purpose of the Constitution. 2 "Its true office," wrote Joseph Story in his COMMENTARIES, "is to expound the nature and extent and application of the powers actually conferred by the Constitution, and not substantively to create them. For example, the preamble declares one object to be, 'to provide for the common defense.'

#### Increase requires a net increase

**Words and Phrases 8** (20B W&P – 265-265)

Cal.App.2 Dist. 1991. Term “increase,” as used in statute giving the Energy Commission modification jurisdiction over any alteration, replacement, or improvement of equipment that results in “increase” of 50 megawatts or more in electric generating capacity of existing thermal power plant, refers to “net increase” in power plant’s total generating capacity; in deciding whether there has been the requisite 50-megawatt increase as a result of new units being incorporated into a plant, Energy Commission cannot ignore decreases in capacity caused by retirement or deactivation of other units at plant. West’s Ann.Cal.Pub.Res.Code § 25123.

#### Substantially means in substance, not illusory

**Merriam-Webster, 8** (“substantial”, 2008, http://www.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=substantially)

Main Entry: sub·stan·tial

1 a: consisting of or relating to substance b: not imaginary or illusory : real, true c: important, essential

#### heir “Resolved” and colon arguments make no sense–the Affirmative has to defend the proposition that the government should act

**Parcher 01** (Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html)

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committtee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### Fairness exists to ensure participation from both sides – our framework allows for storytelling, they just have to ground it in a topical affirmative

**Burch 08** – Assistant Professor, Cumberland School of Law (Elizabeth, “CAFA'S IMPACT ON LITIGATION AS A PUBLIC GOOD” 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2517, May, lexis)

Given this shortcoming, the second procedural justice component is fairness. Fairness arguments are typically offered as policy reasons to trump pursuit of certain reform proposals and aggregate social goals; n101 however, I use fairness here (and in assessing CAFA) as a **supplemental constraint rather than a substitute**. Employing a deontological conception of fairness to balance utility aids in, not only distributing procedural costs and correcting procedural errors, but also in ensuring that the procedural system does not disproportionately favor or burden plaintiffs or defendants. n102 Put differently, process should disperse the risk of error and the cost of access as evenly as possible. **Neither party** [\*2535] **should have an advantage**. n103 This idea of "fairness" as avoiding lopsided distribution of error can be likened to the concept of "neutrality." n104 To be sure, some imparity in distributing risks may be inevitable.

Finally, although analogous to fairness, participation - manifested as adequate representation in the class context - humanizes process. n105 In its simplest form, participation necessitates that those who are bound by a decision have an opportunity to take part (and be heard) in adjudication. n106 Moreover, it encompasses inherent rights to present evidence, observe the proceedings, cross-examine witnesses, and hear the judge's decision. n107 And participation, even in class litigation, affords litigants dignity by granting them a forum in which to tell their story. n108 "Storytelling" has been criticized when used to demonstrate satisfaction with process as a proxy for "justice." n109 I use the term here, however, for its cathartic value **only when situated within this larger** [\*2536] **procedural fairness framework**.

# 1nr

#### Criticizing the brutal history of the United States accomplishes nothing–this criticism becomes isolated and self-referential without concrete alternatives and blocks action against atrocities in the present

**GITLIN 2005** (Todd, professor of journalism and sociology at Columbia University, The Intellectuals and Patriotism, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/git01/)

From the late New Left point of view, then, patriotism meant obscuring the whole grisly truth of the United States. It couldn’t help spilling over into what Orwell thought was the harsh, dangerous, and distinct phenomenon of nationalism, with its aggres-sive edge and its implication of superiority. Scrub up patriotism as you will, and nationalism, as Schaar put it, remained “patriotism’s bloody brother.”

Was Orwell’s distinction not, in the end, a distinction without a difference? Didn’t his patriotism, while refusing aggressiveness, still insist that the nation he affirmed was “the best in the world”? What if there was more than one feature of the American way of life that you did not believe to be “the best in the world”—the national bravado, the overreach of the marketplace. Patriotism might well be the door through which you marched with the rest of the conformists to the beat of the national anthem.

Facing these realities, all the left could do was criticize empire and, on the positive side, unearth and cultivate righteous tradi-tions. The much-mocked “political correctness” of the next academic generations was a consolation prize. We might have lost politics but we won a lot of the textbooks. The tragedy of the left is that, having achieved an unprece-dented victory in helping stop an appalling war, it then proceeded to commit suicide. The left helped force the United States out of Vietnam, where the country had no constructive work to do—ei- ther for Vietnam or for itself—but did so at the cost of discon-necting itself from the nation. Most U.S. intellectuals substituted the pleasures of condemnation for the pursuit of improvement.

The orthodoxy was that “the system” precluded reform—never mind that the antiwar movement had already demonstrated that reform was possible. Human rights, feminism, environmental-

ism—these worldwide initiatives, American in their inception, flowing not from the American Establishment but from our own American movements, were noises off, not center stage. They

were outsider tastes, the stuff of protest, not national features, the real stuff. Thus when, in the nineties, the Clinton administra-tion finally mobilized armed force in behalf of Bosnia and then

Kosovo against Milosevic’s genocidal Serbia, the hard left only could smell imperial motives, maintaining that democratic, anti-genocidal intentions added up to a paper-thin mask.

In short, if the United States seemed fundamentally trapped in militarist imperialism, its opposition was trapped in the mir-ror-image opposite. By the seventies the outsider stance had be-come second nature. Even those who had entered the sixties in diapers came to maturity thinking patriotism a threat or a bad joke. But anti-Americanism was, and remains, a mood and a

metaphysics more than a politics. It cannot help but see practical politics as an illusion, entangled as it is and must be with a sys-tem fatally flawed by original sin. Viewing the ongoing politics of the Americans as contemptibly shallow and compromised, the demonological attitude naturally rules out patriotic attachment to those very Americans. Marooned (often self-marooned) on university campuses, exiled in left-wing media and other cultural

outposts—all told, an archipelago of bitterness—what sealed it- self off in the postsixties decades was what Richard Rorty has called “a spectatorial, disgusted, mocking Left rather than a Left which dreams of achieving our country.”

#### We are not responsible for every evil perpetuated by individuals representing western culture – their argument breeds racism because it is the essence of cultural stereotyping

**Berliner, 1999** (Michael, PhD and Former Executive Director of the Ayn Rand Institute, “The Christopher Columbus Controversy,” http://www.aynrand.org/site/PageServer?pagename=objectivism\_columbus)

Underlying the political collectivism of the anti-Columbus crowd is a racist view of human nature. They claim that one's identity is primarily ethnic: if one thinks his ancestors were good, he will supposedly feel good about himself; if he thinks his ancestors were bad, he will supposedly feel self-loathing. But it doesn't work; the achievements or failures of one's ancestors are monumentally irrelevant to one's actual worth as a person. Only the lack of a sense of self leads one to look to others to provide what passes for a sense of identity. Neither the deeds nor misdeeds of others are his own; he can take neither credit nor blame for what someone else chose to do. There are no racial achievements or racial failures, only individual achievements and individual failures. One cannot inherit moral worth or moral vice. "Self-esteem through others" is a self-contradiction. Thus the sham of "preserving one's heritage" as a rational life goal. Thus the cruel hoax of "multicultural education" as an antidote to racism: it will continue to create more racism. Individualism is the only alternative to the racism of political correctness. We must recognize that everyone is a sovereign entity, with the power of choice and independent judgment. That is the ultimate value of Western civilization, and it should be proudly proclaimed.

#### “The West” is not a monolith that can be rejected as a whole. The left condemns itself political irrelevancy when they refuse to recognize differences between policies.

**Wolin, 06** (The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism, Richard Wolin, Professor of History and Comparative Literature at the Graduate Center, City University).

With a self defeating Nietzschean glibness, postmodernism has burned its bridges to a traditional rhetoric of moral evaluation. Hence, Baudrillard and Zizek pointedly fad to mention that the West, in addition to being an epicenter of imperialism (conveniently, instances of genocide or conquest that originate outside the West always go unmentioned), is also the birthplace of a moral discourse that has given birth to international law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 1948 Convention against Genocide. For postmodernist hipsters like Zizek and Baudrillard, however, such precepts remain woefully "foundationalist" and are, consequently, simply irrelevant. Amid the fog of postmodern relativism disseminated by Baudrillard, Zizek, and others, something essential is missing. Going back to the Thucydides' Melian Dialogue, the massacre of civilian innocents has been a touchstone of civilized moral judgment. It remains today the cornerstone of human rights law and just war theory. Yet for the cultural left, slavishly following the "genealogical" approach recommended by Nietzsche and Foucault, moral reasoning is merely another one of civilization's clever "normalizing ruses”- hence, an intellectual weakness to be avoided at all costs. Once again, postmodernism's right-wing intellectual pedigree- Nietzsche, Spengler, and Heidegger-has left it morally impotent and politically clueless. For years the left has demonstrated a predilection to romanticize the "other”- Ho Chi Minh, Che, Fidel, as well as countless other apostles of Third World revolution-in the hope that the Wretched of the Earth would provide a remedy for the West's intractable political impasse. At a conference I attended recently, a friend with impeccable left-wing credentials who until communism's recent collapse had been an ardent champion of the proletarian cause, jumped on the pan-Arab bandwagon, reciting the names of obscure Muslim intellectuals who, he claimed, offered a promising political alternative to the debilities of Western liberalism. Plus ca change . . . . The left can ignore the imperatives of morality and international law only at its own peril. By romanticizing the lifestyles and mores of non-Western peoples, it suspends critical judgment, destroys its own credibility, and guarantees its own political irrelevance.

**They universalize coloniality. That method’s *worse*; misinforms transitions and disproves the K *in Cuba context*.**

**Powell ‘8**

Kathy Powell. Lecturer. PhD Social Anthroplogy – National University of Ireland, Galway. Critique of Anthropology – Vol 28(2) p. 177–197 – Sage Database

Yet, within these **broad** patterns, it is clear from the behaviour of **different**¶states and the **diversity** of political responses that neoliberalism has¶ spread unevenly, been adopted selectively and hybridized with existing political¶ processes and political cultures; that neoliberalism in practice is characterized¶ by an ‘unstable and volatile historical geography’ (Harvey, 2005: 70).¶ Emphasizing the need to study such ‘actually existing neoliberalisms’, Peck¶ and Tickell insist that ‘[w]hile processes of neoliberalization are clearly at work in . . . **diverse situations**, **we should not expect this to lead to a simple**¶ convergence of **outcome**s, a neoliberalized end of history and geography’¶ (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 384, quoted in Gledhill, 2004). Such a focus not¶ only **fractures the notion of neoliberalism as a monolithic force**; its emphasis¶ on process **also complicates** the notion of **political ‘transitions’** by raising¶ questions about the normativities underlying perceptions of previous¶ periods as well as future ones (Gledhill, 2002; Roseberry, 1985; Verdery,¶ 2002) – and Cuba is particularly burdened by the reification of ‘transition’.¶ An emphasis on historically and **contextually specific** studies shares¶ conceptual and methodological ground both with historical anthropology’s¶ **critique of monolithic views of colonialism**, **the spread of capitalism** **and**¶ **state** formation ( Joseph and Nugent, 1994; Roseberry, 1985), and with calls¶ for an ‘ethnography of the state’: these similarly critique binary state/society¶ models (Gupta, 1995; Nugent, 1994), focusing on the ‘degree to which the¶ state has become implicated in the minute texture of everyday life’ (Gupta,¶ 1995: 375) and the specific nature of these intimate relations, where people¶ deal with the corrupt bureaucrat, petition the official representative, avoid¶ the police, and engage in discursive constructions of the state which both¶ inform and make sense of their accommodations and resistances – and¶ which reveal the state as an ‘ensemble of social relations’ ( Jessop, 2002: 40).¶ **Cuba** both shares in and **departs from** these **broad** regional **tendencies**,¶ and presents a particularly complex historical conjuncture. Centeno notes¶ that ‘[Cuba] remained exceptional during the 1990s as it not only resisted¶ neoliberalism, but also the accompanying democratizing wave’ (2004:¶ 404). Resistance came at an immense social cost: the 1990s in Cuba¶ mirrored the decimation much of the rest of Latin America endured¶ during the 1980s under structural adjustment, and revealed the exclusionary¶ and punitive logic of neoliberal hegemony.3 As mentioned above,¶ resistance entailed accommodation in the marketization of certain sectors,¶ resulting in an economic and social bifurcation and hierarchization,¶ reproducing regional patterns of inequality, informality and migration:¶ these processes (discussed in more detail below) **coexist** in some tension¶ with the government’s strong political imperatives to firmer resistance in¶ the face of heightened hostility.¶ The Cuban state’s formal ‘ensemble of social relations’ and the¶ ways in which it is ‘implicated in the minute texture of everyday life’, are¶ exemplified by official mass organizations4 with active and highly politicized¶ memberships at neighbourhood level and upwards. These organizations¶ can be seen as attempts to ‘monopolize social allocation’, which¶ Verdery (2002: 382) argues have been characteristic of socialist systems: at¶ the same time, while such ‘monopolization’ cannot be exhaustive, it does tend to view with suspicion unofficial social groupings and dynamics,¶ particularly when these ‘escape’ into informality,5 positing more ambiguous¶ sets of relations. By no means everyone is captured by the mass organizations,¶ and the socially divisive effects of growing inequality work against¶ their efforts to sustain a vigorous attachment to Cuban socialism. For some¶ disaffected sectors of the population, the Cuban state’s resistance to neoliberalism¶ itself represents the continued hegemony of the socialist regime,¶ which is in turn unevenly resisted in a variety of everyday ways, such as¶ evasion, political apathy, valorization of self-interest and, especially, dreams¶ of escape to an imagined capitalist prosperity; and here alienated¶ discourses of a ‘totalizing’ state re-emerge which construct a future resolved¶ by the demise of socialism.

**The debate space creates backlash and fractures coalitions – losers become scapegoats**

**Atchison and Panetta 9** (Jarrod, PhD. In Speech Communication.  Edward, Ph.D. in Communication. “Intercollegiate Debate Speech Communication: Historical Developments and Issues for the Future”; The SAGE Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Pg. 28-9)JFS

The larger problem with locating the "debate as activism" perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents' academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community. If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.